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Department of InformaticsNon-Cooperative Game Theory
Heinrich H. Nax
www.nax.science
September 30, 2019
Department of InformaticsTwo parts:
1. An introduction to the game-theoretic view on decision-making in interactive environments
2. Some course admin on peer review (and an illustration of game theory in practice)
Department of InformaticsTwo parts:
1. An introduction to the game-theoretic view on decision-making in interactive environments
2. Some course admin on peer review (and an illustration of game theory in practcve)
Department of Informatics…what exactly is Game Theory? andhow is it useful for “ABM and SSS”?
Department of InformaticsLet’s start with a game
Department of InformaticsLet’s start with a game
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest
Keynesian Beauty Contest (1/2 version)
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest (2/3 version)
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest (2/3 version)
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest (2/3 version)
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest (2/3 version)
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest (2/3 version)
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest (2/3 version)
Department of InformaticsKeynesian Beauty Contest (2/3 version)
Department of Informatics
What is game theory?
Department of Informatics
What is game theory?
Department of Informatics«2 Johns»
Department of Informatics
Recipe
Department of InformaticsEveryday games
Department of InformaticsEveryday games
Department of InformaticsThe theory’s impact
Department of Informatics
Page 8
GT’s many agendas
Macro
Micro
Macro
Microstructuring
Department of InformaticsSolution concepts
Department of InformaticsNash’s solution
Department of InformaticsPrisoner’s dilemma
Department of InformaticsHarmony
Department of InformaticsPure coordination games
Department of InformaticsMatching pennis
Department of Informatics
Department of Informatics…How is GT useful for “ABM and SSS”?
cognitive hierarchy
imitation,
herd behavior,learning,hypothesis testing,trial and error,…
…How is GT useful for “ABM and SSS”?
To formulate behavior!
Department of InformaticsEvolutionary Game Theory
Heinrich H. Nax
www.nax.science
December 2, 2019
Department of InformaticsTwo parts:
1. An introduction to the game-theoretic view on decision-making in interactive environments
2. Some course admin on peer review (and an illustration of game theory in practice)
Department of InformaticsAnother game
Department of InformaticsVoluntary Contributions Game
Department of Informatics«Voluntary Contributions Game»
Department of InformaticsWhat happens in experiments?
Department of InformaticsThe «freerider» problem
Department of InformaticsThe «freerider» problem
mpcr<<1
Department of Informatics…= how you will
receive your grades!
Working in groups @school/uni =
Pros• Synergies• Learning transfer• Social skills• Larger scope
Cons• Freeriding• Collusion• Coordination
• A group collaborated and generated some “value”• Who deserves what/ how much?
Our desiderata
The general use case
• A group collaborated and generated some “value”• Who deserves what/ how much?
Our desiderata
• A mechanismPreventing free-ridingFostering synergetic collaboration Enabling fair division: instead of one size fits all
Without dissecting or micro-managing as a supervisor (i.e. without “looking into the process”)
The general use case
My use case: “Controversies in Game Theory”
A group collaborated and earned a project gradeWho deserves which individual grade?
Prologue on a mechanism1. First theory for basic case by de Clippel et al (JET 2008)2. Adapted for a collective action framework 3. Implemented as a grading tool at ETH through a Critical Thinking Award
(thanks!)
3. 1. 2. 3. 2. 1.
Solution The mechanism desiderata:Adequate
• Sum of individual shares= total
Consensual • shares implement consensus when
everyone agreesAnonymous
• equal treatment of everyoneImpartial
• own verdicts of one’s own contribution cannot improve one’s share
Solution The mechanism desiderata:Adequate
• Sum of individual shares= total
Consensual • shares implement consensus when
everyone agreesAnonymous
• equal treatment of everyoneImpartial
• own verdicts of one’s own contribution cannot improve one’s share
• Contributors review each other• A formula aggregates the reviews
to yield individual shares
Solution The mechanism desiderata:Adequate
• Sum of individual shares= total
Consensual • shares implement consensus when
everyone agreesAnonymous
• equal treatment of everyoneImpartial
• own verdicts of one’s own contribution cannot improve one’s share
• Contributors review each other• A formula aggregates the reviews
to yield individual shares
Unique “formula”fulfilling these!
The formula
Average relative contribution jk
Average RC jk without i’s opinion
Auxiliary function assigning share to i when j excluded
Final payment
share in the other slicesi’s residual in his slice
Complicated?
Yes, kind of.But…
Illustration of the formula
5.75
Illustration of the formula
5.75 5.755.75
5.75
Illustration of the formula
Illustration of the formula
5.75
Illustration of the formula
Illustration of the formula
residual
Illustration of the formula
residual
Illustration of the formula
residuali
j
k
l
Complicated? AND it is the unique formula achieving:• Adequateness• Consensus• Anonymity• Impartiality
Aim: Aligning individual and collective incentives through, projects suffer less from free-riding, get better, and individual marks are fairer.
Yes, kind of.But the properties are intuitive and the rating is very simple
Complicated? AND it is the unique formula achieving:• Adequateness• Consensus• Anonymity• Impartiality
Aim: Aligning individual and collective incentives through, projects suffer less from free-riding, get better, and individual marks are fairer.
Yes, kind of.But the properties are intuitive and the rating is very simplePlus the burden is on the computer software, not on the student…
An example
The group gets a 5.25.Who gets which grade?
Caroline, Heiko, Sarah, Tobias
Caroline, Heiko, Sarah, Tobias
Heiko
Sarah
Tobias
Caroline’s evaluation
Caroline, Heiko, Sarah, Tobias
Caroline
Sarah
Tobias
Heiko’s evaluation
Caroline, Heiko, Sarah, Tobias
Caroline
Heiko
Tobias
Sarah’s evaluation
Caroline, Heiko, Sarah, Tobias
Caroline
Heiko
Sarah
Tobias’ evaluation
Caroline
Heiko
Sarah
Tobias
5.5
5.25
5
5.25
The key effect
low effort = low reward+high effort = high reward
The key effect
= mpcr>1
low effort = low reward+high effort = high reward
The key effect
= mpcr>1
low effort = low reward+high effort = high reward
• Given the situation where a group collaborated to generate a “value”
We use
• A mechanismPreventing free-ridingFostering synergetic collaboration Enabling fair division: instead of one size fits all Where indeed all equal contributors will again get the same
Without dissecting or micro-managing as a supervisor (i.e. without “looking into the process”)
As a result
Department of Informatics
Non-CooperativeGame Theory
• Game theoryA useful language for ABMs,
SSSs, behavioral scientistsA toolbox that requires clear
premises regarding use and context of its solution conceptsA rich domain for behavioral
experimentsUseful for mechanism design
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