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BS thesis in Economics
Rights-based Management Systems in Fisheries HowCanAssignedRightschangeFisheries?
Anna Þuríður Pálsdóttir
Supervisor: Dr. Ragnar Árnason
Faculty of Economics June 2016
Rights-basedManagementSystemsinFisheriesHowCanAssignedRightschangeFisheries?
AnnaÞuríðurPálsdóttir
FinalProjectforaBSdegreeinEconomics
Supervisor:Dr.RagnarÁrnason
FacultyofEconomics
SchoolofSocialSciences,UniversityofIceland
June2016
3
Rights-basedManagementSystemsinFisheries.HowCanAssigned
RightsChangeFisheries?
This thesis is a 12 ECTS final project for a BS degree at the Faculty of
Economics,SchoolofSocialSciences,UniversityofIceland
©2016AnnaÞuríðurPálsdóttir
Thisthesismaynotbereproducedelsewherewithoutthepermissionoftheauthor.
Printing:Háskólaprent
Reykjavík,2016
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Preface
Thisessayisafinalprojectworth12ECTSforaBSdegreeinEconomicsintheFaculty
ofEconomicsatUniversityofIceland.TheadvisorforthisthesisisRagnarÁrnasonandI
wanttothankhimforhisassistanceandusefulcriticism.Ialsowishtothankmyparents,
JóhannaHansenandPállHöskuldsson,fortheirhelpandsupport.
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Abstract
Despite the fact that fisheriescanyieldsubstantialeconomicbenefits,majorityof the
world’sfisheryresourcesunderperform.Thisthesiswill trytosheda lightonwhether
rights-basedmanagementsystemscanimprovetheperformanceoffisheriesandeven
leadtomoresustainablefishingpracticesforthewholeecosystem. Itwill reviewhow
commonpropertyregimesandtraditionalcatchlimitregimescanleadtooverexploited
fishstocksandeconomic inefficiency,andhowrights-basedmanagementsystemscan
help to correct for the perverse incentives within the fishing industry. The first part
discusseshowcommonpropertymanagementoffisheriescreatesincentivesforfishers
todepletetheresource,leadingtoeconomiclossesandoverexploitationoffishstocks.
The second part will focus on rights-based management systems for fisheries, ITQ
systemsandhowIcelandhasfaredsinceadoptinganITQsystemfor it’sfisheries.The
third and last part will revolve around ecosystem-based management system for
fisheries, and review a habitat quota system for fisheries and howBritish Columbia’s
bottomtrawlfisherieshavechangedsincetheimplementationofahabitatconservation
quota.
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Contents
Preface.......................................................................................................................4
Abstract.....................................................................................................................5
Contents....................................................................................................................6
ListofFigures.............................................................................................................7
ListofTables..............................................................................................................7
1 Introduction........................................................................................................8
2 TheCommonPropertyProblemofFisheries....................................................10
2.1 ABioeconomicModeloftheFisheryResource.........................................10
2.2 IncentivesofIndividualFishers..................................................................13
3 IndividualTransferableQuotasasaSolution....................................................16
3.1 CanPropertyRightsIncreaseEfficiencyofFisheries?................................16
3.2 IndividualTransferableQuotas..................................................................17
3.2.1 PricesofQuotaShares........................................................................18
3.3 Iceland’sExperiencewithanITQSystem...................................................19
3.3.1 PerformanceoftheIcelandicITQSystem...........................................21
4 Ecosystem-BasedApproachestoFisheriesManagement.................................24
4.1.1 EffectsoffishingontheEcosystem....................................................25
4.1.2 ExistenceValue...................................................................................25
4.2 ChallengesofEcosystem-BasedApproaches.............................................26
4.3 TheHabitatConservationBy-catchLimitinBritishColumbia....................27
4.3.1 ResultsoftheAgreementinBritishColumbia....................................29
4.3.2 TheTheory:WhatMadeThisPossible?..............................................33
4.4 EcosystemManagementinIceland...........................................................35
4.4.1 PossibleApplicationofaHabitatQuotainIceland.............................36
5 Conclusion.........................................................................................................39
References...............................................................................................................41
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ListofFigures
Figure1Anexampleofgrowthcurvesforfisheryresources.Source:Flaaten(2011),p.
14.....................................................................................................................................12
Figure2:Productivityinthemarinesector.Source:Runolfsson(1999)...........................21
Figure3:CatchofdifferentfishstocksinIcelandicwaters1950-2010.Source:SeaAround
US.....................................................................................................................................22
Figure4:...........................................................................................................................23
Figure5:Asketchofanexistencevaluefunction.Φ’(x)Representsexistencevalueandx
istheamountthatbearsthevalue..................................................................................26
Figure6:Spatialmapofcoralandspongezonesandriskassessment.Source:Wallaceet
al.(2015)..........................................................................................................................32
ListofTables
Table1:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchfrom1996-2004.Data:Adron
etal(2007).......................................................................................................................31
Table2:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchaftertheimplementationof
HBCLagreement.Data:Wallaceetal.(2015)..................................................................31
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1 Introduction
Rights-basedmanagementsystemsinfisherieshavebecomemorecommoninthelast
decades.Themaingoalofrights-basedfisheriesistocreatetherightincentivesforfishers
to not only protect the resource from overuse but also to increase efficiency and
economicreturnsfromtheresource.Inthisthesis,Iwilladdresswhytheneedforrights-
basedsystemscameaboutafterthefailureoftraditionalmanagementoffisheriesand
howrights-basedmanagementhasworkedforIcelandicfisheriesandalsohowarights-
basedhabitatprotectionsystemhasworkedforBritishColumbia.Majorityoffisheries
underperformduetooveruse,aproblemthataffectsmany.
Thisthesiswillconcentrateonanalyzingtheeffectsofrights-basedfisherymanagement
schemes.Icelandwasamongthefirstcountriesintheworldtoimplementasystemof
individualtransferablequotas,wherequota-holdersaregivenaspecialpropertyrightto
futureyieldsfromtheresourceandno-onecanharvestwithoutholdingaquota.Inthis
thesis,Iwilltrytoshedalightonwhytheworld’sfisherieshavebeenoverexploitedand
whether implementingarights-basedmanagementsystemsuchasan ITQsystemcan
provideasolutiontowhatiscommonlyreferredtoasthecommonpropertyproblemof
fisheries.Thisthesiswillalsoreviewecosystembasedmanagementoffisheriesandwhy
fisherymanagementusuallyincludesamanagementofthewholemarineecosystemto
somedegree.
Thefirstpartwillfocusonanalyzingtheproblemwithlackofrightsunderacommonpool
regimeandhowthecommonpoolmanagementofmanyfisherieshascreatedincentives
forfisherstooverexploittheresourcewithgraveeconomicconsequences.Thesecond
partoftheessaywillfocusonhowrights-basedfisherymanagementsuchassystemsof
IndividualTransferableQuotascandotofixthecommonpropertyproblemoffisheries
and how assigning rights to the resource changes the incentives of individuals in the
market.ThecaseofIceland,thatimplementedITQSinit’sfisheriesinthe1970sand80s,
how they have changed the marine sector and productivity and efficiency, will be
analyzedinthesecondpartoftheessay.Thethirdpart,chapter5,willrevolvearound
ecosystem based approaches to fisheries management. I will review why ecosystem
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managementcanbeachallenge,whyitcanbevaluableandwhatmeasureshavebeen
takentoprotecttheecosystemfrominvasivefishingpracticessuchasbottomtrawling.
Chapter 4.3 will explore how British Columbia has implemented a rights-based
managementsystemforby-catchforthebottomtrawlingindustry.Thechapteranalyzes
howthesystemwascreatedasanagreementbetweenthebottomtrawlingindustryand
environmentalorganizationsthatadvocateforsustainablefishingpracticesandhowthe
externalityofecosystemdamagewasinternalized.Iwillalsoreviewhowthissystemof
habitatquotashasworkedsinceit’simplementation.Inthefourthsubchapterofchapter
four, Iwill discusshowprotectionof theecosystem is addressed in Icelandandwhat
measures have been implemented into the fisheriesmanagement system in order to
ensuresustainableuseofthecountry’sfisheries.Thelastchapterwillthentrytoaddress
whether implementation of a habitat quota system such as the one implemented in
BritishColumbiacouldbesuitableinIceland.Thefifthchapteristheconclusionofthe
thesisandreviewsthemainpointsofthethesis.
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2 TheCommonPropertyProblemofFisheries
Asignificantpartofeconomicsrevolvesaroundhowbesttoutilizescarceresourcesin
order to reap optimal economic benefits. Fisheries are a type of renewable natural
resourcethathavetheabilitytoyieldeconomicreturnsovertheperiodoftheirlifetime.
However,duetoinefficientuse,fishingnationsforegosubstantialeconomicreturnsfrom
fisheries(Arnason,Kelleher&Willmann,2009).
2.1 ABioeconomicModeloftheFisheryResourceIn order to analyze the economic aspects of the fishery resource it is useful to first
considerabiologicalmodeloftheresourceandthenbuildtheeconomicsontopofthat.
Itisusefultohaveabiologicalmodelinthebackgroundinordertotakeintoaccountthe
biological evolution and behaviour of the fisherywhilemaking an economic analysis.
Linkingtogetherbiologyandeconomicsinthiswayresultsinwhatcanbereferredtoas
bioeconomics(Munro,LectureNotes,2016).
X=Fishablebiomass.Themassoffishofaspecificspeciesthatisfishable,measured
byweight.
Z=Rateof recruitment.Theamountof fish that isnaturallyadded to the fishable
biomass.
G=Growthrateofthefishthatalreadybelongstothefishablebiomass.
M=naturalMortality.Theamountoffishinthefishablebiomassthatdieofnatural
reasons.
E=Fishingeffort.
Infisheries,fishersputinfishingeffort,whichcanbeinputssuchaslabour,gear,bait
andmore,whichisapartofthefishingeffort.Thestockoffishablebiomassgrowsata
ratethatisequaltorateofrecruitmentplusgrowthrateoffishinthebiomassminusthe
naturalmortalityandharvestoffish.(Flaaten,2011).Harvestingisbasedontheeffort
thatisputinandthestateofthefishablebiomass.Fromthatobservationwecandefine
aharvestingfunction
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h(E)=qEαxβ
Whereqandαreflectthestateofthefishingtechnologyandhowcatchablethefish
is. A fishery resource can be utilized on a sustainable basis when the growth of the
biomassisequaltotheamountharvestedfromthebiomassh(E).(Flaaten,2011)Wecan
denotethegrowthofthebiomass,X,asF(X):F(X)=rx(1-X/K)whereristhegrowthrate
ofthebiomass.Krepresentsthemaximumcarryingcapacityofthestock.
Itfollows,thatwhenafisheryresourceisbeingexploitedatalevelthatisequaltoit’s
growthwehave:
h(E)=F(X)->qEαxβ=rx(1-X/K)
Fromthisequation,itispossibletoderivealevelofbiomass,x,foranygivenlevelof
E,thatisthesteadystate,sustainablelevel.
X=K[1–(q/r)E]
Fromthisequationforthesustainablelevelofxwecanderivethesustainableharvest:
hs=qE{G[1–(q/r)E]}(Munro,LectureNotes2016)
Maximizingthissustainableharvestfunctionwithrespecttofishingeffort,E,willresult
inthemaximumlevelofasustainableharvest.WewilldenotethisasxMSYandthelevel
ofEthatresults inthisxwillbedenotedEMSY.Now,ifE>EMSY itwill leadtobiological
overfishing. The level XMSY is themaximum level of yield obtainable for the resource
(Flaaten,2011).
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Figure1Anexampleofgrowthcurvesforfisheryresources.Source:Flaaten(2011),p.14.
Figure1describesthegrowthoryieldfromafisheryresource,(a)isaresourcewith
compensationand(b)isaresourcewithdepensation.Thesegrowthcurvesarebasedon
the observation that recruitment is higher at a lower biomass level until it reaches a
maximumlevelandisdecliningupuntilK,themaximumcarryingcapacityofthestock
(Flaaten,2011).
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2.2 IncentivesofIndividualFishersEachrationalutility-maximizingindividualutilizingacommonresourcesuchasfisheries
willattempttomaximizetheirprofits,toincreasetheirwelfare.Underarationalprofit-
maximizingschemethefisherwillharvestfishuptothepointwherehisMC=MR,thatis
where his marginal cost equals his marginal revenue. This will be the point where
individualprofitsaremaximized.
Now,inordertoanalyzecostsandrevenuesofeachfisherwemustdenotetotalcost
ofeffortTCE=bEwherebistheunitcostoffishingeffort.Inthebiologicalmodel,wecan
deriveEtobeE=h/qxandthereforeTC=bh/qx.
Wecan find total costs and total revenuesof individual fishers from thebiological
modeltobe:
Wherep isthepriceofaunitoffishandhrepresentstheharvestedamount.From
thatwecanderive:
Aslongasthepriceofthefishisgreaterthanb/qxthefisherwillwanttoincreasethe
harvestoffish.Whileallfishersactasaprofit-maximizingunitstheamountofharvested
fishincreasesuntilallofthemwillreachpointofMC=MR.Eachfisherhasonlyasmall
effectonthebiomassbutasallfishersincreasetheirharvestthebiomass,x,willdecrease.
This leads to a level of biomassX<XMSY. This iswhat happens under an open access
regime,wheretherearenoentrylimitations(Flaaten2011).Eachfisherhastheincentive
to maximize individual profits, leading to an expansion in catch until there are no
economicprofits(Munro,LectureNotes,2016).Thiswouldmeanthatthestockwouldbe
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belowthelevelofXMSY.Atthislevel,theyieldfromtheresourceislowerthanitcouldbe,
leadingtoadissipationoftherentthattheresourceisabletoproduce.
In theabsenceofpropertyrights totheresource,acooperationbetweenfishers is
unlikely(Waschman2003)andmostlikelyunstable.Now,iffishersinthemarketwould
want to harvest the resource at a level thatwouldmaximize profits in the sector by
cooperatingandreducingharvest,thereishighprobabilitythecooperationwillfallapart
leadingtoanequilibriumofadepletedresource(Waschman2003).Itwouldnotpayoff
forfisherstopostponeacatchinexpectationofcatchingalargerandmorevaluablecatch
inthefuture.Aslongastherearelimitedentrybarrierstotheresource,thecatchissimply
toolikelytobecaughtinthemeantimebysomeoneelse(Gordon,1954).Thiscreates
incentivesforfisherstoraceforacatchofthefish.Wheneveryfisherracesforthecatch
itwillmostlikelyleadtoanoverexploitationofthefishery,aresultcommonlyreferred
toastheCommonPropertyProblemorTragedyoftheCommons.
But where do we reach equilibrium? If economic profits are positive, there are
incentivesfornewentrants intothefishery,sotherewillbeaninfluxofnewentrants
untiltheeconomicrentis0.Thismeansthatifcurrentagentsintheindustryreachan
agreementonconservingthebiomassinordertogetpositiveeconomicrentthatunder
a free entry regimenewagentswill enter themarket andharvest up to thepoint of
complete dissipation of economic rent. If entry is open and free for everyone,
cooperation is hardly enforceable since all positive economic profit will attract new
entrants.Thisproblemarisesdespitetherationalprofit-maximizingbehaviourofagents
inthemarket.LikeH.S.Gordonsaidinhispaperfrom1954:,,Wealththatisfreeforallis
valuedbynonebecausehewhoisfoolhardyenoughtowaitforitspropertimeofusewill
onlyfindthatithasbeentakenbyanother.‘’(Gordon,1954,p.135)
Thetruetragedyofinefficientuseoffisheryresourcescanbeseenbylookingatthe
currentstateoftheworld’sfisheries.Asof2005,75percentoftheworld’sfisherieswere
eitheroverexploited,depleted,fullyexploitedorinrecovery.Theresultisasubstantial
economicwastethatwasestimatedtobe$50billionUSDfortheyear2004(Arnasonet
al. 2009) That means that the loss from the fishery resources of the world being
overexploited insteadofbeingusedsothateconomicrent ismaximized iscostingthe
societies that own those resources 50million dollars each year. Fishery nations area
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therefore worse than if the resource were optimally harvested. This same paper,
publishedbytheWorldBankandFAOin2009foundthatthereissignificanteconomic
lossfromworldwidefisheries,aresourcethatisabletoyieldsubstantialreturns(Arnason
etal.2009).
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3 IndividualTransferableQuotasasaSolution
3.1 CanPropertyRightsIncreaseEfficiencyofFisheries?
They way fisheries are managed has changed substantially over the years. In 1882
ThomasHuxley, a respectedbiologist at that time, stated at T.H.H.Opening Fisheries
ExhibitioninLondon1883,thattheworld’soceanfisherieswereinexhaustibleandany
regulationoffisherieswouldprovetolittlebenefit(Gordon1954).Thisviewmighthave
beenunderstandableatthetimesincetheworld’spopulationwassmallerandfishing
technologylessdeveloped.In1958and1960,theUNheldaConventionontheLawof
theSeathatwasmeantexaminethelawofthesea(UnitedNations1958).Itwasnotuntil
the1982UNConventionontheLawoftheSeathatcoastalstateshadtherighttoan
ExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)of200nauticalmiles.Eachcountrywasthereforegivena
propertyrighttothefisheryresourcethatwaswithintheirEEZ.Countrieshadtheright
toimplementtheirownmanagementregimesinsidetheirEEZ.(UnitedNations,1982)
Numerousattemptstoeffectivelyregulatefisheriesjurisdictionshavebeenmadeby
coastal states.Manyof theseapproaches tomanagecommercial fisheries focusedon
limitingtotalallowablecatchinthefisheryasanattempttopreventexcessivedepletion
oftheresource.However,thesetypeofinputcontrolshaveoftenfailedintheirobjective
tolimitthefishingeffortandincreaseefficiency(Graftonetal.2005).Traditionalcatch
controlsuchassettingacompetitivetotalallowablecatchhavenotbeenabletoprovide
the correct incentives for fishers to engage in efficient fishing practices. (Kompas &
Gooday,2007)Underthesetraditionalcatchcontrolmanagementsystems,thereislack
ofincentivesforfisherstoaddressthelongtermviabilityoftheresource(Graftonetal.
2005).Despitetheaimofthetotalallowablecatchtopreventfishersfromoverexploiting
the resource, it leads to theundesired sideeffectof creating incentives for fishers to
engageinaraceforthefish.
Anotherwayof regulating fisheries is the use of property rights to correct for the
perverseincentivesoffisherthatweredescribedinchapterchaper2.2.Thereisawell
recognized relationship between property rights and economic efficiency (Arnason,
2012).Alargepartoftheproblemwithinefficientexploitationofmarinefisheriesstems
fromthelackofpropertyrights.(Arnason,2000)Allocatingeffectivepropertyrightstoa
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resourcelikefisheriescanprovetobeadifficulttask.Propertyrightsareinfactanumber
ofrightsand,generallyacceptedthattheirmostimportantcharacteristicsare:
Ø Security
Ø Exclusivity
Ø Transferability
Ø Durability
Propertyrightsaresaidtobeperfectpropertyrightsiftheyfullyfulfillallfourmeasures(Arnason2000).
3.2 IndividualTransferableQuotasAwayofaddressingthechallengeof fisheriesmanagementthroughpropertyrights is
implementingIndividualTransferableQuotas(ITQs).ITQsareasystemofquotaswhere
thequotaholdersaretheonlyonesentitledtousetheresource,andonlyuptothelimit
thequota indicates. In the1970s, Iceland,NewZealandand theNetherlandsbecame
someofthefirstcountriestoimplementanITQsysteminfisheries.Therelativesuccess
of ITQs compared to other management systems led them to be implemented in
hundredsoffisheriesbymorethan22majorfishingnations(SeaAroundUS)(Arnason
2013). ITQs are a rights-basedmanagement system in theway that they do not give
fishersperfectpropertyrightsintheresourcebutrathergivesthemaspecificquotathat
isexclusivelytheirpropertythattheycanuseforthemselvesorsellinthemarket.Under
anITQscheme,resourcemanagerssetatotalallowablecatchfortheseason,andinstead
ofmaking it a competitiveTAC, individualquotas are soldordistributed to fishersor
vesselowners.InanITQschemethequotasaretransferable,soquota-holdershavethe
abilitytoselltheirshareofquotainthemarketorbuymore.Therearemanyvariantsof
IndividualQuotasystems,butforsimplicity,thispaperwillconcentrateonanITQscheme
withtransferableanddivisible,long-termquotasthatarerepresentedasapercentageof
aTACsetbyresourcemanagers.
Oneof thecomplicationsofcreatingefficient fisheriesmanagementsystems is the
difficultyincollectinginformationonaresourcesuchasfisheries.Inorderforresource
managerstoselecttheoptimalTACfortheresource,theyneedtoobtain information
about the function of biomass growth, cost and harvesting functions of firms in the
market(Arnason1990).Obtainingsuchlargeamountofcomplexinformationcanprove
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tobecostly.Oneofthecharacteristicsofagoodresourcemanagementsystemiscost-
effectiveness (Arnason 1990) An important way effective quota systems increase
efficiency is that they can decrease the need for information collected by resource
managers.
ITQsareinfactpropertyrightsoverashareofharvestintheresourceandifITQsfulfill
the four aforementioned criteria for effective property rights: security, exclusivity,
transferability and durability, to somedegree, they are considered to be high quality
property rights (Arnason 2005). A proportional ITQ schemewhere quota-holders are
allocatedashareoftheTACmeansthatquotaholdersare in factholdersofproperty
rightsofa flowofharvest from the resource (Graftonetal. 2000)A rationaldecision
makerholdingaquotasharewouldthereforewanttheresourcetobeharvestedinan
economicallyoptimalway.However,therearechallengestothis,namelythatITQsare
usuallynotperfectpropertyrights,thatis,theymayobtainthefourmaincharacteristics
ofpropertyrightsbutonlytosomelimitedextent(Arnason2005).Thisisinpartdueto
thenatureoffisheryresources,individualquota-holderscannothavecompletecontrol
over the conditionof fish stocksor theirmarineenvironmentand interactionsof fish
stockswiththemarineenvironment.Additionally,quota-holdersusuallydonotholdthe
powerorauthoritytoexcludeexcludeorcontrolothersuseoftheresource.Thisleadsto
ITQs, as property rights, having limited exclusivity (Arnason 2005).Oneway resource
managersandquotaholdershavemetthisproblemisbyimplementingsurveillanceand
strictenforcementonquota.AnotherwaythatanITQsystemincreasesefficiencyand
protects the resource is that they give agents in themarkets, the quota holders, an
incentive toparticipate in costof researchof the fisheryand theenforcementof the
quotas and TAC (Arnason 2012). ITQ systems where the quotas fulfill the four main
criteriaofpropertyrightstosomeextent,canalsocreateincentivesforthequotaholders
toworkcollaboratively(Munro,LectureNotes2016)
3.2.1 PricesofQuotaSharesGenerally,inacompetitivemarket,pricessendsignalstoprospectivebuyersaboutthe
qualityofaproduct.(Bagwell&Riordan1991)Inthecaseofquotamarkets,thepriceof
quota sharescansendsignalsabout thestateof the resourceaswellas futureprofit
prospectsforharvest.(Arnason2012)Ifresourceisbeingutilizedinanefficientmanner,
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makingitlikelythatthefisherywillyieldhighreturnsinthefuture,thepricesofquota
sharesshouldbehigherthaniftheresourcewerebeingoverexploited.Becauseofthis,
pricesofquotasharescanactasatoolindeterminingtheviabilityoftheresourceandbe
a supplementary tool in determining the optimal TAC. Generally, a TAC that is
economically efficient in the long termwould be supported by quota holders.Quota
holderswillhaveincentivestosupportaTACthatmaximizestheflowofrentfromthe
resourceandthereforemaximizesthepriceofthequotashares(Arnason2012).Since
quotasareatypeofproperty,itfollowsthattheirpriceshouldreflectthepresentvalue
offutureharvestsofthefishery(Newelletal.2002).IntheNewZealandquotamarket,
ecologicaluncertaintieswerefoundtodecreasethepriceofquota(Newelletal.2002).
This should give the quota holders incentives to actively advocate for research and
scientificassessmentoffishstocks.Whenquotaholderstakepartinthecostofresearch
andsurveillance,becauseitwillbefortheirowngoodthroughthepowerofquotaprices,
itcanfurtherincreasethecost-effectivenessoftheITQsystem.
3.3 Iceland’sExperiencewithanITQSystemIcelandisasmallopeneconomyof330,000inhabitants(StatisticsIceland).Despiteit’s
small size, Iceland has been one of the leading countries in sustainable fisheries
management. Up until 1976 the Icelandic fisheries were essentially managed as a
commonpoolresource.In1976,Icelandextendedthenationalfisheriesjurisdictionto
200nauticalmiles.Atthattime,Icelandicfisherieswereutilisedbysizeableforeignfleets
as well as Icelandic fishing vessels (Arnason 1993). The measures taken in Icelandic
fisheries in the1970sdidnotgo far insolving thecommonpoolproblemof Icelandic
fisheries. After a substantial decline in the cod stock and reduction in the economic
performanceofthenation’sfisheriesthatcausedthecountryeconomichardship,new
measuresinfisheriesmanagementwereneeded.Anindividualvesselquotasystemwas
introduced in the herring fishery in 1976 (Arnason 2008). This was the first step of
implementationofaquotasystemfortheIcelandicfisheries.Icelandwasamongthefirst
countries to implement a quota system for fisheries. In 1975 the Marine Research
InstitutepublishedareportontheconditionofIcelandicfishstocks.Thereportdescribed
the bad states of fish stocks due to overfishing and called for immediate action on
fisheriesmanagement.(Agnarsson2000)
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ImplementationofquotasforIcelandicfisherieswasasfollows:
1976:Individualvesselquotasfortheherringfishery.
1979:Vesselquotasintheherringfisherymadetransferable.
1980:Individualvesselquotasinthecapelinfishery.
1984:Individualtransferablevesselquotasforallfishingvesselsabove10gross
registeredtonnes(GRT)
1986:Vesselquotasinthecapelinfisherymadetransferable
1991:ITQsystemadoptedforallfisherieswithlong-term,transferablequotas.
Source:MinistryofFisheries,Iceland.Arnason,1993.
ThemarineindustryhasbeenofgreatimportancetotheeconomyofIceland,andis
consideredtohavebeenthesinglemostimportantindustryofIcelandinthe20thcentury.
(Agnarsson&Arnason2005)Duringthelatterhalfofthecentury,themarineindustry
accounted for about 80% of the merchandise export revenues of Iceland (Statistics
Iceland).Duetothislargeshareofthemarineindustryinexportsandeconomicactivity
in Iceland, changes in the fisherymanagement systemhad substantial effects on the
economyandwelfareofcitizens.
TheTACoftheITQsysteminIcelandisdecidedbytheMinistryofFisheriesthatusually
follows suggestions made by the Marine Research Institute (MRI). The enforcement
systemiscarriedoutbyFiskistofa,whichoperatesbothonboardfishingvesselsandat
thedockside.Allmarinecatchmustbeweighedatit’sportoflandinginordertocontrol
the amount of fish landed and provide effective surveillance (Arnason& Runolfsson,
2003).Quotaholdershavestrongincentivestosupporttheenforcementandmonitoring
system since it increases theeffectivenessof their quota and is likely to increase the
value.Enforcementandsurveillancecontributestothedegreeofexclusivityofthequota.
Quota-holders’incentivestoparticipateincostsofenforcementandsurveillancecanalso
playaroleinincreasingthecost-effectivenessoftheITQsystem.InIceland,theMinistry
ofFisheriescollects fees fromquotaholders to fund theenforcementsystems.When
comparingNorway,IcelandandNewfoundland,Arnasonetal.(2003)foundthatthecost
offisheriesmanagementwasthelowestofallinIceland,suggestingasuccessoftheITQ
systemscostefficiency.
21
There are a few ways to measure the success of an ITQ system such as the one
implementedinIcelandicfisheries.Oneislookingatreductioninfishingeffortandlength
ofthefishingseason.Thiswouldsuggestthattheincentivetoraceforthefishisnolonger
inplace.Also,sincethemaingoalofimplementinganITQsystemistoincreaseeconomic
efficiencyofthefisheries(Runolfsson&Arnason2003),thereshouldbeincreasedquality
andcostefficiencyinthemarket.Thiscanbeseenindecreaseofovercapitalizationof
fishinggear,decreasedmanagementcostsandahighervalueoflandedfish.ITQsystems
havealsobeen found to lead tohigherqualityof landedcatch, larger fish stocksand
increasedco-ordinationbetweenlandingsandmarketdemand(Arnason2008).
3.3.1 PerformanceoftheIcelandicITQSystem
WhenlookingattheevolutionoftheIcelandiceconomysincetheimplementationofthe
ITQsystem,therearemanypositivetrends,suggestingincreasedeconomicefficiencyof
the marine sector. Landed value per fisherman has increased steadily since the
implementationof the ITQ system, suggestingan increased labourproductivity in the
industry(StatisticsIceland).Therearealsosignsofanincreaseinefficiencyofthemarine
sector.From1981to2011,themassofcodcacheddecreasedfrom460,000tonnesto
180,000tonnes,whileexportvaluedoubled(Sjávarklasinn,2013).Thisincreaseinexport
valuedespitedecreaseincatchcanbeattributedtoamoreefficientuseofthecatch.In
theyearsfollowingtheITQimplementation,productivityofthesectorincreasedsteadily
(Runolfsson1999),asshowninfigure2.
Figure2:Productivityinthemarinesector.Source:Runolfsson(1999)
22
Figure3showschangesincatchesofdifferentstocksinIcelandicfisheriesfrom1950
to2010.Despitethesefrequentincreasesanddecreasesofthetotalcatchtherearestill
positivesignsofincreasedefficiencyandeconomicrentsinthefisheries.Therehasbeen
an increase in marketing for Icelandic fish products, increasing the relative value in
international markets. (Sjávarklasinn, 2013) Positive incentives for marketing and
creatingvaluecanbeattributedtothefactthatquota-holdershaveaclaimofthefuture
valueof the fisheries. Themarine industryof Iceland contributes a significant part of
economic activity in Iceland, averaging around 15% of direct contribution toGDP for
1970-2000 (Agnarsson&Arnason 2005). Thiswould suggest that increased economic
efficiencyofthesectorwouldhavenoticeableimpactsoneconomicwelfareofIceland.
Arnason(2008)foundastrongcorrelationbetweenperiodsofhighrealGDPgrowthand
high realvalueofquotas, suggesting that thiscorrelationalongwith the fact that the
quotasystemhasbeenaninstrumentincreatingfinancialcapital,isoneofthereasons
fortherelativelyhighrealGDPgrowth.
HowcanwemeasurethesuccessoftheITQsystemandhowcanweknowthatthese
positivesignsofIcelandicfisheriescanbeattributedtotheITQsystem?Inordertorealize
Figure3:CatchofdifferentfishstocksinIcelandicwaters1950-2010.Source:SeaAroundUS.
23
whetherproductivitychangescanbeattributedtoamoreefficientmanagement is to
comparethesechangestothechangesbeforetheimplementationoftheITQsystem.
Figure 4: Indices for productivity (whole line), Stock size (broken line) and total catch size (multiplebrokenline).Source:Þjóðhagsstofnun(1999),p.167.
Figure4describesthechangesinindicesforproductivity,stocksizeandcatchsizefrom
1973-1995.Inthe1980sthereissignificantincreaseincatchlevelsandalsoanincreasein
productivityinthesector.Intheyears1983-1988thereisverysmallincreaseinthecatch
amountwhilethere ismorethan56%increase intheproductivity index.Atthissame
timethereareothersignificantchangesgoingoninthemarineindustryinIcelandsuch
asincreaseinatseafreezingofthecatch,investmentinnewtechnologyofvesselsand
more which makes it difficult to pinpoint a causality relationship between the
implementation of the ITQ system and this large increase in productivity
(Þjóðhagsstofnun 1999). However, overall, the evidence from Iceland since the
implementationofanITQsystemshowsapositivedevelopmentinthemarineindustry,
therehasbeenincreasedmarketingofIcelandicseafoodabroadandmoreefficientuse
of ingredients leading to increased value of exportedmarine products (Sjávarklasinn,
2013).ThissuggestthattheITQsystemchangedtheincentivesoffisherstoengageina
raceforthefishandinsteadcreatedincentivestoincreaseeconomicefficiency,increase
thevalueofthecatchandusefishingcapitalmoreefficiently(Þjóðhagsstofnun,1999).
24
4 Ecosystem-BasedApproachestoFisheriesManagement
Withinthemarineecosystem,therearecomplexinteractionsbetweenorganisms,and
fishingpracticescanhavelong-termeffectsonhowvariousfunctionsoftheecosystem.
Ecosystem-based fisheries management requires resource managers to consider
interactionsoftargetcommercialspeciesofthefisherywithpredators,competitorsand
prey species (Fluharty et al. 1996). Themain objective of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries
Management(EAFM)istosustainhealthymarineecosystems,preventthedegradation
ofecosystems,reduceexcessiveby-catchandaccountforimpactsandrequirementsof
non-targetspecies,habitatsandtrophicinteractions(Pikitchetal.2004).EAFMcanbe
usedascomplementtoexistingfisheriesmanagement(Fluhartyetal.1996).EAFMhave
playedaroleinrestoringecosystemsthathavebeendegradedthroughoverfishingand
damaging fishing practices (FAO, 2014). The target of EAFM is not only to manage
commercialfishstocksbutrathermanagetheecosystemasawhole.Oneoftheconcerns
of advocates for EAFM is that fishingmethods, such as bottom-trawling,might have
damaging effects on the ecosystem that are potentially irreversible. Corals can be
especially vulnerable to fishing practices such as bottom-trawling due to their slow
growthwhichmakestherecoveryofcoralsfromdamagetakealongtime(Steingrímsson
&EInarsson2004).Bottom-trawlingcanalsodamagehabitatsandreducebiodiversity
(NordicMinistryCommittee2008),potentiallyalteringthebiotaoftheecosystem.
However, EAFM cannot solve all the problems of currentmanagement systems in
fisheries(Fluhartyetal.1996),buttheycanbeanpartofthewayfisheriesaremanaged.
Graftonetal.(2005)arguethatEAFMwouldnotworkontheirownasanalternativeto
traditionalcommercialfisheriesmanagementandisunlikelytochangefishers’behaviour
thatdamagehabitats.
WhatarethemainconcernsforadvocatingforEAFMandcouldrights-basedfishery
managementsystemssuchasindividualquotaspotentiallysolvetheproblemsthatEAFM
aretargeting?InthischapterIwillmakeanattempttoanswerthesequestionsandreview
howBritishColumbiaimplementedaquotaforhabitatby-catchinit’sbottomtrawling
fisheriesandwhetherasimilarsystemcouldbeapplicableforIcelandicfisheries.
25
4.1.1 EffectsoffishingontheEcosystem
Asignificantproblemofmanymodernfishingmethodsistheamountofby-catchthatis
caught.Evidencesuggeststhatthemostdamagingfishingpracticeinmodernfisheriesis
bottom-trawling(CSAS2010),eventhoughotherfishinggearcanalsocausedamage.Due
tothenatureofthegearusedforbottom-trawling,itcancatchalargeamountofother
animalssuchasnon-marketablefish,undersizedfish,corals,sponges,seagrassandmore
(Stilesetal.2010).Itisestimatedthatbottomtrawlingisresponsibleforuptohalfofall
discarded marine life in the world’s fisheries (Kelleher 2005). This large amount of
discardedmarinelifeandthedisruptionthattrawlingcausesthenaturalhabitatofocean
organismscanleadtolargeamountsofeconomicwasteandirreversibledamagetothe
ecosystem.Becauseoftheuncertaintyaboutinteractionsofcommercialfishspecieswith
theecosystem,damagestotheecosystemcanhavelong-lastingnegativeconsequences
forcommercialfisheries.Whenfishinggearcausesdamagetotheecosystem,it’scausing
anegativeexternality.Theseexternalities,suchasdamagestocorals,habitatsofmarine
species are categorized as techno-ecological externalities (Seijo et al. 1998). These
externalities affect the environment of commercial and non-commercial species and
mightaffecttheirwayoffeeding,reproducingandsurvivingintheocean(Wallaceetal.
2015).Manyofthespeciesthat live incommercialmarinefisheriesaredependenton
healthy habitats in order to survive. These externalities can arise even in fisheries
managedbyeffectiveITQsystems.OnemightthinkthatanITQsystemwouldprevent
suchexternalitiessincetheycanaffecttherecolonizationandrecruitment(Botsfordet
al.1997)whichcoulddiminishreturnsfromthefishery.However,thatisnotalwaysthe
case,andcaninsomepartbeattributedtotheproblemofuncertaintyabouttheeffects
offishinggearonthemarineecosystem.
4.1.2 ExistenceValueIntheanalysisofecosystem-basedapproachestofisheriesmanagement it isusefulto
introduce the concept of existence value. Existence value is the benefit that society
enjoys knowing that a resource, a good or a commodity exists (Kopp 1992) Marine
resourcescanhaveexistencevalueasandtosociety,theknowledgethattheecosystem
isprotectedfromdamageandspeciesspeciesareprotectedfromextinctioncanhave
substantialexistencevalue(Munro, lecturenotes,2016)Organismssuchascoralsand
26
sponges have negligible direct commercial value but theymay have existence value.
Usually, this existence value will increase as awareness about ecosystem damages is
raised. Existence value is a falling function of the existence of a thing, x. When the
existenceofxisgetsclosetozero,it’sexistencevalue,undernormalcircumstances,will
beincreasing.(Munro,LectureNotes2016)Whenmarineresourcesandnon-commercial
organismswithinanecosystemholdanexistencevaluetosociety,itcanhaveinfluence
onpoliticalactionsregardingfisheriesmanagement.Existencevalueofthemarinebiota
contributes to the intangible value of the ecosystem, but these values are almost
impossibletoestimatewithoutdatasetsandacceptedvaluationmethods(Arnasonetal.
2009).Figure3showsanexampleofanexistencevaluewhereΦ(x)istheexistencevalue.
Figure5:Asketchofanexistencevaluefunction.Φ’(x)Representsexistencevalueandxistheamountthatbearsthevalue.
4.2 ChallengesofEcosystem-BasedApproachesPredictingbehavioursandinteractionsinanecosysemisanimpossibletask,evenwith
extensiveresearch(Fluhartyetal.1996).Eventhoughit’sgenerallyacceptedthatcertain
fishingmethodsadverselyaffect theecosystem,resulting inpossibleeconomic losses,
estimatingtheeconomicbenefitofecosystemandhabitatprotectionisnotpossiblefor
most fisheries (Holland & Schnier 2006). An estimate of $50 m. USD made in 2009
(Arnason et al. 2009) that total economic losses due to inefficient and unsustainable
fishingpracticescouldevenbelargerwhenpossibleeconomiclossesduetoecosystem
damageandintangiblevaluesofecosystembiotaistakenintoaccount.
Traditionalapproachestoprotectingvulnerableareasandhabitatsistheimplementation
ofMarineProtectedAreas(MPAs)(Holland&Schnier2006).Fishingisthenlimitedwithin
27
those areas by law. It has been argued that reserve areas such asMPAs do not deal
directlywith therootcauseof theproblem(Wilenetal.2006), theexternality that is
causedbyfishing.
Becauseoftheunavoidablechallengesofuncertaintyandhighinformationcostswhen
it comes to themarineecosystem, it isof interestweather rights-basedmanagement
systems such as quota systems, could bemore cost-effective and create the correct
incentivestoalterfishers’behaviourtoactivelyprotecttheecosystemfromirreversible
damages.HollandandSchnier(2006)arguethat,asamanagementsystemformarine
habitats,asystemofIndividualHabitatQuotas(IHQs)wouldbemorecost-effectivethan
traditionalMPAsbyutilizingeconomicincentivesoffishers.
4.3 TheHabitatConservationBy-catchLimitinBritishColumbiaBritishColumbia,Canada,hasbeenafrontrunnerinimplementingaversionofahabitat
quotaforit’sbottomtrawlfisheries,whichhasseensuccessinreducingcoralandsponge
by-catch,aswellasreducingthesizeofvulnerableareastrawled(Wallaceetal.2015).
ThefisheryresourceoffthecoastofBritishColumbia,Canadahasbeenoperatedunder
anITQschemesince1997(FisheriesandOceans(DFO)Canada).InBritishColumbia,the
fisheryresourceisanimportantcomponentofeconomicproductionandemployment.
Thefisheriesandaquaculturesectorprovided$667.4millionCADtotheprovince’sGDP
in2011and13,900individualsareemployedintheindustry.Approximately300active
bottomtrawlvesselsoperateinthefishery(DFOCanada)andtargetavarietyofdifferent
species including rockfish, lingcod, Pollock, sablefish, dogfish, skate and Pacific cod.
(Wallaceetal2015).Thetotalquotaallocationis151,000tonsin2014formarketable
speciesandthere isanextraquotaallocationfornonmarketablespeciesasmeansof
managingby-catch.Apartof the fisheriesmanagementsystem inBC isonboardand
docksidemonitoring,whichisasimilarenforcementsystemsuchastheoneoperatedin
Icelandanddescribedinchapter3.3.Individualmonitoringemployeescountallcatchby
the vessels. Individual vessel owners are held accountable for all catch recorded by
monitors,bothretainedandreleased fish.Dueto thismeasurethere isaccuratedata
availableonallcatchesmadebythefisheryindustryandalsoallby-catchofbothsponges
andcoralsandnonmarketablespeciescaught(FAOCanada).
28
AroundBritishColumbiathereisalsoanabundanceofspongesandcoralsthatmake
upanimportantfactorofthemarineecosystem.Thesecoralsandspongescreateathree
dimensionalstructurethatcanaffecthydrodynamicsneartheoceanfloor.Thisimportant
coral and sponge structure plays an important role in a fish’s lifespan, it provides
substrateforeggcases,shelterfrompredatorsandwatercurrents(Wallaceetal.2015).
Damagedonedothesecoralsandspongescouldcausedisruptioninthenaturallifespan
ofthefishandaffecttheyieldformtheresource.Thebottom-trawlingisconsidereda
threattotheviabilityofcoralsandspongesthatserveashabitats forawiderangeof
differentspecies(Ardon2005).Inthelasttwodecades,therehasbeenaneverincreasing
scientificattentionbroughttotheuniqueHexactinellidspongereefsandcoralsandhow
theycanbeaffectedbybottomtrawling(Ardon,2005).
Priortothe21stcenturytherewaslimitedknowledgeabouttheimpactsofbottom
trawlingecosystemintheseaaroundBritishColumbia.(Ardon,2005)Duetoincreasing
attention the ocean floor got from scientists in recent years, Environmental Non-
GovernmentOrganizations(ENGOs)startedcampaigningforincreasedprotectionofthe
ocean’sorganismsandcriticizingthebottomtrawlindustry.
In2010,theCanadianGroundfishResearchandConservationSociety(CGRCS),ENGOs,
andtheDeep-seaTrawlersAssociationinitiateddiscussiontofindawaytoresolvethe
issue of damage done by trawlers to the marine environment. The result of this
cooperationbetweenagentsinthebottomtrawlindustryandENGOswasacreationofa
collaborative environment between agents in the bottom trawling industry and
environmentalresearchandconservationorganizations.Animportantcomponentofthe
collaboration was the creation of ecosystem based boundaries for bottom trawling.
Unliketheformerboundariesthatweresetbythegovernment.Theseecosystem-based
spatialboundarieswerecreatedthroughcooperationbetweenENGOsandthebottom
trawlingindustry.Allpartiesanalysedandshareddatafrommappingandresearchofthe
area (Wallace et al. 2015). This made for a transparent cooperative process of
implementationofnewspatialboundariesthatlimitedbottomtrawlingaroundBC.The
agreementalsodefinedanencounterprotocolthataimedtoprovidemoreinformation
aboutvulnerablemarineecosystems.Accordingtotheprotocol,whenvesselencounters
29
alargeamountofcoralsandspongesinit’scatch,morethan20kg,itmustfollowaset
ofstepsaimedtocollectmoredataaboutthespecificarea(Wallaceetal.2015).
Another component of the collaborative agreement was an implementation of a
habitatquota,referredtoasHabitatConservationBy-catchLimit(HCBL)(Wallaceetal.
2015).TheHCBLestablishedafleet-videand individual limitsoncatchesofcoralsand
sponges by bottom trawlers. Thismeant that not only were the vessels subject to a
specificquotaoffishbutalsoaquotafortheby-catchofcoralsandsponges.Becausethe
bottomtrawlfisheryhadoperatedunderaITQschemewithbothonboardanddockside
monitoringsince1997thereisextensiveinformationavailableonhistoricalspongeand
coralcatchbybottomtrawlers.In2012theHBCLtotalquotawassetto4500kgforall
vesselscombined,thelongtermgoalwastogettotalcatchdownto884kgperseason.
(Wallaceetal2015).
Someofthemainobjectivesofthebottomtrawlingagreementwereasfollow:
1. Reduceamountofcoralsandspongescatchinthebottomtrawlindustry.
2. Restricttheareastrawled.
3. Ensurethatbottomtrawlersdonotdisproportionallyaffectaspecifichabitat
type.
4. Developawayforthebottomtrawlindustry,ENGOsandFisheriesandOceans
Canadatoaddressandactonhabitatprotection.
4.3.1 ResultsoftheAgreementinBritishColumbia
Before the implementationof theHBCL inBritishColumbia,differentapproacheshad
been taken to address the ecosystem damage and by-catch of the bottom trawling
fishery.Firstly,in1996theGroundfishTrawlObserverProgramwasimplemented(DFO
Canada).Underthisprogram,allvesselswererequiredtohaveanon-boardobserverthat
wouldrecordallby-catch;corals,spongesaswellasnon-marketablefish.Secondly,the
bottom-trawl industrywas asked to voluntarily follow recommended closures around
knownsensitivecoralreefs.Thesevoluntaryclosureswerenoteffectiveandweremade
mandatory in2002 (Ardonet al. 2004).According to a researchdonebyArdonet al.
publishedin2007theystatethat,,Whilehelpful,the2002hexactinellidclosuresdidnot
bythemselvesadequatelyminimizethecoralandspongeby-catchissue.’’(Ardonetal.,
30
2007,p.7)Theyalsoattempttomeasuretheeconomiceffectoftheclosures,butdueto
the lack of precise information on fish behavior and their interaction with marine
habitats,theresultsarelimited.
Whenclosingoffzones togroundfish trawling itmustbeaddressedthatmany fish
speciesareverymobileandcanmoveinandoutofthezone.Also,theknowledgeonthe
recoveryofmarinehabitatsandhowthewholeecosysteminteractsislimited.Thereare
twoaspectsoftheeconomicimpactsofsuchclosurezones:Firstly,theclosuresreduce
the sizeof fishablearea, and therefore limiting the sizeof the fishingare for vessels.
Becauseof fishmobilityhowever, thismightnotbeaseffective for theprotectionof
mobilespeciesasfornonmobileones.Also,vesselownersarelikelytobeabletocatch
theirquotasoutsideoftheclosurezoneduetothemobilityofspecies.Secondly,ifthe
closuresareeffectiveinprotectingthemarinehabitatinsidethem,leadingtoincreased
lifespan and stock size, it can lead to “spill-over” effects when the fish leaves the
protectedzoneingreaternumbersthanbefore(Munro,LectureNotes2016).
31
Table1:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchfrom1996-2004.Data:Adronetal(2007)
YEAR AMOUNTOFCORALSANDSPONGESTAKENASBY-CATCH
1996 7,894kg.–ObserverProgramBegins
1997 39,444kg.
1998 22,178kg.
1999 21,813kg.
2000 78,778kg.–VoluntarySpongeClosuresimplemented
2001 101,332kg.
2002 23,155kg.–LegalSpongeclosuresimplemented
2003 17,216kg.
2004 10,570kg.
Table1showsamountofhabitatby-catchfromBCbottom-trawlingandchangesthrough
theyearsofimplementationoftheObserverProgram,voluntaryandlegalclosures.
Table2:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchaftertheimplementationofHBCLagreement.Data:Wallaceetal.(2015)
Intermsofareatrawledtherewasa20.6%reductionintotalareatrawledinallwaters,
from39,927km2to31,633.Totaldeepwaterhabitatstrawledsawa65%reductionfrom
4,018km2to1,395km2andsizetotalcontinentalslopehabitatareatrawledreducedby
18%from15,214km2to12,413km2.(Suzuki,2015)Figure6showsthechangesinarea
trawledbeforeandaftertheagreement.
YEAR AMOUNTOFCORALSANDSPONGESTAKEN
2012 500kg.
2013 280kg.
2014 270kg.
32
Figure6:Spatialmapofcoralandspongezonesandriskassessment.Source:Wallaceetal.(2015)
What is also important about theHCBLpart of the agreement, is that it takes the
responsibilityofhabitatprotectionfromthefisherymanagementandmovesitoverto
agentsinthemarket.Whenavesselusesallofit’shabitatby-catchquotait’sownersface
theundesirablechoicebetweenbuyinganadditionalquotaortyingtheirshiptothedock
fortherestoftheseasonwhichcouldcausethemsignificantloss(Wallaceetal.2015).In
thisway,theHBCLgivesindividualfishersandcaptainsincentivetousetheirextensive
knowledgeof the locationsof spongesandcorals fromtheirexperienceoutat sea to
adjusttheirfishingpattern.AnalysisoftheeffectivenessoftheHBCLsuggeststhatsuch
self-interestdrivenincentivestoavoidspongeandcoralcatchcansignificantlyreducethe
amountofcoralandspongecatchofthebottomtrawlingindustry(Wallaceetal.2015).
The agreement is also supposed to provide flexibility for individual vessel owners. If
fishersassessthattherevenuefromthefishtheymightcatchinanareofhistoricallyhigh
33
amountofby-catch, ishigherthantheexpectedcostofadditionalquotatocover the
expectedcatch,thentherationaldecisionwouldtotrawlthearea.Thisisbecauseatthe
timeofmaking theagreement, vesselowners required some flexibility to the closure
areas in order to prevent economic loss due to the areas with the highest historical
amount of fish harvest being closedoff to protect sponges and corals (Wallace et al.
2015).
4.3.2 TheTheory:WhatMadeThisPossible?
The measures taken collaboratively by the Environmental Non-Government
Organizations (ENGOs) and agents in the bottom trawling industry in B.C., were
essentiallymadepossibleduetotheactionstakenbytheENGOsthat internalizedthe
externalityand internalized theexternalitycausedbybottomtrawlingandcreatedan
incentive forCGRCS toengagewith theENGOs in creatinganagreementon reducing
habitat damage (Wallace et al. 2015). Theprimarymarket for seafoodproducts from
bottomtrawlinginB.C.isalongthewestcoastoftheUnitedStates.ENGOscampaigned
inraisingawarenessandimplementingaSeafoodWatchthatcertifiedwhetheraseafood
producthadbeencaughtinawaythatavoidedmajordamages.Ifaproductdidnotmeet
the SeafoodWatch criteria, some stores and restaurantswould not agree to sell the
product.VesselownersthatdidnotcomplywiththeprotectingmeasuresthattheENGOs
and the SeafoodWatch required as a minimum, faced decreasing demand for their
productandevenlowerprices.Thisthreatoflossinthemarketbecameanincentive
fortheCGRCStocollaboratewiththeENGOs(Wallaceetal.2015).Inthisway,thecost
wasbornebythevesselowners.However,itmustalsobeaddressedthattheITQsystem
in B.C. had created an incentive for the bottom trawl fishers towork collaboratively
(Wallaceetal.2015).Therewasalsolimitedinterventionbythefisheriesmanagementof
B.C. Externalities such as those imposed by the bottom trawling industry can be
complicated tomanagedue to scarcityof informationonhowserious thesedamages
actuallyareandhowlonghabitatstaketorecover(Ardron,2005).Anotherimportant
factoristhatresearchisusuallylackingandisnotonlyexpensiveandrequirestechnical
gadgetsbutitisalsoaresearchthatmustbedoneoveralongperiodoftime.Department
of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) has identified that there is substantial lack of
informationandresearchoncoralsandspongesaroundBritishColumbia.(Fisheriesand
34
OceansCanada(DFO),2008)Manyaspectsofthestructure,distributionandbiologyof
coralsandspongesthatformontheoceanfloorissimplynotwellunderstood.Inareport
publishedin2015bytheDFOitstates:
The paucity of information on the distribution of cold-water corals andspongescombinedwiththecurrentlackofspeciesinformationinmonitoringprogramsmakeitdifficulttofullyassesstheextentofanthropogenicimpactsand other risks to cold-water corals and sponges, including measures toenhance conservation. To address these gaps in knowledge, DFO Sciencemustdevelopastrategicapproachtoproviderelevantinformation.(DFO,p.30,2008)
Because of this lack of information about the precise biology of these corals and
sponges,assessingtheextentandprecisecostsoftheexternality,thedamagedoneto
thesespongesandcorals,wasimpossibletoassess.Duetothenatureofthesituation,it
mustbeassessedthatcreatingincentivesinthemarketforthevesselownerstogather
informationandaddress theproblem ismorecost-effective than implementingavast
researchprojectandthenimplementamanagementsystemsetbythegovernment.
When theexternalityhadbeen internalizedbyENGOs, agents in thebottom trawl
industry had a strong incentive to cooperate with ENGOs in finding a collaborative
solutionthatwouldnotonlykeepdamagestotheecosystematminimumbutalsocreate
aviablemarketenvironmentforthefishingproductinforeseeablefuture(Wallaceetal.
2015).WithoutadurableITQsysteminplace,theseincentiveswouldnothavebeenin
placesincethefuturevalueofthefishwouldnotbeofasmuchinteresttothevessel
owners. This example is another prove howproperty rights, in the formof ITQs, can
createanincentiveforvesselownerstobeinvolvedinresearchandconservationofthe
resourceandinthecaseofecosystemdamage,alsothemarineenvironment.Wecan
alsolookatthisfromtheaspectofmanagingaproperty.Whenquotasgivevesselowners
aneffectivepropertyrighttotheresource,itisinthequotaholdersbestinteresttothat
the resource is used in a sustainablemanner, just as if itwas a share in a company.
Managing not only the commercial fish catch but also by-catch can be compared to
analysingaportfolioofinvestments.(Munro,LectureNotes2016)
35
4.4 EcosystemManagementinIcelandThereare severaldifferent typesof regulations thathavebeen implemented into the
Icelandicfisheriesmanagementsystemwiththegoalofprotectingvariousorganismsthat
are a part of themarine ecosystem, to conserve habitats and ensure that there isn’t
excessive damage done to themarine environment. One of the approaches taken in
Icelandistoclosecertainareasthatareconsideredvulnerabletogroundfishtrawlingand
otherinvasivefishingequipement.Areasclosedtofishingequipmenthavealonghistory
inIcelandicfisheriesandtherehavebeenclosedareasofsomesortformanydecades
(CommitteeappointedbyMinisterof Fisheriesof Iceland,2005).Theobjectiveof the
closuresistomaintaintheconservationofvulnerablehabitatsaswellasprotectingsmall
fish(MinistryofForeignAffairs,2009).TheareasareclosedbylawsetbytheParliament
and based on recommendations from the Marine Research Institute. There are also
regulations on allowable trawling areas based on size of trawlers and in 1997, the
ParliamentofIcelandpassedalawstatingthatbottomtrawlingwouldonlybeallowed
withincertainspecifiedareasandatspecifiedtimes(Alþingi,1997).
EstimatingthevalueofvariousorganismssuchascoralsaroundIcelandisadifficult
taskbecausetheprecisebiologyanddevelopmentofthesecoralsarelargelyunknown
(Jónasson et al. 205). Corals are generally slow growing and are therefore expecially
vulnerabletodamageduetolongrecoverytime.Researchondistributionofcoralareas
knownbyfishersaroundIcelandshowedthatlargeareasofcoralshavebeendestructed
andoutof11knowncoralareasthatwereknownin1970thereare4stillingoodstand
(Steingrímsson&Einarsson,2004).
Analyzingtheeffectsoftheseclosuresonthefishstocksprovestobequitedifficult
duetoscarcityofresultsfromresearchconductedonthefishstocksthatareaffectedby
theseclosures.Duringtheyearsof1993to1994theIcelandicMarineResearchInstitute
conductedaresearchoncodbothinsidetheprotectedclosureareasandfromthefishing
area.Accordingtotheresultsthecodthatlivedinsidetheclosureareawaslesslikelyto
berecoveredlaterasasmallfishthanthecodthatwastrackedinsidethefishingarea.
Looking at data from Icelandic Marine Research Institute from closure areas East of
Icelandshownomeasureablechangeinvarietyofmarinespecies,quantityoffishandits
distributionwhencomparingclosureareastothefishingareas.(Jónassonetal.2005).
36
Icelandhasextensiveregulatoryenvironmentwhenitcomestoensuringsustainability
ofthemarineenvironment.However,therehavebeendamagestohabitatsaroundthe
country that may take long time to recover (Jónasson et al. 2005) (Steingrímsson &
Einarsson,2004).AroundIcelandarecoralareasofLopheliapertusathatmainlygrowsin
the Norteast-Atlantic Ocean and in North Seas. It’s growth around Iceland might be
importantinconservationofthespecies(Jónassonetal.2005).
4.4.1 PossibleApplicationofaHabitatQuotainIceland
Considering the relative success off the Habitat By-catch Limit agreement in British
Columbia,itisofinterestwhetherasimilaragreementcouldbemadefortheIcelandic
groundfishfisheries.Wallace’setal.(2015)analysisoftheapplicationandresultsfrom
thehabitatprotectingagreementidentifiesthefollowintcriteriathatwerevitalinmaking
theagreementpossible:
1. Extensivedataonhistoricalby-catch
a. IcelandicMarineResearchInstitutehasconductedresearchonthe
affectsofbottomtrawlingontheoceanflooraroundIceland.Fiskistofa
conductssurveillanceonharvestsbothonboardvesselsanddockside
surveillance.
2. Thirdparty’sabilitytobringpressureonthebottomtrawlingindustry
a. ENGOsinterventioninthemarketforharvestsfromthebottomtrawling
industrywasavitalpartinthecreationoftheagreement.Bycreatinga
pressureonthebottomtrawlingindustry,anincentivefortheindustryto
cooperatewithENGOswascreated.MostofBCtrawlharvestsweresold
alongtheWestCoastofNorthAmerica,aplaceofconsiderablyhigh
consumerawareness,andthereforitisintheindustry’sbestinterestthat
theytrytoprotectthemarineenvironment,orelseretailerswon’tbuy
theproductoffthem.
b. Currently,thereisnosuchcriteriaforsustainablefishsuchasthe
SeafoodWatchinIceland.(Consumersdonothavetheoptionof
boycottingseafoodthathasnotbeencertifiedastheharvestof
sustainablefisherypractices.)Implementingasimilarregulationismore
likelytobesuccessfuliftheexistencevalueofthemarineenvironmentis
37
considerablehigh.Also,recentresearchhasunveiledthatoneofthe
largestcold-watercoralsintheworldcanbefoundintheNorth-Atlantic.
(NordicMinistryCommittee2008)Thisislikelytoincreasetheexistence
valueoftheocean.
3. Possibilityofcooperationbetweenagentsintheindustry
a. ForanarrangementsuchastheHabitatProtectionAgreementtowork,
agentsinthefisherymustbeabletosustainalongtermcooperative
gamewithoutbetrayingtheagreement.Undersuchcooperative
agreementthereisalwaysthethreatoffreeridingandthecooperation
subsequentlybreakingdown.
4. Effectiveregulatoryenvironment
a. IcelandicfisheriesaremanagedunderanITQsystem.
b. Thereiseffectiveregulatoryenvironmentandextensivemonitoringand
surveillance.
ThereconditionssuggestingthatasimilaragreementsuchastheonereachedinB.C.
whereahabitatby-catchquotawascreated,couldbeimplementedforIcelandicbottom
trawl fisheries. Iceland has a special position regarding implementation of such
agreement since it’s fisheries are managed under an ITQ system and there is also
extensivesurveillanceanddatacollectingonallcatchbothonboardandattheportof
landing.However,thesamepressure imposedbyENGOsonBCbottomtrawl industry
thatcreatedanincentivefortheindustrytoenterintonegotiationsisnotasapparentin
Iceland.
Anagreementsuchastheone inBCcouldbebeneficial to Iceland intwodifferent
ways:
1. Decreasingtheeffectsofbottomtrawlingontheecosystem
Whentheinteractionoforganismswiththeecosystemisnotfullyknown,it
canhavenegativeconsequencesiftheecosystemispermanentlydamaged.Some
damageshavealreadybeendonetocoralswithinIcelandicfisheriesjurisdiction.
(Jónassonetal.,2005)
38
2. Avoidingeconomiclossesifdamageisrealizedlater
Ifgroundfishtrawlingdamagesleadstobaddamageonlytoberealizedafter
thedamageisdoneitmightleadtoanin-seasonclosureoftheareasurrounding
thedamagedarea,andwhenareasareclosedsuddenlytofishingitcanleadto
economicloss(O’Keefe&Decelles2013).
39
5 Conclusion
Rights-basedfisherymanagementsystemscangoafarwayincreatinganenvironment
forefficientutilizationoffisheries.Icelandwasoneofthefirstnationstoimplementan
ITQsystem,atypeofrights-basedfisherymanagementsystem,forit’sfisheries.Overall,
Iceland’sexperiencewiththeimplementationofaITQsystemforit’sfisherieshasleadto
increased productivity and more efficient marine sector. This thesis also reviewed
ecosystem-basedapproaches to fisheriesmanagementandhowBritishColumbiawas
able to reduce the amount of habitat by-catch in it’s bottom trawl fisheries by
implementingahabitatquota.Thehabitatquotawasaresultofanagreementbetween
thebottomtrawlingindustryinBritishColumbiaandenvironmentalorganizations.
Manyfisherieshavebeenmanagedunderanopenaccessregimeatsomepoint,where
anyonecanenterandutilizetheresource.Thisthesisexploreswhysuchasystemwill
createasituationwherefishershaveincentivestosimplyoverexploittheresourceina
racetomaximizeindividualprofits.Italsotouchesbrieflyonhowcompetitivetotalcatch
limits,thatareintendedtoprotecttheresource,caninducefisherstoengageinarace
for the available catch, leading to large economic losses. Inadequate fisheries
managementcanhavepossiblyirreversiblelong-termconsequencesfortheresource.In
responsetobadlyperformingmanagementsystemstherehasbeenanincreaseinthe
implementationofrights-basedmanagementsystemssuchasITQsystems.Icelandwas
oneofthefirstnationsto implementaquotasystemfor it’sfisheries.Therehasbeen
considerableincreaseinproductivityinthemarinesectorsincetheimplementationof
the ITQ system. There has also been increase inmarketing abroad,making Icelandic
productsmorevaluableininternationalmarkets.Thesechangesweremadepossibleby
theexistenceoftheITQsystemthatgivesquotaholdersapropertyrighttoaflowfrom
the resource.When holding a property right that has value, there is an incentive to
maximizethevalue,inthiscasetheflowofreturnsfromtheresource.
Overexploitationoffishstocksisunfortunatelynottheonlyworryoffisherymanagers.
Increasedattentionhasbeenbrought to thedamagingeffectsof thebottomtrawling
industryoncorals,spongesandotherorganismsthat liveontheoceanground.These
40
organismsareallapartofanecosystemthathascomplexinteractions.Icelandhastaken
severalmeasures to reduce damage to vulnerable organisms due to fishing. Despite
these efforts, there are large areas of deep-sea corals around Iceland that have
completelydisappearedsincetrawlingintheareasbegan.Closurezonesandreservesas
anecosystemmanagementhavebeencontroversialand ithasbeenargued that they
don’tdealwiththerootcauseof theexternalityimposedbybottomtrawling.British
Columbia, has recently introduced a new management system of individual habitat
quotas to address the threat of bottom trawling to the ecosystem. This systemwas
createdthroughcooperationofthebottomtrawlingindustryandthird-partyENGOs.The
mainaimofthesystemistonotonlyclosethezonesthataremostvulnerabletotrawling,
butalsotocreateincentivesforindividualfisherstoactivelytrytoavoidsensitivezones
and report areas with high by-catch of sponges and corals and non-commercial fish
stocks.Theresultshavebeenpositiveforthefirstthreeyearsofimplementation.British
ColumbiareliesonasimilarsystemofITQsasIcelanddoes,andthatcreatedabasisthat
made the implementation possible. One of the biggest challenges in fisheries and
ecosystem management is the high degree of uncertainty and difficulty and cost of
research. Forthatreason, themanagementsystemsthataimtocreate incentives for
fisherstoactivelyengagethemselvesinprotectionoftheresourceandresearch,suchas
ITQsystemsandthehabitatby-catchsysteminBC,havehadarelativelyhighsuccess.
Rights-basedmanagementeffortshavegonealongwayinnotonlyprotectingthefishery
resourcefromoverexploitation,butalsoincreatingtherightincentivesfortheindustry
toengageinvalue-addingactivitiessuchasincreasingutilization,positiveinvestmentin
theresourceandmarketing.TheexperiencefromBritishColumbiasuggeststhataquota
systemforhabitatdamageisaneffectivewayoflimitingby-catchofcoralsandsponges
andtoreducedamagedonebybottomtrawlers.ThequotaissimilartoanITQsystem
wherequotaholderscansellandbuyquotainthemarket.
41
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