BS thesis in Economics

Rights-based Management Systems in Fisheries HowCanAssignedRightschangeFisheries?

Anna Þuríður Pálsdóttir

Supervisor: Dr. Ragnar Árnason

Faculty of Economics June 2016

Rights-basedManagementSystemsinFisheriesHowCanAssignedRightschangeFisheries?

AnnaÞuríðurPálsdóttir

FinalProjectforaBSdegreeinEconomics

Supervisor:Dr.RagnarÁrnason

FacultyofEconomics

SchoolofSocialSciences,UniversityofIceland

June2016

3

Rights-basedManagementSystemsinFisheries.HowCanAssigned

RightsChangeFisheries?

This thesis is a 12 ECTS final project for a BS degree at the Faculty of

Economics,SchoolofSocialSciences,UniversityofIceland

©2016AnnaÞuríðurPálsdóttir

Thisthesismaynotbereproducedelsewherewithoutthepermissionoftheauthor.

Printing:Háskólaprent

Reykjavík,2016

4

Preface

Thisessayisafinalprojectworth12ECTSforaBSdegreeinEconomicsintheFaculty

ofEconomicsatUniversityofIceland.TheadvisorforthisthesisisRagnarÁrnasonandI

wanttothankhimforhisassistanceandusefulcriticism.Ialsowishtothankmyparents,

JóhannaHansenandPállHöskuldsson,fortheirhelpandsupport.

5

Abstract

Despite the fact that fisheriescanyieldsubstantialeconomicbenefits,majorityof the

world’sfisheryresourcesunderperform.Thisthesiswill trytosheda lightonwhether

rights-basedmanagementsystemscanimprovetheperformanceoffisheriesandeven

leadtomoresustainablefishingpracticesforthewholeecosystem. Itwill reviewhow

commonpropertyregimesandtraditionalcatchlimitregimescanleadtooverexploited

fishstocksandeconomic inefficiency,andhowrights-basedmanagementsystemscan

help to correct for the perverse incentives within the fishing industry. The first part

discusseshowcommonpropertymanagementoffisheriescreatesincentivesforfishers

todepletetheresource,leadingtoeconomiclossesandoverexploitationoffishstocks.

The second part will focus on rights-based management systems for fisheries, ITQ

systemsandhowIcelandhasfaredsinceadoptinganITQsystemfor it’sfisheries.The

third and last part will revolve around ecosystem-based management system for

fisheries, and review a habitat quota system for fisheries and howBritish Columbia’s

bottomtrawlfisherieshavechangedsincetheimplementationofahabitatconservation

quota.

6

Contents

Preface.......................................................................................................................4

Abstract.....................................................................................................................5

Contents....................................................................................................................6

ListofFigures.............................................................................................................7

ListofTables..............................................................................................................7

1 Introduction........................................................................................................8

2 TheCommonPropertyProblemofFisheries....................................................10

2.1 ABioeconomicModeloftheFisheryResource.........................................10

2.2 IncentivesofIndividualFishers..................................................................13

3 IndividualTransferableQuotasasaSolution....................................................16

3.1 CanPropertyRightsIncreaseEfficiencyofFisheries?................................16

3.2 IndividualTransferableQuotas..................................................................17

3.2.1 PricesofQuotaShares........................................................................18

3.3 Iceland’sExperiencewithanITQSystem...................................................19

3.3.1 PerformanceoftheIcelandicITQSystem...........................................21

4 Ecosystem-BasedApproachestoFisheriesManagement.................................24

4.1.1 EffectsoffishingontheEcosystem....................................................25

4.1.2 ExistenceValue...................................................................................25

4.2 ChallengesofEcosystem-BasedApproaches.............................................26

4.3 TheHabitatConservationBy-catchLimitinBritishColumbia....................27

4.3.1 ResultsoftheAgreementinBritishColumbia....................................29

4.3.2 TheTheory:WhatMadeThisPossible?..............................................33

4.4 EcosystemManagementinIceland...........................................................35

4.4.1 PossibleApplicationofaHabitatQuotainIceland.............................36

5 Conclusion.........................................................................................................39

References...............................................................................................................41

7

ListofFigures

Figure1Anexampleofgrowthcurvesforfisheryresources.Source:Flaaten(2011),p.

14.....................................................................................................................................12

Figure2:Productivityinthemarinesector.Source:Runolfsson(1999)...........................21

Figure3:CatchofdifferentfishstocksinIcelandicwaters1950-2010.Source:SeaAround

US.....................................................................................................................................22

Figure4:...........................................................................................................................23

Figure5:Asketchofanexistencevaluefunction.Φ’(x)Representsexistencevalueandx

istheamountthatbearsthevalue..................................................................................26

Figure6:Spatialmapofcoralandspongezonesandriskassessment.Source:Wallaceet

al.(2015)..........................................................................................................................32

ListofTables

Table1:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchfrom1996-2004.Data:Adron

etal(2007).......................................................................................................................31

Table2:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchaftertheimplementationof

HBCLagreement.Data:Wallaceetal.(2015)..................................................................31

8

1 Introduction

Rights-basedmanagementsystemsinfisherieshavebecomemorecommoninthelast

decades.Themaingoalofrights-basedfisheriesistocreatetherightincentivesforfishers

to not only protect the resource from overuse but also to increase efficiency and

economicreturnsfromtheresource.Inthisthesis,Iwilladdresswhytheneedforrights-

basedsystemscameaboutafterthefailureoftraditionalmanagementoffisheriesand

howrights-basedmanagementhasworkedforIcelandicfisheriesandalsohowarights-

basedhabitatprotectionsystemhasworkedforBritishColumbia.Majorityoffisheries

underperformduetooveruse,aproblemthataffectsmany.

Thisthesiswillconcentrateonanalyzingtheeffectsofrights-basedfisherymanagement

schemes.Icelandwasamongthefirstcountriesintheworldtoimplementasystemof

individualtransferablequotas,wherequota-holdersaregivenaspecialpropertyrightto

futureyieldsfromtheresourceandno-onecanharvestwithoutholdingaquota.Inthis

thesis,Iwilltrytoshedalightonwhytheworld’sfisherieshavebeenoverexploitedand

whether implementingarights-basedmanagementsystemsuchasan ITQsystemcan

provideasolutiontowhatiscommonlyreferredtoasthecommonpropertyproblemof

fisheries.Thisthesiswillalsoreviewecosystembasedmanagementoffisheriesandwhy

fisherymanagementusuallyincludesamanagementofthewholemarineecosystemto

somedegree.

Thefirstpartwillfocusonanalyzingtheproblemwithlackofrightsunderacommonpool

regimeandhowthecommonpoolmanagementofmanyfisherieshascreatedincentives

forfisherstooverexploittheresourcewithgraveeconomicconsequences.Thesecond

partoftheessaywillfocusonhowrights-basedfisherymanagementsuchassystemsof

IndividualTransferableQuotascandotofixthecommonpropertyproblemoffisheries

and how assigning rights to the resource changes the incentives of individuals in the

market.ThecaseofIceland,thatimplementedITQSinit’sfisheriesinthe1970sand80s,

how they have changed the marine sector and productivity and efficiency, will be

analyzedinthesecondpartoftheessay.Thethirdpart,chapter5,willrevolvearound

ecosystem based approaches to fisheries management. I will review why ecosystem

9

managementcanbeachallenge,whyitcanbevaluableandwhatmeasureshavebeen

takentoprotecttheecosystemfrominvasivefishingpracticessuchasbottomtrawling.

Chapter 4.3 will explore how British Columbia has implemented a rights-based

managementsystemforby-catchforthebottomtrawlingindustry.Thechapteranalyzes

howthesystemwascreatedasanagreementbetweenthebottomtrawlingindustryand

environmentalorganizationsthatadvocateforsustainablefishingpracticesandhowthe

externalityofecosystemdamagewasinternalized.Iwillalsoreviewhowthissystemof

habitatquotashasworkedsinceit’simplementation.Inthefourthsubchapterofchapter

four, Iwill discusshowprotectionof theecosystem is addressed in Icelandandwhat

measures have been implemented into the fisheriesmanagement system in order to

ensuresustainableuseofthecountry’sfisheries.Thelastchapterwillthentrytoaddress

whether implementation of a habitat quota system such as the one implemented in

BritishColumbiacouldbesuitableinIceland.Thefifthchapteristheconclusionofthe

thesisandreviewsthemainpointsofthethesis.

10

2 TheCommonPropertyProblemofFisheries

Asignificantpartofeconomicsrevolvesaroundhowbesttoutilizescarceresourcesin

order to reap optimal economic benefits. Fisheries are a type of renewable natural

resourcethathavetheabilitytoyieldeconomicreturnsovertheperiodoftheirlifetime.

However,duetoinefficientuse,fishingnationsforegosubstantialeconomicreturnsfrom

fisheries(Arnason,Kelleher&Willmann,2009).

2.1 ABioeconomicModeloftheFisheryResourceIn order to analyze the economic aspects of the fishery resource it is useful to first

considerabiologicalmodeloftheresourceandthenbuildtheeconomicsontopofthat.

Itisusefultohaveabiologicalmodelinthebackgroundinordertotakeintoaccountthe

biological evolution and behaviour of the fisherywhilemaking an economic analysis.

Linkingtogetherbiologyandeconomicsinthiswayresultsinwhatcanbereferredtoas

bioeconomics(Munro,LectureNotes,2016).

X=Fishablebiomass.Themassoffishofaspecificspeciesthatisfishable,measured

byweight.

Z=Rateof recruitment.Theamountof fish that isnaturallyadded to the fishable

biomass.

G=Growthrateofthefishthatalreadybelongstothefishablebiomass.

M=naturalMortality.Theamountoffishinthefishablebiomassthatdieofnatural

reasons.

E=Fishingeffort.

Infisheries,fishersputinfishingeffort,whichcanbeinputssuchaslabour,gear,bait

andmore,whichisapartofthefishingeffort.Thestockoffishablebiomassgrowsata

ratethatisequaltorateofrecruitmentplusgrowthrateoffishinthebiomassminusthe

naturalmortalityandharvestoffish.(Flaaten,2011).Harvestingisbasedontheeffort

thatisputinandthestateofthefishablebiomass.Fromthatobservationwecandefine

aharvestingfunction

11

h(E)=qEαxβ

Whereqandαreflectthestateofthefishingtechnologyandhowcatchablethefish

is. A fishery resource can be utilized on a sustainable basis when the growth of the

biomassisequaltotheamountharvestedfromthebiomassh(E).(Flaaten,2011)Wecan

denotethegrowthofthebiomass,X,asF(X):F(X)=rx(1-X/K)whereristhegrowthrate

ofthebiomass.Krepresentsthemaximumcarryingcapacityofthestock.

Itfollows,thatwhenafisheryresourceisbeingexploitedatalevelthatisequaltoit’s

growthwehave:

h(E)=F(X)->qEαxβ=rx(1-X/K)

Fromthisequation,itispossibletoderivealevelofbiomass,x,foranygivenlevelof

E,thatisthesteadystate,sustainablelevel.

X=K[1–(q/r)E]

Fromthisequationforthesustainablelevelofxwecanderivethesustainableharvest:

hs=qE{G[1–(q/r)E]}(Munro,LectureNotes2016)

Maximizingthissustainableharvestfunctionwithrespecttofishingeffort,E,willresult

inthemaximumlevelofasustainableharvest.WewilldenotethisasxMSYandthelevel

ofEthatresults inthisxwillbedenotedEMSY.Now,ifE>EMSY itwill leadtobiological

overfishing. The level XMSY is themaximum level of yield obtainable for the resource

(Flaaten,2011).

12

Figure1Anexampleofgrowthcurvesforfisheryresources.Source:Flaaten(2011),p.14.

Figure1describesthegrowthoryieldfromafisheryresource,(a)isaresourcewith

compensationand(b)isaresourcewithdepensation.Thesegrowthcurvesarebasedon

the observation that recruitment is higher at a lower biomass level until it reaches a

maximumlevelandisdecliningupuntilK,themaximumcarryingcapacityofthestock

(Flaaten,2011).

13

2.2 IncentivesofIndividualFishersEachrationalutility-maximizingindividualutilizingacommonresourcesuchasfisheries

willattempttomaximizetheirprofits,toincreasetheirwelfare.Underarationalprofit-

maximizingschemethefisherwillharvestfishuptothepointwherehisMC=MR,thatis

where his marginal cost equals his marginal revenue. This will be the point where

individualprofitsaremaximized.

Now,inordertoanalyzecostsandrevenuesofeachfisherwemustdenotetotalcost

ofeffortTCE=bEwherebistheunitcostoffishingeffort.Inthebiologicalmodel,wecan

deriveEtobeE=h/qxandthereforeTC=bh/qx.

Wecan find total costs and total revenuesof individual fishers from thebiological

modeltobe:

Wherep isthepriceofaunitoffishandhrepresentstheharvestedamount.From

thatwecanderive:

Aslongasthepriceofthefishisgreaterthanb/qxthefisherwillwanttoincreasethe

harvestoffish.Whileallfishersactasaprofit-maximizingunitstheamountofharvested

fishincreasesuntilallofthemwillreachpointofMC=MR.Eachfisherhasonlyasmall

effectonthebiomassbutasallfishersincreasetheirharvestthebiomass,x,willdecrease.

This leads to a level of biomassX<XMSY. This iswhat happens under an open access

regime,wheretherearenoentrylimitations(Flaaten2011).Eachfisherhastheincentive

to maximize individual profits, leading to an expansion in catch until there are no

economicprofits(Munro,LectureNotes,2016).Thiswouldmeanthatthestockwouldbe

14

belowthelevelofXMSY.Atthislevel,theyieldfromtheresourceislowerthanitcouldbe,

leadingtoadissipationoftherentthattheresourceisabletoproduce.

In theabsenceofpropertyrights totheresource,acooperationbetweenfishers is

unlikely(Waschman2003)andmostlikelyunstable.Now,iffishersinthemarketwould

want to harvest the resource at a level thatwouldmaximize profits in the sector by

cooperatingandreducingharvest,thereishighprobabilitythecooperationwillfallapart

leadingtoanequilibriumofadepletedresource(Waschman2003).Itwouldnotpayoff

forfisherstopostponeacatchinexpectationofcatchingalargerandmorevaluablecatch

inthefuture.Aslongastherearelimitedentrybarrierstotheresource,thecatchissimply

toolikelytobecaughtinthemeantimebysomeoneelse(Gordon,1954).Thiscreates

incentivesforfisherstoraceforacatchofthefish.Wheneveryfisherracesforthecatch

itwillmostlikelyleadtoanoverexploitationofthefishery,aresultcommonlyreferred

toastheCommonPropertyProblemorTragedyoftheCommons.

But where do we reach equilibrium? If economic profits are positive, there are

incentivesfornewentrants intothefishery,sotherewillbeaninfluxofnewentrants

untiltheeconomicrentis0.Thismeansthatifcurrentagentsintheindustryreachan

agreementonconservingthebiomassinordertogetpositiveeconomicrentthatunder

a free entry regimenewagentswill enter themarket andharvest up to thepoint of

complete dissipation of economic rent. If entry is open and free for everyone,

cooperation is hardly enforceable since all positive economic profit will attract new

entrants.Thisproblemarisesdespitetherationalprofit-maximizingbehaviourofagents

inthemarket.LikeH.S.Gordonsaidinhispaperfrom1954:,,Wealththatisfreeforallis

valuedbynonebecausehewhoisfoolhardyenoughtowaitforitspropertimeofusewill

onlyfindthatithasbeentakenbyanother.‘’(Gordon,1954,p.135)

Thetruetragedyofinefficientuseoffisheryresourcescanbeseenbylookingatthe

currentstateoftheworld’sfisheries.Asof2005,75percentoftheworld’sfisherieswere

eitheroverexploited,depleted,fullyexploitedorinrecovery.Theresultisasubstantial

economicwastethatwasestimatedtobe$50billionUSDfortheyear2004(Arnasonet

al. 2009) That means that the loss from the fishery resources of the world being

overexploited insteadofbeingusedsothateconomicrent ismaximized iscostingthe

societies that own those resources 50million dollars each year. Fishery nations area

15

therefore worse than if the resource were optimally harvested. This same paper,

publishedbytheWorldBankandFAOin2009foundthatthereissignificanteconomic

lossfromworldwidefisheries,aresourcethatisabletoyieldsubstantialreturns(Arnason

etal.2009).

16

3 IndividualTransferableQuotasasaSolution

3.1 CanPropertyRightsIncreaseEfficiencyofFisheries?

They way fisheries are managed has changed substantially over the years. In 1882

ThomasHuxley, a respectedbiologist at that time, stated at T.H.H.Opening Fisheries

ExhibitioninLondon1883,thattheworld’soceanfisherieswereinexhaustibleandany

regulationoffisherieswouldprovetolittlebenefit(Gordon1954).Thisviewmighthave

beenunderstandableatthetimesincetheworld’spopulationwassmallerandfishing

technologylessdeveloped.In1958and1960,theUNheldaConventionontheLawof

theSeathatwasmeantexaminethelawofthesea(UnitedNations1958).Itwasnotuntil

the1982UNConventionontheLawoftheSeathatcoastalstateshadtherighttoan

ExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)of200nauticalmiles.Eachcountrywasthereforegivena

propertyrighttothefisheryresourcethatwaswithintheirEEZ.Countrieshadtheright

toimplementtheirownmanagementregimesinsidetheirEEZ.(UnitedNations,1982)

Numerousattemptstoeffectivelyregulatefisheriesjurisdictionshavebeenmadeby

coastal states.Manyof theseapproaches tomanagecommercial fisheries focusedon

limitingtotalallowablecatchinthefisheryasanattempttopreventexcessivedepletion

oftheresource.However,thesetypeofinputcontrolshaveoftenfailedintheirobjective

tolimitthefishingeffortandincreaseefficiency(Graftonetal.2005).Traditionalcatch

controlsuchassettingacompetitivetotalallowablecatchhavenotbeenabletoprovide

the correct incentives for fishers to engage in efficient fishing practices. (Kompas &

Gooday,2007)Underthesetraditionalcatchcontrolmanagementsystems,thereislack

ofincentivesforfisherstoaddressthelongtermviabilityoftheresource(Graftonetal.

2005).Despitetheaimofthetotalallowablecatchtopreventfishersfromoverexploiting

the resource, it leads to theundesired sideeffectof creating incentives for fishers to

engageinaraceforthefish.

Anotherwayof regulating fisheries is the use of property rights to correct for the

perverseincentivesoffisherthatweredescribedinchapterchaper2.2.Thereisawell

recognized relationship between property rights and economic efficiency (Arnason,

2012).Alargepartoftheproblemwithinefficientexploitationofmarinefisheriesstems

fromthelackofpropertyrights.(Arnason,2000)Allocatingeffectivepropertyrightstoa

17

resourcelikefisheriescanprovetobeadifficulttask.Propertyrightsareinfactanumber

ofrightsand,generallyacceptedthattheirmostimportantcharacteristicsare:

Ø Security

Ø Exclusivity

Ø Transferability

Ø Durability

Propertyrightsaresaidtobeperfectpropertyrightsiftheyfullyfulfillallfourmeasures(Arnason2000).

3.2 IndividualTransferableQuotasAwayofaddressingthechallengeof fisheriesmanagementthroughpropertyrights is

implementingIndividualTransferableQuotas(ITQs).ITQsareasystemofquotaswhere

thequotaholdersaretheonlyonesentitledtousetheresource,andonlyuptothelimit

thequota indicates. In the1970s, Iceland,NewZealandand theNetherlandsbecame

someofthefirstcountriestoimplementanITQsysteminfisheries.Therelativesuccess

of ITQs compared to other management systems led them to be implemented in

hundredsoffisheriesbymorethan22majorfishingnations(SeaAroundUS)(Arnason

2013). ITQs are a rights-basedmanagement system in theway that they do not give

fishersperfectpropertyrightsintheresourcebutrathergivesthemaspecificquotathat

isexclusivelytheirpropertythattheycanuseforthemselvesorsellinthemarket.Under

anITQscheme,resourcemanagerssetatotalallowablecatchfortheseason,andinstead

ofmaking it a competitiveTAC, individualquotas are soldordistributed to fishersor

vesselowners.InanITQschemethequotasaretransferable,soquota-holdershavethe

abilitytoselltheirshareofquotainthemarketorbuymore.Therearemanyvariantsof

IndividualQuotasystems,butforsimplicity,thispaperwillconcentrateonanITQscheme

withtransferableanddivisible,long-termquotasthatarerepresentedasapercentageof

aTACsetbyresourcemanagers.

Oneof thecomplicationsofcreatingefficient fisheriesmanagementsystems is the

difficultyincollectinginformationonaresourcesuchasfisheries.Inorderforresource

managerstoselecttheoptimalTACfortheresource,theyneedtoobtain information

about the function of biomass growth, cost and harvesting functions of firms in the

market(Arnason1990).Obtainingsuchlargeamountofcomplexinformationcanprove

18

tobecostly.Oneofthecharacteristicsofagoodresourcemanagementsystemiscost-

effectiveness (Arnason 1990) An important way effective quota systems increase

efficiency is that they can decrease the need for information collected by resource

managers.

ITQsareinfactpropertyrightsoverashareofharvestintheresourceandifITQsfulfill

the four aforementioned criteria for effective property rights: security, exclusivity,

transferability and durability, to somedegree, they are considered to be high quality

property rights (Arnason 2005). A proportional ITQ schemewhere quota-holders are

allocatedashareoftheTACmeansthatquotaholdersare in factholdersofproperty

rightsofa flowofharvest from the resource (Graftonetal. 2000)A rationaldecision

makerholdingaquotasharewouldthereforewanttheresourcetobeharvestedinan

economicallyoptimalway.However,therearechallengestothis,namelythatITQsare

usuallynotperfectpropertyrights,thatis,theymayobtainthefourmaincharacteristics

ofpropertyrightsbutonlytosomelimitedextent(Arnason2005).Thisisinpartdueto

thenatureoffisheryresources,individualquota-holderscannothavecompletecontrol

over the conditionof fish stocksor theirmarineenvironmentand interactionsof fish

stockswiththemarineenvironment.Additionally,quota-holdersusuallydonotholdthe

powerorauthoritytoexcludeexcludeorcontrolothersuseoftheresource.Thisleadsto

ITQs, as property rights, having limited exclusivity (Arnason 2005).Oneway resource

managersandquotaholdershavemetthisproblemisbyimplementingsurveillanceand

strictenforcementonquota.AnotherwaythatanITQsystemincreasesefficiencyand

protects the resource is that they give agents in themarkets, the quota holders, an

incentive toparticipate in costof researchof the fisheryand theenforcementof the

quotas and TAC (Arnason 2012). ITQ systems where the quotas fulfill the four main

criteriaofpropertyrightstosomeextent,canalsocreateincentivesforthequotaholders

toworkcollaboratively(Munro,LectureNotes2016)

3.2.1 PricesofQuotaSharesGenerally,inacompetitivemarket,pricessendsignalstoprospectivebuyersaboutthe

qualityofaproduct.(Bagwell&Riordan1991)Inthecaseofquotamarkets,thepriceof

quota sharescansendsignalsabout thestateof the resourceaswellas futureprofit

prospectsforharvest.(Arnason2012)Ifresourceisbeingutilizedinanefficientmanner,

19

makingitlikelythatthefisherywillyieldhighreturnsinthefuture,thepricesofquota

sharesshouldbehigherthaniftheresourcewerebeingoverexploited.Becauseofthis,

pricesofquotasharescanactasatoolindeterminingtheviabilityoftheresourceandbe

a supplementary tool in determining the optimal TAC. Generally, a TAC that is

economically efficient in the long termwould be supported by quota holders.Quota

holderswillhaveincentivestosupportaTACthatmaximizestheflowofrentfromthe

resourceandthereforemaximizesthepriceofthequotashares(Arnason2012).Since

quotasareatypeofproperty,itfollowsthattheirpriceshouldreflectthepresentvalue

offutureharvestsofthefishery(Newelletal.2002).IntheNewZealandquotamarket,

ecologicaluncertaintieswerefoundtodecreasethepriceofquota(Newelletal.2002).

This should give the quota holders incentives to actively advocate for research and

scientificassessmentoffishstocks.Whenquotaholderstakepartinthecostofresearch

andsurveillance,becauseitwillbefortheirowngoodthroughthepowerofquotaprices,

itcanfurtherincreasethecost-effectivenessoftheITQsystem.

3.3 Iceland’sExperiencewithanITQSystemIcelandisasmallopeneconomyof330,000inhabitants(StatisticsIceland).Despiteit’s

small size, Iceland has been one of the leading countries in sustainable fisheries

management. Up until 1976 the Icelandic fisheries were essentially managed as a

commonpoolresource.In1976,Icelandextendedthenationalfisheriesjurisdictionto

200nauticalmiles.Atthattime,Icelandicfisherieswereutilisedbysizeableforeignfleets

as well as Icelandic fishing vessels (Arnason 1993). The measures taken in Icelandic

fisheries in the1970sdidnotgo far insolving thecommonpoolproblemof Icelandic

fisheries. After a substantial decline in the cod stock and reduction in the economic

performanceofthenation’sfisheriesthatcausedthecountryeconomichardship,new

measuresinfisheriesmanagementwereneeded.Anindividualvesselquotasystemwas

introduced in the herring fishery in 1976 (Arnason 2008). This was the first step of

implementationofaquotasystemfortheIcelandicfisheries.Icelandwasamongthefirst

countries to implement a quota system for fisheries. In 1975 the Marine Research

InstitutepublishedareportontheconditionofIcelandicfishstocks.Thereportdescribed

the bad states of fish stocks due to overfishing and called for immediate action on

fisheriesmanagement.(Agnarsson2000)

20

ImplementationofquotasforIcelandicfisherieswasasfollows:

1976:Individualvesselquotasfortheherringfishery.

1979:Vesselquotasintheherringfisherymadetransferable.

1980:Individualvesselquotasinthecapelinfishery.

1984:Individualtransferablevesselquotasforallfishingvesselsabove10gross

registeredtonnes(GRT)

1986:Vesselquotasinthecapelinfisherymadetransferable

1991:ITQsystemadoptedforallfisherieswithlong-term,transferablequotas.

Source:MinistryofFisheries,Iceland.Arnason,1993.

ThemarineindustryhasbeenofgreatimportancetotheeconomyofIceland,andis

consideredtohavebeenthesinglemostimportantindustryofIcelandinthe20thcentury.

(Agnarsson&Arnason2005)Duringthelatterhalfofthecentury,themarineindustry

accounted for about 80% of the merchandise export revenues of Iceland (Statistics

Iceland).Duetothislargeshareofthemarineindustryinexportsandeconomicactivity

in Iceland, changes in the fisherymanagement systemhad substantial effects on the

economyandwelfareofcitizens.

TheTACoftheITQsysteminIcelandisdecidedbytheMinistryofFisheriesthatusually

follows suggestions made by the Marine Research Institute (MRI). The enforcement

systemiscarriedoutbyFiskistofa,whichoperatesbothonboardfishingvesselsandat

thedockside.Allmarinecatchmustbeweighedatit’sportoflandinginordertocontrol

the amount of fish landed and provide effective surveillance (Arnason& Runolfsson,

2003).Quotaholdershavestrongincentivestosupporttheenforcementandmonitoring

system since it increases theeffectivenessof their quota and is likely to increase the

value.Enforcementandsurveillancecontributestothedegreeofexclusivityofthequota.

Quota-holders’incentivestoparticipateincostsofenforcementandsurveillancecanalso

playaroleinincreasingthecost-effectivenessoftheITQsystem.InIceland,theMinistry

ofFisheriescollects fees fromquotaholders to fund theenforcementsystems.When

comparingNorway,IcelandandNewfoundland,Arnasonetal.(2003)foundthatthecost

offisheriesmanagementwasthelowestofallinIceland,suggestingasuccessoftheITQ

systemscostefficiency.

21

There are a few ways to measure the success of an ITQ system such as the one

implementedinIcelandicfisheries.Oneislookingatreductioninfishingeffortandlength

ofthefishingseason.Thiswouldsuggestthattheincentivetoraceforthefishisnolonger

inplace.Also,sincethemaingoalofimplementinganITQsystemistoincreaseeconomic

efficiencyofthefisheries(Runolfsson&Arnason2003),thereshouldbeincreasedquality

andcostefficiencyinthemarket.Thiscanbeseenindecreaseofovercapitalizationof

fishinggear,decreasedmanagementcostsandahighervalueoflandedfish.ITQsystems

havealsobeen found to lead tohigherqualityof landedcatch, larger fish stocksand

increasedco-ordinationbetweenlandingsandmarketdemand(Arnason2008).

3.3.1 PerformanceoftheIcelandicITQSystem

WhenlookingattheevolutionoftheIcelandiceconomysincetheimplementationofthe

ITQsystem,therearemanypositivetrends,suggestingincreasedeconomicefficiencyof

the marine sector. Landed value per fisherman has increased steadily since the

implementationof the ITQ system, suggestingan increased labourproductivity in the

industry(StatisticsIceland).Therearealsosignsofanincreaseinefficiencyofthemarine

sector.From1981to2011,themassofcodcacheddecreasedfrom460,000tonnesto

180,000tonnes,whileexportvaluedoubled(Sjávarklasinn,2013).Thisincreaseinexport

valuedespitedecreaseincatchcanbeattributedtoamoreefficientuseofthecatch.In

theyearsfollowingtheITQimplementation,productivityofthesectorincreasedsteadily

(Runolfsson1999),asshowninfigure2.

Figure2:Productivityinthemarinesector.Source:Runolfsson(1999)

22

Figure3showschangesincatchesofdifferentstocksinIcelandicfisheriesfrom1950

to2010.Despitethesefrequentincreasesanddecreasesofthetotalcatchtherearestill

positivesignsofincreasedefficiencyandeconomicrentsinthefisheries.Therehasbeen

an increase in marketing for Icelandic fish products, increasing the relative value in

international markets. (Sjávarklasinn, 2013) Positive incentives for marketing and

creatingvaluecanbeattributedtothefactthatquota-holdershaveaclaimofthefuture

valueof the fisheries. Themarine industryof Iceland contributes a significant part of

economic activity in Iceland, averaging around 15% of direct contribution toGDP for

1970-2000 (Agnarsson&Arnason 2005). Thiswould suggest that increased economic

efficiencyofthesectorwouldhavenoticeableimpactsoneconomicwelfareofIceland.

Arnason(2008)foundastrongcorrelationbetweenperiodsofhighrealGDPgrowthand

high realvalueofquotas, suggesting that thiscorrelationalongwith the fact that the

quotasystemhasbeenaninstrumentincreatingfinancialcapital,isoneofthereasons

fortherelativelyhighrealGDPgrowth.

HowcanwemeasurethesuccessoftheITQsystemandhowcanweknowthatthese

positivesignsofIcelandicfisheriescanbeattributedtotheITQsystem?Inordertorealize

Figure3:CatchofdifferentfishstocksinIcelandicwaters1950-2010.Source:SeaAroundUS.

23

whetherproductivitychangescanbeattributedtoamoreefficientmanagement is to

comparethesechangestothechangesbeforetheimplementationoftheITQsystem.

Figure 4: Indices for productivity (whole line), Stock size (broken line) and total catch size (multiplebrokenline).Source:Þjóðhagsstofnun(1999),p.167.

Figure4describesthechangesinindicesforproductivity,stocksizeandcatchsizefrom

1973-1995.Inthe1980sthereissignificantincreaseincatchlevelsandalsoanincreasein

productivityinthesector.Intheyears1983-1988thereisverysmallincreaseinthecatch

amountwhilethere ismorethan56%increase intheproductivity index.Atthissame

timethereareothersignificantchangesgoingoninthemarineindustryinIcelandsuch

asincreaseinatseafreezingofthecatch,investmentinnewtechnologyofvesselsand

more which makes it difficult to pinpoint a causality relationship between the

implementation of the ITQ system and this large increase in productivity

(Þjóðhagsstofnun 1999). However, overall, the evidence from Iceland since the

implementationofanITQsystemshowsapositivedevelopmentinthemarineindustry,

therehasbeenincreasedmarketingofIcelandicseafoodabroadandmoreefficientuse

of ingredients leading to increased value of exportedmarine products (Sjávarklasinn,

2013).ThissuggestthattheITQsystemchangedtheincentivesoffisherstoengageina

raceforthefishandinsteadcreatedincentivestoincreaseeconomicefficiency,increase

thevalueofthecatchandusefishingcapitalmoreefficiently(Þjóðhagsstofnun,1999).

24

4 Ecosystem-BasedApproachestoFisheriesManagement

Withinthemarineecosystem,therearecomplexinteractionsbetweenorganisms,and

fishingpracticescanhavelong-termeffectsonhowvariousfunctionsoftheecosystem.

Ecosystem-based fisheries management requires resource managers to consider

interactionsoftargetcommercialspeciesofthefisherywithpredators,competitorsand

prey species (Fluharty et al. 1996). Themain objective of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries

Management(EAFM)istosustainhealthymarineecosystems,preventthedegradation

ofecosystems,reduceexcessiveby-catchandaccountforimpactsandrequirementsof

non-targetspecies,habitatsandtrophicinteractions(Pikitchetal.2004).EAFMcanbe

usedascomplementtoexistingfisheriesmanagement(Fluhartyetal.1996).EAFMhave

playedaroleinrestoringecosystemsthathavebeendegradedthroughoverfishingand

damaging fishing practices (FAO, 2014). The target of EAFM is not only to manage

commercialfishstocksbutrathermanagetheecosystemasawhole.Oneoftheconcerns

of advocates for EAFM is that fishingmethods, such as bottom-trawling,might have

damaging effects on the ecosystem that are potentially irreversible. Corals can be

especially vulnerable to fishing practices such as bottom-trawling due to their slow

growthwhichmakestherecoveryofcoralsfromdamagetakealongtime(Steingrímsson

&EInarsson2004).Bottom-trawlingcanalsodamagehabitatsandreducebiodiversity

(NordicMinistryCommittee2008),potentiallyalteringthebiotaoftheecosystem.

However, EAFM cannot solve all the problems of currentmanagement systems in

fisheries(Fluhartyetal.1996),buttheycanbeanpartofthewayfisheriesaremanaged.

Graftonetal.(2005)arguethatEAFMwouldnotworkontheirownasanalternativeto

traditionalcommercialfisheriesmanagementandisunlikelytochangefishers’behaviour

thatdamagehabitats.

WhatarethemainconcernsforadvocatingforEAFMandcouldrights-basedfishery

managementsystemssuchasindividualquotaspotentiallysolvetheproblemsthatEAFM

aretargeting?InthischapterIwillmakeanattempttoanswerthesequestionsandreview

howBritishColumbiaimplementedaquotaforhabitatby-catchinit’sbottomtrawling

fisheriesandwhetherasimilarsystemcouldbeapplicableforIcelandicfisheries.

25

4.1.1 EffectsoffishingontheEcosystem

Asignificantproblemofmanymodernfishingmethodsistheamountofby-catchthatis

caught.Evidencesuggeststhatthemostdamagingfishingpracticeinmodernfisheriesis

bottom-trawling(CSAS2010),eventhoughotherfishinggearcanalsocausedamage.Due

tothenatureofthegearusedforbottom-trawling,itcancatchalargeamountofother

animalssuchasnon-marketablefish,undersizedfish,corals,sponges,seagrassandmore

(Stilesetal.2010).Itisestimatedthatbottomtrawlingisresponsibleforuptohalfofall

discarded marine life in the world’s fisheries (Kelleher 2005). This large amount of

discardedmarinelifeandthedisruptionthattrawlingcausesthenaturalhabitatofocean

organismscanleadtolargeamountsofeconomicwasteandirreversibledamagetothe

ecosystem.Becauseoftheuncertaintyaboutinteractionsofcommercialfishspecieswith

theecosystem,damagestotheecosystemcanhavelong-lastingnegativeconsequences

forcommercialfisheries.Whenfishinggearcausesdamagetotheecosystem,it’scausing

anegativeexternality.Theseexternalities,suchasdamagestocorals,habitatsofmarine

species are categorized as techno-ecological externalities (Seijo et al. 1998). These

externalities affect the environment of commercial and non-commercial species and

mightaffecttheirwayoffeeding,reproducingandsurvivingintheocean(Wallaceetal.

2015).Manyofthespeciesthat live incommercialmarinefisheriesaredependenton

healthy habitats in order to survive. These externalities can arise even in fisheries

managedbyeffectiveITQsystems.OnemightthinkthatanITQsystemwouldprevent

suchexternalitiessincetheycanaffecttherecolonizationandrecruitment(Botsfordet

al.1997)whichcoulddiminishreturnsfromthefishery.However,thatisnotalwaysthe

case,andcaninsomepartbeattributedtotheproblemofuncertaintyabouttheeffects

offishinggearonthemarineecosystem.

4.1.2 ExistenceValueIntheanalysisofecosystem-basedapproachestofisheriesmanagement it isusefulto

introduce the concept of existence value. Existence value is the benefit that society

enjoys knowing that a resource, a good or a commodity exists (Kopp 1992) Marine

resourcescanhaveexistencevalueasandtosociety,theknowledgethattheecosystem

isprotectedfromdamageandspeciesspeciesareprotectedfromextinctioncanhave

substantialexistencevalue(Munro, lecturenotes,2016)Organismssuchascoralsand

26

sponges have negligible direct commercial value but theymay have existence value.

Usually, this existence value will increase as awareness about ecosystem damages is

raised. Existence value is a falling function of the existence of a thing, x. When the

existenceofxisgetsclosetozero,it’sexistencevalue,undernormalcircumstances,will

beincreasing.(Munro,LectureNotes2016)Whenmarineresourcesandnon-commercial

organismswithinanecosystemholdanexistencevaluetosociety,itcanhaveinfluence

onpoliticalactionsregardingfisheriesmanagement.Existencevalueofthemarinebiota

contributes to the intangible value of the ecosystem, but these values are almost

impossibletoestimatewithoutdatasetsandacceptedvaluationmethods(Arnasonetal.

2009).Figure3showsanexampleofanexistencevaluewhereΦ(x)istheexistencevalue.

Figure5:Asketchofanexistencevaluefunction.Φ’(x)Representsexistencevalueandxistheamountthatbearsthevalue.

4.2 ChallengesofEcosystem-BasedApproachesPredictingbehavioursandinteractionsinanecosysemisanimpossibletask,evenwith

extensiveresearch(Fluhartyetal.1996).Eventhoughit’sgenerallyacceptedthatcertain

fishingmethodsadverselyaffect theecosystem,resulting inpossibleeconomic losses,

estimatingtheeconomicbenefitofecosystemandhabitatprotectionisnotpossiblefor

most fisheries (Holland & Schnier 2006). An estimate of $50 m. USD made in 2009

(Arnason et al. 2009) that total economic losses due to inefficient and unsustainable

fishingpracticescouldevenbelargerwhenpossibleeconomiclossesduetoecosystem

damageandintangiblevaluesofecosystembiotaistakenintoaccount.

Traditionalapproachestoprotectingvulnerableareasandhabitatsistheimplementation

ofMarineProtectedAreas(MPAs)(Holland&Schnier2006).Fishingisthenlimitedwithin

27

those areas by law. It has been argued that reserve areas such asMPAs do not deal

directlywith therootcauseof theproblem(Wilenetal.2006), theexternality that is

causedbyfishing.

Becauseoftheunavoidablechallengesofuncertaintyandhighinformationcostswhen

it comes to themarineecosystem, it isof interestweather rights-basedmanagement

systems such as quota systems, could bemore cost-effective and create the correct

incentivestoalterfishers’behaviourtoactivelyprotecttheecosystemfromirreversible

damages.HollandandSchnier(2006)arguethat,asamanagementsystemformarine

habitats,asystemofIndividualHabitatQuotas(IHQs)wouldbemorecost-effectivethan

traditionalMPAsbyutilizingeconomicincentivesoffishers.

4.3 TheHabitatConservationBy-catchLimitinBritishColumbiaBritishColumbia,Canada,hasbeenafrontrunnerinimplementingaversionofahabitat

quotaforit’sbottomtrawlfisheries,whichhasseensuccessinreducingcoralandsponge

by-catch,aswellasreducingthesizeofvulnerableareastrawled(Wallaceetal.2015).

ThefisheryresourceoffthecoastofBritishColumbia,Canadahasbeenoperatedunder

anITQschemesince1997(FisheriesandOceans(DFO)Canada).InBritishColumbia,the

fisheryresourceisanimportantcomponentofeconomicproductionandemployment.

Thefisheriesandaquaculturesectorprovided$667.4millionCADtotheprovince’sGDP

in2011and13,900individualsareemployedintheindustry.Approximately300active

bottomtrawlvesselsoperateinthefishery(DFOCanada)andtargetavarietyofdifferent

species including rockfish, lingcod, Pollock, sablefish, dogfish, skate and Pacific cod.

(Wallaceetal2015).Thetotalquotaallocationis151,000tonsin2014formarketable

speciesandthere isanextraquotaallocationfornonmarketablespeciesasmeansof

managingby-catch.Apartof the fisheriesmanagementsystem inBC isonboardand

docksidemonitoring,whichisasimilarenforcementsystemsuchastheoneoperatedin

Icelandanddescribedinchapter3.3.Individualmonitoringemployeescountallcatchby

the vessels. Individual vessel owners are held accountable for all catch recorded by

monitors,bothretainedandreleased fish.Dueto thismeasurethere isaccuratedata

availableonallcatchesmadebythefisheryindustryandalsoallby-catchofbothsponges

andcoralsandnonmarketablespeciescaught(FAOCanada).

28

AroundBritishColumbiathereisalsoanabundanceofspongesandcoralsthatmake

upanimportantfactorofthemarineecosystem.Thesecoralsandspongescreateathree

dimensionalstructurethatcanaffecthydrodynamicsneartheoceanfloor.Thisimportant

coral and sponge structure plays an important role in a fish’s lifespan, it provides

substrateforeggcases,shelterfrompredatorsandwatercurrents(Wallaceetal.2015).

Damagedonedothesecoralsandspongescouldcausedisruptioninthenaturallifespan

ofthefishandaffecttheyieldformtheresource.Thebottom-trawlingisconsidereda

threattotheviabilityofcoralsandspongesthatserveashabitats forawiderangeof

differentspecies(Ardon2005).Inthelasttwodecades,therehasbeenaneverincreasing

scientificattentionbroughttotheuniqueHexactinellidspongereefsandcoralsandhow

theycanbeaffectedbybottomtrawling(Ardon,2005).

Priortothe21stcenturytherewaslimitedknowledgeabouttheimpactsofbottom

trawlingecosystemintheseaaroundBritishColumbia.(Ardon,2005)Duetoincreasing

attention the ocean floor got from scientists in recent years, Environmental Non-

GovernmentOrganizations(ENGOs)startedcampaigningforincreasedprotectionofthe

ocean’sorganismsandcriticizingthebottomtrawlindustry.

In2010,theCanadianGroundfishResearchandConservationSociety(CGRCS),ENGOs,

andtheDeep-seaTrawlersAssociationinitiateddiscussiontofindawaytoresolvethe

issue of damage done by trawlers to the marine environment. The result of this

cooperationbetweenagentsinthebottomtrawlindustryandENGOswasacreationofa

collaborative environment between agents in the bottom trawling industry and

environmentalresearchandconservationorganizations.Animportantcomponentofthe

collaboration was the creation of ecosystem based boundaries for bottom trawling.

Unliketheformerboundariesthatweresetbythegovernment.Theseecosystem-based

spatialboundarieswerecreatedthroughcooperationbetweenENGOsandthebottom

trawlingindustry.Allpartiesanalysedandshareddatafrommappingandresearchofthe

area (Wallace et al. 2015). This made for a transparent cooperative process of

implementationofnewspatialboundariesthatlimitedbottomtrawlingaroundBC.The

agreementalsodefinedanencounterprotocolthataimedtoprovidemoreinformation

aboutvulnerablemarineecosystems.Accordingtotheprotocol,whenvesselencounters

29

alargeamountofcoralsandspongesinit’scatch,morethan20kg,itmustfollowaset

ofstepsaimedtocollectmoredataaboutthespecificarea(Wallaceetal.2015).

Another component of the collaborative agreement was an implementation of a

habitatquota,referredtoasHabitatConservationBy-catchLimit(HCBL)(Wallaceetal.

2015).TheHCBLestablishedafleet-videand individual limitsoncatchesofcoralsand

sponges by bottom trawlers. Thismeant that not only were the vessels subject to a

specificquotaoffishbutalsoaquotafortheby-catchofcoralsandsponges.Becausethe

bottomtrawlfisheryhadoperatedunderaITQschemewithbothonboardanddockside

monitoringsince1997thereisextensiveinformationavailableonhistoricalspongeand

coralcatchbybottomtrawlers.In2012theHBCLtotalquotawassetto4500kgforall

vesselscombined,thelongtermgoalwastogettotalcatchdownto884kgperseason.

(Wallaceetal2015).

Someofthemainobjectivesofthebottomtrawlingagreementwereasfollow:

1. Reduceamountofcoralsandspongescatchinthebottomtrawlindustry.

2. Restricttheareastrawled.

3. Ensurethatbottomtrawlersdonotdisproportionallyaffectaspecifichabitat

type.

4. Developawayforthebottomtrawlindustry,ENGOsandFisheriesandOceans

Canadatoaddressandactonhabitatprotection.

4.3.1 ResultsoftheAgreementinBritishColumbia

Before the implementationof theHBCL inBritishColumbia,differentapproacheshad

been taken to address the ecosystem damage and by-catch of the bottom trawling

fishery.Firstly,in1996theGroundfishTrawlObserverProgramwasimplemented(DFO

Canada).Underthisprogram,allvesselswererequiredtohaveanon-boardobserverthat

wouldrecordallby-catch;corals,spongesaswellasnon-marketablefish.Secondly,the

bottom-trawl industrywas asked to voluntarily follow recommended closures around

knownsensitivecoralreefs.Thesevoluntaryclosureswerenoteffectiveandweremade

mandatory in2002 (Ardonet al. 2004).According to a researchdonebyArdonet al.

publishedin2007theystatethat,,Whilehelpful,the2002hexactinellidclosuresdidnot

bythemselvesadequatelyminimizethecoralandspongeby-catchissue.’’(Ardonetal.,

30

2007,p.7)Theyalsoattempttomeasuretheeconomiceffectoftheclosures,butdueto

the lack of precise information on fish behavior and their interaction with marine

habitats,theresultsarelimited.

Whenclosingoffzones togroundfish trawling itmustbeaddressedthatmany fish

speciesareverymobileandcanmoveinandoutofthezone.Also,theknowledgeonthe

recoveryofmarinehabitatsandhowthewholeecosysteminteractsislimited.Thereare

twoaspectsoftheeconomicimpactsofsuchclosurezones:Firstly,theclosuresreduce

the sizeof fishablearea, and therefore limiting the sizeof the fishingare for vessels.

Becauseof fishmobilityhowever, thismightnotbeaseffective for theprotectionof

mobilespeciesasfornonmobileones.Also,vesselownersarelikelytobeabletocatch

theirquotasoutsideoftheclosurezoneduetothemobilityofspecies.Secondly,ifthe

closuresareeffectiveinprotectingthemarinehabitatinsidethem,leadingtoincreased

lifespan and stock size, it can lead to “spill-over” effects when the fish leaves the

protectedzoneingreaternumbersthanbefore(Munro,LectureNotes2016).

31

Table1:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchfrom1996-2004.Data:Adronetal(2007)

YEAR AMOUNTOFCORALSANDSPONGESTAKENASBY-CATCH

1996 7,894kg.–ObserverProgramBegins

1997 39,444kg.

1998 22,178kg.

1999 21,813kg.

2000 78,778kg.–VoluntarySpongeClosuresimplemented

2001 101,332kg.

2002 23,155kg.–LegalSpongeclosuresimplemented

2003 17,216kg.

2004 10,570kg.

Table1showsamountofhabitatby-catchfromBCbottom-trawlingandchangesthrough

theyearsofimplementationoftheObserverProgram,voluntaryandlegalclosures.

Table2:AmountofCoralsandSpongestakenasby-catchaftertheimplementationofHBCLagreement.Data:Wallaceetal.(2015)

Intermsofareatrawledtherewasa20.6%reductionintotalareatrawledinallwaters,

from39,927km2to31,633.Totaldeepwaterhabitatstrawledsawa65%reductionfrom

4,018km2to1,395km2andsizetotalcontinentalslopehabitatareatrawledreducedby

18%from15,214km2to12,413km2.(Suzuki,2015)Figure6showsthechangesinarea

trawledbeforeandaftertheagreement.

YEAR AMOUNTOFCORALSANDSPONGESTAKEN

2012 500kg.

2013 280kg.

2014 270kg.

32

Figure6:Spatialmapofcoralandspongezonesandriskassessment.Source:Wallaceetal.(2015)

What is also important about theHCBLpart of the agreement, is that it takes the

responsibilityofhabitatprotectionfromthefisherymanagementandmovesitoverto

agentsinthemarket.Whenavesselusesallofit’shabitatby-catchquotait’sownersface

theundesirablechoicebetweenbuyinganadditionalquotaortyingtheirshiptothedock

fortherestoftheseasonwhichcouldcausethemsignificantloss(Wallaceetal.2015).In

thisway,theHBCLgivesindividualfishersandcaptainsincentivetousetheirextensive

knowledgeof the locationsof spongesandcorals fromtheirexperienceoutat sea to

adjusttheirfishingpattern.AnalysisoftheeffectivenessoftheHBCLsuggeststhatsuch

self-interestdrivenincentivestoavoidspongeandcoralcatchcansignificantlyreducethe

amountofcoralandspongecatchofthebottomtrawlingindustry(Wallaceetal.2015).

The agreement is also supposed to provide flexibility for individual vessel owners. If

fishersassessthattherevenuefromthefishtheymightcatchinanareofhistoricallyhigh

33

amountofby-catch, ishigherthantheexpectedcostofadditionalquotatocover the

expectedcatch,thentherationaldecisionwouldtotrawlthearea.Thisisbecauseatthe

timeofmaking theagreement, vesselowners required some flexibility to the closure

areas in order to prevent economic loss due to the areas with the highest historical

amount of fish harvest being closedoff to protect sponges and corals (Wallace et al.

2015).

4.3.2 TheTheory:WhatMadeThisPossible?

The measures taken collaboratively by the Environmental Non-Government

Organizations (ENGOs) and agents in the bottom trawling industry in B.C., were

essentiallymadepossibleduetotheactionstakenbytheENGOsthat internalizedthe

externalityand internalized theexternalitycausedbybottomtrawlingandcreatedan

incentive forCGRCS toengagewith theENGOs in creatinganagreementon reducing

habitat damage (Wallace et al. 2015). Theprimarymarket for seafoodproducts from

bottomtrawlinginB.C.isalongthewestcoastoftheUnitedStates.ENGOscampaigned

inraisingawarenessandimplementingaSeafoodWatchthatcertifiedwhetheraseafood

producthadbeencaughtinawaythatavoidedmajordamages.Ifaproductdidnotmeet

the SeafoodWatch criteria, some stores and restaurantswould not agree to sell the

product.VesselownersthatdidnotcomplywiththeprotectingmeasuresthattheENGOs

and the SeafoodWatch required as a minimum, faced decreasing demand for their

productandevenlowerprices.Thisthreatoflossinthemarketbecameanincentive

fortheCGRCStocollaboratewiththeENGOs(Wallaceetal.2015).Inthisway,thecost

wasbornebythevesselowners.However,itmustalsobeaddressedthattheITQsystem

in B.C. had created an incentive for the bottom trawl fishers towork collaboratively

(Wallaceetal.2015).Therewasalsolimitedinterventionbythefisheriesmanagementof

B.C. Externalities such as those imposed by the bottom trawling industry can be

complicated tomanagedue to scarcityof informationonhowserious thesedamages

actuallyareandhowlonghabitatstaketorecover(Ardron,2005).Anotherimportant

factoristhatresearchisusuallylackingandisnotonlyexpensiveandrequirestechnical

gadgetsbutitisalsoaresearchthatmustbedoneoveralongperiodoftime.Department

of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) has identified that there is substantial lack of

informationandresearchoncoralsandspongesaroundBritishColumbia.(Fisheriesand

34

OceansCanada(DFO),2008)Manyaspectsofthestructure,distributionandbiologyof

coralsandspongesthatformontheoceanfloorissimplynotwellunderstood.Inareport

publishedin2015bytheDFOitstates:

The paucity of information on the distribution of cold-water corals andspongescombinedwiththecurrentlackofspeciesinformationinmonitoringprogramsmakeitdifficulttofullyassesstheextentofanthropogenicimpactsand other risks to cold-water corals and sponges, including measures toenhance conservation. To address these gaps in knowledge, DFO Sciencemustdevelopastrategicapproachtoproviderelevantinformation.(DFO,p.30,2008)

Because of this lack of information about the precise biology of these corals and

sponges,assessingtheextentandprecisecostsoftheexternality,thedamagedoneto

thesespongesandcorals,wasimpossibletoassess.Duetothenatureofthesituation,it

mustbeassessedthatcreatingincentivesinthemarketforthevesselownerstogather

informationandaddress theproblem ismorecost-effective than implementingavast

researchprojectandthenimplementamanagementsystemsetbythegovernment.

When theexternalityhadbeen internalizedbyENGOs, agents in thebottom trawl

industry had a strong incentive to cooperate with ENGOs in finding a collaborative

solutionthatwouldnotonlykeepdamagestotheecosystematminimumbutalsocreate

aviablemarketenvironmentforthefishingproductinforeseeablefuture(Wallaceetal.

2015).WithoutadurableITQsysteminplace,theseincentiveswouldnothavebeenin

placesincethefuturevalueofthefishwouldnotbeofasmuchinteresttothevessel

owners. This example is another prove howproperty rights, in the formof ITQs, can

createanincentiveforvesselownerstobeinvolvedinresearchandconservationofthe

resourceandinthecaseofecosystemdamage,alsothemarineenvironment.Wecan

alsolookatthisfromtheaspectofmanagingaproperty.Whenquotasgivevesselowners

aneffectivepropertyrighttotheresource,itisinthequotaholdersbestinteresttothat

the resource is used in a sustainablemanner, just as if itwas a share in a company.

Managing not only the commercial fish catch but also by-catch can be compared to

analysingaportfolioofinvestments.(Munro,LectureNotes2016)

35

4.4 EcosystemManagementinIcelandThereare severaldifferent typesof regulations thathavebeen implemented into the

Icelandicfisheriesmanagementsystemwiththegoalofprotectingvariousorganismsthat

are a part of themarine ecosystem, to conserve habitats and ensure that there isn’t

excessive damage done to themarine environment. One of the approaches taken in

Icelandistoclosecertainareasthatareconsideredvulnerabletogroundfishtrawlingand

otherinvasivefishingequipement.Areasclosedtofishingequipmenthavealonghistory

inIcelandicfisheriesandtherehavebeenclosedareasofsomesortformanydecades

(CommitteeappointedbyMinisterof Fisheriesof Iceland,2005).Theobjectiveof the

closuresistomaintaintheconservationofvulnerablehabitatsaswellasprotectingsmall

fish(MinistryofForeignAffairs,2009).TheareasareclosedbylawsetbytheParliament

and based on recommendations from the Marine Research Institute. There are also

regulations on allowable trawling areas based on size of trawlers and in 1997, the

ParliamentofIcelandpassedalawstatingthatbottomtrawlingwouldonlybeallowed

withincertainspecifiedareasandatspecifiedtimes(Alþingi,1997).

EstimatingthevalueofvariousorganismssuchascoralsaroundIcelandisadifficult

taskbecausetheprecisebiologyanddevelopmentofthesecoralsarelargelyunknown

(Jónasson et al. 205). Corals are generally slow growing and are therefore expecially

vulnerabletodamageduetolongrecoverytime.Researchondistributionofcoralareas

knownbyfishersaroundIcelandshowedthatlargeareasofcoralshavebeendestructed

andoutof11knowncoralareasthatwereknownin1970thereare4stillingoodstand

(Steingrímsson&Einarsson,2004).

Analyzingtheeffectsoftheseclosuresonthefishstocksprovestobequitedifficult

duetoscarcityofresultsfromresearchconductedonthefishstocksthatareaffectedby

theseclosures.Duringtheyearsof1993to1994theIcelandicMarineResearchInstitute

conductedaresearchoncodbothinsidetheprotectedclosureareasandfromthefishing

area.Accordingtotheresultsthecodthatlivedinsidetheclosureareawaslesslikelyto

berecoveredlaterasasmallfishthanthecodthatwastrackedinsidethefishingarea.

Looking at data from Icelandic Marine Research Institute from closure areas East of

Icelandshownomeasureablechangeinvarietyofmarinespecies,quantityoffishandits

distributionwhencomparingclosureareastothefishingareas.(Jónassonetal.2005).

36

Icelandhasextensiveregulatoryenvironmentwhenitcomestoensuringsustainability

ofthemarineenvironment.However,therehavebeendamagestohabitatsaroundthe

country that may take long time to recover (Jónasson et al. 2005) (Steingrímsson &

Einarsson,2004).AroundIcelandarecoralareasofLopheliapertusathatmainlygrowsin

the Norteast-Atlantic Ocean and in North Seas. It’s growth around Iceland might be

importantinconservationofthespecies(Jónassonetal.2005).

4.4.1 PossibleApplicationofaHabitatQuotainIceland

Considering the relative success off the Habitat By-catch Limit agreement in British

Columbia,itisofinterestwhetherasimilaragreementcouldbemadefortheIcelandic

groundfishfisheries.Wallace’setal.(2015)analysisoftheapplicationandresultsfrom

thehabitatprotectingagreementidentifiesthefollowintcriteriathatwerevitalinmaking

theagreementpossible:

1. Extensivedataonhistoricalby-catch

a. IcelandicMarineResearchInstitutehasconductedresearchonthe

affectsofbottomtrawlingontheoceanflooraroundIceland.Fiskistofa

conductssurveillanceonharvestsbothonboardvesselsanddockside

surveillance.

2. Thirdparty’sabilitytobringpressureonthebottomtrawlingindustry

a. ENGOsinterventioninthemarketforharvestsfromthebottomtrawling

industrywasavitalpartinthecreationoftheagreement.Bycreatinga

pressureonthebottomtrawlingindustry,anincentivefortheindustryto

cooperatewithENGOswascreated.MostofBCtrawlharvestsweresold

alongtheWestCoastofNorthAmerica,aplaceofconsiderablyhigh

consumerawareness,andthereforitisintheindustry’sbestinterestthat

theytrytoprotectthemarineenvironment,orelseretailerswon’tbuy

theproductoffthem.

b. Currently,thereisnosuchcriteriaforsustainablefishsuchasthe

SeafoodWatchinIceland.(Consumersdonothavetheoptionof

boycottingseafoodthathasnotbeencertifiedastheharvestof

sustainablefisherypractices.)Implementingasimilarregulationismore

likelytobesuccessfuliftheexistencevalueofthemarineenvironmentis

37

considerablehigh.Also,recentresearchhasunveiledthatoneofthe

largestcold-watercoralsintheworldcanbefoundintheNorth-Atlantic.

(NordicMinistryCommittee2008)Thisislikelytoincreasetheexistence

valueoftheocean.

3. Possibilityofcooperationbetweenagentsintheindustry

a. ForanarrangementsuchastheHabitatProtectionAgreementtowork,

agentsinthefisherymustbeabletosustainalongtermcooperative

gamewithoutbetrayingtheagreement.Undersuchcooperative

agreementthereisalwaysthethreatoffreeridingandthecooperation

subsequentlybreakingdown.

4. Effectiveregulatoryenvironment

a. IcelandicfisheriesaremanagedunderanITQsystem.

b. Thereiseffectiveregulatoryenvironmentandextensivemonitoringand

surveillance.

ThereconditionssuggestingthatasimilaragreementsuchastheonereachedinB.C.

whereahabitatby-catchquotawascreated,couldbeimplementedforIcelandicbottom

trawl fisheries. Iceland has a special position regarding implementation of such

agreement since it’s fisheries are managed under an ITQ system and there is also

extensivesurveillanceanddatacollectingonallcatchbothonboardandattheportof

landing.However,thesamepressure imposedbyENGOsonBCbottomtrawl industry

thatcreatedanincentivefortheindustrytoenterintonegotiationsisnotasapparentin

Iceland.

Anagreementsuchastheone inBCcouldbebeneficial to Iceland intwodifferent

ways:

1. Decreasingtheeffectsofbottomtrawlingontheecosystem

Whentheinteractionoforganismswiththeecosystemisnotfullyknown,it

canhavenegativeconsequencesiftheecosystemispermanentlydamaged.Some

damageshavealreadybeendonetocoralswithinIcelandicfisheriesjurisdiction.

(Jónassonetal.,2005)

38

2. Avoidingeconomiclossesifdamageisrealizedlater

Ifgroundfishtrawlingdamagesleadstobaddamageonlytoberealizedafter

thedamageisdoneitmightleadtoanin-seasonclosureoftheareasurrounding

thedamagedarea,andwhenareasareclosedsuddenlytofishingitcanleadto

economicloss(O’Keefe&Decelles2013).

39

5 Conclusion

Rights-basedfisherymanagementsystemscangoafarwayincreatinganenvironment

forefficientutilizationoffisheries.Icelandwasoneofthefirstnationstoimplementan

ITQsystem,atypeofrights-basedfisherymanagementsystem,forit’sfisheries.Overall,

Iceland’sexperiencewiththeimplementationofaITQsystemforit’sfisherieshasleadto

increased productivity and more efficient marine sector. This thesis also reviewed

ecosystem-basedapproaches to fisheriesmanagementandhowBritishColumbiawas

able to reduce the amount of habitat by-catch in it’s bottom trawl fisheries by

implementingahabitatquota.Thehabitatquotawasaresultofanagreementbetween

thebottomtrawlingindustryinBritishColumbiaandenvironmentalorganizations.

Manyfisherieshavebeenmanagedunderanopenaccessregimeatsomepoint,where

anyonecanenterandutilizetheresource.Thisthesisexploreswhysuchasystemwill

createasituationwherefishershaveincentivestosimplyoverexploittheresourceina

racetomaximizeindividualprofits.Italsotouchesbrieflyonhowcompetitivetotalcatch

limits,thatareintendedtoprotecttheresource,caninducefisherstoengageinarace

for the available catch, leading to large economic losses. Inadequate fisheries

managementcanhavepossiblyirreversiblelong-termconsequencesfortheresource.In

responsetobadlyperformingmanagementsystemstherehasbeenanincreaseinthe

implementationofrights-basedmanagementsystemssuchasITQsystems.Icelandwas

oneofthefirstnationsto implementaquotasystemfor it’sfisheries.Therehasbeen

considerableincreaseinproductivityinthemarinesectorsincetheimplementationof

the ITQ system. There has also been increase inmarketing abroad,making Icelandic

productsmorevaluableininternationalmarkets.Thesechangesweremadepossibleby

theexistenceoftheITQsystemthatgivesquotaholdersapropertyrighttoaflowfrom

the resource.When holding a property right that has value, there is an incentive to

maximizethevalue,inthiscasetheflowofreturnsfromtheresource.

Overexploitationoffishstocksisunfortunatelynottheonlyworryoffisherymanagers.

Increasedattentionhasbeenbrought to thedamagingeffectsof thebottomtrawling

industryoncorals,spongesandotherorganismsthat liveontheoceanground.These

40

organismsareallapartofanecosystemthathascomplexinteractions.Icelandhastaken

severalmeasures to reduce damage to vulnerable organisms due to fishing. Despite

these efforts, there are large areas of deep-sea corals around Iceland that have

completelydisappearedsincetrawlingintheareasbegan.Closurezonesandreservesas

anecosystemmanagementhavebeencontroversialand ithasbeenargued that they

don’tdealwiththerootcauseof theexternalityimposedbybottomtrawling.British

Columbia, has recently introduced a new management system of individual habitat

quotas to address the threat of bottom trawling to the ecosystem. This systemwas

createdthroughcooperationofthebottomtrawlingindustryandthird-partyENGOs.The

mainaimofthesystemistonotonlyclosethezonesthataremostvulnerabletotrawling,

butalsotocreateincentivesforindividualfisherstoactivelytrytoavoidsensitivezones

and report areas with high by-catch of sponges and corals and non-commercial fish

stocks.Theresultshavebeenpositiveforthefirstthreeyearsofimplementation.British

ColumbiareliesonasimilarsystemofITQsasIcelanddoes,andthatcreatedabasisthat

made the implementation possible. One of the biggest challenges in fisheries and

ecosystem management is the high degree of uncertainty and difficulty and cost of

research. Forthatreason, themanagementsystemsthataimtocreate incentives for

fisherstoactivelyengagethemselvesinprotectionoftheresourceandresearch,suchas

ITQsystemsandthehabitatby-catchsysteminBC,havehadarelativelyhighsuccess.

Rights-basedmanagementeffortshavegonealongwayinnotonlyprotectingthefishery

resourcefromoverexploitation,butalsoincreatingtherightincentivesfortheindustry

toengageinvalue-addingactivitiessuchasincreasingutilization,positiveinvestmentin

theresourceandmarketing.TheexperiencefromBritishColumbiasuggeststhataquota

systemforhabitatdamageisaneffectivewayoflimitingby-catchofcoralsandsponges

andtoreducedamagedonebybottomtrawlers.ThequotaissimilartoanITQsystem

wherequotaholderscansellandbuyquotainthemarket.

41

References

Agnarsson,S.(2000)StjórnFiskveiðaáÍslandi.FylgiskjalmeðskýrslutilAuðlindanefndar.RetrievedApril20thfromhttp://hhi.hi.is/sites/hhi.hi.is/files/R-series/2000/R00_03_Stjorn-fiskvei%C3%B0a_final.pdf

Ardon,J.A.(2005)ProtectingBritishColumbia’sCoralsandSponges.AreportbyLivingOceansSociety(v.1.0)RetrievedApril24thfromhttp://www.livingoceans.org/sites/default/files/Protecting_BCs_Corals_and_Sponges.pdf

Arnason,R.,Kelleher,K.,Willmann,R(2009)TheSunkenBillions.Doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-7790-1

Arnason,R.(2012)PropertyRightsinFisheries:HowMuchCanIndividualTransferableQuotasAccomplish?doi:10.1093/reep/res011

Arnason,R.(2000)FAOPublication:Propertyrightsasmeansofeconomicorganizationftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/x7579e/x7579e01.pdfretrievedApril22nd2016

Arnason,R.(2005)PropertyRightsinFisheries:Iceland’sExperiencewithITQ’s.DOI:10.1007/s11160-005-5139-6

Arnason,R.,Agnarsson,S.(2005)SjávarútvegursemgrunnatvinnuveguráÍslandi,Fjármálatíðindi,52(2),14-34.

Arnason,R.(1993)TheIcelandicIndividualQuotaSystem:ADescriptiveAccount.DOI:10.1086/mre.8.3.42629066

Arnason,R.(1990)MinimumInformationManagementinFisheries.TheCanadianJournalofEconomics,Vol.23,No.3,pp.630-653.

Bagwell,K.,&Riordan,M.H..(1991).HighandDecliningPricesSignalProductQuality.TheAmericanEconomicReview,81(1),224–239.Retrievedfromhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2006797

Botsford,L.W.,Castilla,J.C.,Peterson,C.H.(1997)TheManagementofFisheriesandMarineEcosystems.DOI:10.1126/science.277.5325.509

DavidSuzukiFoundation,CanadianGroundfishResearchandConservationSociety(CGRCS),LivingOceansSociety(2012)RetrievedMarch15thfromhttp://www.davidsuzuki.org/media/news/Habitat%20Conservation%20Collaboration-Backgrounder%20FINAL.pdf

42

Jónasson,J.B.,Eyjólfsdóttir,G.,Sigurjónsson,J.,Steingrímsson,S.A.,Þráinsson,S.,Matthíasson,S.I.(2005)FriðunviðkvæmrahafsvæðaviðÍsland.RetrievedFebruary9th2016fromhttps://www.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/media/Skyrslur/fridunskyrsla_2005.pdf

FisheriesandOceansCanada(2008)PacificRegionCold-WaterCoralandSpongeConservationStrategy2010-2015.RetrievedMarch2nd2016fromhttp://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/documents/cscs-pcce/cscs-pcce-eng.pdf

FisheriesandOceans.InherentCharacteristicsofFishStocks.RetrievedFebruary17thfromhttp://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w6914e/W6914E01.htm

Fluharty,D.,Aparicio,P.,Blackburn,C.,Boehlert,G.,Coleman,F.,Conkling,P.,…,Sissenwine,M.(1996)EcosystemBasedFisheryManagement.Retrievedfromhttp://www.marinenz.org.nz/documents/EPAP_2003_Ecobased_Fish_Man.pdf,March20th2016.

Gordon,H.Scott,(1954)EconomicTheoryofaCommon-PropertyResource:TheFishery.JournalofPoliticalEconomy,Vol.62no.2pp.124-142.RetrievedFebruary16th2016from:http://www.jstor.org/stable/1825571?seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents

Grafton,R.Q.,Arnason,R.,Bjorndal,T.,Campbell,D.,Campbell,H.F.,Clark,ColinW.…Weninger,Q.(2005)IncentiveBasedApproachestoSustainableFisheries.RetrievedFebruary20thfromhttps://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/43117/2/een0508.pdf

Holland,E.,Schnier,K.E.,(2005)Individualhabitatquotasforfisheries.doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.005

Hutchings,JeffreyA.,Rangele,RobertW.(2011)CorrelatesofrecoveryforCanadianAtlanticcod(Gadusmorhua)doi:10.1139/Z11-022

Kelleher,K.(2005)DiscardsintheWorld’sMarineFisheries:AnUpdate,Issue170,Part1.FisheriesandOceans.

Kompas,T.andGooday,P.(2007)‘Thefailureof‘commandandcontrol’approachestofisheriesmanagement:lessonsfromAustralia’,Int.J.GlobalEnvironmentalIssues,Vol.7,Nos.2/3,pp.174–190

Kopp,R.J.(1992)WhyExistenceValueShouldBeUsedinCost-BenefitAnalysis.JournalofPolicyAnalysisandManagementVol11(1)p.123-130.

LivingOceansSociety(2009)BycatchinCanada’sPacificGroundfishBottomTrawlIndustry.TrendsandEcosystemPerspectives.RetrievedFebruary16thfromhttp://www.livingoceans.org/sites/default/files/bycatch_BC_Bottom_Trawl_Fishery_0.pdf

Paulyetal.(1998)FishingDownMarineFoodWebs.doi:10.1126/science.279.5352.860

43

Magnuson-StevensFisheryConservationManagementAct.(Revised2015)RetrievedFebruary20thfromhttp://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/F1_Sup_REVISED_Att3_HR1335annotatedMSA_E-Only_JUN2015BB.pdf

MarineResearchInstitute,Iceland.Áhrifveiðafæraáhafsbotn.RetrievedMarch15thfromhttp://www.hafro.is/undir.php?ID=16&REF=2

MinistryofForeignAffairs,Iceland(Utanríkisráðuneyti)(2009).Meginatriðiíslenskrarsjávarútvegsstefnu.

Munro,G.R.,Houtte,A.V.andWillmann,R.,(2004).FoodandAgricultureOrganization.TheConservationandManagementofSharedFishStocks:legalandeconomicaspects.(Appendix:Prisoner’sDilemmaandfisheries)RetrievedMarch3rdfromhttp://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5438e/y5438e00.htm#Contents

Munro,G.R.(2007)GameTheoryandtheEvolutionofHighSeasFisheries.RetrievedMarch1stfromhttps://www.gerad.ca/colloques/Workshop-GTERE/papers/Munro.pdf

NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration(2013)AHydrothermalventformswhenseawatermeetshotmagma.RetrievedMarch5thfromhttp://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/vents.html

Newell,R.G.,Sanchirico,J.N.,Kerr,S.(2002)FishingQuotaMarkets.RetrievedFebruary10thfromhttp://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Event-fishing-quota.pdf

NordicMinistryCommittee(2008)Aggressivefishingpracticesdamagetheoceanfloorecosystem(Aðgangsharðarfiskveiðarskaðalífríkiáhafsbotni)RetrievedMarch10thfromhttp://www.diva-portal.se/smash/get/diva2:700925/FULLTEXT01.pdf

O’Keefe,C.E.,Decelles,G.R.(2013)FormingaParnershiptoAvoidBycatch.DOI:10.1080/03632415.2013.838122

Runolfsson,B.,Arnason,R.,(2003)IndividualTransferableQuotasinIceland.RetrievedFebruary8thfromhttps://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/FishorCutBaitIndividualTransferableQuotas.pdf

Runolfsson,(1999)SjávarútvegurÍslendingaþróun,staðaoghorfur.RetrievedApril23rdfromhttps://notendur.hi.is//~bthru/skyrslan.pdf

Seijo,J.C.,Defeo,O.,Salas,S.,(1998)FisheriesBioeconomics.Theory,ModellingandManagement.FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNationsRome.

Sjávarklasinn(2013)Helmingiminniafli,tvöfaltmeiraverðmæti.RetrievedApril9th2016fromhttp://www.sjavarklasinn.is/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Greining_Sj%C3%A1varklasans_26.3.2013.pdf

44

Steingrímsson,S.A.,Einarsson,S.Tr.,(2004)KóralsvæðiáÍslandsmiðum:matáástandiogtillageumaðgerðirtilverndarþeim.RetrievedApril2ndfromhttp://www.hafro.is/Bokasafn/Timarit/korall.pdf

Stiles,M.L.,Stockbridge,J.,Lande,M.,Hirshfield,M.F.,(2010),ImpactsofBottomTrawlingonFisheries,TourismandtheMarineEnvironment.RetrievedMarch10thfromhttp://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/Trawling_BZ_10may10_toAudrey.pdf

UnitedNations(1982)UnitedNationsConventionoftheLawoftheSea.RetrievedFebruary2ndfromhttp://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

TheWorldBank(2006)Whereisthewealthofnations?Doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-6354-6

Wallace,S.,Turris,B.,Driscoll,J.,Bodtker,K.,Mose,B.,Munro,G.,(2015)Canada’sPacificgroundfishtrawlhabitatagreement:Aglobalfirstinecosystemapproachtobottomtrawlimpacts.MarinePolicy,volume60pp.240ö248RetrievedJanuary25thfromhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X15001931

Waschman,Yoav(2003)ExternalitiesandManagementRegimesinFisheriesExploitation.RetrievedFebruary22ndfromhttp://www.soest.hawaii.edu/PFRP/soest_jimar_rpts/wachsman03.pdf

Wilen,J.E.(1985)TowardsaTheoryoftheRegulatedFishery.MarineResourceEconomicsVol.1,No.4pp.369-388.Retrievedfromhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/42628868?seq=1#page_scan_tab_content

45