assembly elections in kashmir, kerala and west bengal
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8/12/2019 Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal
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Indian Political Science ssociation
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN KASHMIR, KERALA AND WEST BENGAL: A DIFFERENTIATED ANDA COMPARATIVE OVERVIEWAuthor(s): IQBAL NARAIN and NILIMA DUTTSource: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July - Sept. 1987), pp. 370-399Published by: Indian Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855316.
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ASSEMBLY
ELECTIONS
IN
KASHMIR,
KERALA AND
WEST
BENGAL: A
DIFFERENTIATED AND
A
COMPARATIVE
OVERVIEW
IQBAL
NARAIN AND
NILIMA
DUTT
With
the
assembly
elections
in
three
states
-
Jammu
and
Kashmir,
Kerala
and
West
Bengal
approaching
closer
-
Rajiv
Gandhi,
the
Prime Minister of India
and
the
Congress
Party
President,
was
involved
with
such
controversies
f
national charac-
ter that were well-expected to influence the poll verdict. Two of
the
major
controversies
that
he was confronted
with
were
Rajiv-
Zail
rift
and
Rajiv-V.P.
Singh
tension. Removal
of
foreign
secretary,
A.P.
Venkateswaran,
by
an
announcement
at
a
press
conference,
also
served
a
major
blow
to the
credibility
of
the
Prime
Minister.
Congress (I)
was
fully
aware of
the
eroding
image
of
their
leader and decided to
campaign
on the
old
slogan
of
threat
to
national
unity,
rather
than to
project
the
personality
of
ajiv
Gandhi
to win
votes.
Ironically
Rajiv
Gandhi did
not hold a
single
Congress
Working
Committee
meeting
ever
since
he
took
over as
the
Prime
Minister.
This added
to
the
already existing
unfavourable
at-
mosphere
for
Rajiv
and his
party
at
a
time
when
campaigning
for
the
assembly
elections
in three states
was
in
full
swing.
The
elections
under
no
circumstances
could be
postponed
with
the
term
of
West
Bengal
assembly
ending
on
13
June,
and that
of
Kerala
on 23
June.
Similarly,
elections
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir
should be held before 31 March
-
that is before the end of the
financial
year
-
to
enable
the new
assembly
to
complete
essen-
tial
financial
business.
Thus
Rajiv
was forced
to
plunge
in
elec-
The
ndian
ournal
f
Political
cience,
ol.
48,
No.
3,
July
September,
987.
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ASSEMBLY
LECTIONS
N
KASHMIR,
ERALA
AND
WEST
BENGAL
371
tioneering
at
a
time
when
his
party's image
had almost nosedi-
ved. Rajiv took the burden and partyresponsibilitywith exten-
sive
election
tours
in
the three
states.
He had no
option
but
to
use
the little
political
charisma
he
was left with.
It
was
neces-
sary
to save
the face of the
Congress
(I)
in
these three states
for
the
future of
Haryana
polls
as
psychology
of
Haryana
voters
would also
depend,
atleast
to some
extent,
on
the
outcome
of
three
assembly polls.
Rajiv
tried to
give
a
new
look
to
the
party
by dropping
every
second
sitting
MLA
in all
the
three
states.
Altogether,
the elections
definitelyposed
a test for
Rajiv's
popu-
larity
and
credibility
as also for the
popularity
of theCongress (I)
vis-a-vis
ts
performance
as
viewed
by
the
electorate.
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
Pre-election
cenario
In
Jammu
and
Kashmir,
Rajiv-Farooq
accord
confused the
electorate
totally.1 Only
about two
years back, Farooq
was
branded
as anti-national
and
a
threat to the
security
of
the
nation.2
The
accord
aroused
militancy
among
Congress
party
members.3 Dissidence in
Congress
(I)
created
difficulties n
evol-
ving intra-party
consensus on the 31
candidates till
the
last
minute.
Ultimately,
out
of 76
assembly
seats,
NC(F)
decided to
contest
for
45
seats and
Congress
(I)
for
31
seats. Seat
adjust-
ments were
mutually agreed
upon
between
Farooq
and
Rajiv
but
the
Congress
(I)
members were
unhappy
over the
way
Farooq
exercised his final say on every candidate, including that of
Congress (I).
While
the
NC(F)
decided
to
field
most of
its old
hands,
the
Congress (I)
dropped
most of
its old
faces.
Further,
as a
result
of
the electoral
alliance,
Congress
(I)
was
contesting
new seats
in
which
it
had fared
poorly
in
1983
elections
-
Kokernag,
Trai,
Kangan,
Noorabad
and
Anantnag
in
the
valley.
This resulted
in
dissension in
Congress (I)
circles.
In
Jammu
region,
the
electorate
strongly
felt
that
because
of its alliance with the NC(F), the Congress would not be able
to
safeguard
the interests
of
the
region.
Also
Sikh
electorate,
even
if
in
minority,
who were
concentrated in
Jammu
division,
was
already anatagonistic
to
any
Congress
moves
especially
after
the
Blue
Star
Operation.
The
two
Sikh
organisations
-
10
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8/12/2019 Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal
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372 THE
INDIAN
JOURNAL
F
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
the
Khalsa
Panthic
Party
and
the
State
Akali
Dal
-
announced
that theywould support the candidates of Abdullah. Elections
became
all the
more a
tough
going
forthe
Congress (I)
as con-
certed
efforts
were
being
made
by
Hindu
voters
to build
up
an
alliance
between
the
BJP
and the
Janata
party
along
with seat
adjustments
with
the
NC(K)
and
the
Lok
Dal. It
could thus
hardly
hope
to
win
same ratio of
seats in
the
region
which it
had
won
in 1982
when
it
bagged
23 out of
32 seats.
Farooq
however
was
optimistic:
"By
contesting
the
election
as
partners
we
are
determined
to
prove
that not
only
can we
retain
our Kashmir
identitybut be part of the national mainstream as well."3
Whatever
the
shortcomings
nd
differences,
he
alliance
was
viewed
as
a
far-sighted ompromise
and
described as.
"Consensus
Politics."4
It
pledged
to
fight
elections
with
an
appropriate
recognition
of the
prospective strength
of the
two
parties,
as well
as
the
long-term
objective
of
winning
the
loyalty
of
the
Muslim
valley
in
the
national interest.
However,
the
time
did
not
permit
the
alliance
to
reach its
grass
roots,
which
undoubtedly gave
rise
to misunderstanding both at inter-party nd intra-partyevels.
Many
of
the
dissidents
turned
towards the
MUF,
which
compri-
sed
of
fundamentalist
groups
-
the
Jammat-e-Islami,
Ummat-
e-Islami,
and
the
Mahaaz-e-Azadi and
constituted
a
loose
confederation
of
politico-religious
groups.
For
the
first
time,
the
valley
,
faced a threat
from
Muslim
voters.
The
MUF
and its
allies decided
to encash
on
the
Muslim
sentiments,
and
an
open
call was made
to vote for
Islam.
(In
the valley there are 95% Muslim voters) They declared
that
a
vote
for
the alliance would
endanger
Islam.
They
dubbed
the
accord
as centre's
move to colonise
Kashmir.
Abdul
Gani
Lone
of
the
Peoples
Conference had
openly
told
voters
in
Kashmir
that
a vote for the
ruling
alliance will
mean
vote
for
'India's
colonial
attitude in Kashmir.'
Elections
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir were of
national
impor-
tance
because
it
was
the first time when
NC
and
Congress
(I)
had joined hands. The political pundits thoughtthat thevictory
of
the
alliance
of
a national
party
with a
regional
party
would
provide
a
new
model for
harmonising regional
with
national
aspirations,
and
would clear
th
clouds
covering
Kashmir
poli-
tics.
The
victory
would
certainly
vouch for
Kashmir's
willingness
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ASSEMBLY
LECTIONS N
KASHMIR,
ERALA
AND WEST BENGAL373
to
join
the mainstream of
Indian
political
life.
It
was also
being
seen as a victoryof the secular forces in politics. On the eve of
elections,
it
was evident
that
chances
of
victory ay
heavily
on
the side
of the
alliance. The alliance
expected
to secure
60-62
seats
in
the
state.
Post-election
eflections
Results
from
Jammu
and Kashmir
came as
tranquil
demea-
nour
for
Rajiv
and the
Congress
(I).
The alliance
bagged
63
seats as against 70 in the dissolved house
-
39 seats captured by
NC
and 24
by
Congress (I). According
to
Rajiv,
the
alliance's
victory
made the
border
state
a 'bastion
of India's
unity
and
integrity'
and
would
help
in the
country's
fight gainst
commu-
nalism
in
the
Punjab.5
The
message
of
the
results
was
that
it
were
the
Muslims
who defeated
Muslim
Fundamentalism.6
Congress
(I)
which
had
earlier
contested
elections
as
an
opposition
to
NC
now
fought
and won as its
ally.
Though
the
Congress (I)'s
success
in
retaining nearly
the same
number
of
seats it had in the
previous
Assembly
owes a lot to the alliance
with
Farooq
Abdullah,
the evidence
of
its continued
hold over
the
Jammu
region
is
significant
s
irgives
a clue to the
political
thinking
f the
voters in the Hindi heartland.
BJP's cry
of
alli-
ance
as 'unethical' has been belied.7
What
helped
the
Congress
(I)
restrict its
losses was
the
fragmentation
f
the
opposition.
It
just
lost four
seats
in
Jammu
and Kathua
regions.
It achieved
more than
what it
expected,
and
managed
to win 19 out of 24 seats ithad contested/Although
the
percentage
of
vote
of
Congress (I)
fell,
they
retained
all the
seats
-
in
Bari
Brahmana,
it
fell
from
53%,
to
45%,
in
Basohli
from
53%
to
40%,
in R.S.
Pura
from
50%
to
37%,
in
Jandrah-
Gharota
from
43%
to
34%.
These
areas
had
no resentment
against
the
alliance,
but
against
the
Congress (I).
On
the other
hand,
out of the
total
of
73 seats for which
elections
held,8
MUF won
4,
BJP
2
and
Independents
4.
The*
BJP had no representationin the dissolved assembly.
The fact
that
MUF still
retains its
influence
n
the
valley
and its
impact
is
pronounced
in
South
Kashmir,
where
it
has
made
inroads
into the
strongholds
of
the
NC
(F)
-
Congress
(I)
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374
THE INDIAN
JOURNAL
F POLITICAL
CIENCE
alliance
is
alarming
rnough
for
the
government
to be on
the
defensive and not allow these forces to grow further. The dis-
sensions
in
the
Congress
(I)
and NC
helped
MUF
in
the
valley.
MUF
remains
far
from
vanquished.
The sizable number of votes
it has
captured
in its
strongholds
of
Baramulla,
Anantnag,
and
Pulwana
districts
suggests
that its
potential
by using religion
to
sway
the
electorate
could not
completely
be
neutralised.
In
practically
all the constituencies
MUF nominees were runners
up.
In
1983,
it
had drawn
a blank.
The
Jammat
is
gaining
new
adherents,
particularly
among
the
youth.9
Dr.
Abdullah
who contested from
the citadel
of Ganderbal
was
involved
in
a
four cornered
context.
There
was
no doubt
in
his
retaining
of
the seat
which his father
ate
Sheikh
Abdullah
also
held.
He was
declared elected
by
22,000
votes
but
the
percentage
fell
from
98.8%
of
the valid votes,
to
78.8%,
with
MUF
polling
nearly
18%. Although
Khan
Sahib,
Uri,
Charie
Sharif
lost,
they
lost
by
slim
margins.
Major reversals inflictedon the two rulingparties included
defeat
of
two
NC
ministers,
Abdul Ahad
Vakil
in
Sopore
and
Abdul
Slama
Deva
in
Homshalibug;
and that of senior
Congress
leader
Trilochan
Dutt in
Jammu
contonment,
and PCC
general
secretary
Dharampal
in
Akhnoor.
Significant
achievements
came
for
MUF
from
Sopore
constituency
where
the
Jammat-e-Islami
leader
Syed
Ali
Shah
Gillani
defeated
Vakil.
Sopore
also
happens
to
be
the
hometown
of
PCC
president
Ghulam
Rasool
Kar.
Unfortunatelyforthe alliance, its inevitable poll victoryhas
come
to be
painted
with
widely
held
doubts about
its
"ethical
legitimacy".
Total
absence
of
post-election
euphoria
at
people's
level,
unlike
in
previous
elections,
indicated
a
cynical
mood
towards
the
election
outcome.
A
young
lawyer
pleaded,
"I
don't
even
pray
regularly.
But
I am
supporting
the MUF
because there
is
nothing
else.
If
you
take
my
vote
away,
I lose all
faith in
Indian
democracy."11
In the end it may be said thatwiththevictoryofthe alliance
Kashmir
is
expected
to be
integrated
in
the
main
political
stream
of
the
country.
It
is
a
victory
of secular
forces.
Much,
however,
would
depend
on
how
the
alliance
in
power
actually
works to
translate
its
promises.
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ASSEMBLY
LECTIONS
N
KASHMIR,
ERALAAND WEST
BENGAL375
KERALA
Pre-election
cenario
As
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir,
it
is
reported
that
the
electorate
in
Kerala was
totally
confussd
-
right
from
the
start.
The
voters
found
it difficult
the
keep
track of the
political
groupings
and
regroupings.
The
picture
became so
grim
at
one
time
that
it
was
not
clear how
many
groups
were
active
members
of
the
ruling
United
Democratic
Front
(UDF).
The
picture
was
far
from
clearer than what prevailed in 1967 when there was a direct
confrontation
between
the two
major
groups
-
one
led
by
the
Congress
and the other
led
by
CPI
(M).
The
political
scenario
with
Hindu
BJP
combination,
recently
born
Communist
Marxist
Party (CMP),
split
in the Kerala
Congress,
two
factions
of
the
National
Democratic
Party
-
all
beating
their
own
drums
-
totally
confused
the
electorate.
After
a successful
completion
of its
term,
Karunakaran
led - United Democratic Front (UDF) faced serious crisis and
would
have
certainly preferred
a
delayed
poll
on
account
of
differences
revailing
amongst
themselves.
First
Kerala
Congress
was
on the
throes
of
a
factional
dispute
between
revenue
minister
P-
J*
Joseph
and
irrigation
minister
K. M.
Mani
-
each
lead-
ing
a
group.
Secondly,
there
was a
boycott
call
by
Muslim
League
on account
of Babri
Masjid.
Thirdly,
there
were
differen-
ces
in the
Congress
(I)
itself. Thre
was
a
Karunakaran
lobby
which
was
strongly opposed by
young
leaders
belonging
to
erst-
while Anthony Congress.
Chief
Minister
Karunakaran's
announcement
of
ob
reserva-
tions
provoked
resentment
and
criticism,
not
only
from its
own
party
members,
but
also
from
allied
parties
and
UDF
faced
a
severe
threat
of a
split.
He had
announced
that
15%
of
govern-
ment
obs
would
be reserved for
those
with an
annual
income
of
less
than
Rs.
6,400
-
irrespective
of
the
community
they
belong t.
The
decision
was
vehemently
opposed
by
the
Muslim Lea-
gue.
It
believed
that
the
scheme
would
undermine
communal
reservations.
The new
scheme
was
not
expected
to
touch
the
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376
THE
INDIAN
JOURNAL
F
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
already
existing
reservation
quota
of
50%
of
which
Muslims had
been assured 12% when the new proposal was put into effect.
The Social
Republican Party
(SRP)
also
opposed
the
new reser-
vation
policy.
Similarly,
the
National Democratic
Party
(NDP)
criticized
the reservation
policy
and
warned the
UDF of dire
consequences
if NDP
was
ignored
in
allocation of
seats.
The
SRP
claimed to
represent
Ezhava interests.
However,
the NDP
faction
led
by
P.K.
Narayana
Panicker
severed
its connection
with
the UDF.
He
said,
"How
can we trust the
Chief
Minister
again
or believe
that he
will
implement
15%
economic
reserva-
tion after he election. Will not the Muslim League oppose it
again
and
force
the Chief Minister to
react?"12
Although
NDP
was
not
expected
to
win
any
seat,
it
was still feared
to
have the
potential
to
turn
the
tables
against
the
UDF
candidate
in central
Travancore.
Panicker was the chief of
the Nair
Service
Society
and
UDF
could
not
afford to lose
Nair votes
for UDF
victory.
The
CPI
(M)
led Left Democratic Front
(LDF)
called the reser-
vation
policy
a
shrewed
political
move.
In an atmosphere of resentmentagainst the UDF, BJP and
Hindu
Munnani
groups
joined
hands
against
UDF,
and
were
bent
upon
creating
an
atmosphere
of Hindu
revivalism
in
politics
in
the
State.
BJP
decided not to
ally
with
any
of the
two
-
LDF
or
UDF,
and
contest 60
seats
in
alliance
with the Hindu
Front.
This
alliance
was
expected
to cut
into
the
voting
strength
f
both
the frontsbut
more into
that of
UDF. Hindu
Munnani
organisation
(which
appeared
on
the
scene
during
the
1984
parliamentary
elections)
openly
opposed
the
policies
of the
government. It had its roots n all the constituencies and attracted
people
from
among
the
Nairs.
As an
independent
organisation
it
was
not
feared
to
do
any
harm,
but if it
decided to work
against
candidates
from
other
communities
it
was
expected
to have
effect.
Karunakaran,
himself
belonged
to the
Nair
community
and
feared
the
threat from
Hindu Munnani
force.
He could
not
afford
to
lose
any
Nair vote.
After NDP
parted
company
fromUDF, Karunakaran had no choice but to appease the NDP,
for
Panicker
was
expected
to endorse and
garner
Nair
votes.
Hence,
on
reservation
ssue,
he
said. "We stand
by
the
(cabinet)
decision.
It will
be
implemented
by
the
new
government
and
in
consultation
with
all the
concerned,
a
commission will
be
appoin-
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ASSEMBLY
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KASHMIR,
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377
ted
to
work out
the modalities of
implementation."13
In
view
of
this statement,Panicker reversed his decisions following a written
assurance
given
by
the Chief Minister. UDF
was
thus forced
to
make a
compromise.
The
Congress (I),
apart
from
dependence
on caste
and
communal-based
parties,
was also
being
forced
to
make
compro-
mises on vital issues of
national
importance.
A
section of
the
Congress (I),
therefore,
wanted to
scrap
its
alliance
with
commu-
nal
and
caste-based
parties
and
go
it
alone
in
the
elections.
The
strategy of the Congress (I) was to secure the maximum seats,
and not
depend upon
Muslim
League
or
Kerala
Congress.
It
decided
to contest 75
seats.
In
Kerala
the
Muslim
fundamentalists
were
demanding
their
rightful
position
from the
Congress (I.)
Apart
from
Northern
Kerala
where
they
were
predominant,
they
were
scattered in
all
14-0
constituencies. The
communal
force
of
Ezhava
community
could not be
minimised.
In
a
way,
it
determined
the
political
future of the state. A predominant section of it was with the
Leftists,
but
the elite
group,
managing
the
affairs
of
the
commu-
nity
(SNDP
and
its
political
wing SRP)
was
trying
to
get
closer
to
Congress
(I).
SRP
was the
political
arm
of
Ezhava
community,
which
decided to
leave the
UDF
in
protest
against
the
raw
deal
over
seat
allocation
and
demanded
parity
with
the
NDP.
The
Democratic
Labour
Party
(DLP)
also
threatened
to
leave
the
UDF.
Karuakaran
was
banking
on a
clout
wielded
by
Narayana
Dharmaparipalana
Yogam,
SNDP
chief,
and
M.
K.
Raghavan,
who joined the Congress (I) along with thousand of his
followers.
Karunakaran also
had
to
compromise
with
the
League
in
order
to
make
sure that
he
won
League's
support
to
win
elections.
For
this
he
was
severely
criticized
by
his
own
partymen.
But
he
observed
that he had
to
compromise
in
order
to
get
League's
support
to contest from
Guruvayoor
which
was
predominantly
a
Muslim
constituency
and a
sure
seat
of
the
League.
The State
had
a
powerful
christian
community.
The
christian
dominated
Kerala
Congress
was
divided
and
both
fac-
tions
were
up
against
each
other.
Kerala
Congress
demanded
more
seats
than
Congress
(I)
could
give
and,
it,
therefore,
broke
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378 THE
INDIAN
JOURNAL
F POLITICAL
SCIENCE
its
electoral
understanding
with the alliance.
Candidates
of
Kerala Congress - Joseph faction (Kerala Congress-J) filed
nominations
against
the
UDF and
also
against
Kerala
Congress
-
Mani
group
(Kerala
Congress-M).
They
were
battling
over
the
'Horse',
symbol
of the
party,
and
fighting
ver
24
seats
that were
allotted to
the
party
as one
unit.
While
finalising
the
list of
condidates,
the
Congress
Parlia-
mentary
Board
(CPB)
dropped
Finance minister
Thachadi
Prabhakaran,
Transport
minister
. K.
Velaydhan,
formerminister
Gangadharan and threeotherMLAs. They weredropped because
of their
alleged
corrupt
image.
Karunakaran
hoped
to
return to
power
on two
arguments.
That his
coalition
government
did the
maximum
possible
good
to
the
maximum
number of
people.
That
despite
his
government
being
a
coalition
of different
parties,
he could
complete
a
full
term
when
the
CPI
(M)
could
not
complete
even three
years
when
Congress
was in
opposition.
UDF also
adopted
both
the
Kerala Congress factions,when on the eve of elections the feud
between
the two
came to an
end,
and both
the
factions
patched
up
their
differences.
Both
Joseph
and
Mani
joined
hands
and
appeared
on
a
common
platform,
putting
an end to
the
specula-
tion
that
each would
try
to
sabotage
the
other's
prospects.
This
came
as
a
relief
o
the
UDF but further
onfused
the
electorate.
Karunakaran
on
his
part
was also
trying
to
placate
all
conceivable
communal
interests
even
when
they
were
seemingly
in conflict with each other. He raised the election slogan that
poverty
had
no
religion,
and used it
to
justify
almost
every
step
he took.
The other
pillar
of
Kerala's
political
drama was
the Left
Democratic
front
(LDF)
led
by
CPI
(M).
The
strategy
of
the
CPI
(M)
was
also to
contest the
maximum
number
of
seats,
thereby
ncreasing
its
voting
percentage
to become
the
biggest
party
in
Kerala.
CPI
(M)
thus
decided
to contest
79 seats
(including 9 Independents). The strategyworked out among the
partners
of
the LDF was to
put
on
commonly acceptable
indepen-
dent
candidates
in
constituencies where
the communal
and
caste
based
groups
had
a
sway.
An
agreement
was
also
reached
bet-
ween
all the
constituents
of
the
LDF
that
it would
field
a
few
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ASSEMBLY
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N
KASHMIR,
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379
new
eminent
personalities
as
Independents,
as was
done
by
GPI
in 1957 when it backed people like JusticeV. R. Krishna Iyer,
Dr. A.
R.
Menon,
and
Prof.
Joseph
Mundassery
who
became
ministers
n the
first
ommunist
government
ed
by
EMS
Nam-
boodiripad.
CPI
(M)
manifesto
called
to
defeat
the
communal and
casteist
forces
and reiterated
that
it
could have no
alliance
with
any
caste
or communal
group.
The
party
blamed
the
ruling
front for all
the
economic reversals
in
the
State.
It
also
pointed
out that the industrial and
agricultural
production
had come
to
a
standstill
under
the
government.
It
also held
the
view
that
the reservation
policy
was
announced
to
divide
the
people
on
communal
lines.
Communist
Party
State
Secretary,
Vasudevan
Nair
observed
that
his
party
was
in favour
of
maintaining
a
status
quo
on the issue
of communal reservation. He
held
the
view
that
reservation
was
an
allrlndia
issue
which had
to
be
discussed
widely.
He also
opined
that
reservation
was
no
solution
to
th
problems
of
unemployment, poverty
and
economic
back-
wardness.14
The
CPI
(M)
led Leftist
Front was
trying
o
fight
the
elec-
tions
in
a bid
to
capture
power.
E.M.S.
amboodiripad
pinned
his
hopes
on
the
infighting
f
the
Congress
and
the
general
senti-
ments
of
the
people
against
communalism and
failures
of
the
Rajiv
government.
He announced
his
decision
to
support
Independent
candidates
who had left
Congress
(I).
LDF
did
not
have to make any compromises with any faction. It was free
from
party
squabbles
and
rebels.
It
did
face
an
impact
of
the
split-away
group
led
by
M.
V.
Raghavan
who
formed
the
CMP.
However,
CPI
(M)
faced
no
threat of
losing
face
from
other
factions of
LDF
-
Revolutionary
Socialist
Pany
(RSP),
the
Janata
Party,
and
Congress
(S).
It
decided to
keep
away
from
the
regional
and communal
parties.
In
1982
assembly
elections
the
Congress (I)
led
front
under
the leadership of Karunakaran) got 48.23% votes, totalling
46,17,493
voters.
The
CPI
(M)
led
front
ecured
47.24%,
total-
ling
45,23,228
voters.
Thus
by
a
margin
of
94,270
votes
the
Congress
(I)
was
able to retain
power.
These
assembly
figures
were
retained
in
1984 Lok
Sabha
poll.
But
in
1984,
according
11
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380
THE INDIAN
JOURNAL
F POLITICAL
SCIENCE
to
some
observers,
elections were
fought
on
the
sympathy
wave
followingMrs. Gandhi's assassination.
Now
the
list
of voters
had
enlarged by
the
induction
of
younger
elements.15 The
image
of
Rajiv
with women
and
youth
was
a
plus
point
to be
duly
considered#
But communalism
of
all
shades had
influenced the
elections in
a
big way.
The
politi-
cal
inclination
of new
voters
was,
however,
not
known.
The
LDF
hoped
that
the
youth
would
reject
the communal
combina-
tion
of the
UDF. The
increasing
problem
of
unemployment
and
UDF's failure to solve them was also expected to influencethe
voters.
The
LF
thought
that new
generation
of
youth
should
change
the
political
scenario.
Namboodiripad
questioned
if the
new
generation
would behave
the same
way
it did
in
1982
and
1984.
Those
days
the
Marxist
Party
and
the
LDF
led
by
it
were
openly having
deals
with
communal
parties.
But
now
LDF
was
facing
the
electorate
with
an
uncompromising
stance
against
communalism and had
snapped
all its relations with
any
sortof
communal
groups
or
parties.
They
were
optimistic
in view
of
the
significant
gains
made
by
the Leftist
Student
Unions
in
the
campus
elections held
recently.
But
there
was another
side
of
the
picture.
The
expulsion
of the dissident
leader,
V.
Raghavan,
from
CPI
(M)
and the formation of CMP
had
an
adverse
effect
on
the
young
Marxists
in
the student
and
youth
wings
of CPI
(M).
Hence,
in
order to check
resentment
of the
youth
and to
arrest
mass
exodus
from he
party,
the CPI
(M) leadership
allotted
a
size-
able number of seats to student and
youth
leaders in the assem-
bly
elections. Youth in
the
Congress (I)
was,
on
the other
hand
disgruntled.
It had
bee#
allegedly
ignored.
The
entire
youth
Congress (I)
office
bearers
resigned
in
protest.
The
mass
resig-
nations were
later
withdrawn
following
a
personal
plea
by
the
Prime
Minister.
Nevertheless,
the Youth
Congress
(I)
was
tak-
ing
time
in
becoming
active
in
electioneering
even
though
some
Youth
Congress
(I)
leaders were
candidates.
Altogether,
the
youth
voters
could
swing
the balance
either side.
Similarly,
women were
expected
to
swing
the
elections
one
way
or
the
other,
as
they
outnumbered
men
in
voter's
list
in 94
of
140
constitutencies.
According
to the
revised
voter's list
of
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ASSEMBLY
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381
1,59,21,209
voters
in
Kerala, 80,90,993
were
women
who
had
an
overall majorityof 2,60,777 votes.
Towards the end of
electioneering
slight
shift n
LDF
stra-
tegy
was
obvious when
CPI
(M)
General
Secretary
E.M.S. Nam-
boodiripad spoke
of
Indianization,
while
UDF
declared to extend
support
to
the
newly
formed
CMP.
LDF was
trying
to
woo
other
sections of
society
including
Hindu Front
to
offset
grip
over
Muslims and
Christians which
accounted for
42%
of
Kerala's
population.
He
said,
"The
Hindu
Front
has
been
formed
to
safeguard Hindu interests and resistMuslism
-
Christian commu-
nlism.
In
this,
electoral
defeat
of the
Congress
(I)
and
forma-
tion of
an
opposition
government
are
decisive
factors.
The
thinking
sections
among
the
Hindu,
arrayed
behind
the
BJP-
Hindu
Front
axis,
will
realise that
the
way
to
achieve
these
ob-
jectives
is
the
victory
of the
LDF".16
Due
to various inbuilt
problems
in
UDF-infighting
and
bic-
kerings,
emergence
of
rebels,
and
absence
of
sympathy
wave
-
it became
inevitable for
the
Congress (I) president,Rajiv
Gan-
dhi,
to
step
into the election arena. His firstvisit met
with
lukewarm
response
from
the
people.
His
speeches
were
centring
around
Punjab
and
Barnala
and
Jyoti
Basu.
He
was
quiet
on
the
performance
of the
Karunakaran
government.
On
the
one
hand,
he
attacked communal
parties
and,
on
the
other,
he
was
alleged
to have
turned
a
blind
eye
to
the
communal
aspects
of
the
parties
which
were
part
and
parcel
of
the
Congress
(I).
During
his second round of
tour
he
refrained
from
addressing
meetings
in
areas where
communal
parties
in
coalition with UDFwere
contesting,
but concentrated
on
areas
where
Congress
(I)
or
Independent
candidates
backed
by
Congress
(I)
were
in
the
fray.
He asked the
people
to
compare
the
rule
of
the
LDF
with
that of
UDF.
Rajiv pointed
out
that
Rs.
2,000
crores
had
been
earmarked
(which
would be
assisted
by
other
programmes)
to
create
more
jobs
and
employment
in
agricultural
and
industrial
sectors.
He
also
strongly
criticised
the
CPI
(M)
and
said
it
was
only
interested
in
strengthening
the
'cadre
raj'.17
Rajiv
vehe-
mently
maintained that
the
Congress (I)
-
led UDF had givenKerala
during
its rule the
stability
required
in
administration
whicK
the
State had not
witnessed
for a
long
time.
According
to
him,
stability helped
maintain
law
and
order
and
also
led
to
successful
implementation
of
many
developmental
programmes.
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382
THE INDIAN
JOURNAL
F
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
During
his third
and
last tour
of the
State,
the
Prime
Minister
said, "For us, administration is a major tool forbuilding the
nation,
for the
uplift
of the
poor.
The
Marxists
on
the
other
see it as
a
tool
only
for
building
up
their
party
cadre".1*
Addressing
a
rally
in
Trivandrum,
he
attacked
Indianization
thesis
of
Namboodiripad
and
said,
"After
nearly
seven
decades
of
political thought
he
(Namboodiripad)
talks
about
Indianiza-
tion
which was
rejected
even
by
RSS
as
impractical".19
Also,
Rajiv
defended
the
concept
of
Navodaya
schools
everywhere
during
electioneering.
Post-election
eflections
In
Kerala,
Congress
(1)
-
led
ruling
United
Democratic
Front
faced
a
severe
blow
from
the CPM-led
Left
Democratic
Front in
a
close
race.
The
LDF came
to
power,
getting
151,265
votes
more
than UDF.
In
1982
the
UDF
had scored
29,272
votes
more than
LDF.
Of
the total
1,263,280
votes
polled
in
Kerala
Assembly,
the UDF
had
a
share
of
5,482,147
votes
and
LDF
6,633,412.
While
the
UDF
fielded
136 candidates
and won
60 seats, LDF contested for 138 seats and won 76. The Congress
(I)
put
up
74 candidates
to
gain
33 seats or
24.51%
of
valid
votes. CPI
(M)
fielded
68 candidates
and won
36
seats
with
a
^percentage
of
22.32.
Although
it
fell
by
a
margin
of
ust
about
2%
of
votes,
it was
enough
for the
overthrow
of
the
government.
With
this
came
an end of
Congress
(I)
control
of
the
only
South-
ern
State
where it
had its
share
in
administration.
E. K.
Nayanar
took
charge
of
the
LDF
government
fifth ommunist
led
in
30
years.
It
is
for
the
first
time
since
1970
that
the
state
has
a
governmentwithout any section of the Muslim League, Kerala
Congress
or
the
Congress^
Given
the
national
scene,
the LDF
strategypaid
its dividents.
It
wooed
the
youngsters
by
giving
them
party
tickets.
Said
Cheriyan
Philip,
one of
the Youth
Congress
(I)
state
secretaries:
"The
LDF,
especially
the
CPI
(M)
had
fielded
almost 30
young
candidates,
some
of
them
straight
out
of
college.
We,
on
the
other
hand,
were
given
only
5
seats,
which
included
two
sitting
youth
congress
MLAs".20
It
also
successfully played
up
the
delicate issue of law and order situation in the state by pointing
out
police
atrocities
on women
in
Thangmani
village.
The LDF
strategy
was
masterminded
and
spearheaded
by
Nambooridipad,
the CPI
(M)
general
secretary.
LDF
appealed
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ASSEMBLY
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ERALAAND WEST BENGAL
383
to the
voters
from
a
secular
and non-communal
platform.
The
Congress (I), on the other hand, fell a prey to its own deeds -
lack
of
cooperation
and
disorganization.
As Karunakaran
would
put
it
"I
take
the
responsibility
for
the
defeat of the
UDF.
It
is,
however,
not
because
of
the
poor
performance
of
the
govern-
ment,
but due
to the internecine
quarrels
between the consti-
tuents
of
the
UDF."21
It had to
spend
a
lot of time
trying
o
balance
the
different
ommunal
and
religious segments
Muslim
League,
Kerala
Congress,
the
Socialist
Republican
Party
(SRP)
and
National
Democratic
Party
(NDP)
which stood
for
Muslims,
Christians,the Ezhavas and the Nairs respectively. The UDF
was further
handicapped
by
its
educational
policy
and
its
stand
on
the
reservation
issue.
Rajiv
agreed
that
the
party
was
not
able
to handle
education
system
which
created
serious
problems
-
and
thus
the
majority
community
felt
strongly.22
The
bickerings
amongst
the
UDF
partners
were
responsible
for
its
downfall.
The
split
in
the Kerala
Congress
came
at the
time of seat
allocation.
Inspite
of their
warm
hand
shake
on
the
eve of
elections,
the
split greatly
damaged
their
prospects
of
victory
-
especially
in the
Travancore
region
where
it
wielded
influence
-
and
they
could
capture
only
9
of
the
23
seats
contested^there.
It is
evident
from the
poll
results
that
the
UDF
failed to evoke a
favourable
response
from
the
people
in its
own
strongholds
-
Travancore
and
Cochin.
It won
only
8 seats out
of 38
in
three
districts of
Trivandrum,
Quilon,
and Ernakulam.
It failed to channelise non-left and non-Marxist
vote
in
its
own
favour.
The
image
of the Prime Minister
had
little
impact
on
the voters.23
Nevertheless,
some
reversals
in the
voting
pattern
are
quite
interesting.
UDF
won
in
communist
bastions
of
Kasargod,
Kozhikode,
and
Palghat
in
the north
and
LDF had victories
in
the
UDF
citadels of central and
southern Kerala.
Total
rejection
of
the Nair-based NDP and
Ezhava-based
SRP
and the
Kerala
Congress
indicates
a
severe setback
to forces
of
communal
politics.
The defeat of the Muslim League in Cochin
-
Travancore
belt
clearly
suggests
that the
electorate was
not
willing
to vote
for
theological
issues. The
Indian
Union Muslim
League's
(IUML)
representation
shrunk
from 18
to
15,
that
of
Kerala
Congress
from
16
to
9.
The
emergence
of
Hindu-vote
bank
was
another
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384
THE INDIAN
JOURNAL
F POLITICALSCIENCE
TABLE
-
1
Kerala
Party
Position
4
The
following
is
the
detailed
election board for
Kerala:
Contested
Won Votes
Per-
polled
centage
Congress
(I)
74 33
3,074,922
24.51
IUML 23 15 991,236 7.90
KC
(J)
13 5
450,392
3.59
KC
(M)
10 4
425,378
3.39
NDP
9
1
281,881
2.24
SRP
4 nil
154,450
1.23
UDF-Ind.
3
2
103,888
0.82
Total for UDF 136 60 5,482,147 43.70
CPI
(M)
68
36
2,800,938
22.32
CPI
(M)
Ind.
9
4
373,810
2.98
CPI
(Inc.
1
Ind)
26
17
1,073,382
8.55
Congress
(S)
14
6
511,727
4.07
Janata
12
7
482,212
3.84
RSP 7 5 313,004 2.49
Lok
Dal
2
1
78,339
0.62
Total
for LDF
138 76
5,633,412
44.91
BJP-Hindu
Munnani
122
nil
812,915
6.48
Communist
Marxists
86
1
140,483
1.11
Independents
750
1
474,569
3.78
(Cong-I
rebel)
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ASSEMBLY LECTIONS
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ERALA
AND WEST BENGAL
385
important
feature of these elections.
Hindu
awareness
was
mili-
tant to recognise Namboodiripad as a better Hindu than
Karunakaran.
However,
the
"third-front"
which
comprised
of
the
BJP
and
the
Hindu Munnani
failed to secure
any
seat.
The
group
was
vehemently
decried as
communal
by
the
LDF.
In
the
new
Kerala
ministry
here
are
8
woman
as
opposed
to
five
in the
last
assembly.
In
1982
elections,
15
women
were
fielded
as
oppose
to
34 this time. There are now
48
new
faces
and 61
members from
the
dissolved
house
-
including
9 members
fromthe Karunakaran ministry. In the assembly of 138 seats,
LDF
bagged
76 seats while
UDF could
only
caputure
60 seats.
One seat
each
went
to Communist Marxists
and
Independents
(Congress-I rebels).
LDF's
foremost
task would be
to consolidate
its
position,
review the
working
of
traditional
industries,
maintain
law
and
order in
the
state,
introduce correctives
in educational
institu-
tions and
administration,
and
foremost
of
all,
curb
the
process
of
communalization in the state.
It
may
be worthwhile
to recall
here that in
1982,
LDF
was
voted out
of
power
because
of its lack of control over
the activi-
ties of
the
Centre for
Indian Trade
Unions
(CITU).
Now
that
LDF
is back in
power
again,
it
must
make sure to
organise
CITU.
Further
LDF
should also ensure
that it is
in
officefor
a
full
term
This is
even more
important
in
view of the
Lok
Sabha
elections
in
1989.
WEST
BENGAL
Pre-election
cenario
Like
Kerala,
West
Bengal
also
posed
a
challenge
to
Rajiv,
where
preparations
for elections
for
Assembly
had
already begun
as
early
as
from
28
November,
1986,
when
the
Left
Front issued
its
manifesto,
and
where
354 lakh
voters,
incommunicative
as
never
before,
were
to vote for
294
seats
in the
Assembly
elections.
Rajiv plunged
into
the
electioneering arena with
a
team
of
young
Congressmen
and said
that
he
was
fully
prepared
to
give
the
CPI
(M)
a
tough
fight.
"He
(Jyoti
Basu)
will
say
that he
will
win,
but
I
will
say
I
will
win and that is what
you
call
parlia-
mentary
democracy,"
said
the
Prime
Minister.25
The
Congress
(I)
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THE
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POLITICAL
CIENCE
decided
to contest
all
the
294
Assembly
seats
including
three in
the Darjeeling district.
One
certainly
witnessed
a
delay
in
selection
and
finalisation
of
Congress
(I)
candidates.
PCC(I)
and AICG
could
not
arrive
at
a
unanimous
consensus
over choice of
candidates.
There
was
a definite
ir
of
confusion
and
conflict.
Dispute
over
loyalists
and
former
Congressmen
who
opposed
Mrs. Indira
Gandhi fur-
ther
delayed
the
finalisation
of the
list. But
this in
no
way
shook
the
confidence
of
the
Congress
(I)
which
was
agile
in
constituting
the State Pradesh Ejection Committee in Februarry,1987. How-
ever
low-keyed
was
its
movement,
it
was
still
roaring
with
optimism
"We
do
not want
to emulate
the
CPI(M)
which
took
out
procession
on
the
very day
the
polls
were
announced in
November,
1984.
As
a result their
campaign
peaked
before
polling
day
and
we
gained,"
remarked
a
Congress
(I)
General
Secretary.26
The
Congress
Parliamentary
Board
abandoned
its
earlier
criterionof selecting candidates on their winning prospects and
loyalty
to
the
party,
because such
a
criterion
nly
resulted
n
poor
performance
n 1982.
Congress
(I)
decided to
give
chance
to all
Congress
MLA's.
"We
have
decided not to
disturb
the
sitting
MLA's.
All
of
them would
be
nominated,"
said
AICC(I)
obser-
ver,
R.
L.
Bhatia.27
It also
decided
to
nominate
more
young
nen,
particularly
professionals
as
candidates for
the
election
fray.
Representation
of
youth
was ensured.
A
senior
Congress
(I)
leader
said,
"The move
was
apparently
designed
to
pave
way
for a regeneration of the party long dominated by leaders who
belong
to
the
pre-Independence
era".28
This
was
reflected n
the
lists
of
candidates
of
both the
CPI(M)
and
Congress
(I).
Elections
came
as
a
tough fight
in
West
Bengal
both
for
Rajiv
anil
his
party.
The
challenge
emanated
from
the
fact
that
the
CPI
(M)
was
geared
for
elections under
its
experienced
leadership.
Many
of
its leaders
had
been
associated
with
the
communist
movement
since its
beginning
in
India.
They
had
been in the partywhen it was in opposition and lived with the
party
in
its
ups
and downs.
Although
splits
in
Communist
movements,
rise
of Naxalites
and
changes
in
the
socialist
world
outside
India
were
a cause of
concern,
Jyoti
Basu's
personal
charisma
and
popularity
did
help
the CPI
(M) gain
its
vigour.
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ERALA
AND
WEST
BENGAL387
West
Bengal
had been free from
communal
trouble for the
last decade when people had spent peaceful time as compared to
the
years
1972
and
1977
during
the
Congress
rule.
There
were
no
caste
conflictsnor
there were
reported any
police
atrocities.
"In
my
assessment
our
significant
uccess
lies in
ensuring
democratic
rights
and civil liberties to
the entire
community
and all
political
parties.
These
rights
and liberties
were
ruthlessly
taken
away
by
the
previous
Congress regime.
Our
government
has done
best
to
safeguard
the interest
of the
minorities,
harijans,
scheduled
castes
and
tribes
and the hill
people.
Our
thrust on rural
acti-
vities has yielded results. Our accent on urban development
has also
produced
positive
results,
lthough
in
some
fields we
are
yet
to
go
a
long
way
said
Jyoti
Basu
in
an
interview
to the
Statesman
Calcutta.29
He
also confessed
that
"
the
situa-
tion
in
some
of
the
industrial belts
...
is
unsatisfactory
primarily
because
of
wrong
and
unfavourable
policies
of
the
Centre. The
funding
pattern
of
the
Centre
in
respect
of
industrial
reconstruc-
tion
is
totally
faulty..."30
Rajiv's main aim of electioncampaign was to bringCongress
(I)
back to
power
in
West
Bengal
and
rout
the
leftists.
How-
ever,
he
was
cautious not
to
upset
the
electorate
which
he
believed
to be more
pro-left.
He
said,
"sometimes
I
think
why
do we
fight
t
all."31 He
gave
a
call
to
break
the
Communist
citadel
and
promised
the birth
of Nutan
Bangla
(New
Bengal).
He
said,
"Today
West
Bengal
deserves
our
special
attention
because
in the
last
10
years
it
has
lagged
behind
in
all
spheres.
We
shall
spare
no
effort o
build
a
Nutan
Bangla.
Our
efforts
have begun. My personal effort oo ... We have kept aside Rs.
1000 crores to build
a
Nutan
Bangla
and
take it
along
the
road
of
prosperity.
I
assure
you
all
I
shall
make
every
effort
nd
lay
special emphasis
on
Bengal's
development
so
that
Bengal
forges
ahead
of
all
other
states. You
have
to
strengthen
he
Congress,
you
have
to ensure the
victory
of
our
candidates
and
help
form
Congress
led
government
because
only
then
will
Bengal
be
able
to
move
ahead
at a
faster
pace."32
The
Prime
Minister,
on
his
part,
also
blamed
the
Left
Front for
misappropriation
of
Central
funds.
The
Congress (I)
manifesto
was
full
of
promises
made
with
a
view to transform
West
Bengal
into a
New
Bengal.
It
promised
to create
more
obs,
to
remove
poverty
in
villages,
and
to
im-
12
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388
THE
INDIAN
JOURNAL
F
POLITICAL CIENCE
prove
the standard
of farmers.
The
Congress (I),
if it formed
a
government,would implement the 20 point programmeof Rajiv
Gandhi and
achieve the
targets
of Seventh
Five
Year Plan.
It
said
that
the land
ceiling
Act
would also
be
reconsidered.
Gha-
ni
Khan
Choudhary
had earlier
declared,
"The centre would never
let
West
Bengal
down.
Mr.
Rajiv
Gandhi means what
he
says.
All
projects
announced and
assistance assured
will
be realised
in
the near
future."33
The
Congress
(I)
launched
its election
campaign
simultane-
ously in the districts and the cities. Rajiv said that the elections
in
West
Bengal
would be a
referendum nd
a
peoples'
verdict
on
10
years
rule
of
the
Left,
its failures
and successes.
He
appealed
to
the
people
to
throw
the
"cadre
raj"
and
replace
it
with
"peoples'
raj".
Addressing
a
meeting,
he
said,
"The
only
pri-
ority
of
the
Left
Front in the
last
10
years
has
been
to
strengthen
the
cadres
which
have
penetrated every
walk
of
life
in
the
state.
If
cadre
raj
continues,
everything
in
West
Bengal
will
be des-
troyed,
all
institutions will
collapse."34
He further
said
that
people had been blaming the Centre forall its backwardness: the
time
had
now come
when
they
should
exercise
their
right judge-
ment
and
bring
Congress (I)
back
to
power.
Congress
(I)
felt
uneasy,
not
only
because
of
the
superior
organisational
capacity
of the
CPI
(M),
its
electioneering
mano-
uevres
and
its
undenied
strength
t the
grassroots
evel,
but
also
because
of
the
upcoming
of
dissident
Congress (I)
members
who
assembled
under
the
banner
of
Rashtriya
Samajbadi
Congress
under the leadership of formerUnion Finance Minister,Pranab
Mukherjee.
The
Central
Parliamentary
Board
(CPB)
of
the
Janata
Party
believed
that
Mukherjee's party
had
come
up
asan
effective
hird
force
n the
politically
polarised
state.
The
Janata
Party
had
declared to
forge
an alliance with
Pranab
Mukherjee's
party.
The
CPI
(M)
appealed
to the
electorate
to recall
any
of
the
tall
promises
made
by
the
Congress
(I)
in the
past
that
were
fulfilled. The grant by the Centre to the State of Rs. 1007
crores
had
already
become
a
serious
subject
of
dispute
between
the
Centre
and West
Bengal.
Centre's
promise
to resume
the
project
on
Budge
Namkhana
railway
line
found
no
place
in
Madhav
Rao
Scindia's
railway
budget.
The
feeling
that
money
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8/12/2019 Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal
21/31
ASSEMBLY
LECTIONS
N
KASHMIR,
ERALA
AND
WEST
BENGAL
389
was
being
offered
to
buy
the
votes,
was
spreading
like
wild
fire.
Thus Prime Minister's remarks received a severe rebuttal from
Jyoti
Basu.
He
said,
"Why
doesn't
the
Congress
first reate a
New
Bihar or
New
Uttar
Pradesh,
places
where it is
in
office.
The
Congress
has
no
right
to
utter such
words."35
He
said that
the
Prime
Minister
was
himself
devoting
so
much time
in
West
Bengal
because
none of
his
party
leaders
commanded
credibility
among
the
people,
which
certainly
underlined
the
weakness
of
the local
leadership.
In
reply
to the Prime
Minister's
statement
that
the
Chief Minister
had become
old and
should
now
retire,
Jyoti
Basu said, "First I will see him out of politics and then
retire.
It
isdangerous
for the
country
to
have
a
Prime
Minister
like Mr. Gandhi
who
simply
does not
know
how
to
speak
the
truth."36
The
issues
that
the
Left
Front
put
before
the
electorate
were
peace
and not communal
and caste
disturbances,
the
indispensa-
bility
of the Left
in view
of
10-year
rule
without
any
sign
of
weaknesses,
need
for
continued
political
stability,
the
desirability
of rejuvenation of state economy, removal ofregional imbalances
and
economic
development.
He talked
of
Left
Front
as
the
champion
of
social
and economic
equality.
Basu
also
took
a
nationalistic
stance.
His
appeal
to the
people
was
in
national
perspective.
"We
want
every
state
to
develop
equally.
But
our
complaint
is
why
should
Bengal
be
discriminated
against?
Why
should
Centre
keep
turning
down the
industrial
projects
we
propose?"37
He
also did
not
refrain
from
commenting
that,
"Prime
Minister
is
taking
recourse to
limitless
untruth
and
end-
less false promises. This is surprising. His mother had taken
years
to
go
that
way
but
the
young
Prime
Minister
had
lost
no
time
to
adopt
such
techniques."38
An
election
booklet
entitled "An
appeal
to
the
people
of
West
Bengal"
issued
by
the State
CPI
(M),
accused
Rajiv
Gandhi
of
shielding
the
anti-national
and
terrorist-activitiesf
the
Gorkha
National
Liberation
Front
(GNLF)
workers,
despite
the
declared
shift
in
the
party's
stand
on the
issue
following
discussions
between Rajiv and JyotiBasu. They expressed the apprehension
that
the
Centre
might
allow
carving
of
separate
Gorkhaland
after
elections.
While
the
CPI
(M)
did
not
want
t
make
Gorkhaland
an election
issue
as the
question
of
preserving
the
country's
unity
and
integrity
was
involved
with
it,
the
party
explained
that
it
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8/12/2019 Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal
22/31
390
THE
INDIAN
JOURNAL
F POLITICAL
SCIENCE
spoke
on Gorkhaland
only
"to
satisfy
the
people
who
want
to
know about the Ghising-Gandhi entente."39
Thus
the electorate was
lft
totally
confused
on the
eve of
elections.
A
commoner,
said,
that
he
was
unhappy
with
the
programme
of
the Left
Front,
but
doubted
if the
Congress
(I)
could come back
to
power.
He
said,
"I
will not waste
my
vote
this time."40
People
did not seem to
have
enough
faith
in
the
Congress (I).
The vote from the minoritiesalso appeared divided. There
were
those
who
supported
the rule
of
the Left
Front
government
and
there
was
a
section of
those
who were
disappointed
with
the
rule
of
the
Left
Front. A sect
of Muslims
criticised
the CPI
(M)
for
opposing
the
Muslim
Divorce
Bill.
"The
Communists
were
trying
to dilute our
identity
by opposing
Rajiv
government's
decision
to
leave
us alone with
our
personal
problems
and
laws,"
said Maulana
Wazir Ahmed.41
Said
another
Maulana,
"Do
not
vote for
a
leader
who
attacked our
law
and
who
does
not believe
in God. A few more years of communism and you will be
punished
even
for
saying your
prayers.
Rajiv
is
bad,
but
he is
God
fearing."42
However
another
sect
of Muslims
preferred
he
Left rule
in
West
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