agilewarrior12 pages

24A R M Y R E C O V E R Y C A P A B I L I T YDirectorateofForceDevelopment

AGILE WARRIOR 12Summary of Insights

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

2

Contents Introduction 4 Insights 5 1Operations in Urban Environments. 5 2 Cyber Operations. 7 3 Command, Control and Information 9 Requirements in the FCOC Era.

4 Intelligence, Surveillance and 11 Reconnaissance – Command, Control and Integration.

5 Urgent Operational Requirements. 13

6 UK Resilience. 15

7 Defence Engagement and Capacity Building. 17

8 Professional Development. 19

D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T

Battle-winning Armed Forces, smaller than before but able to reach across the world and operate across the spectrum from high-intensity combat to enduring stabilisation activity, who work with each other and with allies, equipped and trained for their task, their families well supported, trusted to shape their own future and manage their own resources within Defence1

1.AGILEWARRIORdeliversanauthoritativeevidence-basedanalysisoflandcapabilitywithinajoint,inter-agency,intra-governmentalandmultinationalcontext.Itcontributestothetransformationoflandcomponentcapabilityandforcestructuresacrossalllinesofdevelopment.Itisdesignedtoinstitutionaliseaprogrammeofexperimentation,synchronisedwiththeemergentMoDStrategytoCapabilityFramework.Atitscoreisahungerforprogressiveself-transformation.AW2011(AW11)wasthefirstannualreport.Itproducedvaluablefindingsthathavealreadyinfluencedourunderstandingoffuturecapabilityrequirements.

2.AW12identifiednewareasforinvestigationaswellasbuildingontheoutputofAW11.ThecoreoftheAGILEWARRIORprogrammefocussedonanumberofthemesandquestions;questionsthatexploredfuturecapabilitydriversandrequirements.AW12usedacombinationofmethodsandarangeofeventsandtechniquesincludingOperationalAnalysis,exercisesandmilitaryjudgmentsupportedbylessonsfromoperationsandtraining,todevelopacommonArmypositionthatinformsfutureconceptualdevelopment,forcedesignandcapabilitydevelopment.

3.TheheadlinethemesforstudyinAW12were: • OperationsinUrbanEnvironments • CyberOperations • Command,ControlandInformation • IntelligenceSurveillanceTargetAcquisitionandReconnaissance • UrgentOperationalRequirementsintocore • UKResilience • DeterrenceandCapacityBuilding • ProfessionalDevelopment

4.EvidencefromtheAGILEWARRIORprogrammewillinformourrevisionoftheArmy’shighlevelconcepts,theplanninganddeliveryofcapabilityandtheongoingrevisionoftacticaldoctrineastheArmycontinuestotakeforwarditsowntransformation.Inmanyareas,thisworkhasfeddirectlyintotheparalleldevelopmentofArmy2020.Theheadlineissuesaresummarisedinthefollowingpages,bysubjectarea.Theycontinuetobuildthecorporatebodyofevidencetosupportdecisionmakingaswetransformtomeetthechallengesofthefuture.AllForceDevelopmentstakeholdersshouldreadthispublicationandnotetheguidingprinciplesthatitcontains.Someoftherecommendationsmaynotsitcomfortablywithallaudiences;thisistobeseenasahealthydynamicastheArmybothdefinesandrefinesthecapabilitiesthatwillberequiredforfuturecontingentoperations.TheensuingdiscussionswillshapefurthercyclesoftheAGILEWARRIORprogramme.

1. ‘Defenceina

ChangingWorld’-The

DefenceSecretaryPhilip

Hammondlaunchingthe

newDefenceVision,

14May2012.

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

4 4D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTSWhat Are The Future Capability Requirements For Operations In The Urban Battlespace And How Might They Be Delivered?

‘We will not want to fight in urban areas, but the urban environment represents in my view a highly credible worst case – and we would be foolish indeed to plan to fight only convenient battles against stupid adversaries. Urban areas are where politics, people, resources, infrastructure and thinking enemies converge’2

Urbanisationmeansthatcitieshavebecome–andwillremain–pivotalpointsforinfluencingnational,regional,andglobalrisks,notleastastheselocationsattractextremists,terrorists,andorganisedcriminals,andarethenexusfordifferentcultures,ethnicities,andsupplychains.Despitethelikelypoliticalreluctance,themilitarymustthereforebepreparedtooperateinurbanareasgiventhegrowingstrategicsignificanceoftheselocations.

TheurbanthemewasidentifiedinAW11asanarearequiringfurtherstudy.Thisinvestigationintourbancapabilityrequirementscontinues,beyondAW12,undertheauthorityofDirectorCombat,howeverwithinAW12twomajoractivitiessoughttoinformthiswork.

• ExURBANWARRIOR3(UW3).ThisexperimentwasheldinSouthampton.Theaimwastoexamineoperationsinanurbanenvironment,atformationlevel,inordertoimproveunderstandingofthedemandsoffutureurbanoperations,ina2020timeframe.

• ARUSIStudyGroupentitled:‘Howthemilitarycancontributetoachievingeffectintheurbanenvironment.’TheRUSIStudyGroupconsideredhowlimitedforceelementscangeneratemassandeffectintheurbanenvironmentforabroaderrangeofpurpose.

RecommendationsfromUW3included:

• RecognisethatitismorelikelythannotthattheArmywillberequiredtofightinacitywithinthenext10-15years.

• Prepareandemploycombinedarmsbrigades,withexpeditionaryandmobileheadquartersformanoeuvringtoseizethetacticalinitiative.

• Investinthedivisionallevel,whereoperationalartshouldbepracticedusingacomprehensiveapproach.

• Re-mechanise.Beyond2020,ensurethattheequipmentprogrammeincludesacapablemainbattletank,anarmouredreconnaissancevehicle,anarmouredartillerypieceandarmouredvehiclesforarmouredandmechanisedinfantry;withcommandandsupportvehiclestomatch,inordertoensurethenecessarylevelsoffirepower,protectionandmobility.

• Movefromassuredtoconfidenttargeting,basedonjudgements,thelawandaccountability,ratherthanmechanisticprocesses.

• Investinspecificpreparationsforoperatinginurbanareas:inter alia,intelligenceawarenessoftheterrain;amethodforsimplifyingthecommonoperatingpicture;communicationthatworksinbuiltupareas;psychologicalinoculationofpersonnel;andtacticaltrainingforfightinginbuildingsandunderground.

• Re-investinlogistics,medicalandequipmentsupportpushedforwardandintegratedwiththefightingechelon.

• Ensurethataviationcanoperateeffectivelyinurbanareas.

‘In the future, we will be unable to avoid being drawn into operations in the urban and littoral regions where the majority of the World’s population live and where political and economic activity is concentrated’.3

2. DesigningtheFuture

Army:ExURBANWAR-

RIOR3FirstImpressions

Report–14Nov11.

3. FutureCharacterOf

Conflict

6 6

RecentexperimentationhasshownthattheArmyisnotfullyready,inbothpreparednessandcapabilityterms,forthedemandsoffutureoperationsinurbanenvironment.

• Force Preparation.Thedemandsandcomplexityofoperationsintheurbanenvironmentpointedclearlytotheneedforafundamentalreappraisalofourapproachtoforcepreparation.Whilstthisdemandsenhancementsinthephysicalcomponent(manpower,equipment,trainingandsustainability)underpinnedbyastrongandresilientmoralcomponent,significantadvancescanbemadeintheshorttermandatrelativelylowcostbyinvestmentintheconceptualcomponent–inparticulartrainingandeducation.

• Understand.Tobeabletodelineateitsroleandoperateeffectivelywithasmallfootprint,theArmyneedstodevelopmethodsforunderstandingthephysicalandsocialinfrastructure(includinginterdependencies),powerrelationshipsandsourcesofeconomichealthincities.Basedoncurrentresourcing,ourinabilitytoadequatelyunderstandtheurbanenvironmentwasrecognised.Thisunderstandingmustbedevelopedpriortodeployment,includingbyincorporatinglessonslearnedfrompolicing,planningstudies,anddisastersinurbanareasintorelevantdoctrine,trainingandexercising.

• Yardsticks.URBANWARRIOR3confirmedtheinadequacyofcurrentlypublishedplanningyardsticksforoperationsintheurbanenvironment.Manyoftheseyardsticksshouldberefreshedbyfocussed

experimentation,OperationalAnalysisandresearch.

• Offensive Support.Theutilityofindirectfiresinurbanoperationswasconfirmed.Conventionalfirestodefeatorneutralisetheenemyremainhighlyrelevantalthoughthebalancebetweenyield,precisionandsuppressiondemandarangeofcapabilitiestobeavailable.Non-explosivenatureswerealsoseentohaveutility,e.g.markerandsmoke.Furtherstudyisrecommendedtoinvestigatehownovelmunitionscouldenableoperationsintheurbanenvironmentwhereavoidingcollateraldamageisamajorfactor.

• Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE).UrbancommunitieswillexpecttheprovisionofservicesandutilitiesthattheArmyisnotequippedtodeliver,eitherbecauseoflackofcapabilitiesorbecauselandforceswillhavecompetingpriorities.TheArmywillneedtoberealisticaboutitsownabilitytodeliver,limitingitsambitionstowhatisachievableandmaximisingitsadvantages;whataretheArmy’scriticalcapabilitiesandvulnerabilitieswhenoperatingintheurbanenvironment?

Next Steps. ToexploittheworkofAW12,UW3andUW4,anUrbanConceptandan‘UrbanRoadmap’arebeingdevelopedtoidentifythepaththroughwhichtheArmyshoulddevelopitsurbancapabilities.

URBANWARRIOR5willexaminetheissuefurtherinaseriesoflive,virtualandconstructiveexperimentsinthelatterhalfof2012

D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Operations in Urban Environments

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

CYBER OPERATIONSWhat Land Forces capability requirements are needed for cyber operations at the tactical level?”

‘Future war will always include a cyber dimension and it could become the dominant form’ - Chief of the Defence Staff, 2011

The2010StrategicDefenceandSecurityReviewandassociatedNationalSecurityRiskAssessmentrecognisedtherisksofCyberAttackasaTier1risktothenationalsecurityoftheUK.Whilstitishardtoextrapolatethethreatoutto2020,3-5yearassessmentsindicatethatrisksofCyberAttackareontheincrease4.ThethreatofcyberattackfromhybridadversarieswashighlightedintheFutureCharacterofConflict(FCOC)5.Withmilitaryoperationsdependentontheuseofcyberspace,therequirementtointegratecyberactivityintotheconductofmainstreammilitaryoperationshasbecomeessential6.Freedomofmanoeuvrewithincyberspaceisnecessaryinordertoconductplanning,achievesituationalawareness,enablecommandandcontrol,realisethesynchronisationofeffects,andsupportadministrativeandlogisticservices.Defenceisreliantonnetworkconnectivitywithindustryandwithcoalitionpartners.Ouradversariesarealsobecomingincreasinglydependentoncyberspace;sowithincreasedthreatsocomesopportunity.Defencemustbeeffectiveatdefendingitselfwithincyberspace,andmustcapitaliseonopportunitiestoexploitadversaries’weaknessesthroughtheconductoffullspectrumcyberoperations.

TheDefenceCyberSecurityProgrammehasbeenestablishedtodelivercybercapabilityacrosstheDepartment,recognisingthatactivityincyberspaceneedstobeconductedinamannerwhichisinherentlyJoint.Equallythecomplexnatureofoperationsinthisdomain,andtheneedforcoherenceofactivity,meansthatcyberoperationsneedtobecoordinatedatthestrategicandoperationallevels.NeverthelessthereareclearanddiscretecapabilityrequirementsthatLandForceswillneedatthetacticallevelinordertoensureitcanconducteffectiveandfullyintegratedcyberoperationsinthe2020era.TheArmyCyberPlanprovidestheframeworkforthatactivity.

4. QuintepartiteIntel-

ligenceProductionPlan

Strategic3to5Year

OutlookfortheCyber

Environment(QUIPP-2-

10-36QdatedSep10).

5.FutureCharacterof

Conflict(FCOC),DCDC,

17Sep09

6.JDN3/12.

8 8D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T

• TheconductofoperationswithincyberspacewillbeinherentlyJointandwillseeablurringofdecisionmaking(andaction)betweenthestrategicandtacticallevels.LandForcetacticalcybercapabilitydevelopmentwillneedtobeseamlesslyintegratedwithinDefencecybercapabilitydevelopmentstrategiesatthestrategicandoperationallevels.

• JointDoctrineNote3/12:Cyber Operations: The Defence Contribution,willprovidethedoctrinalbasisforcapabilitydevelopment.TheSingleSIGINTBattlespace(SSB)providestheframeworkonwhichcyberoperationscapabilitydevelopmentissettotakeplace.

• LandForcesmustacttointegrateactivitythroughouttheElectromagneticEnvironment(ofwhichcyberoperationswillrepresentoneelement).ThismustincludethedevelopmentofgreatercoherencebetweentheJ2,J3andJ6functionalareas.

• ThefocusofcybercapabilitydevelopmentmustbeitsintegrationintotheJointActionframeworkthroughtheFullSpectrumTargetingprocess.ThiswillallowLandForcestonotonly‘dothingsbetter’butalsoto‘dobetterthings’.

• Themajorityofcybercapabilityissettobecontrolledatthestrategic/nationallevelbutwillhavethecapacitytobeemployedatthetacticallevel.Unlockingsuchcapabilityatthetacticallevelwillprincipallyinvolvethreethings;acleardoctrinalframework(settobebasedontheSSB),tacticalmanpowerresource(mostsignificantlymeasuredincyberspecialist,analystandlinguistmanpower)andspecialisedInformationandCommunicationServiceconnectivity.Maintainingcyberspecialistskillsetswillrepresentakeycapabilityrequirement.

• Thereisarequirementto‘getthebasicsright’intermsofInformationAssurance(IA)policycompliance

andthedevelopmentofCyberDefenceawareness.Individualsmustbeseenasthefirstlineofdefence.ImplementingindividualIA/CyberDefencetraining,alongsideculturalchangeinitiativeswhichseektoreinforcetheimplicationsof‘inappropriateconduct’withincyberspace,willprovecritical.Cyberhygienemustbecomeculturallyengrained.

• Tacticalforceswillneedtooperateundera‘presumptionof[cybersecurity]breach’.Theymustdevelopagilemechanismstorespondtothreatsonarisk-balancebasisandensurethattheydevelopandexerciserobustbusinesscontinuityplansinordertobeabletooperatepost-incident/attack.TherewillbearequirementforCyberDefencetrainingobjectivestobemoreeffectivelyincorporatedintoLandForcecollectivetraining.

• Attainingcybersituationalawareness(vianetworkmonitoringtools)andthemeanstoplanpost-incidentresponses(vianetworkplanningtools)willrepresentkeycapabilityrequirements.

Next Steps:

• TheArmyneedstore-invigorateCyberDefenceandInformationAssuranceawarenessthroughtrainingandbehaviouralchangeinitiatives.

• AnArmyTacticalDoctrineNoteoncybershouldbeissuedassoonaspossible.

• TherecommendationsoftheDefenceCyberSecurityProgrammeTrainingNeedsAnalysismustbeembeddedintoindividualtrainingandeducationcourses.

• ArmyCIOhasdevelopedaCyberPlanwithintheArmyInformationProgramme.Thisshouldbeimplementedinfull.

• CapabilityDirectorsmustconsidertheimplicationsofcyberinthedevelopmentofexistingandfuturecapabilities.

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Cyber Operations

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE FCOC ERA.‘What are the Command, Control and Information (C2I) Requirements at Theatre, Divisional and Brigade Levels to operate in the FCOC Era?’

Theexponentialgrowthininformationtechnologyhasrevolutionisedoperations.Thedemandforcomplex,richinformationservicesinthecurrentandfutureoperatingenvironmentshasoutstrippeddelivery.InformationandCommunicationsServices(ICS),andtheirapplicationsanddata,needtobemadeavailable,securely,toaverylargenumberofdispersedusersandifnecessarywithinacontestedenvironment.Theseuserswillneedaccesstoinformationservicesthrough‘pointsofpresence’,interconnectedbyhighbandwidthlinks,andwillneedtobeabletoreachacrossthedeployedforce,toalliesandcoalitionpartners,tothehomebaseandtoothersinthecountryofdeployment.Whilereversionaryworkingneedsdevelopingandpractice,thereis,essentially,nogoingback.C2elements,largeandsmallneedaccesstoa‘flat’,ubiquitousICSnetworktoallowthemtoachieveanoperationaladvantage;allwithinthecontextofcyberspace-withitsassociatedopportunitiesandthreats.

Militarycommunicationsspecialist,supportedbyDE&Sandcontractors,willneedtooperateacommonequipmentplatform,carryingcommonNATOservicesandapplications,usingasingleServiceManagementregime.ThescalingofDii(S)andDii(R)todelivermediumscaleenduringoperations,requiresreview.Thereisalsoalackofanagile(smaller/lighter)solution.ItwillbeessentialthattheICSregimentsusecommoninfrastructure,networksandservicemanagement,andthatthereisacommonsetofuserapplications.Withoutthiscommonplatform,themulti-roleapproachwillbedifficulttoimplement.

Deliveringrichinformationservicesintothefastmovingmanoeuvreelementsofaforceischallengingandservicesatthislevelwillbeoptimisedforvoice,situationalawarenessandbattleplanningandcontrol,withsometailoredaccesstoricherservices;fixedorstaticHQs,withrelativestablepowersupplies,canexpectthefullrangeofICStobeprovided;BGsandCoyswillrelyonTacticalCIS.Asthereisadirectcorrelationbetweenthequalityandtimelinessofinformationanddecisionmaking9,manoeuvreforceelementswillneedtoreadjusttomakingdecisionswithlessinformationandthusreducedunderstanding,whichwillhaveaconcomitantimpactonthelevelofassurance,riskandtempoofoperations.

7. Operationalactivity

comprisinganumberof

processes,eachwithits

associatedinformation

exchangerequirements

(IERs).

8.Estimatedbroad-

bandWANbandwidth

requirementsrange

from10Mbpsatthe

smallestC2nodesupto

32Mbpsatthelarger

nodes.

9.Informationfrom

thecognitive,physical

andvirtualdomainleads

toenhancedsituational

awareness,which

whenanalysedleadsto

comprehension(insight)

andafterjudgementis

applied,leadstounder-

standing(foresight).

1010D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T

• TheirisanemergingimbalancebetweenthedemandforrichICSandtheabilityforsupplytokeeppace.

• GainingandmaintainingoperationaladvantagewillrequireICSstructuresthatareflatubiquitous.

• Deliveringrichinformationservicesintothefastmovingmanoeuvreelementsofaforceischallengingandservicesatthislevelwillbeoptimisedforvoice;greatermobilitywillresultinreducedsituationalawareness,whichhasimplicationsforrisk,tempoandtheabilitytoconductmissioncommand.ContingentoperationswillchallengeLandForcesindifferentwaystothatforwhichestablishedICSstructureshavedevelopedinAfghanistan.

• Interoperability(voiceanddata),viaTacCISandbroadbandWideAreaNetwork(WAN)isacriticalrequirementtosupportallmissionthreads7intheCJIIMenvironment.

• Amediumscalestabilisationoperationrequires74xbroadband(WAN)pointsofpresence.8FALCONisthetrunksystemthatwillprovidethehighcapacitybroadbandcommunicationsWAN.WhilstMISSIONSECRETwillbetheprimarysecuritydomain,avarietyofinformationinfrastructure(securitydomains)arerequiredasitisnotyetpossibleforsecurityreasonstocarryallsecuritydomainsonasingle,physicalnetwork.

• TherearesufficientFALCONtoallowmediumscaleenduringoperations.Thereisalsoapotentialmismatchbetweenprotectionandmobility.FurtheranalysisisrequiredtoinformtheEquipmentProgramme,andinformationexchangerequirementsneedtoberegularlyreviewedtomaintainaccuracyandcurrency.

• AproperlyresourcedJFCISComdandJ6staffisrequiredtoensurethenetworks,infrastructureandapplicationsareeffectivelymanaged.AreviewofstaffusertrainingisalsorequiredtoensurethatstaffusersareabletomaximiseexploitationofinformationdeliveredtoincreasinglycomplexCIS.

Next Steps • AC3ICONEMPisbeingdevelopedinparallelwith

theDeployableDivisionalHeadquartersCONEMP;theseCONEMPswillbevalidatedduringsubsequentAGILEWARRIORwork,notablytheAGILEWARRIORExperimentin2013.

• ConcurrencyassumptionsneedtobetestedtoagreaterextentandtheC2Irequirementsforasinglecomplexinterventionneedtobecapturedandvalidatedacrossarangeofoperationalscenarios.

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Command, Control and Information Requirements in the FCOC Era.

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)- COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTEGRATIONDetermine the optimum Command and Control for integral ISR assets at Bde level, and also for reinforcing ISR assets that may be task-organised to the Bde; and the optimum means of integrating all of these assets within the Bde HQ’s process.

Theoperatingenvironmenthasbecomemorecomplex;achievinganadvantageoveranopponentinthecyberandinformationspacestoenableunderstandingisbecomingevermoreimportant.TheunprecedentedgrowthinISTARcapabilitiesatthebrigadelevelandbelowhashighlightedgapsinourabilitytocontrol,integrateandexploitthesignificantadvantagesuchcapabilitiesshoulddeliver.Alackofeducationisattheheartofthisissue.Bespokeprocedures,trainingregimesandstaffcellshavebeengeneratedtoresolvethisissueforOperationsTELICandHERRICK,notallofthesesolutionshaveenduringutilitybuttheyprovideaneffectivestartpointforcontingentoperations.

ISTARisaprocessinvolvingcollect(STAR),analysis(Intelligence),exploitationandissupportedbyCIS/G6.G2,G3andG5allrequiretobesupportedbypartsoftheISTARprocess.Thekeyprinciplesarecentralisedcoordination;responsivenessandtimeliness;robustandflexiblesensormix;interconnectivityandInformationManagement;mass,soak,layerandcross-cue,andmulti-sourceapproach.MaintainingcoherencethroughISTARcapabilitiesandstafffunctionsatthetacticallevelwillbefundamentalwhileaddressingthesekeyprinciples.WemustavoidusingISTARasacatch-alltermbutratheruseitappropriatelyinlinewithendorseddoctrine,whichneedstobebetterunderstoodandtaughtatalllevels.

RobustISTARstructuresateachlevelofcommandareessentialtomeetfuturecontingentneeds.WhilstformingabespokeIX/ISTARGrouponoperations(asseenonOpHERRICK)maybeanoptionitshouldnotnecessarilybethedefaultsetting.Whatisneededisbetteralignmentofcollectionassetsandtheprocessofcollectionmanagement,withthatofInformationRequirementsManagementinordertobettersupportacommander’sdecisionmakingwithananalysedoutput(Intelligence).Thekeytosuccessistheeffectivegroupingofspecial-to-armI,S,TA,Rforceelementsinbarracks,holdingthemattheappropriatereadinessandforcegeneratingthemattherightstageofthesupportedHQsCollectiveTraining;CT5andCT6eventsmustincludethefullsuiteofISTARcapabilities.

SpecialistsupportmustbescalableandadaptabletotheHQstructure;startsmall(lean)andgetbiggerasrequired.Followingthe‘plugandsocket’philosophy,whichisakeytenetoftheA2020proposition,thereisaneedforacombinationofbettereducatedgeneralistswithappropriatetrainingandexperiencetobecorestaffmembersinBattlegroup,BrigadeandDivisionalHQs,responsibleforintegratingISTAR;andspecialists(EW,UAS,HUMINT,GMRetc)thataretask-organisedwhenrequiredtobringprofessional/SMEadviceandinputtobothcollection(FIND)andexploitation.

10. ISTARisthe

coordinatedacquisition,

processingand

disseminationoftimely,

accurate,relevantand

assuredinformation

andintelligencewhich

supportstheplanning

andconductof

operations,targeting

andtheintegration

ofeffects,enabling

commanderstoachieve

theirgoalsthroughout

thespectrum[mosaic]of

conflict(JDP0-01.1).

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• TheunprecedentedgrowthinISTARcapabilitiesatthebrigadelevelandbelowhashighlightedgapsinourabilitytocontrol,integrateandexploitthesignificantadvantagesuchcapabilitiesshoulddeliver;alackofeducationisattheheartofthisissue.

• WemustavoidusingISTARasa‘catch-all’term,butratheruseitappropriatelyinlinewithendorseddoctrine,whichneedstobebetterunderstoodandtaughtatalllevels.10

• ThereisaneedforacombinationofbettereducatedgeneraliststobecorestaffmembersinBattlegroup,BrigadeandDivisionalHQs,responsibleforintegratingISTAR;andspecialiststhataretask-organisedwhenrequiredtobringprofessional/subjectmatterexpertadviceandinputtobothcollectionandexploitationactivitieswithintheISTARprocess.

• SpecialistsupportmustbescalableandadaptabletotheHQstructure,flexibleandrobustenoughtomeetthedemandsofanycontingentoperation;startleanandaugmentasrequiredfortheoperation.

• Thekeytosuccessiscentralisingspecial-to-armI,S,

TA,Rforceelementsinbarracks(enhancedcoherenceandprofessionalism),holdingthemattheappropriatereadinessanddeliveringthemaspartofacoherent

andfullytrainedforcepackageattherightstageofthesupportedHQsCollectiveTraining;Level5and6CollectiveTrainingeventsmustincludethefullsuiteofISTARcapabilities.

• StructuresshouldbereviewedinaccordancewiththeArmy2020FindandUnderstandBrigadeConceptofEmployment(CONEMP)whichwilldelivergreatercoherencebetweentheprocessesinvolvedinCollectionManagementwiththatofInformationRequirementsManagementinordertobettersupportacommander’sdecisionmakingwithananalysedoutput.

• Eachdeployedbrigadeshouldhaveitsownorganicgroundmountedrecce,Intelligence,Communication,GeoandBattlespaceManagementelements.Thedivisionmayrequirethedevelopmentofabespokedeployablereconnaissance/surveillanceorganisationthatmanoeuvrestofindbutindirectsupportofdivisionalinformationrequirements.

• AOne-Starproponent(CapabilityDirectorInformation)willreinforcetheprofessionalisationofISTARasadisciplineandbringcoherencetoitsdelivery.

• Considerationshouldbegiventointroducingatacticalintelligencecareerstreamforinfantryandarmouredregiments.

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) - Command Control and Integration

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS INTO COREIdentify and prioritise the capabilities developed for Afghanistan (and Iraq) that have enduring relevance for the future in order to determine those that should be brought into the core programme for Army 2020.

RecentoperationsinbothIraqandAfghanistanhaveseenaproliferationofdeployedcapabilitiesprocuredundertheUrgentOperationalRequirement(UOR)process.FollowingSDSRandthefutureofthecurrentcampaigninAfghanistan,thereisarequirementtodeterminewhichofthesecapabilities,measuresandequipmentprocuredanddevelopedforthesecampaigns,shouldberetainedbytheArmyonReturntoContingency.

Theanalysisofwhichcapabilitiestoretain,consideredalltheDefenceLinesofDevelopment.KeystakeholderengagementfromacrossdefenceseekstoachievecoherencebetweenthesingleServices.

Thescaleofthetaskhasmeantthatthefullfindingswillnotbeavailableuntillaterin2012,althoughsomeemergingheadlineshavebeenmadeavailableinthisreport.

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Fires, Targeting and ISTAR.• Retainthesignificantenhancementincollectcapability• Retainandnurturethesignificantenhancementinstaff

disseminationandprocessingskills.

Lethality. • Reviewoftrainingprogressionandtheuseof

simulation.• Maintainthecompetencelevelsamongreservesand

supportforcesacrossthewidespectrumofnewweaponsystemsthattheyhaveused.

Counter-IED. • Futuretrainingwillneedtobalancebetweenscenarios

constrainedbyanIEDenvironmentwithtrainingforoperationsthatdemandspeedofmanoeuvre.

• UKmustmaintainitsworldclassR&Dandmanufacturingcapability.

Vehicles• ThosevehiclesusedtoprovideEquipmentSupport

musthavemobilityandprotectionmatchedtothosethattheyaresupporting.

• Futurefleetrequirementsmustenableunitstotrainastheyfightasopposedtowholesaleconversiontotypepriortodeployment.

Dismounted Close Combat• Acoherentassessmentofnightoperatingcapabilityis

required.

ISTAR / Base ISTAR• NeedforanintegratinghubforallISTARcollectassets.• ProvisionofrobustFullMotionVideocapable

InformationSupportService,separatefromBaseISTARinfrastructureshouldbeinvestigatedinordertosupportcontingentoperations.

• ThereisanenduringrequirementforalayeredISTARmixrangingfromheavytolightandincludingacapableaerostat.

• ProvisionofsimulationinsupportofISTARtraining.• ISTARSpecialistsmustbemadeavailableforLevel3

CollectiveTrainingactivities,andabove.

Aviation• EnhancedDefensiveAidSuitesarefundamentalforthe

useofaviation,particularlyasthefutureairspaceislikelytobeincreasinglycontested.

Training• Theinvestmentintraininginsupportofcurrent

operations,anditsclearbenefits,hasbeenhardearned–andmustberetained

• TacticsTechniquesandProcedures(TTPs)thathaveevolvedduringHERRICK(andwhichwillhaveutilityinfutureoperatingenvironments)needtobehardwiredintotrainingandTacticalDoctrine.

Next Steps:• OutputhasinformedArmy2020andwillbeusedto

informMoDandArmycapabilitybalanceofinvestmentdecisions.

• Studycontinuesonthisthemein2012.

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-UORs into Core

A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S

UK RESILIENCEBy 2020, what capabilities will Land Forces require to provide UK homeland security and resilience?

UK Military /Civil Integration (MCI) and UK EngagementUKEngagementistheactivityconductedbytheArmywithnationalandlocalagenciesandpartnersthatwill,ifeffectivelydelivered,createasecureenvironment,athome,thatsustainstheArmy,enablestrainingforanddeploymentonoperationsandensurestheconsentandsupportofthepublic.Successshapesnationalandcommunityperceptionsandcreatesasupportivecommunityfromwhichtorecruit,withinwhichtoserve,andtowhichtoreturnattheendofservice.Itisaregionallyrelevant‘bottomup’ratherthan‘topdown’approachandonethatshapesthelocalandregionalenvironmenttodeliver,interalia,4keyoutcomes:

• MaintainingInflow:SupporttoRecruiting.• Shapingthe‘FirmBase’.• EnablingEffectiveDefenceCommunicationattheRegionalLevel.• SupporttoUKOps:ContributiontoRegionalResilience.

Successfulengagementinthisspacewillmakeavitalcontributiontoabroaderoutcome-anArmythatcontinuestooperateandthrivethroughtheconsentofthepeople,confidenceofgovernmentandcommitmentofitssoldiersandtheirfamilies.

The Provision of Resilience and Homeland SecurityNationalsecurityandresilienceencompassesawiderangeofthreats,fromtraditionalstate-on-stateaggressionthroughterroristgroupstocivilemergenciessuchasfloodingorpandemics.Italsoencompassesaspectrumofcapabilitiesandresponses—notmerelypreventingordealingwithattacksornaturaldisasters(‘security’),butalsoensuringthatvitalservicesaremaintainedandlifecancontinueasclosetonormalaspossible(‘resilience’).TherearetwobroadcategoriesofcapabilitiesthattheMoDmaintains:nichecapabilitiesandaugmentationcapability.

• ProvisionofCapacity.Highreadinessbulkmanpower,capableofenduringandsustainingoperationsinadverseconditions,withflexibleattitudesofmindandaMissionCommandphilosophy,willcontinuetobeanimportantcontributionfromthemilitary,eithertoaugmenttheemergencyresponseortofreeupcivilianpersonnelfromothertaskstoallowtheirredeployment.Thereisthetraditional,andassumed,publicexpectationthatthemilitarywillbeabletoprovidebothspecialistandgeneraldutiesmanpowertoconducttasksatshortnotice.

• NicheCapabilities.Thearmedforcescurrentlyprovideguaranteed,small-scalenichecapabilitiesthatcivilauthoritiescannotbeexpectedtodevelop(atleastonasignificantscale).Despitesignificantinvestmentinciviliancapabilitiesoverrecentyears,capabilitygapswillendurewherethemilitarycouldaddtotheircurrentcontribution:

• Commandandcontrolatscaleandonapanregionalbasis. • Developingacommonoperatingpictureduringacrisis. • UrbanSearchandRescue. • Providingtransportandlogisticsatscale. • Specialistengineering. • ‘MilitaryResilienceUnits/Groups,smallC2andlogisticsupporthubsto

whichothercapabilitiescouldbeattributedandwhichwouldbetailored tomeetthedemandsofaspecificsituation.

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UK Military/Civil Integration.RegionalUKengagementmust:

• Bedeliveredatthe1*level;inaregionalcontext;andasacommandfunctionwiththeauthorityandresourcestoachieveeffect.

• Havetheabilitytodevelopandsustainadeepandprofoundunderstandingoftheregion.

• Haveboundariescoincidentwithlocalauthority/regionalboundariesandoperatefromwithintheregionforwhichtheyhaveresponsibility.

• Supportbrigadeswithregionalresponsibilitieswithasuperior2*HQthatlinkswiththeArmyHQ/departmentalpolicybranches,andhasthecapacityandcompetenciestoensureefficientandcoherentimplementationofpolicyanddeliveryofeffectacrossregionalboundaries;

• BepartofacoherentcontinuumofmilitarycivilengagementfromLocalAuthoritytoGovernmentDepartmentsandaccesstothoseArmyandDefencePolicystaffsthatroutinelyengagewithsuchdepartments(Health,DWP,Education,DCLGetc).

Provision of Resilience and Homeland Security.

• Thereislittleformalnationalguidanceornational-levelrequirementsforhomelandsecurity;thishindersmilitarypreparationandinvolvement.Thereisanopportunityand,thestudywouldargue,animperativetodevelopanationalresilienceconceptthatisnotjustpredicatedonabottom-upapproachandinvolvesthemilitary.

• Homelandsecurityshouldtakeitsplaceasarelevantmilitarytasktomeetincreasedthreat,growingpoliticaldemandsandtoallowtheArmytomaintaincurrencyandcompetencyinthisarea.

• Defencegenerally,andtheArmyspecifically,isconditionedbytheexpeditionaryfocusofthe1998StrategicDefenceReviewandthecontemporaryexperienceoflargeandenduringoverseasinterventionsofthelast20years.

• ThereisanopportunitytodevelopcommondoctrinebetweenthemilitaryandCivilianresponders.

Next Steps.OutputhasinformedArmy2020andwillbeusedinthedevelopmentoftheArmyOperatingConcept(AOC).

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-UK Resilience

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DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDINGBy 2020, what capabilities will LF require to deliver capacity building abroad and support civil emergency organisations abroad in time of crises?

Defence Engagement and Capacity BuildingDeductionsfromtheFCOCpapersuggestthatArmy2020willrequiretheabilitytodelivercapacitybuildingandtosupportcivilemergencyorganisationsabroadintimesofcrisis.Dependentonthenatureofthecrisis,andinsomecasespotentialsecuritythreats,A2020willneedtoprovidethemeanstobuildcapacityinbothmilitaryandciviliandomains,andinbothbenignandthreateningenvironments.

ThereportbuiltontheworkoftheFutureArmyStructures(NextSteps)(FAS(NS))MACEPaperwhichcreatedtheMilitaryStabilisationSupportGroup(MSSG),byrecommendingamodestinvestmentinMSSGtoestablishsubordinateCivil-EffectsUnits-independentorganisationsabletodeliverupstreampreventactivity;forceelementsforcontingencyoperations;trainingsupporttowidertheDefencecommunityandcoherentMACEwithinenduringstabilisationoperations.

ThisreportreinforcesthefindingsofAW11(WorkPackage4)andotherassociatedwork,recommendingtheestablishmentofaOne-StarMilitaryAssistanceandStabilisationGroup(MASG)asa‘centreofexcellence’forcapacitybuildingandthedevelopmentofcoherentMACEandMCBcapability.EvidencefromoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,combinedwiththedirectionoftheNationalSecurityStrategyallstronglysuggestthatMCBwillplayapivotalrolefortheArmyof2020.

Thenewlypublished Joint Concept Note 2/12: Future Land Operating Concept identifiesthefuturerolesofLandForces.AspartofDefenceEngagementandinthecontextoftheBuildingStabilityOverseasStrategy(BSOS)hasputinplaceanintegratedcross-governmentstrategytoaddressconflictissues.Thepaperrecognisestheneedfor‘upstreamprevention’toanticipateinstabilityandpotentialtriggersforconflict.Indigenous capacity-building and upstream security assistance is likely to play a key role in generating the necessary indigenous capability, mass, insight and understanding that we will need in these environments in the future. UpstreamCapacityBuildingwillbeexaminedinthenextroundofAGILEWARRIOR.

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Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE). MACEshouldcontinuetohavetwoseparatebutcomplementaryaspects:

• MilitarySupporttoStabilisation–acapabilitythatisrequiredprimarilywhenciviliansareunabletodelivercivileffectinnon-permissiveenvironments.Whilstonlyrequiredperiodically,itisacomplexareathatrequiresexperiencedMACEplannersandaccesstoabroadrangeofcivilianskill-sets.

• CivilMilitaryCo-operation(CIMIC)–acapabilitythatisrequiredallthetime,athomeandabroad,todeliverco-ordinationandco-operation,betweenthemilitaryandcivilactors.

MACEcapabilityisrequiredacrossthetactical-strategicspectrum.Mostpressingly,theUKneedstoaddress:

• AlackoftrulydedicatedMACEstaffinUK FormationHQs.

• Incoherenceintheselection,trainingandpreparationofIndividualAugmenteesfillingMACErelatedpostswithinProvincialReconstructionTeams(PRTs)andCoalitionHQs.

• Alackofdedicated1*and2*CIMICcapability.

• Apparentincoherenceandlackofclearownershipof

militarystaffsecondedtotheUKStabilisationUnit.

• MACEspecialistsarebettercentralisedasde-centralisationhashistoricallyresultedinmisemploymentbyformationheadquartersandalossinMACEcurrency.EffectiveMACErequiresamixofSpecialistandGeneralistcapability.Thereisarequirementfor‘Generalist’RegularforceelementsreinforcedbyReservistsaswellasaccessto‘Specialists’mostofwhomareReservists.

Military Capacity Building (MCB). Inanerawhereourexitstrategiesaretransitionstrategies,MCBmightarguablybethemostimportantmilitaryactivityinanyfuturestabilisationoperation.MilitarysuccessintheFuture/ContemporaryOperatingEnvironmentismeasuredpartiallythroughthecapabilityoftheindigenousforcesleftbehindtodealwiththeresidualthreatstosecurity.MCBisstrategicallyandoperationallydecisive.MCB,therefore,iscorebusiness,notanicheactivity.Howeverdevelopingappropriatestructuresisonlyonepartofthechallenge:doctrine;training;andequipmentneedtobealigned.EffectiveMCBrequiresamixofSpecialistandGeneralistcapability.

Next Steps. ThestudyinformeddevelopmentofArmy2020andwillbeusedinthedevelopmentoftheArmyOperatingConcept(AOC)andUpstreamCapacityBuildingdoctrinaldevelopment.

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Defence Engagement and Capacity Building

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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENTHow do we develop personnel with the mental and physical resilience required by the new Army 2020 structure; and how do we attract the right people to sustain it?’

PeoplewillremaintheArmy’sstrategicedge–attheheartofcapability.Howeverthechallengewillcontinuetobedeliveringpersonnel,insufficientnumbers,thatarecapableandmotivatedtomeetthedemandsofthefuture.ThestudyfocussedontheemergingArmy2020structureandtheaccompanyingtransformationsbeingintroducedbyWholeForceConcept(WFC),FutureReserves2020(FR2020)andtheNewEmploymentModel(NEM).

Theframeworkforthestudyfocussedonthethreeelementsof:‘Attract;Develop;andRetain’,andwasthusfocussedontothefollowingissues:

(1) Howdowerecruitthesortofpeopleweneed?

(2) Whatmanningcriteriadoweneedtobecognisantof?

(3) Whatsortofqualifications(artisanskills)dotheyneed?

(a) Beforejoining?

(b) Duringservice?

(4) HowdowemaintainresiliencethroughPhysicalDevelopment?

(5) Howdoweidentify(andmanage)potentialandabilitytomatchthe needsofthestructure?

(6) Whatistheoptimumcareerprogressioncycle-3years?

(7) HowdoweretaintheonesthatweneedtomaintainOperational EfficiencyandBusinessEfficiency?

(8) Howdowegiveourspecialisttheexperiencethattheyneed (duringnon-opperiods)?

(9) Whatisthebalancerequiredbetweengeneralistandspecialist?

(10) Howdowedevelopthenecessarymindsetandculture?

ThestudyoffutureProfessionalDevelopmentcontinuesandisinextricablylinkedtoboththeNewEmploymentModelandtheA2020Study.

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• ‘Army of Specialists’. AfutureArmyislikelytoexperienceaparadigmshiftinwhichtherewillbeareductioninthenumberofgeneralistswhohaveservedinnumerouscareerfields,tomorecareerstreamingandspecialisation,withtheassociatedpost-graduateeducationalopportunities.

• ‘Career Partnerships’. Maintainingexperienceandexpertisewillbeachallengeinthepost-Afghanistancampaignera,forwhichasolutionmightbethefurtherdevelopmentof‘DefenceCareerPartnerships’.Thiswouldinvolveamoredevelopedrelationshipwithcivilianorganisationsinordertomaintaincurrency,experienceandretentionwithintheArmy.

• Motivation. Betterunderstandingofthemotivationofpotentialrecruitsneedstobeestablishedinrelationtothe‘Offer’ofacareerintheArmy.TheimpactofGovernmentchangesinschoolleavingage(18from2015)andtheintroductionofuniversityfees,needtobeassessed.ThebalancebetweentheArmybeingperceivedasajoborprofessionratherthanavocationneedstobeexaminedandtheimplicationsunderstood.

• Personnel Development Fund (PDF). FortheArmytomaximisethebenefitsthatadditionalqualificationsandtrainingprovidespersonnel,theArmyshouldconsidertheproposaltodevelopacentralPDFincorporatingEnhancedLearningCredits(ELC),StandardLearningCredits(SLC)andResettlementfunds.

HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Professional Development

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Army Code 71980

Anycommentsonthecontentofthisreportshouldbeaddressedto:

Lt Col Charlie Barker RASO1ForceDevelopment2DirectorateofForceDevelopmentForceDevelopmentandTrainingCommandArmyHeadquartersBlenheimBuildingMarlboroughLinesMonxtonRoadAndoverHampshireSP118HT

MilTel:943936360CivTel:01264886360Mile-mail:DFD-FD2-SO1@mod.ukCive-mail:charles.barker295@mod.uk

Design:DesignStudio,ArmyHeadquarters,ADR000990