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24A R M Y R E C O V E R Y C A P A B I L I T YDirectorateofForceDevelopment
AGILE WARRIOR 12Summary of Insights
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
2
Contents Introduction 4 Insights 5 1Operations in Urban Environments. 5 2 Cyber Operations. 7 3 Command, Control and Information 9 Requirements in the FCOC Era.
4 Intelligence, Surveillance and 11 Reconnaissance – Command, Control and Integration.
5 Urgent Operational Requirements. 13
6 UK Resilience. 15
7 Defence Engagement and Capacity Building. 17
8 Professional Development. 19
D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T
Battle-winning Armed Forces, smaller than before but able to reach across the world and operate across the spectrum from high-intensity combat to enduring stabilisation activity, who work with each other and with allies, equipped and trained for their task, their families well supported, trusted to shape their own future and manage their own resources within Defence1
1.AGILEWARRIORdeliversanauthoritativeevidence-basedanalysisoflandcapabilitywithinajoint,inter-agency,intra-governmentalandmultinationalcontext.Itcontributestothetransformationoflandcomponentcapabilityandforcestructuresacrossalllinesofdevelopment.Itisdesignedtoinstitutionaliseaprogrammeofexperimentation,synchronisedwiththeemergentMoDStrategytoCapabilityFramework.Atitscoreisahungerforprogressiveself-transformation.AW2011(AW11)wasthefirstannualreport.Itproducedvaluablefindingsthathavealreadyinfluencedourunderstandingoffuturecapabilityrequirements.
2.AW12identifiednewareasforinvestigationaswellasbuildingontheoutputofAW11.ThecoreoftheAGILEWARRIORprogrammefocussedonanumberofthemesandquestions;questionsthatexploredfuturecapabilitydriversandrequirements.AW12usedacombinationofmethodsandarangeofeventsandtechniquesincludingOperationalAnalysis,exercisesandmilitaryjudgmentsupportedbylessonsfromoperationsandtraining,todevelopacommonArmypositionthatinformsfutureconceptualdevelopment,forcedesignandcapabilitydevelopment.
3.TheheadlinethemesforstudyinAW12were: • OperationsinUrbanEnvironments • CyberOperations • Command,ControlandInformation • IntelligenceSurveillanceTargetAcquisitionandReconnaissance • UrgentOperationalRequirementsintocore • UKResilience • DeterrenceandCapacityBuilding • ProfessionalDevelopment
4.EvidencefromtheAGILEWARRIORprogrammewillinformourrevisionoftheArmy’shighlevelconcepts,theplanninganddeliveryofcapabilityandtheongoingrevisionoftacticaldoctrineastheArmycontinuestotakeforwarditsowntransformation.Inmanyareas,thisworkhasfeddirectlyintotheparalleldevelopmentofArmy2020.Theheadlineissuesaresummarisedinthefollowingpages,bysubjectarea.Theycontinuetobuildthecorporatebodyofevidencetosupportdecisionmakingaswetransformtomeetthechallengesofthefuture.AllForceDevelopmentstakeholdersshouldreadthispublicationandnotetheguidingprinciplesthatitcontains.Someoftherecommendationsmaynotsitcomfortablywithallaudiences;thisistobeseenasahealthydynamicastheArmybothdefinesandrefinesthecapabilitiesthatwillberequiredforfuturecontingentoperations.TheensuingdiscussionswillshapefurthercyclesoftheAGILEWARRIORprogramme.
1. ‘Defenceina
ChangingWorld’-The
DefenceSecretaryPhilip
Hammondlaunchingthe
newDefenceVision,
14May2012.
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
4 4D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTSWhat Are The Future Capability Requirements For Operations In The Urban Battlespace And How Might They Be Delivered?
‘We will not want to fight in urban areas, but the urban environment represents in my view a highly credible worst case – and we would be foolish indeed to plan to fight only convenient battles against stupid adversaries. Urban areas are where politics, people, resources, infrastructure and thinking enemies converge’2
Urbanisationmeansthatcitieshavebecome–andwillremain–pivotalpointsforinfluencingnational,regional,andglobalrisks,notleastastheselocationsattractextremists,terrorists,andorganisedcriminals,andarethenexusfordifferentcultures,ethnicities,andsupplychains.Despitethelikelypoliticalreluctance,themilitarymustthereforebepreparedtooperateinurbanareasgiventhegrowingstrategicsignificanceoftheselocations.
TheurbanthemewasidentifiedinAW11asanarearequiringfurtherstudy.Thisinvestigationintourbancapabilityrequirementscontinues,beyondAW12,undertheauthorityofDirectorCombat,howeverwithinAW12twomajoractivitiessoughttoinformthiswork.
• ExURBANWARRIOR3(UW3).ThisexperimentwasheldinSouthampton.Theaimwastoexamineoperationsinanurbanenvironment,atformationlevel,inordertoimproveunderstandingofthedemandsoffutureurbanoperations,ina2020timeframe.
• ARUSIStudyGroupentitled:‘Howthemilitarycancontributetoachievingeffectintheurbanenvironment.’TheRUSIStudyGroupconsideredhowlimitedforceelementscangeneratemassandeffectintheurbanenvironmentforabroaderrangeofpurpose.
RecommendationsfromUW3included:
• RecognisethatitismorelikelythannotthattheArmywillberequiredtofightinacitywithinthenext10-15years.
• Prepareandemploycombinedarmsbrigades,withexpeditionaryandmobileheadquartersformanoeuvringtoseizethetacticalinitiative.
• Investinthedivisionallevel,whereoperationalartshouldbepracticedusingacomprehensiveapproach.
• Re-mechanise.Beyond2020,ensurethattheequipmentprogrammeincludesacapablemainbattletank,anarmouredreconnaissancevehicle,anarmouredartillerypieceandarmouredvehiclesforarmouredandmechanisedinfantry;withcommandandsupportvehiclestomatch,inordertoensurethenecessarylevelsoffirepower,protectionandmobility.
• Movefromassuredtoconfidenttargeting,basedonjudgements,thelawandaccountability,ratherthanmechanisticprocesses.
• Investinspecificpreparationsforoperatinginurbanareas:inter alia,intelligenceawarenessoftheterrain;amethodforsimplifyingthecommonoperatingpicture;communicationthatworksinbuiltupareas;psychologicalinoculationofpersonnel;andtacticaltrainingforfightinginbuildingsandunderground.
• Re-investinlogistics,medicalandequipmentsupportpushedforwardandintegratedwiththefightingechelon.
• Ensurethataviationcanoperateeffectivelyinurbanareas.
‘In the future, we will be unable to avoid being drawn into operations in the urban and littoral regions where the majority of the World’s population live and where political and economic activity is concentrated’.3
2. DesigningtheFuture
Army:ExURBANWAR-
RIOR3FirstImpressions
Report–14Nov11.
3. FutureCharacterOf
Conflict
6 6
RecentexperimentationhasshownthattheArmyisnotfullyready,inbothpreparednessandcapabilityterms,forthedemandsoffutureoperationsinurbanenvironment.
• Force Preparation.Thedemandsandcomplexityofoperationsintheurbanenvironmentpointedclearlytotheneedforafundamentalreappraisalofourapproachtoforcepreparation.Whilstthisdemandsenhancementsinthephysicalcomponent(manpower,equipment,trainingandsustainability)underpinnedbyastrongandresilientmoralcomponent,significantadvancescanbemadeintheshorttermandatrelativelylowcostbyinvestmentintheconceptualcomponent–inparticulartrainingandeducation.
• Understand.Tobeabletodelineateitsroleandoperateeffectivelywithasmallfootprint,theArmyneedstodevelopmethodsforunderstandingthephysicalandsocialinfrastructure(includinginterdependencies),powerrelationshipsandsourcesofeconomichealthincities.Basedoncurrentresourcing,ourinabilitytoadequatelyunderstandtheurbanenvironmentwasrecognised.Thisunderstandingmustbedevelopedpriortodeployment,includingbyincorporatinglessonslearnedfrompolicing,planningstudies,anddisastersinurbanareasintorelevantdoctrine,trainingandexercising.
• Yardsticks.URBANWARRIOR3confirmedtheinadequacyofcurrentlypublishedplanningyardsticksforoperationsintheurbanenvironment.Manyoftheseyardsticksshouldberefreshedbyfocussed
experimentation,OperationalAnalysisandresearch.
• Offensive Support.Theutilityofindirectfiresinurbanoperationswasconfirmed.Conventionalfirestodefeatorneutralisetheenemyremainhighlyrelevantalthoughthebalancebetweenyield,precisionandsuppressiondemandarangeofcapabilitiestobeavailable.Non-explosivenatureswerealsoseentohaveutility,e.g.markerandsmoke.Furtherstudyisrecommendedtoinvestigatehownovelmunitionscouldenableoperationsintheurbanenvironmentwhereavoidingcollateraldamageisamajorfactor.
• Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE).UrbancommunitieswillexpecttheprovisionofservicesandutilitiesthattheArmyisnotequippedtodeliver,eitherbecauseoflackofcapabilitiesorbecauselandforceswillhavecompetingpriorities.TheArmywillneedtoberealisticaboutitsownabilitytodeliver,limitingitsambitionstowhatisachievableandmaximisingitsadvantages;whataretheArmy’scriticalcapabilitiesandvulnerabilitieswhenoperatingintheurbanenvironment?
Next Steps. ToexploittheworkofAW12,UW3andUW4,anUrbanConceptandan‘UrbanRoadmap’arebeingdevelopedtoidentifythepaththroughwhichtheArmyshoulddevelopitsurbancapabilities.
URBANWARRIOR5willexaminetheissuefurtherinaseriesoflive,virtualandconstructiveexperimentsinthelatterhalfof2012
D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Operations in Urban Environments
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
CYBER OPERATIONSWhat Land Forces capability requirements are needed for cyber operations at the tactical level?”
‘Future war will always include a cyber dimension and it could become the dominant form’ - Chief of the Defence Staff, 2011
The2010StrategicDefenceandSecurityReviewandassociatedNationalSecurityRiskAssessmentrecognisedtherisksofCyberAttackasaTier1risktothenationalsecurityoftheUK.Whilstitishardtoextrapolatethethreatoutto2020,3-5yearassessmentsindicatethatrisksofCyberAttackareontheincrease4.ThethreatofcyberattackfromhybridadversarieswashighlightedintheFutureCharacterofConflict(FCOC)5.Withmilitaryoperationsdependentontheuseofcyberspace,therequirementtointegratecyberactivityintotheconductofmainstreammilitaryoperationshasbecomeessential6.Freedomofmanoeuvrewithincyberspaceisnecessaryinordertoconductplanning,achievesituationalawareness,enablecommandandcontrol,realisethesynchronisationofeffects,andsupportadministrativeandlogisticservices.Defenceisreliantonnetworkconnectivitywithindustryandwithcoalitionpartners.Ouradversariesarealsobecomingincreasinglydependentoncyberspace;sowithincreasedthreatsocomesopportunity.Defencemustbeeffectiveatdefendingitselfwithincyberspace,andmustcapitaliseonopportunitiestoexploitadversaries’weaknessesthroughtheconductoffullspectrumcyberoperations.
TheDefenceCyberSecurityProgrammehasbeenestablishedtodelivercybercapabilityacrosstheDepartment,recognisingthatactivityincyberspaceneedstobeconductedinamannerwhichisinherentlyJoint.Equallythecomplexnatureofoperationsinthisdomain,andtheneedforcoherenceofactivity,meansthatcyberoperationsneedtobecoordinatedatthestrategicandoperationallevels.NeverthelessthereareclearanddiscretecapabilityrequirementsthatLandForceswillneedatthetacticallevelinordertoensureitcanconducteffectiveandfullyintegratedcyberoperationsinthe2020era.TheArmyCyberPlanprovidestheframeworkforthatactivity.
4. QuintepartiteIntel-
ligenceProductionPlan
Strategic3to5Year
OutlookfortheCyber
Environment(QUIPP-2-
10-36QdatedSep10).
5.FutureCharacterof
Conflict(FCOC),DCDC,
17Sep09
6.JDN3/12.
8 8D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T
• TheconductofoperationswithincyberspacewillbeinherentlyJointandwillseeablurringofdecisionmaking(andaction)betweenthestrategicandtacticallevels.LandForcetacticalcybercapabilitydevelopmentwillneedtobeseamlesslyintegratedwithinDefencecybercapabilitydevelopmentstrategiesatthestrategicandoperationallevels.
• JointDoctrineNote3/12:Cyber Operations: The Defence Contribution,willprovidethedoctrinalbasisforcapabilitydevelopment.TheSingleSIGINTBattlespace(SSB)providestheframeworkonwhichcyberoperationscapabilitydevelopmentissettotakeplace.
• LandForcesmustacttointegrateactivitythroughouttheElectromagneticEnvironment(ofwhichcyberoperationswillrepresentoneelement).ThismustincludethedevelopmentofgreatercoherencebetweentheJ2,J3andJ6functionalareas.
• ThefocusofcybercapabilitydevelopmentmustbeitsintegrationintotheJointActionframeworkthroughtheFullSpectrumTargetingprocess.ThiswillallowLandForcestonotonly‘dothingsbetter’butalsoto‘dobetterthings’.
• Themajorityofcybercapabilityissettobecontrolledatthestrategic/nationallevelbutwillhavethecapacitytobeemployedatthetacticallevel.Unlockingsuchcapabilityatthetacticallevelwillprincipallyinvolvethreethings;acleardoctrinalframework(settobebasedontheSSB),tacticalmanpowerresource(mostsignificantlymeasuredincyberspecialist,analystandlinguistmanpower)andspecialisedInformationandCommunicationServiceconnectivity.Maintainingcyberspecialistskillsetswillrepresentakeycapabilityrequirement.
• Thereisarequirementto‘getthebasicsright’intermsofInformationAssurance(IA)policycompliance
andthedevelopmentofCyberDefenceawareness.Individualsmustbeseenasthefirstlineofdefence.ImplementingindividualIA/CyberDefencetraining,alongsideculturalchangeinitiativeswhichseektoreinforcetheimplicationsof‘inappropriateconduct’withincyberspace,willprovecritical.Cyberhygienemustbecomeculturallyengrained.
• Tacticalforceswillneedtooperateundera‘presumptionof[cybersecurity]breach’.Theymustdevelopagilemechanismstorespondtothreatsonarisk-balancebasisandensurethattheydevelopandexerciserobustbusinesscontinuityplansinordertobeabletooperatepost-incident/attack.TherewillbearequirementforCyberDefencetrainingobjectivestobemoreeffectivelyincorporatedintoLandForcecollectivetraining.
• Attainingcybersituationalawareness(vianetworkmonitoringtools)andthemeanstoplanpost-incidentresponses(vianetworkplanningtools)willrepresentkeycapabilityrequirements.
Next Steps:
• TheArmyneedstore-invigorateCyberDefenceandInformationAssuranceawarenessthroughtrainingandbehaviouralchangeinitiatives.
• AnArmyTacticalDoctrineNoteoncybershouldbeissuedassoonaspossible.
• TherecommendationsoftheDefenceCyberSecurityProgrammeTrainingNeedsAnalysismustbeembeddedintoindividualtrainingandeducationcourses.
• ArmyCIOhasdevelopedaCyberPlanwithintheArmyInformationProgramme.Thisshouldbeimplementedinfull.
• CapabilityDirectorsmustconsidertheimplicationsofcyberinthedevelopmentofexistingandfuturecapabilities.
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Cyber Operations
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE FCOC ERA.‘What are the Command, Control and Information (C2I) Requirements at Theatre, Divisional and Brigade Levels to operate in the FCOC Era?’
Theexponentialgrowthininformationtechnologyhasrevolutionisedoperations.Thedemandforcomplex,richinformationservicesinthecurrentandfutureoperatingenvironmentshasoutstrippeddelivery.InformationandCommunicationsServices(ICS),andtheirapplicationsanddata,needtobemadeavailable,securely,toaverylargenumberofdispersedusersandifnecessarywithinacontestedenvironment.Theseuserswillneedaccesstoinformationservicesthrough‘pointsofpresence’,interconnectedbyhighbandwidthlinks,andwillneedtobeabletoreachacrossthedeployedforce,toalliesandcoalitionpartners,tothehomebaseandtoothersinthecountryofdeployment.Whilereversionaryworkingneedsdevelopingandpractice,thereis,essentially,nogoingback.C2elements,largeandsmallneedaccesstoa‘flat’,ubiquitousICSnetworktoallowthemtoachieveanoperationaladvantage;allwithinthecontextofcyberspace-withitsassociatedopportunitiesandthreats.
Militarycommunicationsspecialist,supportedbyDE&Sandcontractors,willneedtooperateacommonequipmentplatform,carryingcommonNATOservicesandapplications,usingasingleServiceManagementregime.ThescalingofDii(S)andDii(R)todelivermediumscaleenduringoperations,requiresreview.Thereisalsoalackofanagile(smaller/lighter)solution.ItwillbeessentialthattheICSregimentsusecommoninfrastructure,networksandservicemanagement,andthatthereisacommonsetofuserapplications.Withoutthiscommonplatform,themulti-roleapproachwillbedifficulttoimplement.
Deliveringrichinformationservicesintothefastmovingmanoeuvreelementsofaforceischallengingandservicesatthislevelwillbeoptimisedforvoice,situationalawarenessandbattleplanningandcontrol,withsometailoredaccesstoricherservices;fixedorstaticHQs,withrelativestablepowersupplies,canexpectthefullrangeofICStobeprovided;BGsandCoyswillrelyonTacticalCIS.Asthereisadirectcorrelationbetweenthequalityandtimelinessofinformationanddecisionmaking9,manoeuvreforceelementswillneedtoreadjusttomakingdecisionswithlessinformationandthusreducedunderstanding,whichwillhaveaconcomitantimpactonthelevelofassurance,riskandtempoofoperations.
7. Operationalactivity
comprisinganumberof
processes,eachwithits
associatedinformation
exchangerequirements
(IERs).
8.Estimatedbroad-
bandWANbandwidth
requirementsrange
from10Mbpsatthe
smallestC2nodesupto
32Mbpsatthelarger
nodes.
9.Informationfrom
thecognitive,physical
andvirtualdomainleads
toenhancedsituational
awareness,which
whenanalysedleadsto
comprehension(insight)
andafterjudgementis
applied,leadstounder-
standing(foresight).
1010D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T
• TheirisanemergingimbalancebetweenthedemandforrichICSandtheabilityforsupplytokeeppace.
• GainingandmaintainingoperationaladvantagewillrequireICSstructuresthatareflatubiquitous.
• Deliveringrichinformationservicesintothefastmovingmanoeuvreelementsofaforceischallengingandservicesatthislevelwillbeoptimisedforvoice;greatermobilitywillresultinreducedsituationalawareness,whichhasimplicationsforrisk,tempoandtheabilitytoconductmissioncommand.ContingentoperationswillchallengeLandForcesindifferentwaystothatforwhichestablishedICSstructureshavedevelopedinAfghanistan.
• Interoperability(voiceanddata),viaTacCISandbroadbandWideAreaNetwork(WAN)isacriticalrequirementtosupportallmissionthreads7intheCJIIMenvironment.
• Amediumscalestabilisationoperationrequires74xbroadband(WAN)pointsofpresence.8FALCONisthetrunksystemthatwillprovidethehighcapacitybroadbandcommunicationsWAN.WhilstMISSIONSECRETwillbetheprimarysecuritydomain,avarietyofinformationinfrastructure(securitydomains)arerequiredasitisnotyetpossibleforsecurityreasonstocarryallsecuritydomainsonasingle,physicalnetwork.
• TherearesufficientFALCONtoallowmediumscaleenduringoperations.Thereisalsoapotentialmismatchbetweenprotectionandmobility.FurtheranalysisisrequiredtoinformtheEquipmentProgramme,andinformationexchangerequirementsneedtoberegularlyreviewedtomaintainaccuracyandcurrency.
• AproperlyresourcedJFCISComdandJ6staffisrequiredtoensurethenetworks,infrastructureandapplicationsareeffectivelymanaged.AreviewofstaffusertrainingisalsorequiredtoensurethatstaffusersareabletomaximiseexploitationofinformationdeliveredtoincreasinglycomplexCIS.
Next Steps • AC3ICONEMPisbeingdevelopedinparallelwith
theDeployableDivisionalHeadquartersCONEMP;theseCONEMPswillbevalidatedduringsubsequentAGILEWARRIORwork,notablytheAGILEWARRIORExperimentin2013.
• ConcurrencyassumptionsneedtobetestedtoagreaterextentandtheC2Irequirementsforasinglecomplexinterventionneedtobecapturedandvalidatedacrossarangeofoperationalscenarios.
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Command, Control and Information Requirements in the FCOC Era.
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)- COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTEGRATIONDetermine the optimum Command and Control for integral ISR assets at Bde level, and also for reinforcing ISR assets that may be task-organised to the Bde; and the optimum means of integrating all of these assets within the Bde HQ’s process.
Theoperatingenvironmenthasbecomemorecomplex;achievinganadvantageoveranopponentinthecyberandinformationspacestoenableunderstandingisbecomingevermoreimportant.TheunprecedentedgrowthinISTARcapabilitiesatthebrigadelevelandbelowhashighlightedgapsinourabilitytocontrol,integrateandexploitthesignificantadvantagesuchcapabilitiesshoulddeliver.Alackofeducationisattheheartofthisissue.Bespokeprocedures,trainingregimesandstaffcellshavebeengeneratedtoresolvethisissueforOperationsTELICandHERRICK,notallofthesesolutionshaveenduringutilitybuttheyprovideaneffectivestartpointforcontingentoperations.
ISTARisaprocessinvolvingcollect(STAR),analysis(Intelligence),exploitationandissupportedbyCIS/G6.G2,G3andG5allrequiretobesupportedbypartsoftheISTARprocess.Thekeyprinciplesarecentralisedcoordination;responsivenessandtimeliness;robustandflexiblesensormix;interconnectivityandInformationManagement;mass,soak,layerandcross-cue,andmulti-sourceapproach.MaintainingcoherencethroughISTARcapabilitiesandstafffunctionsatthetacticallevelwillbefundamentalwhileaddressingthesekeyprinciples.WemustavoidusingISTARasacatch-alltermbutratheruseitappropriatelyinlinewithendorseddoctrine,whichneedstobebetterunderstoodandtaughtatalllevels.
RobustISTARstructuresateachlevelofcommandareessentialtomeetfuturecontingentneeds.WhilstformingabespokeIX/ISTARGrouponoperations(asseenonOpHERRICK)maybeanoptionitshouldnotnecessarilybethedefaultsetting.Whatisneededisbetteralignmentofcollectionassetsandtheprocessofcollectionmanagement,withthatofInformationRequirementsManagementinordertobettersupportacommander’sdecisionmakingwithananalysedoutput(Intelligence).Thekeytosuccessistheeffectivegroupingofspecial-to-armI,S,TA,Rforceelementsinbarracks,holdingthemattheappropriatereadinessandforcegeneratingthemattherightstageofthesupportedHQsCollectiveTraining;CT5andCT6eventsmustincludethefullsuiteofISTARcapabilities.
SpecialistsupportmustbescalableandadaptabletotheHQstructure;startsmall(lean)andgetbiggerasrequired.Followingthe‘plugandsocket’philosophy,whichisakeytenetoftheA2020proposition,thereisaneedforacombinationofbettereducatedgeneralistswithappropriatetrainingandexperiencetobecorestaffmembersinBattlegroup,BrigadeandDivisionalHQs,responsibleforintegratingISTAR;andspecialists(EW,UAS,HUMINT,GMRetc)thataretask-organisedwhenrequiredtobringprofessional/SMEadviceandinputtobothcollection(FIND)andexploitation.
10. ISTARisthe
coordinatedacquisition,
processingand
disseminationoftimely,
accurate,relevantand
assuredinformation
andintelligencewhich
supportstheplanning
andconductof
operations,targeting
andtheintegration
ofeffects,enabling
commanderstoachieve
theirgoalsthroughout
thespectrum[mosaic]of
conflict(JDP0-01.1).
1212D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T
• TheunprecedentedgrowthinISTARcapabilitiesatthebrigadelevelandbelowhashighlightedgapsinourabilitytocontrol,integrateandexploitthesignificantadvantagesuchcapabilitiesshoulddeliver;alackofeducationisattheheartofthisissue.
• WemustavoidusingISTARasa‘catch-all’term,butratheruseitappropriatelyinlinewithendorseddoctrine,whichneedstobebetterunderstoodandtaughtatalllevels.10
• ThereisaneedforacombinationofbettereducatedgeneraliststobecorestaffmembersinBattlegroup,BrigadeandDivisionalHQs,responsibleforintegratingISTAR;andspecialiststhataretask-organisedwhenrequiredtobringprofessional/subjectmatterexpertadviceandinputtobothcollectionandexploitationactivitieswithintheISTARprocess.
• SpecialistsupportmustbescalableandadaptabletotheHQstructure,flexibleandrobustenoughtomeetthedemandsofanycontingentoperation;startleanandaugmentasrequiredfortheoperation.
• Thekeytosuccessiscentralisingspecial-to-armI,S,
TA,Rforceelementsinbarracks(enhancedcoherenceandprofessionalism),holdingthemattheappropriatereadinessanddeliveringthemaspartofacoherent
andfullytrainedforcepackageattherightstageofthesupportedHQsCollectiveTraining;Level5and6CollectiveTrainingeventsmustincludethefullsuiteofISTARcapabilities.
• StructuresshouldbereviewedinaccordancewiththeArmy2020FindandUnderstandBrigadeConceptofEmployment(CONEMP)whichwilldelivergreatercoherencebetweentheprocessesinvolvedinCollectionManagementwiththatofInformationRequirementsManagementinordertobettersupportacommander’sdecisionmakingwithananalysedoutput.
• Eachdeployedbrigadeshouldhaveitsownorganicgroundmountedrecce,Intelligence,Communication,GeoandBattlespaceManagementelements.Thedivisionmayrequirethedevelopmentofabespokedeployablereconnaissance/surveillanceorganisationthatmanoeuvrestofindbutindirectsupportofdivisionalinformationrequirements.
• AOne-Starproponent(CapabilityDirectorInformation)willreinforcetheprofessionalisationofISTARasadisciplineandbringcoherencetoitsdelivery.
• Considerationshouldbegiventointroducingatacticalintelligencecareerstreamforinfantryandarmouredregiments.
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) - Command Control and Integration
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS INTO COREIdentify and prioritise the capabilities developed for Afghanistan (and Iraq) that have enduring relevance for the future in order to determine those that should be brought into the core programme for Army 2020.
RecentoperationsinbothIraqandAfghanistanhaveseenaproliferationofdeployedcapabilitiesprocuredundertheUrgentOperationalRequirement(UOR)process.FollowingSDSRandthefutureofthecurrentcampaigninAfghanistan,thereisarequirementtodeterminewhichofthesecapabilities,measuresandequipmentprocuredanddevelopedforthesecampaigns,shouldberetainedbytheArmyonReturntoContingency.
Theanalysisofwhichcapabilitiestoretain,consideredalltheDefenceLinesofDevelopment.KeystakeholderengagementfromacrossdefenceseekstoachievecoherencebetweenthesingleServices.
Thescaleofthetaskhasmeantthatthefullfindingswillnotbeavailableuntillaterin2012,althoughsomeemergingheadlineshavebeenmadeavailableinthisreport.
1414D I R E C T O R A T E O F F O R C E D E V E L O P M E N T
Fires, Targeting and ISTAR.• Retainthesignificantenhancementincollectcapability• Retainandnurturethesignificantenhancementinstaff
disseminationandprocessingskills.
Lethality. • Reviewoftrainingprogressionandtheuseof
simulation.• Maintainthecompetencelevelsamongreservesand
supportforcesacrossthewidespectrumofnewweaponsystemsthattheyhaveused.
Counter-IED. • Futuretrainingwillneedtobalancebetweenscenarios
constrainedbyanIEDenvironmentwithtrainingforoperationsthatdemandspeedofmanoeuvre.
• UKmustmaintainitsworldclassR&Dandmanufacturingcapability.
Vehicles• ThosevehiclesusedtoprovideEquipmentSupport
musthavemobilityandprotectionmatchedtothosethattheyaresupporting.
• Futurefleetrequirementsmustenableunitstotrainastheyfightasopposedtowholesaleconversiontotypepriortodeployment.
Dismounted Close Combat• Acoherentassessmentofnightoperatingcapabilityis
required.
ISTAR / Base ISTAR• NeedforanintegratinghubforallISTARcollectassets.• ProvisionofrobustFullMotionVideocapable
InformationSupportService,separatefromBaseISTARinfrastructureshouldbeinvestigatedinordertosupportcontingentoperations.
• ThereisanenduringrequirementforalayeredISTARmixrangingfromheavytolightandincludingacapableaerostat.
• ProvisionofsimulationinsupportofISTARtraining.• ISTARSpecialistsmustbemadeavailableforLevel3
CollectiveTrainingactivities,andabove.
Aviation• EnhancedDefensiveAidSuitesarefundamentalforthe
useofaviation,particularlyasthefutureairspaceislikelytobeincreasinglycontested.
Training• Theinvestmentintraininginsupportofcurrent
operations,anditsclearbenefits,hasbeenhardearned–andmustberetained
• TacticsTechniquesandProcedures(TTPs)thathaveevolvedduringHERRICK(andwhichwillhaveutilityinfutureoperatingenvironments)needtobehardwiredintotrainingandTacticalDoctrine.
Next Steps:• OutputhasinformedArmy2020andwillbeusedto
informMoDandArmycapabilitybalanceofinvestmentdecisions.
• Studycontinuesonthisthemein2012.
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-UORs into Core
A G I L E W A R R I O R 1 2 S U M M A R Y O F I N S I G H T S
UK RESILIENCEBy 2020, what capabilities will Land Forces require to provide UK homeland security and resilience?
UK Military /Civil Integration (MCI) and UK EngagementUKEngagementistheactivityconductedbytheArmywithnationalandlocalagenciesandpartnersthatwill,ifeffectivelydelivered,createasecureenvironment,athome,thatsustainstheArmy,enablestrainingforanddeploymentonoperationsandensurestheconsentandsupportofthepublic.Successshapesnationalandcommunityperceptionsandcreatesasupportivecommunityfromwhichtorecruit,withinwhichtoserve,andtowhichtoreturnattheendofservice.Itisaregionallyrelevant‘bottomup’ratherthan‘topdown’approachandonethatshapesthelocalandregionalenvironmenttodeliver,interalia,4keyoutcomes:
• MaintainingInflow:SupporttoRecruiting.• Shapingthe‘FirmBase’.• EnablingEffectiveDefenceCommunicationattheRegionalLevel.• SupporttoUKOps:ContributiontoRegionalResilience.
Successfulengagementinthisspacewillmakeavitalcontributiontoabroaderoutcome-anArmythatcontinuestooperateandthrivethroughtheconsentofthepeople,confidenceofgovernmentandcommitmentofitssoldiersandtheirfamilies.
The Provision of Resilience and Homeland SecurityNationalsecurityandresilienceencompassesawiderangeofthreats,fromtraditionalstate-on-stateaggressionthroughterroristgroupstocivilemergenciessuchasfloodingorpandemics.Italsoencompassesaspectrumofcapabilitiesandresponses—notmerelypreventingordealingwithattacksornaturaldisasters(‘security’),butalsoensuringthatvitalservicesaremaintainedandlifecancontinueasclosetonormalaspossible(‘resilience’).TherearetwobroadcategoriesofcapabilitiesthattheMoDmaintains:nichecapabilitiesandaugmentationcapability.
• ProvisionofCapacity.Highreadinessbulkmanpower,capableofenduringandsustainingoperationsinadverseconditions,withflexibleattitudesofmindandaMissionCommandphilosophy,willcontinuetobeanimportantcontributionfromthemilitary,eithertoaugmenttheemergencyresponseortofreeupcivilianpersonnelfromothertaskstoallowtheirredeployment.Thereisthetraditional,andassumed,publicexpectationthatthemilitarywillbeabletoprovidebothspecialistandgeneraldutiesmanpowertoconducttasksatshortnotice.
• NicheCapabilities.Thearmedforcescurrentlyprovideguaranteed,small-scalenichecapabilitiesthatcivilauthoritiescannotbeexpectedtodevelop(atleastonasignificantscale).Despitesignificantinvestmentinciviliancapabilitiesoverrecentyears,capabilitygapswillendurewherethemilitarycouldaddtotheircurrentcontribution:
• Commandandcontrolatscaleandonapanregionalbasis. • Developingacommonoperatingpictureduringacrisis. • UrbanSearchandRescue. • Providingtransportandlogisticsatscale. • Specialistengineering. • ‘MilitaryResilienceUnits/Groups,smallC2andlogisticsupporthubsto
whichothercapabilitiescouldbeattributedandwhichwouldbetailored tomeetthedemandsofaspecificsituation.
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UK Military/Civil Integration.RegionalUKengagementmust:
• Bedeliveredatthe1*level;inaregionalcontext;andasacommandfunctionwiththeauthorityandresourcestoachieveeffect.
• Havetheabilitytodevelopandsustainadeepandprofoundunderstandingoftheregion.
• Haveboundariescoincidentwithlocalauthority/regionalboundariesandoperatefromwithintheregionforwhichtheyhaveresponsibility.
• Supportbrigadeswithregionalresponsibilitieswithasuperior2*HQthatlinkswiththeArmyHQ/departmentalpolicybranches,andhasthecapacityandcompetenciestoensureefficientandcoherentimplementationofpolicyanddeliveryofeffectacrossregionalboundaries;
• BepartofacoherentcontinuumofmilitarycivilengagementfromLocalAuthoritytoGovernmentDepartmentsandaccesstothoseArmyandDefencePolicystaffsthatroutinelyengagewithsuchdepartments(Health,DWP,Education,DCLGetc).
Provision of Resilience and Homeland Security.
• Thereislittleformalnationalguidanceornational-levelrequirementsforhomelandsecurity;thishindersmilitarypreparationandinvolvement.Thereisanopportunityand,thestudywouldargue,animperativetodevelopanationalresilienceconceptthatisnotjustpredicatedonabottom-upapproachandinvolvesthemilitary.
• Homelandsecurityshouldtakeitsplaceasarelevantmilitarytasktomeetincreasedthreat,growingpoliticaldemandsandtoallowtheArmytomaintaincurrencyandcompetencyinthisarea.
• Defencegenerally,andtheArmyspecifically,isconditionedbytheexpeditionaryfocusofthe1998StrategicDefenceReviewandthecontemporaryexperienceoflargeandenduringoverseasinterventionsofthelast20years.
• ThereisanopportunitytodevelopcommondoctrinebetweenthemilitaryandCivilianresponders.
Next Steps.OutputhasinformedArmy2020andwillbeusedinthedevelopmentoftheArmyOperatingConcept(AOC).
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-UK Resilience
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DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDINGBy 2020, what capabilities will LF require to deliver capacity building abroad and support civil emergency organisations abroad in time of crises?
Defence Engagement and Capacity BuildingDeductionsfromtheFCOCpapersuggestthatArmy2020willrequiretheabilitytodelivercapacitybuildingandtosupportcivilemergencyorganisationsabroadintimesofcrisis.Dependentonthenatureofthecrisis,andinsomecasespotentialsecuritythreats,A2020willneedtoprovidethemeanstobuildcapacityinbothmilitaryandciviliandomains,andinbothbenignandthreateningenvironments.
ThereportbuiltontheworkoftheFutureArmyStructures(NextSteps)(FAS(NS))MACEPaperwhichcreatedtheMilitaryStabilisationSupportGroup(MSSG),byrecommendingamodestinvestmentinMSSGtoestablishsubordinateCivil-EffectsUnits-independentorganisationsabletodeliverupstreampreventactivity;forceelementsforcontingencyoperations;trainingsupporttowidertheDefencecommunityandcoherentMACEwithinenduringstabilisationoperations.
ThisreportreinforcesthefindingsofAW11(WorkPackage4)andotherassociatedwork,recommendingtheestablishmentofaOne-StarMilitaryAssistanceandStabilisationGroup(MASG)asa‘centreofexcellence’forcapacitybuildingandthedevelopmentofcoherentMACEandMCBcapability.EvidencefromoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,combinedwiththedirectionoftheNationalSecurityStrategyallstronglysuggestthatMCBwillplayapivotalrolefortheArmyof2020.
Thenewlypublished Joint Concept Note 2/12: Future Land Operating Concept identifiesthefuturerolesofLandForces.AspartofDefenceEngagementandinthecontextoftheBuildingStabilityOverseasStrategy(BSOS)hasputinplaceanintegratedcross-governmentstrategytoaddressconflictissues.Thepaperrecognisestheneedfor‘upstreamprevention’toanticipateinstabilityandpotentialtriggersforconflict.Indigenous capacity-building and upstream security assistance is likely to play a key role in generating the necessary indigenous capability, mass, insight and understanding that we will need in these environments in the future. UpstreamCapacityBuildingwillbeexaminedinthenextroundofAGILEWARRIOR.
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Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE). MACEshouldcontinuetohavetwoseparatebutcomplementaryaspects:
• MilitarySupporttoStabilisation–acapabilitythatisrequiredprimarilywhenciviliansareunabletodelivercivileffectinnon-permissiveenvironments.Whilstonlyrequiredperiodically,itisacomplexareathatrequiresexperiencedMACEplannersandaccesstoabroadrangeofcivilianskill-sets.
• CivilMilitaryCo-operation(CIMIC)–acapabilitythatisrequiredallthetime,athomeandabroad,todeliverco-ordinationandco-operation,betweenthemilitaryandcivilactors.
MACEcapabilityisrequiredacrossthetactical-strategicspectrum.Mostpressingly,theUKneedstoaddress:
• AlackoftrulydedicatedMACEstaffinUK FormationHQs.
• Incoherenceintheselection,trainingandpreparationofIndividualAugmenteesfillingMACErelatedpostswithinProvincialReconstructionTeams(PRTs)andCoalitionHQs.
• Alackofdedicated1*and2*CIMICcapability.
• Apparentincoherenceandlackofclearownershipof
militarystaffsecondedtotheUKStabilisationUnit.
• MACEspecialistsarebettercentralisedasde-centralisationhashistoricallyresultedinmisemploymentbyformationheadquartersandalossinMACEcurrency.EffectiveMACErequiresamixofSpecialistandGeneralistcapability.Thereisarequirementfor‘Generalist’RegularforceelementsreinforcedbyReservistsaswellasaccessto‘Specialists’mostofwhomareReservists.
Military Capacity Building (MCB). Inanerawhereourexitstrategiesaretransitionstrategies,MCBmightarguablybethemostimportantmilitaryactivityinanyfuturestabilisationoperation.MilitarysuccessintheFuture/ContemporaryOperatingEnvironmentismeasuredpartiallythroughthecapabilityoftheindigenousforcesleftbehindtodealwiththeresidualthreatstosecurity.MCBisstrategicallyandoperationallydecisive.MCB,therefore,iscorebusiness,notanicheactivity.Howeverdevelopingappropriatestructuresisonlyonepartofthechallenge:doctrine;training;andequipmentneedtobealigned.EffectiveMCBrequiresamixofSpecialistandGeneralistcapability.
Next Steps. ThestudyinformeddevelopmentofArmy2020andwillbeusedinthedevelopmentoftheArmyOperatingConcept(AOC)andUpstreamCapacityBuildingdoctrinaldevelopment.
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Defence Engagement and Capacity Building
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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENTHow do we develop personnel with the mental and physical resilience required by the new Army 2020 structure; and how do we attract the right people to sustain it?’
PeoplewillremaintheArmy’sstrategicedge–attheheartofcapability.Howeverthechallengewillcontinuetobedeliveringpersonnel,insufficientnumbers,thatarecapableandmotivatedtomeetthedemandsofthefuture.ThestudyfocussedontheemergingArmy2020structureandtheaccompanyingtransformationsbeingintroducedbyWholeForceConcept(WFC),FutureReserves2020(FR2020)andtheNewEmploymentModel(NEM).
Theframeworkforthestudyfocussedonthethreeelementsof:‘Attract;Develop;andRetain’,andwasthusfocussedontothefollowingissues:
(1) Howdowerecruitthesortofpeopleweneed?
(2) Whatmanningcriteriadoweneedtobecognisantof?
(3) Whatsortofqualifications(artisanskills)dotheyneed?
(a) Beforejoining?
(b) Duringservice?
(4) HowdowemaintainresiliencethroughPhysicalDevelopment?
(5) Howdoweidentify(andmanage)potentialandabilitytomatchthe needsofthestructure?
(6) Whatistheoptimumcareerprogressioncycle-3years?
(7) HowdoweretaintheonesthatweneedtomaintainOperational EfficiencyandBusinessEfficiency?
(8) Howdowegiveourspecialisttheexperiencethattheyneed (duringnon-opperiods)?
(9) Whatisthebalancerequiredbetweengeneralistandspecialist?
(10) Howdowedevelopthenecessarymindsetandculture?
ThestudyoffutureProfessionalDevelopmentcontinuesandisinextricablylinkedtoboththeNewEmploymentModelandtheA2020Study.
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• ‘Army of Specialists’. AfutureArmyislikelytoexperienceaparadigmshiftinwhichtherewillbeareductioninthenumberofgeneralistswhohaveservedinnumerouscareerfields,tomorecareerstreamingandspecialisation,withtheassociatedpost-graduateeducationalopportunities.
• ‘Career Partnerships’. Maintainingexperienceandexpertisewillbeachallengeinthepost-Afghanistancampaignera,forwhichasolutionmightbethefurtherdevelopmentof‘DefenceCareerPartnerships’.Thiswouldinvolveamoredevelopedrelationshipwithcivilianorganisationsinordertomaintaincurrency,experienceandretentionwithintheArmy.
• Motivation. Betterunderstandingofthemotivationofpotentialrecruitsneedstobeestablishedinrelationtothe‘Offer’ofacareerintheArmy.TheimpactofGovernmentchangesinschoolleavingage(18from2015)andtheintroductionofuniversityfees,needtobeassessed.ThebalancebetweentheArmybeingperceivedasajoborprofessionratherthanavocationneedstobeexaminedandtheimplicationsunderstood.
• Personnel Development Fund (PDF). FortheArmytomaximisethebenefitsthatadditionalqualificationsandtrainingprovidespersonnel,theArmyshouldconsidertheproposaltodevelopacentralPDFincorporatingEnhancedLearningCredits(ELC),StandardLearningCredits(SLC)andResettlementfunds.
HEADLINEDEDUCTIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS-Professional Development
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Army Code 71980
Anycommentsonthecontentofthisreportshouldbeaddressedto:
Lt Col Charlie Barker RASO1ForceDevelopment2DirectorateofForceDevelopmentForceDevelopmentandTrainingCommandArmyHeadquartersBlenheimBuildingMarlboroughLinesMonxtonRoadAndoverHampshireSP118HT
MilTel:943936360CivTel:01264886360Mile-mail:[email protected]:[email protected]
Design:DesignStudio,ArmyHeadquarters,ADR000990