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A LONG-LASTING FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS: TURKEY'S
MILITARY INTERVENTION TO CYPRUS IN ITS 40TH
ANNIVERSARY**
FUAT AKSU
**
SULEYMAN GUDER***
Abstract July 2014 is the 40th anniversary of Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus. It is one
of the most striking incidents of the near past, whose impacts continue to occupy a significant
place in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. The conflict is already a bargaining issue in
local political rivalries and Turkey’s relations with the EU. International actors have long
been in quest for a permanent solution for Cyprus, which is being perceived as the second
most significant dispute in the Middle East-East Mediterranean axis after the chronic Arab-
Israeli conflict. The aim of this paper is to shed a light on the long-lasting Cyprus dispute,
claiming that it is one of the interesting examples of the foreign policy crises that Brecher and
Wilkenfeld classified successfully (2003). It aims to discuss turning of this dispute first into a
conflict and then into a long-term foreign policy crisis between Turkey and Greece.
Introduction
In this paper, “dispute” refers to verbal disagreement between two or more parties on
any issue. Conflict on the other hand is employed to describe the escalated level of dispute at
which the verbal disagreement is brought to the state of action by one of the parties.
It is possible to study crises at different levels as employed by Charles Hermann and
Michael Brecher. With a classification on the basis of actors, the foreign policy crises and
international crises are separated. In general, in cases of mismanaging the situations of dispute
and conflict, when one or all of the parties include the options involving military violence
among literal or operational conducts and challenge the opponents may create a perceptional
crisis situation. Hence, crisis is understood/employed as a situation between two parties and
carrying the risk of militarization and putting the decision maker to a choice among limited
options.
In this view, the development triggering the crisis situation;
Occurs on any issue prepossessing the diplomatic concerns/agenda of the decision
maker
Might emerge suddenly as well as developing in a certain period of time
Enforces the decision maker to make a change in her perception or reality, in her
values and priorities
This situation is perceived as risk, danger or threat by the decision maker
The decision maker has to make a choice among limited options and take a
decision due to this perceptional situation
Though a possibility of military conflict or war with the opponent actor/s because
of her decisions exists, this does not happen all the time.
* This paper is supported by Yıldız Technical University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Department
YTU Project 2014-02-03-DOP03 and TÜBİTAK 1001 Project – Project Number: 112K172.
** Assoc. Prof. PhD; Yıldız Technical University, Department of Political Science and International Relations,
faksu@yildiz.edu.tr
*** PhD. Student; Yıldız Technical University, Department of Political Science and International Relations,
suleymanguder@gmail.com
It is possible to undertake the crisis analysis at two different levels; it is possible to put
the crises into two categories based on the parties. The first is the foreign policy crises based
on actors and occur between the states. The second is system based and they are called
international crises. In the foreign policy crises at least one of the parties is a state. In the
international crises, despite the fact that one of the parties of the crisis is a state, the crisis is
pertained to several states and organizations directly or indirectly and forces to take a decision
and it is more sophisticated. Moreover, it is always possible –though rare- for a foreign policy
crisis to turn into an international crisis. Both foreign policy and international crises may
occur suddenly, they can diminish or re-escalate with a provoking word or deed. Therefore,
crises usually hold the marks of a long-term dispute or conflict. Plus, long term and protracted
crises are likely to strike a military dimension and turn into a war eventually.
Turkish – Greek Foreign Policy Crises in Protracted Conflict (1923-2014)
Source: Created by autors using table in Brecher, International Political Earthquakes…, p. 38.
According to Brecher, the following characteristics are observed in the crises emerged
in long term conflict:1
• The triggering word, deed or situation includes high possibility of violence,
• The possibility of threat to high-priority values is high,
• The possibility of violence in crisis management is high.
The above listed features are low possibility in the crises emerged not within long-
term conflicts. In this regard, between Turkey and Greece the status of minorities since
1 Michael Brecher, International Political Earthquakes, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008,
p.29.
Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923 has been a matter of dispute-conflict except short intervals
within this period of time. The issue of minorities can be regarded as long-term disputes with
regard to the relationships of two countries. Nonetheless, while the crisis triggering word-
deed involved (non-military) violence during September 6-7 events in 1955 and Western
Thrace events in 1984, the parties did not consider it as a threat to their high priority values
and did not deploy violence/military violence as an option for crisis-management strategy.
Parallel with the evaluations of Brecher, when we look at the crises between Turkey and
Greece, it is understood that both parties consider the crises on the status of minorities as low-
threat. Therefore they preferred to manage these crises by employing political strategies with
low possibility of military violence.
On the other hand, their sense of threat is high regarding the crisis-triggering words,
deeds and situations on Cyprus or Aegean Sea disputes. In some of these crises, it can be seen
that Turkey gives way to the strategies of using and/or threat of using military force (coercive
diplomacy) among crisis management strategies in line with its high threat perception.2 We
see the exception of that in continental shelf crisis in Aegean Sea as it designed by creating a
de facto situation in Aegean Sea since 1973-74. In this crisis, Turkey employed its actions to
make Greece accept its right in delimitation of continental shelf through peaceful-political
means (such as sending exploration ships to contested areas or issuing license for them). Since
the aim was to force the opposing party to accept the dispute and to initiate the negotiations
she applied a defensive strategy not an aggressive one. Therefore she acted on legitimate
ground of international law. As a matter of fact, when Greece lodged a complaint against
Turkey in UN Security Council during 1976 crisis and asked for provisional injunction, in the
2 For details about the strategies of coercive diplomacy see; Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy:
Definition and Characteristics”, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Alexander L. George and William E.
Simons (eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 7. Alexander L.. George, Forceful Persuation: Coercive
Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington: United States Instute of Peace, 1997. The implementation
of Turkish Foreign Policy see; Fuat Aksu, Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi, İstanbul: Bağlam
Yay., 2008.
resolution of Security Council dated August 24, 1976 the Council decided that the scientific
activities executed by Turkey would not constitute a threat against the rights and interests of
the both countries and invited the parties to direct negotiations.
TABLE 1 – TURKISH – GREEK FOREIGN POLICY CRISES (1923-2014)
CRISIS
PARTIES
PARTIES TRIGGERED THE
CRISIS
1955, September 6-7 Crisis Turkey - Greece Turkey
February 11, 1959 (Treaty of Zurich), 19 February
1959 (London Convention)
August 16, 1960 (The Establishment of The Republic
of Cyprus)
1963-1964 Cyprus Crisis I
(December 21, 1963 to 10 August 1964) Turkey - Republic of Cyprus Republic of Cyprus
1967 Cyprus Crisis II
(November 15, 1967 - December 1, 1967)
Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot
Administration) / Greece
Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /
Greece
Dated November 1, 1973 and numbered 14699 the
Official Gazette / TPAO Continental Shelf License
1974 Cyprus Crisis III
(July 15, 1974 to 16 August 1974)
Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot
Administration) / Greece
Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /
Greece
1974 -1980 NOTAM Crisis / August 6th, 1974
proclamation of NOTAMs No. 714 Turkey - Greece Turkey
1974-1976 Aegean Crisis I / November 11, 1976
Bern Declaration Turkey - Greece Turkey
Removal of Turkish NOTAM numbered 714 /
Removal of Greek NOTAM numbered 1157
1981 (Militarization of) Limnos Crisis / October
20, 1980 Greece's return to NATO with Rogers Plan Turkey - Greece Greece
1984 (Minority of ) Western Thrace Crisis Turkey - Greece Greece
1987 Aegean Crisis II Turkey - Greece Greece
1994-1995 Aegean Sea casus belli Crisis / UNCLOS
III- Statements of Parliaments Turkey - Greece Greece
1996 Kardak / Imia Islets Crisis Turkey - Greece Greece
1997 S-300 Missile Crisis* Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot
Administration) / Greece
Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /
Greece
1998 Syria –Ocalan Crisis** Turkey - Greece Turkey
2003- Maritime Jurisdiction Crisis in Eastern
Mediterranean Sea ***
Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot
Administration) / Greece
Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /
Greece
* In Cyprus crises (1964, 1967, 1974) Greece has a guarantor state status. 1997 S-300 Missile Crisis has experienced between Turkey and
Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) but signed Joint Defense Doctrine and the Greece’s guarantor state status has become Greece to indirect parties in crisis.
** The target country in Syria- Ocalan crisis (1998) is Syria, however Turkey has led to Greece indirect target due to the Greece's protection and support of Ocalan. Turkey stated that she may use the legal rights of self-defense.
*** In the crisis of maritime jurisdictions over Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has witnessed the emerging crisis period, which is about over
maritime borders in both of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Considering the relations between Turkey and Greece, two crises should be considered
as indirect crises. Despite the fact that S-300 missile crisis in 1997 occurred between Turkey
and Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece also involved in the issue. This issue was a result
of the common defense alliance of Greece with GCA within the framework of common
defense doctrine. During the crisis, Turkey’s statement to destroy the missiles in case of their
deployment in the Island is a high risky ultimatum to be tested. Greece and GCA agreed to
store the missiles in Crete instead of delivering to the island and Turkey’s demand has been
met. Turkey’s considering the missiles as a threat and to declare that it would use military
force in case of need, made a deterrent effect. Besides, it is necessary to consider this crisis as
a crisis within a long term conflict as defined by Brecher because it is a part of larger Cyprus
issue.
The next crisis is the Ocalan-Syria crisis between Turkey and Syria in 1998. Turkey’s
coercive diplomacy strategy involving threat for the use of force stemming from self-defense,
ended up with the predicted effect on Syria and it deported Ocalan and PKK elements in its
territories. Ocalan’s seeking protection and asylum in Greece after Syria brought Turkey and
Greece into confrontation. Turkey’s stating that in case of Greece’s granting asylum to
Ocalan, the same measures with Syria would be taken for Greece and considers Greece as a
country supporting terrorism displayed the escalation of the crisis. Greece focused on not to
enter into a military conflict or war with Turkey while giving effort for unburdening itself
from Ocalan residing in its territory. When it is understood that Ocalan is kept in Greece’s
embassy in Kenya, the US stepped in and Ocalan is delivered to Turkey with an operation.
Thereby a possible crisis between Turkey and Greece has been resolved through US
mediation. During that crisis a hot debate went on between the government and
opposition/bureaucracy and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis dismantled some politicians
and bureaucrats with the claim that they put Greece into a conflict with Turkey. Following the
crisis, fixing the relations is provided through the letter-diplomacy between the ministers of
foreign affairs.3 When we look at from the crisis analysis perspective, Ocalan-Syria crisis is a
“reflection-crisis” for Turkey-Greece relations. In the post-1980 period, explicit-implicit
support for anti-Turkish terror groups had been the part of the Turkish policy of Greece.
Although Turkey put the concrete evidences of this support to terrorist organizations by
Greece, Greece preferred to deny this support every time. Ironically, this support has also
been revealed by the statements of Ocalan during his trial.4
Cyprus dispute in Turkey-Greece Relations
In the general course of relations between Greece and Turkey the 1919-23 period
carries the traces of war period. The 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty is a founding text/act which
establishes a balance between the parties. In the era from 1923 to 1950 a relative friendship
and cooperation is observed. In Turkey-Greece relations, Cyprus and Aegean disputes have an
old past too. This stems from the fact that a mutually agreed status regarding Cyprus dispute
have been demanded to be changed unilaterally in time.5 Therefore it is a challenge against
status quo at the same time. After the First World War the basic text determining the national
boundaries of modern Turkey and resolving the territorial issues of Ottoman lands is the
Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923. The Lausanne Treaty not only resolved the boundary issues
3 See for details: İsmail Cem, Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya, Cilt I, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniv. Yay, 2004.
4 See for details: Atilla, Uğur, Abdullah Öcalan'ı Nasıl Sorguladım:İşte Gerçekler, İstanbul: Kaynak
Yayınları, 2011. Savas Kalenderidis, Öcalan’ın Teslimi, İstanbul: Pencere Yay., 2011.
5 For details visit;
http://tdpkrizleri.org/index.php?option=com_seoglossary&view=glossary&catid=1&id=138&Itemid=188&lan
g=tr
with Greece but also with Italy and the UK. While Dodecanese is left for Italy the British
mandate in Cyprus have been recognized by the signatories.
The mutual recognition of the boundaries of sovereignty among the states signing the
Treaty had created equilibrium and until post-WW II era this balance has been protected. In
this period, unilateral challenge to the balance has been observed in the case of Cyprus as
well. In 1931, the rebel against the British mandate in Cyprus and demand for enosis (union
with Greece) has been suppressed by the harsh methods of British administration. Though the
demand of enosis declined after harsh suppress of the rebellion, it re-emerged in the 1950s.
After WW II the cession of the Dodecanese islands to Greece from Italy increased the
expectation for enosis regarding Cyprus. Cyprus’ becoming a concern of Turkey-Greece
relations had also occurred in the same period. In the early 1950s the rising enosis (union with
Greece) propaganda in the Island has been considered as an internal affair of Great Britain at
first and Turkey remained relatively silent. In a period from which Greece had recently
survived from a civil war and maintaining recovery, Turkey did not want to create a new field
of conflict with Britain support of whom she was asking for. After Greece’s
“internationalization” the demands on Cyprus with the pressure and propaganda of the Greek
Orthodox Church of Cyprus and enosis supporters, Turkey also got involved in the issue. In
this involvement Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey and the national press played an important
role.
At the beginning, since the mandate of Britain is recognized in Cyprus, Turkey did not
claim any right on Cyprus. In this phase, Cyprus is not a dispute to be negotiated between
Turkey and Greece either. In the meantime, Turkish side who observed the possible
worsening of relations between two countries warned the Greek side on the matter. The
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu warned his Greek counterpart and
stated that the enosis policy with Cyprus would negatively affected Turkey-Greece relations.
In 1955 the London Conference initiated as a solution seeking effort for the dispute
have been a process led the parties to embody their arguments and expectations as well as
sharpening the sides of a long-term conflict.6 Therefore Cyprus dispute has 64 years old past
in Turkey-Greece relations. With the conclusion of the negotiations started in 1955 in 1960, a
state has been established based on the political equality of the two societies living in the
island and the parties renounced their claims by guaranteeing the status of the new
independent state. The new state has been a part of international system as a member of the
UN. However, this structure based on the political equality of the communities in the island
could not have been sustained. In 1963, the unilateral intervention of Makarios to change the
Cyprus constitution and the beginning attacks against Turkish Cypriot community brought the
dispute to a different level. This time the addressee of Turkey not only was Greece but also
Republic of Cyprus. Remarkably, the representatives of Turkish Cypriots under Republic of
Cyprus had become unable to use their constitutional rights and authority. In other words,
despite the fact that Republic of Cyprus had been founded as a partnership regime in the crisis
situation one of the partners could not be represented at all. This situation rapidly led the
6 1950-1960 was the period during which both Greek and Turkish communities living in the Island had
organized for armed resistance. In the early 1950s, against the attacks of EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kyprion
Agoniston/National Struggle Organization of Cypriots founded under the leadership of George Grivas, Turkish
community displayed a loose defense at the beginning; however, in 1957 Turkish Resistance Corps were
founded. For the details about the foundation of both organizations see; Ulvi Keser, Kıbrıs’ta Yer altı
faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, (Underground Activities in Cyprus and Turkish Resistance Corps)
İstanbul: IQ Yay., 2007; Makarios Druşotis, Karanlık Yön: EOKA (The Dark Side: EOKA) , Lefkoşa:
Galeri Kültür Yay., 2007.
dispute to evolve into a political conflict among the communities and the guarantor states and
it turned into a serious crisis in a short period of time.
If we start the period of crises in Turkish-Greek relations with the “Bloody
Christmas” of 1963, it is possible to treat the progress of crises of Cyprus dispute within a 50
year period. From 1950 to today, 14 diplomatic crises emerged between Turkey and Greece. 5
of them are directly related with Cyprus issue. However, from the Cyprus crises 1963-64,
1967 and 1974 as Cold War crises and 1997 S-300 missiles and 2003 Eastern Mediterranean
Maritime Jurisdiction Areas (EEZ) crises have different characteristics. Besides, in the post-
1990 crises we observe efforts to create de facto situation and to enforce a new status. From a
different perspective Cyprus crises can be considered as “long-term and protracted crises” in
Turkey-Greece relations. As a matter of fact, this dispute emerged in the early 1950s and
while the 1960s witnessed conflicting relations, between 1960 and 1974 three crises with
almost the same characteristics appeared. Despite the fact that conflict had been re-appealed
after each crisis period, these appeals have been high-tension status quo ante since the
founding texts of the parties granted no such status. Moreover, conflict resolution -
management processes/ initiatives following these three crises did not remove the
disagreements between the parties.
On the other hand, in the post-1990 crisis period the discursive/operational behaviors
triggering the crisis are evidences for crisis-management strategies of Greek Cypriot
Administration. In the S-300 missile crisis between 1997 and 1999, the strategy of creating a
de facto situation (fait accompli) in a period when the Cyprus issue had been put into
mothballs have been consciously designed as it is explained by Glafkos Klerides. With
Turkey’s reaction to missile order and statement that missiles would be destroyed in case of
delivery to the island suddenly provoked the international/regional agenda and organizations
like UN, NATO and the EU got involved into the issue. Turkey managed to prevent the
delivery of missiles into the island with the threat of coercion but could not prevent the rise of
Cyprus issue in the agenda of international society. While the missiles stored in Crete Island,
after a while, with the call of UN Secretary General to restart the negotiations between the
parties the Cyprus issue entered into a new phase. Following these negotiations the Annan
Plan emerged as it is subjected to referendum in 2004. In this period, sometimes negotiations
were interrupted but dialogue has been sustained with new offers.
In the progress of Cyprus issue from 1950 to today, doubtlessly, Annan Plan-
Comprehensive Peace Plan for Cyprus- put to the people of Cyprus in a referendum in 2004
has been a turning point. The peace plan prepared with the mediation of UN Secretary
General as an output of the negotiations of the parties have been put to the people for
referendum for the first time in the long history of dispute. Even the founding texts of Cyprus
Republic were not the text put in front of the public opinion in the history of long dispute-
crisis. Annan Plan has been prepared after long and harsh negotiations and put into
referendum on April 24, 2004 on both sides of the island and while Turkish Cypriots said
YES with 64,91 percent vote, Greek Cypriots voted NO with 75,38 %. Therefore the plan has
been rejected and Cyprus dispute could not been resolved.
The direct results of the failure of Annan Plan are noteworthy. While the resolution of
Cyprus dispute was put as a pre-condition for the EU membership of Turkey, the Greek
Cypriot Administration has been accepted as a full-member to the union representing the
whole Island. By approving the EU membership created a paradoxical situation with its own
expansion principles and accepted GCA before it resolved its boundary disputes. Turkish
Cypriots on the other hand, could not escape the isolation and preventions even though they
supported the plan. Moreover, the membership of GCA to the EU also brought a new
conditionality in Turkey-EU relations. Including GCA to the Customs Union created new
problems in the execution of the full membership framework document and put the accession
monitoring program into difficulty.
Another dispute-crisis spiral for Turkey related with Cyprus is the determination of
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas. GCA’s concluding agreements with the
countries in the Eastern Mediterranean regulating (exclusive economic zones/EEZ)
boundaries of the region, issuing international licenses and to allocate tenders in declared
continental shelf regions confronted Turkey and GCA directly and Greece indirectly. GCA’s
initiatives for maritime jurisdiction areas and strategies are similar to Turkey’s strategies
followed for the dispute in determining continental shelves in Aegean Sea in 1974 to 1976.
Turkey followed the strategy of creating de facto situations to claim her rights in Aegean Sea
against Greece’s claims of continental shelf in that period. As a part of this strategy, in the
disputed areas of Aegean Sea, except territorial waters, in the areas claimed as Turkey’s
continental shelf, Turkey issued license for Turkish Petroleum Company-TPAO to conduct
seismic research in the region. Upon the reaction of Greece, she stated that maritime
boundaries had not been determined by an agreement and was ready for negotiation on the
issue. In this way the dispute on maritime jurisdiction came into the scene. However, basic
policy of Turkey in this dispute-conflict-crisis process is defensive and its main target has
been to enforce Greece to accept the rights of coastal countries on Aegean Sea.
Similarly, in the first half of 2000s, we see that GCA’s attempts are for creating de
facto situation. While GCA was joining international negotiations for a permanent peace for
Cyprus dispute, on the other hand she signed EEZ agreements with Egypt on February 17,
2003, with Lebanon on January 2007 and with Israel on December 17, 2010 and invited
tenders for license. 7
However, this is controversial in many dimensions. The natural resources
and their use are under the authority of central/federal state as determined by 1960 Nicosia
Agreement and 2004 Annan Plan.8 Until reaching a permanent resolution for Cyprus dispute,
the view that any action to escalate tension between the parties should be denied had been
delivered by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-TRNC and negotiators to Greek side
but it was not possible to prevent such developments.9 GCA’s signing agreements before
ending the negotiations and issuing licenses to international companies created new fields of
discussion in the negotiations on the one hand and led Turkey and TRNC to develop opposing
strategies on the other. In the agreements between Turkey and TRNC, TRNC also issued
license for Turkish Petroleum Company-TPAO in both northern and southern region of the
island and continued its claim on the disputed regions.
From the crisis-management perspective, the policy executed by GCA is quite risky
both economically and politically and involves sensitive issues. This de facto situation created
7 See the regulations about maritime jurisdiction rights in Eastern Mediterranean Sea; Sertaç Hami Başeren (Y.
Haz.), Doğu Akdeniz'de Hukuk ve Siyaset, Ankara: A.Ü. SBF Yay., 2013.
8 See for the relevant provision of Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960); Article 25/3,
http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/$fil
e/CY_Constitution.pdf?openelement
See for the relevant provision of Annan Plan; “Part IV: The Federal Government And the Constituent States,
Article 14 Competences and functions of the federal government”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/un-comprehensive-
settlement-plan-of-the-cyprus-question.en.mfa
9 “KKTC de Petrol ve Doğalgaz Arayacak”, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25242258/ ; “Türkiye ve KKTC’den
Önemli Adım!”, http://www.gazetevatan.com/turkiye-ve-kktc-den-onemli-adim--401041-gundem/
a new field of dispute-crisis between Turkey and GCA and the relations are driven to tension.
Upon the reaction of Turkey GCA declared that she is ready for discussing the controversial
areas but this carries the dispute to another realm. Since Turkey did not recognized GCA, it
asked for the participation of TRNC as a party to the negotiations. And this created a paradox
because GCA did not want to consider TRNC as a partner. In a context where parties do not
recognize each other as addressees, creating a de facto situation on the one hand and
retaliation strategies of Turkey on the other have been executed. Considering the negotiations
to resolve the Cyprus dispute, such developments are negatively affecting the process. As a
matter of fact, the debates over the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean are turned
into mutual showdown and the peace negotiations are interrupted.10
Crisis Name Discourse and/or Actions
Triggered the Crisis
The Nature of Events
Triggered the Crisis
The Category of Events
Triggered the Crisis
1955 6-7 September Crisis
Non-military violent and
attacks against the Greek
minorities
Violation of treaty Political- Humanitarian
1963-1964 Cyprus Crisis I
Military-paramilitary
violent and attacks against
the Turkish Cypriots
Violation of status Political- Humanitarian-
Juristical
1967 Cyprus Crisis II
Military-paramilitary
violent and attacks against
the Turkish Cypriots
Violation of status Political- Humanitarian-
Juristical
1974 Cyprus Crisis III Coup d’Etat / Enosis Violation of status Political- Juristical - Military-
Humanitarian-
1974 -1980 NOTAM-FIR
Crisis Military security measures Security dilemma Military- Political- Juristical
1974-76 Aegean Sea
(Continental Shelf) Crisis-I
License declaration and
seismic research
Creation of de facto
situation Political-Juristical-Economics
1981 (Militarization of)
Limnos Crisis Militarization of Islands Violation of status Military- Political- Juristical
1984 (Minority of) Western
Thrace Crisis
Non-military violent and
attacks against the Turkish
minority in Western Thrace
Violation of Status and
Treaty
Humanitarian- Political-
Juristical
1987 Aegean Sea
(Continental Shelf) Crisis-II
Declaration of invalidity of
agreement and statements
of oil exploration activities
Agreement -Violation
of status Juristical- Political
1994-1995 Aegean Sea casus
belli Crisis
Declaration of Greek
Parliament Declaration of will Political
1996 Kardak/Imia Islets
Crisis
Landing troops on Kardak
Islets and warning to fire in
case of draw near to islets
Use of military force Military- Political
1997 S-300 Missile Crisis*
The signing of the missile
purchase agreement with
Russia
Violation of status / fait
accompli Military- Political
1998 Syria –Ocalan Crisis**
Turkey’s demand from
Syria to fulfill according to
upon its request
Political pressure Political- Military
2003 Maritime Jurisdiction
Crisis in Eastern
Mediterranean Sea***
Greek Cypriot
Administration’s bilateral
EEZ agreements with
neighbors and license
declaration
Unilateral fait accompli Political- Juristical
In this process of fifty years, the events that triggered Cyprus crises took place with
the intention of realizing the enosis which was dream shared by Greek Cypriot Community
10
“MEB’imiz İhlal Edilirse Görüşmelerden Çekiliriz!”, http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/guney/meb-imiz-
ihlal-edilirse-muzakerelerden-cekiliriz/35546
and Greece. Actually, even the establishment of Cyprus Republic through the treaties in 1960
was a step in line with this purpose11
. In years of 1963-1964, 1967 and 1974, three crises took
place that needed Turkey’s intervention in its capacity as guarantor in the island as a result of
the attacks that were increased by the directions of the decision makers from Cyprus Greek
Community and Greece. Whereas England was seen as the main obstacle in the way to enosis
between 1950 and 1960, Turkish Cypriot Community and Turkey were started to be seen as
the main obstacle starting from 1960. On the other hand, the main purposes and the priorities
of Turkey during the crises were to prevent the assaults against the existence of Turkish
Cypriots living in the island and to protect the rights and the status provided constituent
treaties. During the first two attacks (1963-1964 and 1967), Turkey used the international
legitimacy provided by its status as the guarantor state in order to prevent the assaults and
solved the crisis through coercive diplomacy strategies12
. However, the solutions that were
agreed on could not settle the disputes in negotiations between communities held after these
crises. With the coup d’état against President Makarios and the proclamation of The Hellenic
Republic of Cyprus, Turkey’s right as a guarantor came up again. That the group that staged
the military coup in the island was supported by the military junta in Greece pointed Greece
as the real responsible for the coup. Turkey consulted England for it was the other guarantor
state, but it could not convince England for a joint intervention. Ultimately, Turkey decided to
intervene by itself. Turkey carried out a military intervention in Cyprus in 20 July 1974.
The common point of all these three crises was that the events that turned the conflicts
into crises were enosis-based. Besides, during each of these crises, the paramilitary group
named EOKA / EOKA-B played an essential role13
. At this point, it is not possible to
differentiate state and non-state actors as the triggering actors of the crises. Because, when it
was discussed who were responsible for these events later on, leaders of Greek Cypriot
Community blamed EOKA and General George Grivas and tried to avoid the political
responsibilities. Even though Turkish Cypriots were the ones targeted in the armed assaults
during the first two crises, a military coup was held against President Makarios in 1974 crisis,
though the legitimacy of his position can be questioned. After the coup, another conflict broke
up in the island within Greek Cyprot Community itself and pro-enosis coupists and the ones
having problems with the junta in Greece though they support the enosis started to struggle
against each other. According to “Akritas Plan” that were created in the beginning of 1960s
by decision makers from Cyprus and Greece that acted together to realize enosis, it was aimed
to intimidate and exterminate Turkish Cypriots unless they were assimilated. Pro-enosis
groups that acted together during the crises of 1964 and 1967 drifted into disagreements
between themselves between 1964 and 1967, and President Makarios became an obstacle for
the military junta in Greece. That Makarios was more popular and respected in the island
compared to the leaders of the junta in Greece caused coupists to attempt both getting rid of
Makarios and realize the enosis in the same time. Though the military coup held in 15 July
against Makarios created an internal conflict within Greek Cypriot Community, coupists did
11
See Druşotis, Karanlık Yön[ Dark Side]… for the difference of opinions and discussions between politicians
from EOKA, Greece and Cyprus about the acceptance of solutions provided by Zurich and London Treaties.
12 See Fuat Aksu, Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi (Coercive Diplomacy in Turkish Foreign
Policy), Istanbul: Baglam Publishing House, 2008.
13 It can be seen that EOKA and General George Grivas played important roles during the events that triggered
each of the crises. After years from these events, Greek leaders confirmed this situation through their
statements admitting that they had difficulty in controlling the activities of EOKA/EOKA-B paramilitary
organization and Grivas during the crises. It can be seen that Greece increased its activities in the island
through EOKA, National Guard Army and military officers from Greek Troops in the island led by Grivas and
tried to neutralize Makarios’ impact in the island. In this process, along with the assaults against Turkish
community in the island, Greeks that were not pleased by the activities of EOKA were targeted as well.
not want to move provoke Turkey by attacking Turkish Cypriot Community. However,
Turkish Cypriots were anxious in the face of events. The community that experienced 1964
and 1967 events was worried that they were going to be harmed during the crises and tried to
provide security from Turkey. That Turkey only condemned the coup and did not take any
action until July 20 encouraged the coupists but their expectations failed. Turkey’s military
intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 caused long term effects and a new period was started
in Cyprus.
Cyprus Crises and Turkey’s Crisis Management Strategies
With 1960 Treaties, related parties agreed on the establishment of a certain status
(quo). Instead of charging Greece or Turkey with the management of the island or dividing it
between two states, a new state was established that is based on the political equality of both
communities. England, Greece and Turkey recognized this state and guaranteed the territorial
integrity of it. At this point, the decision makers in Turkey had the opinion that the
establishment of Cyprus Republic was a good solution to strengthen the relationships between
Turkey and Greece and even that it could generate a Turkish-Greek federation. However, the
solution that was agreed on by all parties was not a long lasting one. Makarios tried to change
the Constitution of Cyprus and excluded Turkish Cypriots from the administration in due
course, and that increased the tension again.
When the assaults against Turkish community in the island broke out, Turkey tried to
settle the disagreements both through negotiations between the guarantor states and direct
contact with the President of Cyprus, Makarios. Actually, long before the beginning of the
assaults in the island, Turkey called for a negotiation in order to settle the disagreements
between the community leaders during Makarios’ official visit to Ankara between 22 and 26
November 1962.14
In addition, it expressed clearly that Turkey will not allow unilateral
changes in the status. After the incident of “Bloody Noel” in 1963, the negotiations broke
down and armed conflict began between the communities and that put Turkey in a position to
make a hard decision. Political negotiations were ineffective and no improvement was
achieved; therefore, it was necessary to consider options including military actions in order to
stop the assaults. However, those options had their own difficulties due to the national
conditions of that time.
Though 4th
article of the Treaty of Guarantee provided a legitimate basis for Turkey to
make a military intervention in the island, military readiness and capacity of Turkey in that
time was not in a shape to make such an intervention.15
When the Turkish decision makers the
time evaluated the option of a military intervention, they realized that the intervention of
Armed Forces with its limited recourses to the island would bring many problems with itself.
Moreover, even though the military intervention option was supported by the national
community, it is not possible to claim that it was supported by international actors, especially
by the leaders of Western bloc. US President Lyndon Johnson’s letter to Turkish Prime
Minister İsmet İnönü reminded this harsh truth to Turkey. Until August, 1964, Turkey’s only
military intervention to ongoing clashes in the island was to let the air forces fly on the island
in low-altitude; however, when the assaults restarted in the beginning of August, they bombed
Greek military targets directly. That Turkey used its exemplary force entry treat helped
Turkey to terminate the crisis and reduced the violence against Turkish community creating a
deterrent impact.
14
See for Makarios’ visit to Turkey and the details of the negotiations: Turgut Tulumen, Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs
(Lifelong Cyprus), Istanbul: Bogazici Publishing House, 1998, p. 49-57.
15 See for the discussions on Turkey’s decision to make military interventions to the island during Cyprus crises
in 1963-1964 and 1967; Fuat Aksu, Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi (Coercive Diplomacy in
Turkish Foreign Policy), Istanbul: Baglam Publishing House, 2008.
During 1963-1964 crisis was actually an example where both parties were actually
testing each other and they learned the crisis management. When the conflict between two
parties restarted in 1967, decision makers in Turkey faced the decision to make a military
intervention to the island again. During this crisis, it was revealed once more that the
necessary military capacity and preparations of Turkey were not sufficient for such an option.
Turkish decision makers considered using coercive diplomacy strategies to manage the crisis
and they achieved that by instead of using the power, using its threat. In that crisis,
conciliation by USA contributed a lot to the process. Thanks to the shuttle diplomacy carried
out by US diplomat Cyrus Vance, Turkey obtained its demands and assaults against Turkish
community were stopped. Moreover, 20,000 Greek soldiers and heavy weapons sent to the
island from Greece upon the agreement between Greece and Makarios during 1960 incidents
were removed from the island at the insistent requests of Turkey.16
After the crises in 1963-1964 and 1967, Turkish decision makers realized that they had
limited options in the case of protracted Cyprus crises and they focused on necessary
preparations for a military intervention to the island. Until 1974, the Turkish Armed Forces
almost completed the necessary military training and readiness needed for a successful
amphibian operation. And these preparations facilitated Turkey’s military intervention to
Cyprus on 20 July 1974 and when the intervention was concluded, the casualties were much
less compared to previous crises17
.
Each of these crises took place during the rule of different governments. However, the
issue of Cyprus was considered as a “matter of national cause” and especially during and after
1967 crisis, Cyprus policy of the governments was supported widely. When the Turkey’s
crisis management strategies during the crises in question are examined, we see that in the
first two crises, Turkey adopted a coercive diplomacy strategy18
. In the case of 1974 crisis,
Turkey adopted another defense-based crisis management strategy. Bu implementing its
military intervention decision, Turkey applied “strategy of limited escalation”. When Turkey
announced its decision to make a military intervention, it stated that the purpose of the
intervention is to reconstruct the constitutional order in the island as the guarantor state.
Turkey stated that in line with its purpose, it will not open fire unless any fire is opened
against its forces first. The target was the military coup against Makarios staged by EOKA-B
organization. However, Turkey’s military intervention created a conflictive situation in the
island. Whereas the supporters of Makarios supported Turkey’s intervention unwillingly,
supporters of EOKA-B, military officers from Greek Troops, Greek soldiered sneaked into
the island and pro-enosis people struggled against the military intervention of Turkey.
Therefore, the decision to not open fire unless a fire is opened first was not practiced in reality
and Turkish forces had to fight against EOKA-B forces, Greek National Guard Forces and
Greek Troops.
16
Andreas Papandreu explains how the decision to land troops and weapons on the island was made and
implemented after 1960 in his personal writings. See for details: Andreas Papandreu, Namlunun Ucundaki
Demokrasi (Democracy at Gunpoint), Ankara: Bilgi Publishing House, 1988, s. 164.
17 One of the important factors that positively affected the success of Turkey’s military intervention was that
troops and weapons that were sneaked into the island by Greece though it conflicted with the treaties were
removed from the island during 1967 crisis. 20,000 Greek soldiers and heavy weapons were the subject of the
negotiations carried out by the US representative Vance and these forces were removed out of the island in line
with the agreements reached at the end of the negotiations. It can be seen that the resistance would be much
harder during 1974 operations if these troops stayed in the island.
18 See for details of coercive diplomacy and crisis management strategies: Alexander L. George, “Strategies for
Crisis Management”, Alexander L. George (Ed.), Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991, pp. 377-394.
From the beginning of the clashes in Cyprus, the use of force was limited carefully and
it was not allowed to spread the conflict outside the island along the borders of Greece. In this
respect, strategies carried out by Turkey were accordant with both its obligations and
responsibilities as a guarantor, and the crisis management. Government Spokesman of the
time, Orhan Birgit, explains in his personal writings that in line with the information delivered
to them, they delivered the message that they have no intention for any military attack against
Greece to the military officers who were against the coup, and contributed to the fall of
military junta in Greece in this way.19
Hence, Prime Minister Ecevit showed that he supported
peace and cooperation between the states by congratulating Konstantin Karamanlis who
returned to his country after the fall of the junta and conveying his sincere greetings.20
Conclusion
After 40 years from Turkey’s military intervention to Cyprus, inter-communal
negotiations that have been maintained between the two communities living on the Island are
still continuing. However, we see that the two parties haven’t compromised on a
comprehensive solution yet. Along with this, endeavors that aim to remove the devastating
effects of a long run conflict are also being pursued. The endeavors are going on in the frame
of such parameters that foresee a solution which is centered on the federation and is based
upon the equality of the parties, and also which takes the bicommunal and the bizonal solution
as its core. Although we are not quite hopeful for a solution to come out from the official
negotiations in a short run, it is possible to mention some positive developments on the level
of the communities / peoples of the Island. Especially the facts that access between the South
and the North of the Island is now facilitated, that some positive outcomes were taken from
the attempts to investigate the whereabouts of missing people of both communities in 1963-
1974 and the joint historiography that is purified from the prejudices can be given as
examples of these developments.
For the conflicting communities that have lost their experience of coexistence, getting
rid of the trauma of the past and confronting with them can take a long time. If we view the
1974 intervention from a positive point of view, it in fact gives both of the sides a new
chance. For this time, instead of such purposes of the paramilitary organizations that are quite
extreme and not possible to be realized, a new chance of creating a mutual future supported
by the culture of living together has now arisen. And this is a subject of another particular
discussion that exceeds the limits of this article.
19
See for details: Orhan Birgit, Kalbur Saman İçinde: Olaylar, Anılar, Portreler (Once upon a Time: Events,
Memories, Portraits), Istanbul: Doğan Publishing House., 2012, p. 123-124.
20 See for details: Kamuran Gürün, Bükreş-Paris-Atina Büyükelçilik Hatıraları (Bucharest-Paris-Athens
Ambassadorial Memoirs), Istanbul: Milliyet Publishing House., 1994, p. 330-331.
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