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167
~ thia chapter we examine aspects of the :!unctloni.ng at
three ministries (Madras• U.P •• Bihar). CUr ana1ys1s does nat
attempt a detailed survey of legislative am administrative
policies; we discuss these features to the extent that they give
us an idea o:f the function of t!->ese procedures within the Cong
ress objective ~ consolidating its p<Ner in relation to the
colonial regime.
We also try to develop a picture of the significant dis
sOJ:lances in pOl.it!p&.l. agency which arose UDier the Ministries.
Here the relation between the ministry arxl extra-parliamentary
inStitutions a:rxl movements (Congress Coumittees, kisan organisa
tions) is examined. As far as popuJ.ar initiatives are concerned,
we .focus on the agrarian movement. Cur aim here is to discern
what the implications o:f these different political .forms and
their relationship with each other were for Congress politics.
The threads are drawn together to gain such an overview
in the last section. 'lhis handles the evolution of the Gandhian
leadership •s all-India perspective and interrogates the deeper
historical rationale of the ministerial experience arn ita
impl.ications for the development of mtionalist hegemony in
p ol.i tical. li.f'e.
Const~onalism in Practice: The Ra.1agopal.achari ~R"ii1S_ .
•• • we are au so sensitive aDd urabl.e to
lG8
think outside forua.U.as and proposition~of old times ••• 1 (C. Rajagopalachari)
3.1.1 Controlllng the state apparatus
It 1a easy to ~ke a virulent denunc :La tion o! Rajagopala
ehari's policies as a reversal of Congress policy. s. Gopa.l has
drawn our attention to his authoritarianism and repressiveness,
his reliance on the most colonial of British codes (the grant
ing of titles for example), his 1 istrust of Imian administra
tive capabil.ities and cultivation of the colonial bureaucre.cy.2
Indeed, the ~.!Cidras Pretiier was gullty of all these misdemeanours.
However, for our purposes, llhat is more pertinent than mere
denunciation is an explanation of these policies as pol.itioal
strategy.
In the previous chapter we had suggested that the consti
tutionalist argument comprised two key elements: a reorienta
tion of Congress politics to a gradually developed control aver
the institutions of the sta teJ and, relate~y, a de-emphasis on
extra-parliamentary methods, for such methods coul.d uniermine
the control the Congress cou1d exercise over the state apparatus,
and cOUld therefore jecpardise the Congress programme. Iri
September 1937, at a political ccnterence 1n Madras, Rajagopala
chari (CR) reiterated this governing rationalea now that the
Congress bad taken office, talk about doing a-.y with Government
-should be mi n1 ad sed ar¥1 Government officers should not be cri ti-
1
2
CR to Patel, 25 Nay 1939, c. Rajagopalach.:tri Ms. (hereafter at Ms •) Roll 2.
S • Gopal., i~lfl Nehru,. A B10Sf&phx. Vol. 1, Delhi, 1975. pp.~
cised because they were cooperating with the Congress m.inii.;try.
He ccncluded ttflt these changes would take place at the expense
of the Congress Commit-tees a there shOUld be a restrict! an o~
lJbat could be agitated an and o£ whit ViS demanded of the Jriini
stry. Gertain Congress programmes should nov be postpcmed. 3
nus desired reorganiSation ~ politics 1n the Cangresa
is best illustrated by CR 's mndling of the case of s.s. Batli
wala, a Comnnmist 1n the Co¥>.gress Socialist Party. In September
Batli'wala ~d •de a speech in Arxlhra attacking landlordism. The
attack, cast in a 'nationalist idian, identi!ied the landlords
with the colonial regime by using the metaphor of a family (the
Indian nation)' be~ betrayed by a treacherous member (the zamin-,
dar) into letting an outsider d<liitimte them. The Congress would
avenge this treachery, and Batliwala urged the people to join
-the party -~se. Further, he urged them to suppress their
traditional :tears of the Government machinery as Congress had
taken office and so controlled the services. The symbols of this
liberation were Gandhi and Nehru at the national level. Rajago
paJ.acbari at the provinc~l and T. Prakasam at the local. How
eVU', a running theme of the speech was the rebel.lious exampJ.e
set by Alluri Sitarama"((ju, leader ot the 1921 Rampa rebeUiCXl,
an emphasis which suggested that in the last resort the people
wculd look to themselves and use farce againSt the l&ndlord.s
and the Raj • It
3 Clippire .from The Hiniu, 5 September 1937, AICC P.L. 3/ 1937.
4 AICC P.L. 18/1937.
170
It seems to have been this last emphasis, on popular ac
tion which could take· an extra-legal form, which caused c.R. to
single thiS case out for exempl.ary punishment, and to launch
prosecution for sedition under section 124A IPC. As the moderate
nationalist paper • The ijil!iu, pointed out, t~re had been nothing
seditious about the speech.5 And even Patel, though he was
equally anxious ·to n~intain discipline in the Congress, was
clearly puzzled by the c ·"' of' thiS section.6
Rutherford, Secretary to Erskine, analysed tbe signif10lnce
of CR 's action suggestively. He pointed out that the Premier
bad v.anted to- stress that Batliwal.P 's speech v.es an attack on
constituted goVernment and thus sought to focus attention a-y
from the real thrust of the attack, against British rule. 7 The
significance of "constituted government" rray be extended .further:
under such rule, the machinery ar the state \<,S.S inviolate as it
would now function in accord with the dictates of popular govern
ment. By stressing metr.ods of action which negated such a con
ception of government (even if extra-legal action was only posed
as an ul tim te threat) Batli~la bad transgressed the impera
tives CR ~d chalked rut. NatiomliSt hegemony over the services
...as the objective here as CR indicated when he noted thata
5 Cutting ~m issue of 13 November 1937, ibid.
6 11 ••• I unierstand from the supporters o.t Mr Be.t11\111Ella tbat although his speech rrtiily be unjustified :trom the point of view of non-v1o1ence it does not fall under Section 124-A.• To Rajaji 4 November 1937, CR Ms. Roll 3.
7 T .G. Rutherford to Laithwaite {FSV), 25 I~y 1938. Linl.1.thgow Ms. Eur. F 125/65.
171
I cannot gather ful~POW!y fii the field of laJ am order su as 1leve I nave one Iii greater measure t~n in o1her prcwincea, unless I am able to draw (the line between liberty am licence) .a
To underline this priority, the Batlil~Ella prosecution l!llls
worked up into a symbollc 1J118'turet con:!abulated 1
by 0\ in consul
tat ion with the Governor, Erskine 1
• • • we • • • came to the concl.usion that some action had better be taken at once to show that the Government ...,as not prepared to degenerate into licence, and to give clear warning that strong action would be take2l against those sed.itianists i! they continue to stir up class hatred ••• 9
To underline that the case ,as cne in which the forces of the
state were ranged ~inst those of lawlessness, the symbolic
.features ~e extended into sending down lthiraj, the Public
frosecutor, to banile the case.10
CR was not UDiware that he would be subject to strong
criticism in the AICC, and to cover himsel.f against t..he charge
of repression, he asked Erskine that two prisoners from the
And.aiians be released. The reasons he gave elaborate his attempt
to reorient politicsa
8
9
I must insist immediate action ••• I have taken action against Batl.i~la w1 thout minding general reaction or consulting colleagues other provinces or anyone else
CR to !6tel, 12 October 1937, m Ms • Roll 3.
Ersld.De to Linlitbgow, 8 October 1937. Erskine Ms. Eur. D 596/2. ·
10 From Nehru •s private notes <h~ the c2se in AICC PL 18/1937; cutting from Indian E?spresa, 11 October 1937. ibid.
172
in order to establish sourxi policy. Your Excellency should support me in same marmer and strengthen my position in order to oppose all .forces being organised against me in regard to recent acticm and prnent crisis. 'nle reactions in other provinces over proposed releases w1l.l. be more than counteraCted by aouni far-reaching reaction in regard to my action Batlill&l.a .ldl1.dl '(111 then have entife support of msse~
1be loeic of his appeal to Erskine is revealing of his vision
of how politics would be re-oriented: the confidence o£ the
i·raasses" would be won not by a gauging ~ their needs as expres
sed through their self-activity but by the example set by firm
government. further, the demonstration of CoDc,rTess' capacity
to rule WOUld also reassure those who were not Congress suppor
ters. Re1'erring -to the forthcoming Calcutta AICC, which he y.e.s
unable to attend due to ill health, CR noted to Nehru that:
I hope that nothing will be done to impair the c ;.;nf ide nee and strength cocmarxled by provincial governments both inside and outside Cangress12 -
'lhe criticism the Madras Prenier anticipated did occur,
inspite of the release of the Andamn prisoners, ani it occurred
both in the Cl1C and in the Aicc.1' The debate in the ewe was
also revealing of the basic issues at stake in ~ •s political
reorientation. In his notes on the controversy Nehru had come
dol.-n to the b3.sic problem of whether such serious action could
11
12
13
al to Erskine, telegram 17 October 1937, Erskine Ms. Eur. D 596/2. Emphasis adele~. The o.~er of release was issued on 24 October. Brackenbury to CR 24 October 1937J CR Ms. Roll
CR to Nehru, telegram, 27 October 1937, CR Ms. Roll 2.
Far the AICC see Section 3.4.
173
be taken w1 thout previously consulting the relevant· Pee, the
ewe ar the Parliamentary sub-CoDIDittee (P5C) •14 He reiterated
this a-t tha Calcutta CWC •eting, proposing that in future be•
:tare making any arrests or instituting prosecution the m1n1·s
tera IIU8t consult the ewe. The proposal vaa defeated, with
Gandhi reportedly siding with CR.15
The issue at stake here was the source of authority in
Congress politics at the provincial level. There was no doubt
that for CR the extra-parliamentary wing of the party should no
longer occupy a decisive place in the scheme of things as he -,
saw them. At first sight, this would apPear to be because in
CR's view the PCC, and local Congress Committees at large, were
not responsible for or in control o:f the belligerence of cer
tain radical sections •16 But in fact th~re _,_\as a str()ng desire
here to ensure that there was no diminution of the Ministry's
aut..llority. The Congress organisation should be functional to
the Hinistry, not an altenlative tase of power. The desirable
function of the PCC \\Els illustrated by the Tamilnadu. unit which
criticised "certain ••• Congressmen who by their propaganda and
in ather \'ll&ys, are creating a _d:lt':ticu1t atmosphere and embarrass
ment to the Congress Hinistry• ani placed non record ita complete
confidence in ar:d appreciation . of the wot•k o:r the Midras
14
15
16
AICC P1.. 1 B/1937.
From the account given by the Madras Miniaters attending the CWC to Erskine. Erskine to Linlithgow, 16 November 1937, Erskine Ms. Eur. D 596/2.
CR to .Nehnl, 1 November 1937. CR. Ms. Rol.l. 2.
174
Miniatry ••• "17
So a two pronged strategy, underlining the MJ.niatry· 1 s ·
authority and subordinating extra..pe.rliamentary institutions
am teDiencies to ita control, was being developed here. In the
pursuit o! this reorganiSation af politics CR -• una be. shed
about using procedures which had previously l>een reviled by the
Congress. 'l'he case of using a sedition charge has already been
notedJ in addition. to monito1r and curb lett-wing tendencies,
evidently seen by lU.m to be the mjor threat to his plans, he
used CID surveill.ance,18 confiscated literature,19 demanded
17
18
19
Resolutio:ta of TNCC WC, 8 November 1937 in C.N. Muthuranga MUdaliar, PreSident to PM. Midras am to Preside:at, AICC, 10 November 1937, CR Ms. Roll 2. The Madras Congress Legislature Party, after recording its approval of the e.otion taken to ureserve law am order, sought to emphasise the authority of the Ministry even further through the follo,.;ini? resolution wich ,.,.as moved and discussed, but finally aropped, "though the principle involved in it \']aS aereed to•:
The Madras Legislattl!'e Congl"ess Party is of opinion that it would be d!f'f'icult U not ~ossible to carry on admlnistro.t5.on of t..'w Province under the Farl!amentary programme o£ the Congress if the :Sxecut ive actions o:f r-rovinoial Governments ! ormed for that purpose are to be discussed at the AICC JOOetings.
Nota by I. Subra.'lmanyam, Assistant Secretary, MCLP• 14 November 1937, ibid.
E .M.s. Namboodiripad complained of such surveUlance of a peasant delegation on its :rrarch .from Kere.la to the PrOYinoial Assembly:. Na.mboodiripad to· Nehru, 22 October 1937, AICC P.L. 18719371 Jayaprakash said he had been .followed whil.a in Andhra. To Nehru, 26 October 1937, ibid. See al.so secretary, N. *l.abar DCC to secretary AICC, 11 August 1938. AICC P.L. 3/1937. See also KPCC resol.ution o:f 26 June 1938 complaining a bout s~dowi.ag, opening o:f letters and house searches in AICC P 12(i)/1938-39.
Nembooc11r1pad 'a vUJ.age house bad been raided for a copy of Jobn Strachey'a ~e C9'!1g{
7Stnaggl.e. Namboodiripad tO
Nehru, 22 October 1 7, op.c t.
175
security from newspapers, 20 and in Malabar he ·l:;h~e·~\;e.V\~a .f! impo
sition of a punitive police !orce.21 It is interesting to note
that in regard to these actions even Pate 1 was some'Wha t uncom
!ortable.22
From CR •a viewpoint, these forces had to be undermined
because their functioning ,.s antagonistic to his plan ot poli
tically neutralizing the state apparatus. He c cnstantly came
into conflict ,.,ith the Kerala PCC because their mobllisati<n of
the peasantry and workers brought ·them into eont"lict with the
police and revenue administration, a trend which he !eared would
drive the officials into the arms of the Muslim Leegue. 23
20 Security had been demanded from B. Srinivas Rao, Secretary Madras CSP, tr,r the TamU periodical The SQg~~t K.B. Menon, Secretary 1 Civil. Liberties union '€o(lt~rMober 1937, AICC P.L. 18/1937.
21 lhe evidence iS unclear whether this was actually resorted to. It \;Els cha.r~ed that pu"'li.tive police were used in the wake of peasant delegations .from Kasaragode, s. canara marching to the administration to put for\mrd their grievances. A .K. Gopalan, In the cause of the Fe oo+e, ~dras 1937 ed., pp. 96-97J All rndia Kfc;an BU1ietln,3 January 1939, Yajnik .Ms. F. 8(1) J according to Gopalan this led to peasants being arrested in large numbers, on charges af rape, stealing timber fran the forest, assault and decoi ty. 151 people ,._ere implicated in 17 pJ.aces in Chirakkal taluka alone.
22 Regarding CID surveill.ance, Patel noted •you seem to have a superfluous sta.tt in this Department. Wh¥ don't you employ them in the prohibition they a<lll.d be use;tully /:::!:!.h9.V'fJ.. employed •" To m 4 NovembP_r 1937 • CR t+l. Roll 3J am regarding Namboodiripad •a charges about. the deployEnt of punitive police, Patel. noted •I- do not think you wUl accept any proposal for posting punitive police vtatever may be the situationn • 'ro CR 21 December 1938. CR Ms. Roll 2.
23 CR to Kripalani, 7 Dece;nber 1938, AICC P 3/1938. Tht! Madras Premier ~s also particul.arly sensitive about the MlppUa area of Mal.abar. On learning that Jayaprakaah ltflS due to tour the area he urged Nehru to persuade SooJalJ.sta not to go there as ".... there is a supers-tition thtlt once in a number of years there 1a an upriSing amongst the Mopl.aha•. Nehru informed Jayaprakash about m•s anxieties
17()
A politicisation of the services would in CR 's view impair
their amenab111ty to carrying out Congress policy. ~s, in
september 1937' 'lben L1n11thgow --.s due to tour Madras Presi
dency am the Congress threatened t 0 boycott the twr' m pro
tested to Nehru, explaining that such an action might alieBlte
the services whose aid (the implementation of the prohibition
policy was specified) would be needed for implementation of the 24 Congress programme. lJiter, differences arose again betW?en
t.~e mdras Premier and Nehru on the issue of enrolment of Govern-~ .
ment officers as members of tae Caogress. m had the legislature
party issue a directive forbidding enrolment Of COlli~ess members
"by or among government servants alX1 loOll body emplo-
eont•d •• ! .n. 23
but advised him to do as he wished. Earlier he had told Rajagopalac!J=lri that, if anything, Jayaprakash 1s visit ·...rould soothe ai'fairs as " • • • in t~~is respect he is tmlike Batliwala and others ••• " CR to Nehru, 12 September 1937, CR 1~. Roll 2; Nenru to CR, 25 september 1937, ibid.; Nehru to Jayaprakash, 23 September 1937, AICC P3/1937. It is also worth noting that CR ag.c'eed wittl EltaH:ine that, while the Moplah Outrages Act had been repl,~~~. •the necessity ot· naintaini.ng good communica tiona arxi means of quick transport .facilities is obvious especially when -have to justify our policy o:.t: trust without relaxing e!:tic!ency of Government in the preservation at public security •" 'I'O Yaku'b Hassan. Minister of f\.ibl.ic Works, 25 september 1937. The context ,.as Hassan 'a saying U.t tile roe.d.s in the Mlppil.a area wou.l.d no longer have a strategic importame, a statement which had worried Erskine. FS Governor o£ Madras to at, 25 September 1937, 1akub Haasan to ~ 26 September, CR ~ Erskine, 27 November, CR Ms. F.S/23.
24 CR to Nehru, 21 September 1937t ~ Ms. Roll. 2J AICC P.L. 3/1938. Nehru pointed cut the danger of such an approach invi tir.g compromise. on lareer issues. 'I o ffi, 2r/ September 19}7, CR Ms. Roll 2; AICC, P.L. 3/1938.
.25 yees •••
177
CR explained to Nehru that the services would be
demoralised if they were mobilised while the Congress \1B.S in
power. 26
For Nehru, the controversy again raised the issue o! the
source o! authority. He considered that CR's action bid in
fringed the authority of the fCC by giving directtves in an area
traditionally under its jurisdiction.27 He noted t:tat "••• not
only the PCC should c '1tinue to .ftmction independently but should
also take the initiative in C<ngress uattera... Congressmen
shruld .feel that the Provincial Congress CoDJnittee is a more
vital organ of theirs than the frovincial Government.•
Nehru bid accurately pinpointed the changes m -'& tz-ying
!or. As we have pointed out 1n the ccntext of Munshi •s concep
tions, there -was a slippage from the pragnatic imperatives of
relating to the services (to enable the Congress programme to
be implemented) to a view o~ how state power had to be wielded.
This ideal conception- in which the services would be li.t'ted out
of politics - did ho\..ever inhabit a strategic realm. The bureau-
25 Statement by J. &lbrahnanyam, Assistant Secretary Madras Congress Legisl.ature P&rtr.r on betalt ~ CR. 13 september 1937, AICC P.L. 3/1938. CR had a silllilar attitude to goverl'llllnt teachers participating in elections. at to Patel, 16 August 1939, Ql Ms. Roll 2. See also Minister o.f Education to CR 29 September 1939, CR MB. Roll 4.
26 CR to Nehru, n.d. AICC P.L. 3/19.38.
27 Nehru to CRl1 October 1937. He also noted to Sitaraayya that t was not the !unction o~ the Legislature Party to issue instructions to Congress C0111ni ttees. 1 October 1937 • AICC PL. 3/1938.
178
cracy would be inveigled into nationalist hegemony not by poli
tical appeals but through the inculcation of the belief that
the Qlngress bad accepted their 1Dviol.ability. Political appeals
were riakyJ they coul.d alienate the services, preventing them
.troa developing what the consti'bltionaliats desired to incul.•
cate in them - a sense of professional neutral! ty. In terms of
Ccngress authority this would necessitate a shllt ali!Ely from the
PCC - an extra-parliamentary farue.tion, labituated. to extra
constitutional modes of action, am tbere.tore liable to di.ti:use
the emphasia desired to be placed by the .minister!allsta on
constituted authority - to the minJ.stry. In theoretical terms
the line of traDsf~tion my be posed 1n the foll.owing waya
previously the Congress had the character !sties of a movement
opposed to the state, and, as a result, it tended to perform
certain counter-state functions through institutions such as
thanas; panchayats etc. Now these functions :W.d to be sep:1rated
from the party, and to be pl.aced .tirmly in the domain of the
state. In the process the functionaries of the state would be
stripped of theA£ pol.itics, their all.egiance to the Raj, and
their ant1-mt1ona.l1st .feeling, far natiomlism wOUld no .longer
pose aa a rival to their tunctions. In CR •s scheme the CODgress
must now appear to them as one of a host of parties trying for .
l.egitilate governmental authority, but no longer a party threa-
tening to overturn the basic procedures and institut1Clll8 on
which that authority was .founded. In .fact the Congress, 1n
at •a view• had to be seen as distinct an exactly these growxls 1
Wbl t ob~ections can be raised to a 'ustice
17~)
Ministry enrolling members that way apply to Congress enrol.ment also, so long as the Congress is engaged in elections .28 (sic).
On occe.sion' this separation o! government and state was ambi
gurusly posed. In an argument relating to how the changes a
Congress government would D:t.ke - especially at the level of the
state structure - would be transient as these coold be reversed
in the wake of Congress leaving office, the possible reasons for
such an eventuality included deadlock, imperialist forces and
also
if the electorate displaces us in the normal course ex hypothese, another Government will be in power which wlll be mar~ popular than ourael ves .29
This should be seen not as a distinct political possillility,
conforming to the strategy of the 1935 Act, but rather as deuar
cating the transience of governments 1n relation to the state.
Evidently, it \tJB.S not expected that there could be such a deve
lopment, only that in the ideal polity of CR 's imagination, such
an inviolability af the state wouJ.d be ~racteristic.
However, this did not mean t~t the state as it existed
satis£ied the new political conditions in their entirety. The
requirements of parliamentary rule required moclificatialS 1n the
the legal terms of reference • This is lllustrated by the contro
versy over the Madraa Premier's use of the Cr1minal Law Amend
ment Act against anti-Hindi picketers. In response to Patel's
advice that he adopt other means to handle the situation in the
28 Statement by J. SUbrahmanyam, Assistant secretary Madras Congress LegiSlature Party, em bahal..t of CR., op.cit.
29 CR to Nehru. 28 September 1937, CR Ms. Roll 2.
180
face o! mounting criticism inside and outside the Cangress, 30
CR3 1 noted the impracti~lity of using the penal code against
the picketers, as also the sections pertaining to aediticm or
class hatred. While the last option would be "quite just!iied
c:n the basis of the shouts and demonstrations, ••• it would be
impracticable for government to sanction a prosecution every
day spectiically for each case, as this w.ould be necessary for
action under 153(a)". Practical issues apart, what he then
made was a distinction between "government by bureeucracy" am
"government by ministers under parliamentary·insti tutions•. The
clause in the Penal Code which came closest to being applicable
to the current case, tnlt concerning obstruction and annoyance
to public servants, could be used under former conditicms, but
not under parliamentary in.stituticns. For the protection af
these, which at noted \<JaS the object of the lllhole exercise,
there could be an ·amendment of the Penal Code and the Criminal
Procedure Code 0 to protect parliamentary institutions against
vulgar attacks," but this would immediately be called a repres
sive measure. 'lbus his decision to selectively use the Crimi
ral Law Amendment Act.
However, it a selective reorientation o~ the state WlS
required to suit new political conditions, there were other
institutions which WOUld be carried over if, theoretically at
least, for a d~erent purpose. So, of his continued use of
the c.I.D., CR 'AElS reported to have said that it was i.Mi.spen-
30 Patel to CR, 14 August 1938, CR Ms • Roll 2.
31 CR to RaJendra Praaad. 28 August 19381 1b14.
181
sable for any government and wh3. t mattered v.e.s how it -was
used.32 In this context, perhaps CR was just being more forth
right about h1a pr1~ities vis-a-vis dissidence and anti-state
tendencies such as represented by the COJllllunists am. social1sta
than other Right-Wing Congressmen ,ere as yet prepared to be. 33
Perhaps in fact he ~s bringing the Ccngress to an awareness o!
the procedures of most modern states, irrespective of their
ideological proclivities. HOl-JeVer, on one issue, CR displayed '
an authoritarian viewpQint 1n his argument for continuities in
the organisation of the state that 'W8.S s1ngular amcngst Right
Wing Congressmen.
In the d1Scus~1on of the Congress objective of the sepa
ration of judicial and executive !unctions of government, the
crucial parts o.f CR •s opposi tian shi.fted between a tactical and
an ideological rationale. From a tactical viewpoint he noted
that sessions judges and British elements in the High Court had
vast pCMers. At present the District Magistrates were unier the
Ministry, but with a separation of juiicial and executive func
tions those offioers wouJ.d come under the sessions judge and the
32 NamboocU.r1pad to Nehru. 22 OCtober 1937 cpoting a statement by m re_l>orted in M~mu of 22 September 1937, AICC P .L. 18/1937. Regi reporting of charges that CR -a using the CID to shadow CoDgressmen and had unjust~iab1y.used section 124A IPC (Pt:ltel to CR 4 November 1937)1 at ~ied "••• the compl.aints are quite ~ong • .12 ~be eft!nt S Fo ~·no foound for ~omDefftl• A great eai~ oP~, 6oveiilber 19 r, • Roll 3, Emphaaia added. This WOUld tend to corroborate tba attitu:le reported by The Hirxlu,
33 See Fatel 's concern about the use of the c.I.n., f .n. 22 above.
182
Chie! Justice and "all the power we have secured for demoCracy
in regard to the policy and the administration of justice wi.ll
be lost and we shall .tind tHlt we are powerless to help the
people or to carry cut our policies whenever the cr1mi.nal law
comes in.•31+ •'lhe Judiciary will becaDe the stronghold just aa
the Executive was before of .foreign domination". 35
However, this 'ltt8S only one moment in t~ discussion. The
argument shi.fted gear to present an ideal ·- · s ion in which the
judiciary and the executive woul.d fuse with each other and ex
chan&~ characteristicsa
Tb!t Magistracy must have the power to control the police otherwise than by passing~ judiements 1n oases. '1'he power to decide cases 1.t divested :tran the power to control investigation and prosecution will. result only 1n two separate watertight compartments. The policemen will take orders from a dU.terent set of people and there will be conflict at the top and no coordination below. There will be no wholeS(JUe fear in the Llind of the police. The present prejudices are due to the fact tr~t the executive has hitherto been all al.ong against the popular will. With the identification of the people 1 s interest with the executive 1 t wUl be an advantage to have the Digis~ in conti-nual touch with ~e_peop].e. .e. w1 th the Government R. V,J. ~ co ol is possibl.e unless the magistrate 1a in touch with police am is al.so a'bl.e to decide the caae... o ce ome m -
r nves r
a
34 CR to Nehru, 28 September 1937, rn. Ms. Roll 2.
35 CR to al.l Congress Premiers, 3 September 1937, m ~. Rol.l. 3.
CR. to Nehru, 28 September 1937, op.cit. Emphasis added.
183
In other words "it is not the police admin1sti1ltion which
will dominate over the Digistracy hereafter. it wUl be the
other \lilly about al¥1 the Dllgiatracy wUl purity and liberalise
the police.•37 This would be possible because the magistracy,
hitherto arbitrary and repressive in ita unaccountable acticms,
would now be def'ined by a greater sense of social interest, as
it would nO\>r be governed by a ministry founded on a popular
ma:n.0.c·- +<,, and re:fJ.ectine p orular needs • W 1 th striking clarity,
~ SUl!'llled up his position in the following benevolent-dictato
rial imagesa
This essentially authoritarian perception nevertheless
points out the case of Ol. •s pol.itics as a strategy for power.
The provincial government for him ~s to be the fortress from
the natio~list struggle would now be li!Elged. I! the state -s to
37 CR to Ritel, 12 October 1937, CR Ms. Roll 3.
38 CR to Nehru, 28 September, op.cit. Emphasis added. The other minor reasons CR pra.Cerred for not separating judicial and executive !unctions included the argument that changes ot this order would be reversed after Congress left offices and that the policy wa.U.cl prove too expensive to UDiertake. Ibid. See also CR to Patel for· the emplasis on control, 12 October 1937. CR Ms • Roll 3. Patel claiatd to see CR 'a point, rut 'IIIElS worried as to whether he would be abl.e to convince nour people in the AICC or even in the we about the soundness of ya.Jr policy, which .Ls so viol.entl.y contra!l to our consistent acl continua.LB agitation in the matter • Pate1 to at, 16 October 1937, ibid.
be tmchallenged from w1 thout, it WlS to be increasingly control
led from within. The crux of CR 'a objective WiS to bend the
state to the dictates at pop~ government. As a result much
of hia energies were spent in ensuring that the apparatus of
governaent oOUl.d not function outside his ken. And his plan
alSo entailed that those institutions which were not constitu
tionally bound to e.cknowlerlee the ministry's priiTilcy should be
made to toe the line.
It can in fact be observed that the moments at llhich
L!nli thgow or Erskine , .. ~re woiTied. a bout CR 's stability as pre
mier were over issues of control pertaining to the relations
between the servi~s and the ministry. Salary reduction. part
o.f general Congress policy, 'ISS a recurrent point o£ tensicn in
this context. CR. had been persuaded by Erskine that pay-cuts
should not effect those currently in service i.e. those in
service before 1 April 1937 {the date of the tne.uguration o£
the 1935 Act) and those promoted to service before 1 October
1937 (the budget spee~~ having been made in September). The
achievement of this agreement had not been free of con!lict
however. The ministers initially proposed a pay reduction to
t:t» new level for incumbents as well• a proposal which contained
a (subsequently dropped) threat of resignation 1£ the demal'Ji was
not aecepted. - The European members at the service \018re also
covered by this demand, though CR had at :first exempted them
£rom the cut. But• probably understarding that the colcnial
government would be adamant on this issue, the ministers with-
18S
drew the demand and did not send the letter.39
However, con!lict over this iaaue re-emerged in 1939,
when CR sent a mmore.ndum ooncernirlg pe.y-cu't ot members ot the
AU-India Services, whose position _,. protected by the 1935
Act. Simultaneously a cut in the pay ot provincial and aubar
dimte services t.~Bs also proposed.4o To underline the signi.fi
cance o:f ministerial control, CR also insisted that only those
o1'ficers showing 0 spec1al energy "~ efficiency• be eligible 4" !or specJal additional pensions. 't When the proposal ,.. tur-
·- ·- ....
ned down, CR 1s sense of outrage indicates the priority he had
given to extending the space of miniBterial control into the
domain protected by the Secretary of State. He considered the
latter's attitude to. be an •outrageous form at protectioo."42
and as showing th&t the phre.se -secretary of S'blte ·. officers
was not merely a technical financial phrase, but "one denoting
the very direct ~nagement that is claimed by the Secretary of
state in provincial matters•.43
This emphasis on curtaUing extra-ministerial authority
is Ulustrated again by m •a oppositioo. to the functioning of
39 Erskine to Linlithgow, ·17 November 193~ 14 December 1937, 18 December 1937. Erskine Ms. Bur. D 6/2.
40 Erald.ne to CR, 9 February 1939. CR Ms. r. 8/23.
41 a\ to Erskine, 10 February 1939, ibid.
42 CR 'to Erskine, ibid.
43 CR to Erskine, 23 February 1939. ibid.
186
agencies such as the Central Intelligence Bureau44 ani in his
attempt to ensure that the High Court Judges, to whose indepen
dence we have already noted his antagonism, would be eZZe cti wly
nanjna ted by h1m.45
That tor CR Ccmgress provincial governments were now the
critical centres of nationalist power is best illustrated by the_
way CR related to various aspects o:! procedural relaticns between
levels at the power structure umer the 1935 Act. Regarding
the issue o~ matters relating to the aJ.l-IncUa Services, the ~
constitutional procedure ,.,as tor the Provine.ial GovernmentLseo-
retary to the Gover-.oor-Genero.l, trom where it would pass on to
the Secretary Qf State. As, at an intermediary stage, this
correspondence was !nevi tably referred to releV'dnt departments
in the Government at India, (]{ had allowed a short-circuiting
of this procedure on one ocoasion am the correspondence relat-
44 •The provincial governments are completely responsible far law and order in their jurisdiction. The Central Intelligence Bureau 1s incompatible in principle as -well as practice with the position of the provincial government wner ~~e constitution. No police agency of any kind should work in this province except UDier the control and direoti on of tr..a I .G. and the Government o£ the province. The Central an-eau staU is as wmecessary in practice aa objectiombl.e in princip].e.• Nol;e on Central Intelligence B\reau by c.a •• n.d., ib14.
45 •I do not think it is too great a claim for tbl provincial government to desire that ln such appo:lnt.menta I should have a aay thrOUgh your:" ExceUency and 1n the most confidential form. There 1s a growing antipatlly between the Higb Court. and the Provinc.tal governments in aU the provinces which, I hopei ahouJ.d be prevented before it becomes too pralOUDCeil. CR to ErsklDa, 25 September 1938, ibid. See also CR to Erskine, 25 July 1939. ibid., for CR 's dissatisfaction with the .functioning of Ghief Justice !Jlkahlllam Rao• in his lenient hand1ing of labour cases and llba't CR believed -.a an ~ment o:f the do•ln o~ the
- Executive• who alone. I beUew, have the materials to judge aDd. extend clemency. •
187
1ng to individual officers' oases had been addressed directly
to ~· departments o.f the Government of India far practical
o~nience. 46 Hove~, al bad ob~ected to a proposal to ameDd
the procedure, and his reasons are illuminating. IUa ob3eCt1on
to the Government of India 1nterced1Dg _. not in relation to
the present circumstances, but in terms of_ the !u~, structure,
under Federation. He noted t}jat !or a Government canposed a!
Ministers 1n the Government o:f India to deal with such provin
cial caaea -.a an undesJ.rabl.e centralisation of discipl.ine and
control and it could lead to dif!icul ties in resisting the
Government view on any l!lltter. He felt that ministers !uncticn-,
illg 1n the Governme_nt o.f Ind.Ja uooer the Act might be inclined
to encroach on the :domain o:f the provinces. 4 7
Th13 poeition gives us insight int" the basic refarmula-'
tion of nationalist strategy that at envisaged. He, like the
Gandh1an Right, hoped for a democratisation of States' represen
tation with a view to securing a Congress majority in the pro
jected Federal. Government and thus subverting the colonial
governmeiit •s hopes of inatal.~ing a substantial. conservative bloc
in 1be Federal Logisl.ature.48 . In his arguments agaiDst amemlq
procedural. relaticns between the provincial. gowrnmeut and. the
Government ~ India, bOiievar, tbere is suggested a clitferelrt
att11uda, \llbich may be interpreted in oo.e at two ,.,.ys. Firatly,
46 Erskine to at, 21 June 1939, ibid.
47 CR to Ernkine, 1 July '!939. ibid.
48 Far tbe probl.cms o! the Federal. acbeme am the Congress · attitude, sect below, Cbapter 4.
188
he was prepared to conceive o:t a Federal Government in which
such a COllgl'ess presence was nat possible, and within which
framework the autcmomy ~ the prcw1Do1al GoY8rDilent, oontimdna
bastian ot Dltianaliat power in oonstitutionallat strategy,
would ba- to be d~end8d. Secoally ~ nen U a Congress aa~o
rity regime could come into being, it 1s possible that the argu
ment for preservation of autonomy wrul.d persist, given the finan
cial and political restricticns tlat the 1935 Act enshrined.
E11her way, the a.ssl.l!Dption v~s that the Federation scheme
could come into being. This 'W'!ls a singular position. Erskine
had noted tlilt aver the question of amending the procedural. rela-. J ~~
t1oosh1p between~ .i'rovincJ.al Gowr!'lP-nt and the Government ot
India• the ot..~er provinces had been ame~ble.49 we riS.y inter
pret this to mean that whlle CR •s opposition was rala ted to the
lang-run significance o:f the ministries, even in new, politically
inimical circumstances, for others these institutions, am the
1935 Act itself, did not ~ve such signtlicBnoe.
'rhis anal.ysis ms attempted to show the inner conaistency
a£ CR'a strategy, a pattern through which all the chargee level
led against his attitudes am policies can be explaJned. illteg
ral.ly. The· acceptance that the Federation scheJDe ooul.d be
implemented was one .turther moment 1n this strategy • Par the #
strategy •a pz"emi.sed en the conviction tblt the constitutiozal
.tra.mewark• 1.t operated with pQlitt.cal aCUDen, would al.low for a
growth 1n the hegecony o£ mt1onal.1Bm. '1be centres ot power,
the ministries, would consolidate infl.uence ewer the state appa-
18~}
ratus by firm control, opposition to extra provincial authcrity
(in the !om o! the all-India services am the Judiciary}, and,
in pO:U. tical terms the most ca-1g1nel feature, by curtaU1Dg
extra parliaMntary author1 ty and. therefore undercutting ccaWD
tioml :natioaaliat rivalry with 'the functions of tba state. Wblt
was sOUght here was a depoliticisatian of the state apJ;&:re.tua.
The authority of its functions ,.e.s guaranteed in order t~t it
accepted a non-political space unrelated not only to political
parties, but to the Ra~ - over which ODl.y the aove:rm.ut curren
tly in power, be it Congress or any ather party, cOUld exercise
sway. However, once attention li8S rcdocuaed on to parliamen
tary power, wbit ,.,uld the mechanism at change be, whereby
mtionalist authority could be exterxled beyo:al the domain of
provincial rule? While this is nowhere specifically stated, it
would appear that the elections would fulfil this. function. In
CR 'a percept! an the constitution would remain, and so it woul.d
seem that natiou:Llist power, built on the new foundations of
adjustment with a neutralised state form, a curbing at destabi
lizing extra-legal fonDS, and a constructive legislature, vould
emphasize ita authority through renewed •mates. And we •Y
speculate that with such .an expression ~ popul.ar infl"*lce and
discipline, CR would hope for a reviSicm - perblps by conven
tion 1111t1ally, later by conatituticmal. change - of the cousti
tutional. position. All tbia WOUld re~~&1D within the fiel.d ot
cons t1 tutionali ty, as is 1m1cated. by his col.Dltenancing of even
an inJmical Federal Government. In such an eventual.ity, nationa
lia~ strength in the provincial governments would press do-.n en
such unrepreaentati.va poUt1cal. at:ructurea ..
190
Ho,.,ever, while a unity a£ perspective and strategy may
be established in this 'lliy, its effectiveness is open to ques
tion. For, as .tar aa Cl\ 1 a bid to c<mtrol extra-mSnSaterial
iD:nuences (of the all•IndJa service a and the Ju11c.lary) ~·
cCDCernad, he ,_. not aucce~ul. ln both instances, the autho
rity of the Secretary o! State ll88 cited and the Madras Premier
ll.as helpless •50 AS for his strategy vis-a.-vis the services,
while cushioning them against criticism and attacks might indeed
haw reduced antagonism, 1 t need not lave affected the political
balance 1n favour o£ the Congress.
This is underlined by the fact that the third element ot
ca•s strategy,- to Which a reassurance ~ the services l!IEls inte
gnilly related, that of curbing extra-parliamentary authority,
could not be successfully oaiT1ed through. T~s w:t.s i.nSpite ~
CR 'a beat e.f.totts to suppress al.l such 1n1 tia ti ves. In the next
sectiQil1 we shal.l examine aspects o.f the dynamics of such action.
and see what impllcatims these had 1n the political. situaticm.
3.1.2 populer Moyepents
Rajagopalacbarl's model for tbe Congress Minlatriea •• o.t
course an ideal. conatruct. His desire to_ neutralise extra-ccns
tituticmal tendencies, thougb whole-heartedly pursued, lll88 not a
complete aucc~aa. I.t anything, tmrest 1n Mala bar aDd coastal
50 on the queation of High CcNl't appointments, aee EraJd.Da to CR, 23 October 19391 CR MI. r • 8/23J .tor tbe Central. Intorm9.ticm Bul-eau, Erald.ne to CR, 16 September 1938, ibid.J for the _Secretary o£ state aver-riding recommendaticms by CR al:Jli.nst special. add.i.tional pension being granted for the services in all caaea, at to Erald.ne • 10 february 1939. ibid.
1Dl
AIXibra ,.s of a more sustained and p~rful nature than anything
that had taken place between 1934 am 1937.
on the other ~. Tamilmdu itael! -· largely quiescent
on the agrarian !rom.51 Tbl domiDant UDrest o! the time arose
in reaction against tbe Madras Mlniatry 1s attempt to .mtroduca
Hindi into the School.s.52 In turn the overall mil.dness 1n this
province was expressed in the amenability ~ the Congress orf!11-
n1sation itself t - the dictates of the Ministry .53 That the
relaticmship between the provincial organisation. and the Miniatry
~s very important in the development ~ popular unrest wUl be
demonstrated in the di!.terent experiences o:t the Andbra am
Malabar cases. '
(i) Apdhra
In a summary of the agrarian struggl.es of this period•
N.G. Ranga draws oar attention to the significant detail tblt
in the Mur»lgala Satyagraha in Krishna District, leadership 1118.8
undertaken by the DCC and that in the Kalipatnam Satyagraha at
West Godavari District, the Tal.uka Cang1'8SS Coamittee President,
Ramany • took up the peasant cause. 54
51
52
53
54
A _ProYi.DcJal 'l'am11nadu Kisan Organ181ng Ccmaittee ~· only set up in late 1938 and tbe :tirat provincial ootrf;~~t~~J. ,aa cmJ.y held on 30 December 1938. All India K1aan Bulletin (barea.tter AiltB)• 11 November 1938 and 13 J'81Ulry 1939• tajnlk JIIJ. F. No. 8( 1) • However labour unrest. which we are not dealing v1 tht did taka pl.a~, tmder the Congnasa Ministry.
See above1 . secticn 1.1., 1n the context o:f CR •s use of the ~iminal. Law Amendment Act.
See above• Sectian ,.1.1.
Andhra lt1aan S'truggl.ea. YajDik PBS. F. No~ 1. For tbe
Like other post-depression struggl.es \ta6ged on :z.amindari
territory, these two cases revolved around the retrieval o!
land that teranta bad been evicted froa.55 Tezant direat action
1n occupation and cul.tivation ~ the contested land led to ·
severe ,re~aaicm by the pollee am adminJstrationa eectica 144,
preventing access to caiiDU1ll!ll laMa, grazing fields, tanks, wlls
and the contested private plots, .as imposed, leading to a large
number of prosecutions. 56 ·
COD.'t '4 • .• f _n • 54 West K.f.stna DCC leadership of the Munaga]S. S'tntggl.ea also see AID. 28 C:Ctober 1938, Na.tioml iron'k• I, 31, 30 October 1938, p. 11 •
55 Both movement.a bad lcag histories • Unrest on tbe Mlnagala estate bad ~ken place over the previous two decades and bad secureo.- the attenticn of T. Prakasam and Biawanatb Daa whO were to become Ministers under the Congress Ministries of Madras' and Orissa. The West Kistna DCC bid been central in carry~ on propaganda and had published a repcrt em the tenants' grievances. 'lbe intensity o£ the recent struggle ~~s attributed to the involvement of the Socialista and the Ryots Associatic:m. The H;tnu, 10 June 1939, p. a. The first reports of unrest on t e Estate related · to Zamimar atrocities against tenants !or organising themselves. AIKB, 2 September 1938, Yajnik IrS F. B(i). Thereafter the unrest ....,e.s directed &Slinst attempts at evictim by court decree. AIKB, 28 October 1938. ibid.
In 'the Kalipatmm Zamindari, lilnlaapur Talulca ot wes-t Goda~1 District, in 1925, the zamindar !Bd a~ed to give tenan-t rights in exchange far tbe ssanta giving~ their cuatOIIEll"y fiahiDg righta and clear the :forest. n. coDdJ.tion .as that the raiyats ahoul petition the GovernmaD\ tor irrigation facilities !or the lam. Ho.ever,. cmce these tac111tlea come through the Z8JD1ndar infringed tne agreeJDent and started sell1Dg up the lAnd to cutsldera. He then pl"OOdcs.cl to .!il.e suits against the peasants for forcible cultivation of lands he ~irlec:l to be h1.a ovn. Pe Sundarayya 'a account, ADa: ~1 .... 14 Q)tober 1938 in.,., - Ia..~~ 16 Ootober 19~ P• 11! aDi K.s. r c ngrn; Against Ejection", ~t onal Front, II, +, 26 March 1939, P• 114.
l'or ~~tmm AIKB, 2 ·Sflptember 19381 Ya3Dik 16. F. 8(1) am · na •s acQOunt. ,.ci-t., K..s. Murthy, op.clt. 'lbt HUJ.'Jl• 9 Mlrch.- P• 13, 1 Mlrch, P• 17. Fer Jtmagala,
193
Inspite ot repression both estates witnessed a signifi
cant duraticm o! struggle, lasting for about a year trom mid•
1938 to llld-1939· 1he persistence ot peaaant init.:lativea am the
invca.vement o:t local Ccmgreeamen -de mediation by the provinc.tal
committee iDIYitable. In the Mulagala case G. Brahma rJa, aeuraJ. secretary ot the ~. arbitrated in the matter in December
1938. lhis procedure was decided on by an infor~l. conference
of local aclmin1strators, police ofticials, C c;~ ~essmen, District
Ryot Association leaders and the lanilord 's son and valdl.. A
settlement WlS arrived at57 llhereby it -.s agreed that ' 1beti1
{forced labour) be stopped, that Ulegally confiscated houses
and other proprie~s be returned, tbilt rigbt at way to tanka
and wells and also to the neighbouring villages be reinstated am that promissory notes .forcibly taken trca Kisan for sums not
paid be cancelled. In return the peaaanta were to pay reduced
rent.58
Hawver, conflict reCUITed with the tenants claSmng tbat
the J.andl.ord. has not fulled his side ot the agreement.59 They
re:fused to pay rent, inspite of Blahmayya 'a insistence that this
Cont 1d. • ~ .n. 56 '
57
58
59
AID, 11 Honmber 19~J .o,, a. I, 39! 13 Novs'ber 1938J AID. 9 .7\me 19~ 2 UDe ~ YaJDik MS F • 15J RaDga 'a nate n.d. (probabl.e May-JUDe 1939) 18.jn1Jc Ml F. 14; }ll Nal~ 6 J~, P• 10, 7 June P• 11, 9 Ju;taP• 2J 10 unet P• • In 1:!le secorJi phase of the MuD& satyagraha,
ati!x sentences such aa 6 llOil'tha R.I. and as. 100 tiDII ware meted out to the satyagrahis. 1he B>u. 16 JUDe 1939, p.1o.
The Ministry bad a representative in A. Kales-.ra Rao Chie.t Parliamentary Secretary. 'lb:t local Congressmen were be President and the Secretary o.t the west K:Lsta DCC, p. Bapa."1'1& aDd K. VeDlratarama~ Jb' QtMu. 10 June 1939• P• 8. Note by fteD&a. • n.4. (prObalala May-June 19:!'9). Ta3Jalk *• F. 14f lfa4rie 'iR ( 1) Juae 1939• · Ibid•• AIKB, 9 June 1939, Yajnik ~. F. 14J Madras FR(1)
-a necessary for the agreement to be implemented. Aa a result,
the General Secretary of the R::C deal.ared that arbitration :tad
fa1led.60 Tension mounted over l.and. occupied by one Papayya 1n
1930 vbich .as now in the landlord's possesa1on.61
Satyagraha was offered systematically with volunteers
being sent every day and within less thln a •* acme 140 ryota
had been arrested.62 The police action 'tlhich involved brutal
lathi charges63 \VEiS publicly revUed in meetings throughout the
province ')n 11 June, 64 as were reported acts a£ brutality in the
jaUs in Wich thG satyagrahis tad been cons1gt'ed65 and the
large-scale confiscation of cattle tl':at took pl.ace for arrears
of rent.66
Cont •d •• f .n. 59 M:ly 1939.
60
61
62
63
64 65
66
In the subsequent Government review of the issue, it ,.as ctarged t~t it was the socialists who had stirred up unrest, resulting in nan..payment of rent ani social boycott of estate officials. Local of:ficials ~&;~c.( by the PCC General Secretary b!v-i·~cV to get the peasants to l\t.gotia te on the basis of· the earlier settl.ement, but they said that they did not mind if the agreement was emed, am so Brahmayya made his decl.aratian that arbitration had .faUed. Madras FR( 1}, June 1939.
AIKB, 23 June 19391 Yajnik MSS. F. 15J Range. 's note, ibid.
Yipdy• 6 June.! P• 10. 7 Jl.Ule, P• 11 .. 9 June• P• 2 and 10 UDa1 P• s. :rbese vere the i1unber o~ satyagrahis. Tbe
number at tenants present was estimated at 1000. AIKB, 23 JUDe 1939• Yajnik MS. F. 15.
AID. 23 June, ibid•J ~'it¥• 6 Jamuu-y1 P• 10. According to the of!1c1al.s 1 the a charge took plJice when the poJ.ice tried to remove iJDpl.ementa and the crowd rushed them. Madras FR (1)• June 1939. AIICBt 23 Jwte 1939, ibid. Ibid.
Ibid.
By mid-year both the Kalipatnam and Munagala satyagrahas
were withdrawn on the basis o! assurances tW.t the HinLstry and
the .PCC WOUld mediate and resolve the tenants' grievances. Si ta
raaayya urged the stopping of the ICalipatnam struggle in March,
promiairlg 1nter¥ent1CI1 after his return from the Tr1pur1 Cong
ress 67 am Prakasam made similar promises shortly after. 68 The
Govenunent ordered. the collector and one representative each of
the zamindars and villagers to ho1d an enquiry. As no f\.U"tber
disturbances were expected tbe government wleased those convic
ted and withdrew any pending prosecutions. 69 Ho'A!eVer, the con
flict \\.8.8 revived, with the Zamindar claiming Ulat the tenants
were continuing to Lnvac.e his property. 70 '
In the Munagala case the F-!inistry urged the DiStrict Magis
trate to take firm action with the satyagrahis, though it was
noted that as far as possible forceful dispersal o! the crowds
should be avoided. 71 Prakasam ted the impot.UXied cattle rel.eased,
advised the peasants not to be carried a-y by ill-considered
67 Hindu, 9 March 1939, P• 13.
68 !Rid, 11 March 1939, p. 17.
69 l'tldras m (2) !tlrch and FR(1) April 1939. The ADlbra ProvinOJal Rpota Association Leaders K. satyaDatbayana KJrthy ani Vasude'V8 Rao appreciated the Government's act in vithdrawin8 caaas, and only complained about the appointment ot the DJ.strict Collector to nake the prel1mi,mry enquiry. They asked the Government to act on the basis o! the repcrt to be submitted by n. Narayanaraju of the w. Godavari na: K. Satyanatbay&Da ft.lrthy and VasUieva Rao to CR, 30 l'Brch 1939. CR M:J. Rol.l 6.
70 Sitarannyya. to CR, 20 July 1939, ibid.
71 Madras FR (1), June 1939.
18\)
advice but to abide by the law", and reasstred them tblt the
Zamindari bill he ~s drai:ting woul.d solve their problems. 72
Ranga a1 the other hand had the objective of a.tta1n1ng certain
concrete goals, such as having the M.ullgala estate taken under
the Court ot wards for miaDlDlgement am threatened further
milita:rx:y in the .face of government obduracy. ?3 He noted that
the Government was bent upon a .fight and that the ryots would
accept the challenge74 but then tmexpectedC'{· tacked down, accep
ted the Government's terms, and even seemed ·to register that no
swift solution could be arrived at. This is indicated by the
statexrent made by him an behalf Of the Provi.ncial Ryots' Asso
ciation suspending Satyagre.ha s
72
73
74
75
The present suspe11..sion o.f satyagraha • ••• is specially intended to enable the Government to review the special circumstances· a! the peopl.e of f.lmagala, the conduct of the 1 ocal authorities during the last three weeks and the utter incapacity o.f most of the ryots to pay any more rent arrears. It is also intended to help the Government to get into touch with the local. authorities am look into the relevant records in the collectorate and District Police Staticn and ascertain through suc..ll records 'Whether under the administration of the present zamindar •••• then 1s any real likelihood o:f the re-establishment o! peace and tranqul!tity in 'the estate. I do seriously hope tl:fit the Ministry will genu1ne1y res~ to this gesture of the Ryots Association. 75
Hjpdu,. 19 June 1939, P• 10.
Rar~a to Yajnikt 15 June 19391 Yajnik I--IS. F • 14. Ranga 'a stawment in~ 15 June 1~39, P• 111 the suggestion was rejectP.d "fiY\:R who urged that norma oc:Diitions be restored and t~t the tenants depend on the cOW'"ts or an the award already given to resolve ·tre conflict. Hind'.:\• 16 June 1939.
In 1rlct be expected 'to be arrested am asked !ajnik to come dovn to Munagal.& in that eventual:tty. To Ya~ik, 15 June 1936. Yajnik MS. F. 14. Hindu, 19 June 1939, P• 10.
197
In addition the Ryots Association told the peasants who
were capable ~ paying rent to do soa however it also advised
that those whO could not pay should insist on remission till
the following year and should strive .tor such remission. 76 ·
Cl.early, a pe.as1ve p~s• had been !Daugurated UDder the
duress of repression arvi lack o£ su:cess. 'lw'hile Ranga bad l!IBXed
elOQ.uent in his militancy over the previous days, it seems t}?at
his coD n.agues in the district were not so sanguine about the
possibilities of continued militanoy,77
lio•,.oJewr, the Munagala dispute 1n !act continued after the
Con.c_~ess cirdstry resigned, ins pi te o.f an intermediary settle
ment which o.tf1c1aJ.45 declared very generous. 78 So both of the '
major land struggles of the period exhibited similar patterns,
suggesting that· the cont'licts at their core were not likely to
be resol.ved by short term adjustments.
If· Rajagopal.achari 's ideal of the State functioning to
peacefully redress disputes -....as not real.! sed beoause of the
intransigent nature o.f the conflicts that developed there were
other cechanisms at Uind which could be used. to neutral.i.se extra-
constitutional action. At the ISlhi. AICC Of September 1938 a
reaol.utian criticising Congressmen who employed vio1ent methoda
76 Ibid.
T1 So while Ranga had noted to Yajnik that he bad exhausted all means of getting conciliation !rom the GovermDent am that the Provincial Kisan Canmittee would decide to take up the fight• his co~des asked him to 11carry an work, develop strene,--th"• till the Government was forced to arrest hie. To Yajnik, 16 June, Yajnik MS. F. 14.
78 Madras FR(1 }, November 19391 FR(2), December 1939.
198
was proposed by Gandhi and passed 79 and significantly one o:f
Gardhi 's re:ferences in this context was to a DCC urging pea
sants to take zaminrlar's land in Andbra. 00 As a result of this,
the APeX served notice on 15 members of the West Godaveri DCC
for taking part in the KallpatDilm satyagraba. 81
This development ,.as merely cme moment 1n a continuing
attempt to bring radicals in the party to heel. Both the v/est
Gadaveri82 and r.0st Kistna DCX:: 's radical leadership B1d been
79
00
81
82
See below, Section 3.4.
"AccumuJ.ating Evidence", 17 September 1938 CWMG, Vol. - LXVII, pp. 352-53. This was countered by ~. sumarayya in his article on the Kal..ipatnam Satyagrala n Zamindars Agresaian in Andbra.•, l'i:ltiot!J Fror· I, 35, 16 October 1938, p. 11., Stm:ia.rayya n tha if the history of the dispute \\Els looked at it ,.as the land1ard am not the tenant who was the usurper.
The eu 17 June 1939, p. 13J letter o! G. Brahmayya (perP8\o the General secretary AICC to ask :for clarification about the Yu1es) 24 June, ~939. AICC P. 3/1939-4(). See al.so Ranga 's statement of 7 June 1939, noting that as long as FCCs did not call a truce between the local landlords or the Government on the one hand and the Kisan satyag:rahis on the other in order to amicably settle the disputes, they had absolutely no right to ban any Congressmen from becoming a Kisan satyagrahi. Indul.a1 Yajnik Ms. F. 14. Uddaraju Suraparaju, President Narsapcre 'ral.uka Congress Coa:mittee, claimed tlat those persons served a show-cause notice - 'lbank1ella Venk.ata Cbelaptbi, Chekuri Achutara.DIIlraju, A. satyanarayanaraju and Pekketi Venkataraman and himseU - had been singled out because thai were sociaJ.ista and ryot -workers. To General Secretary, PCX: n.d. AICC P.3/1939-40. Howewr, there -were ten more cbirge sheeted and perhaps the criterion .tor singling out certain individuals 'A6S their holding a post in the party. Rajemra Prasad to Deshpande, 17 June 1939. Ibid.
A. Satyanarayaua Ex-President. w. Godavari DCC, Garap:t.ti Satyanarayana, Ex-Genera1 Secretary West Godavari DCC, Settipalll Venkataratam, Ex-General Secretary Gudivada TaJ.uka cc, and KaiDJr Balaramayya• were disciplined by the APCC leadership • Mlrupilla Ra-.s-my IUstna DCC and Narayanamurtbi1 member Behllda CC to Pr;sident. INC, 27 May 1938. However, it should be n.oted that these radicals
18~)
subject to disciplinary action, and the latter coiXIIlittee WiS
in fact dissolved in 1939.83 AR:C President Sitaramayya '118.8
engaged in a constant battle with the le:!t wing element, and
even went to the extent of debarring Suniarayya .t'rom the Tripuri
Congress delegates • elections on the grotmds that he ,.,as a sel.:!
avowed communist and ,as using the Congress office to conceal
and distribute communist literature - "considered a particularly
Cont'd •• f.n. 82
-were charged w1 th using doubtful means to entrench themselves through DCC elections. See Sitaramayya, President APCC to General. Secretary AICC, 24 Jtme 1938. AICC P • 3 (i)/1938-39. But Sitarama.yya -s irivolved in an equally dubious battle against the radicalS. See f .n. ~~4.
83 The context was again DCC elections. It seems that two rival groups, one headed by the west KJ~~:ct. DCC President P. Bapaiyya• and the other supported by the .APCC, B1d filed separate membership lists, and the subscription money 't.e.S also separately deposited, the opponents to Bapaiyya turning over the money to the PCC directly. Bapaiyya 's insistence on the membership bocks being deposited with the PCC in order that they be checked be cause of certain discrepancies \toS.S rejected by the FCC. He in turn re.fused to deposit the membership money with the FCC. As a result he and his General Secretary K. Venkataratnam. were disqualified .from contesting any elections in the Congress or in the elections to looal bodies, and the D<X enrolment of 3~lf79 members was cancelled for non-compli-ance with PCC actions. See P. Bapaiyya WK ncx:, 25 December 1938i to Bose a R.V. Raghaw.t-ah to, 6 January 1939, in which he c aimed Bapaiyya -.a not given time to explain his ac:tions; members of WGDCC to Kripalanai 8 Jamtary 1939, in which it ....as noted that aa a result of the dlsc~linary action, 49 out of the 91 members of the PCC and 16 cut o:f 29 FCC members had resigned in protest. Tblt there WiS. an undisciplined aspect to the radiClls' behavious cannot be denied am is especially indicated by Raghavaiah 's remarks that as the PCC -was p1rty to the dispute it coul.d not sit in ju:lgement on the Pee. But given the large numbers of Congressmen involved in this case, to view the problem simply as one of discipline, rather than o£ power, seems inade. qUite. That Bapaiyya md strong links with the Ryots association, which ,as proving so trouble acme &om tbe PCC •s viewpoint, is signi.i'icant.
20U
unworthy and improper course for the head o£ a party (the
Andhra c.s .P.) in respect o:f literature which had been decJ.a
red Ulegal, and to whose cult he belonged• - and because 1n his
appeal he openly declared violence to be inevitable. Sitara
mayya focussed on the last point in particular, connecting it
with a general trend in the province of promoting class hatred,
an atmosphere in whic!1. Congress village workers found it impos
sible to fl.Ulction. 84
Cont'd •• f.n. 83
84
see the complaint of P.C. Rangarao Joint Secretary, Nuzvid Taluka CC, Kistna, to President APCC. n.d. All references from AICC P. 3\ii)/1938-39.
Sitaramayya to Kripa.lani, 5 Jarruary 1939. Kripalan1 on receipt o! Sundarayya •s complaint l to President IN:, 1 January 1939) had cautioned Sitaramayya that a Congressmen could not, be debarred for his camnunist views. To Sitaramayyat 4 January 1939 • Presumably Sundarayya lfl88 finally debarre<:l for his espousal. of violence. The Andhra Communist's defence was as followss (1) that if there bad been a complaint about him, disciplinary action should have been taken, not a refusal to nominate him; ( 2) he also noted that ttThe communist Party 1s now under banJ and that I am not a member needs no saying. Every follower of Engels and Lenin cannot but be a communist. Communists are not violent. But it is thefr faith, that in the process of the establishment of the new order of society, when the final. struggle for power is launched, that the exponents of the new order cannot help meeting the violence of those in power with violence. MeanwhUe the conrnunists do everything in their power to develop consciousness in the people by al.l peace1UL and legitlate means. That is why all the canmunists adopt the Congress goal •••• 31 December 1938. Al1 references from ibid. Sun:iarayya •s w.s a common enough left-wing pooition. It may be compared with Nehru •s formul.ation that he believed that it was possible to establish socialism through the democratic process but that
In practice, however •••• the opponents o:r socialism will reject the democratic method when they see their power threatened. The rejection o:r democracy .does not or should not come .from the
201
If Rajagopalachari' s focus on the authority of the state
\\ElS complemented in this instance by the extra-ccnsti tuti.anal
authority of the PCC in striving to contain radical action, the
situation was reversed in Kerala, where the Kerala PCC led and
sustained such action in the face of repressive state policy.
( ii) Mala bar
l-nlabar socialists dated the start of thei.r movement85 to
1933-34, \1hen t. ~Y mc..naged to get leftist demams for agrarian
mobllisa ticn accepted in the PCC. They described a period o:f
preparation during the years 1935-36 and noted that the election
campaign o:f 1936-37 gave them a great opportunlty for propagan
dising agrarian grievances.~ It al.so provided an opportunity
for establishing .that the socialists had a greater commitment
to the nationalist agrarian programme, for the Right Wing ele
ments, who were in the l.eadership of the KPCC at that time, did
not publish the Congress agrarian programme in their electicn
manifesto. 87 The left then became increasingly identi.fied with
Cant'd •• f.n. 84 the socialist side but .trom the other •••• fascism. How is this to be avoided? The democratic method has many triumphs to its oredit but I do not know that it has yet succeeded in resolving the conflict about the very l:Bsic structure of the state or society. When the question arises, the group or class which controla state-power does nat vo11.Ultar1ly give it up because the majority demarxls it ....
To Lothian, 17 Januazy 1936 se~ed works of Ja.mrw Nebry (hereafter SWJHJ ed. ~. , Vol. VII, P• 65. .
85 The followine is from AIKB, 28 October 1938, in National Fro~, I, 37, 30 October 1938, P• 10.
86 Ibid,
87 E.M.s. Namboodiripe.d, •'!'be Great Betrayal"• CC!lBress Socialist, 20 March 1937.
the agrarian issue. With the formation of the Congress Ministry,
azxl with the new sense of freedom of action available, the move
ment spread under their auspices into the looalit1es88 and into
areas which bad not been active since 1921.89
The agrarian movement's demams included the following a
abolition of illegal exactions and farced labour; reduction of
lam revenue; use of certi.fied instruments of -weight and measure
for the estimation of the ·rop; fixity of tenure; compensation
for the improvements effected by tenants .9° Demonstrations were
the primary meth.J-:i used to achieve these ends, whether to the
administration ·or directly to the concerned jenmi (landlard).91
On sane ocoasicns this met with success.92 But on at least c:m.e
occasion when this pressure did not work, the tenants decided
not to pay rent. 93 While this v.e.s not part of the pr()gra.mme o!
the Malabar Karshaka sangam, officials reported that a campaign
had developed along these lirJ&s under the aegis of vil.l.age san
gams towards the end of 1938, and had lEd to non-payn1ent of rent
in North Malabar and South Kanara distz·ict. Anti-police and
88
&)
90
91
92
93
AIKB, 28 October 1938, op.cit.
Such as Ernad. A.K. GopaJ.an, In the cause ot the feople. Midra.s 1973, P• 89.
From AIKB, 11 November 1938. 25 November 1938, 30 December 1938, 25 August 1939. In Yajnik MS. F. 8(1) and 15 • See also Madras P'R{ 1), December 1938. ·
Ibid.
As with a demonstration to the landlord of" Kudali NQrth Malabar • AIKB, 11 November 1938, Yajnilt i"JS • F. at i).
At Ka:rtmathur, l'!orth Malabar, ibid.
anti-jenm1 prope.gama, and the boycott of landlords by barbers,
washermen etc., were characteristic features of the movement. 94
To combat thia development~ there teas an extension in tha number
of police stations in the area, 95 am a large number of arrests
were made, w1 thout substantial evidence of illegal acti v1 ty. 96
95
Madras FR(1), November 1938; FR(2), November 1938, FR(1), December 1938. There is also an unsigned note in the at papers, dated 11 November 1938, which commented. on the increas 1.ng incidence of non-payment of rent in North l4llabar. It was also stated 1n this that while efforts ~re being made by the police to cheok this, this \'tfis likel:y to be ineffectual, as lang as the organisers of the ag1tatio~ "largely communist•~ were left untouched. nit is evident that there are organised plans for destroying the influence and rights of: the jenmis, giving tenants a practically free j:itle to their land and undermining the authority of the law and its officers•. ~ Iti ROll. 4J Ol aJ.so complained about how' the KR:C ~s making administration very difficult in the police and revenue departments. To Kripe.l.ani, 7 December 1938, m m. Roll 5. Namboodiripad seemed to acknowl.edge the campaign against the police. He noted that they were brutal and in comti:vaooe with landlords and money lenders. Further, while he knew that it was CR 's view that the pol.ice should not be agitated against because this WOUld mean agitation against the .Ministry and that complaints should 'be directed to the Ministry he said that tile latter had done nothing to improve the situation. To President, INC, 1 November 1938, tbid.
AIKB, 13 January 1939, Yajnik MS. F.B(i). Note on tenants Agitation in I•la.labar \unsigned)! 11 November 1938, CR MS Roll. 4. According to Namboodir pad, tbe Collector bad proposed to post punitive police in the area. He noted that the IPCC would not be able to cope with the situation if the peasants decided to resist punitive tax and also tl'at Congressmen who had close relations w1 th the movement, might lave to participate in it. To President DC, 10 December -1938, at MS Roll 2. Patel. t-~s shocked to hear the suggestion and noted to CR that "I do not think yw wUl accept any proposal !or posting punitive police whatever may be the situatico•. To CR, 21 December 1938t_ ibid. It seems that this measure \t.IB.S fimlly not used, as there is no .further mention o.f 1 t in contemporary records. Gopalan makes a :fleeting hut ur.selaborat~d re.fe:rence to it however. Op.cit., p. 96.
Madras .FR(1 )1 December 1938 aDd i'R(2), Janua.ry merel.y remark on cmrges against "certain peopl.ea and that prosecu-
2 0·1
Prakasam visited the troubled areas in January 1939 and
denounced mass non-payment of rent, after which there \\BS some
improvement in the situation according to officials •97 While
no-rent propaganda carried on through Jawary and February, it
-.s remarked that propaganda far whol.eaa:Le retusal to pay rent
was dying down. The campaign \\EJ.S more precisely directed now;
"rents were only to be paid to those whom·. the Karsha.ka sangams
think proper". A:rxl Jenmis were also restricting cultivat:i on to
those whom they trusted and were requiring the 3ettlement af
rents in advance rather than af'ter the crop bad grown. 98 Inspite
of conflict continuing in this manner, over too- next 3 months
unrest petered out, and by May the District Magistrate decided
to w1 thdraw proceedin,r-';S in the pending cases, and in others
also 1i apologies i<rere given. 99
The role of the pa:; in this activity was significant.
Though the party, led by the Socialists :from January 1938, 100
cant 'd.. £ .n. 96
97
98
99
100
tions in court had led to less lawl.essness, though it -.s still dilficul.t to secure evidence agaimt the accused. Gopal.an noted that :Calse charges - including rape, stealing timber from the forest, assault and dacoity had been concated am that in Chirakkal. taluk.a about some 151 people were arrested. Gop3.lan, oo.ctt.t P• 97, Ranga estimted that 145 neaaants -were Invofved in criminal cases. To subhas BOse, 15 January 1939. Yajnik Ms. F.15.
t·1adras FR{1 ), January 1939.
Madras FR(1 ), February 1939.
Fadras FR(2), rv'iiy 1939.
I\.. Gopalankutt~,_;:Risc ar.d Growth of the COI:munist Ferty in Malabar, 19 T' 1 M.Phll., Jawe.blrlal Nehru tJniver-si ty, New Delhi, 197B.
20~)
had threatened agitation in response to the pollee repres-
sion, 101 it denied that a no-rent campaign was being carried
on.102 While this ltAS clearly not the oase, it aeems the party
leadership was aJ.ert to the need !or avoiding the precipita~
tian o! such activity. The general method employed -s to cons
tantly yressurise the 1-Bdras Ministry into curbing repressive
acts, vhllc sOOY-?times threatening to undertake agi ta.tioo. but
never ia :fact doing so.103 'l'h.Ls policy ... ~s followed consistent
ly104 and is perhaps m~;::;t revea~ingly U1u.strated by the KPa: 's
response to the AICC re-solutions of Ju.."le 1939 which hadt amongst
other pro9osals, del:e.rred Congressmen :frorr. tUlde>rtaking ~tya
graha without the concerned PCC's permission, and also made the
Mi:nistric:; ~'::.feet:.. veJ.y accountable only ·to the High Command, am
not to the FCc.105 ~.tUP. this r~d caused strenuous opposition
by the lex"'t-wing, the KPCC ignored the ~atya~ha question and
applaufed the second resolution, emphasising that part of the
101
102
103
104
105
Namboodiripad to President, INC, 10 rece·:.n.bP.r 1938, CR I1S Roll 2.
Ibid.
AB in the North !villa bar case, see :r .n. 101. A~ in, in the case o! the Hitchcook me'llarial {in honour of the officer wo was in-·tolved in repression of the non-cooperation and 1'-appila· unrest) it was urged tMt the demand !ar its removal be con~ed ""Without in any way paving the way !or th~ starting o£ satya~"· KPCC res~utions, 26 november 1938, AICC, P. 12 (1)/1938-39.
Resolutions am letters abru"t po~ice atrocities arxl the t'iinistry's not doing anything about it were frequent, and addressed bath the Ministry and the Congress High Command. See KPCC resolutio..l'lS o£ 26 June, 1938, and 26 November 1938. P 12(1)/1938-39. Namboodiripad to President INC, 1 November 1938, 10 December 19381 ~ MS Roll 2.
see Chapter 5 below.
20()
resolution lbioh urged that the Ministers should work in coop
eration with the PCC. This was then used to urge that the
Ministry be directed. by the President o:t the INC to take up
the questiat ot police atrocities, to which it ,.e.s noted the
PrJ.• Miniater bad been 1nd1:t.!erent •106 This constant liiElging
o:t propagama warfare against landlords, police am the Minis
try's imi.f:terence, but alli!B.ys within constitutlanal t-~rms,
exasperated CR, who came to see the Kerala unit as a threat to
his plans of integrating the state to Congress needs, and of
achieving social consolidation.107
Interestingly, in neither the case of the Andhra nor the
Malabar peasant movement was the latter threat fOUDied at the
level of attacking agrarian legislation. The Amhra Ryots
Association in .fact organi.sed marches to taluka and revenue
of.!ices to support, with certain amendments, the Madras Minis
try's ·Debt Relief BUl, 108 and this was also the case with the
106 Namboodiripa.d to President, IR::, 29 June 1939, CR M3. Roll 2.
107 'Ihus he did not ,.ant Namboodiripad to stand .for a by-election because he will be a thorn 1n the nesh. Party work wlll be impossible 1.f we continue and a aan like that comes at this juncture. • To Patel, 1 Febnlary 1939, at M3 Roll 2. But Rltel said that he would have to abide by the KPCC's selection ~ camidate. To CR, 30 January 19~, ibid.
108 AIKB, 24 December 1937, Yajnik MS. F. 8(1). The bUl discharged au interest due on 1 October 1937, and allowed an.J.y principle to be paid. There was a palllative 1n the bUl to the landlords 1n the :torm o.t a clause excluding .from the benefit o:t the act those tenants who had nat paid rent .for the current and last faslis. Further, the blll did not make any ~:terence between Income levels and oade all ry~i hol.dings eligible for ita bene:Cits irrespective ot the size ot holdings. Recommendations of select coamitteeJ Erskine to Linl.ithgow, 4 February 1938. Linlithgow. MsS Eur. F. 125/65.
207
Mld.ras Estate Land Act CODIIlittee Report under T. Prakasam,
whose proposals would have substantively benefited the tenant 1°9
In fact, unlike the Bihar am u.P. legislation, it was the
Revenue Minister's commitment to the Act which made it difficult
to realise re:torm.110 The Governor •a anxiety at the Act 1s
terms, 11 j and the petitioning o! the Congress by the major land
lords,112 caused Rajagopalachari to seek adjustments with Patel's
help. 11 3 att the pressure from Prakasam azxl from the part .. cir-
109 Amongst the important proposals ~s tblt land review rates would be reduced to the level existing in 1002, i.e. be-! ore the permanent settlement. Erskine noted this would mee.n a very large fall in rental levels • · Another important cmnge-'-. mooted -was that peasants would have \mdi.s puted rights over :forests. Erskine to Linlithgow, 10 November 1938. Linlithgow MS Eur. F. 125/66. For the Ryots Association's approval of the proposals with some excePtions, see AIKB, 9 December 1938. Yajnik MS. F. 8(i).
'
110 Far example Patel informed a delegation of landlords that he could not do anything in the matter with:but the Madras Government's cooperation "and particularly the Revenue Minister who !'as devoted so much labour ard thought over the question•. To CR, 19 July 1939, CR MS. Roll 2. To evade suspiciotli 1 that Prakasam's work was to be revised as a result of negotiations, CR suggested that the venue :for discussions should be Bombay instead of Madras. To Patel, 25 July 1939, ibid.
111 Erskine to Linllthgow, 10 November 1938. Linlithgow MSS. Eur. F. 125/66.
112 CR. to Patel, 11 February 1939, CR M3 Roll 2J Rltel to CR, 6 July 1939, ibid.J Patel to CR 16 July 1939, ibid.; Patel
. to CR, 19 July 1939, ibid.; m to Patel, 25 July 1939 ibid.; Pa.tel to CR, 31 AugUSt 1939, ibid.a Patel to CR, 17 October 1939, ibid.
113 Ibid.
20il
cumscribed114 such possibilities, although compromise was being
attempted untU the time the Ministry resigned.115 The result
ot these counter-vailing compulaians l!IBS t~t the Act ~ not
finally passed. However, it WQ.lld perhaps be inadequate to
look at thia iasue simply in terms of legislative achievement.
The very impasse reached on this issue signi!ied that commitment
to agr-arian reform was irreducible. And further, the committee's
proposals provided a plat~arm for peasant mob1lisation.116
It was this which also defined the point of tension in
the relations between the Ministry and the peasant movement.
CR 's legislative policy may have been acceptable, but his bel.iet
that this could be .,implemented by the mechanisms of the state ,·
was constantly taxed by the realities ot conflict on the groum. And inSpite of his belief that such actions should be discoura
ged, he co uld not in practice avoid a mediatory relationship
to direct action, as 1A!e have observed in the oases ot Kalipa
tnam ani I-tunagala. Further, he l\Bs bewUdered when confronted
114
115
116
Patel explained to the landlords that as the general principles of the report had been accepted by the Madras Legalative Assembly, it wwld be difficult to do anything. To ca. 16 Jul.y 1939, ibid.
Patel was preparing to come to Madras for negotiations on 28 October 1939 when the Congress decision to resign from the Ministries took place. Patel to CR, telegrams of 17 and 18 October 1939, ibid. attel 's via media tor the Act lllflB not to reduce rental levels drastically but to have a rent court am to settle the rent on ryotwari principles. Erskine to Linlithgow, 9 September 1939, Erskine M3S Eur. D. 596/4. Thus \11Els related to the tact that the proposals as they stood would have led to tent in zamindari tracts falling below ryotwari rents. Erskine to Linlithgow, 10 November 1938. Linlithgow MSS Eur. F. 125/66. It ~ reported that publication at the report had led to · a non-payment of rent in the zamindari tracts. Erskin~ to Linlil::h13ow, 10 N""· 1"1'1~. ib,d.
20B
with the cunningly conceived and controlled Malabar movement,
in which constant pressure am propaganda was brcught to bear on
repressi'Y8 agrarian relat1Cil8 ard. on the institutions o! the
State, bUt largely on the basis o! methods which did nat trans
gress legality.
Thus, under the Madras Ministr;, the desired focus had
been on making the state the prime mover of change, with a view,
simultaneously, of winning the state ap~tus over to the
nationalist cause. But 1n practice the focus ,.as dispersed by
the pressures constantly exercised wner extra-consti 'b.ltianal.
Congress auspices on the state structures. As we wlll see re
currently in our ~ination of the Ministries, ex.tra-constitu-. tional power reta!nBd a vivid existence despite whatever stra
tegic or tactical adjustments ': . .are soue;ht to be made by the
leadership in their handling of the 1935 Act.
3.2 Bibara Class adjustment and Class Conflict
3.2.1 The logic of compromise
In keeping with his views on the functions of office
acceptance as outlined in the previous chapter, Rajendra Prasad
\..as determined to enact legislation as swiftly as possible. This
priority had a set of concomitants which led to acrimony ani
conflict w1 thin the party, or more pertinently, between artho
dcat or Ganihian Congressmen and legislators em. the one ham and
Congress Kisan Sabhaites on the other.
At the centre ot the controversy was the Cang:ress-ZWni:rxiar
agreement aL 1937-38. Th1a _. denOlDlced by the Kisan Sabha aa
210
a compromise with the big landlords and a betrayal of peasant.
interests. 117 However, the process o'£ this rapprochement was
mare complex, and oan be understood in terms ~ the pr iari ty
given to quick amelioration rather than to straighttone.rd
class questions. From the beginning of the Congress Ministry's
tenure, Rajendra Prasad had made it clear to zamitrlar eorres- ·
pondents that he had been dismayed at the lack oi: cooperation
the larxilords had afforded to the Kisan Enquiry Committee, but
that this WOUld not deter the Congress fran seeking cooperation
aga1n.118 'lhis allo\>.B.nce, however, bas to be seen in terms o!
the priority o:f swift legislation. T~rds the end of September
1937 the Congress had rushed thrcugh an ameDiing bill to the
Tenancy Act giving little time .for discussion;. Further, am
pernaps in the absence of any positive attempts at rapprochement
on the part of the 7)imi1Xlars at this stage, the Bill was refer
red not to a Joint Select Committee of the two Houses, but to
the Select Committee of the Assemb1y.119 One of the landlord
r-n£s made it clear that as a result of this indi!ference on the
part of the Congress, the landl.ards wwJ.d have no option but to
117
118
119
• Congress-zami mar Agreement Condemned • t statement at Bihar Provimial .Kisan CouncU, 1 Augus't 1938. Yajnik Ms. F. 4(i), Newspaper clipping.
To Sha.h .!1ohamJie.d ~soodt Hen. secretary Central lamindars 1
Association, Patna, 20 July 1937, Raje~ Prasad Ms. XI/ 31/ coll.. 1 · and to Khan· Babadur Momii~DBd Is mall he noted that "If the COD€,ress propcsals are unaatis.factory the Zamindars shcul.d be pr-epared to propose a better solution a~ I am sure the Government will not fail to give it tr.air utmost consideration~' 12 October 1937 • ibid.
Kbm Babadur MohaDJDad Ismail• ~c, to Rajendra Prasad, 17 October 19}7, ibid.. ·
211
reject the bill or to make an amendment to it 1n the councu.120
This threat was followed up by a grQJp of zamindar representa
tives meeting Rajen:tre Prasad in Calcutta after the AICC meeting
o£ October 1937, urging him that a settlement be brought about
on the agrarian question. Discussions then took place in Patm
between Rajenira Prasad, A7Jld, "Congr-ess workers who are inter
ested in the Kisan Sctb'i'l.:i" arrl represen-tative zamindars. The
result was a set 0f p-:· .::>sals \'lhich Rajendra fra.sad considered
reasonable, though not in accord with Kisan Sa.bha. demnds, am which he hoped the zarnindars would f.in:l acceptable and. pass
through the ·upper Hcuse •121 The rationale of their rapproche
ment derived for Rajendra Prasad from the constitutional and
legal limits presented to "the Congress by their hlving to func
tion under the Act. As he noted to Patel
120
121
122
In these negotiations -we have two things prominently before us viz. quick pissage of legislation in the two chambers am consequent speedy relief; secorxlly, some solution o.f the problem of ~k.hast and arrears by consent. We are old l;ha.t there may be some legal di.fficul ties which may be regarded as expropriatory122 (sic.)
Ibid.
To NehrU, 23 November 1937, Rajendra Prasad Ms. I-RP/PSF-1-37.
To Pate I. 28 Novemb~r 19 37, VaJ..miki Cl'U:Nihary ( ed. ) , !2£ R e.tXlra Prasad 1 Con-es e and e t D nta \fiere-a er t , •t P• • considered the genera proposals "quite gOOd and if you can get thrOUgh the BUl by consent it would be a great gain. It is no use trying to improve it 1f it has to be forced down the throats o:f unwilling landl.ards. We sh:lll. have to resist the excessive demnds o:f the tenants who have been worked up arr:i eXDttato§ ¥*e :from Co~ss r11.n1sters•!J• Patel to Hajenlraaa , camber 1937, ibid., P• 1-'0
212
Rajendra Prasad al.so noted that if the zamindars did not .find
even this minimum programme acceptable, then lilley of the con
cessions made to them would be rescinded am l.eg1slat1on would
proceed irrespective of negot1ations.12'
In practice, howeVer, this did not work rut. In the .first
Cangress-zamindar agreement of December 1937, the .following ad
justments 1n t:te original bil.l were accepted in order to can-y
the l.nndlord vote in the upper house: the 7 year clause, where
by at the option of the tenant the court coul.d neke over the
entire holding :for a period nat exceeding 7 years in lieu of
arrears, attar W1ich restoration would take place, i.e. a choice
between l.osing part holding for ever am the whole for a period,
was dropped due to landJ.ord objections, 124 similtu•ly, salami,
Cont 1d •• :! .n. 122
123
124
(empbasis added to in:lica.te the sense o£ limitations imposed an the Hinistry "U1at both Right-Wing leaders felt).
Rajendra Prasad to Sri Krishna Sinha, 5 December 1937, ibid,. p. 137.
Patel to Rajerxira Prasad, ·16 December 1937, fiid,. p. 143. R.ajendra Prasad, "The A~!an Problem in B! r*, n.d., Rajendra Prasad Ms. 1-e/1938, co1.1.2. Prasad also noted in this survey that other reascns :tor dropping the clause incluied the tact that the tenant would be ren:lered completely landless by tbe clause, and that in the interim period neither the landlord nor tbe tenint would have any interest in neintaini.ng the f'ertUity of the soil. But in a letter .to S.K. Sinha he noted that 1n the event or landlards withdrawing from tbe agreement, the 7 year clause should be reinstated as they had been. persuaded to give 1 t up only to pW'Chase the ~urd.Diars 1 c CllSen:t. To S .K. Sinha• 2 December 1937, Rajenira Prasad Ms. XV/37/coU.3. And Kisan .Jabha representatives :f.n the Assembly, JaJill.JIB Karji and ot.~ers, cvnsidered this one of the I!lOSt serious de~etions .from the original. bill. "Dissatis£actian with provisions o! Tenancy Bil.l." • 22 December 1937, Indul.al Yajnik Ms., F.4(1), newspaper cllppings.
the transfer fee to be p1id to the J.amlord at the time of land
transfer, origi.nally scheduled to be abolished, ,as retained at
a reduced. rateJ 125 and :tinally1 the rature of the punishment to
be given for levying of aln\eba (Ulegal exactions) Wls changed
by the landlord body in the upper house,126 an act subsequently
ratified by the Ccmgress, but held out as an eJCJlmple of landlord
inconsistency by Rajendru Prasad.127
I! legislative feasibility "IUS too major motive · ~hin:l
these concessions, as signi.tioant 'MlB the question o£ practical
implementa tiun of the various reforms achieved - rent reduc
tion, COlllJ!l'-'tation, a mare equitable division of crop 1n bata!
(share-cropping) la~, the exemption a£ tenants from various
penalties for not paying rent arrears (immunity from attachment
of moveable property, house, and from arrestJ and only part
sale of holding in execution of a decree for rent arrears, as
opposed to the earlier total sa:te, irresp?ctive of however snflll
the amount o:f the decree, or great the value o.f the holding) •128
Practicability \\SS al.so at issue here, as it was fea:ced that
questions such as remi.ss1on a£ rental arrears, and the later
125 Rajendra P.nlsad, "The Agrarian Problem•. ibid.
126 Originally the Bil.l Ullde it a cognisable offence but it ..as DBde non-cognisable for !ear that it would e;ive the police a hauil.e to oppress the landl.ords. Rajendre. Prasad, ibid. Sahajalllnd pointed out that the cmnge t<.fts etf ected by landl.ord •treachery• in the upper house. "Cangreaszamimar Agreement in Bihar•, c. August 1938, IDiulal Yajnik Ms. F 4( i) •
127 He cited the transgression as something t.o be eschewed 1f cooperation between l.andl.ards and the ministry ~~as· to succeed. To Darbbanga, 20 AprU 1938, RaJencira Prasad, Ms • 1-e./38/ coll.1 •
128 For deta11s, Rajend..ra Prasad, •The Agrarian Prob1em•, op.cit.
21tl
plan to restore bakasht lands, wOUld present legal di~ficul
ties. But with such an agreement, whatever the nature of the
concessions, these problems woul.d be ciroumvented bece.use
we ••• ~VS obtained promiaes from them /1!le · landlorcliJ to g1 ve efi ect to the terms 0! the settlement even if no legislation on these points is .found possible under the law. There nay be some recall:Ltrant landlords but others have promised to join us in these measures and devise means to give relief to the ten.ants.129
But this compu-1.sion, once accspted, tun1ed out to be
C.1f1'1cult to limit in terms of landlord denands far protection
of thE'ir rights :from a recalcitrant tenantry am whit 'Atls seen
as ar!b:.gonistic .· min!oterial positions regarding efficient rent
realisat1on.130
As a result o! this impediment to legislation a second
a~eement ~s entered into. The l.aoolords gave up the right to
use certi~icate pocedure to realise rents 1 ' 1 but ~re concilia
ted with much more stringent proor.::dures for rent realisation.
----------------129 Hajendra Prasad to Nehru, 18 December 1937. Rajemra
Prasad Ms. I-RP/FSF(i)/1937. .
130 Thus Shyamnar¥:lan Sahay o£ the Bihar Landholders' Association noted that 1n regard to speedy rent realisation and automatic remission of cess consequent upon remission of rent "Government holds viel!IS which are neither in keeping with the letter nor the spirit oi the compromise". This \lt'6.S vlth reference to s.K. Sinb1 1s statement in the Assembly that .speedy rent reaJ.isaticn procedure could ml.y be arranged atter ~table adjustment a£ rent bad been undertaken. To Ra end%9 Prasad, 13 AJrll 1938. Rajeoora Prasad Ms. 1-a/ /coll..1.
131 Hallelt to Linlithgow, 5 March 1938. Llnlithgow t-1s. Eur. F 125/44. Ill the cer-~ificate procedure. inbtead o£ obtaining a decree and executing it in a ClviJ. Cc~, the landlord. at'ter fuUUlJ.ng conditions ~ maintaining correct accounts etc., cOUld be issued a certificate by the Rewnue
21G
-The crucial features o:f the agreement were: 132 instead
of· partial sale of a hol.ding to make up rent arrears, if a
tenant had not paid rent tor four consecutive years, be could
be declared a habitual defaulter and the entire plot could be
sold. Further, in order that the tersnt be discouraged from
trying to evadEt this clause by making delayed rent payment,
such pa)llOOnt would be appropriated to making up arrears. Final
ly, and most controversially. was the addition of the facility
of a di!3tra1nt order on crops to realise rent arrears; pending
decision of a sui"'~, the crop could be cut am sold and the money
would lie in court untll the suit was decided. To facilitate
swifter proceedin.gs, while suc..l-t an order wruld come from the
civil court, the execution wou1d be un1erval-cen by the revenue
official.133
Both t:'le -total s..'lle clause and the -distraint/attachment
order effectively rev~rsed the position to t~:~at preceding the
1937 Tenancy Act.134 To underline the serirusn:?ss o:f this re-
Cant'd •• f.n. 131 Officer 'Whi.ch -woUl.d en.1.ble i.IIIIlediate retrieval ~ rent arrears. In practice this temed to give the landlord special power over the temnt. See RajelXlra Pre.sad,•'l'be Agrarian Problem,• op.cit.
132 Ccmgress-Zamindar Agreement, Patna, 4 July 1938. Rajendra Prasad I1s. 1-a/38/ eo1.1.1.
133 Note by P.ajcmdra Praaad, Congress Zamindar agreement, n.d. Rajendra Prasad Ms. 1-a/38/coll.2.
134 In the discussion between Government am zamindars on the distraint clausa it was pointed out that attachment ~ crops bad been made al.most impossible under the .first Amendment Act o:f 19~Jt ibid.; as for the ql.1estion o:f total sale, lihUe in 'tlll.S case 1 t re].a ted to the problem af habitual defaulter, it bad been another practice ended by
21G
versal, it should also be noted that thiS, am the whole series
of changes in legislative approach signalled by the .first agree
ment ~ December 1937, lll8re undertaken in the .tace o.f s.igni.ti
oant disapproval in the party. In September, well before the
agreement took place, aome 61 Congress ML.Aa, i.e. about 2/3 of
the l.Bgislature Rlrty, submitted a representation to the Premier
asking ~or introduction of measures in accord with tr..e Faizpur
agrarian programme (including the wiping ot:.t of rent , arrears,
50 per cent reduction in rent and canil rates) and uncompromis
ing legislation on natters specifically pertaining to Bihar (e.g.
regarding bakasht, there was a demand that all peasant lands
auctioned for rent arrears ~ returned) •135 Later, when the
second agreement came up in the select Committee, it was repor
ted that rank ana file Congressmen almost :revolted against it,
as ttey r..ad net been consulted.1 36 Vbile t~e Working Committee
of the PCC supported the agreement,137 the meeting Vl.ich passed
Cent 'd •• f .n. 134
the 1937 Act. The pre-1937 stricture had, however, been rcore ::~vere tr.an the cla\.1Se envisaged by ·the Agreement. The entire !loJ.ding had been liable to be sold however szm&ll the amount ~ the decree and however great the val.w ot the holding .. Rajend.ri?. Pre.sad• "The Agrarian Ft-oblem ••• • op.cit.
135 "0verhall Tenancy Act. Bibir MLAs ux-ge Premier to introduce b~U in Assemb~y"• News~per clipping at' 10 September 1937 • Indulal Yajnik Ms • F .4(11) •
136 Stewart to Linlithgow, 13 June 1938. LinJ.ithgow MJs. Eur. F. 125/44.
137 But at the meeting it l,,as ::1oted tmt it woul.d be dif':ficult to g~t the rest of t.1e pE.crty to support tte 3.gr'ecrrent. Ste"~t to Brabour:oe, 28 July 1938. Ibid.
217
the proposals witnessed airing o.f considerable cltlticism, and
not only from the leftists •138 In its final form, the agreement
was questionc:!d in parts even by those V!o the party had deaig
nated to mediate with lJlndlords, Jamuna Prasad Singh, MLA 139
and NarainJi, Secretary ~ the Provincial Kisan Department ot
the Congress.140
Rajendra Prasad was well aware of the criticism that he
\'t6S likely to recei,re :for pursuing such a compromise, not only
:from the Kisan Sabha, but from Congressmen ani per:taps even
from the High Comnand.141 In fact he had brought Mau:Lana Azad
into the -negotiations so as to give greater authority to the
Ninistry in the legislation it was undertaking and which he
realized :fell below the Faizpur programme af the Cangress.142
He was willing and prepared to run these risks because he was
seized with the urgency of pushing the legislation through as
138
139
140
141
142
Ste".ert to Brabourne, 9 August 1938, ibid.
Jamuna Prasad Singh questioned the landlord assumption that Section 55 of the Act would be amemed to enable appropriation o:f any rental payment towards arrears. Indian Nat1'trt9 July 1938 in Rajendra Prasad, Ms. 1-a/ :3S/c011.1. Rajendra Prasad confirmed that such an amendment was iDieed envisaged. Note en the agreement in ibid., collection 2.
Narainji bad wanted the whole chapter on distraint aboliphed as he believed that it t.Els very oppressive. Rajendra rasad to s.K. Sinha, 27 ~J 1938. Ibid., co11.2. When
the distraint clause \IJ&s uied in the Agreement Narain-ji emphasized that the landlord belief that previous Government orders prohibiting this would be cancelled -.a wrong. The only change was that there would be a trarud er a£ the order :from the civil court to the Revenue Court for execution. Indian Nation, 9 July 1938 in ibid., co11.1.
Rajendra Pre.sa,d to J:Brbhanga, 20 Apr!~ 1938, ibid.
Rajendra Prasad to Ramda~1u Sinha, 7 December 1937 • Rajendra Prasad Ms. III/37/coll.1.
swiftly as possible. This sense of urgency \';BS heightened by
the Ministerial crisis of February 1938, when the B!Mr Minis
try temporarUy resigned over the issue o! the dilatory way
in which their orders !or release of political prisoners was
being responded to by the Governor. As he noted to s.K. Si.nba t
I do not know when the next ccnstitutional crisis will arise. It rrs.y come as suddenly ani unexpecteclly as the last one. I am, therefore, anxious that the Ministry should get through as many legislative and administrative measures as possible within the shortest possibl.e time so that when the next crisis comes the country may have before it a record o:! good work done by the Congress Ministry. I can visualise a conflict between the Minlstry am "the British Government in connect.:Lon with the introduction of the Federal Constitt.ttion. It is pcssible that an attempt wiU be made to introduce it some time to,..e.rds the e:OO of the current yes.r and when that comes I do not know 'What fcrm the conflict r5ly take. It T.II!iy be a constituticmal deadlock or direct action. In either case normal work of reform am reconstruction will have to be given up, so whatever the Ministry can do betwen nSa%¥1 September next must be done ana f f'ee1 ~ Uriiess you are all very axpedi tious in planning and executing the reforms which you may lllfUlt to introduce you will have failed in your attempt and the Congress wiU stand discredited at the time o! coofl.ict, when it will need all the support af the people at l.arge.143
It is clear from the subsequent developments arowxl the
issue of tenancy legislation that Rajen:lra Prasad saw the agree
ment with the zamindars as central. to ensuring this goal.. And
this lii&S . not Clll.y to be vi th a view to Sh crt-circuiting. the
~egislative process. which could be interminably delayed by
143 Rajendra Prasad to S .K. Sinha, 4 March 1938, Rajendra Prasad Ms. 3B/1938. (Emptasis added to underl.ine the limited sense o£ duration P.rasad bad for the 1egisl.at1cc to take plaoe).
21~)
larrllord opposition in the upper house, but in a more active
sense, through their participation in the implementation o£ the
law. He emp:tasised the importance of adm1n1stering the law •so
that people can .feel tmt :they have gat something out o£ this
understanding'~. To this end he urged the ltBhara ja. ot Darbha
nga 144 that praninent zamindars issue a statement to the .follow
ing effect:
(a) all evictions and illegal exaction should cease. (ab~bs
indulged in should be specifically cited)J
(b) tenants should not be compelled to sell any articles at
less than JnB.rket price;
(c) no paymerit shpuld be accepted without grant of a receipt I
in the prescribed .forma
-(d) no forced or underpaid labour.
He also urged that any complaints against a.mla~ (landlords'
a gents) would be promptly enquired into by the zamindars con
cerned and followed up in terms of relief and action wherever
fowxl valid. U the amelioration provided by the Acts ....e.s
ensured in this ~y, he 1n turn ,.as willing that the Ministry
issue a statement urging that rent be pa1d.145 Am a.occrdingly,
to palliate l.andlcrd .fears, it ..,as ensured in the Agreement that
if within six months rent ViS not being realised, legislative
am other formS of aqtion wouJ.d be taken; further that as the
agreement had PCC sanction, all subordim te DCCs would support
144 Rajendra FTasad to Darbhanga, 20 April 1938. Rajenira Frasad, Ns. 1-a/38/ col.l..1 •
145 Rajendra Prasad to Darbbanga • 25 June 1938. ibid.
220
it, or otherwise .face disciplinary action; and that Azad would
issue a statement that as the zs.mindArs had agreed to the terms,
it would be up to the Congress to ensure tmt an atmosphere o:t
peace was maintained and rents p:l1d.146
Rajendra Prasad's strategy here \I,S.S then oriented not
only to facilitate legislation but to ensure its implementation.
The orientation af th'?se compromises in our estims.tion WiS to
v.e.rds ameliorating _;le condition of the tenantry, am the Agree
ments were tactical devices to ensure tbl t Cmgress achievement
in this area, constrained by legislative limits and the :rear
of a short tenure, would not be jeo~ised by lamlard oppo-
si tion.
However, if compromise with the land1ords as a cl.ass on
questions of rent realization cOUld achieve, theoretlcally at
least, certain benefits for the tenantry, the other critical
legislation undertaken during this period, the Restoration o!
Bakasht Lands Act o£ 1938 could not even claim these: theoreti
cal virtues. This Act, which aimed at securing restoration of
lams sOld in execution of rent decrees, exempted petty land
lards with an agricultural income below Bs. s.ooo/- and also over
looked oases o£ land settled \'lith a third pe.rty. Restar-ation
would otherwise take place on payment o£ hal£ the sale cost
within a period o:t £1 ve years •147
146 Congress Zamindar Agreement, ibid.
147 Hallett to Linllthgow, 5 March 1938, Linlithgow Ms. Eur. F. 125/44. Far :!urther detaUa of the Act, see Bihar cszverneent•s Fertormaw. Aicc 81/1938.
b~"~~ ~-·-·'d~ > ..,...~ .... =--.:> ' 2 2 1 -t' .n ' "ii Jt ' .... ~ ' ~\ f l . •~d~~_:'Governor Hallett pointed out, this meant that resto-
on would only take place on the larger estates.148 Rajen
dra Prasad was all6I'e o£ this and noted that the exemption in
favour of 'petty landlords • mll.lified to a large extent the
e:t:tect of the reatore.ticn provision as in some places only
petty landlords dominated and so no restoration would take
place in these areas. He also noted that in some cases petty
and large l;lndlords could ue co-sharers, so t.hlt, according to
the terms of the Act, \lhile ooe tenant might get his land back•
the neighbouring one might not, az:d this coul.d be to the cost
of the more deserving tens.nt. To resolve this Rajemra Prasad
suggested a l1mi t1Di of the de:fini tion of the small landlcrd.
Hitherto the term referred to ane \\bo did not pay agricultural
incane-tax. but now ~sad suggest6!d that it only rel.ate to one
who pai~ less than~. 125/- road cess annually.149 But the
earlier definition held.150
If there ,,as discomfort about the implications af support
to the small l.and1ord over the ba.kp.slJt issue, there \\8.s equal
uncertainty as to whether the Agricu1tural Income Tax Bill was
doing adequate justice to this category. This provided !or ex
emption for income below Rs. 5,000/• but there would be a :nat level o£ taxation !or all incomes above one l.akh. Rajendra
148 Hallett to L!nli thgow, ibid.
149 Rajendra &-asad to CPN Singh. Ra.jendra Frasad Ms. 1-e./ 38/coll..1.
150 Bihar Government'§ Fer.fgrmance, qp.cit,
222
Prasad said that this signi:fied a concession to the big land
lord at the expense of the smaller one am suggested that the
rates should be al.tered so as to raise tb8 upper limit am to
reduce the rates for l.ower incomes, subject to the condition
that the total yield would not be red.uoed.151 However no gra
dations of this order took place in the final act.152
If ~ try to interpret a c].ass orientation, or rather
result, from Rajendra Prasad's legisl.ative strate ·r, it would
seem that overoll it ~s the small landlCJt"d 's interests which
were protected, though in some oases wi~n a framework of
corx:illatian. of the larger landl.ords. · On the other hand a
space !or reform -we.s also chalked out for the peasantry, circums
cribed however it might have been by the conc111ation of the
landJ. ords •
Even in terms o.f these advances, however, there were in
evitable problems. The abil.ity of the peasantry to utilize the
legal. procedures provided for the amelioration of their grie
vances, founded as they \ltere on documentary requirements to
establ.ish occupancy and rent J.e·J"el.S 1 arxl the costs of litiga
tion would tend to be restrictive for the smaller peasants. It
must ba ve been an a'W&reness of these probl.ems - e.g. of lack of
rent receipts, manip.ll.ation o:t evidence by landlords agents am
1,1
152
To CPN Singh, 2.5 April 1938, Rajemra Prasad M3. 1-e/38/ c011.1.
Bihar Government's Pe~rmance, op,!it. In addition it should be noted that t Premier sa d ti:at no interest woul.d be charged !or non-payment of the tax. G.P. Sharma, •The Congress!. Feasant Movement and Agrarian Legialatica in Bihar• 193·r-39•, M.PhiJ.., Centre far Historical Studies, Jawahlrlal Nehru university, New Del.h11 1979.
223
their uae o~ ~orce to settle conflicts with the tenantry- which
led to Rajendra P.rasad •s demand that these means be curbed by
the landlords.153
In a sense, to alleviate the problems posed by a con8t1-
tut1onal-administrative resolution. Rajendre. Prasad vas seeking
to circumvent these !nsti tutians. The notion of a Congress
compromise with, or sup;>ort to, J'he landl.ord cJ.ass fails to
encompass this a.-:- ect oi his strategy. The landl<rds, who bad
been at the receiving end o£ the 1937 elections, were being
invited by Prasad to acquire citizenship umer the nationa11st
regime, in return for a certain legal protection o~ their rights
as landlords, a:rxi ~n coDii tion Ula t they in turn adopt. a legal
approach on the many issues affecting their tenantry •154
Thi3 objective was, however, severely curtaUed by the
"uncivllity" of the society Rajendra Prasad was handling. In
response to his pl.ea tba t the lP.ndlords be brought into line to
implement the agreement, a..trbl'lanoaa noted tl6a·t they would try
t.~eir best to ensure this, but he also cautioned Rajenira Prasad.
that his group .formed one of the component pal .. ta of a Party in
the Councll Ula.t consisted of mincr1ty groups and 1r¥liv1duala,
and so could nat be held responsible ~or those who did not
identity with the Bil:ar Landholders 1 Associat1cn.155 Ani this
problem did not cnl.y surface inside the legislature.. Outside
153 See above, footnote 144.
1.54 This may be contrasted with the ccnsti"b..ttiomlist approach of Rajagopalachari, which tended to restrict its gaze to the realm of tba state J command over all other relationships wou1.d now ~rom the primry task ot controlling tbe state.
155 Darbhanga to Rajemra Frasad• 21 April 1938, Rajenira
224
the legislature it was reported that in anticipation o:f the
legislation, landlords were arriving at favourable tenurial
settlements in Gay a, ~ tna and Shahabad districts. Further,
certain sections ot the landl.ords such as the Fatm and Bhagal
pur Landholders' Associations had repuiiated the agreement.156
In fact, whlle the Kisan Sabha criticism t.e.s levelled
most ~ all against the concessions to the landlords, a major
part of their attack was concentrated on the inefficacy of
leg1sl.a.tion, the acts of commission in its impJ.e~ntation and
so raised the quest1a1 of power on the ground to realize re
l.ief. As Sahajana:rd put it &
It is nat .the mere absence at the legal provisions helping the kisans which has caused their miseries, degradation and ruin in the end. In .fact a lot of such provisions are already there to save them to a considerable extent from the clutches a!, and the troubles from, tr..e zamimars and yet the lot ~ the kisa:ns has ever remained unal.tered, because there has been no vi~ant and n~ ma.c~ry to enlorce em s&Ic rth IO~s tbf{ds l£!Jtl$5~~fi s accruifu ere_o
Cant'd •• f.n. 155
156
Prasad Ms. 1-e./38/coll.1.
Sahajamnd, "Congress-Zamindar Agreement in BUar•, Indul.al Yajnik Hs. F .4{1).
Sahajanand, "Tenancy Measures in Bihar" after 15 August 1938, ibid. L'l"he measures he mentioned k this context included Section 58 of the earller Bihar Temncy Amendment Act Which penalised the :Landlord for non-grant of receipt, or statement o:f accountsJ sections 74 and 75, against abye.bs; section 186, \>Jhich made a criminal oi'.fence oi any ULdue and illegal. ~terference with the produce of the kisan•s holding.'
22S
Thus Sahajanand noted that certain gains of legislation, how
ever imdequa te they might have been in his estimation, were
simply not implemented.158 Even more significantly, Sahajamrxl
showed that there had been a mare active interventicn by the
government to neutralize ar substantially dilute legislation
regarding rent reduction.
In a pamphlet published on the eve of the resignation of
the Congress tlinistry in Biblr 159 sahnjanlzxi drew :-~terrtion to
a series of problema 1n the implementation o:r Section 112A(I)
o£ the Tenancy Act. He showed that in a number o£ instances
Government instructions and circul.ars md been issued with a
view to lessen the ,impact of the rent reduction law on the
landlords.
He noted that kisans had hoped t..'rlat clause c( ii) of the
section, vhose chief aim ~s to reduce rent i:f the landlord had
neglected irrigation, would facilitate reduction retrospecti
vely. This hope appeared to be borne out by the Government's
ear1ier clirect.ives in which the rent reduction officer was
instructed to remit rent .for 10 years if' the landlord •s omis-
158 Amongst 1Jhe .failures citeds the non-implementation of the .fo~ula .for grain division b€-tween lai¥Uord and tenant in the ~ systemJ that the "meagre• 2 lakh reductic:n of can:1I"ra~es had not been put into practice; and ·that rent reduction was not being impl.emented because of the nature o£ the machinery, presumably re!erri~ here to the d1!!1-cu1 ties faced ~, the teB!.nt in providing evidence of rent p1yment and of establishing rental levels. 11 CongressZamindar Agreement Condemned•, Bombay Sent~ 1 August 1938 and So.h~.janand, "Tenancy ~asures In t3 11
1 op .cit., both in InduJ.al Yajnik 1'-'is • F. 4{ i).
159
22G
sion -s judged to be habitual. However, in the Government's
later circular (No. 43), it was directed that before such ac
tiCI'l ,..as taken the l.andl.ord should be given time to make good
his ob1{gatiana, and if within that time satisfactory changes
were not made remission o:1 ren:t woul.d be made .tina:t. but would
take effect only "from such date after tc~ filing of the tenant •s
not be given retr pective effect for per:!.oc.1 prior to fj~ing of
appeal." Further, circular 48 gave landlords opportunity far
revision of such a settlement by empov~ering rer.ct reducti.on
officers to revise aey such order if they were satisfied with
the landlord 's e:ff orts • 16o
The Government's good. L"ltentions towards the landlords
,.,.,ere further established by circule.rs 38 and 46. The first
insisted that in all instances the evidence of the landlords
must be considered and in the order passed rP.asons :for rejec
tion or acceptance of these must be stated. As Sabajamnd noted,
this provided the landlords with the poss ibUity o£ pressuris
ing the officers and also gave thee an opportunity to introduce
fabricated evidence.161 CircuJ.ar 46 indicated special consi
deration for landlords in the rent reduction operationss notices
had to be issued to landlords and tenants tMt applications for
rent reduction \'loul.d be considered on a certain date. I.f' land
lords .failed to attend them a further individUil notice would
be issued to them beL o.ce any order was passed; further the land-
160 Ibid, PP• 11-16.
161 Ibigu PP• 2o-21.
22?
lords would als::> be given a copy of the application for rent
reduction made by the temnt.162 The absence af similar al.low
ances and !acUities to tenants was pointed out, ani it was
only then that the Government issued circular No. 52 1n which
they noted that such procedures -were applicable to both clas
ses.163
Sahajanand c:.lso pointed out two other problems presented
by these circu.laz'z. The first \'JClS t11e tendency of the Government
to rely on the judgement of the administration, a dependence
Saba.janlnd did not find reasoa:ible. For example, in the appli
cation of clause c{i) of the section, pertaining to relief
given in the ca8e o~ deteriorating holdings. he noted that
determinE.tion of eligibility of' a holding would be left to the
rent reduction offic~rs. And L"'l one instance he pointed out
thUt "Nhile some o£.f1cers \\Rated ·to ti.se their discreticn to
apply the clause in ti1.e case 01' lands whose productivity \-.ElS
affected by Shade, the reJt officer, IlJ\..B. Will.1ams, declared
that the claw>e -wa.s not applicable •164
The question of partiality to tbe landlord and the du
biou.slleas Qf relying solely an admin.istrative judgement were
two of' the major i...ssues revealed uy ..)ar..ajanand •s analysis of
GovernrJent circulars. The third one ~s an ei'fective abroga
ticn o~ rights given by ·the Rent Reduction section of the Act.
!:>ahajan.uld pointed out that in pe.ragi."aph 48 of the instructions
162 Ibid 1 , PP• 21-22.
163 Ibid,
164 Ibid, PP• B-10.
220
it \\RS provided that rent reduction at'.ficers could use clause
(d) if the rent remained exhorbitantly high a.fter the applica
tion of clauses (a) and (b). If even ~ter this rent ~s
deemed too high after cancellation of enba:ooement, then clause
(e) could be a:pplled. But in March 1939 circular 39 .as issued
prohibiting application of clause (d) in such cases. The use
a.f clause (e) never arose at au.165
Lvidently what had operated here was the gover "1ent•s
desire to palliate landlord interests in a context in which
rents were still not being remitted.166 But the result o.f
these problems, reversals and inef£1ca.cy o.f legislation \\88 to
give the l.aiXU.ord $ sense af po,er, a situation inimical. there
fore to the redressal o:f peasant grievances. Sahajamnd noted
that the zamindars :felt nhappy and victor1.ous•167 because o£
Government concessions, while on the other ham the tenantry
felt no diminishing of their si illation o:f powerlessness:
165 Ibid, PP• 5-6,
166 Ibid,, PP• 24-25.
167 Sabajamnd., "Tenancy Measures in Bihar, • dter 15 August 1938, op.cit. He quoted K.B. IsmaU, an anti..Congreaa Zamindar who :t:e.d refused to cooperate w1 th the Congress Kisan Enquiry Committee and ~o continued to ally with anti-congress elements, as having said in the Council that "By entering into agreement with the Congress the Zaminclars hav~ not surremered their rights. The agreement is in the interest o:! the 7J:lm1ndar community." Later he also noted the opinions ~ landlords at the All-India Landlords • Conference held at Lucknow in April 1939. c.P.N. Singh, a major Bihar Landlord noted that "The Government in Bibar ••• were very reasomble and some concessions were secured by tbe zamind.ars in Bihar which no other Government would have aJ.l.owed". Sahajanand, note on Congress and Zamindars, 1 September 19 39, Indulal Yajnik, .Ma • F .5.
22U
The government, while providing ! or- the machin:!ry {legislation R.V .) did not take into account ••• the wer .... wed and terror stricken condi tians the Kisans were continuoosly in • • • and considered them. :tor au practical purposes of the law. equals o! the zamj ndars. This baa been the greatest handicap :tor the kisans in getting their grievances redressed through the legal machinery. • • In the circumstances mere repeated enumeration o! these reforms would not cut . roue~ ice, it \dJ:J. enrarv il: kisans instead, First curb merclless y taw-less. tyraru .. .:.cal and most objectionable activities of the zamindars and prowptly teach them a terrible lesson :tor these and ~ke them realise that they are unier the regime o! the popular ministry installed by the kisans inspite of them• and see clearly that the times have changed, then and then aJ.one any value o! these measures may be as•ssed by_ the kisans .168
In cur view, Sahajamnd's argument demarcates the criti
cal area of tension ..,.ri thin the ministerial experiment. The
question was not so much of compromise but thi t identification
with peasant interests within this compromise be established.
A political agency outside the realm of the state to realise
legislative achievements an behalf of the tenantry· was required.
otherwise, legislation "wUl enrage the ldsans instead•. In our
next section• we will examine how the canpulsiona of ministerial
action as seen by the Right Wing• and a certain inefficacy ot
legiSlation to ameliorate the agrarian problem. led to a signi
i'icant, if temporary, parting of t.e.ys in the party.
3.2.2 Divergerxt Patterns of Action aa,d fower
The compulsions we have observed in Rajendra Prasad •s stra-
168 "Tenancy Maasures 1n Bibir•. ibid. lmpblsi.s added.
2 ~-~ l)
tegy for social consolidation contrast with the approa.ch of
ltisan Sabba activists in Biblr. The limits to legislation
posed by the structure of the state and of law and by a sense
of the limited pOlitical duration of the Congress experiment,
were of negligible significance to this group. We shall show
that in their perspective, the terrain of' action al\\Eiys rested
outside the structures of government. At first pressure and
later direct action were considered the motive force of all
change. Such action might be oriented to wresting gains from
the administration. to bringing pressure to bear on the Govern
ment with a view to radicalizing legislationJ it might even
have been pursued with a kncndedge o:f legal oppcrtunities and
how these could be used to bene:fi t the tenantry •169 But all
such elements o:f Kisa.n .sabha politics must be seen not as ends
in themselves but as moments in the consolidation of peasant
po'"..er, a power whose aim \'liS the abolition of the Zamirxlari
system. In the Kisan sabha leaders' view, nationalism had to
be radicalised to the point where the abolition of feudal pro
perty could be achieved. In 1939. a:fter the British entry into
the lliBrt an:l on the eve of C<mgress resignation from office,
Yajnik noted that
I think that we shOUld make a bold bid for carrying things to a decisive conc1usian even in tle Kisan Movement. All of us agreed that thiS 1-AS an opportune moment for making
169 For example, whlle the Comilla meeting of the AIKC rourxily denounced Congress ministerial policy regarding indebtedness~. it made elaborate suggestions far how tenants coul.d benerit :trom the existing laws. Comilla Conference, 14
·and 15 May 1938. Yajnik. Ma. F.a.
2 ~31
a bold attem~ for eliminating zamindari system. (sic)170
In Sahajanand too there was a linkage between the radicalisatian ihts
ot the peasant and nat! anal. movement and "is Ulustrated by hia
observation that
Every possible effort rP.s been made by us to keep our Bakasht struggle alive and at the same time make preparations for readiness to rise to a man when the call for the supreme sacrif'ice comes.-171
It is apparent that tor Sahajanam the supreme sacrifice
the complete commitment to abol.ishing the _Raj - would be faci
litated by the unprecedented presence of a c anscious, anti
feudal peasant movement.
But there is 1n the last pronouncement the aspect of a
volt.mtarism struggling to realise that \\bich is becoming stea
dily iJ.lusory. Before the Congress f.11nistries had resigned,
the Bakasht struggle had dwindl.ed into weakness and increasing
ly sporadic activity.172 Further, this perspective only assumed
a definite slllpe af'ter a certain period of the N1n1stry 's li.fe.
While peasant action ~s allll&ys seen as the motor o£ change~
the belie! that it cou1d am in fact should move into a more
radical., expropria·tary phase, was a later develOpment. In this
section we shal~ examine the Character of Kisan Sabha pOlitics,
and how it underwent these changes.
170 Yajnik to Sal1ajamnd, 13 September 1939, Yajr.dk Ms. F .11.
171 To Yajnik~ 18 September 1939, ibid.
172 See below, section (11).
-I The AIKS • skeptical attitude to the Congress decision to
form Ministries -.s reiterated at ita N~matpur (Gaya) session
in mid-July, 173 aD:1 shortly after the inauguration o:t the Mlnis
try, in AugUSt, the BFKS organised a demonstration to the
Assembly to issue a statement of temnt grievances to the lTemier.
In September 1 t v.t!S proposed that there be a Kisan March to the
ASsembly on the i:---.roduction of the Tenancy Amerrlment Bill on 23
.September. Hoir.Ever, it was pointed out that such a demonstra
tion would be premature, since the proposals for tel1incy re_..torm
were not as yet known, and so the march was abandcmed.174
Clearly, this. scepticism expressed a diStrust of the
r-a.n1stry and a determination to exercise constant pressure on
it to ensw·e t~t it did not succumb to moderation. However,
to put this in perspective, it shouJ.d be noted that there had
been a build-up at: laml.<rd organisation arxi pressure during
t.ltese first few months, and there \'IRS a constant stream o£ comp
laints .from landlcrd •a about tenant unrest ar:d nan-payment of
rent.175
The development of class-oanfl.ict placed the K1.san Sabba
"between two hOl"llS of a dUeliiila" as Snmjanand put it, a situa-
173 14 and 15 July. Yajnik Ms. F.s.
174 AICG ~8/1937.
175 e.g. Darbba~ to Rajendxa Prasad 3 June 1937, Rajendra Prasad Me. XJ../37/ct:Jll. 1J Mohamme! *swood• Central Zamindar Associaticn to Rajerxlra Prasad• 20 Ju1y 19371 ibid.; Thakur Bimla Prasad Singh• Sub Divisional. Iandhol.ders Associaticm to Rajenira Prasad1 16 November 1937,_ ibid., ri.I/37/caU.1. Raghunath Prasad Narayan, S:tree Nivaa Estate! Sandha• l-1uzattarpur to secretary BPCC, 9 December 1937. bid. .
23. ')
- l)
tion in which, if the Congress pledge to the peasantry remained
unrealised, the Kisan Sabba might be blamed, especially as
•bec:e.use of our lJnited Frout and inti.JD:lte camection with the
Ccmgress they believe that our voices are bound to be heard ...
Whlle taierstending the d1.t:t1cult1ea o:t the Min1stera, the KSun
Sabha needed an assurance that would neutralise thia awkward
position, •a solemn assurance and public declarattan about the
.future programme o:t the Ministry 1n unequivocal terms, so that
we cay be able to ju:lge and ascertain the position in order to
decide our .tuture course o£ action which my not eml:arrass the
M1nis~s as .tar as possible.• He also noted that as far as the
current Tenancy Bill was cancerned, .tr.is would be acceptable
provided a more comprehensive bill ~s put .fon.erd subsequentl.y176
In fact in October aD:l November there liiElS a discernible
moderation in Kisan sabha appeals. This might have been in res
ponse "t9 Rajerrlra Prasad's private cautioning of the St.,ami before
the Calcutta AICC of October 1937 171 and also perhaps to out
breaks o.t violence 'tdlich had taken place in Southern Bibir, in
vhich a zami:ndar's agent had been kllled.178 TO\o.8l"ds the end of
176
177
17t
Sabajamni 's statement en the Bihar Tenancy Amendment proposals. Betcre 17 October 19371 Yajnik Ms. F. (4)11), newspaper clippings.
On 16 October Rajendra Pt'asad nade a "'Vague caaplaint against some workers" to Sahajanand and Cll 18th gave SahaJamm written complaints. From .sabljamnd's resignation letter to the Bihar PCC, 2 January 1938, ibid.
Tblt Government reported that 1n South Bihar anti-landlord sentiment 1!~3 being ...mipped up to .rever pitch. Tenants had assaulted Zami.."ldar ab:ren~, leading to one death. A large number ~ tel.egrams b:ld been sent from tha vUlagea expressing landlc::rd .tears. B1bar PR.(2) 1 October 1937.
October Sahajanatd presided over a meeting which passed. a reso
lution reposing confidence in the !Unistry.179 Am 1n November
the BPJtS passed a resol.uticm 'fdhich. while reiterating the ri{#lt
o! the peasantry to undertake dem0ll1Strat10M to bring the M1Dia
try to an awareness ot the imdequacy ot their proposals am
the intensity o:r present deBlnds, also warned that Kisans and
Kisan workers ahoul.d be careful.
thnt the ag1ta.tim 1n no case assumes a farm that nBY weaken the C~ss as u t1hole , .... lower ita prestiee. Criticism must be \\1\.::J.lintormed• oourteau.s ani constructive.... The CouncU alSo wisbes to '~the Kisa.n Sabha workers against .tal.l.ing a prey to tm provocat! on of the Zamindars who clearly staDi to, gain 1n tbe event of open claShes lind outbreak ~ violence •• •• Zamin.ili:lra !u!ve been using' violence 1n many shapes • • • • It is mtural. ibli; the peaaar.ct •••• x·ebeln a.gainS these indignities.... It is the duty of the Kisan workers tb:lt this is done in a peace.tul ar¥1 lEigitiftate manner .180
Inspite o.t this conscious toning down of appeals, matters were
precipitated bY 3 DCCs, 2 of \'bich (Saran and Chlmparan) asked
the Swami not to address meetings in their districts for fear
that it WOUld cause tmrest, am a thiril, Monghyr, also asked
their members to disassociate tbeiaSel ves trom the Kisan Sabha • s
activities. On 13 December, the PCC also passed a reso1utian
ordering Congressmen not to associate themse1ves with vio1ent
activity and any Kisan S&bha activities which encouraged this.181
The Manghyr DCC •s reso1ution almost certainl.y resu1ted
179 Ibid.
180 2 ~!O"tembur 1937 • AICC G-98/1937.
181 Rajendra Fxasad lab. XII/Yl/cciU.4.
235
from the recrudesce nee of trouble over be.kasht lands. ZamS Mars
o:t this area, who bad been staunch Ccmgress supporters during
the civU disobedience movement, 182 had complained about unrest
at the time of the calcutta Aia:.183 Inspite ~the fact thfit
it llll& they wo intringed the award given by Rajendra Prasad
and s .K. Sinha earlier in the year, 184 it 1s .likely that their
influence in the area would have led to the DCC's anti-Kisan
5abha position. Of saran, it may be noted that k.1san mobilisa
tion bad been substantial185 and thiB might have led to orthodat
Congress fears; and Champaran was a! course an old GandhSan
stronghol.d.
Sahajamnd complained that inspite of his having written
to Rajendle Frasad about the Saran DCC's move, resulting in
reassurances from Prasad that no action would be taken without
warning him, the B.FCC resolution confirming support to the subar
di.nate committees' action was undertaken without his being given
182 Rajendra Prasad to Nehru, n.d. M:lrch 1937, Rajemra Prasad Ms. I/37/ co11.1.
183 Jagdish Narain Singh, et. al., representatives of Zam1ndars of Barahiya and Tens, thanas I..akbisarai and Sekhpura, MOI'lghyr to General Secrtrtary AICC calcutta 28 December 1937.- Rajendra Prasad Ms. ltii/3i,coll.1. ibey noted that they were Cc:mgresamen who had been to jaU, tblt the earlier troubles, instigated by the Kisan Sabba bad been resolved by Rajernra P.i-asad and S.K. S!Dbl, am that the Kisan satna were again urging temnts to forcibly occupy the lands. For the earlier ccnnict see Ch. 2.3.2, section {1).
184 Bihar FR( 1), November 1937 •
185 The Ki.san ra.J.ly to the Assembly on 26 November 1937 numbered about 1 o.ooo mobilised from the Kisan Sabha stro!!Sholds of Ga-ya and Patna. aD1 al.ao from Saran. Bilar FRl2), November 1937. ·
23 ,,
- lJ
a chance to de.fend himsel.f, and in his absence (he was a we
member) • 186
While the Bil:tu" PCC's treatment of the Swami was cl.earl.y
unjust, for our purposes, what is significant is the ratianal.e
put forward by Rajemra P.rasad tor the action. This compr.§?l;l
sed two charges, o:t itxliscipl.ine and encouraging violence.
Firstly there \'.65 anxiety at the pressure being exercised by the
Kisan Sabha through its ral.l.ies and its mobilisation of MLAs
against Ccmgress l.egi.sl.ative policy, 187 and armofance at it's
subordination of the natl.onaJ. to the red nagJ 188 and secondl.y
there W:ls critic ism o:t the Swami's cult . of the danda, 189 - his
urging that the peasantry defend their rights ani nat succumb
to l.andl. ord teiT or •1 go
186
187
188
189
190
Sahajanamls resignation letter of 2 Jantary 1938, op.cit. He had resigned earlier, in protest over candidate selection in the 1937 elections {see above Ch. 1.2) but had withdrawn the resolution due to loyalty to the Congress. Ibid.
Rajendra Prasad •s nates on the- c cnflict, Rajemra Prasad Ms. XII/37/coll.4. He ~s also annoyed at what he believed were coercive methods being adopted by the Kisan S&bha in 1 ts mobllisation o:f opinicna he noted that the statement at 61 MLAa (see above, 3.2.1) '188 believed by some -of the s ignatcriea to be anJ.y :for party discussion, not for publlcatial. It bad been repcrted. to him tblt thCISe who refused to sign had bad meetings held aSlinst them in their constituencies. He -.a also irritated that sa~jsnand had, without consulting the Ministers about wb:lt they lll8re doing, condemned them :tor inaaticn. However o:t this speech he bad no press npcrt, and we have shown that SahajanaDi tended to express dileDJDa rather than outright hostll.ity.
It ,.as reported to Rajendra Prasad that on the second day of the Niyamatpur Conference o£ the AIKS red nags replaced the nationa1 nag. Rajendra Prasad to Nehru, 18 December 19371 Rajendra Prasad FJSe I. RP/PSF(i)/1937. Ibid.
Sahajamnd admitted using th1a appeal in his resignation l.f!tt!rt. op.o1. t. Howevex:, he denied that its usage had ~ Qnly under tho t;cmgress Ministry. He sat:4 he hac1 been usintt lt for the previws ' ar 4 years.
237
While the issue o:f the :flag did represent an unnecessary
exercise in confrontation and reflected a sectarian attitude,
we have shQWn that the sabha leaders had modulated their approach
to the Ministry since October. en the other hand a less ne-go
tiable di!.terenoe was ~presented by the issue o.t the dama . _
cult. Rajendra ~sad had noted to Nehru tblt the danda cult
would rebound on the peasants191 alX1 he •s reiterating here an
earlier observaticn that direct action to redress grievances
could lead to demoralizing repression and a loss o:f legitimacy
with the court.s.192 <b the other baD:i• while the Kisan Sabha had
moderated its approach with the understanding that unrest had
_given rise to ~ngerous types of action, am beoause of a sense
o£ un1 ted front, they nevertheless saw the issues of peasant
actiCI'l - to protect and consolidate peasant power, and to hold
an WlcompromisJng attitude to legislation - as intractable. This
inevitably pitted them against the Congress Right Wing~. 's priori
ties. Raje11dra Prasad expressed his criticism of the danda cult
and o£ direct action in terms a£ how these methods would hurt
the peasantry. His resolutioo 11as to bring these interests into
the framework of legality (however halting am concesaiaral this
was to the laJXU.ards) that the Ministry's legislation would
provide. Further, such an integration -s politically ·impera
tive. U the Ministry experiment was to succeed in Right WiDg
terms, the Congress social base had to be CalBolidated by demons
trable gains. K1san sabha propaganda threatened this plan by
191 Rajendra Prasad to NehrU, 18 December 1937 • op.cit.
192 RaJeDira Preaad to Nebru• n.d • Manb 1937 • op .cit.
23B
enge:a:lering conflict in the countryside, £or this would jeopar
dize the consensual tactics whereby legislation could be swiftly
pushed through.
1'tlus1 simultaneously with the autonomous action UD:lertaken
by the DCCa, the Coagress Right Willg had, at an aU India scale,
dEtcided to rally their forces at the coming Haripura delegates 1
elections in order to consolidate their positicn and undercut
v.hat they perceived to be a left-wing presence which threatened
the imperatives o:f Mini::;terial strategy.193
Wbile tJU.s Right-Wing plan 'Wii\8 CO!X:eived of by leaders
like Patel and RajeDira Prasad nat to use the existing power they
exercised to suppress the left, in Bihar this "t.8B not unitorme.l-.i
ly so. The Kisan S4bha charged that the Rightists bld used un-
.tair methods sue~ as partisan election officers to disrupt elec
tions and they were alSo ~"'larged with .forcibly preventing voters
in the Congress elections fran exercising their franchise •194
The VioJ.ence Enquiry COIIIDittee that -s set up in the wake at
these conflicts 195 ccrrobcrated that in Darbhanga, 1n a number
o:£ instances, left-wing charges were borne out.196 H~er, the
193
194
195
196
See below. 3.4.
Dhanraj Sharme. to Ja-blrlal Nehru, 4 January 1938. AIO: P. 6/1937.
Compris~ 'the Gan:lh1ans SachiDdrana.th Baau' R.K.L.NaDikeolyar am Phulan Prasad Varma. AICC Pa 6 1939-40.
In Central Tajpur, the Committee's findings suggested that the RJ.ght Wing oendidate had the ballot baas ot cme polling station he was losing in removed. Sim1l.ar disruptions 1.'11 th the connivance of partisan presiding af.ficers were !ound to have occurred in Rosera No. 1, South lltst Sadr and Sadr, · No. 2 (in which tne polliDg ot.!Jcera stopped votJ.Dg
23D
Rep crt o.f the Comnittee also iDiicates that in certain cases
it ~s not on1y the anti-Kisan Sabha candidates who were res
ponsible far the melee. A free-tor-all took place, in which
diatrict Kisan Salila leaders seemed to be helpless. In Central
Sadr CODStituency the Right Wing camidatee TrUoknath Olaudhuri,
charged his oppCilent, Ralllicl'Bmra .f.11shr6, with mob violence. The
latter's evidence suggests that whil.e he wus not directly res
ponsible, his followers certainly seemed to have been the aggres
sors, though their acticn (smshing the doors, windows• ballet
boxes and destroying paPE!rs) -.as precipitated by fears at the
poll being rigged.J 197 1n Ja1e constituency, a rwning battle
between the oppanents• supporters preceded the poll, am a riot, ,'
precipitated by the partisanship of the presiding officer, broke
out, and the Kisan sabba candidate, Yamuna Drjee, again seemed
to hive no contrOl. aver the si tuation.198 And in the Bhaktiar-
Cont'd •• f .n. 196 an some pretext and declared the Right w~ opponents of Dhanraj Sharma am Yamuna Karjee elected). Ca$es wave also c;ooked up against Kisan Sabha.ltes (in warisnagar West Jadunandan Thakur and 22 others were charged with disrupting the pOll., but the case was dismisseda Ibanraj Sharma am othera were charged with violent disruption ot the Baurbar elect1cm. but the case -s diSmissed in the sessiCXlS court over a year later. AICC P 6/1939-40). And the uae of lJlnc:Jlord. J.rrt1m1dat1on .a displayed in the central warisnagar constituency. The Right Wing candidate, Raje~r Prasad 16rayan Singh• brother of Legislative Assembly 9ppos1t1an leader, C.P.N. Singh• was charged with using b1a iDfl.uence to stop Xisans fran voting. ~ were threatenin&l¥ present at the no'l.1J.rur booth• am s"Ciiii'"tenants were stopped by 1:he landlcrdsl men-While on the lilly to the el.ectian venue. Viol.ence Enquiry Committee Repcrt, AICC P-6/1939-40.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
2tl u
pur Constituency of Patna, the men at Raml.akhan Singh Vaidya,
opponent of KJ..san Sabha MLA, Sheelbhadra Yajee, were severely
injured .199
1'he point being made here 1a tl'at while local Right-Wing
Congressmen, sometimes in c~ert with local landed power, were
often the cause o£ the violence tmt broke out 1n 1he Haripura
elections, the Kisan Sabba leadership -re not alli!Elys in control
of their followers. Socio-po:Litical circumstances in B!mr were
giving rise to a series o:f viol.ent local. feuds, and it Ls likely
that the top leadership o.t both grrups 1n the Bib9.r Congress vere
not always able to control the situation.
Though the Sabha registered serious reverses in the elec
tions - 'the Bihar left had qnly 5 out of 36 representatives to
the Al.Ccf-00 - it would be doubtful to suggest that it li!Els their
faUure to dOI!lirllte the Congress elections which led to their
aubsecpent, direct acticn oriented metha:ls. 201 In fact, wat
seemed to bave characterised the percepticn of t!"la leadership
at Right Wing and Kisan Sabha grrups after the crisis of 1937
was o:f the order of a holding game. Rajendra Prasad 11 s inter
pretatiw o:f the BPCC resolution against the K1san Sabba 1IIBS
that •an we have done is to ask Congress lliOrkera to diSassocia
te themselves 1"rom activities which we consider to be objecti<Dl
ble•. He noted that the 'thrust of the Corigress action -.a not
199 Patna cases, ibid.
200 Bihlr FR(2), January 1938.
201
241
against the K!san Sabha but a~ objectiwable propaganda ~2
It is notable also that the Haripura Congress reaoluti.an on
Congress-Kisan sabha relations, though critical of propaganda
and activities \11hich would weaken the Congress am negate Ccmg
reas pr.lnc1p1ea. reiterated 'tbe rig!S ot peasants to set up
un1<ma.203 But it was clear that Ra.jemra P.casad expected the
contlict to acquire a gra~ .form when he noted tblt
l-bch mi.suooerstanding is • • • created in the mass mind 'ik i.ch regards the Kisan Sabha as 16entiCAl with the Congress in many places. It had there.f<re become necessary. to distinguish the two :t'z,om one another .204
The Kisan Sa'tila too made nrotestations to the ef:tect that . . it abjUI"ed violence. But its not:lon o! support to the Congress
T
\>tiS riven w1 th contradicticms in terms of Right Wing priorities.
Thus Ra.mmndan Mishra• de1'ending the K1san rallies to the Assem
bly in AUgt7U.St and November noted to Rajendra Prasad that
It \\65 against the propaganda of the Zamindars • .Associatim and to strengthen the hands at' the Congress Ministry • • • • the Zaminda.rs would never have agreed even to those compromise term if there had nat been such mass agitation ••• • What was in the rally e~ept presentatim of demands'l205
Ramnandan may af course have been right about the pressure
the rally exercised on the ZSnlindars to accede to the M1nistry 1s
.formula for tenancy legislation. But it was naiw to assert that
the rally was merely a presentation ~ denrands. The very presen-
202 To Nehru, 18 Decanber 1937, op.cit.
203 zaidi, Encyc:Jacm.aedia o! ~£, XI. PP• 438-39.
204 To Nehru, 18 December 1937• op.cit.
205
24 ') - ·~
tation aL denams showed a large gap between ministerial and
Kisan Sabha objectives. As there \1.88 to be no alterati.on af
Right Wing pOl.iciea 1n this matter, the di:tferences coul.d only
become more substantial.
U this represented one area o:t unbridgable conflict, so
too did the question of peasant mobilisation. A:f'ter the passing
of the BPCC Resolution againSt the Kisan Sab.hat the BFKS noted
that the Monghyr Kisan Sabha cOUld not be dismantled given the
continued repression the Kisans were .facing there, especially
1n the Barahiya 'tal region.206 This insistence on arganisa-' tional autonomy signi:tied a quite legitimate skepticism about
the in!luences operating en the local Congress in th1a area. The ;
priority given to the de:!ence o:t peasant rights in this scheme
VlB also taken to 1he extent o:f' refusing to acknowledge legal
procedures as a necessary prelim1nary to altering peasants•
economic comitions, when they were nat in turn carried out by
the landlorcls as well. Thus sahajanand objected when Narayanji,
in charge o:r the Kisan departmezzt o:r the BR;C, insisted that
Kisans pay rent even 1:t not grauted a recejpta
we oan•t tolerate thia enoQlragement at not granting legal rece ipta to the .KJ.sana... the Kisan Sabba is duty bouni to ask the Kisana to withhold the payment tm.t11 and unless such receipts are granted.2D7
Wh1l.e this '145 pitched at the level at an incomplete or tm!mple
mented legality, the argument tended to .. , move &ley :!rom tbat ot
206 Resolution of BFKs, 17 December 1937. Yajnik M.s. F .4( 1) newspaper clippings.
207 Statement at Gaya1 ?:/ Jtme 1938, ibid.
legal! ty to one of peasant right, and, as the situation deve-
loped, o:f power.
The gap between Ki.san sabha am Congress strategies for
tenant amelioration become concretized with the secaxl tenancy
act am the Bakasht Restoraticn Bill of Mid-1938. The re-assu
rance of landlor-ds by a stitfening of rent realisatic:m proce-208 dures, an:i the ineffective natv.re of the Ba.kasht bill were
guaranteed to precipitate the brewing discontent Kisan ~''lbha
activi; :ta felt with Congress policy.
It \\68 not as i! the Congress was um,.are o:f the serious
ness o£ the bakasht issue, or of the imdequacy of the legisla
tion they had passed.209 Som dter the formation o:r the Minis
try, the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister visited the
troubled areas of Gaya with a view to achieving a peaceful
solution. 210 The party had set up a special cell to deal w1 th
Kisan problems, headed by a Gandhian, Narayanji, ani he along
with another Congressman and Gandhi Seve. Sangh Member, Bipin
Bihar! Varma, tried to compromise bakasht disputes 1n Gaya dis
trict.211
'lhe problem with Cong:-ess attempts of this order -..s two
fold. Firstly, those ~s the problems of effectiveness ot media
tion. How cOUld they ensure that a reasonable verdict w.s &ITi
ved at? As the BPCC pointed out, 'they had attempted to compro-
208 See above, 3.2.1.
209 Rajendra Prasad to C.P.N. Singh. 38/coll.1.
210 Bihar PR( 1), August 1937 •
211 Bihar FR(2), June 1938.
Rajendra Prasad Ms • 1-e./
24~~
mise the confl.ict in Reora, Gaya district, but "good intentions
did not materialise". 212 Ho-wever, the party 'a emphasis on le
gality meant that it cOUl.d not accept the use at extra-legal
mass action to bear on the decision of the issue. It vetoed
law-b-reald.Dg, especially aa sulta were stUl pending be!are
courts. AJ.l it could do was to urge the Government to ac;t
swiftly to resolve the issue, 21 3
Apart from the fact ttat such legal. redress through the
courts would tend to be more difficult .for the tenants to use
because o.f .f!mncial. prob].ems and the di.fficul ties or providing
documentary proo£,214 the alternative route taken by the Congress,
of mediation, te~ to adopt a concessional. form which could
then be used by the landlords to effectively neutralise tenant
gains, For example, 1n the case o.f the lBrahiya Tal. settlement,
\ihlle the Rajendra Prasad a\\Eird secured a return o:f as much land
to the. temnts as they had occupied before the struggle l.atmched
in 19361 1 t allowed the l.amlord to shift the lam g1 ven to each
tenants so as to prevent the accrual o:t occuprulCy rights.21 5
'!he Right Wing. Congress approach to the prob1em then
ter¥1ed to exhibit glaring weaknesses in its various initiatives.
That these problems related in turn to the class base o! the
212
213
214
215
SearchJ.1fsbt, 10 Jaruary 1939, P• 6.
Ibid.
Stephen He\'\n~!:'f!~ovements in Co~cnial Ia4ial N~ Bihar, 191!~· , 1982, PP• 1 ~. Rakesh Gupta, BilJar f§asantry am The Kisan §§bha,{·1936-4Z), New Iel.hi, 1982, p. 4.
party is likely. Rajerxlra Prasad has noted that the be.kasht
bill would terxi to be limited in its effects given the protec
t! on 1 t all. owed the petty 1Jlm.1 ndar, 216 and in the oe.se of Bara
hiya Tal, b8 explained the a~ the Ccngresa faced as the
llmiddle-cl.aaa • 7JilmS mara at the area had been staunch auppcrters
ot the natio;aallst party. 217
Thus the logic of ministarialism and of' class support
posed problems :for the V!iy that the Congress Right Wing in the
province approached the bakasht issue. And .from this perspec
tive, the way the agitation developed 1n some areas the issue
became completel.y unnegotiable., This emerged at tile point when
the bakasht movement sought not merely to retrieve l.CJSt rights,
but to expand them~ 218 AiJ Henn1ngham bis noted far Darbhanga
districrt, the •distin:tial between protest over control at newly
sold up bekasllt lands and that over lang establlshed bakast laD:l
"£B not clearly de.fined. To str~ their claim peasants, no
matter what the :f'acts were, temed to clAim that they had only
recently lost the 1r occupancy rights in the land under dispute •
216 See above, f .n. 149.
217 Rajendra Prasad to NehrU, n.d., March 1937, op.cit.
218 Th1.a liB& how the information officer of the Gonrnment described the contil118d mllitanoy of the Ghosrawn (Patm district) agitators • He explained that the dispute re lated to 200 bigbas belonging to the landlord which had seen purchased against execution of a decree some 15-20 years earlier. There had been an agitation 1n 1938 llbich bad been 'amioabl.y' settled, with tbe landlord gi~ up al1 but 70 bighaB o~ land• receiving in return 70/- per bigba as salami. Some tenants paid, but o1hers \\Elnted the land .free and the dennnd no-.., •.11(:ls tm t the remining 70 bi&hls shoul.d al;Jo be given to tbe tenants. ser9bUmt, 10 Jtme 1939.
24G
and conversely land1ords tended to claim that they had held
the disputed land as bakasht over a long period ••• 219 When the
diSputes entered this kind of grey legal area, arxl Satyagrahia
refused to accept even substantial restore. tion, the Government
ccW.d. only ascribe it to the stubberDasa ot •ldsans and out
siders•.220
This incomprehension was understandable in terms of the
imperatives a£ Right Wing :ni!listerial policy. But the actions
can be comprehended, not in terms of pressure for redressa.l a!
grievances, but rather as l.ying along a di£.ferent trajectory at
power, in which all the llrd.ts posed by functioning within the
terms ~ the Act, and at mediating to ensure ref arm, bee oma in
creasingly of secomary importance.
This is ilXlicated ~.Y the BPI'S response to the str1.cturea
passed against the Kisan Sabha in December 1937. The Executive
Coumil noted tHlt the atmosphere of conflict toot had developed
'\lo6S related to a .feeling of liberation ani ex;pectatian.. •The
peasants .felt that they had their <».11 government now am so they
look the world straight in the .face, and they become bolder am
move resistant to oppression•. 221
In .tact, the bakasht struggle ..as largely related to th1a
aliJEUceni.Jlg, and Rajendra Prasad noted tmt the KJ.san 31bba bad
not instigated .S.t. 222 The cantllct had developed, off' and an,
219 Henn1fl#lam, qp.cJ;t,, P• 1.53.
220 Information Qf:t1cer's statement, 30 June 1939, o~ · <.1~.
221 All. India Kisan Ibl~et.in, 24 December 1937.
222 'l'o Nehru, MaJ'ch 1937, op.cit.
247
since 1937, and was persistent in the districts ot Monghyr,
Gaya and Patna. As far as Kisan Sabhl relations with this un
rest ia concerned, Government reports suggest that it ._s not
organised, am ag:t.ta'tora 'tended to b&rcise influence mare ·
through the mediwa Qf militant speecbea• urgJDg the taking over
ot lands am cutting of crops.223 There is little doubt tbit
Kisan Sabha militants woul.d mve been active in this mnner,
cansiotent ao it \'~ 1-ri.t:·~ Sahajanan:Ps notion o:f se~f-defence.
The ComUJ.a conference of the AIXS sllggo-ested a more organised
solution to these developments, when it advocated the setting
up o:! Kisan volunteer carps "to fit peasants to peacefully yet
law!ully protect their hearth ani home am the honour ar the 1r
women !olk and mairrbin their legal rights •. This defensive
idiom was elabQIJlted into an objective of agrarian revolution,
a raising of the K1san Movement 11 :from its present preliminary
stage to such higher and more intensive forms of struegles
5'n1cbJ 'WOuld not <mly secure iimnediate relief but would also,
gathering volume and mcaent~ cul.minate in a nation-wide peace
fuJ. peasant struggl.e tbat would eni in • • • agrarian revolu'-J.an•.
Howen:er, it ~a noted tbat this objective QOuld not be acbieY8d
within the ~ramework of 1mper1allsm. aiXi so these would blw to
2.23 In I»cember 1937, it l8S reported that the bakasht disputes had emerged in a large lUllber in <hya am Patm am that in 2 pl.aces o! Barb subdivision ot Patm attempts were made to cut crops by :lorce soon after meetings bad been addressed by •outside agt tators• advocating :lcrcible entry into bakasht lams. Bihar PRf1), December 1937.
248
be alliance with other sections through the Cangress.224
In Bihar it was cl~r from early 1938 that direct action
-.a envisaged. Activity of the Sabba was at first concentrated
in Monghyr, and it -a believed that there would be an attempt
to revive the struggle in tba Babariya Tal area. 225 But by Mu-ch
activity bad spread to I:arbhanga lilere, at a Kisan Sa.bha meeting,
it \'IJQS noted that it might be necesaazy to uniertake non-violent
direct action to redress grievances. 226 H~ver, the actual.
advice offered for this kim at action by the provincial leader
ship -was at a contradictory nature. JadunarXJ.an Sharna for
eJCample encouraged Gaya tenants to undertake a nBmmoth demons
tration and court a.rrest. Regarding rent realisation procedure, f
he advised tenants to take out black nags on its introduction.
Eut as far as eviction was concerned • he told them not to fight
but to go to the sub-divisional. o:tficer.227 On the other hand,
Samjanand urged villagers 1n Gaya district to fom village
defence parties and to arrange :tor alarm signalS between vU1a
ges.228
The developing picture then seemed to be one o:f a diffused
leadership a activity was encouraeed at a local lewl. and at
the provincial the emphasis appeared to be an preparation, though
224 Comil].a Conference Reso~utions, 14 ani 15 November 1938. Yajnik Ms. F .a.
225 Biblr FR( 1) and (2), February 1938.
226 Bibar m(1), ~f.t.h 1938.
227 Bihnr FR(2), tv'.ay 1938.
228 Ibid.
0
1 ts means were. not uni.fied into a definite procedure. Perhaps
this reflects also the dU:tused nature af the struggles as. they
were shaping •.
But a definite shape vas 1eant to KJ.san sabha initiatives
by tba Congress Zami roar a#eement of Jul.y 1938 and the subse
quent lagislation. The Ki!38.n Sabha called for c..n anti-compro
gize \"Vee!; in July, to be followed by province-\dde meetings and
a mammoth rally be£ ore t.he assembly on 15 August. 229 BU"ahiya
Tal led the way to a major of.fensive in October, sprung by the
retuaal of the 7llminiara to ab!Ce by the terms of the Rajendra
Prasad sattle- o£ ~arch 1937.230 Gaya .toll~. in November
with the launching o£ satyagraha by Jadtmandan Sharma to resist
eviction by laalloros from abrut 1000 bighas in sambly v1ll.age~31
On December 4, the BPK.S deeJ.ared that as legislation lllBS ineffec
tual and mediation had not been successful., there was no al.ter
native but to resort to satyagraba.232 Over the next 10 mOnths
Shaha~d (villages I•hlriar, Ba.rgaon, Betari, Kbinon, Sikaria,
l).u .. igaon), Saran (villac;eB Am\ot:lri, Jujori, Chitiauli, Parsadi),
Ilirbhanga (villages Dekuli, Ragb.opur, Pandaul., Sakri, Bitmm,
Parr!, Nlrpat:aagar, Kana.kpur, sa~ur). Oaya (apart from Recra,
229 All Illdia Kisan Bul.letin, 19 August 1938.
230 All Ind.'la K.i:-.an BulletJ.n. 28 October 1939. The official view however ~3 that both sides had evaded the terms of the agreement. Biblr FR(1 ). November 1938.
231 All India Kisan Bull.eti.."l• 11 November 1938. BJ.Mr FR(1 ), November and FR(2). l)!oember 1938.
232 wain! Conference, DarbhaDg'78., 3 and 4 December 1938. All India Kisan Bulletin, 9 December 1938J Bibir FR(1) December 1938.
250
villages fvllsuda, Tika.ri, lilssua, Mlnjhia-wa, fhalua, Agan:la, M:ln
jhwe am thanas Dumria, Pakribarawan, 'lklrisaliganj), Monghyr
(apart from Barahiya Tal, Mokameh Tal, Surajgarba, Sikandra,
Le gar - 8 .K. Sinha •s vil.lage), Patna ( vlll.ages Gosra-.n1 Paijna
and th&Da.s Aatha¥ln1 Bihar t All tganj, Maaaubri, Bikram t CJBnd1,
Isla.mpur) and less substant~::i:.ly, Chapr.:t, !'~.l~fia:..'1>'Jr, Bbagal-
pur, Purne<-J, ChoLanacpu1:', C?'..cdill~r<--n, -were: ai'fected b"f tc.e bakasht 2r·
mcr-~e:;1ent. ~)
Certain pat-terns are c.iscernable: C~~s Comnittees
tried to pre-empt tJ.1e struggles tl'.:rrugh negotiated settlement
but prOYed initially unsuccessful. 234 The KiSlln sabm leaders
were not averse to such mediation, but arbitration ooomitteea
tamed to be paralysed by the intransigence o£ tt.e contesting
parties. 235 And negotiation at a provincial level, to the em of a combined effort by the Congress ani the Kisan sabha, never
~terialised. It t;;eem~ that Sahajanam 1613 advised to discuss
tl;e issue,. with Rajendra h:usad, but he WlS opposed to negot1a-
233
234
235
Compllt.d from ;'t.l..l Ind.ia Kisan Bulleti~.f. December 1938-0ctober 1939 ani Bibir FR, December 19;>ti - October 19~.
Bibu' FR( 1), September 1938.
In DBny cases this W&S because o£ lack o£ lamlcrd ooopera.tionL e.s. in D=-rbhangal. Bihar FR(1),~oh 19~J Purnea, Bihar .&'R{2J, March 19391 ratna1 ibid.J ~ bad, B.lbar J'R ( 1.!_1 Ju:ty 1939, Gaya, B :h3.r FR\ 2), July am FR. ( 1 ) , August 19~ for ·instances either o:f re:Cusal to accept arbitraticn, c:r a tencler.cy to back cut of tre settl.ement.a ~~t bad been agreed upon. As for teD:lDt intransigence, the atf1c1als cited numerous instances of their tran:Jgres.sJ.ng established landl.aro rights, o£ going against cwrt verdicts aDi o:t refusing the terms ot an O"Jt o~ court settl.crnerrt.
tiona with the Congress High Ccmnam. 236
In fact there was a tendency to invite repression, possi
bly with a view to developing the iDJlge of a powerful movement
pitted against a repressive gowrnment.237 In accordance with
this, while me<Uatcry initiatives were not apun»d, tbere _.
an inclination to give signi:ticance to mUitancy, even 1! this
jeopardized a settlement. 238 However, the question \\fiS not al
ways one of mere militancy: intransigence could arise because,
in the perception o:t the peasantry mobilized, the terms were
ina.deqt.a te • 239
237
239
Yajnik made enquiries aboot the talks Salajanand '4lS to have with Rajemra Prasad. Yajnik to Sahajamnd, 4 Feb!:UBIY 1939. Sablj8.Dlnd said that there had been ncme. To Yajnik, 7 February 1939. Yajnik, JIB. F. 11 ( 11). Earlier Sahajamm had objected to Ranga having talks with Gandhi aboot the repression of the ldsan movement. Ranga to Yajnik, after 1 January 1939. Yajnik Ms-. F. 14.
During the Recra struggle, when only Jadunandan Sblrua and a few others had been arrested, sahajanam noted:
The Government 1s not arresting the Kisans, perhaps to show to the outside wortid that the Kisans are not with us. However, we have succeeded. But I think to do something to compel the government to come in its naked form either arresting our men cr in accepting its defeat so far as Recra is concerned. But 1he struggle must go em in a:D!J' case whether the Government arrest us ar not •••• •
To Yajnik, 1 January 1939. Yajnik, Ms. F. 11(i1).
For example, in Majhia.an ( Gaya), the District Mlgistra te asked t.tat the satyagraha be s'l.Wpenied 'Lor 4 days so tbat he cOUld try tor a settlement. The remain1ng men of the village (others had been arrested) agreed, but the women aatyagrahis r~, procl.a1m1ng tmt tbare would be no suspena101l until tn1s liiBS ordered by Jadumndan or the Kisan Sllbha. Sabaj&mlnd euthusiaatioe.lly approved this defiance. All Indla Kisan Bulletin, 8 September 19391 Sabajanand to Yajnik, 23 August 1939, Yajnik I-13. F. 11 •
e.g. in lllarahiya Tal. where, in the administrator's phrase, ~ha se.ttlement W:lS short-lived because it did not satis~
So, while an arbitrated resolution ~s often .finally
accepted - whether because of repression or achievement - this
,.e.a inevitably preceded by a period of mU1tan't action. Th1a
may be related to the umerlying pattern of Kisan sabha politics:
whil.e ahort-c"Un economic ga1Da were certa1Dly cme objective,
there alSo operated here the aims a! bringing politics to the
peasants in terms of a sense of their own power. In certain
phases of the movement peasant acticn am defiance of the autho
r! ties became a virtue in .itself. Am this empblsis can be dis
cerned in the debate over the status oZ arrested satyagrahis. ' Rahul Sankrityayan, Jadunandan Sharma, the conmunist stu-
dent leader AnU M11;ra and a number at others arrested for par-/
ticipaticn in the bakasht satyagral13. urxiertoolt :fasts in prisat
in order to get the government to recognise them as political
prisoners. These fasts were enormous enterprises 1n personal
coumi tmen:t, ranging in saue instances from 40-75 dAys , during
which period the strikers bad to be force-:fed. Sankrityayan in
particular exhibited an obsessive mini, engineering his re
arrest so that he cOUld carry on his protest.240 'l'he Government
re~ed to accept the hlmger strikers' demand, .tor it intringed
their noticm of the political, as in their view the cpeation of
land satyagraha was motivated not by principl.e but by self
interest.
Cant 1d.. :t .n. 239
the "extravagant promises n held out by the Kisan SB.bha. Billar FR(2), June 1939.
24o All India Kisan Bull.etJ.ns, May 1939 an4 11 August 1939J Sahajar:e.nd to Yajnik, 2 JUly 1939 1 Yajn!k Ms • F • 11 •
The Congress Government •s refusal was groumed in their
belief that the issue was a legal one relating to property
r1ght.241 For the Kisan Sabba however, there wu an alternative
.tremework of perception operating. The vorld at peasant needs
,.,a.a centn.l. and defini~icm.a of the pOl! tical bad to be expan;. ded to come to terms with this fact. !nevi tably this meant a
ccnstant transgressi.on o:f what was construed as an unjust lega
lity. From the Congress viewpoint ihis inevitably meant allow
ing the due process a! law to take its cwrse, resulting in a
large number of arrests.
At manents, what this entailed WiS not merely law breaking
but an antagonistic counterposi tion bet,.,een the state and the
peasantry. This 'lAs' perhaps most strikingly illustrated by the
trial of Jadunarx\an Sharma in Gaya city. An estimated 30,000
peasants proceeded to the city on the day of the tr1a1.242
thousa:als flooding the rall\I.O.y stations, where they waited
"though 1he authorities had notified beforehand the cancellaticn
241 • •••• The Government ••• ne.de a distinction between a person who resorted to Satyagraha for a principJ.e and for political convictions and a person who joined it far personal monetary gain. They were prepared to treat the former class as political but they were not prepared to treat a person who -• convicted tor diaobey1ng any law .tor getting possessicn o! land about which there -.a dispute between himsel..f and another party • as a political prisoner. Their viewpoint was tbit such a person did not court imprisonment for a principle or for politi~l conviction, but to get possession ar lani to which he might or might not be enti t1ed and that he adopted tb1.s course to avoid the decisi en of the dispute on lta DSrits and had no right to treatment which li!BS intended for persons who courted suffering far a higher cause than persona1 gain to themselves •• •" Rajerxira Prasad to Nehru, 8 July 1939. Rf CSD, 3, ·P • 152 •
242 AU Irldia Kisan Bulle-tin• 27 January 19391 Bilar FR (2), January 1939.
254
of the morning train and in .fact that train reached K'ashichak
at 2 p.m. instead of 10 a.m.
and even then the K1sans stood on the liD& and would not allow the train to pass. They wre persuaded anyhow to withdraw. The trains proceeding to Gaya that day had policemen 1n all the compartments who wcm.•t all.ow anyone to enter it without tickets• .243
Here we are presented a situatim tmt ~s not wUled by the
Kisan Sa.bh.a - in fact Sahajanand v.e.s instrumental in diffusing
t.f).~ · explosive si tuat1an244 - but ratrer il'Xlicates a sullen
counterposi tion of the peasantry against the state.
It was permps a registering of this inarticulate source
·o£ motivation that md impressed itself em sab:ljamm when he 1
conceived of the pEfisant movement being further radi~lised.
Ho\'JSver, what happened, by September-Q:tober 1939, liiBB instead
a diminishing of the struggle. The reasons for this were mu1 ti
ple. Settlements had taken place, sometimes with resouming
success·, 245 in a rumber of the disputed areas. 246 Further, rent
243
244
245
Sahajanand to Yajnik, 28 June 1939, Yajnik Ms. F.11(1i).
In the administration's report Sahajanand \II&.S meant to hive been embarrassed by this confrontation. as he lmew it woULd "alienate public :teeling• am he -.s reported to !:llve publ1c1y spc£en out against ticketless travelling. Nhar IR(2), January 1939.
In Reara the tenants got 8() per cent of the landt and this WG..S
divided :tair1y equitably, with landl.ess l.abourers also getting a certairi amOW'lt of land. 8abljanam to Yajnik, 26 Ma~ 1939, Yajnik m. F. 11(ii)J this ,_. reseuted by Blmm1blr tenants. B1Jw.r I'R(1}, May 1939.
'l'he Raghopur dispute (Darbhanga) \liElS settled on •terms .favourable to tenants in June, Bihar FR(2), June 1939. other Darbhanga disputes were settled 1n Jul.y arr::l October • after the movement• had practically collapsed•, Biber FR (2), July and PR(1 ), October. The Ghosral!Jiln c<mtllot lias tirst settled in Jw.y •. Biblr iR~1), July 1939t though
. ) : {::... l) '"J
reduction procedures seem to bive taken effect in some neasure~47 And 1 t seems likel.y that an up\\Elrd trend in prices after a period
of prolcaged depression would al.ao blve abated the eoananic d1t
f1cul ties :taced by the peasautry. 248
In ~act, to,_rds the end at their rul.e, the Ccllgreaa Right
Wing would seem to ~ve ridden the storm and to have gained their
objectives. In some areas, such aa rent reduction, they might
nat have gone as far as the Kisan Sabt'_a bad \".6rrted, nor in fact
as far as their OV1 legislation provided for. 249 In others,
such aa the bakasht struggle, they had to go beyorn the terms
of their limited legislat1cm. A settlement o£ this problem on
the ground.had to be pursued, a methcxi initially umercut by
peasant 1n1t1atives and landl.ord intransigence. That in the
ultimate ar.al.ysis mediation wcrked, et least tempare.rUy, my
be seen as resulting in no small ~Y !rom the peasant movement.
Cant•d •• f .n. 246 obviouslr not satis:factor1lyt as agitation continued, Bihar FR\2), July 1939, iR(1 J1 August 1939, Samjruand to Yajnik, 5 September 1939, Yajnik Mi. F. 11. The dispute _. ultiDBtely settled in December, Bihar PR(2), December The Dargaon dispute (~bad) ~s settled in July Biblr FR.( 1), July 1939.. other S~babad disputes were seHled. by August, Bjbir FR( 1) t August 1939. In Gaya disputes vera resolved 111 a XIUIDber or places by the CcmgNss bakasht pancbayats, (Bihar FR( 1 ) , August 1939) and also 1n the maJcr centres of Mljh1a11118n ani Dumuria (in which the landlc:rd undertook to ~· e.t.torts to settle privately most of the 129 dj.aputes outstanding between him and his tenants). Bihar ffi(1). October 1939.
247 Bihar PR(1 ), AprU 1939.
248 Henningbam, op.citu P• 165.
249 See above, 3.2.1.
25G
As the officials put it, "the atmosphere for ibis line of
approach (caapromise) is much mere favourable. ••• p the 1nten:
pi.ficat~on " th! Ktea •sitaticp Me 1TresseO. upq! gmx o: th!
pm1P'!n 1:h• •ce••Ux s£ getting ca. tem with the ;tepeqta.•250 U 1n some oaaea this movement bad resulted in a oonsolidati<D
o! peasant right, in others the terns Of settlement remained
unsatisfactory, and_ st..-uggle to revise those was to be renewed
ii"l the :futm~e. 251
Thus, irCI'lically, at the very point at l«hich Sahajam.nd
envisaged a linld.ng up of the peasant and nat10llil movements,
·;;he peasant dlowment had in .fact docli!led. In the absence of
detailed work qn this problem, it is diffic...ll.t to l'llzard expla
notiv.ns in terms ot how thi!s was related to a sh!!'ting social
base. But it s~ems likely that the Ministry's initiatives had
consolidated the small laiJiJ.ords and won over the upper temntry.
In .tact the tension between the Congress and K1san Sabbl can
partially be ascribed to the fact ~t the bakasht struggle
comprised a class-struggle between tenants and not cnly big· but
snall l.andl.ords as lle1l.. 252 Within the be.kasht movement itsel:t,
250
251
252
B1bu' JR (2)• Decanber 1938. Empmsia added, . -
As with the Barabiya Tal. agitationt_~ch was renewd in 1~6. Rakeah Gupta• ._op.citu PP• Z29-30t
'lhe otf1cJala remarked .1ron103l.1y thlt dahajamnd 's appeel to small zaminiars ~~s hardl.y consistent vi tb the Muriar agi taticn in Sbah4~ 1 which \IBS carried on apinst tb1a claaa. Bibar FR (2)• April 1939. Qt the struggl.e launched 1n M:lsaUl"hi thana at Rltn:l district. Sahajamnd noted that the teUlnts, oppcments were petty zamimars 'Who were "t-ypical tyrants". To Yajnik, 19 August 1939. Yajnik ~. F .11. Tbat there wa11 a problem here that threaten ad the broad Xisan sa'bba poJ.icy t4 un1!{ with the asll -.m1nrJara was aJ.so mU.cated. by SBbajana:o:'l a reapcmae to tJW Searpb:
25'7
there was a drawing in o:t tenants down the agrarian hierarchy
and or l~r caste status, 253 but the movement incorporated all
sectioo.s of the peasantry. This was noted with mixed :feelings
by SebajalllDi later when be said that the upper tenantry had
been brought into the movement w1 th a .view to strengthen 1 t and
therefore to strengthen the position o:r the lower sections of
the peasantry, but in practice tr.J.s had redoumed to the bene
fit of the ~ormer.254 J.jJ_
The Bihar mjnjsterial experience then represents a comp-
lex pattern. Starting out w1 th the objective aJ: redressing
peasant n&eds within a£ 'P.
&hort period as possible, and therefore
circumscribed 1n these terms by the needs of· cc:()ncn:·~.ating the i
landlords of the Upper House, the Right Wing tended to struc-
Cant 'd.. :t .n. 252
J.i.gh:t charge that the 5abha 's policies v..el,.e directed at t'l'iiP'etty ZamiD:lar (23 April 1939, Yajllik Ms. F. 11(ii)J he reiterated unity. but went on to note that the Sabha \'IOul.d not toJ.erate the tyranny of petty 2"Jlmin:lars "due to their :false notion of prestige as Zam1rnars or un:ler the in£luence and guj.dance of enemies ~ tt.~.e K!.;m.n Sabba" statement of 25 April 1939. Yajnik l-1S. F. 11(1i).
253 The Swami nnde the following analysis of the !Bkasht satyagrahis in Jagt'lishpur 1 Darbhanga. The vUlage comprised 300 fam1liea in ana ot these eo were Millaha (bc:atmen), 30-40 Koeris• 30 GOtP-las, 30 !-lmlimn, 25-30 Busadbs, 15 Qlamars, 20 Kbltawe, 5 barbers, 8 tellia, 8 Vaishyas, 4 dhobis. 2.5 carpenters, some ma.lis and Kayastbas. The victims of the zam.indari assault included 2 Dusadhs, 2 KooriB. 2 J~tlllabs, 1 I1ali and 1 Khntawe. To Yajrdk, 20 April 1939, ibid.l !n the r-usaurhi struggle too, launched against pet;ty 2Jlm_ndars, the peasants were mostly of low caste status. To Yajnik, 19 August 19391 ibid. Rakesh Gupta also bils shown how in the Barahiya Tal agi.ta.tion at r1onghyr there \46.8 substantial participation by lower-caste tenants. Gt.•.pta, op,c1t, The afi"ected tenants in the Parri and fumauJ. satyagrams of Darbhanga consisted of Koeris and Caal,.a.a. Hellllingblm1 opeci'•• PP• 156-58.
254 Henningbam, ibid.. pp. 167-68.
ture a set o! pOtlE!r relations in the countryside. Legislaticm
tended to .favour the srrall landlord and the upper seotiana of
the teDlntry benefited from the tenurial r~arm. 1h1a occurred
not cmJ.y because these aectiODS were the bea't suited to utilise
such re.torm, but because implementation ot the measures tuded
to be partial, and to limit the extent o£ relief.
en the other hand, the Kisan Sab~ started out with a
skeptical attitude towards the capabilities of ministerial re
form, both in terms of their umerstaming o1: the State, but
also 1n terms ot what ~they Zeared to be the suaceptibUity ot
the ministries to landed pressure. A3 a result they gave- con
siderable importance to peasant aation 1n Pl'"C!ssurising against
such o~omise. !n this emphasis, and in their dif.ferences
over the nature of legislaticn, they inevitably came into conf
lict with ministerial pol.icy and the Right Wing stra.tegy • This
confl.iot materialised in attempts to isoiate ·;;h& KJ..san sa.bha
.from the party (through party reso1ut1ons aimed at distinguish
ing t:.-1e party from the peasant \mien) and in their margimllsa
tion in the party through electoral. mobUisation against them
(and SOlletimea by outright usa a! pCM!r in the party). Th1s
dewlopJ.ns oon.tlict was gi·~en its fim.l push by the Ccmgress•
Zaa:lnrlar compranise ~ Jul.y 1938 and the attendant legislation
on tenancy am- bakasht restoration.
Direct action was umertaken by the K1san Babba which
locked in with an alr&ady serious situation in the disputed
lands. K.isUn Sabha objectives are di.f.ficu1t to pinpoint. In
cme sense the a truggle llltla an attempt to entc:rce deoisJ.CIIS ca
t
the grOtmd against the grain of legislation. But it is obser
vable that peasant mllitancy was o.tten supported in the face of
the posaib1Ut1ea at madiaticm. It appears that by 1939. a
mDDber o! KJ.san sabha leaders had come to the position that·
agrarian radicaliam could develop further, ant ca4d be used
to radicalise the national movement. Ho,.,ever, it .-.a in th1a
very period that a resolution of conflict in the countryside
,.as taking pl.ace, and this left the leadership w1 th a radical
rhetoric but no base on which to develop it.
~!~ilii\hft:i;atrfD: th[wgh the ema-comt1t\t
In Midras the Min:l.stry dominated by design (though not as
fully as its architect WOUld have wished). In Biblr the heigh-
tened nature of class-con:!llct brought politics into the domain
of the extra-constitutioml. Legislation am the observation
o! legal codes \liBS desired, for tactical and perhaps increasingly
:for ideological reasons, but this could not be held to in prac
tice. In u .P. on the other ham there ~s an unsteady coexis
tence of these levels !or most of the r11nistry's li!e. The Minis
try .aa not a :forceful iDstitution_ 1n any o:t its accustomed
domains, whether o:t legislation cr ot law en:tcrcement. A a a re
sult the extra-constitutional activity of Cangreasmn (vividly
cc:Diucted 1n an uncoordinated .fashion in the localities) retained
a considerable space, and this led to a state o:t almost cOQStant
tension ~or the administration.
The extra-constitutional in :f.'act £uncticmed aa a force
26f1
field in which al.l other elements had to .find their bearings.
But, ineluctably, the situation bad to be controlled and the
apace for such acticm curtailed to SUit the more Um1ted needs
o:r constitutional tactics. The compulaiona at legiala t:lve
achievement, and therefore the need tor a situation or equili
brium for the state to function in, gradual.ly made their impress
felt on the volatile political atmosphere. In the unravelling
of this process, the provincial unit of the party came to play
a decisive role. The U .P. PCC bad been unusual 1n voting
against Ministry formation, 255 and it bld alSo been the solitary
provincial coumittee to accept the idea at a collective a.t:rilla
tion o£ working-class and peasant un1CI'l:s to the Congress. 256
1be weight of thiS political tradition ~ brcught to bear on
the Mi.nistry, and it is this relationship which explains to a
large extent the administrative impasse the Ministry was placed
in.
Nevertheless, if on certain critical issues the Pee exer
cised a po..erf'ul radicalising force, it was also the mechanism
whereby, gradually, the extra-ccnstitutional. lll68 brOUght into
line with the t»ed.a of the m.f.nisterial experiment. '.fh1s process
was not achieved without aor1mcmy in the party, and its eventual
success JIIUSt be _related to the powerful intluence exercised by
Nehru 1n tbe province and in the support given to him by a sec
ti en ot the CSP •
255 See above, Ch. 2.2.1.
256 see above, Ch. 1.2.
26J
However, a superficial analysis of the Ministry would not
suggest the significance of these tendencies. In the legisla
tive arena the Ministers managed to pursue poUciea vhich did
not al:•ys meet with the approval of the Congress party. Before
going on to examine the deeper currents of power that were at
work in the period, we wil.l brie.tly detail Ule various points
at which moderation was espoused inspite of PCC pressure, and
what the rationale for this was.
Wb1l.e FCC pressure ~s constantly active, it waa l.arge_ly
contained on certain issues relating to changes desired by Cong
ressmen in the s1ate structure, issues which 'Nere not al\\IElys
negotiable 1n terms of the limits set by the 1935 Act.. The
f'HJ.nisters managed to side-step the serious pursuit of commit
ments which might have brought them into cal!'l1ct with the Secre
tary of S'blte. These incl.uded proposals to fonn district commit
tees to ch~k corruption, 257 the recODJnendations tmt t~ po.st of ,..
prwincial comm1asioner be abolished and the plan that village
panchayats, with the power to central chowkidars am to enliat
civic guarda, aa well as judic1a1 pancbayats, be set up. 25B
257 1h1s was not seriously pursued in the As.sembly. Haig to ' Linlithgow, 23 October 1938. Ha1g MlS. Eur. F.125/2AJ Haig to Linlithgow, 19 December 1938, L1nl.ithgow MSS Eur. F. 125/101.
Ha1g saw these proposal.S as cal.culated to enhance control aver the rural areas. Haig to Linlithgow, 19 December 1938, ibid. The final proposals -were inoffensive from the Governor •a point o£ view. The panchayat ,.e.a now conceived of as a cooperative society • Heada ot Households •re represented 1n it and it ~a authoriaed to £1x ita own election methods.
All ~ these proposals constituted the nationalist ideal
of g1 ving the people a greater se me of p~r and control over
their lives am so there tended to be ccnsiderable resentment
over the shelving of these programmes. 259 Tb1a antagonJ.am 1a
beat illustrated by the controversy over the rural development
scheme.
The Governor had taken issue with the Ministries 1n regard
to the appointment of the lower s tnf.f o:f the Rural Development
Boo.rd. It ~s suspected t~t the Boar- \\&s being used politi
cally aDi that political instructions wre beJ.Dg cl1aaem1nated
to the sta.U at their tra 1ning camp. 26o Though the Miniaters
did not initially respoxxl to Biig's criticism, they subsequently
agreed to the issue o:r instructions emphasising that the rural
development staff must conform strictly to the government
servant.•s cond_uct rules and must not take p1rt in politics.
Further, while earlier the M1nisters had 'A&nted to keep the
District officer out o.f the implementaticm o.f the scheme, it was
now agreed that his cooperation \'.&s necessary, and tmt the
Ccmt•d •• t .n. 258
259
giwn · It waaliitt1e power, and Katju noted that 1f there were stlll Objecticns tha power could be further limited. Hai~ to LinlithgOWt: 24 June 1939, I.J.nlitbgow MlS Eur. F. 125/102.
There was objection to the eDBscul.atian of the village pa.ncbayat in the r-11n1stry itself, w1 th rm PaJX11t lllllnting to abide by the original rttport. She however later accep;. ted the Katju proposals. Ha!g to Linlithgow 25 February 1939, ibid. Perbape as aha \IJBS identi!iecl dtb Nebru, abe 1111l8 expected to abide by the party 'a more rad1C:81 aspirations, .:f'or appu-ently her retraction was unpopular in the party. Haig to Linll.thgow. 8 August 1939, ibid.
Hai' to Linlithgow• 9 February 19:58. Ha1g MS8 Eur • F. 125 17 b.
263
Ministry also ~ted the cooperation ot landlords in the sche
me.261 As a result of this compromise they were severely cri
ticised in the Pee. In the meeting of 16 October 1938 the
scheme -.s denounced aa bureaucratic and in:tringing ~ the · PCC •a
resolution that "the no IC3 otticer should be involved. Umbrage
-.s also taken at the instruction tN:lt the rural development
organisers should not carry the Congress :Clag. However the
Hillis try \'1011 the day • 262
There was a convergence here with CR •s emphasis on poli
·-tlcaily neutr&f!Zfilg the -state machineey~- -BUt -it -.s nota-----
conscious design, ariSing from ~inite notions of how the party
should relate to the state. Rather ,p.s it the resul.t of the ' ..
pressures upon the r-tlnistry that made them contc:rm to existing
practices in order that they ·could achieve their basic objecti
ves. These compulsions were in evidence in the evolutian of the
controversy raised by the Congress Ministry's Employment Tax
Bill.
As Biig told Fant, this -was a covert attempt to cut service
salaries, as it focused an Government servants and excluied pro-
261 Haig to Linl1thgow• 9 M!lrch 1938, ibid. Perbapa the shift 1Jl the M1n1stera 1 attitude l!lll& related to their temparary resigrlltion in February over the issue o:r pollt1ca1 prisoners. They must have caae back into the Ministries with a sense of th~!:r;l1ty ot their tenure. am o:r the need therefore to e conf'lict w1 th the Governcr in order that their tenure lasted until their legislative tasks md been completed.
262 P1gpatr• 17 October 1938• PP• 1• 16.
264
fessions • trades and callings from 1 ta purview. 263 The bUl
led to violent confrontation between its opponents am Congress
men at the end ~ March 1939. Pant however reuaine<l adamant and
it .as repcrted that he had undertaken negotiations w1 th the
laml.<rd·lobby 1n the councn, the arxengement being that if
they passed the bill he would not push for an early introduction
of the Af;Ticul. 'b.lral Income Tax Bill and that they would. get a
better deal. on the Tena.:ooy BUl. He also -wooed the moneylemers,
prcaiaJ.na concessicms re~rding the introduction of the Debt
Bill. As a resul.t the Bill secured passage through the Coun
cil. 264 Quite unebiracteriatioally 1 Katju disp].ayed cons ide-,
rable bravado on thi• issues he claimed that the M1nistry would
be able ~ e.t.fect salary cuts without having to supplicate the
Secretary of State. 265
Unlike the problem of chlnging the structures ~ the
state raised by the ather controversies discussed here, the
Employment Tax Bill represented two sets of compulsions. In
keeping with Congress criticism of the Raj, there was an attempt
here to curtail tbe status of the serv1cesa am secondly, there
264
Haig to Linlitbgow, 9 Februal--y 1939• L1nlithgov, H3S Bur. F. 125/101.
Haig to L1nl.itbgow, 17 M:trdl 1939, ibidel Haig to IJ.nlithgow• 24 May 1939• Haig MSS. Eur. F. 115.
He .aa rep<rted to have said •I refuse to go to the Secre• tay at State 1n supplication am ask him to consider a salary cut wen I oan act on our own authority. I am looking .forward to the day when all the public servants w;Ul owe allegiance to us and not to a Ml-bap Secretary o:C State ••• a laig to Linlithgow, 25 Mirch 1939. L1nlithgow K>S. Eur • F .125/102.
we.s the simpler fact of the :!ine.nc1a1 bene:!its that would accrue
to the Government 1! such a measure was passed. The rhetoric
which accompanied the Blll can be ascribed to a conjunctural
issue. Katju•a appea.1s were designed to mitigate the situat_ian
created by tile Tripuri crisis o:t March 1939. u .P. bld voted
against the Gandhian candidate, and anti-leadership a:nd anti•
Ministry attitudes were pronounced at that time. 266 This rhe
tc~ic swiftly dissolved when the Governor determined to reserve
the Bill in August. The situation bad altered by them; insta
bility 1n the- Congress Gr@l!ln1Bat10D bad mcunted after the Boae
lee July demcnstrations 3-gQ!nst constitutional changes in the
Ccngress, 267 so the Ministers might bive l!IElnted to avoid a
confrontation with the Governor, one which in the circumstances
cOUld easily develop into a crisis. AD:i this would go against
the ministerial 1mperat1 ve of ensuring tMt the ~Cenancy Bill.
\'An passed. 268
While on issues o.t: structu:rtll ctenge in the state the
Ministry had evaded serious ccnfrontation with the PCC, the
question of tenancy reform acquired much mare signi.ficant pro
pcrtions of disagreement. 'l'he imperative here was to ensure
that the s.ml.l latrll.ard, vho \188 being wooed by tbe large land
lords oZ the provinoe, 269 ,,as not al!em ted by Congress
266
267
268
269
Seo beloW, Ch. 5.
Ibic1.
Haig to Lin11thgow, 9 August 1939, Linlithgow MSS. Eur. F. 125/102.
Zam1mara conference, Luclmc:'J!.t clipping. f'rom P1afi!Ut• 30 October 19371 in AICC c-6/191'6. _
266
policy. 2?0 ll4lile thia strategy l!l6s agreed upon in the party,
there were d1£:terences about the ca tegar ies o:t landlord who
could blw their lau:l atmpted !rem the proposals tar securing
occupancy rights tor 'the temnta. The initial proposal waa tblt
landlcrda with §J£ (seU-c:llltivated) hold:lnga below 100 aorea
should be exempted, but UDier pressure in the Ccmgress Legisla
ture Party, the amount \\6oS brought down to 50 acres .'Z71 The
PCC ..anted to go 7~·.!I"ther. Certain left-wing members such as
B.D. Tripathi, Z.A. Ahmed• K.Le Gautam am Jo.gadamba Narain ·,_
sexena rebutted pleas that the issue not be discussed as- it
would embarrass the ministry. They no+..ed tm.t PCC decisicns
lJOuld be biD«Ung on/the Ministry. TrJpathi tbln went on to
criticise some Congress Leg1sJ.a1Jure Rirty members !or conscrt
ing tri th Ulmindars, and it -s moved that !J;t be altogether dis
lll.lowed for J.anllords who paid a revenue assessment of above
Bs. 1000/- per annun. After heated discussion, the resolution
,.as caiTed by a vote at 88-70 (However it was not included in
the Tenancy proposaJ.sZ72 ). F\n"ther acrimaly developed over
211
Z/2
Mohanl.a.J. 8axel»l-. Right Wing President at the UPCC 1n 1938, noted tba't the Coneress repreMD'ted the amau landlord aa well as the peasattt. am he attacked the Klsan Sangh tar encouraging class conflict Wich be claimed would aid the foreign buree.mre.cy's policy ~ divide and rule. u.P. Polltlcal c~ .. ence Luclmow, 30 December 1937. lpdian Nnzue~ ljeqis'k£. JuJ.y•Decemoor 1937, p. 385.
Cong:-ess Legislature 1\:lrt~Maeting, Pi~- 28 June 1938, P• '· This ~s how the clause liiEl8 l.l.y :tcrmulatQd. Hallett to Brabourne• 2/f eptember 1938, L1nllthgow lt3S. · Eur. I<'. 125/45.
As presented 1n 1b1d.
267
the amount by which rent ~s to be reduced. A resolution ,.as
passed. asking for a 50 per cent reduction until rent based an
the surplus produce of the land cQJJ.d be calwlated. Pant
pleaded tblt tb.1s \llll& f1118nc1all.y impossible ani auggeated
instead. a 7 crore reduc'ticn, which wwld have amOUJl'btd to about
28-30 per cent reduction. The different political v1ewpoil'lt3
at work were expressed in ex-terrorist Bhuperxlm Nath Sanyal 's
aacerbic remrk that t."le Ministry's business \ll&s nat to balance
the b\.idgat but to wreck the act. 'lhe Ministry • s viewpoillt ws ·,
finally carripct by a vote ot 70-68, with the adjustment tblt
8 ratha'r than 7 crores tTOUld. ba reduced.m
T."lB eriticiBme at the bill followed the cha.racteristic
left-will& prot;r3:mnatic trajac:tory • that it did not include I
zamil'Jiari abolition. This t-.GS ex!)ressed at a rr.ass tooeting which,
ironically enoug.."l, '~s arranged by I1oblnlal saxem to welcome
the bili. The zamimari abolition proposal caLlS up ins pi te o!
the plans or the crlJlnisers. The resolution noted that the
CongE"ess must realise that the position of the tenant could not
improve without this change. It e.J.so regretted that the CCilg
ress bad not been abl.e to ccmtain pollee repressicm in tbe
countryside 1Dsp1te ~ its having been in power for ao lcmg.274
273
Z74
60 m.embe~ staged a -lk-out on the grourds that a 50 per cent reduction had been carried the previc:ua day_ aDd they ob~ected to 'the re-1ntr()duot1on at tbe issue. ac:ger, 10 July 1938. .
~;R;J :; ~~tr!I:tf~~~1ct ;~;po=-t:~~..:~:11 e.g. lloJnbSty Qlronicl.l• 25 June 1939, P• s.
268
However, the real problem arose because of zaminiar oppositicn
to the blll. 2:15 The Ministers realised that the bill. could be
seriously delayed with the oppcs1t1cn of the landlords 1n the
Legislative Council. Twa negotiations were arranged through
out late 1938 and early 19~ ill wbioh .featured prominently the
Nalll8b of Cbbatari, the former Interim Ministry Premier and
Patel, Chairn:an o.f the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee.
Patel, wh.Ue anxious to arrive at an agreement whereby the
passage ~ the blll could be hastened, 276 nevertheless stipu
lated. that his verdict WOUld have to be accepted as 'b1Diing by j
the-landlords.zn cnce the authority o:t the- congress \£8 accep-
ted, Patel was willing to discuss even more fav~ble terms
~ concession to conciliate lamlcrd grievances in regard to
right to trees, pir and provisions fer ejectment.Zl8 However,
the intransigence of the taluqdars of A,.,adh subverted any chances
of settlement. Zl9 Discussions however c antinued while the Bill
275
276
2Tl
278
279
The select Comni ttee o! the ASsembly on the Tenancy Bill was adjourned for a !orti;l.ight at the request of the :rAmindar members. UP FR(2), June 1938.
Aa a result there tes postponement o£ the consideration ot the bill. Patel to ou-tari, 15 October 1938, 10 November 1938, Cbhatari ~.
Patel to RajeDira Prasad, 21 October 19381 Rajendra Prasad Ms 4-A/38/coll.5. Patel to Qlhatari, 21 october 1938, 2 November 1938. Chhatari Ms.
Patel to C~tari, 11 November 1938J see alSo Patel. to Chbatari, 28 September 1938 aJXl Cbhatari to Patel, 18 October 1938. Chllatari MS.
E9tel to Rajendra Prasad, 2 November 1938, R.PCSD, 2, P• 129.
269
was in the Council. and the zamindars were a!fered a concession
in the rent realisation procedure. Ho'W8ver they reii81ned. be-
si tant aot were :Cinally divided in the CouncU vote which passed
the bill. 280 To ensure that the Tenancy Bill would bave a· safe
passage in the CouncU debt legislation -.a conscicualy delayed
to prevent the alielfltion of the moneylenders blOC:.: in the
Upper House. 281
This a.t'tempted CC'"1promise WlS not looked on with equani
mity by either the Kisan .:3angh or the FCC. The Bill •s delay
was criticised by t~ CSP and the J'easant organisatial as they
noted tblt this woul.d give the landlords time to eject ~ir
temnts before it came into .f'orce.282 Significantly, it was
also during this period that the ideological radioalisation of
the Kisan Sangh took place. Earlier, this organisation bad
remained itxlependent from the all-India body an the grouxxls that
it did not accept the AIKS •s objective ~ zamindars abolition
without compensation. It now accepted this objective and affi
liation took place in December 1938.283 .AlXl the PCC, in a sin-
280
281
282
283
Haig to L1nl.ithgow1 12 June, 24 June! 9 August, 6 September 1939. Linl.ithgow l'BS Bur. F. 125/1oz. The ooacesaion offered was that ejectmen-t wOUld be .from the llbole ho1d1ng 1! the tenant did not pay the arrears o! rent within two years following the due date, 1n addition to paYJte:at of current rent. Pimeer, 28 July 19391 P• 1.
Hai~ to -Linlithgow, 24 Jtme 1939, L1nl.1tbgow MSa Eur. F. 125/102.
Congress SocAAJ,i§t, 2, 43, 23 October 1938, p. 2.
N.A. Rasul., History of' the All-India Kisan Sabba, Calcut"ta, 1974, P• 45.
270
gular move, questioned the authority of the Farliamentary Sub
Committee 1n undertaking negotiatiOns over tenancy legislation
in the province. 284
These moves were not of cwrae decisive in preventing the
mod.eraticm. ot the billa that had been accomplished by the land
lcrds themselves. It might be argued 1n fact that the ministers, h
or at least ministerial compulsions, had trium~ed over the
intransigence of the extra-parliamentary motivations of t..he
party. They had evaded the implementation o£ t.be radical demo
cratic objectives of the party ~enever these threatened to come
into con:f'l.ict with their objectives at reaUsing a success1'ul.
legislative pr~. And 1n regard to the latter, in the shape ,. a£ the tenancy bill, ~Y had remained impervious to attempts
to have it charlged 1 and had only been prevented from further
moderation because o! lack of' lamlord tmity.
HC>wever, to look at the legislative side o£ the u.P. ex
perience is to tell only hal.f the story. Power was focussed
not ally in the legislative assembly. In the next section we
shall examine the deeper undercurrents o£ autbc.rity, and its
shaping, that developed under the C ongreas Min1stry 1n U .P.
can tradict1 ons cr.r poli tioal form pressed down at nany
pointa on the Min1.atry 1s functioning. There is a constant sense
284 The ewe reprimanded the UP PCC for their resoluticn am ree.:f'f'!rmed the overriding e.uthority of the Farliamentary Sub--Committee, ;B,Qmb8z C.b£on1g1e1 1 October 1938, p. g.
27l
of the ministers straining to reconcile the democrati.c pres
sures present in the Congress political tradition with the
objectives and inevitable adjustments signitied by ministerial
strategy.
Perhaps this conflict can best be illustrated by the
Ministry's hesitant relationship to the po\\ertul labour move
cent that had developed in the Kanpur textile m!lls. Kanpur
b.l.sinessmen and district of'.ficials eJqressed doubts about the
Ministry's capacity to rule in the light of its treatment of
tb.1s 1ssu~.285 The ~overncr, Haig, recognised that t:ant exhi
bited different :r~tures .trom hi.3 colleagues eles8lthere, but
believed that the sources of this di.tference lay 1n irresolu
tion rather than dn altermte set of ·convictions. 286 The impli
cation l!BS that it ~s the si tuatian rather than mintsterial
attitudes which was decisive. The pressure exercised by the
Congress Committee -v.es critical here. The Kanpur City Congress
Ca:mdttee (CCX:) had developed an intimate relation with the
workers' movement in the textile industry and in 1938 was to
extend active suppcrt to the striking workers. Its President,
Balakrishna Sharma, WiS to chair the Textlle Workers • Conference
285 Ewart of the Intellli~~ Bureau was similarly worried, am contrasted the I-t try's attitude unf'avourably with that o£ their Bombay cwn1:erD8rta • But bath he and the Governor, Haig, hoped that Cfovernor' s rule would be prevented at all costs. Ewart em the sitUltian in u.P., 28 November 1937, L1nlithgow MSS, Eur. F. 125.
286 Haig to r.tnlithgow, 10 January 1938. Linlithgow r-es, Eur. F. 125/100.
o! December 1938.287 Among the actions the Committee proposed
to aid the strikers was that the UP PCC ccmsid.er instituting a
boycott of the gOOds of such factories which did not accept the
recommendations o:! the inquiry conmittee set up to go into
questions relating to ..age-lewls am union recognition. 288 And
at the height o:! the 1938 strike, the KanJUI' CCC suspended
Ramarattan Gupta, its Vice-President and also Mllliging Director
of the Laxmiratan Mills, !'rom its Executive Committee !or his
refusal to support the ccc•s activities in the str1ke.289 The
signii"icance of this context fer ministerial attitudes 'tii&S ad-'
mitted by Katju \dlen he noted to Blig that i:le real problem in
Kanpur was Bal.akrisbm Sharma, litho the Ministry -was not willing '
to challenge because of the powerful influence he wielded. 290
This is not to argue that the Ministers were simply buckl
ing under such pressures. Individuals like Pant were evidently
eager to avoid repressive actions. Shortly after the Ministry
took office the Premier explained to !big that he believed that
communism shOUld be dealt with by argument rather tte.n by
force.291 Later, when i"Jle Kanpur District IvBeistrate used sec-
287
288
289
290
291
2nd All India Textile Workers • Conference, 24 December 1938. AITUC F. No. 61.
T!Je PiC!!l@G£• 24 May 1938, P• 4.
Boml?ax Chronicl.'ib 24 June 1938, P• 12.
Hai~ to Linl.itbgow, 2JJ December 1938, Haig MSS. Eur. F. 115/29. .
Hai~·to LinlithgO\vt 23 Aug1.1st 1937, Haig HSS. Eur. F. 115/17 b.
273
tion 144 Cr. P.c. to prohibit mill. gate meetings am slogan
shouting, Fant declared that he would not interfere with the
crder but at the same time he would not give the District
Magistrate a .tree m:OO. 1n prosecuting speakers. 292 I
Ha own coum.1tment to nco-repressive means, and his &\118re
ness ot the pressures working outside the ministry to prevent
recOW""se to such action, ca.used him to constantly procrastinate
over such measures. In one instance, lil ig had wanted action
taken against Parmamm, a Kakor1 prisoner who had been rel.eased
when Cc:mgress took office, for ~ak1ng seditious Sp!eches against
the British and Ule army. This happened shortl.y ai'~r the
heated ewe mee-ting at Cal.cut'bl, in which Nehru had argue<! that
repressive action related to the question of sedition should
not be taken without prior consul.tatian with the concerned PCC,
the WC or: the Parllamenta~r Sub-Committee. While Nehru tad been
de.f a3. ted on this issue, 293 Pant told Haig that b? would be con
sulting •others to whom according to our eonstitutic.n a re.ference
will have to be ~de on occasions like this. •294 Apparently
opinion in the Congress High Camre.nd was that the speech was
indeed very. bad but that action shOUld be taken only 1n case of
repitition. 295 In the :Ca.ce o:C Saig 1s adamant stance, Pant
292
293
294
295
Haig to Lin.l.ithgow, 10 December 1938. Haig ms. Eur. F. 115/29.
See above, 3.1.1.
Haig to Linl.ithgow, 29 November 19371 Blig MSS. F. 115/15.
Haig to Linlithgow, 16 December 1937 t ibid. Rajendra Prasad -bad cited Pant s anxiety at the aemonstrations taken out on the release of the Kakari prisoners when compl.aining about the growing 1ndisc1PlJ.ne in the Congress ~. To Pate11 28 September 1937 • ~~ndra Prasad fiB. n/'57/ col.l. 4.
274
compromised by noting that he would accept responsibility far
Parmamnd 's prosecution but as he had in the meanwhile been
arrested 1n Delhi on another count, proceedings tor sedition
should be suspended. 296 He made it clear tblt nser1ous develop
ments are likely to ensue d..f no way out ot the difficulty 1s
.toum• .297 U Ha1g decided to by-pass the Ministers,. ?-ant would
have to disassociate himSelf .fror4 the action, a course he would
not l.ike to adopt because of t:12 repercusslons it \fould have on
the ndmjnJstraticn and on the public. He eXplained that in
terms of public opinion, n there \..SS a large body of fluid opi
nion between the right_ and le.ft wings that could be infl.uenced
a[1iinst him ~J, this prosecution and that his position .for the
' future wOUld become decidedly weaker." 'lhe immed.iate background
to his apprehension lay in his support to the Kanpur District
Magistmte 's use of Section 144. He .felt tbat while Cor..gress
men might be able ·to accapt one such action, he dwbted whether
they coul.d accept another. 29B Haig realised the procariousness
of the situation and accepted Fan:t 's suggestions on condition
that he issue a public \\6nling to tne ei".fect tt..at theae speeches
would not be tolerated tmd that the Government woul.d be Zree to
institute proceedingS without further \1t6rll1ng• Pant accepted
this and the potentiul Cl·isi-s was diffused. 299
----------·------·· 296 Haig to Linli thgow • ibid.
297 Pant to ltiig, 11 December 1937, ibid.
298 Haig to Linl1thgow. 13 Dece!!lb:!r 1937 • 1b1d.
299 fi1ig to I.J.n:Lithgow, 23 December 1937 • ibid.
~75
Pant's own uneasiness 1n employing repressive methods
emerges from the welter of pragmatic explanations he prof erred
to Haig. But more signUicantly the discus.s1on aJ.so highlights
the two points ot pressure working on the Miniaters ., The first •
emerging from Nehru and the High Command, indicates that Rajagq
palacbari 's urnercutt1ng of l'litionalist imagery in his proscut
ing Batl.iwala for sedition had left its mark. Secand1y, am
mare significantly, it confirms the status given to ex'~ra
consti tutio~l opinion in the province in determining ministe-
rial attitudes.
The nature of this extra-constitutional authority li!B.S
diffused and uncoordinated 1n the agrarian sphere. It -was ex
pressed in the development Of parall.el government formations in
t~e 1Silediate ~ke of 1:be setting up o! the Congress Min1stry.30°
At first a!fic.1als suspected that this was a deliberate methai
employed by the Cangres3 party to deets.bl.ize the administration.
Haig however understood that there ~s no organisa.tion behind
thasa developments and he suggested to Linl.ithgow that tbat was
required was a patient approach. 301
The sustained 1.! spor-adic am \8'1Coard1nated nature of
this process som led to the £~t or a series of initiatives
300 These .tormatians tended to encwrage submission of repcrta directly. to Coneress officials and t0 denigrate gove!'nment servants. Compl.ainta bad been received :from almost all districts. UP m (1) and (2), August 1937. See also Ha1g MSS. Eur. F. 115/121 passim.
301 Haig to Linl.ithg~r, 17 November 1937, ibid. In his private r.otez on tr..e is£u.e he analy:>ed that \'.1-'..ile COID.u<Tess liiBS popular in the villages it bad as yet inadequate control at that 1e·ve1_ over party workers. !bid.
276
taken by the Ccmgress to lessen such activity, embarrassing as
it was to the ministry and to the adm1n1strat1on.302 thler the
instructions o! the Ministry, Chie.f Secretary Gwynne issued a
circular urging ~t the time had come •when determined ef.torts
should be made by the o.t:ticers at Government to establish rela
tions o.t mutual confidence with the district leaders ot the
Congress", to the end of creating· efficient and h<mP.st adminis
tration. "• •• It ls iroport3nta, the circular continued, "that
the district authorities shoul.d be in touch with the represen
tatives of the Congress organisation in their respective areas.
The Congress committees are being addressed in a aimUar sensa
by the UP P::C" .303 Seth Damodar swarup,. (Socia.lia·t) Secretary
of the UP PCC then issued a circular to tha DCC directing that
the Congress organisation and the government had to wrk A.s
allies as long as the representatives o1' the Coogress formed
the Government. He ackn~ladged that Congressmen and government
officers were reporting against each other ani urged that more
e.f.ticient redressal of grievances could be effected if the two
302 e.g. Pant had been de:teilSive o:t BabEl Raghavdas, the Gandhian wrker from Garakhpur, whom locel officials claimed \1188 undermining the authcri~y of the police. When Ragbavdaa was arrested, he ,.as so incensed that he wanted to mve a departmental enquiry into the handling of the Garakhpur tro.l~le. Ho-.teVer, he realised, that this wwl.d only excite local feeling and would possibly also impair ·tt.e <?A~tt;..;,:.:-i ~Y o:r the district staz.f and so he agreed with Haig that a private enQUiry wQJJ.d later be conducted by Katju, wiih tM he~p o:! Ul8 CO!mni.ssioner. Haig to L1nlltbgowJ. 22 September and October 1937, Haig KlS. Eur. F. 115/1•t b.
303 Illig 1-lSS. Eur. F. ·i15/12.
Zi7
acted in concert. Grievances should be settled locally ancl,
while Cor~essmen cou1d make enquiries into the genuineness at
the reports, they should on the whole leave investigation to
the proper authorities. In case of d~tisfaction the relevant ,. diStrict authorities should be approached am, where necessary,
the PCC.304
Linlit.hgow was shocked at both circulars. He felt tmt
they impaired the net.:.trallty o.f tbe ser•rices. He understood
the al.itwardnes.43 o:t the cireumstances • as the Gwynne circular
had been p?:'epared under mi.n.i.Ste1·ial m~er·~, but argued that
\Olhen a suitable oppuctuni ty arose stepe shOUld be taken :f'or its
withira,.e.l or mc.xi!.f!cation a£.td l'~ssurances f.J.ven to tlle ser-
vices.305 ,"
Haig en the other hWld i'elt that the circular :Md
r.ot imp~rilled service ~orale a!ld in !~ct had along with the
UPE!(:C's circulell" improved the sit~tion. He said that Congress
men now had to appronch the a.dndnistr-ation like everyone else,
while a speci.fic re.ference had to be mad.:: to them be0:1u~ of
the history of embittered relatior.!S betwen the Ca1gress and
the services. Conversations \•tith District officers gave him
the impression that the situation 1IIElS now stabler.306
In .tact, Illig was placed in a di.fficult position. In
singling aut the Ccngress for special treatment, the circular
couJ.d not but have boosted Congress prestige. By the end of
304 Cl.ipp!ng :from J'he Pionem:,, 9 Dece~ber 1937, ibid.
305 'l'o Ha!g. 24 Dece!llber 1937, ibid.
306 To Linll.tl~-rOtJ, 12 Febnary 1938. ibid.
278
1938, 1n reviewing the political sitmtion, he noted that while
the phenomenon of parallel government had died down, the ser
vices, and the police 1n particular, did not exhibit auch con
fidence. ?t:J?
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, there lllllS a
tendency on the part of Congress fwi.As arxl regular party men to
put pressure on the services and to arrange for transfers.
Secomly, there were conflicts developing on the labour am
agrarian :fronts througho-.1t 1938 and these af'ten in turn temed
to demoralise the services, especially as there was a certain
spice allowed to activists in these .f!el~.
Both c£ tl:ese trams ... :ere :fwg..~t out in the FCC. In 1938,
it had a Right Wing Pres1d~nt, Homnlal Saxena, •11ho tried to
arrange act! vi ties such the.t tl':c !:11nietry wocld not be embar
rass.gd or impeded in its func-ticning. But his policies came
under a tt&.ck, and this led to a cri.zis in the party in the
latter part of the year.
On tJ:.;e agrarinn issue, ·tr..e PCC had eought to reduce ten-
a ion by sending inGtrt:ctior..s asking the DCCs to i.rxluce tenants
to pay rent,308 and it ho.cl a~so supported the actions of the
authcrities to control labour unrest in Kanpur. 309 During 1938,
this outlcolt ~s taxed by the development o.t serious unrest in
307 Haig to LinJ.ithgow. 19 Decacber 1938, Linlit.ngat; f6S. :&lr • F • 125/101 •
308 UP FR (2), ~ptember 1937.
309 UP FR ( 1), ~cei:lber 1937.
thttse !ields • 310 am 1n the increased organisation toot arose
in its wakeJ311 am in the process Saxem 's un:lerstanding of
how the PCC should relate to the Ministry also came umer attack.
saxena•s view was that the primary responsibility o! the
party was to carry wt the instructions o! the legis~tive
party and of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee and he believed
that it should not criticise the Ministry. His understanding
\..as tl'l:l t the PCC • s role was to ensure the success o£ Ministerial.
p0l.icy.312 Criticism by the Kisan Sangh of Ministerial policy,
expressed in JJarches to the assembly, mounted press we on this
attitude both outside and inside the party. SOcialist members
such aa Narendr1:1 Deva (who was also ooe of the AD<C members
assigned to af.filia~ the U .P. Kisan sangh to the all India
body-'13) came il)to conflict with saxena.314 As a result of
310
311
312
313
314
There was a resumption of strike activity in the Kanpw MUla in Mly due to the failure of the Employees Association to implement the labour Enquiry Committee's recommendations. UP FR(1 ), May 1938. In the agrarian sphere landlords had been re!using to accept recorded rents in many cases, and there had been an increasing tendency amongst tenants to deposit rents in the tahsils. Further, in anticipation o£ the Tenancy Bill., ].andJ.crda bad been resorting to ejectments and in turn temnts were seizing disputed lam. UP FR( 1), Jamary 1938, FR( 1) and (2), June 1938.
In May and June there were lar~ numbers of Kisan meetings hol.d· to ~otest the Governnent s delay~ tenancy legislation. FR(1), f.By 1938 and FR(1) and t2), Jtme 1938.
President, UPPCX: to all Members, 20 August 1938. Aiel: 17/1938.
Niyamtpur Session, AIKC, 14 and 15 July 1937. Yajnik MS.F.S.
Nehru criticised saxe.na :for his inability to c:J;J.rry men of a di:f!erent party like Narernra Deva with him and urged that they be DJlde to .feel that "al.though they dU!er :troa you they are getting a s~e deal and m<re•. To Saxem, 20 April. 1938. AICC P 20(Pr.2)/1938.
280
these differences, Saxena proferred his resignation in August
1938.315 But he was persuaded to witMre.v his resignation on
the basis a! a PCC resolution that a!:tirmed his viewpoint. The
resolution noted that action would be taken against those seek
ing to UDiermine the Congress organisation, and it directed
Congressmen to disassociate themselves from those Kisan Sabhas
which srught to replace the national flag or which had as office
bearers Congressmen against whom disciplinary :.ction had been
taken. It also warned that anti-Ministry propaganda WOUld be
punished and it !!nally ordered that no grcup satyagraha de:ty
ing government orders should be un:lertaken withrut the prier
permission of the PCC. 316
Tension however continued. The independence of the FCC
from the Hinistry was underlined when in January a resolution
was passed debarring MLAs !rom election to the Pa:: Executive
Council. As a result the PCC executive resigned. Nehru was
unhappy with the suspicion this cast on the outgoing council,
and a reconsideration o:f the controversial c1ause took place
and the decision -.s reversed, The FCC expressed confidence 1n
the Council and the l.atter agreed to carry an untU the next
electiona,317 Nehru took over as the new President.318
In substance, NehrU's attitudes on specific issue were
315 AICC 17/1938,
316 Pioneer, 16 October 1938, P• 10.
317 Ibid" 30 December 1938.
318 Ibid.
281
not very different .from Saxena's, but he brought a different
emphasis to bear en the .framing of his positions. For example,
he supported the FCC resolution o.f *Y 1938 on the ai tt.etion 1n
the. Mills 'Which criticized both employers am workers, the lat
ter for not warning the employers before going on s1rika. When
the Kanpur Mlzdur Sabha leader, Hariharnath Shastri, -nted the
resolution amended so as not to criticise the workers, as he
believed that -t-.hi.s WOUld demaral.ise them, Nehru differed,
noting that
1.f they (Congressmen) thought that the workers did wrong in resorting to a strike without giving notice and consulting the .Ma2'Jiur Sabba, then they must say so to them. It the Mlzdur Sabha' which was their representa t1 ve waa not
consulted 1h such cases, the employers ~e right in refusing recognition to such a body.319
This ~s not an ant?i-worker position, but it was one vhich -s
not perhaps fully aware o.f the canpulSions operating on working
class struggles, compulsions which rrily not always have been
amenable to such a rational, disciplined ordering of activity
as Nehru deemed .fruitful for the development of the workers
tmJ.cn.
Similarly, like Saxena he came into cc:nfl.ict with Kisan
Sangh activity directed against the Ministry. Due to lac:k of
information, he believed that a Kisan Sangh mrch to the Assem
bly an 20 AprU 1938 had been designed to rival the Kisan rally
called tor by the FCC on 17 AprU, and expressed his irritaticn
at the irresponsible frequency of these demonstraticns to the
319 DaM·· 24 May 1938, P• 4.
282
C ouncll House. 320 When 1 t Wis explained to him that the rally
of the 2oth had been arranged well before t:OO PCC •s decision
to hold a meeting had been taken,'21 he apol.ogised, but reite
rated that such demcnatrtltiona should only take place em. spe
cial occasicma. 322
These similar! ties with &txem should not blirtd us to the
differences between the two. Unlike Saxena Nehru never ques
tioned the need !or an in:lependent Kisan organi~tian. 323 He
only wanted to discourage their .functioning as institutions
rivalling the Congress.324 This ~YP-5 sense in tr~ case o.f U.P.
where • unlike Bihar, the .PCC was amenable to radical mobUisa
tion. At the 'Same. time, as with his attitudes to workers' '
action, there are suggestions here of a certain inSensitivity
to the dynamics of working class and peasant action. However,
this did not mean that he identified with Saxena's rigid demo
rcation of the status of these movements. He ,.as abroad when
the PCC passed the resolution of October 1938, which ._as effec
tively levelled againSt Congressmen in the Kisan Sangh. His
distance ;[rom this attitude also made him eligible to sort out
320 Statement of 14 AprU 1938. AICC P 20(Pr.2)/1938.
321 Seth Damoclar Swarup to Nehru, 18 April 1938, ibid.
322 Statement of 20 Aprll 1938, ibid.
323 Saxena had noted that as the Congress had a daninantly peasant membership, there ,... no need ;[or a separate organisation. Speech at U.P. Pol.itical. Con:Ce-rence, Lucknow, 30 December 1937, Indj,an AP!!Jal Register, July-December 1937, p. 385.
324 JlS!l!K~ 24 May 1938, P• 6.
283.
the tangle in the party caused by these conflicts in 1938.
As Preside.~t of t."le political cc:nference at Ajodhya in
l);!cember 19381 m struck a balance between the Ministry and
radical Congressmen. He)letended the Min1Stry on the grOUDia
of the restrictions it \\tiS faced with because of the constitu
tion, but at the same time regretted the amount o.f time legis
lation was taking. w'hil.e criticising the for-rration of Kisan
organisations to rival the C'Jng!'ess, he a~o cr iJ;i3ized the
priority ot imple!!lenting the bUl and o~ opposi;J.g all attempts,
especially in the Council, to delay this.325 This last empbl-I
sis was significant for, as we have shown, negotiations to
whittle the bill do"~ had just taY.en place and t.~re still going
OD behind the scenes • Pressure ViS thus being exercised on the
Ministers am at the same ti!!le a precise orientation to extra
parliamentary action 'NBS being outlined: to support Congress
policy instead of trying to criticise it and to rival the party.
In short the exhortation li&S to de.!e.rxi the Blll's gains by pres
surising !rom within the party, against compromise. This visic:m
~ the extra-parliamentary \iElS not simply functional to minis
terial policy. It could be critical of this, but on the Ccng
ress plattcra.
Nehru •s empl:Bsis on disciplined action am criticism led
him to go on tg def'1ne the re~tianship between the party ani
the state. M we have noted• one ~ the anxieties the Governor
had registered in relation to the nature am domain of C<mgress
author! ty \..aS in the COJluOTeSS tendency to subvert the adninis-
325 ~' 9, PP• 312-17.
284
tration, not only through parallel ftmctioning, but by inter
fering in administrative procedure and by engineering trans
fers. 326 The Minister a informed !Big that tbey were also un
easy with th1a phenomencm and it waa through consultation With
the.,;v that ·the PCC passed the :Col.lowing resol.utie3U
While it is the duty o! all Congressmen to keep a vigilant eye on the welfare and ril?tlti of the people ani to report cases af oppression, it is not their busines:J, nor 13 it in conscnar.ce with their dignity, to interfere in anywal in uattors of adL .. _nistration, more especiaJ.l.y t.'lose relating to appointroonts, transfers am the like. The Councll there.fore lay down the rule that in future no member at a Congress COmmittee should make any reccmmendation to Government afficiaJ.s :for appointment or dismissal or transfer .tor political reasons.32B
This move can be analysed al.ong wi~h the reversal of the
PCC's attack on the Legislature Party and the lilinisters which
had sought to exclude I'-'lLAs from the executive af the party. The
latter reversal defended the legitimacy of ministerial and
legislative work f'rom the attackS o.f the extra-parLtamentary
section while the .fo..T'!ner i'irmly separated the donains of the
state and the pari.y • T'.ae p-:t.rty' s con!lati on with these other
points in the political spectrum ws deemed to have led to
mal.functioning at these different levels ~ the polity.
Remarkably, out at a very different experience, positiCilB
akin to at •s were being worked out. But the virtue o.f these
326
327
328
Hai~ to Linlithgov, 9 'tBy 1939. L1nlithgow I"'BS Eur. F. 125/102.
Ibid. .
Quoted in Haig to Linli thgow. 9 May 1939, Linl.i thgow M3S F. 125/102.
285
~unctions being kept separate lttElS not theoretically conceived
as with the l<hdras Premier, but emerged from tr..e threat to
political coMrenoe posed by their conflation. Further, this
view did not arise .!rom the stampoint of the state, but .troa
that of the party. This development also bad the distinction
o! being expressed by Nehru, a :figure who had cast doubts en
the worth of the o.ffice experlment. further, this viewpoint
\\68 shJ:lred by leading S':>Cic>.lli;ts o.f the prt~vince, li!t'.e Narendra
neva \Clo, wi 121 Nehru, tsld objected to the amendment excluding
tJJLAs from the Executive Council o:f the Party.329 Significantly !
1n Mu-ch 1939 when Gandhi, anxious about the cmotic situaticn
in the province, t"!l!'ged Nehru to dissolve the cabinet, assume '
Premiership ar.d "get control over the unrcly eler.1ents •, he a l.so
' noted tmt he ~d had lmg discussions ldth the Socialists an
the matter am he wsnted Nehru to discuss it with Narendra
Devo..330
A growing consensus then defined the decisim to "get
contrvl over the unruJ.y elements" and tre results: were quickl.y
observd.ble. In this pericxi, ShJ.bbanla~ Saxena, whose tmchecked
activities at~ongst the Gcrakhpur tenantry had eroded the stabUity
of the Gorakbpur Revenue admin.istraticn, was called to Lucknow
to see the ICS Reconl Otticer, am Nehru gaw him a dressing-
329
330
Pispeer, 30 December 1938.
To Nehru, 30 Miroh 1939, Ne~ MSSI Corref!pCDience, Vo1. 25. S1gn.U'1o&ntly it was after th s, on 7th April. tb:lt. the resolution asking COI'lt'"7"CSsmen not to interf'ere in the admin.1straticn was p;utsed.
286
down. Katju, acting I?remier from 10 to 17 Apr11, promised to
help the District Magistrate in the event at further trouble~31
In Miy Gwynne issued a circular advising action a~inst aU
speeches fomenting eonmuml and class violence. In the latter
category men:tion -.a made ~ comunist activity am irxiustrial
disputes. 332 In June, Haig noticed a distinc·i; shift in Fant •s
atti·i;ucte to the law and 01-d.er situ:ltion. The Premier noted
that he was eoing to take a firmer s-tand with the · ·'tzdur Sabha
on the issue ot lightning strikes, picketting ani "datJgerous
strikes •. 333 Evidently the consensus w1 thin tre p3.rty had
given him a new resolve. And 1n addition, aa Haig md accura
tely speculated,334 it seems likely that this attituie was re-e
l.ated to the decision ~ the High Command to §t matters UDler ,..
control; for this change occurred just before the Banbay sessicm
of the AICC, in which controversial changes were to be made in
the Congress constitution with a view to ef~ecting greater
control over the organisation. 335
The corroJ.ary of this stream:Lining err the party's da.iin
Wie its concentrated action on that which lf&S deemed its legi-
331
332
333
334
335
Ha1g to IJ.nl.ithgow, 25 rm-oh, 10 and 26 April. 1939. Linlithgow J69 Eur. F. 125/102.
To all District ot:ticers. AICC PL 2/1939.
Haig to t.inlithgow, 12 June 1939. Linlithgow MSS Eur. F. 125/102.
Ibid.
~ee Chapter 5.
287
timate sphere: the protection o£ tea1nt interest as it had
been legally constituted. On the Te~ncy Bill being passed by
the Upper House, a mge number o:t meetings were held through
out the province to publicize its benefits •336 In turn, Nehru
mouuted a compaign against taluq:Jar attempts to delay the bill
by asking !or Governor •s intercession. Nehru •s response was to
denounce this as dilatory tactics, as the interview with the
Governor \'t6.s fixed a month later. He stressed that there should
be no toning down a£ the Congress's position, and he .feared
that the d8lay '11.-ould cause -suspicion that the Ccngress was
be.:..lt-track1ng.337 Tha Blll ~s finally given Governor's sanc
tion shortly ~ar .the Congress withdrew .from the Hin.1atry.338 I •
It would sa em t.'len that 1n u .P,. the r-tirus terial experiment
had succeeded in its objectives of passing legislation tblt con
s elida ted tr...e ten&"lts 1 occupancy rigl'lts. I\1rhaps mare signifi
cantl:r. it bad da.."le this without tbe Congress aeriously alienat
ing it.'l supporte:~s. ~"ld this was aci1ieved by tl1e extra-parlia
mentary wing's ca;;acity, for a period at least, to allow for a
co-existence o! political !orms - ar canati tutioml and extra
constitutioml action. When sucll a nexible .tramew<rk - the
result (J! varicua pressures, rather than of conscioua clesign -
3:36 Nehru to Raje%¥ira Prasad, 17 October 1939. Nehru M>S Corrospondanca Vol. 85. See also Illig's report of the mass propaganda undertaken by the Co..1'lgl'ess to p~ularize the Blll in the v1llages *- iaig to Linl.ithgow, 1 November 1939. Linllthgow MSS Eur. F. i25/102.
337 Nehru to Rajendra Prasad 1 ibid.
338 UP FR (1), December 1939.
28S
became untenable in terms ~ the eonsti tutional .framework the
party liEla :f'unction1ng in, the sbitt 1n attitude to a more
crderly conception ot extra-parliamentary act1CI1 bad the beD&..
fit o£ being slllred by a section of the lett-wing 1n the party
wxler NehrU's guidance. The result ,..as that when disciplinary
action l.as taken, it tended not to take the form of a blanket
curtailment of direct action - as we have observed in the oases
~ the BJ.hai- am Andbra units -but was expressed rather through
individual aclmaniticm. Even when deoiaive action .as deiBDled
by the High 90111Dand, in the passage of the June 1939 resolution
prohibiting aatyagraha which md not been sanctioned by the I
concerned R:C, the .. u.P. case had a distinct approach. Nehru
asked 4 members of the Allahabad DCC who bad participated 1n
the 9 July demonstration opposing the resolution to resign
their posts •and carry on their agitation as primary members•~39
Thus, even though its emphasis was to organise extra-parlia
mentary activity on mere discipl.ined terms • the UP Fa= retained
a mare fiexible appr~ch 'Which crul.d integrate the con:f'licting
.torms o:f' action it 'liB& faced with under the ministries.
3.4 1'hl 8hap! gt the strategy
(Air e.Dllyais of the Ministerial. experience in three pro
vinces bas revealed tvo basic sets of compulsions: ( 1 ) Tba
mfntstera functicaed according to a sense at the llm1ta ~ the
Act. This was expressed in an evasion o:f' ccm.trantation over
289
issues, legislative and administrative, tmt cOUld lead to a
crisis and a premature termination of the ministries' lite.
Such crises had to be evaded in their view in order that the
primary objective o:r their tenure, the passage of ameliorative
legislation, ,.,as achieved. Inevitably this led to their seeking
adjustment in the realm of agrarian legislation with the land
lords so that they could ensure that opposition from tmt group
wouJ.d not signi:f'icantly delay the legislative process.
This sums up the tactical compulsions at work. But in
the case of CR 1M8 have observed a definite shift in strategy.
Adjustments, especially with the state apparatt.is, were not tac
tically conceiVedJ ~ey \\'8r~ seen as moments in the development
o.f control wer this apparatus, as J.evers in the process ~
making them willing agents o.f the elected government. CR sought
1n a sense to depol.iticise them, to 1!8ke them neutral implementer&
o:f Government policy. Simul taneousl.y, he tried to exercise
greater effective control over them at the points at wich they
were protected by the Act. The objective here was the consol.i
dation of the relationship bet\\'ften the popular government and
the state, with a view to enlarging the authority ot the former
over the l.a tter. we have suggested that in this strategy for
power the strength of the nationalist posi ticm ~s sought to be -
shifted alt9.y fran extra-ccnstitutiorill points of authority. The
provincial governments would be the .fcrtresses ~ nationalist
pO!t.ter, the position from which, through rene\\lE!d demonstrations
of electoral. strength, pressure would be brought to bear on tbe
Raj to effect a fundamental. tre.ns£er a! power.
290
Ministerial compu1s1ons and constitutionalist strategy
inevitably bid as their corol.lary a de-empbe.sis on extra-cons
titutional activities, !or the latter would calStantly threaten
tbe equilibrium desired with the services am the propertied
classes. But this trem remained unabated and 1! anything was
strengthened umer the ministries.
There appeared to be several. reasons for this. Firstly,
with the Congress taking •)ffice, the.ra were awakened great
expectat1al8 1 and perbips a sense of power vis-e.-"'is the col.o
nial state. AIXl secondly, this was linked up to a lett-wing
attitude which gave primry signi.ficance ·to the motivations ot
the classes they scugbt to represent. In turn this leadership }
displayed a skeptical relationship to the possibilities o! re-
form unier the Act. They were 1ndif.ferent to the questions ot
how the Act curtailed the legislative programme and temed to
press ~or the passage of measures Wich wre considered imprac
tical from the r~Jinisters ' point of view. Even when legislation
~s considered satisf'actm-y, however, there lllllS stUl room for
confl.ict. For the drive to rea~ise change through direct acticn
was still central, whether in terms ot realising le{fll rights ~
or 1n pressing tor~more radical ahU't in power relaticms.
The natio.zallst leadership approached this contradicticn
in two wys. Firstly, 1 t shoul.d be mated that they were not
bound down by the cautiou.aness characterist1o at the mJ.niste-
. rial viewpoint. en the other bind they accepted tb:lt 1:f a
balance sheet of constructive achievement was to be ~eft behind
at "the time of Ccmgress-withdra.al from at:Cice, wbich l'U anti-
291
cipated to happen at the time the Raj tried to impose Federa
tion on the coun~ then m1nister1a1 constraints would have
to be accepted in a :Large measure.
The GamhJan and Gandh1an Right Wing freedom from minis
terial caution -s demtWlBtrated by their approach to certain
is sues which would have been evaded by the m1n1sters 1£ they
were left to bindle matters in terms at their own sensa of
priorities. Thus in FebrUary 1938 Patel instructed M.mshi to
release political prisoners whcse case the Bombay Home Minister
had earlier said could not be rev1ewed.341 In tJle same vein it
can ba shown that when the U.P. and Biblr Ministries resigned in
February 1938• the decision -s nade by the High cormnam. and
i.n :ract the Ministers • view \'aS that a crisis should not be
provoked, otherwise it would jeopardise their legislative achieve-
ment.
The resignations in u.P. and Biblr arose :trom the Governcr•s
refusal to release palitical. prisCilers. In u.P. Pant initially
accepted that i:C Ha1g ~s adanant that the prisoners in ques-
tion could not be released, he would do nothing as he was not
prepared to resign an the issw or to declare their ditterencea
policy, presuably' because this wcul.d lead to a cr1sis.342 In
Bihar too in early January the Governcr reported that the issue
Rl3erxlra Prasad to s.K. S1nba• 4 March 1938. Rajemra Eriaad !6. 38/1938.
341 Lumley to Linl!thgow. 1 r'll.rch 1938. L1nlithgow MSS F. 115/51.
Haig to L1nl1thgow1 30 January 1938· Linlithgow MSS. &u-. F. 125/100.
292
of political prisoners had lapsed into the background. 343 But
then a drama tic shi.t't took place, which seemed to be only pirtl.y
related to hunger strikes by the prisoners in Allahabad and
Hazaribagh jalls (Pant•s deoisicn not to precipitate a crisis
had taken place attar the Allahabad nmger strike bad starte4344).
Pant had beco~ uncertain whether the issue could be evaded any
l<mger, and he attributed the change to the .factors of growing
publlc disgruntlement - probably exacerbated by the strike in
Al.lambad jail -and tlle likelihood of criticism at the forth
coming Haripura session ext the Ca1gress, criticism which ~s !
likely to be very broad-baaed as the Congress pooiticn an civil.
liberties ~s nat merely a leftist coornitment.345 These consi
derations must have contributed to the working Committee calling
for the release ~ all political prisoners on the eve of the
Ha.ripura sess1on.346 However. there were differences in the
Working Committee as to whether to o1ainte.in a :firm llne on the
issue or to avoid e. cr1s1s.347 The choice v.as left to Gandhi
who decided that the mjn.1sters should resign on the grounds tbat
their authority had been 1ntr1nged.348 In B!bU- tou Sinl'a noted
Hallett to L1nl.1thgow, 5 January 1938. Linlithgow MSS. Eur. F • 125/44.
Haig to Linl.ithgow, 22 January 1938. IJ.nlithgow loSS. Eut-. F. 125/100.
Haig to Linlithgow, 30 January 1938, ibidct:
BombaY Chronic1•• 11 February 1938, P• 12.
Ibid,, 15 February 1938. p. 1.
Ibidt
293
that he was not eager to precipitate a crisis, but given the
strong public opinion that had developed, he was sure that the
Working Committee WOUld call tor resignation.349
The Congress resolution an this issue waa not aggressive.
It pointed out that tbe Miniaters' functioning bad been infrin
ged, something lbich the Congress had undarstood would not take
place ,j}en it accepted office. Whlle laying the blame an the
Governors, the resolution went on to indicate that the p;trty
had no desire to precipate a crisis and direct acticn and so
'\IIEls reluctant to call for resignations in other provinces • It
therefore called upon the Viceroy to reccmsider his decisicn so
that the Governors. "may act constitutionally am a.ecept "the ' advice at their ministers in the matter at rel~se a! the poli-
tical prisonera •••• -'50 Nehru was later to note that though the Congress Working
Committee position ,.as moderate, it ,as firmJ while their
primary aim was to push through agrarian legisl.atim and then
to deal with the Federation they, ar.d particularly Gandhi, had
been prepared to follow through with their position an this
1ssue.351 In the end thiS mocleraticn was adequate to gain C<mg
rass ends, w1 th most of the prisoners being released very shc:rtly
after the Ministers' returning to o.tt1ce.352
350
351
352
Hallett to Governor-General• 2 February 1938t IJ.nl.ithgow MSS Bur. F. 125/44.
Zaidi, .§hcxcl.qpaedia of IN£, Vol. XI, p • 438.
To V .K. Krishna Henon, 5 M:lrch 1938, SWJH, VoJ.. VII, p.379.
In U.P. al.l ot the 15 prisoners ~oncernad 1D the controversy were released ·1n Rlrch;. Ha.ig to Linlithgow, 2'
294
There were two reference points present in this decisions
a sensitivity to extra-m1niaterial compulsions ani opiniona and
a firm defence f4 the m1n.1aters• authority in tile face of the R
Raj •s interference. It .aa this issue which again precipitated
the Orissa Ministry's resipt1m. 'l'h1s occurred because an
ICS officer hPd been appointed Acting Governor. In the Congress
view this was a threat to t.l-J.eir can.stitut1ow.1 position as they
insisted that the services were subordinate to the Hinistry.
Gandhi precipitated the crisis by issuing a statement criticis
ing the appo¥ttment ~ Dain, t~e concerned officer, am taking
it clear that reinstatement of the Congress ministry after the
termimtion or 'ru.s tenure WOUld be questiom.bla in his eyes.353
Tha statement ,.as issued withou~ consulting tr~ N.irdsters,
though Gandhi noted that they had agree<! with him tb:it the issue
had to be handlai :!!rmly,354 He noted that lle considered the
issue -to be more fundamental than thnt o.f t-"le release o£ the
pollticaJ. prisoners as it m--eacbed a very blsic constitutional
po1nt.355
cont•d •• t.n. 352 ...
353
354
March 1~38. L1nl1thgow MSS. Eur. F, 125/100hin Bihar 40 out at .:t-1 :ri.sol"lers had been released by Apr • J!!!ian AmueJ Re~ter· Jamaary-Juna 1937, P• 17.
en receiving news o£ Dain1s appointment, the ewe demanded that the deeision be rescilxled. B~ ••eli; 5 Apr11 1939e P• 1. Gan:ihi then issued hiS ste • _bay ChronJ.g],e, 21 April 1939e P• 15.
Gandhi-Lumley interview. 13 ~by 1938. Linl.ithg0\<1 r.f>s. Etu- • F. 125/51.
Ibid. The criSis was evaded by tbe Govern~, Bub'backe eancellJ.ng hf.s leave.
295
The other major ministerial issue o~ political signifi
cance in which the Gambians were invQlved li&S that relating
to the restoration at lands confiSCated :f'rom peasants in G~
rat during the civil disobedience movement. Gandhi •a and 'fatel •s
invol.vement bad two features. Firstly it affirmed the legiti
macy ~ pre-ministerial Cc::agx-ess activity and questioned British
actions during that period, and so 1n the process reaf£1rmed
the basic differences between the Ccngress and colonial ruJ~:
Gandhi went to the extent of suggesting to Gove:m.or Lumley that
the Gujarat Lams Act have a preamble in which the Br.itish
Government would be condemned for their v1ct1misation of the
concerned land ·hol~.35S And secoDily• like the orissa issue, '
it UDierlined the sl.lbordinate attitude the services had to adopt
in relation to the popular governments.357
In these instances, the Gandhians not cmly transcended
the lQgic o:f ministerial caution, they al.so l"eaaserted the rights
o.f popularly constituted authcrity. in the £ace of the Raj and
the services. Further, in doing this, they drew attention to
the real politiOll. orbit the m2ntstr1es .functicned inz not tlat
o! the constitutiCGll. space afforded them by the 1935 Act. but
a space defined by a national.iat, extra-constitutional. authcrity.
tJowewr. as we have noted, in the case of the original
Gandhjan Rightist arguments 1n £avour ot o.t'f1ce acceptance, and
356 Ibid.
357 Th-=re 1.\GS s~ong pressure :fron Fatel. ani Revenue H1n1ster l\1orarj1 Desai .for Garret. the civU servant ccamected with re~s:Jton in the area. to be tre.~errad. Lumley to Linl.1 thgow •. 15 March and 2 April, ibid.
296
aa we have observed in the practice ar Rajendra Prasad in
Bihar, the main priority o! the ministerial phase -s not to
precipitate conf'l.ict, but to ensure social conaolidaticn. At
this level both Gandhi and the Gandh1an Rightists accepted the
logic ot mJ.ntaterial action and ita liaita, and so aligned thea
selves against those elements in the Congress llhich threatened
the equil.ibrium required to achieve these · ends.
In Gandhi 1 s vision, tne incorporative and subordinating
aspects of the 1935 Act358 could be t:m.rted if the Act waa
used in a nanner not expected by the rulers and if the rrd nj s
ters re.tra~ from using it in the manner iDtended by them.359
Wblt .as this t1De~cted ma.nner't Fasentially it meant an imple• '
men'Ultian of the cmstructive programme (Camnunal amity, eradica
tion of untoucblbUity, end o:r addiction to drinks and drugs,
social enfrancld sement o! wmen, amel.iora tion o:r vlllagers, free
and coJJtpul.sary educe.tiCil, overhauling ot higher education to .
bring 1 t 1n line w1 th the needs ~ the people, radical changes
in the legal. machinery so as to make justice pure and inexpen
sive, conwrsicn o! jalls into re£orDJltories360), which 'WEl8
equivalent in hJa mind to the ttwUltng exercise at nc:n-violeme
by 'tbe whole mass at ;PeopJ.e•. 361 In his early statements en the
358
359
360
"••. "uD:lerlying (the Act) is the hope that what has been imposed tipon us we shall get to like, i.e, \18 Shall really regard our expl.o1tat1on aa a blessing in diaguiae •• ,• C~esa MJ.n18tr1es. 17 Jul.y 1937. CWMG1 Vol. LXV, pp, ~.
Ibid,
My aeaning ~ ot.tice acceptance • Hal1.1an• 4 September 1937t CWJ19• Vol, LXV, P• 105.
Ibid.
297
ministries, Galxlhi noted that 1:t this 'inU.spensable conditiCil'
was ;[ulfilled, then his 1dea1 at the conversion of the adminis
trators at the system cOUld be fult.1lleda
·~1-~~thatanding their desire to the com;rary they sav that their guDS and everything they bad created !or the consolidaticn o! their auUlcrity were usel.ess bec&use c4 our non-use or them, they could not do otberwiae than to bow to the inevitable and either retire from the scene, or remain on our terms • i.e. as friends to cooperate with us, not as rulers to impose their will upon us. ·
I! Congressmen have entered the legislatures with that (non-violent) mentality and it the British administrators tolerate Ccmgr&ss .tadetinite].y, the Congress will be em a :fair VJ.y to ...-eck the Act and to achieve caaplete 1Diepen:lence. For an indefinite prolongation of the . ministries on the terms mentioned by me means ever J.ncreasing power of the Cmgress till 1 t beComes irresistable am 1a able to have its way all alcng the Une.362
Galldhi's strategy can be logicaJ.ly broken down into the
! ollowing points s
(a) a non-violent approach ~s the lynehpin at the strategy.
This involved the ccnstruetion of an ideal eonmunity of the
peopl.e, wherein divisions and differences were dissolved by
progressive ~arm.
(b) if suob a ccmnun.ity lriBS constructed, then repression would
become an obsolete phenomenon ( •. •• • the 1r guns and everytbiDg
they had created tor the consolldation of their authority wre -
useless because ot. sw MQ=W!! qt tbp•.)
(11) thJ.a neutralisation of the re,treasive funct1Cil8 of the
state woul.d rob it of all power aver society ("an indefinite
298
prolcmgation o:f the ministries on the terms menticned by me
means an ever-increasing power o:f the Congress tUl it becomes
irresisti-ble and is able to have its 'WilY all along the 11ne •••• •)
In the terms of Gandhi's thought, to describe thia stra
tegy as designed to achieve ciVil hegemony would be 1nnacurate1 f-er the argument tended to break down the di v .1s ian between
political and civil society.363 The ideal canmunity o:f the
latter would, in Ge.ndhi 's terms, tend t9 undermine the rationale
:for the existence of the state as a separate, arbitrating ani
re}ressing institution. In a sense Ga.Mbi 's view ~ diametri
cally opposed to CR•s. Far the latter the state would be raised
to the level of ideal and impartial arbiter in the affairs of
the people. For acbnu, on' the other ham, the functicning of
the people would make the state an irrelevant phenomenon.
In Gandhi's ideal terms, this meant the establlshmnt of
a direct, harmonious relationship between the peopl.e •s repre
sentatives ani the people. An ideal CODnuni ty of interests \1188
the object! ve, one whose realisation wculd circumvent the struc
tures of repression represented by the state, and wuld there
fore cOI'lSolidate nationalist power on the grOUDis of an irresis
tabl.e maral and social authority. The :functionaries of the
state WOUld become impotent bystanders, bemused by a society
which had !lo need ar them.
363 R1rtha Cbl.;tterjee bas oe.de such an aralys1s of GEuxlhi's thQ.lgltt, lati~t T. in a £9l,on1al World. A Perivative Dis00urse New hi, 1987.
299
In practical terms, this 'WliS a struggle !or civU hege
mony, because it sought to shift the grQ.Jlld of authority and,
of course, it bad to come to terms with the fact that (1)
society ,.e.s divided and oontliotual and (2) the state theretore
must cODtinue to ft.UJ)tion. How lJ9.S this contradiction resolved?
we shall attempt to show that in Gandhi's view Congressmen would
have to discipline themselves into accepting the existing legal
parameters c:r the state. If t~ae were accepted as the unavoi
dable basis ~or action, then the possibilities at cmtlict - at
a rupturing of the ideal conmuni ty - would be pre-empted and,
in turn, the sl!IBy the state nachinery exercised oYer society
would be curta.U.ed •.
Gandhi's respOnse to the developing ccntradictions in the
situation in:licate hJ.s dual emphasis on Congress discipline ani
peaceful {i.e. ncn-i."'epressive) ministerial cCI'ltrol. When unrest
amcngst crim:l n:J1 tribes and the working-class 1n, respectively,
Sholapur and Abloodabad led to pol.ice .firing, Gazxih1 interpreted
the events in the .follow.ing t~J.y l that a section of Congressmen
(the "Red Flag men") were not suomi tting themselves to Congress
discipline in that they were pursuing such violent terms of
acticm, and secondly, that the Ccngz:-ess was not ab1e to control
n~cmgress elements (it seems tna.t alluded to here \t.ere not
only those mo 'IJ9re not Congr-essmen or Congress supporters, but
also those. who did not accept C~ess methods). Be believed
that Sbol.apur and Ahloodabad represented the expectations that
had developed in the \'JElke o:r Congress taking of.fice, and so he
believed· this unrest would be controll.able ., I~ on the other
300
hand these ,_re indeed signs o:t the wealmess of Congress c antrol.
then he feared that the holding of o:C.fice would be detremental
to tba Congress, sal the situation WOUld have to be reviewed~ Howewr, Ccmgreas •a incapacity to represent various ·
interests, am the Ministry's taking recourse to repressiCil to
handle th1a fact, were fea'blrea 1Dcreasingl.y seen by Ga.mh1 as
being determi.ood by the refUsal of Congressmen to abide by non
violent n&X"IDS. In his vie\t, this approo.ch jeopardized the
imperative at abiding by the terms of trust of British inten
tions on which grouni the Ministry experiment ,,.as being carried
on~It also infri.Dged his own sense o:r cmstructive wcrk as a
practice which cOUl.d rder only to its own weaknesses, and should '
not seek the sources of its problems in causes outside 1 tseU,
such as the :functioning of the state.366
The intringement of these moral imperatives meant, in
political terms, that re09.loitrant elements would have to be
disciplined into {lccept.ing the methcds ar activity which ,_re
deemed correct, i.e. functioning within the legal s~ce that
the dacisicn to accept office bad brcught w5;th it.
To Nehru, 18 November 19371 ~ Vol.. LXVI, P• 297J •stea-m Signals•, Har1,1an• 20 Novembe--r-1937. ibid., PP• 300-1.
Thus he noted to the Bombay Governor, Turnley, tbit he :Celt that the British had been sincere 1n their re:rorms1 however much he disagreed with t."le Acst. Interview, 1.:> May 1938. Ltnlitbgow MSS. F. 125/S.
In 1935. after Patel made a speech critical at the Government' O;lnihi noted: "We shOuld not criticise the Government s policy in tblt tone at the present time • • • 1 t is a time for intrropection, fc.u .. putting and keeping our house 1n order. ••" To .Eate1• 22 Aprll 1935, 9a:P, Vol. LX, P• 458.
301
Thus, when at the Daloutta session, severe criticism l!lflS
levelled against the ministries far failure to fully implement
the Congress programme of civil libert1ea,367 he .u aghast at
the "untruth al'ld vio:lence• which characterized the speeches ,368
So disturbed in fact was Oarxlhi that be actually envisaged the
Gandh1ana • res1gnat1cm !'rom the Working Comni ttee. 369 There
~s considerable acrimony 1n the committee, and from accounts
o:f the altercations, it is clear ttat the ministers had con
vimed Ganihi that repressive methods had to be used in the
face at the v1 olence they claimed that left-wing ecngressmen j
were rescrting to, and it *B reported t.te t as a result the
Ministries had, been given .freedom to use the law to oontrol
such unreat,370
Gandhi now ~d to curtail or at least postpone his vision
of a non-repntssive, idea~ representativeness in the f'ace o:t
these oontlicts am because of the needs of the ministerial
369
370
Amongst the issues menticned were the arrest af fetli,ala, the continued detention of certain communists 1n Bombay, the arrest of' certain persons in U,P. for having proscribed 11 terature the faUure to separate executive am jusicial functlcms ot Government. A.ICC 6 aDi 45/1937.
The AICC,,Ha£1.1an• 13 November 1937, C!f:lG, Vol, LXVI, PP• 292-9 •
To Eatel, 1 November 1937, ibid,, PP• 285-86,
According to Jtlmshi a serious argument took. .1>lace between Kher and Nehru in rela t:lan to how to deal with labour trouble 1n Bombay al¥1 Kber emerged victorl~t claiming that he owld even usa emergency powers now u necessary. Lumley to Linllthgow• 9 November 1937• L1nl.1thgow MSS F. 125/5. A similar account of the CWC came f'rom the Madras Ministers. Erskine to L1nl.1thgow• 16 November 1937 Erskine Ms. D 596/2. See alao •Notes on the situation in the CCI'lgresa•. 20 November 1937t ibid. am R.M. Rlxwal.1,
302
experiment. When CR was bitterly criticised for his use of
the Cr1mSnal l.aw Amendment Act, for example, he urged that ttthe
obnoxious clauses• be repealed, but accepted a\'a decl.arations
that the Act •conta!Ds a ~ev sectitllS which suit the new situa
tion that the C<Dgreaa is ~ao~ •••• ' 71 However, 1t acceptance
o:r the legal. space and its logic l!ElS one aspect of Ga.r:dhi •s
relati<m. to the new situation, his and the Right Wing.'.s prin:Bry
means to ensure that the obsen-at!on at legality was ensured
l.&S through canaolldating inner party control.
Be£ore the October AICX:, Ge.nihi urged Patel to get control
over the "turbulent wind that 1s blowingtl.372 And 1D:lependent
ly, the Right Win& J~Jere preparing to do 'tlla. In September, '•
Patel canplained to' Rajendr8 Prasad about the activities of
communists !n Bombay • Shol.apur, Kan:pur and Cal.cutta and of K1san
Sabha :t\inct1on1.~ in Bihar, Maharashtra and Andhl"aJ he felt tbat
an attempt -s be !ng made by these groUps to discredit tlle C ong
ress Ministries by putting f~~ extravagant denams. 373 He
noted that he had al\t6ys been against the fannation o:r the Kisan
sabha because· of the inevitable rivalry tblt wou.ld develop bet
ween the two, am ..nich in turn would result in the erasion at
311
372
373
nOn the relaticnship between Congress Ministries and the Congress n., 21 November 19371 ibid •
f!lri.1Nb 10 September 19;)8, cytp. Vol. LXVII, P• 328.
To Patel. before 9 October 1937'. CJtp, Val. LXVI, P• 213,
H~~l to RaJ~ndra Prasad, 22 September 1937 • Ra.jeiXira Frasad MS_ II./-,7/coU.4.
303
Congress prestige. In ract he believed tblt this crganisa.tion
was e!!ectively trying to displ.ace the Congress am urged that
this issue be faced at the calcutta Aicc.374
Patel was pointing to the divergences tblt seemecl inevi•
table 1n the ciro\IIStance&, i.e., in terms o! the pitching ~
denania beyond the point where they were negotiable 1n ~rms of "
the possibillties ..of lcgisl&tion tll'lC.er the Act. Ckl. the atber
ham, Patel's opinion that this lMllS an attempt to displace the
Congress exprensed an exclusivist ncrtion a! what the mtionalist
orgard~tion ;,,as, ar..d of the methods it should pursue.
1be n:sul.t ~ these growing divergences was a cocrdinated
attempt to organise the G-'lndhian elements to defeat the le£t
wingers in t..,_e f'Zlrip.;xra elee'tians in order to ensure tblt their
min1ster1. <J.l ztrategy tr1umphed.375 This effcrt bore fruit at
374 Patel to Rajenlra Prasad, 2 October 1937, ibid.
Y/5 In November Patel. wrote to Rajendra Prasad that if the office acceptance experiment "t.&S to be a success 1 t was imperative to organise their !c.rces so as to dominate the AICC at lilripura and after. To Rajendra Prasad • 21 November 1937. Hajendra Prasad tiJSS III/37/ooll..S. Rajemra Prascd respcnded pocitiwly (25 .NO'tember 1937 • lbW am wrote to the Biblr Premier, s.K. Sinha to organise their follOWGrs. He noted that at the Calcutta AICC session
_ thCI6e holding to Gandhi's Jrograllllle decided to crge.ni.se themselves am that at a meeting o! the Gandhi Seva Sallgh it was decided tb.a t the Gandhians should not allow the Congress orga.nj.sntion to slip out o! their hams. Rajendra irasad emphasized that whlle e:very ef!ort had to be made to secure the success of the Gandhian programme, he did not 1llllnt a:n.y advantage taken ty those already entrenched in positions cf power. The main aim \\1Bs tor the Gandh1an group to submerge confliot amongst themselves and to stase a clear-cut conte3t with the soc !a lists. To S .K. Sim. • 2 Decen:1ber 1937, Rajendra Prasad Pti- XV/37/coll.2. See also Raje!l.dra Prasad to R.a~ya.J..u Sinhl, 7 December 1937 • ibid., for sind.l.ar ;instructions. Munshi bUd e.l.so infanned Lumley that n right-wing soJ.idari~.l had been ~onned t;o contest the
304
Haripura. In most o! the PCC elections, except Kerala, where
the socialists secured one third of the seats, the Gandh1ans
secured a najarity. In the delegates• elections the left-wing
presence liiU sign1!1cant but nowhere domimnt. In ADihra
socialists secured 8 out ot 29 seats, in Bihar 5 oot at 36.m Even in u.P. a Right Wing leader, Momnlal saxena, ~s Presi
dent ~ the FCC in 1938.371 However, those victories were nat
always as cleanly fought as ~1c Right Wing desired, and in
Bihar 1n particuJ.ar, i:ni'luence .Ll ·!;;.he di&tricts ani in the
party was used. by :local. Right Winti candidates, along with brute
farce. to gain thei4" ends.370
_ Insp1te ol' domtranca ill ·tL.e party by the time of the
Baripl.l.ra sessi0l11 cv ~~ricus a:t·ta.:..pt to emorce ciiscipline ~s
undertaken throughout 1938. Inst<3ad tll6 Rightists issued we.rn
illgs against wmt tr~y deemed disruptive activity, as in the
case of th& resolution ou t::le K.i.s.:ln .3abha at Iilrlpura,379 and
in the repr~uding oi' Z.A • . \~1 R.K. Lohia and K.M. Ashraf,
J.e.tt-willg secz·e·wries oi: tllii ~..rcc, i:or not :raithfully represent
ing the Q!:t:icia:l Congress line •380 It seems that there \..S.S an
Ccnt•d •• t .n. 315
elections. Linlithgow to Zetl.~nd, 16 December 1937, Lln~ithgow rr~ L'ur. F. 12.5/4. For :turther details of Right Wing mob111satian see Patel. to Rajendra Prasad 12 Decembar, 16 December 1937. Rajemra Prasad IwS. II,37/coll.2.
376 FRa (1) am (2). January 1938.
377 S~e ab~, Section 3.3.2.
376 Se;,e above section 3.1-.2.
379 Zaidi. 1$mY2J.QpaE!cl.ifl ot :WCt VOl.. Xl• -PP• ~~;;g.
380 AICC 59/37.
305
occasion a demand for disciplinary action,381 but even in
September 1938, at the AICC session in Delhi, ins pi te of the
grotd.ng tension that had developed as a result of agrarian
con:flicta in Amhra am Bihar, am the labour movement in BOm
bay._ the civil liberties reso1ut1on moved by Gandhi li!BS :timlly
onl.y a \tf!ilrning against class and camm.mal violence and an asser
tion ot Congress "support to measures that may be umertaken by
the Congress Governments for the defence o:f l.i.fe and property. n382
As we have shown, the Delhi resolution did in practice
lead to PCCs in Arxihra and U.P. rul.ing that disciplinary action
WOUld be taken against Ccagressmen who participated in satya
grabl without PCC sanction.383 And, as Sumarayya bld noted,
when Gan:lhi made a re:rerence to the case of the Kal.ipatnam
satyagra.ha to censure Congressmen for encour:-aging the usurpa
tion of l.andlcrd •s property, he was not aware of the background
and of the tenants' rights ani accaroing to Suzxiarayya, his
statement encouraged the land1ards.384 This b11nkered view,
even w1 thin the terms of legal rights, indicated a biased a tti-
382
The we meeting of May vas reported to haw voted :r or disciplinary action for releasing press statements without the prior approval ot the General Secretary, but no resolution was passed, lev Chrcniir• 18 *11938, p. 1. It liB& later re:ptll" that Lo a, secretary ot the AICC Fcreign r»partment, bad pro:t'erred his resignation, but the we would not accept it. Bombax Chron.1.c1e, 21 September 19391 P• 1.
Resolution for AICC, dre.:rted by Gandtd, be:fare 23 september 1938. QiMG, Vol. LXVII, P• 368.
See above, 3.1.2 and 3.3.2.
Sundarayya, "lSmimari Aggression 1n Alxlhra", Natiozp.l f£9R.:£, 1• 35t 16 October 19381 P• 11.
306
tude to agrarian conflict.
However, the distinction between ~ni.ng ani outright
disciplinary action is not irrelevant. The Right-Wing li!BS in
control o~ the party during 1938, but refrained tram exercising
discipl :lnary action to make Congressmen conform to the diatates
~ the ministerial situation. They only rescrted to such action
by June 1939, when the A!CC p3.ssed a resolution prohibiting
satyagraha without the prior permission of the PCC concerned. 3~5
It could be argued that such disciplinary action \1119.S being
taken by allowing law and order to run its norJJBl course • Arr
ests did seem to ~ve deterred the Malabar peasant movement but
we haw noted, in that instance, that the socialists pursued a
restrained policy in handling unrest. 386 In Kalipatnam and
Munagala, arrests had not tmdermined the movement, and in :ract
the PCC had interceded to resolve the issue.387 In Bihar too,
the bak&sht movement had been undaunted by such modes a£ control.
And interestingly, arrests did not always preclude continued
involvement. Thus, in the negotiations relating to the settle
ment ,af'l.~the Barahiya Tal ag11a tion in Monghyr, Karyanam Sbirma
'AflS transferred to a nearly jaU •o that he could be included
in the mediation. 388 Am sipUicantly, while the B~C had, 1n
385
386
387
388
see bel~, Chapter 5.
see above 3.1.2.
See above 3.1.2.
K.B. Sahay and Saha.janarxl negotiated with Sharma in jail• and he agreed to help in arbitration. The Government agreed to provide .tac111 ties .tar this but would not release him. S~mnandan S!Dba, K.A to Yajn:l.k, 25 May 1939, Yajnik MS F. 11(2). Sblrma \\68 then trans.terred to
307
January 1939, disallowed DCCS :trom participating in satyagrabl
witha.rt its permission, 389 individual participation was not
disallowed. Rajendra Prasad }resided over thia meeting.390
It appears that even U Gandhi aDi the Right Wing believed
that extra-constitutional action had to be halted in the given
circumstances of Congress occupying ministries, they did not
put the weight of their pO\ver behir.rl the enforcement of this
position. They censured, repY'1manded ani warned Congressmen
that they should conform to legal activity. They bad. entrenched
their control over the party in 1938 but did not use this to
control direct action. '!bat their resolutions did lead to such
efforts is an inadeqUlte critericn to characterise their pollcy.
It is likely th:lt the popular mture of direct action
initiatives acted as a barrier to enforcement of a monolithic
strategy at the sort that CR bad desired, and which not even
he ...as able to implement. While the Right Wing's evaluaticm of
the politioal circumstances caused them to view direct action
as a threat, in practice they .frum it d1£ficul.t to act deciSi
vely against it. Given that they cOUld for a long period
couutenance this duality of method, it would perhaps not be
inaccurate to hazard that it WlS their own non-constitutioral.
approach to politics that enabled them to adopt thiS attitude.
eont•d •• t .n. 388
Mongb¥r jail. AIKB, 9 Jtma 19391 Yajnik MS ~ • 15.
389 See above 3.2.2.
390 "Lal¥1 to the Tlllers", C0!!£!1! Sgci!].1ata 4,2,29 June 1939t PP• 1-2.
Ultimately, in Jtme 1939, they took decisive action, but
the circumstances were more complex tb:ln is immediately appa
rent. The Bose victory at Tripuri bid revealed a significarxt
discordance that was only part1all.y related to left-wing anti•
pathy to miniateriaJ. pQlicy. The incoherence ~ the opposition . ~---------- - --- -------
suggested that Gandhi's growing .fear or corropt1on in the party
bad some basis.391 But if strict control was related to this,
it must also be related to a desire to control the enJ.arged
dimensions that direct action had acquired 1n 1939, especially
in Bihar.
Nevertheless, if we now take an overview of the policy o:f
the n;ltionalist leadership in this period the picture suggested I
is one of strategy as a resultant. Although the 1eadership
deemed it necessary to curtail extra-parliamentary action ar
the order of satyagraha, they could not do so. AiJ a result,
there developed a co-existence o.f forms for the larger ~rt af
the C<mgress min1str1es ' li.fe.
391 See below, Chapter 5.
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