167

~ thia chapter we examine aspects of the :!unctloni.ng at

three ministries (Madras• U.P •• Bihar). CUr ana1ys1s does nat

attempt a detailed survey of legislative am administrative

policies; we discuss these features to the extent that they give

us an idea o:f the function of t!->ese procedures within the Cong­

ress objective ~ consolidating its p<Ner in relation to the

colonial regime.

We also try to develop a picture of the significant dis­

sOJ:lances in pOl.it!p&.l. agency which arose UDier the Ministries.

Here the relation between the ministry arxl extra-parliamentary

inStitutions a:rxl movements (Congress Coumittees, kisan organisa­

tions) is examined. As far as popuJ.ar initiatives are concerned,

we .focus on the agrarian movement. Cur aim here is to discern

what the implications o:f these different political .forms and

their relationship with each other were for Congress politics.

The threads are drawn together to gain such an overview

in the last section. 'lhis handles the evolution of the Gandhian

leadership •s all-India perspective and interrogates the deeper

historical rationale of the ministerial experience arn ita

impl.ications for the development of mtionalist hegemony in

p ol.i tical. li.f'e.

Const~onalism in Practice: The Ra.1agopal.achari ~R"ii1S_ .

•• • we are au so sensitive aDd urabl.e to

lG8

think outside forua.U.as and proposition~of old times ••• 1 (C. Rajagopalachari)

3.1.1 Controlllng the state apparatus

It 1a easy to ~ke a virulent denunc :La tion o! Rajagopala­

ehari's policies as a reversal of Congress policy. s. Gopa.l has

drawn our attention to his authoritarianism and repressiveness,

his reliance on the most colonial of British codes (the grant­

ing of titles for example), his 1 istrust of Imian administra­

tive capabil.ities and cultivation of the colonial bureaucre.cy.2

Indeed, the ~.!Cidras Pretiier was gullty of all these misdemeanours.

However, for our purposes, llhat is more pertinent than mere

denunciation is an explanation of these policies as pol.itioal

strategy.

In the previous chapter we had suggested that the consti­

tutionalist argument comprised two key elements: a reorienta­

tion of Congress politics to a gradually developed control aver

the institutions of the sta teJ and, relate~y, a de-emphasis on

extra-parliamentary methods, for such methods coul.d uniermine

the control the Congress cou1d exercise over the state apparatus,

and cOUld therefore jecpardise the Congress programme. Iri

September 1937, at a political ccnterence 1n Madras, Rajagopala­

chari (CR) reiterated this governing rationalea now that the

Congress bad taken office, talk about doing a-.y with Government

-should be mi n1 ad sed ar¥1 Government officers should not be cri ti-

1

2

CR to Patel, 25 Nay 1939, c. Rajagopalach.:tri Ms. (here­after at Ms •) Roll 2.

S • Gopal., i~lfl Nehru,. A B10Sf&phx. Vol. 1, Delhi, 1975. pp.~

cised because they were cooperating with the Congress m.inii.;try.

He ccncluded ttflt these changes would take place at the expense

of the Congress Commit-tees a there shOUld be a restrict! an o~

lJbat could be agitated an and o£ whit ViS demanded of the Jriini­

stry. Gertain Congress programmes should nov be postpcmed. 3

nus desired reorganiSation ~ politics 1n the Cangresa

is best illustrated by CR 's mndling of the case of s.s. Batli­

wala, a Comnnmist 1n the Co¥>.gress Socialist Party. In September

Batli'wala ~d •de a speech in Arxlhra attacking landlordism. The

attack, cast in a 'nationalist idian, identi!ied the landlords

with the colonial regime by using the metaphor of a family (the

Indian nation)' be~ betrayed by a treacherous member (the zamin-,

dar) into letting an outsider d<liitimte them. The Congress would

avenge this treachery, and Batliwala urged the people to join

-the party -~se. Further, he urged them to suppress their

traditional :tears of the Government machinery as Congress had

taken office and so controlled the services. The symbols of this

liberation were Gandhi and Nehru at the national level. Rajago­

paJ.acbari at the provinc~l and T. Prakasam at the local. How­

eVU', a running theme of the speech was the rebel.lious exampJ.e

set by Alluri Sitarama"((ju, leader ot the 1921 Rampa rebeUiCXl,

an emphasis which suggested that in the last resort the people

wculd look to themselves and use farce againSt the l&ndlord.s

and the Raj • It

3 Clippire .from The Hiniu, 5 September 1937, AICC P.L. 3/ 1937.

4 AICC P.L. 18/1937.

170

It seems to have been this last emphasis, on popular ac­

tion which could take· an extra-legal form, which caused c.R. to

single thiS case out for exempl.ary punishment, and to launch

prosecution for sedition under section 124A IPC. As the moderate

nationalist paper • The ijil!iu, pointed out, t~re had been nothing

seditious about the speech.5 And even Patel, though he was

equally anxious ·to n~intain discipline in the Congress, was

clearly puzzled by the c ·"' of' thiS section.6

Rutherford, Secretary to Erskine, analysed tbe signif10lnce

of CR 's action suggestively. He pointed out that the Premier

bad v.anted to- stress that Batliwal.P 's speech v.es an attack on

constituted goVernment and thus sought to focus attention a-y

from the real thrust of the attack, against British rule. 7 The

significance of "constituted government" rray be extended .further:

under such rule, the machinery ar the state \<,S.S inviolate as it

would now function in accord with the dictates of popular govern­

ment. By stressing metr.ods of action which negated such a con­

ception of government (even if extra-legal action was only posed

as an ul tim te threat) Batli~la bad transgressed the impera­

tives CR ~d chalked rut. NatiomliSt hegemony over the services

...as the objective here as CR indicated when he noted thata

5 Cutting ~m issue of 13 November 1937, ibid.

6 11 ••• I unierstand from the supporters o.t Mr Be.t11\111Ella tbat although his speech rrtiily be unjustified :trom the point of view of non-v1o1ence it does not fall under Section 124-A.• To Rajaji 4 November 1937, CR Ms. Roll 3.

7 T .G. Rutherford to Laithwaite {FSV), 25 I~y 1938. Linl.1.­thgow Ms. Eur. F 125/65.

171

I cannot gather ful~POW!y fii the field of laJ am order su as 1leve I nave one Iii greater measure t~n in o1her prcwincea, unless I am able to draw (the line between liberty am licence) .a

To underline this priority, the Batlil~Ella prosecution l!llls

worked up into a symbollc 1J118'turet con:!abulated 1

by 0\ in consul­

tat ion with the Governor, Erskine 1

• • • we • • • came to the concl.usion that some action had better be taken at once to show that the Government ...,as not pre­pared to degenerate into licence, and to give clear warning that strong action would be take2l against those sed.itianists i! they continue to stir up class hatred ••• 9

To underline that the case ,as cne in which the forces of the

state were ranged ~inst those of lawlessness, the symbolic

.features ~e extended into sending down lthiraj, the Public

frosecutor, to banile the case.10

CR was not UDiware that he would be subject to strong

criticism in the AICC, and to cover himsel.f against t..he charge

of repression, he asked Erskine that two prisoners from the

And.aiians be released. The reasons he gave elaborate his attempt

to reorient politicsa

8

9

I must insist immediate action ••• I have taken action against Batl.i~la w1 thout minding general reaction or consulting colleagues other provinces or anyone else

CR to !6tel, 12 October 1937, m Ms • Roll 3.

Ersld.De to Linlitbgow, 8 October 1937. Erskine Ms. Eur. D 596/2. ·

10 From Nehru •s private notes <h~ the c2se in AICC PL 18/1937; cutting from Indian E?spresa, 11 October 1937. ibid.

172

in order to establish sourxi policy. Your Excellency should support me in same marmer and strengthen my position in order to oppose all .forces being organised against me in regard to recent acticm and prnent crisis. 'nle reactions in other provinces over proposed releases w1l.l. be more than counteraCted by aouni far-reaching reac­tion in regard to my action Batlill&l.a .ldl1.dl '(111 then have entife support of msse~

1be loeic of his appeal to Erskine is revealing of his vision

of how politics would be re-oriented: the confidence o£ the

i·raasses" would be won not by a gauging ~ their needs as expres­

sed through their self-activity but by the example set by firm

government. further, the demonstration of CoDc,rTess' capacity

to rule WOUld also reassure those who were not Congress suppor­

ters. Re1'erring -to the forthcoming Calcutta AICC, which he y.e.s

unable to attend due to ill health, CR noted to Nehru that:

I hope that nothing will be done to impair the c ;.;nf ide nee and strength cocmarxled by provincial governments both inside and outside Cangress12 -

'lhe criticism the Madras Prenier anticipated did occur,

inspite of the release of the Andamn prisoners, ani it occurred

both in the Cl1C and in the Aicc.1' The debate in the ewe was

also revealing of the basic issues at stake in ~ •s political

reorientation. In his notes on the controversy Nehru had come

dol.-n to the b3.sic problem of whether such serious action could

11

12

13

al to Erskine, telegram 17 October 1937, Erskine Ms. Eur. D 596/2. Emphasis adele~. The o.~er of release was issued on 24 October. Brackenbury to CR 24 October 1937J CR Ms. Roll

CR to Nehru, telegram, 27 October 1937, CR Ms. Roll 2.

Far the AICC see Section 3.4.

173

be taken w1 thout previously consulting the relevant· Pee, the

ewe ar the Parliamentary sub-CoDIDittee (P5C) •14 He reiterated

this a-t tha Calcutta CWC •eting, proposing that in future be•

:tare making any arrests or instituting prosecution the m1n1·s­

tera IIU8t consult the ewe. The proposal vaa defeated, with

Gandhi reportedly siding with CR.15

The issue at stake here was the source of authority in

Congress politics at the provincial level. There was no doubt

that for CR the extra-parliamentary wing of the party should no

longer occupy a decisive place in the scheme of things as he -,

saw them. At first sight, this would apPear to be because in

CR's view the PCC, and local Congress Committees at large, were

not responsible for or in control o:f the belligerence of cer­

tain radical sections •16 But in fact th~re _,_\as a str()ng desire

here to ensure that there was no diminution of the Ministry's

aut..llority. The Congress organisation should be functional to

the Hinistry, not an altenlative tase of power. The desirable

function of the PCC \\Els illustrated by the Tamilnadu. unit which

criticised "certain ••• Congressmen who by their propaganda and

in ather \'ll&ys, are creating a _d:lt':ticu1t atmosphere and embarrass­

ment to the Congress Hinistry• ani placed non record ita complete

confidence in ar:d appreciation . of the wot•k o:r the Midras

14

15

16

AICC P1.. 1 B/1937.

From the account given by the Madras Miniaters attending the CWC to Erskine. Erskine to Linlithgow, 16 November 1937, Erskine Ms. Eur. D 596/2.

CR to .Nehnl, 1 November 1937. CR. Ms. Rol.l. 2.

174

Miniatry ••• "17

So a two pronged strategy, underlining the MJ.niatry· 1 s ·

authority and subordinating extra..pe.rliamentary institutions

am teDiencies to ita control, was being developed here. In the

pursuit o! this reorganiSation af politics CR -• una be. shed

about using procedures which had previously l>een reviled by the

Congress. 'l'he case of using a sedition charge has already been

notedJ in addition. to monito1r and curb lett-wing tendencies,

evidently seen by lU.m to be the mjor threat to his plans, he

used CID surveill.ance,18 confiscated literature,19 demanded

17

18

19

Resolutio:ta of TNCC WC, 8 November 1937 in C.N. Muthuranga MUdaliar, PreSident to PM. Midras am to Preside:at, AICC, 10 November 1937, CR Ms. Roll 2. The Madras Congress Legislature Party, after recording its approval of the e.otion taken to ureserve law am order, sought to empha­sise the authority of the Ministry even further through the follo,.;ini? resolution wich ,.,.as moved and discussed, but finally aropped, "though the principle involved in it \']aS aereed to•:

The Madras Legislattl!'e Congl"ess Party is of opinion that it would be d!f'f'icult U not ~ossible to carry on admlnistro.t5.on of t..'w Province under the Farl!amentary programme o£ the Congress if the :Sxecut ive actions o:f r-rovinoial Governments ! ormed for that pur­pose are to be discussed at the AICC JOOetings.

Nota by I. Subra.'lmanyam, Assistant Secretary, MCLP• 14 November 1937, ibid.

E .M.s. Namboodiripad complained of such surveUlance of a peasant delegation on its :rrarch .from Kere.la to the PrOYin­oial Assembly:. Na.mboodiripad to· Nehru, 22 October 1937, AICC P.L. 18719371 Jayaprakash said he had been .followed whil.a in Andhra. To Nehru, 26 October 1937, ibid. See al.so secretary, N. *l.abar DCC to secretary AICC, 11 August 1938. AICC P.L. 3/1937. See also KPCC resol.ution o:f 26 June 1938 complaining a bout s~dowi.ag, opening o:f letters and house searches in AICC P 12(i)/1938-39.

Nembooc11r1pad 'a vUJ.age house bad been raided for a copy of Jobn Strachey'a ~e C9'!1g{

7Stnaggl.e. Namboodiripad tO

Nehru, 22 October 1 7, op.c t.

175

security from newspapers, 20 and in Malabar he ·l:;h~e·~\;e.V\~a .f! impo­

sition of a punitive police !orce.21 It is interesting to note

that in regard to these actions even Pate 1 was some'Wha t uncom­

!ortable.22

From CR •a viewpoint, these forces had to be undermined

because their functioning ,.s antagonistic to his plan ot poli­

tically neutralizing the state apparatus. He c cnstantly came

into conflict ,.,ith the Kerala PCC because their mobllisati<n of

the peasantry and workers brought ·them into eont"lict with the

police and revenue administration, a trend which he !eared would

drive the officials into the arms of the Muslim Leegue. 23

20 Security had been demanded from B. Srinivas Rao, Secretary Madras CSP, tr,r the TamU periodical The SQg~~t K.B. Menon, Secretary 1 Civil. Liberties union '€o(lt~rMober 1937, AICC P.L. 18/1937.

21 lhe evidence iS unclear whether this was actually resorted to. It \;Els cha.r~ed that pu"'li.tive police were used in the wake of peasant delegations .from Kasaragode, s. canara marching to the administration to put for\mrd their grie­vances. A .K. Gopalan, In the cause of the Fe oo+e, ~dras 1937 ed., pp. 96-97J All rndia Kfc;an BU1ietln,3 January 1939, Yajnik .Ms. F. 8(1) J according to Gopalan this led to peasants being arrested in large numbers, on charges af rape, stealing timber fran the forest, assault and decoi ty. 151 people ,._ere implicated in 17 pJ.aces in Chirakkal taluka alone.

22 Regarding CID surveill.ance, Patel noted •you seem to have a superfluous sta.tt in this Department. Wh¥ don't you employ them in the prohibition they a<lll.d be use;tully /:::!:!.h9.V'fJ.. employed •" To m 4 NovembP_r 1937 • CR t+l. Roll 3J am regarding Namboodiripad •a charges about. the deployEnt of punitive police, Patel. noted •I- do not think you wUl accept any proposal for posting punitive police vtatever may be the situationn • 'ro CR 21 December 1938. CR Ms. Roll 2.

23 CR to Kripalani, 7 Dece;nber 1938, AICC P 3/1938. Tht! Madras Premier ~s also particul.arly sensitive about the MlppUa area of Mal.abar. On learning that Jayaprakaah ltflS due to tour the area he urged Nehru to persuade SooJalJ.sta not to go there as ".... there is a supers-tition thtlt once in a number of years there 1a an upriSing amongst the Mopl.aha•. Nehru informed Jayaprakash about m•s anxieties

17()

A politicisation of the services would in CR 's view impair

their amenab111ty to carrying out Congress policy. ~s, in

september 1937' 'lben L1n11thgow --.s due to tour Madras Presi­

dency am the Congress threatened t 0 boycott the twr' m pro­

tested to Nehru, explaining that such an action might alieBlte

the services whose aid (the implementation of the prohibition

policy was specified) would be needed for implementation of the 24 Congress programme. lJiter, differences arose again betW?en

t.~e mdras Premier and Nehru on the issue of enrolment of Govern-~ .

ment officers as members of tae Caogress. m had the legislature

party issue a directive forbidding enrolment Of COlli~ess members

"by or among government servants alX1 loOll body emplo-

eont•d •• ! .n. 23

but advised him to do as he wished. Earlier he had told Rajagopalac!J=lri that, if anything, Jayaprakash 1s visit ·...rould soothe ai'fairs as " • • • in t~~is respect he is tmlike Batliwala and others ••• " CR to Nehru, 12 September 1937, CR 1~. Roll 2; Nenru to CR, 25 september 1937, ibid.; Nehru to Jayaprakash, 23 September 1937, AICC P3/1937. It is also worth noting that CR ag.c'eed wittl EltaH:ine that, while the Moplah Outrages Act had been repl,~~~. •the necessity ot· naintaini.ng good communica tiona arxi means of quick transport .facilities is obvious especially when -have to justify our policy o:.t: trust without relaxing e!:tic!ency of Government in the preservation at public security •" 'I'O Yaku'b Hassan. Minister of f\.ibl.ic Works, 25 september 1937. The context ,.as Hassan 'a saying U.t tile roe.d.s in the Mlppil.a area wou.l.d no longer have a strategic importame, a statement which had worried Erskine. FS Governor o£ Madras to at, 25 September 1937, 1akub Haasan to ~ 26 September, CR ~ Erskine, 27 November, CR Ms. F.S/23.

24 CR to Nehru, 21 September 1937t ~ Ms. Roll. 2J AICC P.L. 3/1938. Nehru pointed cut the danger of such an approach invi tir.g compromise. on lareer issues. 'I o ffi, 2r/ September 19}7, CR Ms. Roll 2; AICC, P.L. 3/1938.

.25 yees •••

177

CR explained to Nehru that the services would be

demoralised if they were mobilised while the Congress \1B.S in

power. 26

For Nehru, the controversy again raised the issue o! the

source o! authority. He considered that CR's action bid in­

fringed the authority of the fCC by giving directtves in an area

traditionally under its jurisdiction.27 He noted t:tat "••• not

only the PCC should c '1tinue to .ftmction independently but should

also take the initiative in C<ngress uattera... Congressmen

shruld .feel that the Provincial Congress CoDJnittee is a more

vital organ of theirs than the frovincial Government.•

Nehru bid accurately pinpointed the changes m -'& tz-ying

!or. As we have pointed out 1n the ccntext of Munshi •s concep­

tions, there -was a slippage from the pragnatic imperatives of

relating to the services (to enable the Congress programme to

be implemented) to a view o~ how state power had to be wielded.

This ideal conception- in which the services would be li.t'ted out

of politics - did ho\..ever inhabit a strategic realm. The bureau-

25 Statement by J. &lbrahnanyam, Assistant Secretary Madras Congress Legisl.ature P&rtr.r on betalt ~ CR. 13 september 1937, AICC P.L. 3/1938. CR had a silllilar attitude to goverl'llllnt teachers participating in elections. at to Patel, 16 August 1939, Ql Ms. Roll 2. See also Minister o.f Education to CR 29 September 1939, CR MB. Roll 4.

26 CR to Nehru, n.d. AICC P.L. 3/19.38.

27 Nehru to CRl1 October 1937. He also noted to Sitara­ayya that t was not the !unction o~ the Legislature Party to issue instructions to Congress C0111ni ttees. 1 October 1937 • AICC PL. 3/1938.

178

cracy would be inveigled into nationalist hegemony not by poli­

tical appeals but through the inculcation of the belief that

the Qlngress bad accepted their 1Dviol.ability. Political appeals

were riakyJ they coul.d alienate the services, preventing them

.troa developing what the consti'bltionaliats desired to incul.•

cate in them - a sense of professional neutral! ty. In terms of

Ccngress authority this would necessitate a shllt ali!Ely from the

PCC - an extra-parliamentary farue.tion, labituated. to extra

constitutional modes of action, am tbere.tore liable to di.ti:use

the emphasia desired to be placed by the .minister!allsta on

constituted authority - to the minJ.stry. In theoretical terms

the line of traDsf~tion my be posed 1n the foll.owing waya

previously the Congress had the character !sties of a movement

opposed to the state, and, as a result, it tended to perform

certain counter-state functions through institutions such as

thanas; panchayats etc. Now these functions :W.d to be sep:1rated

from the party, and to be pl.aced .tirmly in the domain of the

state. In the process the functionaries of the state would be

stripped of theA£ pol.itics, their all.egiance to the Raj, and

their ant1-mt1ona.l1st .feeling, far natiomlism wOUld no .longer

pose aa a rival to their tunctions. In CR •s scheme the CODgress

must now appear to them as one of a host of parties trying for .

l.egitilate governmental authority, but no longer a party threa-

tening to overturn the basic procedures and institut1Clll8 on

which that authority was .founded. In .fact the Congress, 1n

at •a view• had to be seen as distinct an exactly these growxls 1

Wbl t ob~ections can be raised to a 'ustice

17~)

Ministry enrolling members that way apply to Congress enrol.ment also, so long as the Congress is engaged in elections .28 (sic).

On occe.sion' this separation o! government and state was ambi­

gurusly posed. In an argument relating to how the changes a

Congress government would D:t.ke - especially at the level of the

state structure - would be transient as these coold be reversed

in the wake of Congress leaving office, the possible reasons for

such an eventuality included deadlock, imperialist forces and

also

if the electorate displaces us in the normal course ex hypothese, another Government will be in power which wlll be mar~ popular than ourael ves .29

This should be seen not as a distinct political possillility,

conforming to the strategy of the 1935 Act, but rather as deuar­

cating the transience of governments 1n relation to the state.

Evidently, it \tJB.S not expected that there could be such a deve­

lopment, only that in the ideal polity of CR 's imagination, such

an inviolability af the state wouJ.d be ~racteristic.

However, this did not mean t~t the state as it existed

satis£ied the new political conditions in their entirety. The

requirements of parliamentary rule required moclificatialS 1n the

the legal terms of reference • This is lllustrated by the contro­

versy over the Madraa Premier's use of the Cr1minal Law Amend­

ment Act against anti-Hindi picketers. In response to Patel's

advice that he adopt other means to handle the situation in the

28 Statement by J. SUbrahmanyam, Assistant secretary Madras Congress LegiSlature Party, em bahal..t of CR., op.cit.

29 CR to Nehru. 28 September 1937, CR Ms. Roll 2.

180

face o! mounting criticism inside and outside the Cangress, 30

CR3 1 noted the impracti~lity of using the penal code against

the picketers, as also the sections pertaining to aediticm or

class hatred. While the last option would be "quite just!iied

c:n the basis of the shouts and demonstrations, ••• it would be

impracticable for government to sanction a prosecution every

day spectiically for each case, as this w.ould be necessary for

action under 153(a)". Practical issues apart, what he then

made was a distinction between "government by bureeucracy" am

"government by ministers under parliamentary·insti tutions•. The

clause in the Penal Code which came closest to being applicable

to the current case, tnlt concerning obstruction and annoyance

to public servants, could be used under former conditicms, but

not under parliamentary in.stituticns. For the protection af

these, which at noted \<JaS the object of the lllhole exercise,

there could be an ·amendment of the Penal Code and the Criminal

Procedure Code 0 to protect parliamentary institutions against

vulgar attacks," but this would immediately be called a repres­

sive measure. 'lbus his decision to selectively use the Crimi­

ral Law Amendment Act.

However, it a selective reorientation o~ the state WlS

required to suit new political conditions, there were other

institutions which WOUld be carried over if, theoretically at

least, for a d~erent purpose. So, of his continued use of

the c.I.D., CR 'AElS reported to have said that it was i.Mi.spen-

30 Patel to CR, 14 August 1938, CR Ms • Roll 2.

31 CR to RaJendra Praaad. 28 August 19381 1b14.

181

sable for any government and wh3. t mattered v.e.s how it -was

used.32 In this context, perhaps CR was just being more forth­

right about h1a pr1~ities vis-a-vis dissidence and anti-state

tendencies such as represented by the COJllllunists am. social1sta

than other Right-Wing Congressmen ,ere as yet prepared to be. 33

Perhaps in fact he ~s bringing the Ccngress to an awareness o!

the procedures of most modern states, irrespective of their

ideological proclivities. HOl-JeVer, on one issue, CR displayed '

an authoritarian viewpQint 1n his argument for continuities in

the organisation of the state that 'W8.S s1ngular amcngst Right­

Wing Congressmen.

In the d1Scus~1on of the Congress objective of the sepa­

ration of judicial and executive !unctions of government, the

crucial parts o.f CR •s opposi tian shi.fted between a tactical and

an ideological rationale. From a tactical viewpoint he noted

that sessions judges and British elements in the High Court had

vast pCMers. At present the District Magistrates were unier the

Ministry, but with a separation of juiicial and executive func­

tions those offioers wouJ.d come under the sessions judge and the

32 NamboocU.r1pad to Nehru. 22 OCtober 1937 cpoting a state­ment by m re_l>orted in M~mu of 22 September 1937, AICC P .L. 18/1937. Regi reporting of charges that CR -a using the CID to shadow CoDgressmen and had unjus­t~iab1y.used section 124A IPC (Pt:ltel to CR 4 November 1937)1 at ~ied "••• the compl.aints are quite ~ong • .12 ~be eft!nt S Fo ~·no foound for ~omDefftl• A great eai~ oP~, 6oveiilber 19 r, • Roll 3, Emphaaia added. This WOUld tend to corroborate tba atti­tu:le reported by The Hirxlu,

33 See Fatel 's concern about the use of the c.I.n., f .n. 22 above.

182

Chie! Justice and "all the power we have secured for demoCracy

in regard to the policy and the administration of justice wi.ll

be lost and we shall .tind tHlt we are powerless to help the

people or to carry cut our policies whenever the cr1mi.nal law

comes in.•31+ •'lhe Judiciary will becaDe the stronghold just aa

the Executive was before of .foreign domination". 35

However, this 'ltt8S only one moment in t~ discussion. The

argument shi.fted gear to present an ideal ·- · s ion in which the

judiciary and the executive woul.d fuse with each other and ex­

chan&~ characteristicsa

Tb!t Magistracy must have the power to control the police otherwise than by passing~ judiements 1n oases. '1'he power to decide cases 1.t divested :tran the power to control investigation and pro­secution will. result only 1n two separate watertight compartments. The policemen will take orders from a dU.terent set of people and there will be conflict at the top and no coordination below. There will be no wholeS(JUe fear in the Llind of the police. The present prejudices are due to the fact tr~t the executive has hitherto been all al.ong against the popular will. With the identification of the people 1 s interest with the executive 1 t wUl be an advantage to have the Digis~ in conti-nual touch with ~e_peop].e. .e. w1 th the Government R. V,J. ~ co ol is pos­sibl.e unless the magistrate 1a in touch with police am is al.so a'bl.e to decide the caae... o ce ome m -

r nves r

a

34 CR to Nehru, 28 September 1937, rn. Ms. Roll 2.

35 CR to al.l Congress Premiers, 3 September 1937, m ~. Rol.l. 3.

CR. to Nehru, 28 September 1937, op.cit. Emphasis added.

183

In other words "it is not the police admin1sti1ltion which

will dominate over the Digistracy hereafter. it wUl be the

other \lilly about al¥1 the Dllgiatracy wUl purity and liberalise

the police.•37 This would be possible because the magistracy,

hitherto arbitrary and repressive in ita unaccountable acticms,

would now be def'ined by a greater sense of social interest, as

it would nO\>r be governed by a ministry founded on a popular

ma:n.0.c·- +<,, and re:fJ.ectine p orular needs • W 1 th striking clarity,

~ SUl!'llled up his position in the following benevolent-dictato­

rial imagesa

This essentially authoritarian perception nevertheless

points out the case of Ol. •s pol.itics as a strategy for power.

The provincial government for him ~s to be the fortress from

the natio~list struggle would now be li!Elged. I! the state -s to

37 CR to Ritel, 12 October 1937, CR Ms. Roll 3.

38 CR to Nehru, 28 September, op.cit. Emphasis added. The other minor reasons CR pra.Cerred for not separating judi­cial and executive !unctions included the argument that changes ot this order would be reversed after Congress left offices and that the policy wa.U.cl prove too expensive to UDiertake. Ibid. See also CR to Patel for· the empla­sis on control, 12 October 1937. CR Ms • Roll 3. Patel claiatd to see CR 'a point, rut 'IIIElS worried as to whether he would be abl.e to convince nour people in the AICC or even in the we about the soundness of ya.Jr policy, which .Ls so viol.entl.y contra!l to our consistent acl continua.LB agitation in the matter • Pate1 to at, 16 October 1937, ibid.

be tmchallenged from w1 thout, it WlS to be increasingly control­

led from within. The crux of CR 'a objective WiS to bend the

state to the dictates at pop~ government. As a result much

of hia energies were spent in ensuring that the apparatus of

governaent oOUl.d not function outside his ken. And his plan

alSo entailed that those institutions which were not constitu­

tionally bound to e.cknowlerlee the ministry's priiTilcy should be

made to toe the line.

It can in fact be observed that the moments at llhich

L!nli thgow or Erskine , .. ~re woiTied. a bout CR 's stability as pre­

mier were over issues of control pertaining to the relations

between the servi~s and the ministry. Salary reduction. part

o.f general Congress policy, 'ISS a recurrent point o£ tensicn in

this context. CR. had been persuaded by Erskine that pay-cuts

should not effect those currently in service i.e. those in

service before 1 April 1937 {the date of the tne.uguration o£

the 1935 Act) and those promoted to service before 1 October

1937 (the budget spee~~ having been made in September). The

achievement of this agreement had not been free of con!lict

however. The ministers initially proposed a pay reduction to

t:t» new level for incumbents as well• a proposal which contained

a (subsequently dropped) threat of resignation 1£ the demal'Ji was

not aecepted. - The European members at the service \018re also

covered by this demand, though CR had at :first exempted them

£rom the cut. But• probably understarding that the colcnial

government would be adamant on this issue, the ministers with-

18S

drew the demand and did not send the letter.39

However, con!lict over this iaaue re-emerged in 1939,

when CR sent a mmore.ndum ooncernirlg pe.y-cu't ot members ot the

AU-India Services, whose position _,. protected by the 1935

Act. Simultaneously a cut in the pay ot provincial and aubar­

dimte services t.~Bs also proposed.4o To underline the signi.fi­

cance o:f ministerial control, CR also insisted that only those

o1'ficers showing 0 spec1al energy "~ efficiency• be eligible 4" !or specJal additional pensions. 't When the proposal ,.. tur-

·- ·- ....

ned down, CR 1s sense of outrage indicates the priority he had

given to extending the space of miniBterial control into the

domain protected by the Secretary of State. He considered the

latter's attitude to. be an •outrageous form at protectioo."42

and as showing th&t the phre.se -secretary of S'blte ·. officers

was not merely a technical financial phrase, but "one denoting

the very direct ~nagement that is claimed by the Secretary of

state in provincial matters•.43

This emphasis on curtaUing extra-ministerial authority

is Ulustrated again by m •a oppositioo. to the functioning of

39 Erskine to Linlithgow, ·17 November 193~ 14 December 1937, 18 December 1937. Erskine Ms. Bur. D 6/2.

40 Erald.ne to CR, 9 February 1939. CR Ms. r. 8/23.

41 a\ to Erskine, 10 February 1939, ibid.

42 CR 'to Erskine, ibid.

43 CR to Erskine, 23 February 1939. ibid.

186

agencies such as the Central Intelligence Bureau44 ani in his

attempt to ensure that the High Court Judges, to whose indepen­

dence we have already noted his antagonism, would be eZZe cti wly

nanjna ted by h1m.45

That tor CR Ccmgress provincial governments were now the

critical centres of nationalist power is best illustrated by the_

way CR related to various aspects o:! procedural relaticns between

levels at the power structure umer the 1935 Act. Regarding

the issue o~ matters relating to the aJ.l-IncUa Services, the ~

constitutional procedure ,.,as tor the Provine.ial GovernmentLseo-

retary to the Gover-.oor-Genero.l, trom where it would pass on to

the Secretary Qf State. As, at an intermediary stage, this

correspondence was !nevi tably referred to releV'dnt departments

in the Government at India, (]{ had allowed a short-circuiting

of this procedure on one ocoasion am the correspondence relat-

44 •The provincial governments are completely responsible far law and order in their jurisdiction. The Central Intelli­gence Bureau 1s incompatible in principle as -well as prac­tice with the position of the provincial government wner ~~e constitution. No police agency of any kind should work in this province except UDier the control and direo­ti on of tr..a I .G. and the Government o£ the province. The Central an-eau staU is as wmecessary in practice aa objectiombl.e in princip].e.• Nol;e on Central Intelligence B\reau by c.a •• n.d., ib14.

45 •I do not think it is too great a claim for tbl provincial government to desire that ln such appo:lnt.menta I should have a aay thrOUgh your:" ExceUency and 1n the most confi­dential form. There 1s a growing antipatlly between the Higb Court. and the Provinc.tal governments in aU the provinces which, I hopei ahouJ.d be prevented before it becomes too pralOUDCeil. CR to ErsklDa, 25 September 1938, ibid. See also CR to Erskine, 25 July 1939. ibid., for CR 's dissatisfaction with the .functioning of Ghief Justice !Jlkahlllam Rao• in his lenient hand1ing of labour cases and llba't CR believed -.a an ~ment o:f the do•ln o~ the

- Executive• who alone. I beUew, have the materials to judge aDd. extend clemency. •

187

1ng to individual officers' oases had been addressed directly

to ~· departments o.f the Government of India far practical

o~nience. 46 Hove~, al bad ob~ected to a proposal to ameDd

the procedure, and his reasons are illuminating. IUa ob3eCt1on

to the Government of India 1nterced1Dg _. not in relation to

the present circumstances, but in terms of_ the !u~, structure,

under Federation. He noted t}jat !or a Government canposed a!

Ministers 1n the Government o:f India to deal with such provin­

cial caaea -.a an undesJ.rabl.e centralisation of discipl.ine and

control and it could lead to dif!icul ties in resisting the

Government view on any l!lltter. He felt that ministers !uncticn-,

illg 1n the Governme_nt o.f Ind.Ja uooer the Act might be inclined

to encroach on the :domain o:f the provinces. 4 7

Th13 poeition gives us insight int" the basic refarmula-'

tion of nationalist strategy that at envisaged. He, like the

Gandh1an Right, hoped for a democratisation of States' represen­

tation with a view to securing a Congress majority in the pro­

jected Federal. Government and thus subverting the colonial

governmeiit •s hopes of inatal.~ing a substantial. conservative bloc

in 1be Federal Logisl.ature.48 . In his arguments agaiDst amemlq

procedural. relaticns between the provincial. gowrnmeut and. the

Government ~ India, bOiievar, tbere is suggested a clitferelrt

att11uda, \llbich may be interpreted in oo.e at two ,.,.ys. Firatly,

46 Erskine to at, 21 June 1939, ibid.

47 CR to Ernkine, 1 July '!939. ibid.

48 Far tbe probl.cms o! the Federal. acbeme am the Congress · attitude, sect below, Cbapter 4.

188

he was prepared to conceive o:t a Federal Government in which

such a COllgl'ess presence was nat possible, and within which

framework the autcmomy ~ the prcw1Do1al GoY8rDilent, oontimdna

bastian ot Dltianaliat power in oonstitutionallat strategy,

would ba- to be d~end8d. Secoally ~ nen U a Congress aa~o­

rity regime could come into being, it 1s possible that the argu­

ment for preservation of autonomy wrul.d persist, given the finan­

cial and political restricticns tlat the 1935 Act enshrined.

E11her way, the a.ssl.l!Dption v~s that the Federation scheme

could come into being. This 'W'!ls a singular position. Erskine

had noted tlilt aver the question of amending the procedural. rela-. J ~~

t1oosh1p between~ .i'rovincJ.al Gowr!'lP-nt and the Government ot

India• the ot..~er provinces had been ame~ble.49 we riS.y inter­

pret this to mean that whlle CR •s opposition was rala ted to the

lang-run significance o:f the ministries, even in new, politically

inimical circumstances, for others these institutions, am the

1935 Act itself, did not ~ve such signtlicBnoe.

'rhis anal.ysis ms attempted to show the inner conaistency

a£ CR'a strategy, a pattern through which all the chargee level­

led against his attitudes am policies can be explaJned. illteg­

ral.ly. The· acceptance that the Federation scheJDe ooul.d be

implemented was one .turther moment 1n this strategy • Par the #

strategy •a pz"emi.sed en the conviction tblt the constitutiozal

.tra.mewark• 1.t operated with pQlitt.cal aCUDen, would al.low for a

growth 1n the hegecony o£ mt1onal.1Bm. '1be centres ot power,

the ministries, would consolidate infl.uence ewer the state appa-

18~}

ratus by firm control, opposition to extra provincial authcrity

(in the !om o! the all-India services am the Judiciary}, and,

in pO:U. tical terms the most ca-1g1nel feature, by curtaU1Dg

extra parliaMntary author1 ty and. therefore undercutting ccaWD­

tioml :natioaaliat rivalry with 'the functions of tba state. Wblt

was sOUght here was a depoliticisatian of the state apJ;&:re.tua.

The authority of its functions ,.e.s guaranteed in order t~t it

accepted a non-political space unrelated not only to political

parties, but to the Ra~ - over which ODl.y the aove:rm.ut curren­

tly in power, be it Congress or any ather party, cOUld exercise

sway. However, once attention li8S rcdocuaed on to parliamen­

tary power, wbit ,.,uld the mechanism at change be, whereby

mtionalist authority could be exterxled beyo:al the domain of

provincial rule? While this is nowhere specifically stated, it

would appear that the elections would fulfil this. function. In

CR 'a percept! an the constitution would remain, and so it woul.d

seem that natiou:Llist power, built on the new foundations of

adjustment with a neutralised state form, a curbing at destabi­

lizing extra-legal fonDS, and a constructive legislature, vould

emphasize ita authority through renewed •mates. And we •Y

speculate that with such .an expression ~ popul.ar infl"*lce and

discipline, CR would hope for a reviSicm - perblps by conven­

tion 1111t1ally, later by conatituticmal. change - of the cousti­

tutional. position. All tbia WOUld re~~&1D within the fiel.d ot

cons t1 tutionali ty, as is 1m1cated. by his col.Dltenancing of even

an inJmical Federal Government. In such an eventual.ity, nationa­

lia~ strength in the provincial governments would press do-.n en

such unrepreaentati.va poUt1cal. at:ructurea ..

190

Ho,.,ever, while a unity a£ perspective and strategy may

be established in this 'lliy, its effectiveness is open to ques­

tion. For, as .tar aa Cl\ 1 a bid to c<mtrol extra-mSnSaterial

iD:nuences (of the all•IndJa service a and the Ju11c.lary) ~·

cCDCernad, he ,_. not aucce~ul. ln both instances, the autho­

rity of the Secretary o! State ll88 cited and the Madras Premier

ll.as helpless •50 AS for his strategy vis-a.-vis the services,

while cushioning them against criticism and attacks might indeed

haw reduced antagonism, 1 t need not lave affected the political

balance 1n favour o£ the Congress.

This is underlined by the fact that the third element ot

ca•s strategy,- to Which a reassurance ~ the services l!IEls inte­

gnilly related, that of curbing extra-parliamentary authority,

could not be successfully oaiT1ed through. T~s w:t.s i.nSpite ~

CR 'a beat e.f.totts to suppress al.l such 1n1 tia ti ves. In the next

sectiQil1 we shal.l examine aspects o.f the dynamics of such action.

and see what impllcatims these had 1n the political. situaticm.

3.1.2 populer Moyepents

Rajagopalacbarl's model for tbe Congress Minlatriea •• o.t

course an ideal. conatruct. His desire to_ neutralise extra-ccns­

tituticmal tendencies, thougb whole-heartedly pursued, lll88 not a

complete aucc~aa. I.t anything, tmrest 1n Mala bar aDd coastal

50 on the queation of High CcNl't appointments, aee EraJd.Da to CR, 23 October 19391 CR MI. r • 8/23J .tor tbe Central. Intorm9.ticm Bul-eau, Erald.ne to CR, 16 September 1938, ibid.J for the _Secretary o£ state aver-riding recommenda­ticms by CR al:Jli.nst special. add.i.tional pension being granted for the services in all caaea, at to Erald.ne • 10 february 1939. ibid.

1Dl

AIXibra ,.s of a more sustained and p~rful nature than anything

that had taken place between 1934 am 1937.

on the other ~. Tamilmdu itael! -· largely quiescent

on the agrarian !rom.51 Tbl domiDant UDrest o! the time arose

in reaction against tbe Madras Mlniatry 1s attempt to .mtroduca

Hindi into the School.s.52 In turn the overall mil.dness 1n this

province was expressed in the amenability ~ the Congress orf!11-

n1sation itself t - the dictates of the Ministry .53 That the

relaticmship between the provincial organisation. and the Miniatry

~s very important in the development ~ popular unrest wUl be

demonstrated in the di!.terent experiences o:t the Andbra am

Malabar cases. '

(i) Apdhra

In a summary of the agrarian struggl.es of this period•

N.G. Ranga draws oar attention to the significant detail tblt

in the Mur»lgala Satyagraha in Krishna District, leadership 1118.8

undertaken by the DCC and that in the Kalipatnam Satyagraha at

West Godavari District, the Tal.uka Cang1'8SS Coamittee President,

Ramany • took up the peasant cause. 54

51

52

53

54

A _ProYi.DcJal 'l'am11nadu Kisan Organ181ng Ccmaittee ~· only set up in late 1938 and tbe :tirat provincial ootrf;~~t~~J. ,aa cmJ.y held on 30 December 1938. All India K1aan Bulletin (barea.tter AiltB)• 11 November 1938 and 13 J'81Ulry 1939• tajnlk JIIJ. F. No. 8( 1) • However labour unrest. which we are not dealing v1 tht did taka pl.a~, tmder the Congnasa Ministry.

See above1 . secticn 1.1., 1n the context o:f CR •s use of the ~iminal. Law Amendment Act.

See above• Sectian ,.1.1.

Andhra lt1aan S'truggl.ea. YajDik PBS. F. No~ 1. For tbe

Like other post-depression struggl.es \ta6ged on :z.amindari

territory, these two cases revolved around the retrieval o!

land that teranta bad been evicted froa.55 Tezant direat action

1n occupation and cul.tivation ~ the contested land led to ·

severe ,re~aaicm by the pollee am adminJstrationa eectica 144,

preventing access to caiiDU1ll!ll laMa, grazing fields, tanks, wlls

and the contested private plots, .as imposed, leading to a large

number of prosecutions. 56 ·

COD.'t '4 • .• f _n • 54 West K.f.stna DCC leadership of the Munaga]S. S'tntggl.ea also see AID. 28 C:Ctober 1938, Na.tioml iron'k• I, 31, 30 Octo­ber 1938, p. 11 •

55 Both movement.a bad lcag histories • Unrest on tbe Mlnagala estate bad ~ken place over the previous two decades and bad secureo.- the attenticn of T. Prakasam and Biawanatb Daa whO were to become Ministers under the Congress Ministries of Madras' and Orissa. The West Kistna DCC bid been cent­ral in carry~ on propaganda and had published a repcrt em the tenants' grievances. 'lbe intensity o£ the recent struggle ~~s attributed to the involvement of the Socia­lista and the Ryots Associatic:m. The H;tnu, 10 June 1939, p. a. The first reports of unrest on t e Estate related · to Zamimar atrocities against tenants !or organising them­selves. AIKB, 2 September 1938, Yajnik IrS F. B(i). There­after the unrest ....,e.s directed &Slinst attempts at evictim by court decree. AIKB, 28 October 1938. ibid.

In 'the Kalipatmm Zamindari, lilnlaapur Talulca ot wes-t Goda­~1 District, in 1925, the zamindar !Bd a~ed to give tenan-t rights in exchange far tbe ssanta giving~ their cuatOIIEll"y fiahiDg righta and clear the :forest. n. coDdJ.tion .as that the raiyats ahoul petition the Govern­maD\ tor irrigation facilities !or the lam. Ho.ever,. cmce these tac111tlea come through the Z8JD1ndar infringed tne agreeJDent and started sell1Dg up the lAnd to cutsldera. He then pl"OOdcs.cl to .!il.e suits against the peasants for for­cible cultivation of lands he ~irlec:l to be h1.a ovn. Pe Sundarayya 'a account, ADa: ~1 .... 14 Q)tober 1938 in.,., - Ia..~~ 16 Ootober 19~ P• 11! aDi K.s. r c ngrn; Against Ejection", ~t onal Front, II, +, 26 March 1939, P• 114.

l'or ~~tmm AIKB, 2 ·Sflptember 19381 Ya3Dik 16. F. 8(1) am · na •s acQOunt. ,.ci-t., K..s. Murthy, op.clt. 'lbt HUJ.'Jl• 9 Mlrch.- P• 13, 1 Mlrch, P• 17. Fer Jtmagala,

193

Inspite ot repression both estates witnessed a signifi­

cant duraticm o! struggle, lasting for about a year trom mid•

1938 to llld-1939· 1he persistence ot peaaant init.:lativea am the

invca.vement o:t local Ccmgreeamen -de mediation by the provinc.tal

committee iDIYitable. In the Mulagala case G. Brahma rJa, aeu­raJ. secretary ot the ~. arbitrated in the matter in December

1938. lhis procedure was decided on by an infor~l. conference

of local aclmin1strators, police ofticials, C c;~ ~essmen, District

Ryot Association leaders and the lanilord 's son and valdl.. A

settlement WlS arrived at57 llhereby it -.s agreed that ' 1beti1

{forced labour) be stopped, that Ulegally confiscated houses

and other proprie~s be returned, tbilt rigbt at way to tanka

and wells and also to the neighbouring villages be reinstated am that promissory notes .forcibly taken trca Kisan for sums not

paid be cancelled. In return the peaaanta were to pay reduced

rent.58

Hawver, conflict reCUITed with the tenants claSmng tbat

the J.andl.ord. has not fulled his side ot the agreement.59 They

re:fused to pay rent, inspite of Blahmayya 'a insistence that this

Cont 1d. • ~ .n. 56 '

57

58

59

AID, 11 Honmber 19~J .o,, a. I, 39! 13 Novs'ber 1938J AID. 9 .7\me 19~ 2 UDe ~ YaJDik MS F • 15J RaDga 'a nate n.d. (probabl.e May-JUDe 1939) 18.jn1Jc Ml F. 14; }ll Nal~ 6 J~, P• 10, 7 June P• 11, 9 Ju;taP• 2J 10 unet P• • In 1:!le secorJi phase of the MuD& satyagraha,

ati!x sentences such aa 6 llOil'tha R.I. and as. 100 tiDII ware meted out to the satyagrahis. 1he B&gtu. 16 JUDe 1939, p.1o.

The Ministry bad a representative in A. Kales-.ra Rao Chie.t Parliamentary Secretary. 'lb:t local Congressmen were be President and the Secretary o.t the west K:Lsta DCC, p. Bapa.­"1'1& aDd K. VeDlratarama~ Jb' QtMu. 10 June 1939• P• 8. Note by fteD&a. • n.4. (prObalala May-June 19:!'9). Ta3Jalk *• F. 14f lfa4rie 'iR ( 1) Juae 1939• · Ibid•• AIKB, 9 June 1939, Yajnik ~. F. 14J Madras FR(1)

-a necessary for the agreement to be implemented. Aa a result,

the General Secretary of the R::C deal.ared that arbitration :tad

fa1led.60 Tension mounted over l.and. occupied by one Papayya 1n

1930 vbich .as now in the landlord's possesa1on.61

Satyagraha was offered systematically with volunteers

being sent every day and within less thln a •* acme 140 ryota

had been arrested.62 The police action 'tlhich involved brutal

lathi charges63 \VEiS publicly revUed in meetings throughout the

province ')n 11 June, 64 as were reported acts a£ brutality in the

jaUs in Wich thG satyagrahis tad been cons1gt'ed65 and the

large-scale confiscation of cattle tl':at took pl.ace for arrears

of rent.66

Cont •d •• f .n. 59 M:ly 1939.

60

61

62

63

64 65

66

In the subsequent Government review of the issue, it ,.as ctarged t~t it was the socialists who had stirred up un­rest, resulting in nan..payment of rent ani social boycott of estate officials. Local of:ficials ~&;~c.( by the PCC General Secretary b!v-i·~cV to get the peasants to l\t.gotia te on the basis of· the earlier settl.ement, but they said that they did not mind if the agreement was emed, am so Brah­mayya made his decl.aratian that arbitration had .faUed. Madras FR( 1}, June 1939.

AIKB, 23 June 19391 Yajnik MSS. F. 15J Range. 's note, ibid.

Yipdy• 6 June.! P• 10. 7 Jl.Ule, P• 11 .. 9 June• P• 2 and 10 UDa1 P• s. :rbese vere the i1unber o~ satyagrahis. Tbe

number at tenants present was estimated at 1000. AIKB, 23 JUDe 1939• Yajnik MS. F. 15.

AID. 23 June, ibid•J ~'it¥• 6 Jamuu-y1 P• 10. According to the of!1c1al.s 1 the a charge took plJice when the poJ.ice tried to remove iJDpl.ementa and the crowd rushed them. Madras FR (1)• June 1939. AIICBt 23 Jwte 1939, ibid. Ibid.

Ibid.

By mid-year both the Kalipatnam and Munagala satyagrahas

were withdrawn on the basis o! assurances tW.t the HinLstry and

the .PCC WOUld mediate and resolve the tenants' grievances. Si ta­

raaayya urged the stopping of the ICalipatnam struggle in March,

promiairlg 1nter¥ent1CI1 after his return from the Tr1pur1 Cong­

ress 67 am Prakasam made similar promises shortly after. 68 The

Govenunent ordered. the collector and one representative each of

the zamindars and villagers to ho1d an enquiry. As no f\.U"tber

disturbances were expected tbe government wleased those convic­

ted and withdrew any pending prosecutions. 69 Ho'A!eVer, the con­

flict \\.8.8 revived, with the Zamindar claiming Ulat the tenants

were continuing to Lnvac.e his property. 70 '

In the Munagala case the F-!inistry urged the DiStrict Magis­

trate to take firm action with the satyagrahis, though it was

noted that as far as possible forceful dispersal o! the crowds

should be avoided. 71 Prakasam ted the impot.UXied cattle rel.eased,

advised the peasants not to be carried a-y by ill-considered

67 Hindu, 9 March 1939, P• 13.

68 !Rid, 11 March 1939, p. 17.

69 l'tldras m (2) !tlrch and FR(1) April 1939. The ADlbra Pro­vinOJal Rpota Association Leaders K. satyaDatbayana KJrthy ani Vasude'V8 Rao appreciated the Government's act in vith­drawin8 caaas, and only complained about the appointment ot the DJ.strict Collector to nake the prel1mi,mry enquiry. They asked the Government to act on the basis o! the repcrt to be submitted by n. Narayanaraju of the w. Godavari na: K. Satyanatbay&Da ft.lrthy and VasUieva Rao to CR, 30 l'Brch 1939. CR M:J. Rol.l 6.

70 Sitarannyya. to CR, 20 July 1939, ibid.

71 Madras FR (1), June 1939.

18\)

advice but to abide by the law", and reasstred them tblt the

Zamindari bill he ~s drai:ting woul.d solve their problems. 72

Ranga a1 the other hand had the objective of a.tta1n1ng certain

concrete goals, such as having the M.ullgala estate taken under

the Court ot wards for miaDlDlgement am threatened further

milita:rx:y in the .face of government obduracy. ?3 He noted that

the Government was bent upon a .fight and that the ryots would

accept the challenge74 but then tmexpectedC'{· tacked down, accep­

ted the Government's terms, and even seemed ·to register that no

swift solution could be arrived at. This is indicated by the

statexrent made by him an behalf Of the Provi.ncial Ryots' Asso­

ciation suspending Satyagre.ha s

72

73

74

75

The present suspe11..sion o.f satyagraha • ••• is specially intended to enable the Government to review the special circumstances· a! the peopl.e of f.lmagala, the conduct of the 1 ocal authorities during the last three weeks and the utter incapacity o.f most of the ryots to pay any more rent arrears. It is also inten­ded to help the Government to get into touch with the local. authorities am look into the relevant records in the collectorate and District Police Staticn and ascertain through suc..ll records 'Whether under the administration of the present zamindar •••• then 1s any real likelihood o:f the re-establishment o! peace and tranqul!tity in 'the estate. I do seriously hope tl:fit the Ministry will genu1ne1y res~ to this gesture of the Ryots Association. 75

Hjpdu,. 19 June 1939, P• 10.

Rar~a to Yajnikt 15 June 19391 Yajnik I--IS. F • 14. Ranga 'a stawment in~ 15 June 1~39, P• 111 the suggestion was rejectP.d "fiY\:R who urged that norma oc:Diitions be restored and t~t the tenants depend on the cOW'"ts or an the award already given to resolve ·tre conflict. Hind'.:\• 16 June 1939.

In 1rlct be expected 'to be arrested am asked !ajnik to come dovn to Munagal.& in that eventual:tty. To Ya~ik, 15 June 1936. Yajnik MS. F. 14. Hindu, 19 June 1939, P• 10.

197

In addition the Ryots Association told the peasants who

were capable ~ paying rent to do soa however it also advised

that those whO could not pay should insist on remission till

the following year and should strive .tor such remission. 76 ·

Cl.early, a pe.as1ve p~s• had been !Daugurated UDder the

duress of repression arvi lack o£ su:cess. 'lw'hile Ranga bad l!IBXed

elOQ.uent in his militancy over the previous days, it seems t}?at

his coD n.agues in the district were not so sanguine about the

possibilities of continued militanoy,77

lio•,.oJewr, the Munagala dispute 1n !act continued after the

Con.c_~ess cirdstry resigned, ins pi te o.f an intermediary settle­

ment which o.tf1c1aJ.45 declared very generous. 78 So both of the '

major land struggles of the period exhibited similar patterns,

suggesting that· the cont'licts at their core were not likely to

be resol.ved by short term adjustments.

If· Rajagopal.achari 's ideal of the State functioning to

peacefully redress disputes -....as not real.! sed beoause of the

intransigent nature o.f the conflicts that developed there were

other cechanisms at Uind which could be used. to neutral.i.se extra-

constitutional action. At the ISlhi. AICC Of September 1938 a

reaol.utian criticising Congressmen who employed vio1ent methoda

76 Ibid.

T1 So while Ranga had noted to Yajnik that he bad exhausted all means of getting conciliation !rom the GovermDent am that the Provincial Kisan Canmittee would decide to take up the fight• his co~des asked him to 11carry an work, develop strene,--th"• till the Government was forced to ar­rest hie. To Yajnik, 16 June, Yajnik MS. F. 14.

78 Madras FR(1 }, November 19391 FR(2), December 1939.

198

was proposed by Gandhi and passed 79 and significantly one o:f

Gardhi 's re:ferences in this context was to a DCC urging pea­

sants to take zaminrlar's land in Andbra. 00 As a result of this,

the APeX served notice on 15 members of the West Godaveri DCC

for taking part in the KallpatDilm satyagraba. 81

This development ,.as merely cme moment 1n a continuing

attempt to bring radicals in the party to heel. Both the v/est

Gadaveri82 and r.0st Kistna DCX:: 's radical leadership B1d been

79

00

81

82

See below, Section 3.4.

"AccumuJ.ating Evidence", 17 September 1938 CWMG, Vol. - LXVII, pp. 352-53. This was countered by ~. sumarayya in his article on the Kal..ipatnam Satyagrala n Zamindars Agresaian in Andbra.•, l'i:ltiot!J Fror· I, 35, 16 October 1938, p. 11., Stm:ia.rayya n tha if the history of the dispute \\Els looked at it ,.as the land1ard am not the tenant who was the usurper.

The eu 17 June 1939, p. 13J letter o! G. Brahmayya (perP8\o the General secretary AICC to ask :for clarifi­cation about the Yu1es) 24 June, ~939. AICC P. 3/1939-4(). See al.so Ranga 's statement of 7 June 1939, noting that as long as FCCs did not call a truce between the local land­lords or the Government on the one hand and the Kisan satyag:rahis on the other in order to amicably settle the disputes, they had absolutely no right to ban any Congress­men from becoming a Kisan satyagrahi. Indul.a1 Yajnik Ms. F. 14. Uddaraju Suraparaju, President Narsapcre 'ral.uka Congress Coa:mittee, claimed tlat those persons served a show-cause notice - 'lbank1ella Venk.ata Cbelaptbi, Chekuri Achutara.DIIlraju, A. satyanarayanaraju and Pekketi Venkata­raman and himseU - had been singled out because thai were sociaJ.ista and ryot -workers. To General Secretary, PCX: n.d. AICC P.3/1939-40. Howewr, there -were ten more cbirge sheeted and perhaps the criterion .tor singling out certain individuals 'A6S their holding a post in the party. Rajemra Prasad to Deshpande, 17 June 1939. Ibid.

A. Satyanarayaua Ex-President. w. Godavari DCC, Garap:t.ti Satyanarayana, Ex-Genera1 Secretary West Godavari DCC, Settipalll Venkataratam, Ex-General Secretary Gudivada TaJ.uka cc, and KaiDJr Balaramayya• were disciplined by the APCC leadership • Mlrupilla Ra-.s-my IUstna DCC and Narayanamurtbi1 member Behllda CC to Pr;sident. INC, 27 May 1938. However, it should be n.oted that these radicals

18~)

subject to disciplinary action, and the latter coiXIIlittee WiS

in fact dissolved in 1939.83 AR:C President Sitaramayya '118.8

engaged in a constant battle with the le:!t wing element, and

even went to the extent of debarring Suniarayya .t'rom the Tripuri

Congress delegates • elections on the grotmds that he ,.,as a sel.:!­

avowed communist and ,as using the Congress office to conceal

and distribute communist literature - "considered a particularly

Cont'd •• f.n. 82

-were charged w1 th using doubtful means to entrench them­selves through DCC elections. See Sitaramayya, President APCC to General. Secretary AICC, 24 Jtme 1938. AICC P • 3 (i)/1938-39. But Sitarama.yya -s irivolved in an equally dubious battle against the radicalS. See f .n. ~~4.

83 The context was again DCC elections. It seems that two rival groups, one headed by the west KJ~~:ct. DCC President P. Bapaiyya• and the other supported by the .APCC, B1d filed separate membership lists, and the subscription money 't.e.S also separately deposited, the opponents to Bapaiyya turning over the money to the PCC directly. Bapaiyya 's insistence on the membership bocks being depo­sited with the PCC in order that they be checked be cause of certain discrepancies \toS.S rejected by the FCC. He in turn re.fused to deposit the membership money with the FCC. As a result he and his General Secretary K. Venkataratnam. were disqualified .from contesting any elections in the Congress or in the elections to looal bodies, and the D<X enrolment of 3~lf79 members was cancelled for non-compli-ance with PCC actions. See P. Bapaiyya WK ncx:, 25 December 1938i to Bose a R.V. Raghaw.t-ah to, 6 January 1939, in which he c aimed Bapaiyya -.a not given time to explain his ac:tions; members of WGDCC to Kripalanai 8 Jamtary 1939, in which it ....as noted that aa a result of the dls­c~linary action, 49 out of the 91 members of the PCC and 16 cut o:f 29 FCC members had resigned in protest. Tblt there WiS. an undisciplined aspect to the radiClls' beha­vious cannot be denied am is especially indicated by Raghavaiah 's remarks that as the PCC -was p1rty to the dispute it coul.d not sit in ju:lgement on the Pee. But given the large numbers of Congressmen involved in this case, to view the problem simply as one of discipline, rather than o£ power, seems inade. qUite. That Bapaiyya md strong links with the Ryots association, which ,as proving so trouble acme &om tbe PCC •s viewpoint, is signi.i'icant.

20U

unworthy and improper course for the head o£ a party (the

Andhra c.s .P.) in respect o:f literature which had been decJ.a­

red Ulegal, and to whose cult he belonged• - and because 1n his

appeal he openly declared violence to be inevitable. Sitara­

mayya focussed on the last point in particular, connecting it

with a general trend in the province of promoting class hatred,

an atmosphere in whic!1. Congress village workers found it impos­

sible to fl.Ulction. 84

Cont'd •• f.n. 83

84

see the complaint of P.C. Rangarao Joint Secretary, Nuz­vid Taluka CC, Kistna, to President APCC. n.d. All refe­rences from AICC P. 3\ii)/1938-39.

Sitaramayya to Kripa.lani, 5 Jarruary 1939. Kripalan1 on receipt o! Sundarayya •s complaint l to President IN:, 1 January 1939) had cautioned Sitaramayya that a Congressmen could not, be debarred for his camnunist views. To Sita­ramayyat 4 January 1939 • Presumably Sundarayya lfl88 finally debarre<:l for his espousal. of violence. The Andhra Commu­nist's defence was as followss (1) that if there bad been a complaint about him, disciplinary action should have been taken, not a refusal to nominate him; ( 2) he also noted that ttThe communist Party 1s now under banJ and that I am not a member needs no saying. Every follower of Engels and Lenin cannot but be a communist. Communists are not violent. But it is thefr faith, that in the pro­cess of the establishment of the new order of society, when the final. struggle for power is launched, that the exponents of the new order cannot help meeting the vio­lence of those in power with violence. MeanwhUe the conrnunists do everything in their power to develop cons­ciousness in the people by al.l peace1UL and legitlate means. That is why all the canmunists adopt the Congress goal •••• 31 December 1938. Al1 references from ibid. Sun:iarayya •s w.s a common enough left-wing pooition. It may be compared with Nehru •s formul.ation that he believed that it was possible to establish socialism through the democratic process but that

In practice, however •••• the opponents o:r socia­lism will reject the democratic method when they see their power threatened. The rejection o:r democracy .does not or should not come .from the

201

If Rajagopalachari' s focus on the authority of the state

\\ElS complemented in this instance by the extra-ccnsti tuti.anal

authority of the PCC in striving to contain radical action, the

situation was reversed in Kerala, where the Kerala PCC led and

sustained such action in the face of repressive state policy.

( ii) Mala bar

l-nlabar socialists dated the start of thei.r movement85 to

1933-34, \1hen t. ~Y mc..naged to get leftist demams for agrarian

mobllisa ticn accepted in the PCC. They described a period o:f

preparation during the years 1935-36 and noted that the election

campaign o:f 1936-37 gave them a great opportunlty for propagan­

dising agrarian grievances.~ It al.so provided an opportunity

for establishing .that the socialists had a greater commitment

to the nationalist agrarian programme, for the Right Wing ele­

ments, who were in the l.eadership of the KPCC at that time, did

not publish the Congress agrarian programme in their electicn

manifesto. 87 The left then became increasingly identi.fied with

Cant'd •• f.n. 84 the socialist side but .trom the other •••• fascism. How is this to be avoided? The democratic method has many triumphs to its oredit but I do not know that it has yet succeeded in resolving the conf­lict about the very l:Bsic structure of the state or society. When the question arises, the group or class which controla state-power does nat vo11.Ul­tar1ly give it up because the majority demarxls it ....

To Lothian, 17 Januazy 1936 se~ed works of Ja.mrw Nebry (hereafter SWJHJ ed. ~. , Vol. VII, P• 65. .

85 The followine is from AIKB, 28 October 1938, in National Fro~, I, 37, 30 October 1938, P• 10.

86 Ibid,

87 E.M.s. Namboodiripe.d, •'!'be Great Betrayal"• CC!lBress Socia­list, 20 March 1937.

the agrarian issue. With the formation of the Congress Ministry,

azxl with the new sense of freedom of action available, the move­

ment spread under their auspices into the looalit1es88 and into

areas which bad not been active since 1921.89

The agrarian movement's demams included the following a

abolition of illegal exactions and farced labour; reduction of

lam revenue; use of certi.fied instruments of -weight and measure

for the estimation of the ·rop; fixity of tenure; compensation

for the improvements effected by tenants .9° Demonstrations were

the primary meth.J-:i used to achieve these ends, whether to the

administration ·or directly to the concerned jenmi (landlard).91

On sane ocoasicns this met with success.92 But on at least c:m.e

occasion when this pressure did not work, the tenants decided

not to pay rent. 93 While this v.e.s not part of the pr()gra.mme o!

the Malabar Karshaka sangam, officials reported that a campaign

had developed along these lirJ&s under the aegis of vil.l.age san­

gams towards the end of 1938, and had lEd to non-payn1ent of rent

in North Malabar and South Kanara distz·ict. Anti-police and

88

&)

90

91

92

93

AIKB, 28 October 1938, op.cit.

Such as Ernad. A.K. GopaJ.an, In the cause ot the feople. Midra.s 1973, P• 89.

From AIKB, 11 November 1938. 25 November 1938, 30 December 1938, 25 August 1939. In Yajnik MS. F. 8(1) and 15 • See also Madras P'R{ 1), December 1938. ·

Ibid.

As with a demonstration to the landlord of" Kudali NQrth Malabar • AIKB, 11 November 1938, Yajnilt i"JS • F. at i).

At Ka:rtmathur, l'!orth Malabar, ibid.

anti-jenm1 prope.gama, and the boycott of landlords by barbers,

washermen etc., were characteristic features of the movement. 94

To combat thia development~ there teas an extension in tha number

of police stations in the area, 95 am a large number of arrests

were made, w1 thout substantial evidence of illegal acti v1 ty. 96

95

Madras FR(1), November 1938; FR(2), November 1938, FR(1), December 1938. There is also an unsigned note in the at papers, dated 11 November 1938, which commented. on the in­creas 1.ng incidence of non-payment of rent in North l4llabar. It was also stated 1n this that while efforts ~re being made by the police to cheok this, this \'tfis likel:y to be ineffectual, as lang as the organisers of the ag1tatio~ "largely communist•~ were left untouched. nit is evident that there are organised plans for destroying the influe­nce and rights of: the jenmis, giving tenants a practically free j:itle to their land and undermining the authority of the law and its officers•. ~ Iti ROll. 4J Ol aJ.so complai­ned about how' the KR:C ~s making administration very dif­ficult in the police and revenue departments. To Kripe.l.ani, 7 December 1938, m m. Roll 5. Namboodiripad seemed to acknowl.edge the campaign against the police. He noted that they were brutal and in comti:vaooe with landlords and money lenders. Further, while he knew that it was CR 's view that the pol.ice should not be agitated against because this WOUld mean agitation against the .Ministry and that complaints should 'be directed to the Ministry he said that tile latter had done nothing to improve the situation. To President, INC, 1 November 1938, tbid.

AIKB, 13 January 1939, Yajnik MS. F.B(i). Note on tenants Agitation in I•la.labar \unsigned)! 11 November 1938, CR MS Roll. 4. According to Namboodir pad, tbe Collector bad pro­posed to post punitive police in the area. He noted that the IPCC would not be able to cope with the situation if the peasants decided to resist punitive tax and also tl'at Congressmen who had close relations w1 th the movement, might lave to participate in it. To President DC, 10 December -1938, at MS Roll 2. Patel. t-~s shocked to hear the suggestion and noted to CR that "I do not think yw wUl accept any proposal !or posting punitive police what­ever may be the situatico•. To CR, 21 December 1938t_ ibid. It seems that this measure \t.IB.S fimlly not used, as there is no .further mention o.f 1 t in contemporary records. Gopa­lan makes a :fleeting hut ur.selaborat~d re.fe:rence to it how­ever. Op.cit., p. 96.

Madras .FR(1 )1 December 1938 aDd i'R(2), Janua.ry merel.y re­mark on cmrges against "certain peopl.ea and that prosecu-

2 0·1

Prakasam visited the troubled areas in January 1939 and

denounced mass non-payment of rent, after which there \\BS some

improvement in the situation according to officials •97 While

no-rent propaganda carried on through Jawary and February, it

-.s remarked that propaganda far whol.eaa:Le retusal to pay rent

was dying down. The campaign \\EJ.S more precisely directed now;

"rents were only to be paid to those whom·. the Karsha.ka sangams

think proper". A:rxl Jenmis were also restricting cultivat:i on to

those whom they trusted and were requiring the 3ettlement af

rents in advance rather than af'ter the crop bad grown. 98 Inspite

of conflict continuing in this manner, over too- next 3 months

unrest petered out, and by May the District Magistrate decided

to w1 thdraw proceedin,r-';S in the pending cases, and in others

also 1i apologies i<rere given. 99

The role of the pa:; in this activity was significant.

Though the party, led by the Socialists :from January 1938, 100

cant 'd.. £ .n. 96

97

98

99

100

tions in court had led to less lawl.essness, though it -.s still dilficul.t to secure evidence agaimt the accused. Gopal.an noted that :Calse charges - including rape, steal­ing timber from the forest, assault and dacoity had been concated am that in Chirakkal. taluk.a about some 151 people were arrested. Gop3.lan, oo.ctt.t P• 97, Ranga estimted that 145 neaaants -were Invofved in criminal cases. To subhas BOse, 15 January 1939. Yajnik Ms. F.15.

t·1adras FR{1 ), January 1939.

Madras FR(1 ), February 1939.

Fadras FR(2), rv'iiy 1939.

I\.. Gopalankutt~,_;:Risc ar.d Growth of the COI:munist Ferty in Malabar, 19 T' 1 M.Phll., Jawe.blrlal Nehru tJniver-si ty, New Delhi, 197B.

20~)

had threatened agitation in response to the pollee repres-

sion, 101 it denied that a no-rent campaign was being carried

on.102 While this ltAS clearly not the oase, it aeems the party

leadership was aJ.ert to the need !or avoiding the precipita~

tian o! such activity. The general method employed -s to cons­

tantly yressurise the 1-Bdras Ministry into curbing repressive

acts, vhllc sOOY-?times threatening to undertake agi ta.tioo. but

never ia :fact doing so.103 'l'h.Ls policy ... ~s followed consistent­

ly104 and is perhaps m~;::;t revea~ingly U1u.strated by the KPa: 's

response to the AICC re-solutions of Ju.."le 1939 which hadt amongst

other pro9osals, del:e.rred Congressmen :frorr. tUlde>rtaking ~tya­

graha without the concerned PCC's permission, and also made the

Mi:nistric:; ~'::.feet:.. veJ.y accountable only ·to the High Command, am

not to the FCc.105 ~.tUP. this r~d caused strenuous opposition

by the lex"'t-wing, the KPCC ignored the ~atya~ha question and

applaufed the second resolution, emphasising that part of the

101

102

103

104

105

Namboodiripad to President, INC, 10 rece·:.n.bP.r 1938, CR I1S Roll 2.

Ibid.

AB in the North !villa bar case, see :r .n. 101. A~ in, in the case o! the Hitchcook me'llarial {in honour of the officer wo was in-·tolved in repression of the non-cooperation and 1'-appila· unrest) it was urged tMt the demand !ar its removal be con~ed ""Without in any way paving the way !or th~ starting o£ satya~"· KPCC res~utions, 26 novem­ber 1938, AICC, P. 12 (1)/1938-39.

Resolutions am letters abru"t po~ice atrocities arxl the t'iinistry's not doing anything about it were frequent, and addressed bath the Ministry and the Congress High Command. See KPCC resolutio..l'lS o£ 26 June, 1938, and 26 November 1938. P 12(1)/1938-39. Namboodiripad to President INC, 1 November 1938, 10 December 19381 ~ MS Roll 2.

see Chapter 5 below.

20()

resolution lbioh urged that the Ministers should work in coop­

eration with the PCC. This was then used to urge that the

Ministry be directed. by the President o:t the INC to take up

the questiat ot police atrocities, to which it ,.e.s noted the

PrJ.• Miniater bad been 1nd1:t.!erent •106 This constant liiElging

o:t propagama warfare against landlords, police am the Minis­

try's imi.f:terence, but alli!B.ys within constitutlanal t-~rms,

exasperated CR, who came to see the Kerala unit as a threat to

his plans of integrating the state to Congress needs, and of

achieving social consolidation.107

Interestingly, in neither the case of the Andhra nor the

Malabar peasant movement was the latter threat fOUDied at the

level of attacking agrarian legislation. The Amhra Ryots

Association in .fact organi.sed marches to taluka and revenue

of.!ices to support, with certain amendments, the Madras Minis­

try's ·Debt Relief BUl, 108 and this was also the case with the

106 Namboodiripa.d to President, IR::, 29 June 1939, CR M3. Roll 2.

107 'Ihus he did not ,.ant Namboodiripad to stand .for a by-ele­ction because he will be a thorn 1n the nesh. Party work wlll be impossible 1.f we continue and a aan like that comes at this juncture. • To Patel, 1 Febnlary 1939, at M3 Roll 2. But Rltel said that he would have to abide by the KPCC's selection ~ camidate. To CR, 30 January 19~, ibid.

108 AIKB, 24 December 1937, Yajnik MS. F. 8(1). The bUl dis­charged au interest due on 1 October 1937, and allowed an.J.y principle to be paid. There was a palllative 1n the bUl to the landlords 1n the :torm o.t a clause excluding .from the benefit o:t the act those tenants who had nat paid rent .for the current and last faslis. Further, the blll did not make any ~:terence between Income levels and oade all ry~i hol.dings eligible for ita bene:Cits irrespec­tive ot the size ot holdings. Recommendations of select coamitteeJ Erskine to Linl.ithgow, 4 February 1938. Linli­thgow. MsS Eur. F. 125/65.

207

Mld.ras Estate Land Act CODIIlittee Report under T. Prakasam,

whose proposals would have substantively benefited the tenant 1°9

In fact, unlike the Bihar am u.P. legislation, it was the

Revenue Minister's commitment to the Act which made it difficult

to realise re:torm.110 The Governor •a anxiety at the Act 1s

terms, 11 j and the petitioning o! the Congress by the major land­

lords,112 caused Rajagopalachari to seek adjustments with Patel's

help. 11 3 att the pressure from Prakasam azxl from the part .. cir-

109 Amongst the important proposals ~s tblt land review rates would be reduced to the level existing in 1002, i.e. be-! ore the permanent settlement. Erskine noted this would mee.n a very large fall in rental levels • · Another impor­tant cmnge-'-. mooted -was that peasants would have \mdi.s pu­ted rights over :forests. Erskine to Linlithgow, 10 Novem­ber 1938. Linlithgow MS Eur. F. 125/66. For the Ryots Association's approval of the proposals with some exceP­tions, see AIKB, 9 December 1938. Yajnik MS. F. 8(i).

'

110 Far example Patel informed a delegation of landlords that he could not do anything in the matter with:but the Madras Government's cooperation "and particularly the Revenue Minister who !'as devoted so much labour ard thought over the question•. To CR, 19 July 1939, CR MS. Roll 2. To evade suspiciotli 1 that Prakasam's work was to be revised as a result of negotiations, CR suggested that the venue :for discussions should be Bombay instead of Madras. To Patel, 25 July 1939, ibid.

111 Erskine to Linllthgow, 10 November 1938. Linlithgow MSS. Eur. F. 125/66.

112 CR. to Patel, 11 February 1939, CR M3 Roll 2J Rltel to CR, 6 July 1939, ibid.J Patel to CR 16 July 1939, ibid.; Patel

. to CR, 19 July 1939, ibid.; m to Patel, 25 July 1939 ibid.; Pa.tel to CR, 31 AugUSt 1939, ibid.a Patel to CR, 17 October 1939, ibid.

113 Ibid.

20il

cumscribed114 such possibilities, although compromise was being

attempted untU the time the Ministry resigned.115 The result

ot these counter-vailing compulaians l!IBS t~t the Act ~ not

finally passed. However, it WQ.lld perhaps be inadequate to

look at thia iasue simply in terms of legislative achievement.

The very impasse reached on this issue signi!ied that commitment

to agr-arian reform was irreducible. And further, the committee's

proposals provided a plat~arm for peasant mob1lisation.116

It was this which also defined the point of tension in

the relations between the Ministry and the peasant movement.

CR 's legislative policy may have been acceptable, but his bel.iet

that this could be .,implemented by the mechanisms of the state ,·

was constantly taxed by the realities ot conflict on the groum. And inSpite of his belief that such actions should be discoura­

ged, he co uld not in practice avoid a mediatory relationship

to direct action, as 1A!e have observed in the oases ot Kalipa­

tnam ani I-tunagala. Further, he l\Bs bewUdered when confronted

114

115

116

Patel explained to the landlords that as the general principles of the report had been accepted by the Madras Legalative Assembly, it wwld be difficult to do anything. To ca. 16 Jul.y 1939, ibid.

Patel was preparing to come to Madras for negotiations on 28 October 1939 when the Congress decision to resign from the Ministries took place. Patel to CR, telegrams of 17 and 18 October 1939, ibid. attel 's via media tor the Act lllflB not to reduce rental levels drastically but to have a rent court am to settle the rent on ryotwari principles. Erskine to Linlithgow, 9 September 1939, Erskine M3S Eur. D. 596/4. Thus \11Els related to the tact that the proposals as they stood would have led to tent in zamindari tracts falling below ryotwari rents. Erskine to Linlithgow, 10 November 1938. Linlithgow MSS Eur. F. 125/66. It ~ reported that publication at the report had led to · a non-payment of rent in the zamindari tracts. Erskin~ to Linlil::h13ow, 10 N""· 1"1'1~. ib,d.

20B

with the cunningly conceived and controlled Malabar movement,

in which constant pressure am propaganda was brcught to bear on

repressi'Y8 agrarian relat1Cil8 ard. on the institutions o! the

State, bUt largely on the basis o! methods which did nat trans­

gress legality.

Thus, under the Madras Ministr;, the desired focus had

been on making the state the prime mover of change, with a view,

simultaneously, of winning the state ap~tus over to the

nationalist cause. But 1n practice the focus ,.as dispersed by

the pressures constantly exercised wner extra-consti 'b.ltianal.

Congress auspices on the state structures. As we wlll see re­

currently in our ~ination of the Ministries, ex.tra-constitu-. tional power reta!nBd a vivid existence despite whatever stra­

tegic or tactical adjustments ': . .are soue;ht to be made by the

leadership in their handling of the 1935 Act.

3.2 Bibara Class adjustment and Class Conflict

3.2.1 The logic of compromise

In keeping with his views on the functions of office

acceptance as outlined in the previous chapter, Rajendra Prasad

\..as determined to enact legislation as swiftly as possible. This

priority had a set of concomitants which led to acrimony ani

conflict w1 thin the party, or more pertinently, between artho­

dcat or Ganihian Congressmen and legislators em. the one ham and

Congress Kisan Sabhaites on the other.

At the centre ot the controversy was the Cang:ress-ZWni:rxiar

agreement aL 1937-38. Th1a _. denOlDlced by the Kisan Sabha aa

210

a compromise with the big landlords and a betrayal of peasant.

interests. 117 However, the process o'£ this rapprochement was

mare complex, and oan be understood in terms ~ the pr iari ty

given to quick amelioration rather than to straighttone.rd

class questions. From the beginning of the Congress Ministry's

tenure, Rajendra Prasad had made it clear to zamitrlar eorres- ·

pondents that he had been dismayed at the lack oi: cooperation

the larxilords had afforded to the Kisan Enquiry Committee, but

that this WOUld not deter the Congress fran seeking cooperation

aga1n.118 'lhis allo\>.B.nce, however, bas to be seen in terms o!

the priority o:f swift legislation. T~rds the end of September

1937 the Congress had rushed thrcugh an ameDiing bill to the

Tenancy Act giving little time .for discussion;. Further, am

pernaps in the absence of any positive attempts at rapprochement

on the part of the 7)imi1Xlars at this stage, the Bill was refer­

red not to a Joint Select Committee of the two Houses, but to

the Select Committee of the Assemb1y.119 One of the landlord

r-n£s made it clear that as a result of this indi!ference on the

part of the Congress, the landl.ards wwJ.d have no option but to

117

118

119

• Congress-zami mar Agreement Condemned • t statement at Bihar Provimial .Kisan CouncU, 1 Augus't 1938. Yajnik Ms. F. 4(i), Newspaper clipping.

To Sha.h .!1ohamJie.d ~soodt Hen. secretary Central lamindars 1

Association, Patna, 20 July 1937, Raje~ Prasad Ms. XI/ 31/ coll.. 1 · and to Khan· Babadur Momii~DBd Is mall he noted that "If the COD€,ress propcsals are unaatis.factory the Zamindars shcul.d be pr-epared to propose a better solution a~ I am sure the Government will not fail to give it tr.air utmost consideration~' 12 October 1937 • ibid.

Kbm Babadur MohaDJDad Ismail• ~c, to Rajendra Prasad, 17 October 19}7, ibid.. ·

211

reject the bill or to make an amendment to it 1n the councu.120

This threat was followed up by a grQJp of zamindar representa­

tives meeting Rajen:tre Prasad in Calcutta after the AICC meeting

o£ October 1937, urging him that a settlement be brought about

on the agrarian question. Discussions then took place in Patm

between Rajenira Prasad, A7Jld, "Congr-ess workers who are inter­

ested in the Kisan Sctb'i'l.:i" arrl represen-tative zamindars. The

result was a set 0f p-:· .::>sals \'lhich Rajendra fra.sad considered

reasonable, though not in accord with Kisan Sa.bha. demnds, am which he hoped the zarnindars would f.in:l acceptable and. pass

through the ·upper Hcuse •121 The rationale of their rapproche­

ment derived for Rajendra Prasad from the constitutional and

legal limits presented to "the Congress by their hlving to func­

tion under the Act. As he noted to Patel

120

121

122

In these negotiations -we have two things prominently before us viz. quick pissage of legislation in the two chambers am consequent speedy relief; secorxlly, some solution o.f the problem of ~k.hast and arrears by consent. We are old l;ha.t there may be some legal di.fficul ties which may be regarded as expropriatory122 (sic.)

Ibid.

To NehrU, 23 November 1937, Rajendra Prasad Ms. I-RP/PSF-1-37.

To Pate I. 28 Novemb~r 19 37, VaJ..miki Cl'U:Nihary ( ed. ) , !2£ R e.tXlra Prasad 1 Con-es e and e t D nta \fiere-a er t , •t P• • considered the genera proposals "quite gOOd and if you can get thrOUgh the BUl by consent it would be a great gain. It is no use trying to improve it 1f it has to be forced down the throats o:f unwilling landl.ards. We sh:lll. have to re­sist the excessive demnds o:f the tenants who have been worked up arr:i eXDttato§ ¥*e :from Co~ss r11.n1sters•!J• Patel to Hajenlraaa , camber 1937, ibid., P• 1-'0

212

Rajendra Prasad al.so noted that if the zamindars did not .find

even this minimum programme acceptable, then lilley of the con­

cessions made to them would be rescinded am l.eg1slat1on would

proceed irrespective of negot1ations.12'

In practice, howeVer, this did not work rut. In the .first

Cangress-zamindar agreement of December 1937, the .following ad­

justments 1n t:te original bil.l were accepted in order to can-y

the l.nndlord vote in the upper house: the 7 year clause, where­

by at the option of the tenant the court coul.d neke over the

entire holding :for a period nat exceeding 7 years in lieu of

arrears, attar W1ich restoration would take place, i.e. a choice

between l.osing part holding for ever am the whole for a period,

was dropped due to landJ.ord objections, 124 similtu•ly, salami,

Cont 1d •• :! .n. 122

123

124

(empbasis added to in:lica.te the sense o£ limitations imposed an the Hinistry "U1at both Right-Wing leaders felt).

Rajendra Prasad to Sri Krishna Sinha, 5 December 1937, ibid,. p. 137.

Patel to Rajerxira Prasad, ·16 December 1937, fiid,. p. 143. R.ajendra Prasad, "The A~!an Problem in B! r*, n.d., Rajendra Prasad Ms. 1-e/1938, co1.1.2. Prasad also noted in this survey that other reascns :tor dropping the clause incluied the tact that the tenant would be ren:lered comple­tely landless by tbe clause, and that in the interim period neither the landlord nor tbe tenint would have any interest in neintaini.ng the f'ertUity of the soil. But in a letter .to S.K. Sinha he noted that 1n the event or land­lards withdrawing from tbe agreement, the 7 year clause should be reinstated as they had been. persuaded to give 1 t up only to pW'Chase the ~urd.Diars 1 c CllSen:t. To S .K. Sinha• 2 December 1937, Rajenira Prasad Ms. XV/37/coU.3. And Kisan .Jabha representatives :f.n the Assembly, JaJill.JIB Karji and ot.~ers, cvnsidered this one of the I!lOSt serious de~etions .from the original. bill. "Dissatis£actian with provisions o! Tenancy Bil.l." • 22 December 1937, Indul.al Yajnik Ms., F.4(1), newspaper cllppings.

the transfer fee to be p1id to the J.amlord at the time of land

transfer, origi.nally scheduled to be abolished, ,as retained at

a reduced. rateJ 125 and :tinally1 the rature of the punishment to

be given for levying of aln\eba (Ulegal exactions) Wls changed

by the landlord body in the upper house,126 an act subsequently

ratified by the Ccmgress, but held out as an eJCJlmple of landlord

inconsistency by Rajendru Prasad.127

I! legislative feasibility "IUS too major motive · ~hin:l

these concessions, as signi.tioant 'MlB the question o£ practical

implementa tiun of the various reforms achieved - rent reduc­

tion, COlllJ!l'-'tation, a mare equitable division of crop 1n bata!

(share-cropping) la~, the exemption a£ tenants from various

penalties for not paying rent arrears (immunity from attachment

of moveable property, house, and from arrestJ and only part­

sale of holding in execution of a decree for rent arrears, as

opposed to the earlier total sa:te, irresp?ctive of however snflll

the amount o:f the decree, or great the value o.f the holding) •128

Practicability \\SS al.so at issue here, as it was fea:ced that

questions such as remi.ss1on a£ rental arrears, and the later

125 Rajendra P.nlsad, "The Agrarian Problem•. ibid.

126 Originally the Bil.l Ullde it a cognisable offence but it ..as DBde non-cognisable for !ear that it would e;ive the police a hauil.e to oppress the landl.ords. Rajendre. Prasad, ibid. Sahajalllnd pointed out that the cmnge t<.fts etf ected by landl.ord •treachery• in the upper house. "Cangreas­zamimar Agreement in Bihar•, c. August 1938, IDiulal Yajnik Ms. F 4( i) •

127 He cited the transgression as something t.o be eschewed 1f cooperation between l.andl.ards and the ministry ~~as· to succeed. To Darbbanga, 20 AprU 1938, RaJencira Prasad, Ms • 1-e./38/ coll.1 •

128 For deta11s, Rajend..ra Prasad, •The Agrarian Prob1em•, op.cit.

21tl

plan to restore bakasht lands, wOUld present legal di~ficul­

ties. But with such an agreement, whatever the nature of the

concessions, these problems woul.d be ciroumvented bece.use

we ••• ~VS obtained promiaes from them /1!le · landlorcliJ to g1 ve efi ect to the terms 0! the settlement even if no legislation on these points is .found possible under the law. There nay be some recall:Ltrant landlords but others have promised to join us in these measures and devise means to give relief to the te­n.ants.129

But this compu-1.sion, once accspted, tun1ed out to be

C.1f1'1cult to limit in terms of landlord denands far protection

of thE'ir rights :from a recalcitrant tenantry am whit 'Atls seen

as ar!b:.gonistic .· min!oterial positions regarding efficient rent

realisat1on.130

As a result o! this impediment to legislation a second

a~eement ~s entered into. The l.aoolords gave up the right to

use certi~icate pocedure to realise rents 1 ' 1 but ~re concilia­

ted with much more stringent proor.::dures for rent realisation.

----------------129 Hajendra Prasad to Nehru, 18 December 1937. Rajemra

Prasad Ms. I-RP/FSF(i)/1937. .

130 Thus Shyamnar¥:lan Sahay o£ the Bihar Landholders' Associa­tion noted that 1n regard to speedy rent realisation and automatic remission of cess consequent upon remission of rent "Government holds viel!IS which are neither in keeping with the letter nor the spirit oi the compromise". This \lt'6.S vlth reference to s.K. Sinb1 1s statement in the Assem­bly that .speedy rent reaJ.isaticn procedure could ml.y be arranged atter ~table adjustment a£ rent bad been un­dertaken. To Ra end%9 Prasad, 13 AJrll 1938. Rajeoora Prasad Ms. 1-a/ /coll..1.

131 Hallelt to Linlithgow, 5 March 1938. Llnlithgow t-1s. Eur. F 125/44. Ill the cer-~ificate procedure. inbtead o£ ob­taining a decree and executing it in a ClviJ. Cc~, the landlord. at'ter fuUUlJ.ng conditions ~ maintaining correct accounts etc., cOUld be issued a certificate by the Rewnue

21G

-The crucial features o:f the agreement were: 132 instead

of· partial sale of a hol.ding to make up rent arrears, if a

tenant had not paid rent tor four consecutive years, be could

be declared a habitual defaulter and the entire plot could be

sold. Further, in order that the tersnt be discouraged from

trying to evadEt this clause by making delayed rent payment,

such pa)llOOnt would be appropriated to making up arrears. Final­

ly, and most controversially. was the addition of the facility

of a di!3tra1nt order on crops to realise rent arrears; pending

decision of a sui"'~, the crop could be cut am sold and the money

would lie in court untll the suit was decided. To facilitate

swifter proceedin.gs, while suc..l-t an order wruld come from the

civil court, the execution wou1d be un1erval-cen by the revenue

official.133

Both t:'le -total s..'lle clause and the -distraint/attachment

order effectively rev~rsed the position to t~:~at preceding the

1937 Tenancy Act.134 To underline the serirusn:?ss o:f this re-

Cant'd •• f.n. 131 Officer 'Whi.ch -woUl.d en.1.ble i.IIIIlediate retrieval ~ rent arrears. In practice this temed to give the landlord special power over the temnt. See RajelXlra Pre.sad,•'l'be Agrarian Problem,• op.cit.

132 Ccmgress-Zamindar Agreement, Patna, 4 July 1938. Rajendra Prasad I1s. 1-a/38/ eo1.1.1.

133 Note by P.ajcmdra Praaad, Congress Zamindar agreement, n.d. Rajendra Prasad Ms. 1-a/38/coll.2.

134 In the discussion between Government am zamindars on the distraint clausa it was pointed out that attachment ~ crops bad been made al.most impossible under the .first Amen­dment Act o:f 19~Jt ibid.; as for the ql.1estion o:f total sale, lihUe in 'tlll.S case 1 t re].a ted to the problem af habitual defaulter, it bad been another practice ended by

21G

versal, it should also be noted that thiS, am the whole series

of changes in legislative approach signalled by the .first agree­

ment ~ December 1937, lll8re undertaken in the .tace o.f s.igni.ti­

oant disapproval in the party. In September, well before the

agreement took place, aome 61 Congress ML.Aa, i.e. about 2/3 of

the l.Bgislature Rlrty, submitted a representation to the Premier

asking ~or introduction of measures in accord with tr..e Faizpur

agrarian programme (including the wiping ot:.t of rent , arrears,

50 per cent reduction in rent and canil rates) and uncompromis­

ing legislation on natters specifically pertaining to Bihar (e.g.

regarding bakasht, there was a demand that all peasant lands

auctioned for rent arrears ~ returned) •135 Later, when the

second agreement came up in the select Committee, it was repor­

ted that rank ana file Congressmen almost :revolted against it,

as ttey r..ad net been consulted.1 36 Vbile t~e Working Committee

of the PCC supported the agreement,137 the meeting Vl.ich passed

Cent 'd •• f .n. 134

the 1937 Act. The pre-1937 stricture had, however, been rcore ::~vere tr.an the cla\.1Se envisaged by ·the Agreement. The entire !loJ.ding had been liable to be sold however szm&ll the amount ~ the decree and however great the val.w ot the holding .. Rajend.ri?. Pre.sad• "The Agrarian Ft-oblem ••• • op.cit.

135 "0verhall Tenancy Act. Bibir MLAs ux-ge Premier to intro­duce b~U in Assemb~y"• News~per clipping at' 10 September 1937 • Indulal Yajnik Ms • F .4(11) •

136 Stewart to Linlithgow, 13 June 1938. LinJ.ithgow MJs. Eur. F. 125/44.

137 But at the meeting it l,,as ::1oted tmt it woul.d be dif':ficult to g~t the rest of t.1e pE.crty to support tte 3.gr'ecrrent. Ste"~t to Brabour:oe, 28 July 1938. Ibid.

217

the proposals witnessed airing o.f considerable cltlticism, and

not only from the leftists •138 In its final form, the agreement

was questionc:!d in parts even by those V!o the party had deaig­

nated to mediate with lJlndlords, Jamuna Prasad Singh, MLA 139

and NarainJi, Secretary ~ the Provincial Kisan Department ot

the Congress.140

Rajendra Prasad was well aware of the criticism that he

\'t6S likely to recei,re :for pursuing such a compromise, not only

:from the Kisan Sabha, but from Congressmen ani per:taps even

from the High Comnand.141 In fact he had brought Mau:Lana Azad

into the -negotiations so as to give greater authority to the

Ninistry in the legislation it was undertaking and which he

realized :fell below the Faizpur programme af the Cangress.142

He was willing and prepared to run these risks because he was

seized with the urgency of pushing the legislation through as

138

139

140

141

142

Ste".ert to Brabourne, 9 August 1938, ibid.

Jamuna Prasad Singh questioned the landlord assumption that Section 55 of the Act would be amemed to enable appropriation o:f any rental payment towards arrears. Indian Nat1'trt9 July 1938 in Rajendra Prasad, Ms. 1-a/ :3S/c011.1. Rajendra Prasad confirmed that such an amendment was iDieed envisaged. Note en the agreement in ibid., collection 2.

Narainji bad wanted the whole chapter on distraint aboli­phed as he believed that it t.Els very oppressive. Rajendra rasad to s.K. Sinha, 27 ~J 1938. Ibid., co11.2. When

the distraint clause \IJ&s uied in the Agreement Narain-ji emphasized that the landlord belief that previous Government orders prohibiting this would be cancelled -.a wrong. The only change was that there would be a trarud er a£ the order :from the civil court to the Revenue Court for execution. Indian Nation, 9 July 1938 in ibid., co11.1.

Rajendra Pre.sa,d to J:Brbhanga, 20 Apr!~ 1938, ibid.

Rajendra Prasad to Ramda~1u Sinha, 7 December 1937 • Rajendra Prasad Ms. III/37/coll.1.

swiftly as possible. This sense of urgency \';BS heightened by

the Ministerial crisis of February 1938, when the B!Mr Minis­

try temporarUy resigned over the issue o! the dilatory way

in which their orders !or release of political prisoners was

being responded to by the Governor. As he noted to s.K. Si.nba t

I do not know when the next ccnstitutional crisis will arise. It rrs.y come as suddenly ani unexpecteclly as the last one. I am, therefore, anxious that the Ministry should get through as many legislative and adminis­trative measures as possible within the shortest possibl.e time so that when the next crisis comes the country may have before it a record o:! good work done by the Congress Ministry. I can visualise a conflict between the Minlstry am "the British Government in connect.:Lon with the introduction of the Fede­ral Constitt.ttion. It is pcssible that an attempt wiU be made to introduce it some time to,..e.rds the e:OO of the current yes.r and when that comes I do not know 'What fcrm the conflict r5ly take. It T.II!iy be a constituticmal deadlock or direct action. In either case normal work of reform am reconstruction will have to be given up, so whatever the Ministry can do betwen nSa%¥1 September next must be done ana f f'ee1 ~ Uriiess you are all very axpedi tious in planning and executing the reforms which you may lllfUlt to introduce you will have failed in your attempt and the Congress wiU stand discredited at the time o! coofl.ict, when it will need all the sup­port af the people at l.arge.143

It is clear from the subsequent developments arowxl the

issue of tenancy legislation that Rajen:lra Prasad saw the agree­

ment with the zamindars as central. to ensuring this goal.. And

this lii&S . not Clll.y to be vi th a view to Sh crt-circuiting. the

~egislative process. which could be interminably delayed by

143 Rajendra Prasad to S .K. Sinha, 4 March 1938, Rajendra Prasad Ms. 3B/1938. (Emptasis added to underl.ine the limited sense o£ duration P.rasad bad for the 1egisl.at1cc to take plaoe).

21~)

larrllord opposition in the upper house, but in a more active

sense, through their participation in the implementation o£ the

law. He emp:tasised the importance of adm1n1stering the law •so

that people can .feel tmt :they have gat something out o£ this

understanding'~. To this end he urged the ltBhara ja. ot Darbha­

nga 144 that praninent zamindars issue a statement to the .follow­

ing effect:

(a) all evictions and illegal exaction should cease. (ab~bs

indulged in should be specifically cited)J

(b) tenants should not be compelled to sell any articles at

less than JnB.rket price;

(c) no paymerit shpuld be accepted without grant of a receipt I

in the prescribed .forma

-(d) no forced or underpaid labour.

He also urged that any complaints against a.mla~ (landlords'

a gents) would be promptly enquired into by the zamindars con­

cerned and followed up in terms of relief and action wherever

fowxl valid. U the amelioration provided by the Acts ....e.s

ensured in this ~y, he 1n turn ,.as willing that the Ministry

issue a statement urging that rent be pa1d.145 Am a.occrdingly,

to palliate l.andlcrd .fears, it ..,as ensured in the Agreement that

if within six months rent ViS not being realised, legislative

am other formS of aqtion wouJ.d be taken; further that as the

agreement had PCC sanction, all subordim te DCCs would support

144 Rajendra FTasad to Darbhanga, 20 April 1938. Rajenira Frasad, Ns. 1-a/38/ col.l..1 •

145 Rajendra Prasad to Darbbanga • 25 June 1938. ibid.

220

it, or otherwise .face disciplinary action; and that Azad would

issue a statement that as the zs.mindArs had agreed to the terms,

it would be up to the Congress to ensure tmt an atmosphere o:t

peace was maintained and rents p:l1d.146

Rajendra Prasad's strategy here \I,S.S then oriented not

only to facilitate legislation but to ensure its implementation.

The orientation af th'?se compromises in our estims.tion WiS to­

v.e.rds ameliorating _;le condition of the tenantry, am the Agree­

ments were tactical devices to ensure tbl t Cmgress achievement

in this area, constrained by legislative limits and the :rear

of a short tenure, would not be jeo~ised by lamlard oppo-

si tion.

However, if compromise with the land1ords as a cl.ass on

questions of rent realization cOUld achieve, theoretlcally at

least, certain benefits for the tenantry, the other critical

legislation undertaken during this period, the Restoration o!

Bakasht Lands Act o£ 1938 could not even claim these: theoreti­

cal virtues. This Act, which aimed at securing restoration of

lams sOld in execution of rent decrees, exempted petty land­

lards with an agricultural income below Bs. s.ooo/- and also over­

looked oases o£ land settled \'lith a third pe.rty. Restar-ation

would otherwise take place on payment o£ hal£ the sale cost

within a period o:t £1 ve years •147

146 Congress Zamindar Agreement, ibid.

147 Hallett to Linllthgow, 5 March 1938, Linlithgow Ms. Eur. F. 125/44. Far :!urther detaUa of the Act, see Bihar cszverneent•s Fertormaw. Aicc 81/1938.

b~"~~ ~-·-·'d~ > ..,...~ .... =--.:> ' 2 2 1 -t' .n ' "ii Jt ' .... ~ ' ~\ f l . •~d~~_:'Governor Hallett pointed out, this meant that resto-

on would only take place on the larger estates.148 Rajen­

dra Prasad was all6I'e o£ this and noted that the exemption in

favour of 'petty landlords • mll.lified to a large extent the

e:t:tect of the reatore.ticn provision as in some places only

petty landlords dominated and so no restoration would take

place in these areas. He also noted that in some cases petty

and large l;lndlords could ue co-sharers, so t.hlt, according to

the terms of the Act, \lhile ooe tenant might get his land back•

the neighbouring one might not, az:d this coul.d be to the cost

of the more deserving tens.nt. To resolve this Rajemra Prasad

suggested a l1mi t1Di of the de:fini tion of the small landlcrd.

Hitherto the term referred to ane \\bo did not pay agricultural

incane-tax. but now ~sad suggest6!d that it only rel.ate to one

who pai~ less than~. 125/- road cess annually.149 But the

earlier definition held.150

If there ,,as discomfort about the implications af support

to the small l.and1ord over the ba.kp.slJt issue, there \\8.s equal

uncertainty as to whether the Agricu1tural Income Tax Bill was

doing adequate justice to this category. This provided !or ex­

emption for income below Rs. 5,000/• but there would be a :nat level o£ taxation !or all incomes above one l.akh. Rajendra

148 Hallett to L!nli thgow, ibid.

149 Rajendra &-asad to CPN Singh. Ra.jendra Frasad Ms. 1-e./ 38/coll..1.

150 Bihar Government'§ Fer.fgrmance, qp.cit,

222

Prasad said that this signi:fied a concession to the big land­

lord at the expense of the smaller one am suggested that the

rates should be al.tered so as to raise tb8 upper limit am to

reduce the rates for l.ower incomes, subject to the condition

that the total yield would not be red.uoed.151 However no gra­

dations of this order took place in the final act.152

If ~ try to interpret a c].ass orientation, or rather

result, from Rajendra Prasad's legisl.ative strate ·r, it would

seem that overoll it ~s the small landlCJt"d 's interests which

were protected, though in some oases wi~n a framework of

corx:illatian. of the larger landl.ords. · On the other hand a

space !or reform -we.s also chalked out for the peasantry, circums­

cribed however it might have been by the conc111ation of the

landJ. ords •

Even in terms o.f these advances, however, there were in­

evitable problems. The abil.ity of the peasantry to utilize the

legal. procedures provided for the amelioration of their grie­

vances, founded as they \ltere on documentary requirements to

establ.ish occupancy and rent J.e·J"el.S 1 arxl the costs of litiga­

tion would tend to be restrictive for the smaller peasants. It

must ba ve been an a'W&reness of these probl.ems - e.g. of lack of

rent receipts, manip.ll.ation o:t evidence by landlords agents am

1,1

152

To CPN Singh, 2.5 April 1938, Rajemra Prasad M3. 1-e/38/ c011.1.

Bihar Government's Pe~rmance, op,!it. In addition it should be noted that t Premier sa d ti:at no interest woul.d be charged !or non-payment of the tax. G.P. Sharma, •The Congress!. Feasant Movement and Agrarian Legialatica in Bihar• 193·r-39•, M.PhiJ.., Centre far Historical Studies, Jawahlrlal Nehru university, New Del.h11 1979.

223

their uae o~ ~orce to settle conflicts with the tenantry- which

led to Rajendra P.rasad •s demand that these means be curbed by

the landlords.153

In a sense, to alleviate the problems posed by a con8t1-

tut1onal-administrative resolution. Rajendre. Prasad vas seeking

to circumvent these !nsti tutians. The notion of a Congress

compromise with, or sup;>ort to, J'he landl.ord cJ.ass fails to

encompass this a.-:- ect oi his strategy. The landl<rds, who bad

been at the receiving end o£ the 1937 elections, were being

invited by Prasad to acquire citizenship umer the nationa11st

regime, in return for a certain legal protection o~ their rights

as landlords, a:rxi ~n coDii tion Ula t they in turn adopt. a legal

approach on the many issues affecting their tenantry •154

Thi3 objective was, however, severely curtaUed by the

"uncivllity" of the society Rajendra Prasad was handling. In

response to his pl.ea tba t the lP.ndlords be brought into line to

implement the agreement, a..trbl'lanoaa noted tl6a·t they would try

t.~eir best to ensure this, but he also cautioned Rajenira Prasad.

that his group .formed one of the component pal .. ta of a Party in

the Councll Ula.t consisted of mincr1ty groups and 1r¥liv1duala,

and so could nat be held responsible ~or those who did not

identity with the Bil:ar Landholders 1 Associat1cn.155 Ani this

problem did not cnl.y surface inside the legislature.. Outside

153 See above, footnote 144.

1.54 This may be contrasted with the ccnsti"b..ttiomlist approach of Rajagopalachari, which tended to restrict its gaze to the realm of tba state J command over all other relation­ships wou1.d now ~rom the primry task ot controlling tbe state.

155 Darbhanga to Rajemra Frasad• 21 April 1938, Rajenira

224

the legislature it was reported that in anticipation o:f the

legislation, landlords were arriving at favourable tenurial

settlements in Gay a, ~ tna and Shahabad districts. Further,

certain sections ot the landl.ords such as the Fatm and Bhagal­

pur Landholders' Associations had repuiiated the agreement.156

In fact, whlle the Kisan Sabha criticism t.e.s levelled

most ~ all against the concessions to the landlords, a major

part of their attack was concentrated on the inefficacy of

leg1sl.a.tion, the acts of commission in its impJ.e~ntation and

so raised the quest1a1 of power on the ground to realize re­

l.ief. As Sahajana:rd put it &

It is nat .the mere absence at the legal provisions helping the kisans which has caused their miseries, degradation and ruin in the end. In .fact a lot of such provisions are already there to save them to a considerable extent from the clutches a!, and the troubles from, tr..e zamimars and yet the lot ~ the kisa:ns has ever remained unal.tered, because there has been no vi~ant and n~ ma.c~ry to en­lorce em s&Ic rth IO~s tbf{ds l£!Jtl$5~~fi s accruifu ere_o

Cant'd •• f.n. 155

156

Prasad Ms. 1-e./38/coll.1.

Sahajamnd, "Congress-Zamindar Agreement in BUar•, Indu­l.al Yajnik Hs. F .4{1).

Sahajanand, "Tenancy Measures in Bihar" after 15 August 1938, ibid. L'l"he measures he mentioned k this context included Section 58 of the earller Bihar Temncy Amend­ment Act Which penalised the :Landlord for non-grant of receipt, or statement o:f accountsJ sections 74 and 75, against abye.bs; section 186, \>Jhich made a criminal oi'.fence oi any ULdue and illegal. ~terference with the produce of the kisan•s holding.'

22S

Thus Sahajanand noted that certain gains of legislation, how­

ever imdequa te they might have been in his estimation, were

simply not implemented.158 Even more significantly, Sahajamrxl

showed that there had been a mare active interventicn by the

government to neutralize ar substantially dilute legislation

regarding rent reduction.

In a pamphlet published on the eve of the resignation of

the Congress tlinistry in Biblr 159 sahnjanlzxi drew :-~terrtion to

a series of problema 1n the implementation o:r Section 112A(I)

o£ the Tenancy Act. He showed that in a number o£ instances

Government instructions and circul.ars md been issued with a

view to lessen the ,impact of the rent reduction law on the

landlords.

He noted that kisans had hoped t..'rlat clause c( ii) of the

section, vhose chief aim ~s to reduce rent i:f the landlord had

neglected irrigation, would facilitate reduction retrospecti­

vely. This hope appeared to be borne out by the Government's

ear1ier clirect.ives in which the rent reduction officer was

instructed to remit rent .for 10 years if' the landlord •s omis-

158 Amongst 1Jhe .failures citeds the non-implementation of the .fo~ula .for grain division b€-tween lai¥Uord and tenant in the ~ systemJ that the "meagre• 2 lakh reductic:n of can:1I"ra~es had not been put into practice; and ·that rent reduction was not being impl.emented because of the nature o£ the machinery, presumably re!erri~ here to the d1!!1-cu1 ties faced ~, the teB!.nt in providing evidence of rent p1yment and of establishing rental levels. 11 Congress­Zamindar Agreement Condemned•, Bombay Sent~ 1 August 1938 and So.h~.janand, "Tenancy ~asures In t3 11

1 op .cit., both in InduJ.al Yajnik 1'-'is • F. 4{ i).

159

22G

sion -s judged to be habitual. However, in the Government's

later circular (No. 43), it was directed that before such ac­

tiCI'l ,..as taken the l.andl.ord should be given time to make good

his ob1{gatiana, and if within that time satisfactory changes

were not made remission o:1 ren:t woul.d be made .tina:t. but would

take effect only "from such date after tc~ filing of the tenant •s

not be given retr pective effect for per:!.oc.1 prior to fj~ing of

appeal." Further, circular 48 gave landlords opportunity far

revision of such a settlement by empov~ering rer.ct reducti.on

officers to revise aey such order if they were satisfied with

the landlord 's e:ff orts • 16o

The Government's good. L"ltentions towards the landlords

,.,.,ere further established by circule.rs 38 and 46. The first

insisted that in all instances the evidence of the landlords

must be considered and in the order passed rP.asons :for rejec­

tion or acceptance of these must be stated. As Sabajamnd noted,

this provided the landlords with the poss ibUity o£ pressuris­

ing the officers and also gave thee an opportunity to introduce

fabricated evidence.161 CircuJ.ar 46 indicated special consi­

deration for landlords in the rent reduction operationss notices

had to be issued to landlords and tenants tMt applications for

rent reduction \'loul.d be considered on a certain date. I.f' land­

lords .failed to attend them a further individUil notice would

be issued to them beL o.ce any order was passed; further the land-

160 Ibid, PP• 11-16.

161 Ibigu PP• 2o-21.

22?

lords would als::> be given a copy of the application for rent

reduction made by the temnt.162 The absence af similar al.low­

ances and !acUities to tenants was pointed out, ani it was

only then that the Government issued circular No. 52 1n which

they noted that such procedures -were applicable to both clas­

ses.163

Sahajanand c:.lso pointed out two other problems presented

by these circu.laz'z. The first \'JClS t11e tendency of the Government

to rely on the judgement of the administration, a dependence

Saba.janlnd did not find reasoa:ible. For example, in the appli­

cation of clause c{i) of the section, pertaining to relief

given in the ca8e o~ deteriorating holdings. he noted that

determinE.tion of eligibility of' a holding would be left to the

rent reduction offic~rs. And L"'l one instance he pointed out

thUt "Nhile some o£.f1cers \\Rated ·to ti.se their discreticn to

apply the clause in ti1.e case 01' lands whose productivity \-.ElS

affected by Shade, the reJt officer, IlJ\..B. Will.1ams, declared

that the claw>e -wa.s not applicable •164

The question of partiality to tbe landlord and the du­

biou.slleas Qf relying solely an admin.istrative judgement were

two of' the major i...ssues revealed uy ..)ar..ajanand •s analysis of

GovernrJent circulars. The third one ~s an ei'fective abroga­

ticn o~ rights given by ·the Rent Reduction section of the Act.

!:>ahajan.uld pointed out that in pe.ragi."aph 48 of the instructions

162 Ibid 1 , PP• 21-22.

163 Ibid,

164 Ibid, PP• B-10.

220

it \\RS provided that rent reduction at'.ficers could use clause

(d) if the rent remained exhorbitantly high a.fter the applica­

tion of clauses (a) and (b). If even ~ter this rent ~s

deemed too high after cancellation of enba:ooement, then clause

(e) could be a:pplled. But in March 1939 circular 39 .as issued

prohibiting application of clause (d) in such cases. The use

a.f clause (e) never arose at au.165

Lvidently what had operated here was the gover "1ent•s

desire to palliate landlord interests in a context in which

rents were still not being remitted.166 But the result o.f

these problems, reversals and inef£1ca.cy o.f legislation \\88 to

give the l.aiXU.ord $ sense af po,er, a situation inimical. there­

fore to the redressal o:f peasant grievances. Sahajamnd noted

that the zamindars :felt nhappy and victor1.ous•167 because o£

Government concessions, while on the other ham the tenantry

felt no diminishing of their si illation o:f powerlessness:

165 Ibid, PP• 5-6,

166 Ibid,, PP• 24-25.

167 Sabajamnd., "Tenancy Measures in Bihar, • dter 15 August 1938, op.cit. He quoted K.B. IsmaU, an anti..Congreaa Zamindar who :t:e.d refused to cooperate w1 th the Congress Kisan Enquiry Committee and ~o continued to ally with anti-congress elements, as having said in the Council that "By entering into agreement with the Congress the Zamin­clars hav~ not surremered their rights. The agreement is in the interest o:! the 7J:lm1ndar community." Later he also noted the opinions ~ landlords at the All-India Landlords • Conference held at Lucknow in April 1939. c.P.N. Singh, a major Bihar Landlord noted that "The Government in Bibar ••• were very reasomble and some concessions were secured by tbe zamind.ars in Bihar which no other Government would have aJ.l.owed". Sahajanand, note on Congress and Zamindars, 1 September 19 39, Indulal Yajnik, .Ma • F .5.

22U

The government, while providing ! or- the machin:!ry {legislation R.V .) did not take into account ••• the wer .... wed and terror stricken condi tians the Kisans were conti­nuoosly in • • • and considered them. :tor au practical purposes of the law. equals o! the zamj ndars. This baa been the greatest handicap :tor the kisans in getting their grievances redressed through the legal machinery. • • In the circumstances mere repeated enumeration o! these reforms would not cut . roue~ ice, it \dJ:J. enrarv il: kisans instead, First curb merclless y taw-less. tyraru .. .:.cal and most objectionable activities of the zamindars and prowptly teach them a terrible lesson :tor these and ~ke them realise that they are unier the regime o! the popular ministry installed by the kisans inspite of them• and see clearly that the times have changed, then and then aJ.one any value o! these measures may be as•ssed by_ the kisans .168

In cur view, Sahajamnd's argument demarcates the criti­

cal area of tension ..,.ri thin the ministerial experiment. The

question was not so much of compromise but thi t identification

with peasant interests within this compromise be established.

A political agency outside the realm of the state to realise

legislative achievements an behalf of the tenantry· was required.

otherwise, legislation "wUl enrage the ldsans instead•. In our

next section• we will examine how the canpulsiona of ministerial

action as seen by the Right Wing• and a certain inefficacy ot

legiSlation to ameliorate the agrarian problem. led to a signi­

i'icant, if temporary, parting of t.e.ys in the party.

3.2.2 Divergerxt Patterns of Action aa,d fower

The compulsions we have observed in Rajendra Prasad •s stra-

168 "Tenancy Maasures 1n Bibir•. ibid. lmpblsi.s added.

2 ~-~ l)

tegy for social consolidation contrast with the approa.ch of

ltisan Sabba activists in Biblr. The limits to legislation

posed by the structure of the state and of law and by a sense

of the limited pOlitical duration of the Congress experiment,

were of negligible significance to this group. We shall show

that in their perspective, the terrain of' action al\\Eiys rested

outside the structures of government. At first pressure and

later direct action were considered the motive force of all

change. Such action might be oriented to wresting gains from

the administration. to bringing pressure to bear on the Govern­

ment with a view to radicalizing legislationJ it might even

have been pursued with a kncndedge o:f legal oppcrtunities and

how these could be used to bene:fi t the tenantry •169 But all

such elements o:f Kisa.n .sabha politics must be seen not as ends

in themselves but as moments in the consolidation of peasant

po'"..er, a power whose aim \'liS the abolition of the Zamirxlari

system. In the Kisan sabha leaders' view, nationalism had to

be radicalised to the point where the abolition of feudal pro­

perty could be achieved. In 1939. a:fter the British entry into

the lliBrt an:l on the eve of C<mgress resignation from office,

Yajnik noted that

I think that we shOUld make a bold bid for carrying things to a decisive conc1usian even in tle Kisan Movement. All of us agreed that thiS 1-AS an opportune moment for making

169 For example, whlle the Comilla meeting of the AIKC rourxily denounced Congress ministerial policy regarding indebted­ness~. it made elaborate suggestions far how tenants coul.d benerit :trom the existing laws. Comilla Conference, 14

·and 15 May 1938. Yajnik. Ma. F.a.

2 ~31

a bold attem~ for eliminating zamindari system. (sic)170

In Sahajanand too there was a linkage between the radicalisatian ihts

ot the peasant and nat! anal. movement and "is Ulustrated by hia

observation that

Every possible effort rP.s been made by us to keep our Bakasht struggle alive and at the same time make preparations for readi­ness to rise to a man when the call for the supreme sacrif'ice comes.-171

It is apparent that tor Sahajanam the supreme sacrifice

the complete commitment to abol.ishing the _Raj - would be faci­

litated by the unprecedented presence of a c anscious, anti­

feudal peasant movement.

But there is 1n the last pronouncement the aspect of a

volt.mtarism struggling to realise that \\bich is becoming stea­

dily iJ.lusory. Before the Congress f.11nistries had resigned,

the Bakasht struggle had dwindl.ed into weakness and increasing­

ly sporadic activity.172 Further, this perspective only assumed

a definite slllpe af'ter a certain period of the N1n1stry 's li.fe.

While peasant action ~s allll&ys seen as the motor o£ change~

the belie! that it cou1d am in fact should move into a more

radical., expropria·tary phase, was a later develOpment. In this

section we shal~ examine the Character of Kisan Sabha pOlitics,

and how it underwent these changes.

170 Yajnik to Sal1ajamnd, 13 September 1939, Yajr.dk Ms. F .11.

171 To Yajnik~ 18 September 1939, ibid.

172 See below, section (11).

-I The AIKS • skeptical attitude to the Congress decision to

form Ministries -.s reiterated at ita N~matpur (Gaya) session

in mid-July, 173 aD:1 shortly after the inauguration o:t the Mlnis­

try, in AugUSt, the BFKS organised a demonstration to the

Assembly to issue a statement of temnt grievances to the lTemier.

In September 1 t v.t!S proposed that there be a Kisan March to the

ASsembly on the i:---.roduction of the Tenancy Amerrlment Bill on 23

.September. Hoir.Ever, it was pointed out that such a demonstra­

tion would be premature, since the proposals for tel1incy re_..torm

were not as yet known, and so the march was abandcmed.174

Clearly, this. scepticism expressed a diStrust of the

r-a.n1stry and a determination to exercise constant pressure on

it to ensw·e t~t it did not succumb to moderation. However,

to put this in perspective, it shouJ.d be noted that there had

been a build-up at: laml.<rd organisation arxi pressure during

t.ltese first few months, and there \'IRS a constant stream o£ comp­

laints .from landlcrd •a about tenant unrest ar:d nan-payment of

rent.175

The development of class-oanfl.ict placed the K1.san Sabba

"between two hOl"llS of a dUeliiila" as Snmjanand put it, a situa-

173 14 and 15 July. Yajnik Ms. F.s.

174 AICG ~8/1937.

175 e.g. Darbba~ to Rajendxa Prasad 3 June 1937, Rajendra Prasad Me. XJ../37/ct:Jll. 1J Mohamme! *swood• Central Zamin­dar Associaticn to Rajerxlra Prasad• 20 Ju1y 19371 ibid.; Thakur Bimla Prasad Singh• Sub Divisional. Iandhol.ders Associaticm to Rajenira Prasad1 16 November 1937,_ ibid., ri.I/37/caU.1. Raghunath Prasad Narayan, S:tree Nivaa Estate! Sandha• l-1uzattarpur to secretary BPCC, 9 December 1937. bid. .

23. ')

- l)

tion in which, if the Congress pledge to the peasantry remained

unrealised, the Kisan Sabba might be blamed, especially as

•bec:e.use of our lJnited Frout and inti.JD:lte camection with the

Ccmgress they believe that our voices are bound to be heard ...

Whlle taierstending the d1.t:t1cult1ea o:t the Min1stera, the KSun

Sabha needed an assurance that would neutralise thia awkward

position, •a solemn assurance and public declarattan about the

.future programme o:t the Ministry 1n unequivocal terms, so that

we cay be able to ju:lge and ascertain the position in order to

decide our .tuture course o£ action which my not eml:arrass the

M1nis~s as .tar as possible.• He also noted that as far as the

current Tenancy Bill was cancerned, .tr.is would be acceptable

provided a more comprehensive bill ~s put .fon.erd subsequentl.y176

In fact in October aD:l November there liiElS a discernible

moderation in Kisan sabha appeals. This might have been in res­

ponse "t9 Rajerrlra Prasad's private cautioning of the St.,ami before

the Calcutta AICC of October 1937 171 and also perhaps to out­

breaks o.t violence 'tdlich had taken place in Southern Bibir, in

vhich a zami:ndar's agent had been kllled.178 TO\o.8l"ds the end of

176

177

17t

Sabajamni 's statement en the Bihar Tenancy Amendment pro­posals. Betcre 17 October 19371 Yajnik Ms. F. (4)11), newspaper clippings.

On 16 October Rajendra Pt'asad nade a "'Vague caaplaint against some workers" to Sahajanand and Cll 18th gave SahaJamm written complaints. From .sabljamnd's resig­nation letter to the Bihar PCC, 2 January 1938, ibid.

Tblt Government reported that 1n South Bihar anti-landlord sentiment 1!~3 being ...mipped up to .rever pitch. Tenants had assaulted Zami.."ldar ab:ren~, leading to one death. A large number ~ tel.egrams b:ld been sent from tha vUlagea expressing landlc::rd .tears. B1bar PR.(2) 1 October 1937.

October Sahajanatd presided over a meeting which passed. a reso­

lution reposing confidence in the !Unistry.179 Am 1n November

the BPJtS passed a resol.uticm 'fdhich. while reiterating the ri{#lt

o! the peasantry to undertake dem0ll1Strat10M to bring the M1Dia­

try to an awareness ot the imdequacy ot their proposals am

the intensity o:r present deBlnds, also warned that Kisans and

Kisan workers ahoul.d be careful.

thnt the ag1ta.tim 1n no case assumes a farm that nBY weaken the C~ss as u t1hole , .... lower ita prestiee. Criticism must be \\1\.::J.l­intormed• oourteau.s ani constructive.... The CouncU alSo wisbes to '~the Kisa.n Sabha workers against .tal.l.ing a prey to tm provo­cat! on of the Zamindars who clearly staDi to, gain 1n tbe event of open claShes lind out­break ~ violence •• •• Zamin.ili:lra !u!ve been using' violence 1n many shapes • • • • It is mtural. ibli; the peaaar.ct •••• x·ebeln a.gainS these indignities.... It is the duty of the Kisan workers tb:lt this is done in a peace.tul ar¥1 lEigitiftate manner .180

Inspite o.t this conscious toning down of appeals, matters were

precipitated bY 3 DCCs, 2 of \'bich (Saran and Chlmparan) asked

the Swami not to address meetings in their districts for fear

that it WOUld cause tmrest, am a thiril, Monghyr, also asked

their members to disassociate tbeiaSel ves trom the Kisan Sabha • s

activities. On 13 December, the PCC also passed a reso1utian

ordering Congressmen not to associate themse1ves with vio1ent

activity and any Kisan S&bha activities which encouraged this.181

The Manghyr DCC •s reso1ution almost certainl.y resu1ted

179 Ibid.

180 2 ~!O"tembur 1937 • AICC G-98/1937.

181 Rajendra Fxasad lab. XII/Yl/cciU.4.

235

from the recrudesce nee of trouble over be.kasht lands. ZamS Mars

o:t this area, who bad been staunch Ccmgress supporters during

the civU disobedience movement, 182 had complained about unrest

at the time of the calcutta Aia:.183 Inspite ~the fact thfit

it llll& they wo intringed the award given by Rajendra Prasad

and s .K. Sinha earlier in the year, 184 it 1s .likely that their

influence in the area would have led to the DCC's anti-Kisan

5abha position. Of saran, it may be noted that k.1san mobilisa­

tion bad been substantial185 and thiB might have led to orthodat

Congress fears; and Champaran was a! course an old GandhSan

stronghol.d.

Sahajamnd complained that inspite of his having written

to Rajendle Frasad about the Saran DCC's move, resulting in

reassurances from Prasad that no action would be taken without

warning him, the B.FCC resolution confirming support to the subar­

di.nate committees' action was undertaken without his being given

182 Rajendra Prasad to Nehru, n.d. M:lrch 1937, Rajemra Prasad Ms. I/37/ co11.1.

183 Jagdish Narain Singh, et. al., representatives of Zam1n­dars of Barahiya and Tens, thanas I..akbisarai and Sekhpura, MOI'lghyr to General Secrtrtary AICC calcutta 28 December 1937.- Rajendra Prasad Ms. ltii/3i,coll.1. ibey noted that they were Cc:mgresamen who had been to jaU, tblt the ear­lier troubles, instigated by the Kisan Sabba bad been re­solved by Rajernra P.i-asad and S.K. S!Dbl, am that the Kisan satna were again urging temnts to forcibly occupy the lands. For the earlier ccnnict see Ch. 2.3.2, sec­tion {1).

184 Bihar FR( 1), November 1937 •

185 The Ki.san ra.J.ly to the Assembly on 26 November 1937 num­bered about 1 o.ooo mobilised from the Kisan Sabha stro!!S­holds of Ga-ya and Patna. aD1 al.ao from Saran. Bilar FRl2), November 1937. ·

23 ,,

- lJ

a chance to de.fend himsel.f, and in his absence (he was a we

member) • 186

While the Bil:tu" PCC's treatment of the Swami was cl.earl.y

unjust, for our purposes, what is significant is the ratianal.e

put forward by Rajemra P.rasad tor the action. This compr.§?l;l­

sed two charges, o:t itxliscipl.ine and encouraging violence.

Firstly there \'.65 anxiety at the pressure being exercised by the

Kisan Sabha through its ral.l.ies and its mobilisation of MLAs

against Ccmgress l.egi.sl.ative policy, 187 and armofance at it's

subordination of the natl.onaJ. to the red nagJ 188 and secondl.y

there W:ls critic ism o:t the Swami's cult . of the danda, 189 - his

urging that the peasantry defend their rights ani nat succumb

to l.andl. ord teiT or •1 go

186

187

188

189

190

Sahajanamls resignation letter of 2 Jantary 1938, op.cit. He had resigned earlier, in protest over candidate selec­tion in the 1937 elections {see above Ch. 1.2) but had withdrawn the resolution due to loyalty to the Congress. Ibid.

Rajendra Prasad •s nates on the- c cnflict, Rajemra Prasad Ms. XII/37/coll.4. He ~s also annoyed at what he believed were coercive methods being adopted by the Kisan S&bha in 1 ts mobllisation o:f opinicna he noted that the statement at 61 MLAa (see above, 3.2.1) '188 believed by some -of the s ignatcriea to be anJ.y :for party discussion, not for pub­llcatial. It bad been repcrted. to him tblt thCISe who re­fused to sign had bad meetings held aSlinst them in their constituencies. He -.a also irritated that sa~jsnand had, without consulting the Ministers about wb:lt they lll8re doing, condemned them :tor inaaticn. However o:t this speech he bad no press npcrt, and we have shown that SahajanaDi tended to express dileDJDa rather than outright hostll.ity.

It ,.as reported to Rajendra Prasad that on the second day of the Niyamatpur Conference o£ the AIKS red nags repla­ced the nationa1 nag. Rajendra Prasad to Nehru, 18 Decem­ber 19371 Rajendra Prasad FJSe I. RP/PSF(i)/1937. Ibid.

Sahajamnd admitted using th1a appeal in his resignation l.f!tt!rt. op.o1. t. Howevex:, he denied that its usage had ~ Qnly under tho t;cmgress Ministry. He sat:4 he hac1 been usintt lt for the previws ' ar 4 years.

237

While the issue o:f the :flag did represent an unnecessary

exercise in confrontation and reflected a sectarian attitude,

we have shQWn that the sabha leaders had modulated their approach

to the Ministry since October. en the other hand a less ne-go­

tiable di!.terenoe was ~presented by the issue o.t the dama . _

cult. Rajendra ~sad had noted to Nehru tblt the danda cult

would rebound on the peasants191 alX1 he •s reiterating here an

earlier observaticn that direct action to redress grievances

could lead to demoralizing repression and a loss o:f legitimacy

with the court.s.192 <b the other baD:i• while the Kisan Sabha had

moderated its approach with the understanding that unrest had

_given rise to ~ngerous types of action, am beoause of a sense

o£ un1 ted front, they nevertheless saw the issues of peasant

actiCI'l - to protect and consolidate peasant power, and to hold

an WlcompromisJng attitude to legislation - as intractable. This

inevitably pitted them against the Congress Right Wing~. 's priori­

ties. Raje11dra Prasad expressed his criticism of the danda cult

and o£ direct action in terms a£ how these methods would hurt

the peasantry. His resolutioo 11as to bring these interests into

the framework of legality (however halting am concesaiaral this

was to the laJXU.ards) that the Ministry's legislation would

provide. Further, such an integration -s politically ·impera­

tive. U the Ministry experiment was to succeed in Right WiDg

terms, the Congress social base had to be CalBolidated by demons­

trable gains. K1san sabha propaganda threatened this plan by

191 Rajendra Prasad to NehrU, 18 December 1937 • op.cit.

192 RaJeDira Preaad to Nebru• n.d • Manb 1937 • op .cit.

23B

enge:a:lering conflict in the countryside, £or this would jeopar­

dize the consensual tactics whereby legislation could be swiftly

pushed through.

1'tlus1 simultaneously with the autonomous action UD:lertaken

by the DCCa, the Coagress Right Willg had, at an aU India scale,

dEtcided to rally their forces at the coming Haripura delegates 1

elections in order to consolidate their positicn and undercut

v.hat they perceived to be a left-wing presence which threatened

the imperatives o:f Mini::;terial strategy.193

Wbile tJU.s Right-Wing plan 'Wii\8 CO!X:eived of by leaders

like Patel and RajeDira Prasad nat to use the existing power they

exercised to suppress the left, in Bihar this "t.8B not unitorme.l-.i

ly so. The Kisan S4bha charged that the Rightists bld used un-

.tair methods sue~ as partisan election officers to disrupt elec­

tions and they were alSo ~"'larged with .forcibly preventing voters

in the Congress elections fran exercising their franchise •194

The VioJ.ence Enquiry COIIIDittee that -s set up in the wake at

these conflicts 195 ccrrobcrated that in Darbhanga, 1n a number

o:£ instances, left-wing charges were borne out.196 H~er, the

193

194

195

196

See below. 3.4.

Dhanraj Sharme. to Ja-blrlal Nehru, 4 January 1938. AIO: P. 6/1937.

Compris~ 'the Gan:lh1ans SachiDdrana.th Baau' R.K.L.NaDi­keolyar am Phulan Prasad Varma. AICC Pa 6 1939-40.

In Central Tajpur, the Committee's findings suggested that the RJ.ght Wing oendidate had the ballot baas ot cme poll­ing station he was losing in removed. Sim1l.ar disruptions 1.'11 th the connivance of partisan presiding af.ficers were !ound to have occurred in Rosera No. 1, South lltst Sadr and Sadr, · No. 2 (in which tne polliDg ot.!Jcera stopped votJ.Dg

23D

Rep crt o.f the Comnittee also iDiicates that in certain cases

it ~s not on1y the anti-Kisan Sabha candidates who were res­

ponsible far the melee. A free-tor-all took place, in which

diatrict Kisan Salila leaders seemed to be helpless. In Central

Sadr CODStituency the Right Wing camidatee TrUoknath Olaudhuri,

charged his oppCilent, Ralllicl'Bmra .f.11shr6, with mob violence. The

latter's evidence suggests that whil.e he wus not directly res­

ponsible, his followers certainly seemed to have been the aggres­

sors, though their acticn (smshing the doors, windows• ballet

boxes and destroying paPE!rs) -.as precipitated by fears at the

poll being rigged.J 197 1n Ja1e constituency, a rwning battle

between the oppanents• supporters preceded the poll, am a riot, ,'

precipitated by the partisanship of the presiding officer, broke

out, and the Kisan sabba candidate, Yamuna Drjee, again seemed

to hive no contrOl. aver the si tuation.198 And in the Bhaktiar-

Cont'd •• f .n. 196 an some pretext and declared the Right w~ opponents of Dhanraj Sharma am Yamuna Karjee elected). Ca$es wave also c;ooked up against Kisan Sabha.ltes (in warisnagar West Jadunandan Thakur and 22 others were charged with disrupt­ing the pOll., but the case was dismisseda Ibanraj Sharma am othera were charged with violent disruption ot the Baurbar elect1cm. but the case -s diSmissed in the ses­siCXlS court over a year later. AICC P 6/1939-40). And the uae of lJlnc:Jlord. J.rrt1m1dat1on .a displayed in the central warisnagar constituency. The Right Wing candidate, Raje~r Prasad 16rayan Singh• brother of Legislative Assembly 9ppos1t1an leader, C.P.N. Singh• was charged with using b1a iDfl.uence to stop Xisans fran voting. ~ were threatenin&l¥ present at the no'l.1J.rur booth• am s"Ciiii'"tenants were stopped by 1:he landlcrdsl men-While on the lilly to the el.ectian venue. Viol.ence Enquiry Committee Repcrt, AICC P-6/1939-40.

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid.

2tl u

pur Constituency of Patna, the men at Raml.akhan Singh Vaidya,

opponent of KJ..san Sabha MLA, Sheelbhadra Yajee, were severely

injured .199

1'he point being made here 1a tl'at while local Right-Wing

Congressmen, sometimes in c~ert with local landed power, were

often the cause o£ the violence tmt broke out 1n 1he Haripura

elections, the Kisan Sabba leadership -re not alli!Elys in control

of their followers. Socio-po:Litical circumstances in B!mr were

giving rise to a series o:f viol.ent local. feuds, and it Ls likely

that the top leadership o.t both grrups 1n the Bib9.r Congress vere

not always able to control the situation.

Though the Sabha registered serious reverses in the elec­

tions - 'the Bihar left had qnly 5 out of 36 representatives to

the Al.Ccf-00 - it would be doubtful to suggest that it li!Els their

faUure to dOI!lirllte the Congress elections which led to their

aubsecpent, direct acticn oriented metha:ls. 201 In fact, wat

seemed to bave characterised the percepticn of t!"la leadership

at Right Wing and Kisan Sabha grrups after the crisis of 1937

was o:f the order of a holding game. Rajendra Prasad 11 s inter­

pretatiw o:f the BPCC resolution against the K1san Sabba 1IIBS

that •an we have done is to ask Congress lliOrkera to diSassocia­

te themselves 1"rom activities which we consider to be objecti<Dl­

ble•. He noted that the 'thrust of the Corigress action -.a not

199 Patna cases, ibid.

200 Bihlr FR(2), January 1938.

201

241

against the K!san Sabha but a~ objectiwable propaganda ~2

It is notable also that the Haripura Congress reaoluti.an on

Congress-Kisan sabha relations, though critical of propaganda

and activities \11hich would weaken the Congress am negate Ccmg­

reas pr.lnc1p1ea. reiterated 'tbe rig!S ot peasants to set up

un1<ma.203 But it was clear that Ra.jemra P.casad expected the

contlict to acquire a gra~ .form when he noted tblt

l-bch mi.suooerstanding is • • • created in the mass mind 'ik i.ch regards the Kisan Sabha as 16entiCAl with the Congress in many places. It had there.f<re become necessary. to distin­guish the two :t'z,om one another .204

The Kisan Sa'tila too made nrotestations to the ef:tect that . . it abjUI"ed violence. But its not:lon o! support to the Congress

T

\>tiS riven w1 th contradicticms in terms of Right Wing priorities.

Thus Ra.mmndan Mishra• de1'ending the K1san rallies to the Assem­

bly in AUgt7U.St and November noted to Rajendra Prasad that

It \\65 against the propaganda of the Zamin­dars • .Associatim and to strengthen the hands at' the Congress Ministry • • • • the Zaminda.rs would never have agreed even to those compro­mise term if there had nat been such mass agitation ••• • What was in the rally e~ept presentatim of demands'l205

Ramnandan may af course have been right about the pressure

the rally exercised on the ZSnlindars to accede to the M1nistry 1s

.formula for tenancy legislation. But it was naiw to assert that

the rally was merely a presentation ~ denrands. The very presen-

202 To Nehru, 18 Decanber 1937, op.cit.

203 zaidi, Encyc:Jacm.aedia o! ~£, XI. PP• 438-39.

204 To Nehru, 18 December 1937• op.cit.

205

24 ') - ·~

tation aL denams showed a large gap between ministerial and

Kisan Sabha objectives. As there \1.88 to be no alterati.on af

Right Wing pOl.iciea 1n this matter, the di:tferences coul.d only

become more substantial.

U this represented one area o:t unbridgable conflict, so

too did the question of peasant mobilisation. A:f'ter the passing

of the BPCC Resolution againSt the Kisan Sab.hat the BFKS noted

that the Monghyr Kisan Sabha cOUld not be dismantled given the

continued repression the Kisans were .facing there, especially

1n the Barahiya 'tal region.206 This insistence on arganisa-' tional autonomy signi:tied a quite legitimate skepticism about

the in!luences operating en the local Congress in th1a area. The ;

priority given to the de:!ence o:t peasant rights in this scheme

VlB also taken to 1he extent o:f' refusing to acknowledge legal

procedures as a necessary prelim1nary to altering peasants•

economic comitions, when they were nat in turn carried out by

the landlorcls as well. Thus sahajanand objected when Narayanji,

in charge o:r the Kisan departmezzt o:r the BR;C, insisted that

Kisans pay rent even 1:t not grauted a recejpta

we oan•t tolerate thia enoQlragement at not granting legal rece ipta to the .KJ.sana... the Kisan Sabba is duty bouni to ask the Kisana to withhold the payment tm.t11 and unless such receipts are granted.2D7

Wh1l.e this '145 pitched at the level at an incomplete or tm!mple­

mented legality, the argument tended to .. , move &ley :!rom tbat ot

206 Resolution of BFKs, 17 December 1937. Yajnik M.s. F .4( 1) newspaper clippings.

207 Statement at Gaya1 ?:/ Jtme 1938, ibid.

legal! ty to one of peasant right, and, as the situation deve-

loped, o:f power.

The gap between Ki.san sabha am Congress strategies for

tenant amelioration become concretized with the secaxl tenancy

act am the Bakasht Restoraticn Bill of Mid-1938. The re-assu­

rance of landlor-ds by a stitfening of rent realisatic:m proce-208 dures, an:i the ineffective natv.re of the Ba.kasht bill were

guaranteed to precipitate the brewing discontent Kisan ~''lbha

activi; :ta felt with Congress policy.

It \\68 not as i! the Congress was um,.are o:f the serious­

ness o£ the bakasht issue, or of the imdequacy of the legisla­

tion they had passed.209 Som dter the formation o:r the Minis­

try, the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister visited the

troubled areas of Gaya with a view to achieving a peaceful

solution. 210 The party had set up a special cell to deal w1 th

Kisan problems, headed by a Gandhian, Narayanji, ani he along

with another Congressman and Gandhi Seve. Sangh Member, Bipin

Bihar! Varma, tried to compromise bakasht disputes 1n Gaya dis­

trict.211

'lhe problem with Cong:-ess attempts of this order -..s two­

fold. Firstly, those ~s the problems of effectiveness ot media­

tion. How cOUld they ensure that a reasonable verdict w.s &ITi­

ved at? As the BPCC pointed out, 'they had attempted to compro-

208 See above, 3.2.1.

209 Rajendra Prasad to C.P.N. Singh. 38/coll.1.

210 Bihar PR( 1), August 1937 •

211 Bihar FR(2), June 1938.

Rajendra Prasad Ms • 1-e./

24~~

mise the confl.ict in Reora, Gaya district, but "good intentions

did not materialise". 212 Ho-wever, the party 'a emphasis on le­

gality meant that it cOUl.d not accept the use at extra-legal

mass action to bear on the decision of the issue. It vetoed

law-b-reald.Dg, especially aa sulta were stUl pending be!are

courts. AJ.l it could do was to urge the Government to ac;t

swiftly to resolve the issue, 21 3

Apart from the fact ttat such legal. redress through the

courts would tend to be more difficult .for the tenants to use

because o.f .f!mncial. prob].ems and the di.fficul ties or providing

documentary proo£,214 the alternative route taken by the Congress,

of mediation, te~ to adopt a concessional. form which could

then be used by the landlords to effectively neutralise tenant

gains, For example, 1n the case o.f the lBrahiya Tal. settlement,

\ihlle the Rajendra Prasad a\\Eird secured a return o:f as much land

to the. temnts as they had occupied before the struggle l.atmched

in 19361 1 t allowed the l.amlord to shift the lam g1 ven to each

tenants so as to prevent the accrual o:t occuprulCy rights.21 5

'!he Right Wing. Congress approach to the prob1em then

ter¥1ed to exhibit glaring weaknesses in its various initiatives.

That these problems related in turn to the class base o! the

212

213

214

215

SearchJ.1fsbt, 10 Jaruary 1939, P• 6.

Ibid.

Stephen He\'\n~!:'f!~ovements in Co~cnial Ia4ial N~ Bihar, 191!~· , 1982, PP• 1 ~. Rakesh Gupta, BilJar f§asantry am The Kisan §§bha,{·1936-4Z), New Iel.hi, 1982, p. 4.

party is likely. Rajerxlra Prasad has noted that the be.kasht

bill would terxi to be limited in its effects given the protec­

t! on 1 t all. owed the petty 1Jlm.1 ndar, 216 and in the oe.se of Bara­

hiya Tal, b8 explained the a~ the Ccngresa faced as the

llmiddle-cl.aaa • 7JilmS mara at the area had been staunch auppcrters

ot the natio;aallst party. 217

Thus the logic of ministarialism and of' class support

posed problems :for the V!iy that the Congress Right Wing in the

province approached the bakasht issue. And .from this perspec­

tive, the way the agitation developed 1n some areas the issue

became completel.y unnegotiable., This emerged at tile point when

the bakasht movement sought not merely to retrieve l.CJSt rights,

but to expand them~ 218 AiJ Henn1ngham bis noted far Darbhanga

districrt, the •distin:tial between protest over control at newly

sold up bekasllt lands and that over lang establlshed bakast laD:l

"£B not clearly de.fined. To str~ their claim peasants, no

matter what the :f'acts were, temed to clAim that they had only

recently lost the 1r occupancy rights in the land under dispute •

216 See above, f .n. 149.

217 Rajendra Prasad to NehrU, n.d., March 1937, op.cit.

218 Th1.a liB& how the information officer of the Gonrnment described the contil118d mllitanoy of the Ghosrawn (Patm district) agitators • He explained that the dispute re la­ted to 200 bigbas belonging to the landlord which had seen purchased against execution of a decree some 15-20 years earlier. There had been an agitation 1n 1938 llbich bad been 'amioabl.y' settled, with tbe landlord gi~ up al1 but 70 bighaB o~ land• receiving in return 70/- per bigba as salami. Some tenants paid, but o1hers \\Elnted the land .free and the dennnd no-.., •.11(:ls tm t the remining 70 bi&hls shoul.d al;Jo be given to tbe tenants. ser9bUmt, 10 Jtme 1939.

24G

and conversely land1ords tended to claim that they had held

the disputed land as bakasht over a long period ••• 219 When the

diSputes entered this kind of grey legal area, arxl Satyagrahia

refused to accept even substantial restore. tion, the Government

ccW.d. only ascribe it to the stubberDasa ot •ldsans and out­

siders•.220

This incomprehension was understandable in terms of the

imperatives a£ Right Wing :ni!listerial policy. But the actions

can be comprehended, not in terms of pressure for redressa.l a!

grievances, but rather as l.ying along a di£.ferent trajectory at

power, in which all the llrd.ts posed by functioning within the

terms ~ the Act, and at mediating to ensure ref arm, bee oma in­

creasingly of secomary importance.

This is ilXlicated ~.Y the BPI'S response to the str1.cturea

passed against the Kisan Sabha in December 1937. The Executive

Coumil noted tHlt the atmosphere of conflict toot had developed

'\lo6S related to a .feeling of liberation ani ex;pectatian.. •The

peasants .felt that they had their <».11 government now am so they

look the world straight in the .face, and they become bolder am

move resistant to oppression•. 221

In .tact, the bakasht struggle ..as largely related to th1a

aliJEUceni.Jlg, and Rajendra Prasad noted tmt the KJ.san 31bba bad

not instigated .S.t. 222 The cantllct had developed, off' and an,

219 Henn1fl#lam, qp.cJ;t,, P• 1.53.

220 Information Qf:t1cer's statement, 30 June 1939, o~ · <.1~.

221 All. India Kisan Ibl~et.in, 24 December 1937.

222 'l'o Nehru, MaJ'ch 1937, op.cit.

247

since 1937, and was persistent in the districts ot Monghyr,

Gaya and Patna. As far as Kisan Sabhl relations with this un­

rest ia concerned, Government reports suggest that it ._s not

organised, am ag:t.ta'tora 'tended to b&rcise influence mare ·

through the mediwa Qf militant speecbea• urgJDg the taking over

ot lands am cutting of crops.223 There is little doubt tbit

Kisan Sabha militants woul.d mve been active in this mnner,

cansiotent ao it \'~ 1-ri.t:·~ Sahajanan:Ps notion o:f se~f-defence.

The ComUJ.a conference of the AIXS sllggo-ested a more organised

solution to these developments, when it advocated the setting

up o:! Kisan volunteer carps "to fit peasants to peacefully yet

law!ully protect their hearth ani home am the honour ar the 1r

women !olk and mairrbin their legal rights •. This defensive

idiom was elabQIJlted into an objective of agrarian revolution,

a raising of the K1san Movement 11 :from its present preliminary

stage to such higher and more intensive forms of struegles

5'n1cbJ 'WOuld not <mly secure iimnediate relief but would also,

gathering volume and mcaent~ cul.minate in a nation-wide peace­

fuJ. peasant struggl.e tbat would eni in • • • agrarian revolu'-J.an•.

Howen:er, it ~a noted tbat this objective QOuld not be acbieY8d

within the ~ramework of 1mper1allsm. aiXi so these would blw to

2.23 In I»cember 1937, it l8S reported that the bakasht disputes had emerged in a large lUllber in <hya am Patm am that in 2 pl.aces o! Barb subdivision ot Patm attempts were made to cut crops by :lorce soon after meetings bad been addressed by •outside agt tators• advocating :lcrcible entry into bakasht lams. Bihar PRf1), December 1937.

248

be alliance with other sections through the Cangress.224

In Bihar it was cl~r from early 1938 that direct action

-.a envisaged. Activity of the Sabba was at first concentrated

in Monghyr, and it -a believed that there would be an attempt

to revive the struggle in tba Babariya Tal area. 225 But by Mu-ch

activity bad spread to I:arbhanga lilere, at a Kisan Sa.bha meeting,

it \'IJQS noted that it might be necesaazy to uniertake non-violent

direct action to redress grievances. 226 H~ver, the actual.

advice offered for this kim at action by the provincial leader­

ship -was at a contradictory nature. JadunarXJ.an Sharna for

eJCample encouraged Gaya tenants to undertake a nBmmoth demons­

tration and court a.rrest. Regarding rent realisation procedure, f

he advised tenants to take out black nags on its introduction.

Eut as far as eviction was concerned • he told them not to fight

but to go to the sub-divisional. o:tficer.227 On the other hand,

Samjanand urged villagers 1n Gaya district to fom village

defence parties and to arrange :tor alarm signalS between vU1a­

ges.228

The developing picture then seemed to be one o:f a diffused

leadership a activity was encouraeed at a local lewl. and at

the provincial the emphasis appeared to be an preparation, though

224 Comil].a Conference Reso~utions, 14 ani 15 November 1938. Yajnik Ms. F .a.

225 Biblr FR( 1) and (2), February 1938.

226 Bibar m(1), ~f.t.h 1938.

227 Bihnr FR(2), tv'.ay 1938.

228 Ibid.

0

1 ts means were. not uni.fied into a definite procedure. Perhaps

this reflects also the dU:tused nature af the struggles as. they

were shaping •.

But a definite shape vas 1eant to KJ.san sabha initiatives

by tba Congress Zami roar a#eement of Jul.y 1938 and the subse­

quent lagislation. The Ki!38.n Sabha called for c..n anti-compro­

gize \"Vee!; in July, to be followed by province-\dde meetings and

a mammoth rally be£ ore t.he assembly on 15 August. 229 BU"ahiya

Tal led the way to a major of.fensive in October, sprung by the

retuaal of the 7llminiara to ab!Ce by the terms of the Rajendra

Prasad sattle- o£ ~arch 1937.230 Gaya .toll~. in November

with the launching o£ satyagraha by Jadtmandan Sharma to resist

eviction by laalloros from abrut 1000 bighas in sambly v1ll.age~31

On December 4, the BPK.S deeJ.ared that as legislation lllBS ineffec­

tual and mediation had not been successful., there was no al.ter­

native but to resort to satyagraba.232 Over the next 10 mOnths

Shaha~d (villages I•hlriar, Ba.rgaon, Betari, Kbinon, Sikaria,

l).u .. igaon), Saran (villac;eB Am\ot:lri, Jujori, Chitiauli, Parsadi),

Ilirbhanga (villages Dekuli, Ragb.opur, Pandaul., Sakri, Bitmm,

Parr!, Nlrpat:aagar, Kana.kpur, sa~ur). Oaya (apart from Recra,

229 All Illdia Kisan Bul.letin, 19 August 1938.

230 All Ind.'la K.i:-.an BulletJ.n. 28 October 1939. The official view however ~3 that both sides had evaded the terms of the agreement. Biblr FR(1 ). November 1938.

231 All India Kisan Bull.eti.."l• 11 November 1938. BJ.Mr FR(1 ), November and FR(2). l)!oember 1938.

232 wain! Conference, DarbhaDg'78., 3 and 4 December 1938. All India Kisan Bulletin, 9 December 1938J Bibir FR(1) Decem­ber 1938.

250

villages fvllsuda, Tika.ri, lilssua, Mlnjhia-wa, fhalua, Agan:la, M:ln­

jhwe am thanas Dumria, Pakribarawan, 'lklrisaliganj), Monghyr

(apart from Barahiya Tal, Mokameh Tal, Surajgarba, Sikandra,

Le gar - 8 .K. Sinha •s vil.lage), Patna ( vlll.ages Gosra-.n1 Paijna

and th&Da.s Aatha¥ln1 Bihar t All tganj, Maaaubri, Bikram t CJBnd1,

Isla.mpur) and less substant~::i:.ly, Chapr.:t, !'~.l~fia:..'1>'Jr, Bbagal-

pur, Purne<-J, ChoLanacpu1:', C?'..cdill~r<--n, -were: ai'fected b"f tc.e bakasht 2r·

mcr-~e:;1ent. ~)

Certain pat-terns are c.iscernable: C~~s Comnittees

tried to pre-empt tJ.1e struggles tl'.:rrugh negotiated settlement

but prOYed initially unsuccessful. 234 The KiSlln sabm leaders

were not averse to such mediation, but arbitration ooomitteea

tamed to be paralysed by the intransigence o£ tt.e contesting

parties. 235 And negotiation at a provincial level, to the em of a combined effort by the Congress ani the Kisan sabha, never

~terialised. It t;;eem~ that Sahajanam 1613 advised to discuss

tl;e issue,. with Rajendra h:usad, but he WlS opposed to negot1a-

233

234

235

Compllt.d from ;'t.l..l Ind.ia Kisan Bulleti~.f. December 1938-0ctober 1939 ani Bibir FR, December 19;>ti - October 19~.

Bibu' FR( 1), September 1938.

In DBny cases this W&S because o£ lack o£ lamlcrd ooope­ra.tionL e.s. in D=-rbhangal. Bihar FR(1),~oh 19~J Purnea, Bihar .&'R{2J, March 19391 ratna1 ibid.J ~ bad, B.lbar J'R ( 1.!_1 Ju:ty 1939, Gaya, B :h3.r FR\ 2), July am FR. ( 1 ) , August 19~ for ·instances either o:f re:Cusal to accept arbitraticn, c:r a tencler.cy to back cut of tre settl.ement.a ~~t bad been agreed upon. As for teD:lDt intransigence, the atf1c1als cited numerous instances of their tran:Jgres.sJ.ng established landl.aro rights, o£ going against cwrt verdicts aDi o:t refusing the terms ot an O"Jt o~ court settl.crnerrt.

tiona with the Congress High Ccmnam. 236

In fact there was a tendency to invite repression, possi­

bly with a view to developing the iDJlge of a powerful movement

pitted against a repressive gowrnment.237 In accordance with

this, while me<Uatcry initiatives were not apun»d, tbere _.

an inclination to give signi:ticance to mUitancy, even 1! this

jeopardized a settlement. 238 However, the question \\fiS not al­

ways one of mere militancy: intransigence could arise because,

in the perception o:t the peasantry mobilized, the terms were

ina.deqt.a te • 239

237

239

Yajnik made enquiries aboot the talks Salajanand '4lS to have with Rajemra Prasad. Yajnik to Sahajamnd, 4 Feb­!:UBIY 1939. Sablj8.Dlnd said that there had been ncme. To Yajnik, 7 February 1939. Yajnik, JIB. F. 11 ( 11). Earlier Sahajamm had objected to Ranga having talks with Gandhi aboot the repression of the ldsan movement. Ranga to Yaj­nik, after 1 January 1939. Yajnik Ms-. F. 14.

During the Recra struggle, when only Jadunandan Sblrua and a few others had been arrested, sahajanam noted:

The Government 1s not arresting the Kisans, perhaps to show to the outside wortid that the Kisans are not with us. However, we have succeeded. But I think to do something to compel the government to come in its naked form either arresting our men cr in accepting its defeat so far as Recra is concer­ned. But 1he struggle must go em in a:D!J' case whe­ther the Government arrest us ar not •••• •

To Yajnik, 1 January 1939. Yajnik, Ms. F. 11(i1).

For example, in Majhia.an ( Gaya), the District Mlgistra te asked t.tat the satyagraha be s'l.Wpenied 'Lor 4 days so tbat he cOUld try tor a settlement. The remain1ng men of the village (others had been arrested) agreed, but the women aatyagrahis r~, procl.a1m1ng tmt tbare would be no suspena101l until tn1s liiBS ordered by Jadumndan or the Kisan Sllbha. Sabaj&mlnd euthusiaatioe.lly approved this defiance. All Indla Kisan Bulletin, 8 September 19391 Sabajanand to Yajnik, 23 August 1939, Yajnik I-13. F. 11 •

e.g. in lllarahiya Tal. where, in the administrator's phrase, ~ha se.ttlement W:lS short-lived because it did not satis~

So, while an arbitrated resolution ~s often .finally

accepted - whether because of repression or achievement - this

,.e.a inevitably preceded by a period of mU1tan't action. Th1a

may be related to the umerlying pattern of Kisan sabha politics:

whil.e ahort-c"Un economic ga1Da were certa1Dly cme objective,

there alSo operated here the aims a! bringing politics to the

peasants in terms of a sense of their own power. In certain

phases of the movement peasant acticn am defiance of the autho­

r! ties became a virtue in .itself. Am this empblsis can be dis­

cerned in the debate over the status oZ arrested satyagrahis. ' Rahul Sankrityayan, Jadunandan Sharma, the conmunist stu-

dent leader AnU M11;ra and a number at others arrested for par-/

ticipaticn in the bakasht satyagral13. urxiertoolt :fasts in prisat

in order to get the government to recognise them as political

prisoners. These fasts were enormous enterprises 1n personal

coumi tmen:t, ranging in saue instances from 40-75 dAys , during

which period the strikers bad to be force-:fed. Sankrityayan in

particular exhibited an obsessive mini, engineering his re­

arrest so that he cOUld carry on his protest.240 'l'he Government

re~ed to accept the hlmger strikers' demand, .tor it intringed

their noticm of the political, as in their view the cpeation of

land satyagraha was motivated not by principl.e but by self­

interest.

Cant 1d.. :t .n. 239

the "extravagant promises n held out by the Kisan SB.bha. Billar FR(2), June 1939.

24o All India Kisan Bull.etJ.ns, May 1939 an4 11 August 1939J Sahajar:e.nd to Yajnik, 2 JUly 1939 1 Yajn!k Ms • F • 11 •

The Congress Government •s refusal was groumed in their

belief that the issue was a legal one relating to property

r1ght.241 For the Kisan Sabba however, there wu an alternative

.tremework of perception operating. The vorld at peasant needs

,.,a.a centn.l. and defini~icm.a of the pOl! tical bad to be expan;. ded to come to terms with this fact. !nevi tably this meant a

ccnstant transgressi.on o:f what was construed as an unjust lega­

lity. From the Congress viewpoint ihis inevitably meant allow­

ing the due process a! law to take its cwrse, resulting in a

large number of arrests.

At manents, what this entailed WiS not merely law breaking

but an antagonistic counterposi tion bet,.,een the state and the

peasantry. This 'lAs' perhaps most strikingly illustrated by the

trial of Jadunarx\an Sharma in Gaya city. An estimated 30,000

peasants proceeded to the city on the day of the tr1a1.242

thousa:als flooding the rall\I.O.y stations, where they waited

"though 1he authorities had notified beforehand the cancellaticn

241 • •••• The Government ••• ne.de a distinction between a person who resorted to Satyagraha for a principJ.e and for political convictions and a person who joined it far per­sonal monetary gain. They were prepared to treat the former class as political but they were not prepared to treat a person who -• convicted tor diaobey1ng any law .tor getting possessicn o! land about which there -.a dis­pute between himsel..f and another party • as a political prisoner. Their viewpoint was tbit such a person did not court imprisonment for a principle or for politi~l con­viction, but to get possession ar lani to which he might or might not be enti t1ed and that he adopted tb1.s course to avoid the decisi en of the dispute on lta DSrits and had no right to treatment which li!BS intended for persons who courted suffering far a higher cause than persona1 gain to themselves •• •" Rajerxira Prasad to Nehru, 8 July 1939. Rf CSD, 3, ·P • 152 •

242 AU Irldia Kisan Bulle-tin• 27 January 19391 Bilar FR (2), January 1939.

254

of the morning train and in .fact that train reached K'ashichak

at 2 p.m. instead of 10 a.m.

and even then the K1sans stood on the liD& and would not allow the train to pass. They wre persuaded anyhow to withdraw. The trains pro­ceeding to Gaya that day had policemen 1n all the compartments who wcm.•t all.ow anyone to enter it without tickets• .243

Here we are presented a situatim tmt ~s not wUled by the

Kisan Sa.bh.a - in fact Sahajanand v.e.s instrumental in diffusing

t.f).~ · explosive si tuat1an244 - but ratrer il'Xlicates a sullen

counterposi tion of the peasantry against the state.

It was permps a registering of this inarticulate source

·o£ motivation that md impressed itself em sab:ljamm when he 1

conceived of the pEfisant movement being further radi~lised.

Ho\'JSver, what happened, by September-Q:tober 1939, liiBB instead

a diminishing of the struggle. The reasons for this were mu1 ti­

ple. Settlements had taken place, sometimes with resouming

success·, 245 in a rumber of the disputed areas. 246 Further, rent

243

244

245

Sahajanand to Yajnik, 28 June 1939, Yajnik Ms. F.11(1i).

In the administration's report Sahajanand \II&.S meant to hive been embarrassed by this confrontation. as he lmew it woULd "alienate public :teeling• am he -.s reported to !:llve publ1c1y spc£en out against ticketless travelling. Nhar IR(2), January 1939.

In Reara the tenants got 8() per cent of the landt and this WG..S

divided :tair1y equitably, with landl.ess l.abourers also getting a certairi amOW'lt of land. 8abljanam to Yajnik, 26 Ma~ 1939, Yajnik m. F. 11(ii)J this ,_. reseuted by Blmm1blr tenants. B1Jw.r I'R(1}, May 1939.

'l'he Raghopur dispute (Darbhanga) \liElS settled on •terms .favourable to tenants in June, Bihar FR(2), June 1939. other Darbhanga disputes were settled 1n Jul.y arr::l October • after the movement• had practically collapsed•, Biber FR (2), July and PR(1 ), October. The Ghosral!Jiln c<mtllot lias tirst settled in Jw.y •. Biblr iR~1), July 1939t though

. ) : {::... l) '"J

reduction procedures seem to bive taken effect in some neasure~47 And 1 t seems likel.y that an up\\Elrd trend in prices after a period

of prolcaged depression would al.ao blve abated the eoananic d1t­

f1cul ties :taced by the peasautry. 248

In ~act, to,_rds the end at their rul.e, the Ccllgreaa Right­

Wing would seem to ~ve ridden the storm and to have gained their

objectives. In some areas, such aa rent reduction, they might

nat have gone as far as the Kisan Sabt'_a bad \".6rrted, nor in fact

as far as their OV1 legislation provided for. 249 In others,

such aa the bakasht struggle, they had to go beyorn the terms

of their limited legislat1cm. A settlement o£ this problem on

the ground.had to be pursued, a methcxi initially umercut by

peasant 1n1t1atives and landl.ord intransigence. That in the

ultimate ar.al.ysis mediation wcrked, et least tempare.rUy, my

be seen as resulting in no small ~Y !rom the peasant movement.

Cant•d •• f .n. 246 obviouslr not satis:factor1lyt as agitation continued, Bihar FR\2), July 1939, iR(1 J1 August 1939, Samjruand to Yajnik, 5 September 1939, Yajnik Mi. F. 11. The dispute _. ultiDBtely settled in December, Bihar PR(2), December The Dargaon dispute (~bad) ~s settled in July Biblr FR.( 1), July 1939.. other S~babad disputes were seHled. by August, Bjbir FR( 1) t August 1939. In Gaya disputes vera resolved 111 a XIUIDber or places by the CcmgNss bakasht pancbayats, (Bihar FR( 1 ) , August 1939) and also 1n the maJcr centres of Mljh1a11118n ani Dumuria (in which the land­lc:rd undertook to ~· e.t.torts to settle privately most of the 129 dj.aputes outstanding between him and his tenants). Bihar ffi(1). October 1939.

247 Bihar PR(1 ), AprU 1939.

248 Henningbam, op.citu P• 165.

249 See above, 3.2.1.

25G

As the officials put it, "the atmosphere for ibis line of

approach (caapromise) is much mere favourable. ••• p the 1nten:

pi.ficat~on " th! Ktea •sitaticp Me 1TresseO. upq! gmx o: th!

pm1P'!n 1:h• •ce••Ux s£ getting ca. tem with the ;tepeqta.•250 U 1n some oaaea this movement bad resulted in a oonsolidati<D

o! peasant right, in others the terns Of settlement remained

unsatisfactory, and_ st..-uggle to revise those was to be renewed

ii"l the :futm~e. 251

Thus, irCI'lically, at the very point at l«hich Sahajam.nd

envisaged a linld.ng up of the peasant and nat10llil movements,

·;;he peasant dlowment had in .fact docli!led. In the absence of

detailed work qn this problem, it is diffic...ll.t to l'llzard expla­

notiv.ns in terms ot how thi!s was related to a sh!!'ting social

base. But it s~ems likely that the Ministry's initiatives had

consolidated the small laiJiJ.ords and won over the upper temntry.

In .tact the tension between the Congress and K1san Sabbl can

partially be ascribed to the fact ~t the bakasht struggle

comprised a class-struggle between tenants and not cnly big· but

snall l.andl.ords as lle1l.. 252 Within the be.kasht movement itsel:t,

250

251

252

B1bu' JR (2)• Decanber 1938. Empmsia added, . -

As with the Barabiya Tal. agitationt_~ch was renewd in 1~6. Rakeah Gupta• ._op.citu PP• Z29-30t

'lhe otf1cJala remarked .1ron103l.1y thlt dahajamnd 's appeel to small zaminiars ~~s hardl.y consistent vi tb the Muriar agi taticn in Sbah4~ 1 which \IBS carried on apinst tb1a claaa. Bibar FR (2)• April 1939. Qt the struggl.e laun­ched 1n M:lsaUl"hi thana at Rltn:l district. Sahajamnd noted that the teUlnts, oppcments were petty zamimars 'Who were "t-ypical tyrants". To Yajnik, 19 August 1939. Yajnik ~. F .11. Tbat there wa11 a problem here that threaten ad the broad Xisan sa'bba poJ.icy t4 un1!{ with the asll -.m1nrJara was aJ.so mU.cated. by SBbajana:o:'l a reapcmae to tJW Searpb:

25'7

there was a drawing in o:t tenants down the agrarian hierarchy

and or l~r caste status, 253 but the movement incorporated all

sectioo.s of the peasantry. This was noted with mixed :feelings

by SebajalllDi later when be said that the upper tenantry had

been brought into the movement w1 th a .view to strengthen 1 t and

therefore to strengthen the position o:r the lower sections of

the peasantry, but in practice tr.J.s had redoumed to the bene­

fit of the ~ormer.254 J.jJ_

The Bihar mjnjsterial experience then represents a comp-

lex pattern. Starting out w1 th the objective aJ: redressing

peasant n&eds within a£ 'P.

&hort period as possible, and therefore

circumscribed 1n these terms by the needs of· cc:()ncn:·~.ating the i

landlords of the Upper House, the Right Wing tended to struc-

Cant 'd.. :t .n. 252

J.i.gh:t charge that the 5abha 's policies v..el,.e directed at t'l'iiP'etty ZamiD:lar (23 April 1939, Yajllik Ms. F. 11(ii)J he reiterated unity. but went on to note that the Sabha \'IOul.d not toJ.erate the tyranny of petty 2"Jlmin:lars "due to their :false notion of prestige as Zam1rnars or un:ler the in£luence and guj.dance of enemies ~ tt.~.e K!.;m.n Sabba" statement of 25 April 1939. Yajnik l-1S. F. 11(1i).

253 The Swami nnde the following analysis of the !Bkasht satya­grahis in Jagt'lishpur 1 Darbhanga. The vUlage comprised 300 fam1liea in ana ot these eo were Millaha (bc:atmen), 30-40 Koeris• 30 GOtP-las, 30 !-lmlimn, 25-30 Busadbs, 15 Qlamars, 20 Kbltawe, 5 barbers, 8 tellia, 8 Vaishyas, 4 dhobis. 2.5 carpenters, some ma.lis and Kayastbas. The victims of the zam.indari assault included 2 Dusadhs, 2 KooriB. 2 J~tlllabs, 1 I1ali and 1 Khntawe. To Yajrdk, 20 April 1939, ibid.l !n the r-usaurhi struggle too, launched against pet;ty 2Jlm_ndars, the peasants were mostly of low caste status. To Yajnik, 19 August 19391 ibid. Rakesh Gupta also bils shown how in the Barahiya Tal agi.ta.tion at r1onghyr there \46.8 substantial participation by lower-caste tenants. Gt.•.pta, op,c1t, The afi"ected tenants in the Parri and fumauJ. satyagrams of Darbhanga consisted of Koeris and Caal,.a.a. Hellllingblm1 opeci'•• PP• 156-58.

254 Henningbam, ibid.. pp. 167-68.

ture a set o! pOtlE!r relations in the countryside. Legislaticm

tended to .favour the srrall landlord and the upper seotiana of

the teDlntry benefited from the tenurial r~arm. 1h1a occurred

not cmJ.y because these aectiODS were the bea't suited to utilise

such re.torm, but because implementation ot the measures tuded

to be partial, and to limit the extent o£ relief.

en the other hand, the Kisan Sab~ started out with a

skeptical attitude towards the capabilities of ministerial re­

form, both in terms of their umerstaming o1: the State, but

also 1n terms ot what ~they Zeared to be the suaceptibUity ot

the ministries to landed pressure. A3 a result they gave- con­

siderable importance to peasant aation 1n Pl'"C!ssurising against

such o~omise. !n this emphasis, and in their dif.ferences

over the nature of legislaticn, they inevitably came into conf­

lict with ministerial pol.icy and the Right Wing stra.tegy • This

confl.iot materialised in attempts to isoiate ·;;h& KJ..san sa.bha

.from the party (through party reso1ut1ons aimed at distinguish­

ing t:.-1e party from the peasant \mien) and in their margimllsa­

tion in the party through electoral. mobUisation against them

(and SOlletimea by outright usa a! pCM!r in the party). Th1s

dewlopJ.ns oon.tlict was gi·~en its fim.l push by the Ccmgress•

Zaa:lnrlar compranise ~ Jul.y 1938 and the attendant legislation

on tenancy am- bakasht restoration.

Direct action was umertaken by the K1san Babba which

locked in with an alr&ady serious situation in the disputed

lands. K.isUn Sabha objectives are di.f.ficu1t to pinpoint. In

cme sense the a truggle llltla an attempt to entc:rce deoisJ.CIIS ca

t

the grOtmd against the grain of legislation. But it is obser­

vable that peasant mllitancy was o.tten supported in the face of

the posaib1Ut1ea at madiaticm. It appears that by 1939. a

mDDber o! KJ.san sabha leaders had come to the position that·

agrarian radicaliam could develop further, ant ca4d be used

to radicalise the national movement. Ho,.,ever, it .-.a in th1a

very period that a resolution of conflict in the countryside

,.as taking pl.ace, and this left the leadership w1 th a radical

rhetoric but no base on which to develop it.

~!~ilii\hft:i;atrfD: th[wgh the ema-comt1t\t

In Midras the Min:l.stry dominated by design (though not as

fully as its architect WOUld have wished). In Biblr the heigh-

tened nature of class-con:!llct brought politics into the domain

of the extra-constitutioml. Legislation am the observation

o! legal codes \liBS desired, for tactical and perhaps increasingly

:for ideological reasons, but this could not be held to in prac­

tice. In u .P. on the other ham there ~s an unsteady coexis­

tence of these levels !or most of the r11nistry's li!e. The Minis­

try .aa not a :forceful iDstitution_ 1n any o:t its accustomed

domains, whether o:t legislation cr ot law en:tcrcement. A a a re­

sult the extra-constitutional activity of Cangreasmn (vividly

cc:Diucted 1n an uncoordinated .fashion in the localities) retained

a considerable space, and this led to a state o:t almost cOQStant

tension ~or the administration.

The extra-constitutional in :f.'act £uncticmed aa a force

26f1

field in which al.l other elements had to .find their bearings.

But, ineluctably, the situation bad to be controlled and the

apace for such acticm curtailed to SUit the more Um1ted needs

o:r constitutional tactics. The compulaiona at legiala t:lve

achievement, and therefore the need tor a situation or equili­

brium for the state to function in, gradual.ly made their impress

felt on the volatile political atmosphere. In the unravelling

of this process, the provincial unit of the party came to play

a decisive role. The U .P. PCC bad been unusual 1n voting

against Ministry formation, 255 and it bld alSo been the solitary

provincial coumittee to accept the idea at a collective a.t:rilla­

tion o£ working-class and peasant un1CI'l:s to the Congress. 256

1be weight of thiS political tradition ~ brcught to bear on

the Mi.nistry, and it is this relationship which explains to a

large extent the administrative impasse the Ministry was placed

in.

Nevertheless, if on certain critical issues the Pee exer­

cised a po..erf'ul radicalising force, it was also the mechanism

whereby, gradually, the extra-ccnstitutional. lll68 brOUght into

line with the t»ed.a of the m.f.nisterial experiment. '.fh1s process

was not achieved without aor1mcmy in the party, and its eventual

success JIIUSt be _related to the powerful intluence exercised by

Nehru 1n tbe province and in the support given to him by a sec­

ti en ot the CSP •

255 See above, Ch. 2.2.1.

256 see above, Ch. 1.2.

26J

However, a superficial analysis of the Ministry would not

suggest the significance of these tendencies. In the legisla­

tive arena the Ministers managed to pursue poUciea vhich did

not al:•ys meet with the approval of the Congress party. Before

going on to examine the deeper currents of power that were at

work in the period, we wil.l brie.tly detail Ule various points

at which moderation was espoused inspite of PCC pressure, and

what the rationale for this was.

Wb1l.e FCC pressure ~s constantly active, it waa l.arge_ly

contained on certain issues relating to changes desired by Cong­

ressmen in the s1ate structure, issues which 'Nere not al\\IElys

negotiable 1n terms of the limits set by the 1935 Act.. The

f'HJ.nisters managed to side-step the serious pursuit of commit­

ments which might have brought them into cal!'l1ct with the Secre­

tary of S'blte. These incl.uded proposals to fonn district commit­

tees to ch~k corruption, 257 the recODJnendations tmt t~ po.st of ,..

prwincial comm1asioner be abolished and the plan that village

panchayats, with the power to central chowkidars am to enliat

civic guarda, aa well as judic1a1 pancbayats, be set up. 25B

257 1h1s was not seriously pursued in the As.sembly. Haig to ' Linlithgow, 23 October 1938. Ha1g MlS. Eur. F.125/2AJ Haig to Linlithgow, 19 December 1938, L1nl.ithgow MSS Eur. F. 125/101.

Ha1g saw these proposal.S as cal.culated to enhance control aver the rural areas. Haig to Linlithgow, 19 December 1938, ibid. The final proposals -were inoffensive from the Gover­nor •a point o£ view. The panchayat ,.e.a now conceived of as a cooperative society • Heada ot Households •re represented 1n it and it ~a authoriaed to £1x ita own election methods.

All ~ these proposals constituted the nationalist ideal

of g1 ving the people a greater se me of p~r and control over

their lives am so there tended to be ccnsiderable resentment

over the shelving of these programmes. 259 Tb1a antagonJ.am 1a

beat illustrated by the controversy over the rural development

scheme.

The Governor had taken issue with the Ministries 1n regard

to the appointment of the lower s tnf.f o:f the Rural Development

Boo.rd. It ~s suspected t~t the Boar- \\&s being used politi­

cally aDi that political instructions wre beJ.Dg cl1aaem1nated

to the sta.U at their tra 1ning camp. 26o Though the Miniaters

did not initially respoxxl to Biig's criticism, they subsequently

agreed to the issue o:r instructions emphasising that the rural

development staff must conform strictly to the government

servant.•s cond_uct rules and must not take p1rt in politics.

Further, while earlier the M1nisters had 'A&nted to keep the

District officer out o.f the implementaticm o.f the scheme, it was

now agreed that his cooperation \'.&s necessary, and tmt the

Ccmt•d •• t .n. 258

259

giwn · It waaliitt1e power, and Katju noted that 1f there were stlll Objecticns tha power could be further limited. Hai~ to LinlithgOWt: 24 June 1939, I.J.nlitbgow MlS Eur. F. 125/102.

There was objection to the eDBscul.atian of the village pa.ncbayat in the r-11n1stry itself, w1 th rm PaJX11t lllllnting to abide by the original rttport. She however later accep;. ted the Katju proposals. Ha!g to Linlithgow 25 February 1939, ibid. Perbape as aha \IJBS identi!iecl dtb Nebru, abe 1111l8 expected to abide by the party 'a more rad1C:81 aspira­tions, .:f'or appu-ently her retraction was unpopular in the party. Haig to Linll.thgow. 8 August 1939, ibid.

Hai' to Linlithgow• 9 February 19:58. Ha1g MS8 Eur • F. 125 17 b.

263

Ministry also ~ted the cooperation ot landlords in the sche­

me.261 As a result of this compromise they were severely cri­

ticised in the Pee. In the meeting of 16 October 1938 the

scheme -.s denounced aa bureaucratic and in:tringing ~ the · PCC •a

resolution that "the no IC3 otticer should be involved. Umbrage

-.s also taken at the instruction tN:lt the rural development

organisers should not carry the Congress :Clag. However the

Hillis try \'1011 the day • 262

There was a convergence here with CR •s emphasis on poli­

·-tlcaily neutr&f!Zfilg the -state machineey~- -BUt -it -.s nota-----

conscious design, ariSing from ~inite notions of how the party

should relate to the state. Rather ,p.s it the resul.t of the ' ..

pressures upon the r-tlnistry that made them contc:rm to existing

practices in order that they ·could achieve their basic objecti­

ves. These compulsions were in evidence in the evolutian of the

controversy raised by the Congress Ministry's Employment Tax

Bill.

As Biig told Fant, this -was a covert attempt to cut service

salaries, as it focused an Government servants and excluied pro-

261 Haig to Linl1thgow• 9 M!lrch 1938, ibid. Perbapa the shift 1Jl the M1n1stera 1 attitude l!lll& related to their temparary resigrlltion in February over the issue o:r pollt1ca1 pri­soners. They must have caae back into the Ministries with a sense of th~!:r;l1ty ot their tenure. am o:r the need therefore to e conf'lict w1 th the Governcr in order that their tenure lasted until their legislative tasks md been completed.

262 P1gpatr• 17 October 1938• PP• 1• 16.

264

fessions • trades and callings from 1 ta purview. 263 The bUl

led to violent confrontation between its opponents am Congress­

men at the end ~ March 1939. Pant however reuaine<l adamant and

it .as repcrted that he had undertaken negotiations w1 th the

laml.<rd·lobby 1n the councn, the arxengement being that if

they passed the bill he would not push for an early introduction

of the Af;Ticul. 'b.lral Income Tax Bill and that they would. get a

better deal. on the Tena.:ooy BUl. He also -wooed the moneylemers,

prcaiaJ.na concessicms re~rding the introduction of the Debt

Bill. As a resul.t the Bill secured passage through the Coun­

cil. 264 Quite unebiracteriatioally 1 Katju disp].ayed cons ide-,

rable bravado on thi• issues he claimed that the M1nistry would

be able ~ e.t.fect salary cuts without having to supplicate the

Secretary of State. 265

Unlike the problem of chlnging the structures ~ the

state raised by the ather controversies discussed here, the

Employment Tax Bill represented two sets of compulsions. In

keeping with Congress criticism of the Raj, there was an attempt

here to curtail tbe status of the serv1cesa am secondly, there

264

Haig to Linlitbgow, 9 Februal--y 1939• L1nlithgov, H3S Bur. F. 125/101.

Haig to L1nl.itbgow, 17 M:trdl 1939, ibidel Haig to IJ.nli­thgow• 24 May 1939• Haig MSS. Eur. F. 115.

He .aa rep<rted to have said •I refuse to go to the Secre• tay at State 1n supplication am ask him to consider a salary cut wen I oan act on our own authority. I am looking .forward to the day when all the public servants w;Ul owe allegiance to us and not to a Ml-bap Secretary o:C State ••• a laig to Linlithgow, 25 Mirch 1939. L1nli­thgow K>S. Eur • F .125/102.

we.s the simpler fact of the :!ine.nc1a1 bene:!its that would accrue

to the Government 1! such a measure was passed. The rhetoric

which accompanied the Blll can be ascribed to a conjunctural

issue. Katju•a appea.1s were designed to mitigate the situat_ian

created by tile Tripuri crisis o:t March 1939. u .P. bld voted

against the Gandhian candidate, and anti-leadership a:nd anti•

Ministry attitudes were pronounced at that time. 266 This rhe­

tc~ic swiftly dissolved when the Governor determined to reserve

the Bill in August. The situation bad altered by them; insta­

bility 1n the- Congress Gr@l!ln1Bat10D bad mcunted after the Boae­

lee July demcnstrations 3-gQ!nst constitutional changes in the

Ccngress, 267 so the Ministers might bive l!IElnted to avoid a

confrontation with the Governor, one which in the circumstances

cOUld easily develop into a crisis. AD:i this would go against

the ministerial 1mperat1 ve of ensuring tMt the ~Cenancy Bill.

\'An passed. 268

While on issues o.t: structu:rtll ctenge in the state the

Ministry had evaded serious ccnfrontation with the PCC, the

question of tenancy reform acquired much mare signi.ficant pro­

pcrtions of disagreement. 'l'he imperative here was to ensure

that the s.ml.l latrll.ard, vho \188 being wooed by tbe large land­

lords oZ the provinoe, 269 ,,as not al!em ted by Congress

266

267

268

269

Seo beloW, Ch. 5.

Ibic1.

Haig to Lin11thgow, 9 August 1939, Linlithgow MSS. Eur. F. 125/102.

Zam1mara conference, Luclmc:'J!.t clipping. f'rom P1afi!Ut• 30 October 19371 in AICC c-6/191'6. _

266

policy. 2?0 ll4lile thia strategy l!l6s agreed upon in the party,

there were d1£:terences about the ca tegar ies o:t landlord who

could blw their lau:l atmpted !rem the proposals tar securing

occupancy rights tor 'the temnta. The initial proposal waa tblt

landlcrda with §J£ (seU-c:llltivated) hold:lnga below 100 aorea

should be exempted, but UDier pressure in the Ccmgress Legisla­

ture Party, the amount \\6oS brought down to 50 acres .'Z71 The

PCC ..anted to go 7~·.!I"ther. Certain left-wing members such as

B.D. Tripathi, Z.A. Ahmed• K.Le Gautam am Jo.gadamba Narain ·,_

sexena rebutted pleas that the issue not be discussed as- it

would embarrass the ministry. They no+..ed tm.t PCC decisicns

lJOuld be biD«Ung on/the Ministry. TrJpathi tbln went on to

criticise some Congress Leg1sJ.a1Jure Rirty members !or conscrt­

ing tri th Ulmindars, and it -s moved that !J;t be altogether dis­

lll.lowed for J.anllords who paid a revenue assessment of above

Bs. 1000/- per annun. After heated discussion, the resolution

,.as caiTed by a vote at 88-70 (However it was not included in

the Tenancy proposaJ.sZ72 ). F\n"ther acrimaly developed over

211

Z/2

Mohanl.a.J. 8axel»l-. Right Wing President at the UPCC 1n 1938, noted tba't the Coneress repreMD'ted the amau landlord aa well as the peasattt. am he attacked the Klsan Sangh tar encouraging class conflict Wich be claimed would aid the foreign buree.mre.cy's policy ~ divide and rule. u.P. Polltlcal c~ .. ence Luclmow, 30 December 1937. lpdian Nnzue~ ljeqis'k£. JuJ.y•Decemoor 1937, p. 385.

Cong:-ess Legislature 1\:lrt~Maeting, Pi~- 28 June 1938, P• '· This ~s how the clause liiEl8 l.l.y :tcrmulatQd. Hallett to Brabourne• 2/f eptember 1938, L1nllthgow lt3S. · Eur. I<'. 125/45.

As presented 1n 1b1d.

267

the amount by which rent ~s to be reduced. A resolution ,.as

passed. asking for a 50 per cent reduction until rent based an

the surplus produce of the land cQJJ.d be calwlated. Pant

pleaded tblt tb.1s \llll& f1118nc1all.y impossible ani auggeated

instead. a 7 crore reduc'ticn, which wwld have amOUJl'btd to about

28-30 per cent reduction. The different political v1ewpoil'lt3

at work were expressed in ex-terrorist Bhuperxlm Nath Sanyal 's

aacerbic remrk that t."le Ministry's business \ll&s nat to balance

the b\.idgat but to wreck the act. 'lhe Ministry • s viewpoillt ws ·,

finally carripct by a vote ot 70-68, with the adjustment tblt

8 ratha'r than 7 crores tTOUld. ba reduced.m

T."lB eriticiBme at the bill followed the cha.racteristic

left-will& prot;r3:mnatic trajac:tory • that it did not include I

zamil'Jiari abolition. This t-.GS ex!)ressed at a rr.ass tooeting which,

ironically enoug.."l, '~s arranged by I1oblnlal saxem to welcome

the bili. The zamimari abolition proposal caLlS up ins pi te o!

the plans or the crlJlnisers. The resolution noted that the

CongE"ess must realise that the position of the tenant could not

improve without this change. It e.J.so regretted that the CCilg­

ress bad not been abl.e to ccmtain pollee repressicm in tbe

countryside 1Dsp1te ~ its having been in power for ao lcmg.274

273

Z74

60 m.embe~ staged a -lk-out on the grourds that a 50 per cent reduction had been carried the previc:ua day_ aDd they ob~ected to 'the re-1ntr()duot1on at tbe issue. ac:ger, 10 July 1938. .

~;R;J :; ~~tr!I:tf~~~1ct ;~;po=-t:~~..:~:11 e.g. lloJnbSty Qlronicl.l• 25 June 1939, P• s.

268

However, the real problem arose because of zaminiar oppositicn

to the blll. 2:15 The Ministers realised that the bill. could be

seriously delayed with the oppcs1t1cn of the landlords 1n the

Legislative Council. Twa negotiations were arranged through­

out late 1938 and early 19~ ill wbioh .featured prominently the

Nalll8b of Cbbatari, the former Interim Ministry Premier and

Patel, Chairn:an o.f the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee.

Patel, wh.Ue anxious to arrive at an agreement whereby the

passage ~ the blll could be hastened, 276 nevertheless stipu­

lated. that his verdict WOUld have to be accepted as 'b1Diing by j

the-landlords.zn cnce the authority o:t the- congress \£8 accep-

ted, Patel was willing to discuss even more fav~ble terms

~ concession to conciliate lamlcrd grievances in regard to

right to trees, pir and provisions fer ejectment.Zl8 However,

the intransigence of the taluqdars of A,.,adh subverted any chances

of settlement. Zl9 Discussions however c antinued while the Bill

275

276

2Tl

278

279

The select Comni ttee o! the ASsembly on the Tenancy Bill was adjourned for a !orti;l.ight at the request of the :rAmindar members. UP FR(2), June 1938.

Aa a result there tes postponement o£ the consideration ot the bill. Patel to ou-tari, 15 October 1938, 10 November 1938, Cbhatari ~.

Patel to RajeDira Prasad, 21 October 19381 Rajendra Prasad Ms 4-A/38/coll.5. Patel to Qlhatari, 21 october 1938, 2 November 1938. Chhatari Ms.

Patel to C~tari, 11 November 1938J see alSo Patel. to Chbatari, 28 September 1938 aJXl Cbhatari to Patel, 18 October 1938. Chllatari MS.

E9tel to Rajendra Prasad, 2 November 1938, R.PCSD, 2, P• 129.

269

was in the Council. and the zamindars were a!fered a concession

in the rent realisation procedure. Ho'W8ver they reii81ned. be-

si tant aot were :Cinally divided in the CouncU vote which passed

the bill. 280 To ensure that the Tenancy Bill would bave a· safe

passage in the CouncU debt legislation -.a conscicualy delayed

to prevent the alielfltion of the moneylenders blOC:.: in the

Upper House. 281

This a.t'tempted CC'"1promise WlS not looked on with equani­

mity by either the Kisan .:3angh or the FCC. The Bill •s delay

was criticised by t~ CSP and the J'easant organisatial as they

noted tblt this woul.d give the landlords time to eject ~ir

temnts before it came into .f'orce.282 Significantly, it was

also during this period that the ideological radioalisation of

the Kisan Sangh took place. Earlier, this organisation bad

remained itxlependent from the all-India body an the grouxxls that

it did not accept the AIKS •s objective ~ zamindars abolition

without compensation. It now accepted this objective and affi­

liation took place in December 1938.283 .AlXl the PCC, in a sin-

280

281

282

283

Haig to L1nl.ithgow1 12 June, 24 June! 9 August, 6 September 1939. Linl.ithgow l'BS Bur. F. 125/1oz. The ooacesaion offered was that ejectmen-t wOUld be .from the llbole ho1d1ng 1! the tenant did not pay the arrears o! rent within two years following the due date, 1n addition to paYJte:at of current rent. Pimeer, 28 July 19391 P• 1.

Hai~ to -Linlithgow, 24 Jtme 1939, L1nl.1tbgow MSa Eur. F. 125/102.

Congress SocAAJ,i§t, 2, 43, 23 October 1938, p. 2.

N.A. Rasul., History of' the All-India Kisan Sabba, Calcut"ta, 1974, P• 45.

270

gular move, questioned the authority of the Farliamentary Sub­

Committee 1n undertaking negotiatiOns over tenancy legislation

in the province. 284

These moves were not of cwrae decisive in preventing the

mod.eraticm. ot the billa that had been accomplished by the land­

lcrds themselves. It might be argued 1n fact that the ministers, h

or at least ministerial compulsions, had trium~ed over the

intransigence of the extra-parliamentary motivations of t..he

party. They had evaded the implementation o£ t.be radical demo­

cratic objectives of the party ~enever these threatened to come

into con:f'l.ict with their objectives at reaUsing a success1'ul.

legislative pr~. And 1n regard to the latter, in the shape ,. a£ the tenancy bill, ~Y had remained impervious to attempts

to have it charlged 1 and had only been prevented from further

moderation because o! lack of' lamlord tmity.

HC>wever, to look at the legislative side o£ the u.P. ex­

perience is to tell only hal.f the story. Power was focussed

not ally in the legislative assembly. In the next section we

shall examine the deeper undercurrents o£ autbc.rity, and its

shaping, that developed under the C ongreas Min1stry 1n U .P.

can tradict1 ons cr.r poli tioal form pressed down at nany

pointa on the Min1.atry 1s functioning. There is a constant sense

284 The ewe reprimanded the UP PCC for their resoluticn am ree.:f'f'!rmed the overriding e.uthority of the Farliamentary Sub--Committee, ;B,Qmb8z C.b£on1g1e1 1 October 1938, p. g.

27l

of the ministers straining to reconcile the democrati.c pres­

sures present in the Congress political tradition with the

objectives and inevitable adjustments signitied by ministerial

strategy.

Perhaps this conflict can best be illustrated by the

Ministry's hesitant relationship to the po\\ertul labour move­

cent that had developed in the Kanpur textile m!lls. Kanpur

b.l.sinessmen and district of'.ficials eJqressed doubts about the

Ministry's capacity to rule in the light of its treatment of

tb.1s 1ssu~.285 The ~overncr, Haig, recognised that t:ant exhi­

bited different :r~tures .trom hi.3 colleagues eles8lthere, but

believed that the sources of this di.tference lay 1n irresolu­

tion rather than dn altermte set of ·convictions. 286 The impli­

cation l!BS that it ~s the si tuatian rather than mintsterial

attitudes which was decisive. The pressure exercised by the

Congress Committee -v.es critical here. The Kanpur City Congress

Ca:mdttee (CCX:) had developed an intimate relation with the

workers' movement in the textile industry and in 1938 was to

extend active suppcrt to the striking workers. Its President,

Balakrishna Sharma, WiS to chair the Textlle Workers • Conference

285 Ewart of the Intellli~~ Bureau was similarly worried, am contrasted the I-t try's attitude unf'avourably with that o£ their Bombay cwn1:erD8rta • But bath he and the Governor, Haig, hoped that Cfovernor' s rule would be pre­vented at all costs. Ewart em the sitUltian in u.P., 28 November 1937, L1nlithgow MSS, Eur. F. 125.

286 Haig to r.tnlithgow, 10 January 1938. Linlithgow r-es, Eur. F. 125/100.

o! December 1938.287 Among the actions the Committee proposed

to aid the strikers was that the UP PCC ccmsid.er instituting a

boycott of the gOOds of such factories which did not accept the

recommendations o:! the inquiry conmittee set up to go into

questions relating to ..age-lewls am union recognition. 288 And

at the height o:! the 1938 strike, the KanJUI' CCC suspended

Ramarattan Gupta, its Vice-President and also Mllliging Director

of the Laxmiratan Mills, !'rom its Executive Committee !or his

refusal to support the ccc•s activities in the str1ke.289 The

signii"icance of this context fer ministerial attitudes 'tii&S ad-'

mitted by Katju \dlen he noted to Blig that i:le real problem in

Kanpur was Bal.akrisbm Sharma, litho the Ministry -was not willing '

to challenge because of the powerful influence he wielded. 290

This is not to argue that the Ministers were simply buckl­

ing under such pressures. Individuals like Pant were evidently

eager to avoid repressive actions. Shortly after the Ministry

took office the Premier explained to !big that he believed that

communism shOUld be dealt with by argument rather tte.n by

force.291 Later, when i"Jle Kanpur District IvBeistrate used sec-

287

288

289

290

291

2nd All India Textile Workers • Conference, 24 December 1938. AITUC F. No. 61.

T!Je PiC!!l@G£• 24 May 1938, P• 4.

Boml?ax Chronicl.'ib 24 June 1938, P• 12.

Hai~ to Linl.itbgow, 2JJ December 1938, Haig MSS. Eur. F. 115/29. .

Hai~·to LinlithgO\vt 23 Aug1.1st 1937, Haig HSS. Eur. F. 115/17 b.

273

tion 144 Cr. P.c. to prohibit mill. gate meetings am slogan­

shouting, Fant declared that he would not interfere with the

crder but at the same time he would not give the District

Magistrate a .tree m:OO. 1n prosecuting speakers. 292 I

Ha own coum.1tment to nco-repressive means, and his &\118re­

ness ot the pressures working outside the ministry to prevent

recOW""se to such action, ca.used him to constantly procrastinate

over such measures. In one instance, lil ig had wanted action

taken against Parmamm, a Kakor1 prisoner who had been rel.eased

when Cc:mgress took office, for ~ak1ng seditious Sp!eches against

the British and Ule army. This happened shortl.y ai'~r the

heated ewe mee-ting at Cal.cut'bl, in which Nehru had argue<! that

repressive action related to the question of sedition should

not be taken without prior consul.tatian with the concerned PCC,

the WC or: the Parllamenta~r Sub-Committee. While Nehru tad been

de.f a3. ted on this issue, 293 Pant told Haig that b? would be con­

sulting •others to whom according to our eonstitutic.n a re.ference

will have to be ~de on occasions like this. •294 Apparently

opinion in the Congress High Camre.nd was that the speech was

indeed very. bad but that action shOUld be taken only 1n case of

repitition. 295 In the :Ca.ce o:C Saig 1s adamant stance, Pant

292

293

294

295

Haig to Lin.l.ithgow, 10 December 1938. Haig ms. Eur. F. 115/29.

See above, 3.1.1.

Haig to Linl.ithgow, 29 November 19371 Blig MSS. F. 115/15.

Haig to Linlithgow, 16 December 1937 t ibid. Rajendra Pra­sad -bad cited Pant s anxiety at the aemonstrations taken out on the release of the Kakari prisoners when compl.ain­ing about the growing 1ndisc1PlJ.ne in the Congress ~. To Pate11 28 September 1937 • ~~ndra Prasad fiB. n/'57/ col.l. 4.

274

compromised by noting that he would accept responsibility far

Parmamnd 's prosecution but as he had in the meanwhile been

arrested 1n Delhi on another count, proceedings tor sedition

should be suspended. 296 He made it clear tblt nser1ous develop­

ments are likely to ensue d..f no way out ot the difficulty 1s

.toum• .297 U Ha1g decided to by-pass the Ministers,. ?-ant would

have to disassociate himSelf .fror4 the action, a course he would

not l.ike to adopt because of t:12 repercusslons it \fould have on

the ndmjnJstraticn and on the public. He eXplained that in

terms of public opinion, n there \..SS a large body of fluid opi­

nion between the right_ and le.ft wings that could be infl.uenced

a[1iinst him ~J, this prosecution and that his position .for the

' future wOUld become decidedly weaker." 'lhe immed.iate background

to his apprehension lay in his support to the Kanpur District

Magistmte 's use of Section 144. He .felt tbat while Cor..gress­

men might be able ·to accapt one such action, he dwbted whether

they coul.d accept another. 29B Haig realised the procariousness

of the situation and accepted Fan:t 's suggestions on condition

that he issue a public \\6nling to tne ei".fect tt..at theae speeches

would not be tolerated tmd that the Government woul.d be Zree to

institute proceedingS without further \1t6rll1ng• Pant accepted

this and the potentiul Cl·isi-s was diffused. 299

----------·------·· 296 Haig to Linli thgow • ibid.

297 Pant to ltiig, 11 December 1937, ibid.

298 Haig to Linl1thgow. 13 Dece!!lb:!r 1937 • 1b1d.

299 fi1ig to I.J.n:Lithgow, 23 December 1937 • ibid.

~75

Pant's own uneasiness 1n employing repressive methods

emerges from the welter of pragmatic explanations he prof erred

to Haig. But more signUicantly the discus.s1on aJ.so highlights

the two points ot pressure working on the Miniaters ., The first •

emerging from Nehru and the High Command, indicates that Rajagq­

palacbari 's urnercutt1ng of l'litionalist imagery in his proscut­

ing Batl.iwala for sedition had left its mark. Secand1y, am

mare significantly, it confirms the status given to ex'~ra­

consti tutio~l opinion in the province in determining ministe-

rial attitudes.

The nature of this extra-constitutional authority li!B.S

diffused and uncoordinated 1n the agrarian sphere. It -was ex­

pressed in the development Of parall.el government formations in

t~e 1Silediate ~ke of 1:be setting up o! the Congress Min1stry.30°

At first a!fic.1als suspected that this was a deliberate methai

employed by the Cangres3 party to deets.bl.ize the administration.

Haig however understood that there ~s no organisa.tion behind

thasa developments and he suggested to Linl.ithgow that tbat was

required was a patient approach. 301

The sustained 1.! spor-adic am \8'1Coard1nated nature of

this process som led to the £~t or a series of initiatives

300 These .tormatians tended to encwrage submission of repcrta directly. to Coneress officials and t0 denigrate gove!'nment servants. Compl.ainta bad been received :from almost all districts. UP m (1) and (2), August 1937. See also Ha1g MSS. Eur. F. 115/121 passim.

301 Haig to Linl.ithg~r, 17 November 1937, ibid. In his pri­vate r.otez on tr..e is£u.e he analy:>ed that \'.1-'..ile COID.u<Tess liiBS popular in the villages it bad as yet inadequate control at that 1e·ve1_ over party workers. !bid.

276

taken by the Ccmgress to lessen such activity, embarrassing as

it was to the ministry and to the adm1n1strat1on.302 thler the

instructions o! the Ministry, Chie.f Secretary Gwynne issued a

circular urging ~t the time had come •when determined ef.torts

should be made by the o.t:ticers at Government to establish rela­

tions o.t mutual confidence with the district leaders ot the

Congress", to the end of creating· efficient and h<mP.st adminis­

tration. "• •• It ls iroport3nta, the circular continued, "that

the district authorities shoul.d be in touch with the represen­

tatives of the Congress organisation in their respective areas.

The Congress committees are being addressed in a aimUar sensa

by the UP P::C" .303 Seth Damodar swarup,. (Socia.lia·t) Secretary

of the UP PCC then issued a circular to tha DCC directing that

the Congress organisation and the government had to wrk A.s

allies as long as the representatives o1' the Coogress formed

the Government. He ackn~ladged that Congressmen and government

officers were reporting against each other ani urged that more

e.f.ticient redressal of grievances could be effected if the two

302 e.g. Pant had been de:teilSive o:t BabEl Raghavdas, the Gan­dhian wrker from Garakhpur, whom locel officials claimed \1188 undermining the authcri~y of the police. When Ragbav­daa was arrested, he ,.as so incensed that he wanted to mve a departmental enquiry into the handling of the Garakhpur tro.l~le. Ho-.teVer, he realised, that this wwl.d only excite local feeling and would possibly also impair ·tt.e <?A~tt;..;,:.:-i ~Y o:r the district staz.f and so he agreed with Haig that a private enQUiry wQJJ.d later be conducted by Katju, wiih tM he~p o:! Ul8 CO!mni.ssioner. Haig to L1nll­tbgowJ. 22 September and October 1937, Haig KlS. Eur. F. 115/1•t b.

303 Illig 1-lSS. Eur. F. ·i15/12.

Zi7

acted in concert. Grievances should be settled locally ancl,

while Cor~essmen cou1d make enquiries into the genuineness at

the reports, they should on the whole leave investigation to

the proper authorities. In case of d~tisfaction the relevant ,. diStrict authorities should be approached am, where necessary,

the PCC.304

Linlit.hgow was shocked at both circulars. He felt tmt

they impaired the net.:.trallty o.f tbe ser•rices. He understood

the al.itwardnes.43 o:t the cireumstances • as the Gwynne circular

had been p?:'epared under mi.n.i.Ste1·ial m~er·~, but argued that

\Olhen a suitable oppuctuni ty arose stepe shOUld be taken :f'or its

withira,.e.l or mc.xi!.f!cation a£.td l'~ssurances f.J.ven to tlle ser-

vices.305 ,"

Haig en the other hWld i'elt that the circular :Md

r.ot imp~rilled service ~orale a!ld in !~ct had along with the

UPE!(:C's circulell" improved the sit~tion. He said that Congress­

men now had to appronch the a.dndnistr-ation like everyone else,

while a speci.fic re.ference had to be mad.:: to them be0:1u~ of

the history of embittered relatior.!S betwen the Ca1gress and

the services. Conversations \•tith District officers gave him

the impression that the situation 1IIElS now stabler.306

In .tact, Illig was placed in a di.fficult position. In

singling aut the Ccngress for special treatment, the circular

couJ.d not but have boosted Congress prestige. By the end of

304 Cl.ipp!ng :from J'he Pionem:,, 9 Dece~ber 1937, ibid.

305 'l'o Ha!g. 24 Dece!llber 1937, ibid.

306 To Linll.tl~-rOtJ, 12 Febnary 1938. ibid.

278

1938, 1n reviewing the political sitmtion, he noted that while

the phenomenon of parallel government had died down, the ser­

vices, and the police 1n particular, did not exhibit auch con­

fidence. ?t:J?

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, there lllllS a

tendency on the part of Congress fwi.As arxl regular party men to

put pressure on the services and to arrange for transfers.

Secomly, there were conflicts developing on the labour am

agrarian :fronts througho-.1t 1938 and these af'ten in turn temed

to demoralise the services, especially as there was a certain

spice allowed to activists in these .f!el~.

Both c£ tl:ese trams ... :ere :fwg..~t out in the FCC. In 1938,

it had a Right Wing Pres1d~nt, Homnlal Saxena, •11ho tried to

arrange act! vi ties such the.t tl':c !:11nietry wocld not be embar­

rass.gd or impeded in its func-ticning. But his policies came

under a tt&.ck, and this led to a cri.zis in the party in the

latter part of the year.

On tJ:.;e agrarinn issue, ·tr..e PCC had eought to reduce ten-

a ion by sending inGtrt:ctior..s asking the DCCs to i.rxluce tenants

to pay rent,308 and it ho.cl a~so supported the actions of the

authcrities to control labour unrest in Kanpur. 309 During 1938,

this outlcolt ~s taxed by the development o.t serious unrest in

307 Haig to LinJ.ithgow. 19 Decacber 1938, Linlit.ngat; f6S. :&lr • F • 125/101 •

308 UP FR (2), ~ptember 1937.

309 UP FR ( 1), ~cei:lber 1937.

thttse !ields • 310 am 1n the increased organisation toot arose

in its wakeJ311 am in the process Saxem 's un:lerstanding of

how the PCC should relate to the Ministry also came umer attack.

saxena•s view was that the primary responsibility o! the

party was to carry wt the instructions o! the legis~tive

party and of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee and he believed

that it should not criticise the Ministry. His understanding

\..as tl'l:l t the PCC • s role was to ensure the success o£ Ministerial.

p0l.icy.312 Criticism by the Kisan Sangh of Ministerial policy,

expressed in JJarches to the assembly, mounted press we on this

attitude both outside and inside the party. SOcialist members

such aa Narendr1:1 Deva (who was also ooe of the AD<C members

assigned to af.filia~ the U .P. Kisan sangh to the all India

body-'13) came il)to conflict with saxena.314 As a result of

310

311

312

313

314

There was a resumption of strike activity in the Kanpw MUla in Mly due to the failure of the Employees Associa­tion to implement the labour Enquiry Committee's recommen­dations. UP FR(1 ), May 1938. In the agrarian sphere land­lords had been re!using to accept recorded rents in many cases, and there had been an increasing tendency amongst tenants to deposit rents in the tahsils. Further, in anticipation o£ the Tenancy Bill., ].andJ.crda bad been re­sorting to ejectments and in turn temnts were seizing disputed lam. UP FR( 1), Jamary 1938, FR( 1) and (2), June 1938.

In May and June there were lar~ numbers of Kisan meetings hol.d· to ~otest the Governnent s delay~ tenancy legisla­tion. FR(1), f.By 1938 and FR(1) and t2), Jtme 1938.

President, UPPCX: to all Members, 20 August 1938. Aiel: 17/1938.

Niyamtpur Session, AIKC, 14 and 15 July 1937. Yajnik MS.F.S.

Nehru criticised saxe.na :for his inability to c:J;J.rry men of a di:f!erent party like Narernra Deva with him and urged that they be DJlde to .feel that "al.though they dU!er :troa you they are getting a s~e deal and m<re•. To Saxem, 20 April. 1938. AICC P 20(Pr.2)/1938.

280

these differences, Saxena proferred his resignation in August

1938.315 But he was persuaded to witMre.v his resignation on

the basis a! a PCC resolution that a!:tirmed his viewpoint. The

resolution noted that action would be taken against those seek­

ing to UDiermine the Congress organisation, and it directed

Congressmen to disassociate themselves from those Kisan Sabhas

which srught to replace the national flag or which had as office

bearers Congressmen against whom disciplinary :.ction had been

taken. It also warned that anti-Ministry propaganda WOUld be

punished and it !!nally ordered that no grcup satyagraha de:ty­

ing government orders should be un:lertaken withrut the prier

permission of the PCC. 316

Tension however continued. The independence of the FCC

from the Hinistry was underlined when in January a resolution

was passed debarring MLAs !rom election to the Pa:: Executive

Council. As a result the PCC executive resigned. Nehru was

unhappy with the suspicion this cast on the outgoing council,

and a reconsideration o:f the controversial c1ause took place

and the decision -.s reversed, The FCC expressed confidence 1n

the Council and the l.atter agreed to carry an untU the next

electiona,317 Nehru took over as the new President.318

In substance, NehrU's attitudes on specific issue were

315 AICC 17/1938,

316 Pioneer, 16 October 1938, P• 10.

317 Ibid" 30 December 1938.

318 Ibid.

281

not very different .from Saxena's, but he brought a different

emphasis to bear en the .framing of his positions. For example,

he supported the FCC resolution o.f *Y 1938 on the ai tt.etion 1n

the. Mills 'Which criticized both employers am workers, the lat­

ter for not warning the employers before going on s1rika. When

the Kanpur Mlzdur Sabha leader, Hariharnath Shastri, -nted the

resolution amended so as not to criticise the workers, as he

believed that -t-.hi.s WOUld demaral.ise them, Nehru differed,

noting that

1.f they (Congressmen) thought that the workers did wrong in resorting to a strike without giving notice and consulting the .Ma2'Jiur Sabba, then they must say so to them. It the Mlzdur Sabha' which was their representa t1 ve waa not

consulted 1h such cases, the employers ~e right in refusing recognition to such a body.319

This ~s not an ant?i-worker position, but it was one vhich -s

not perhaps fully aware o.f the canpulSions operating on working­

class struggles, compulsions which rrily not always have been

amenable to such a rational, disciplined ordering of activity

as Nehru deemed .fruitful for the development of the workers

tmJ.cn.

Similarly, like Saxena he came into cc:nfl.ict with Kisan

Sangh activity directed against the Ministry. Due to lac:k of

information, he believed that a Kisan Sangh mrch to the Assem­

bly an 20 AprU 1938 had been designed to rival the Kisan rally

called tor by the FCC on 17 AprU, and expressed his irritaticn

at the irresponsible frequency of these demonstraticns to the

319 DaM·· 24 May 1938, P• 4.

282

C ouncll House. 320 When 1 t Wis explained to him that the rally

of the 2oth had been arranged well before t:OO PCC •s decision

to hold a meeting had been taken,'21 he apol.ogised, but reite­

rated that such demcnatrtltiona should only take place em. spe­

cial occasicma. 322

These similar! ties with &txem should not blirtd us to the

differences between the two. Unlike Saxena Nehru never ques­

tioned the need !or an in:lependent Kisan organi~tian. 323 He

only wanted to discourage their .functioning as institutions

rivalling the Congress.324 This ~YP-5 sense in tr~ case o.f U.P.

where • unlike Bihar, the .PCC was amenable to radical mobUisa­

tion. At the 'Same. time, as with his attitudes to workers' '

action, there are suggestions here of a certain inSensitivity

to the dynamics of working class and peasant action. However,

this did not mean that he identified with Saxena's rigid demo­

rcation of the status of these movements. He ,.as abroad when

the PCC passed the resolution of October 1938, which ._as effec­

tively levelled againSt Congressmen in the Kisan Sangh. His

distance ;[rom this attitude also made him eligible to sort out

320 Statement of 14 AprU 1938. AICC P 20(Pr.2)/1938.

321 Seth Damoclar Swarup to Nehru, 18 April 1938, ibid.

322 Statement of 20 Aprll 1938, ibid.

323 Saxena had noted that as the Congress had a daninantly peasant membership, there ,... no need ;[or a separate orga­nisation. Speech at U.P. Pol.itical. Con:Ce-rence, Lucknow, 30 December 1937, Indj,an AP!!Jal Register, July-December 1937, p. 385.

324 JlS!l!K~ 24 May 1938, P• 6.

283.

the tangle in the party caused by these conflicts in 1938.

As Preside.~t of t."le political cc:nference at Ajodhya in

l);!cember 19381 m struck a balance between the Ministry and

radical Congressmen. He)letended the Min1Stry on the grOUDia

of the restrictions it \\tiS faced with because of the constitu­

tion, but at the same time regretted the amount o.f time legis­

lation was taking. w'hil.e criticising the for-rration of Kisan

organisations to rival the C'Jng!'ess, he a~o cr iJ;i3ized the

priority ot imple!!lenting the bUl and o~ opposi;J.g all attempts,

especially in the Council, to delay this.325 This last empbl-I

sis was significant for, as we have shown, negotiations to

whittle the bill do"~ had just taY.en place and t.~re still going

OD behind the scenes • Pressure ViS thus being exercised on the

Ministers am at the same ti!!le a precise orientation to extra­

parliamentary action 'NBS being outlined: to support Congress

policy instead of trying to criticise it and to rival the party.

In short the exhortation li&S to de.!e.rxi the Blll's gains by pres­

surising !rom within the party, against compromise. This visic:m

~ the extra-parliamentary \iElS not simply functional to minis­

terial policy. It could be critical of this, but on the Ccng­

ress plattcra.

Nehru •s empl:Bsis on disciplined action am criticism led

him to go on tg def'1ne the re~tianship between the party ani

the state. M we have noted• one ~ the anxieties the Governor

had registered in relation to the nature am domain of C<mgress

author! ty \..aS in the COJluOTeSS tendency to subvert the adninis-

325 ~' 9, PP• 312-17.

284

tration, not only through parallel ftmctioning, but by inter­

fering in administrative procedure and by engineering trans­

fers. 326 The Minister a informed !Big that tbey were also un­

easy with th1a phenomencm and it waa through consultation With

the.,;v that ·the PCC passed the :Col.lowing resol.utie3U

While it is the duty o! all Congressmen to keep a vigilant eye on the welfare and ril?tlti of the people ani to report cases af oppression, it is not their busines:J, nor 13 it in conscnar.ce with their dignity, to interfere in anywal in uattors of adL .. _nistration, more especiaJ.l.y t.'lose relat­ing to appointroonts, transfers am the like. The Councll there.fore lay down the rule that in future no member at a Congress COmmittee should make any reccmmendation to Government afficiaJ.s :for appointment or dismissal or transfer .tor political reasons.32B

This move can be analysed al.ong wi~h the reversal of the

PCC's attack on the Legislature Party and the lilinisters which

had sought to exclude I'-'lLAs from the executive af the party. The

latter reversal defended the legitimacy of ministerial and

legislative work f'rom the attackS o.f the extra-parLtamentary

section while the .fo..T'!ner i'irmly separated the donains of the

state and the pari.y • T'.ae p-:t.rty' s con!lati on with these other

points in the political spectrum ws deemed to have led to

mal.functioning at these different levels ~ the polity.

Remarkably, out at a very different experience, positiCilB

akin to at •s were being worked out. But the virtue o.f these

326

327

328

Hai~ to Linlithgov, 9 'tBy 1939. L1nlithgow I"'BS Eur. F. 125/102.

Ibid. .

Quoted in Haig to Linli thgow. 9 May 1939, Linl.i thgow M3S F. 125/102.

285

~unctions being kept separate lttElS not theoretically conceived

as with the l<hdras Premier, but emerged from tr..e threat to

political coMrenoe posed by their conflation. Further, this

view did not arise .!rom the stampoint of the state, but .troa

that of the party. This development also bad the distinction

o! being expressed by Nehru, a :figure who had cast doubts en

the worth of the o.ffice experlment. further, this viewpoint

\\68 shJ:lred by leading S':>Cic>.lli;ts o.f the prt~vince, li!t'.e Narendra

neva \Clo, wi 121 Nehru, tsld objected to the amendment excluding

tJJLAs from the Executive Council o:f the Party.329 Significantly !

1n Mu-ch 1939 when Gandhi, anxious about the cmotic situaticn

in the province, t"!l!'ged Nehru to dissolve the cabinet, assume '

Premiership ar.d "get control over the unrcly eler.1ents •, he a l.so

' noted tmt he ~d had lmg discussions ldth the Socialists an

the matter am he wsnted Nehru to discuss it with Narendra

Devo..330

A growing consensus then defined the decisim to "get

contrvl over the unruJ.y elements" and tre results: were quickl.y

observd.ble. In this pericxi, ShJ.bbanla~ Saxena, whose tmchecked

activities at~ongst the Gcrakhpur tenantry had eroded the stabUity

of the Gorakbpur Revenue admin.istraticn, was called to Lucknow

to see the ICS Reconl Otticer, am Nehru gaw him a dressing-

329

330

Pispeer, 30 December 1938.

To Nehru, 30 Miroh 1939, Ne~ MSSI Corref!pCDience, Vo1. 25. S1gn.U'1o&ntly it was after th s, on 7th April. tb:lt. the resolution asking COI'lt'"7"CSsmen not to interf'ere in the admin.1straticn was p;utsed.

286

down. Katju, acting I?remier from 10 to 17 Apr11, promised to

help the District Magistrate in the event at further trouble~31

In Miy Gwynne issued a circular advising action a~inst aU

speeches fomenting eonmuml and class violence. In the latter

category men:tion -.a made ~ comunist activity am irxiustrial

disputes. 332 In June, Haig noticed a distinc·i; shift in Fant •s

atti·i;ucte to the law and 01-d.er situ:ltion. The Premier noted

that he was eoing to take a firmer s-tand with the · ·'tzdur Sabha

on the issue ot lightning strikes, picketting ani "datJgerous

strikes •. 333 Evidently the consensus w1 thin tre p3.rty had

given him a new resolve. And 1n addition, aa Haig md accura­

tely speculated,334 it seems likely that this attituie was re-e

l.ated to the decision ~ the High Command to §t matters UDler ,..

control; for this change occurred just before the Banbay sessicm

of the AICC, in which controversial changes were to be made in

the Congress constitution with a view to ef~ecting greater

control over the organisation. 335

The corroJ.ary of this stream:Lining err the party's da.iin

Wie its concentrated action on that which lf&S deemed its legi-

331

332

333

334

335

Ha1g to IJ.nl.ithgow, 25 rm-oh, 10 and 26 April. 1939. Lin­lithgow J69 Eur. F. 125/102.

To all District ot:ticers. AICC PL 2/1939.

Haig to t.inlithgow, 12 June 1939. Linlithgow MSS Eur. F. 125/102.

Ibid.

~ee Chapter 5.

287

timate sphere: the protection o£ tea1nt interest as it had

been legally constituted. On the Te~ncy Bill being passed by

the Upper House, a mge number o:t meetings were held through­

out the province to publicize its benefits •336 In turn, Nehru

mouuted a compaign against taluq:Jar attempts to delay the bill

by asking !or Governor •s intercession. Nehru •s response was to

denounce this as dilatory tactics, as the interview with the

Governor \'t6.s fixed a month later. He stressed that there should

be no toning down a£ the Congress's position, and he .feared

that the d8lay '11.-ould cause -suspicion that the Ccngress was

be.:..lt-track1ng.337 Tha Blll ~s finally given Governor's sanc­

tion shortly ~ar .the Congress withdrew .from the Hin.1atry.338 I •

It would sa em t.'len that 1n u .P,. the r-tirus terial experiment

had succeeded in its objectives of passing legislation tblt con­

s elida ted tr...e ten&"lts 1 occupancy rigl'lts. I\1rhaps mare signifi­

cantl:r. it bad da.."le this without tbe Congress aeriously alienat­

ing it.'l supporte:~s. ~"ld this was aci1ieved by tl1e extra-parlia­

mentary wing's ca;;acity, for a period at least, to allow for a

co-existence o! political !orms - ar canati tutioml and extra­

constitutioml action. When sucll a nexible .tramew<rk - the

result (J! varicua pressures, rather than of conscioua clesign -

3:36 Nehru to Raje%¥ira Prasad, 17 October 1939. Nehru M>S Corrospondanca Vol. 85. See also Illig's report of the mass propaganda undertaken by the Co..1'lgl'ess to p~ularize the Blll in the v1llages *- iaig to Linl.ithgow, 1 November 1939. Linllthgow MSS Eur. F. i25/102.

337 Nehru to Rajendra Prasad 1 ibid.

338 UP FR (1), December 1939.

28S

became untenable in terms ~ the eonsti tutional .framework the

party liEla :f'unction1ng in, the sbitt 1n attitude to a more

crderly conception ot extra-parliamentary act1CI1 bad the beD&..­

fit o£ being slllred by a section of the lett-wing 1n the party

wxler NehrU's guidance. The result ,..as that when disciplinary

action l.as taken, it tended not to take the form of a blanket

curtailment of direct action - as we have observed in the oases

~ the BJ.hai- am Andbra units -but was expressed rather through

individual aclmaniticm. Even when deoiaive action .as deiBDled

by the High 90111Dand, in the passage of the June 1939 resolution

prohibiting aatyagraha which md not been sanctioned by the I

concerned R:C, the .. u.P. case had a distinct approach. Nehru

asked 4 members of the Allahabad DCC who bad participated 1n

the 9 July demonstration opposing the resolution to resign

their posts •and carry on their agitation as primary members•~39

Thus, even though its emphasis was to organise extra-parlia­

mentary activity on mere discipl.ined terms • the UP Fa= retained

a mare fiexible appr~ch 'Which crul.d integrate the con:f'licting

.torms o:f' action it 'liB& faced with under the ministries.

3.4 1'hl 8hap! gt the strategy

(Air e.Dllyais of the Ministerial. experience in three pro­

vinces bas revealed tvo basic sets of compulsions: ( 1 ) Tba

mfntstera functicaed according to a sense at the llm1ta ~ the

Act. This was expressed in an evasion o:f' ccm.trantation over

289

issues, legislative and administrative, tmt cOUld lead to a

crisis and a premature termination of the ministries' lite.

Such crises had to be evaded in their view in order that the

primary objective o:r their tenure, the passage of ameliorative

legislation, ,.,as achieved. Inevitably this led to their seeking

adjustment in the realm of agrarian legislation with the land­

lords so that they could ensure that opposition from tmt group

wouJ.d not signi:f'icantly delay the legislative process.

This sums up the tactical compulsions at work. But in

the case of CR 1M8 have observed a definite shift in strategy.

Adjustments, especially with the state apparatt.is, were not tac­

tically conceiVedJ ~ey \\'8r~ seen as moments in the development

o.f control wer this apparatus, as J.evers in the process ~

making them willing agents o.f the elected government. CR sought

1n a sense to depol.iticise them, to 1!8ke them neutral implementer&

o:f Government policy. Simul taneousl.y, he tried to exercise

greater effective control over them at the points at wich they

were protected by the Act. The objective here was the consol.i­

dation of the relationship bet\\'ften the popular government and

the state, with a view to enlarging the authority ot the former

over the l.a tter. we have suggested that in this strategy for

power the strength of the nationalist posi ticm ~s sought to be -

shifted alt9.y fran extra-ccnstitutiorill points of authority. The

provincial governments would be the .fcrtresses ~ nationalist

pO!t.ter, the position from which, through rene\\lE!d demonstrations

of electoral. strength, pressure would be brought to bear on tbe

Raj to effect a fundamental. tre.ns£er a! power.

290

Ministerial compu1s1ons and constitutionalist strategy

inevitably bid as their corol.lary a de-empbe.sis on extra-cons­

titutional activities, !or the latter would calStantly threaten

tbe equilibrium desired with the services am the propertied

classes. But this trem remained unabated and 1! anything was

strengthened umer the ministries.

There appeared to be several. reasons for this. Firstly,

with the Congress taking •)ffice, the.ra were awakened great

expectat1al8 1 and perbips a sense of power vis-e.-"'is the col.o­

nial state. AIXl secondly, this was linked up to a lett-wing

attitude which gave primry signi.ficance ·to the motivations ot

the classes they scugbt to represent. In turn this leadership }

displayed a skeptical relationship to the possibilities o! re-

form unier the Act. They were 1ndif.ferent to the questions ot

how the Act curtailed the legislative programme and temed to

press ~or the passage of measures Wich wre considered imprac­

tical from the r~Jinisters ' point of view. Even when legislation

~s considered satisf'actm-y, however, there lllllS stUl room for

confl.ict. For the drive to rea~ise change through direct acticn

was still central, whether in terms ot realising le{fll rights ~

or 1n pressing tor~more radical ahU't in power relaticms.

The natio.zallst leadership approached this contradicticn

in two wys. Firstly, 1 t shoul.d be mated that they were not

bound down by the cautiou.aness characterist1o at the mJ.niste-

. rial viewpoint. en the other bind they accepted tb:lt 1:f a

balance sheet of constructive achievement was to be ~eft behind

at "the time of Ccmgress-withdra.al from at:Cice, wbich l'U anti-

291

cipated to happen at the time the Raj tried to impose Federa­

tion on the coun~ then m1nister1a1 constraints would have

to be accepted in a :Large measure.

The GamhJan and Gandh1an Right Wing freedom from minis­

terial caution -s demtWlBtrated by their approach to certain

is sues which would have been evaded by the m1n1sters 1£ they

were left to bindle matters in terms at their own sensa of

priorities. Thus in FebrUary 1938 Patel instructed M.mshi to

release political prisoners whcse case the Bombay Home Minister

had earlier said could not be rev1ewed.341 In tJle same vein it

can ba shown that when the U.P. and Biblr Ministries resigned in

February 1938• the decision -s nade by the High cormnam. and

i.n :ract the Ministers • view \'aS that a crisis should not be

provoked, otherwise it would jeopardise their legislative achieve-

ment.

The resignations in u.P. and Biblr arose :trom the Governcr•s

refusal to release palitical. prisCilers. In u.P. Pant initially

accepted that i:C Ha1g ~s adanant that the prisoners in ques-

tion could not be released, he would do nothing as he was not

prepared to resign an the issw or to declare their ditterencea

policy, presuably' because this wcul.d lead to a cr1sis.342 In

Bihar too in early January the Governcr reported that the issue

Rl3erxlra Prasad to s.K. S1nba• 4 March 1938. Rajemra Eriaad !6. 38/1938.

341 Lumley to Linl!thgow. 1 r'll.rch 1938. L1nlithgow MSS F. 115/51.

Haig to L1nl1thgow1 30 January 1938· Linlithgow MSS. &u-. F. 125/100.

292

of political prisoners had lapsed into the background. 343 But

then a drama tic shi.t't took place, which seemed to be only pirtl.y

related to hunger strikes by the prisoners in Allahabad and

Hazaribagh jalls (Pant•s deoisicn not to precipitate a crisis

had taken place attar the Allahabad nmger strike bad starte4344).

Pant had beco~ uncertain whether the issue could be evaded any

l<mger, and he attributed the change to the .factors of growing

publlc disgruntlement - probably exacerbated by the strike in

Al.lambad jail -and tlle likelihood of criticism at the forth­

coming Haripura session ext the Ca1gress, criticism which ~s !

likely to be very broad-baaed as the Congress pooiticn an civil.

liberties ~s nat merely a leftist coornitment.345 These consi­

derations must have contributed to the working Committee calling

for the release ~ all political prisoners on the eve of the

Ha.ripura sess1on.346 However. there were differences in the

Working Committee as to whether to o1ainte.in a :firm llne on the

issue or to avoid e. cr1s1s.347 The choice v.as left to Gandhi

who decided that the mjn.1sters should resign on the grounds tbat

their authority had been 1ntr1nged.348 In B!bU- tou Sinl'a noted

Hallett to L1nl.1thgow, 5 January 1938. Linlithgow MSS. Eur. F • 125/44.

Haig to Linl.ithgow, 22 January 1938. IJ.nlithgow loSS. Eut-. F. 125/100.

Haig to Linlithgow, 30 January 1938, ibidct:

BombaY Chronic1•• 11 February 1938, P• 12.

Ibid,, 15 February 1938. p. 1.

Ibidt

293

that he was not eager to precipitate a crisis, but given the

strong public opinion that had developed, he was sure that the

Working Committee WOUld call tor resignation.349

The Congress resolution an this issue waa not aggressive.

It pointed out that tbe Miniaters' functioning bad been infrin­

ged, something lbich the Congress had undarstood would not take

place ,j}en it accepted office. Whlle laying the blame an the

Governors, the resolution went on to indicate that the p;trty

had no desire to precipate a crisis and direct acticn and so

'\IIEls reluctant to call for resignations in other provinces • It

therefore called upon the Viceroy to reccmsider his decisicn so

that the Governors. "may act constitutionally am a.ecept "the ' advice at their ministers in the matter at rel~se a! the poli-

tical prisonera •••• -'50 Nehru was later to note that though the Congress Working

Committee position ,.as moderate, it ,as firmJ while their

primary aim was to push through agrarian legisl.atim and then

to deal with the Federation they, ar.d particularly Gandhi, had

been prepared to follow through with their position an this

1ssue.351 In the end thiS mocleraticn was adequate to gain C<mg­

rass ends, w1 th most of the prisoners being released very shc:rtly

after the Ministers' returning to o.tt1ce.352

350

351

352

Hallett to Governor-General• 2 February 1938t IJ.nl.ithgow MSS Bur. F. 125/44.

Zaidi, .§hcxcl.qpaedia of IN£, Vol. XI, p • 438.

To V .K. Krishna Henon, 5 M:lrch 1938, SWJH, VoJ.. VII, p.379.

In U.P. al.l ot the 15 prisoners ~oncernad 1D the contro­versy were released ·1n Rlrch;. Ha.ig to Linlithgow, 2'

294

There were two reference points present in this decisions

a sensitivity to extra-m1niaterial compulsions ani opiniona and

a firm defence f4 the m1n.1aters• authority in tile face of the R

Raj •s interference. It .aa this issue which again precipitated

the Orissa Ministry's resipt1m. 'l'h1s occurred because an

ICS officer hPd been appointed Acting Governor. In the Congress

view this was a threat to t.l-J.eir can.stitut1ow.1 position as they

insisted that the services were subordinate to the Hinistry.

Gandhi precipitated the crisis by issuing a statement criticis­

ing the appo¥ttment ~ Dain, t~e concerned officer, am taking

it clear that reinstatement of the Congress ministry after the

termimtion or 'ru.s tenure WOUld be questiom.bla in his eyes.353

Tha statement ,.as issued withou~ consulting tr~ N.irdsters,

though Gandhi noted that they had agree<! with him tb:it the issue

had to be handlai :!!rmly,354 He noted that lle considered the

issue -to be more fundamental than thnt o.f t-"le release o£ the

pollticaJ. prisoners as it m--eacbed a very blsic constitutional

po1nt.355

cont•d •• t.n. 352 ...

353

354

March 1~38. L1nl1thgow MSS. Eur. F, 125/100hin Bihar 40 out at .:t-1 :ri.sol"lers had been released by Apr • J!!!ian AmueJ Re~ter· Jamaary-Juna 1937, P• 17.

en receiving news o£ Dain1s appointment, the ewe demanded that the deeision be rescilxled. B~ ••eli; 5 Apr11 1939e P• 1. Gan:ihi then issued hiS ste • _bay ChronJ.g],e, 21 April 1939e P• 15.

Gandhi-Lumley interview. 13 ~by 1938. Linl.ithg0\<1 r.f>s. Etu- • F. 125/51.

Ibid. The criSis was evaded by tbe Govern~, Bub'backe eancellJ.ng hf.s leave.

295

The other major ministerial issue o~ political signifi­

cance in which the Gambians were invQlved li&S that relating

to the restoration at lands confiSCated :f'rom peasants in G~­

rat during the civil disobedience movement. Gandhi •a and 'fatel •s

invol.vement bad two features. Firstly it affirmed the legiti­

macy ~ pre-ministerial Cc::agx-ess activity and questioned British

actions during that period, and so 1n the process reaf£1rmed

the basic differences between the Ccngress and colonial ruJ~:

Gandhi went to the extent of suggesting to Gove:m.or Lumley that

the Gujarat Lams Act have a preamble in which the Br.itish

Government would be condemned for their v1ct1misation of the

concerned land ·hol~.35S And secoDily• like the orissa issue, '

it UDierlined the sl.lbordinate attitude the services had to adopt

in relation to the popular governments.357

In these instances, the Gandhians not cmly transcended

the lQgic o:f ministerial caution, they al.so l"eaaserted the rights

o.f popularly constituted authcrity. in the £ace of the Raj and

the services. Further, in doing this, they drew attention to

the real politiOll. orbit the m2ntstr1es .functicned inz not tlat

o! the constitutiCGll. space afforded them by the 1935 Act. but

a space defined by a national.iat, extra-constitutional. authcrity.

tJowewr. as we have noted, in the case of the original

Gandhjan Rightist arguments 1n £avour ot o.t'f1ce acceptance, and

356 Ibid.

357 Th-=re 1.\GS s~ong pressure :fron Fatel. ani Revenue H1n1ster l\1orarj1 Desai .for Garret. the civU servant ccamected with re~s:Jton in the area. to be tre.~errad. Lumley to Linl.1 thgow •. 15 March and 2 April, ibid.

296

aa we have observed in the practice ar Rajendra Prasad in

Bihar, the main priority o! the ministerial phase -s not to

precipitate conf'l.ict, but to ensure social conaolidaticn. At

this level both Gandhi and the Gandh1an Rightists accepted the

logic ot mJ.ntaterial action and ita liaita, and so aligned thea­

selves against those elements in the Congress llhich threatened

the equil.ibrium required to achieve these · ends.

In Gandhi 1 s vision, tne incorporative and subordinating

aspects of the 1935 Act358 could be t:m.rted if the Act waa

used in a nanner not expected by the rulers and if the rrd nj s­

ters re.tra~ from using it in the manner iDtended by them.359

Wblt .as this t1De~cted ma.nner't Fasentially it meant an imple• '

men'Ultian of the cmstructive programme (Camnunal amity, eradica­

tion of untoucblbUity, end o:r addiction to drinks and drugs,

social enfrancld sement o! wmen, amel.iora tion o:r vlllagers, free

and coJJtpul.sary educe.tiCil, overhauling ot higher education to .

bring 1 t 1n line w1 th the needs ~ the people, radical changes

in the legal. machinery so as to make justice pure and inexpen­

sive, conwrsicn o! jalls into re£orDJltories360), which 'WEl8

equivalent in hJa mind to the ttwUltng exercise at nc:n-violeme

by 'tbe whole mass at ;PeopJ.e•. 361 In his early statements en the

358

359

360

"••. "uD:lerlying (the Act) is the hope that what has been imposed tipon us we shall get to like, i.e, \18 Shall really regard our expl.o1tat1on aa a blessing in diaguiae •• ,• C~esa MJ.n18tr1es. 17 Jul.y 1937. CWMG1 Vol. LXV, pp, ~.

Ibid,

My aeaning ~ ot.tice acceptance • Hal1.1an• 4 September 1937t CWJ19• Vol, LXV, P• 105.

Ibid.

297

ministries, Galxlhi noted that 1:t this 'inU.spensable conditiCil'

was ;[ulfilled, then his 1dea1 at the conversion of the adminis­

trators at the system cOUld be fult.1lleda

·~1-~~thatanding their desire to the com;rary they sav that their guDS and every­thing they bad created !or the consolidaticn o! their auUlcrity were usel.ess bec&use c4 our non-use or them, they could not do otber­wiae than to bow to the inevitable and either retire from the scene, or remain on our terms • i.e. as friends to cooperate with us, not as rulers to impose their will upon us. ·

I! Congressmen have entered the legislatures with that (non-violent) mentality and it the British administrators tolerate Ccmgr&ss .tadetinite].y, the Congress will be em a :fair VJ.y to ...-eck the Act and to achieve caaplete 1Diepen:lence. For an indefinite prolongation of the . ministries on the terms mentioned by me means ever J.ncreasing power of the Cmgress till 1 t beComes irresistable am 1a able to have its way all alcng the Une.362

Galldhi's strategy can be logicaJ.ly broken down into the

! ollowing points s

(a) a non-violent approach ~s the lynehpin at the strategy.

This involved the ccnstruetion of an ideal eonmunity of the

peopl.e, wherein divisions and differences were dissolved by

progressive ~arm.

(b) if suob a ccmnun.ity lriBS constructed, then repression would

become an obsolete phenomenon ( •. •• • the 1r guns and everytbiDg

they had created tor the consolldation of their authority wre -

useless because ot. sw MQ=W!! qt tbp•.)

(11) thJ.a neutralisation of the re,treasive funct1Cil8 of the

state woul.d rob it of all power aver society ("an indefinite

298

prolcmgation o:f the ministries on the terms menticned by me

means an ever-increasing power o:f the Congress tUl it becomes

irresisti-ble and is able to have its 'WilY all along the 11ne •••• •)

In the terms of Gandhi's thought, to describe thia stra­

tegy as designed to achieve ciVil hegemony would be 1nnacurate1 f-er the argument tended to break down the di v .1s ian between

political and civil society.363 The ideal canmunity o:f the

latter would, in Ge.ndhi 's terms, tend t9 undermine the rationale

:for the existence of the state as a separate, arbitrating ani

re}ressing institution. In a sense Ga.Mbi 's view ~ diametri­

cally opposed to CR•s. Far the latter the state would be raised

to the level of ideal and impartial arbiter in the affairs of

the people. For acbnu, on' the other ham, the functicning of

the people would make the state an irrelevant phenomenon.

In Gandhi's ideal terms, this meant the establlshmnt of

a direct, harmonious relationship between the peopl.e •s repre­

sentatives ani the people. An ideal CODnuni ty of interests \1188

the object! ve, one whose realisation wculd circumvent the struc­

tures of repression represented by the state, and wuld there­

fore cOI'lSolidate nationalist power on the grOUDis of an irresis­

tabl.e maral and social authority. The :functionaries of the

state WOUld become impotent bystanders, bemused by a society

which had !lo need ar them.

363 R1rtha Cbl.;tterjee bas oe.de such an aralys1s of GEuxlhi's thQ.lgltt, lati~t T. in a £9l,on1al World. A Peri­vative Dis00urse New hi, 1987.

299

In practical terms, this 'WliS a struggle !or civU hege­

mony, because it sought to shift the grQ.Jlld of authority and,

of course, it bad to come to terms with the fact that (1)

society ,.e.s divided and oontliotual and (2) the state theretore

must cODtinue to ft.UJ)tion. How lJ9.S this contradiction resolved?

we shall attempt to show that in Gandhi's view Congressmen would

have to discipline themselves into accepting the existing legal

parameters c:r the state. If t~ae were accepted as the unavoi­

dable basis ~or action, then the possibilities at cmtlict - at

a rupturing of the ideal conmuni ty - would be pre-empted and,

in turn, the sl!IBy the state nachinery exercised oYer society

would be curta.U.ed •.

Gandhi's respOnse to the developing ccntradictions in the

situation in:licate hJ.s dual emphasis on Congress discipline ani

peaceful {i.e. ncn-i."'epressive) ministerial cCI'ltrol. When unrest

amcngst crim:l n:J1 tribes and the working-class 1n, respectively,

Sholapur and Abloodabad led to pol.ice .firing, Gazxih1 interpreted

the events in the .follow.ing t~J.y l that a section of Congressmen

(the "Red Flag men") were not suomi tting themselves to Congress

discipline in that they were pursuing such violent terms of

acticm, and secondly, that the Ccngz:-ess was not ab1e to control

n~cmgress elements (it seems tna.t alluded to here \t.ere not

only those mo 'IJ9re not Congr-essmen or Congress supporters, but

also those. who did not accept C~ess methods). Be believed

that Sbol.apur and Ahloodabad represented the expectations that

had developed in the \'JElke o:r Congress taking of.fice, and so he

believed· this unrest would be controll.able ., I~ on the other

300

hand these ,_re indeed signs o:t the wealmess of Congress c antrol.

then he feared that the holding of o:C.fice would be detremental

to tba Congress, sal the situation WOUld have to be reviewed~ Howewr, Ccmgreas •a incapacity to represent various ·

interests, am the Ministry's taking recourse to repressiCil to

handle th1a fact, were fea'blrea 1Dcreasingl.y seen by Ga.mh1 as

being determi.ood by the refUsal of Congressmen to abide by non­

violent n&X"IDS. In his vie\t, this approo.ch jeopardized the

imperative at abiding by the terms of trust of British inten­

tions on which grouni the Ministry experiment ,,.as being carried

on~It also infri.Dged his own sense o:r cmstructive wcrk as a

practice which cOUl.d rder only to its own weaknesses, and should '

not seek the sources of its problems in causes outside 1 tseU,

such as the :functioning of the state.366

The intringement of these moral imperatives meant, in

political terms, that re09.loitrant elements would have to be

disciplined into {lccept.ing the methcds ar activity which ,_re

deemed correct, i.e. functioning within the legal s~ce that

the dacisicn to accept office bad brcught w5;th it.

To Nehru, 18 November 19371 ~ Vol.. LXVI, P• 297J •stea-m Signals•, Har1,1an• 20 Novembe--r-1937. ibid., PP• 300-1.

Thus he noted to the Bombay Governor, Turnley, tbit he :Celt that the British had been sincere 1n their re:rorms1 how­ever much he disagreed with t."le Acst. Interview, 1.:> May 1938. Ltnlitbgow MSS. F. 125/S.

In 1935. after Patel made a speech critical at the Govern­ment' O;lnihi noted: "We shOuld not criticise the Govern­ment s policy in tblt tone at the present time • • • 1 t is a time for intrropection, fc.u .. putting and keeping our house 1n order. ••" To .Eate1• 22 Aprll 1935, 9a:P, Vol. LX, P• 458.

301

Thus, when at the Daloutta session, severe criticism l!lflS

levelled against the ministries far failure to fully implement

the Congress programme of civil libert1ea,367 he .u aghast at

the "untruth al'ld vio:lence• which characterized the speeches ,368

So disturbed in fact was Oarxlhi that be actually envisaged the

Gandh1ana • res1gnat1cm !'rom the Working Comni ttee. 369 There

~s considerable acrimony 1n the committee, and from accounts

o:f the altercations, it is clear ttat the ministers had con­

vimed Ganihi that repressive methods had to be used in the

face at the v1 olence they claimed that left-wing ecngressmen j

were rescrting to, and it *B reported t.te t as a result the

Ministries had, been given .freedom to use the law to oontrol

such unreat,370

Gandhi now ~d to curtail or at least postpone his vision

of a non-repntssive, idea~ representativeness in the f'ace o:t

these oontlicts am because of the needs of the ministerial

369

370

Amongst the issues menticned were the arrest af fetli,ala, the continued detention of certain communists 1n Bombay, the arrest of' certain persons in U,P. for having proscri­bed 11 terature the faUure to separate executive am jusicial functlcms ot Government. A.ICC 6 aDi 45/1937.

The AICC,,Ha£1.1an• 13 November 1937, C!f:lG, Vol, LXVI, PP• 292-9 •

To Eatel, 1 November 1937, ibid,, PP• 285-86,

According to Jtlmshi a serious argument took. .1>lace between Kher and Nehru in rela t:lan to how to deal with labour trouble 1n Bombay al¥1 Kber emerged victorl~t claiming that he owld even usa emergency powers now u necessary. Lumley to Linllthgow• 9 November 1937• L1nl.1thgow MSS F. 125/5. A similar account of the CWC came f'rom the Madras Ministers. Erskine to L1nl.1thgow• 16 November 1937 Erskine Ms. D 596/2. See alao •Notes on the situation in the CCI'lgresa•. 20 November 1937t ibid. am R.M. Rlxwal.1,

302

experiment. When CR was bitterly criticised for his use of

the Cr1mSnal l.aw Amendment Act, for example, he urged that ttthe

obnoxious clauses• be repealed, but accepted a\'a decl.arations

that the Act •conta!Ds a ~ev sectitllS which suit the new situa­

tion that the C<Dgreaa is ~ao~ •••• ' 71 However, 1t acceptance

o:r the legal. space and its logic l!ElS one aspect of Ga.r:dhi •s

relati<m. to the new situation, his and the Right Wing.'.s prin:Bry

means to ensure that the obsen-at!on at legality was ensured

l.&S through canaolldating inner party control.

Be£ore the October AICX:, Ge.nihi urged Patel to get control

over the "turbulent wind that 1s blowingtl.372 And 1D:lependent­

ly, the Right Win& J~Jere preparing to do 'tlla. In September, '•

Patel canplained to' Rajendr8 Prasad about the activities of

communists !n Bombay • Shol.apur, Kan:pur and Cal.cutta and of K1san

Sabha :t\inct1on1.~ in Bihar, Maharashtra and Andhl"aJ he felt tbat

an attempt -s be !ng made by these groUps to discredit tlle C ong­

ress Ministries by putting f~~ extravagant denams. 373 He

noted that he had al\t6ys been against the fannation o:r the Kisan

sabha because· of the inevitable rivalry tblt wou.ld develop bet­

ween the two, am ..nich in turn would result in the erasion at

311

372

373

nOn the relaticnship between Congress Ministries and the Congress n., 21 November 19371 ibid •

f!lri.1Nb 10 September 19;)8, cytp. Vol. LXVII, P• 328.

To Patel. before 9 October 1937'. CJtp, Val. LXVI, P• 213,

H~~l to RaJ~ndra Prasad, 22 September 1937 • Ra.jeiXira Frasad MS_ II./-,7/coU.4.

303

Congress prestige. In ract he believed tblt this crganisa.tion

was e!!ectively trying to displ.ace the Congress am urged that

this issue be faced at the calcutta Aicc.374

Patel was pointing to the divergences tblt seemecl inevi•

table 1n the ciro\IIStance&, i.e., in terms o! the pitching ~

denania beyond the point where they were negotiable 1n ~rms of "

the possibillties ..of lcgisl&tion tll'lC.er the Act. Ckl. the atber

ham, Patel's opinion that this lMllS an attempt to displace the

Congress exprensed an exclusivist ncrtion a! what the mtionalist

orgard~tion ;,,as, ar..d of the methods it should pursue.

1be n:sul.t ~ these growing divergences was a cocrdinated

attempt to organise the G-'lndhian elements to defeat the le£t­

wingers in t..,_e f'Zlrip.;xra elee'tians in order to ensure tblt their

min1ster1. <J.l ztrategy tr1umphed.375 This effcrt bore fruit at

374 Patel to Rajenlra Prasad, 2 October 1937, ibid.

Y/5 In November Patel. wrote to Rajendra Prasad that if the office acceptance experiment "t.&S to be a success 1 t was imperative to organise their !c.rces so as to dominate the AICC at lilripura and after. To Rajendra Prasad • 21 Novem­ber 1937. Hajendra Prasad tiJSS III/37/ooll..S. Rajemra Prascd respcnded pocitiwly (25 .NO'tember 1937 • lbW am wrote to the Biblr Premier, s.K. Sinha to organise their follOWGrs. He noted that at the Calcutta AICC session

_ thCI6e holding to Gandhi's Jrograllllle decided to crge.ni.se themselves am that at a meeting o! the Gandhi Seva Sallgh it was decided tb.a t the Gandhians should not allow the Congress orga.nj.sntion to slip out o! their hams. Rajendra irasad emphasized that whlle e:very ef!ort had to be made to secure the success of the Gandhian programme, he did not 1llllnt a:n.y advantage taken ty those already entrenched in positions cf power. The main aim \\1Bs tor the Gandh1an group to submerge confliot amongst themselves and to stase a clear-cut conte3t with the soc !a lists. To S .K. Sim. • 2 Decen:1ber 1937, Rajendra Prasad Pti- XV/37/coll.2. See also Raje!l.dra Prasad to R.a~ya.J..u Sinhl, 7 December 1937 • ibid., for sind.l.ar ;instructions. Munshi bUd e.l.so infanned Lumley that n right-wing soJ.idari~.l had been ~onned t;o contest the

304

Haripura. In most o! the PCC elections, except Kerala, where

the socialists secured one third of the seats, the Gandh1ans

secured a najarity. In the delegates• elections the left-wing

presence liiU sign1!1cant but nowhere domimnt. In ADihra

socialists secured 8 out ot 29 seats, in Bihar 5 oot at 36.m Even in u.P. a Right Wing leader, Momnlal saxena, ~s Presi­

dent ~ the FCC in 1938.371 However, those victories were nat

always as cleanly fought as ~1c Right Wing desired, and in

Bihar 1n particuJ.ar, i:ni'luence .Ll ·!;;.he di&tricts ani in the

party was used. by :local. Right Winti candidates, along with brute

farce. to gain thei4" ends.370

_ Insp1te ol' domtranca ill ·tL.e party by the time of the

Baripl.l.ra sessi0l11 cv ~~ricus a:t·ta.:..pt to emorce ciiscipline ~s

undertaken throughout 1938. Inst<3ad tll6 Rightists issued we.rn­

illgs against wmt tr~y deemed disruptive activity, as in the

case of th& resolution ou t::le K.i.s.:ln .3abha at Iilrlpura,379 and

in the repr~uding oi' Z.A • . \~1 R.K. Lohia and K.M. Ashraf,

J.e.tt-willg secz·e·wries oi: tllii ~..rcc, i:or not :raithfully represent­

ing the Q!:t:icia:l Congress line •380 It seems that there \..S.S an

Ccnt•d •• t .n. 315

elections. Linlithgow to Zetl.~nd, 16 December 1937, Lln­~ithgow rr~ L'ur. F. 12.5/4. For :turther details of Right Wing mob111satian see Patel. to Rajendra Prasad 12 Decem­bar, 16 December 1937. Rajemra Prasad IwS. II,37/coll.2.

376 FRa (1) am (2). January 1938.

377 S~e ab~, Section 3.3.2.

376 Se;,e above section 3.1-.2.

379 Zaidi. 1$mY2J.QpaE!cl.ifl ot :WCt VOl.. Xl• -PP• ~~;;g.

380 AICC 59/37.

305

occasion a demand for disciplinary action,381 but even in

September 1938, at the AICC session in Delhi, ins pi te of the

grotd.ng tension that had developed as a result of agrarian

con:flicta in Amhra am Bihar, am the labour movement in BOm­

bay._ the civil liberties reso1ut1on moved by Gandhi li!BS :timlly

onl.y a \tf!ilrning against class and camm.mal violence and an asser­

tion ot Congress "support to measures that may be umertaken by

the Congress Governments for the defence o:f l.i.fe and property. n382

As we have shown, the Delhi resolution did in practice

lead to PCCs in Arxihra and U.P. rul.ing that disciplinary action

WOUld be taken against Ccagressmen who participated in satya­

grabl without PCC sanction.383 And, as Sumarayya bld noted,

when Gan:lhi made a re:rerence to the case of the Kal.ipatnam

satyagra.ha to censure Congressmen for encour:-aging the usurpa­

tion of l.andlcrd •s property, he was not aware of the background

and of the tenants' rights ani accaroing to Suzxiarayya, his

statement encouraged the land1ards.384 This b11nkered view,

even w1 thin the terms of legal rights, indicated a biased a tti-

382

The we meeting of May vas reported to haw voted :r or disciplinary action for releasing press statements with­out the prior approval ot the General Secretary, but no resolution was passed, lev Chrcniir• 18 *11938, p. 1. It liB& later re:ptll" that Lo a, secretary ot the AICC Fcreign r»partment, bad pro:t'erred his resigna­tion, but the we would not accept it. Bombax Chron.1.c1e, 21 September 19391 P• 1.

Resolution for AICC, dre.:rted by Gandtd, be:fare 23 septem­ber 1938. QiMG, Vol. LXVII, P• 368.

See above, 3.1.2 and 3.3.2.

Sundarayya, "lSmimari Aggression 1n Alxlhra", Natiozp.l f£9R.:£, 1• 35t 16 October 19381 P• 11.

306

tude to agrarian conflict.

However, the distinction between ~ni.ng ani outright

disciplinary action is not irrelevant. The Right-Wing li!BS in

control o~ the party during 1938, but refrained tram exercising

discipl :lnary action to make Congressmen conform to the diatates

~ the ministerial situation. They only rescrted to such action

by June 1939, when the A!CC p3.ssed a resolution prohibiting

satyagraha without the prior permission of the PCC concerned. 3~5

It could be argued that such disciplinary action \1119.S being

taken by allowing law and order to run its norJJBl course • Arr­

ests did seem to ~ve deterred the Malabar peasant movement but

we haw noted, in that instance, that the socialists pursued a

restrained policy in handling unrest. 386 In Kalipatnam and

Munagala, arrests had not tmdermined the movement, and in :ract

the PCC had interceded to resolve the issue.387 In Bihar too,

the bak&sht movement had been undaunted by such modes a£ control.

And interestingly, arrests did not always preclude continued

involvement. Thus, in the negotiations relating to the settle­

ment ,af'l.~the Barahiya Tal ag11a tion in Monghyr, Karyanam Sbirma

'AflS transferred to a nearly jaU •o that he could be included

in the mediation. 388 Am sipUicantly, while the B~C had, 1n

385

386

387

388

see bel~, Chapter 5.

see above 3.1.2.

See above 3.1.2.

K.B. Sahay and Saha.janarxl negotiated with Sharma in jail• and he agreed to help in arbitration. The Government agreed to provide .tac111 ties .tar this but would not re­lease him. S~mnandan S!Dba, K.A to Yajn:l.k, 25 May 1939, Yajnik MS F. 11(2). Sblrma \\68 then trans.terred to

307

January 1939, disallowed DCCS :trom participating in satyagrabl

witha.rt its permission, 389 individual participation was not

disallowed. Rajendra Prasad }resided over thia meeting.390

It appears that even U Gandhi aDi the Right Wing believed

that extra-constitutional action had to be halted in the given

circumstances of Congress occupying ministries, they did not

put the weight of their pO\ver behir.rl the enforcement of this

position. They censured, repY'1manded ani warned Congressmen

that they should conform to legal activity. They bad. entrenched

their control over the party in 1938 but did not use this to

control direct action. '!bat their resolutions did lead to such

efforts is an inadeqUlte critericn to characterise their pollcy.

It is likely th:lt the popular mture of direct action

initiatives acted as a barrier to enforcement of a monolithic

strategy at the sort that CR bad desired, and which not even

he ...as able to implement. While the Right Wing's evaluaticm of

the politioal circumstances caused them to view direct action

as a threat, in practice they .frum it d1£ficul.t to act deciSi­

vely against it. Given that they cOUld for a long period

couutenance this duality of method, it would perhaps not be

inaccurate to hazard that it WlS their own non-constitutioral.

approach to politics that enabled them to adopt thiS attitude.

eont•d •• t .n. 388

Mongb¥r jail. AIKB, 9 Jtma 19391 Yajnik MS ~ • 15.

389 See above 3.2.2.

390 "Lal¥1 to the Tlllers", C0!!£!1! Sgci!].1ata 4,2,29 June 1939t PP• 1-2.

Ultimately, in Jtme 1939, they took decisive action, but

the circumstances were more complex tb:ln is immediately appa­

rent. The Bose victory at Tripuri bid revealed a significarxt

discordance that was only part1all.y related to left-wing anti•

pathy to miniateriaJ. pQlicy. The incoherence ~ the opposition . ~---------- - --- -------

suggested that Gandhi's growing .fear or corropt1on in the party

bad some basis.391 But if strict control was related to this,

it must also be related to a desire to control the enJ.arged

dimensions that direct action had acquired 1n 1939, especially

in Bihar.

Nevertheless, if we now take an overview of the policy o:f

the n;ltionalist leadership in this period the picture suggested I

is one of strategy as a resultant. Although the 1eadership

deemed it necessary to curtail extra-parliamentary action ar

the order of satyagraha, they could not do so. AiJ a result,

there developed a co-existence o.f forms for the larger ~rt af

the C<mgress min1str1es ' li.fe.

391 See below, Chapter 5.