1 the “grand paris” transport project: beliefs, dead ends, and governance problems j.p. orfeuil...

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The “Grand Paris” transport project: beliefs, dead ends, and

governance problems

J.P. Orfeuil

Université Paris Est

Rsa second seminar

Governing metropolitan regions, 2013

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1982-2007 A decentralization process

• This process leads to give the responsibility of local and regional networks (investment, operations) to local / regional authorities

• They will « do the job »: restriction of the access of the car to the central city (Paris municipality), land use planning and new transport investment in a long term view (region Sdrif)

• Dominance of « environmental justification »

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2007: the government diagnosis

The (new) central government opposes the regional land use project: insufficient

consideration for areas of major economic importance such as La Defense, Saclay, Airport

linksThe capital region, a world city, is viewed as loosing international influence in relation to a lack of ambition and insufficient consideration

for the “metropolitan idea”

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2007

Some support on the government diagnosis:• From experts on the metropolitan dimension

(a too “localist” project; Ascher, Davezies, …)

• From residents, due to lack of progress in the quality of service of the current PT system

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The principle of the regional project

• A careful (and long) working out with multiple stakeholders, including every municipality, attention paid to every detail, but global ambition unclear.

• A result which is hardly readable

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The image of the planned PT by the region: unreadable

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Exemple(several such pages)

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The principle of the government project:

No concertation at all. A small staff working in secret during 6 months

Immediate perception of the ambition, guaranteed emotional reaction,

Associated with a remarkable story telling Esthetics

No need to go through rationality processEvaluation through seduction more than through

public participation

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The first version of the government project (Grand Huit) in the media: clear and

ambitious.

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(Portzamparc)

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With a remarkable story telling

• A quick transport network (150 km) opening the opportunities of urban development and serving current or future clusters

“No more than 30 mn between 2 points of the region”!• Financed by private money (on the growth of the

land values)• Contracts for operations not necessarily to “historic

operators”• A development through a specific company, the

“Greater Paris company”

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And, following the “Flyjvberg” rule

“Underestimated costs + overestimated benefits

=

project approval”

A great fantasy on these topics, without any reference to an independent evaluation

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Which will prove to be a fairy tale very soon

• A million more jobs in relation to the project: no evidence…

• Private funding: it will be marginal only, new taxes (mainly on companies) will be the solution

• The monopoly of RATP historical operator will be guaranteed by law

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A tight commitment of the government

• A ministry dedicated to the project• Who tries (and succeeds) to get the

agreement of local authorities in the back of the regional one

• A specific law• And specific resources, given that the

recuperation of land values growths proves to be a mirage

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At the end of 2010, a large public debate on the regional (Arc express) and government

projects (Reseau de transport du Grand Paris.

2 key “messages” from the public

• 1 We want a current system which works This is the first priority

• 2 Agree with each other (region+government) on a common new project

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The answer of the authorities

Tha authorities speak of a compromize, a synthesis, but actually the “gentlement agreement” named “Grand Paris Express” is an addition à the projects.

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The final political agreement between the government and the regional authority: adding everything because the only key

issue for policy makers is not to lose face.

• Yes, the existing network will be improved

• Yes, the “Grand Paris” network will be built

For a total of 32,4 billion euros from now to 2025

With a usage fee for the operator which will not exceed 0,8 % of the total investment value

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The map of the historical agreement(january 2011)

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The map as in may 2011

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Where are we now?The project is kept, but…

The end of the fairy tale: no government money…

And a (first) reevaluation of costs by 50 %

(Auzannet report)

Impossible to realize the project in 2025 as anticipated…

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Where are we now?

• Every local authority tries to save the parts of the project for which it is the more concerned

• (not to lose face again)• Nor “Paris metropole”, a federative structure,

nor the region are in a position to define the priorities

• Even some “technical solutions”, such as the adaptation of the supply to the predicted demand, are rejected, for reasons of “dignity”

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Have we progressed in infrastructure appraisal?

We keep the myth of infrastructures as always supporting the economic development

(in that case Spain should be the best European economy)

without any reference to the funding structure (the current system needs 6 billion euros to support operation each year) and more generally to the infostructure (for example a unique fare in the Paris region versus the Oyster card in London

produce quite different economic effects)

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Have we progressed in our knowledge of what is a metropolitan area ?

Speed (if by PT)

remains considered as globally positive, even though we know better and better that it has

both positive and negative effects: it contributes to concentration effects on jobs, unbalanced development , segregation, etc.

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Have we progressed in our knowledge of what is a metropolitan area ?

If we consider that a metropolitan area is a place where interdependences between

territories and between sectors (lodging, economic activities, urban renewal, etc.) are higher than elsewhere, then a speed

policy should be designed in order to achieve the aims to in these domains, and for that aim the faster and cheaper is not

necessarily the better

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An example to end: fare structure and compact city

project

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Fare structures in favor of long commuting

0

5

10

15

20

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2z 3 z 4 z 5 z 6 z

Coût / km

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Public support to long distance commuting

2 zones: around 800 euros / year

6 zones: environ 5200 euros / year

Yes, in France, there is such a thing as free lunch!

Can we promote “compact city that way?

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Thanks for your attention.