amie thomasson the ontology of art and knowledge in aesthetics

7/27/2019 Amie Thomasson the Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics

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The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics

Author(s): Amie L. ThomassonSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer, 2005), pp. 221-229Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3700526

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AMIE L. THOMASSON

The Ontologyof ArtandKnowledgein Aesthetics

The ontology of art has provided one of therichest areas of discussion in recent aesthetics,yielding a variety of carefully articulatedandwell-argued positions about the ontologicalstatusof works of music,literature,venpaintingandsculpture. n some ways the varietyof posi-tions seems to be an embarrassment f riches,for it is not clear how we are to decide amongthese apparently mutually incompatible andoften surprisingviews aboutwhether works ofart of some or all kinds are physical objects,abstractobjects, action types, and so on. Inother respects, work on the ontology of artseems to be embarrassingly mpoverished,forthereseemsto be no natural ndnonarbitraryayof answeringotherquestionsin the ontology ofart, such as how many mistakes a performermay make and yet still perform a work ofmusic;how muchrestorationa workof paintingor sculpturemay survive;oreven what the exactcriteriaare forcreatinga work of literature.If we hope to resolve these questions anddecide amongthe competingtheories,we muststep back from the particulardebates about thestatus or identityconditionsof a given kind ofwork to address ssues in meta-ontology,particu-larly as appliedto issues in the ontology of art.What are we doing when we argue about theontologicalstatus of works of art?What are theproper methods and criteria of success to beused in answering and evaluating answers tothese questions?What kinds of answers can welegitimately expect and demand in questionsabout the ontology of art?An influentialparadigm f what t is to acquireknowledge has come from a certain (perhapsnaive) view of how the natural sciences andotherempiricalinvestigationswork. Accordingto this paradigm-call it the discovery view-

the worldcontainsa broadrangeof fully deter-minate, mind-independentfacts about whicheveryonemaybe ignorantor in error,but (someof) which the scientistseeks to discoverby sub-stantive empirical investigations. Thus, oneacquires knowledge about, say, the biologicalnature of whales by ostensively applying theterm 'whale' to this kind of thing and under-taking substantive empirical investigationsabout them (their internal structure,genetics,etc.) in order to discover the real truth aboutwhales' biological nature,which may overturnour common-senseviews about hem.Moreover,on this view, thereis a complete rangeof mind-independent acts to be discovered,so that,forany empiricalpropositionP we could formulateaboutwhales, eitherP or not-P is the case; theonly challengelies in discoveringwhich.So, similarly,knowledgeclaims in the ontol-ogy of art areoften presentedas discoveries offully determinate,mind-independentacts aboutthe ontologicalstatusof worksof artof variouskinds,aboutwhicheveryonemaybe ignorantorin error-so that we shouldnot be surprised fthe "right" iew turnsout to be that works of artare discoveredrather hancreated,action-typesrather than objects, and so on, and so thatwe may rightly demand that theories provideprecise answers to any questions we care toinvent about, for example, the creation,survival,and identityof works of art.I am notconcernedhere to either defend or attack thisdiscovery view of knowledge, but rather toargue that-whatever its merits as an under-standingof scientificor otherempirical nvesti-gations-thinking of the process of acquiringknowledge about the ontology of art on thatmodel (as, I think,many have been inclined todo) leadsus badlyastray.

The Journal f AestheticsandArtCriticism 3:3 Summer 005


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The Journalof AestheticsandArtCriticismThis paper, then, is an exercise in meta-ontology,as appliedto issues in the ontologyofart,designedto examinewhatit is we aredoing

whenwe formulateheoriesabout heontologyofart,howwe canadjudicate mongcompeting he-ories,andwhatthe limitsof knowledgeare n thisarea.In fact,the pointsto be madeseem to havequite generalapplication o much of what goesunder he headingof "ontology"bothinside andoutside of aesthetics.Thus here as elsewhere,Ithink hatcarefulstudyof issues in aestheticscanlead to progressn otherareasof philosophy.Nonetheless, the ontology of art provides aparticularly sefulcase study,since(I will argue)issues come to prominence here that mightotherwise be overlooked. The consequencesofrejectingthe discoverymodel of knowledgeforontological issues are also particularly mpor-tantfor aestheticssince this is an areain whichdebates about the ontological status of theobjectsconcerned(worksof art)play a promin-ent role, with most beginning from thepresumptionthat there are such objects, theonly issue being what sorts of things they are.As a result,the field is flooded with all mannerof diverse, and often revisionary, proposalsaboutthe ontological statusof works of art,aswell as attempts o answer all sorts of questionabout works' identity, creation, and survival.A properunderstandingof what we are doingin the ontology of art,I will argue,can lead usto reevaluate this whole ontological side ofdiscoursein aesthetics.

I. THEONTOLOGYOF ARTThe discovery view of knowledge is bolsteredby causal theories of reference, which ensurethatwe have some independentway of pickingoutkinds like whalesorgold (e.g., by ostendinga sample),so thatwe may thengo on to investi-gate theirtruenature,which may turnout to beat odds with ourconceptsor initialpresupposi-tions. But the qua problemhas made it clearthat this sort of view has crucial limitations.2For any sample will include entities of a greatmany kinds-physical, chemical, biological,functional,and so forth-so that without somedisambiguatingconcept specifying the sort ofkind to be picked out, we cannot unambigu-ously groundreferenceto anykind.

In fact, althoughcausal theories of referencehave most often been discussed with naturalkinds in view, the full virulence of the quaproblembecomes evidentonly when we recog-nize that our generaltermsmay name not onlydiverse naturalscientific kinds, but also socialand culturalkinds, so that in a single situation,would-be groundersof a general term may beconfronted with members of a great manykinds: physical and chemical kinds involvingthe kind of canvas paintedon or the chemicalstructureof the paints used; observable kindslike red thing or square thing, which allmay exemplify; institutionalkinds like objectworth more than $1,000 or entry in the FirstAnnual OceanBankYoungArtist'sCompetition,and so on.This places at least some constraints on acausal theoryof referenceand on the possibil-ities for discovery: at least some frame-leveldisambiguating concept must be involved tostipulate he kind of kindbeingnamed,by speci-fying the sorts of feature(physical, biological,chemical, etc.) that are to be relevantto unify-ing the kind. As a result, to disambiguate,groundersof the reference of a term such as'whale' must,forexample,intend t as a biolog-ical kind (species) term,and so cannotdiscoverthemselves to have been wrong about this(though they can discover that there is no bio-logical kind before them and so discover thattheir term does not refer).3Nonetheless, theycan still discover much about the precise bio-logical natureof theirkind, for example,thatitis a kind of mammal, not fish, that a certainDNA structure s essential to it, that it evolvedin certainways, and so on. As a result,the con-straintsat most appeararound he edges, andsoit seems that the discovery theory can, by andlarge,be retained or cases of empiricalknowl-edge aboutthe kinds referred o.But can the discovery theory nonethelesslargelybe retained or issues of ontology,allow-ing, for example, for surprising discoveriesabout the ontological status of works of art ofvarious sorts (say, that works of art arediscovered not created, that sculptures areaction-types, hatworks of musiccannotbe tran-scribed,norpaintingsrestored,etc.), parallelingsurprisingempiricaldiscoveries aboutwhales?I will arguethatit cannot-indeed that a carefulstudy of the ontology of art suggests that the

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Thomasson TheOntologyofArt andKnowledge n Aestheticsdiscoverytheory s nowhereplausibleas appliedto ontological(as opposedto empirical) ssues.I argued elsewhere that the disambiguatingconception of the sort of kind involved ingrounding he referenceof art-kind ermsmustinclude a nascent concept of the ontologicalstatus of the kinds of work involved.4 As aresult, at least a backgroundconcept of theontologyof thework of art s needed to establishthe reference of terms like 'painting'or 'sym-phony.'Suchconceptsdetermine heontologicalkind, if any, picked out by the term,and so theontology of the work of art must be somethingwe learn about throughconceptual analysis ofthe associatedconcepts of people who compe-tently ground (and reground)the reference ofterms ike 'symphony'and 'painting,'not some-thingwe can seek to discoverthrough nvestiga-tions into mind-independent eality. Moreover,competent grounderscannot (as a whole) bemassively ignorantof or in erroraboutthe onto-logical natureof the art-kind hey refer to sincetheir concepts are determinativeof this. Thuswould-be groundershave some forms of epi-stemicprivilegeregarding he ontologicalstatusof the art-kinds if any) they refer to thatevery-one lacksregarding, ay, thebiologicalnatureofwhales orthechemicalnatureof soy protein.Therehas, however,been a lot of discussionof similarissues for the case of artifactsgener-ally, some of which mightform the basis for aninterestingreply to this line of thought.In Sec-tion I.i I will show how one might develop suchan objection, and then in Section I.ii I willattemptto demonstratewhy this sort of objec-tion ultimatelyfails to undermine he idea thatfacts aboutthe ontology of paintings, sympho-nies, novels, and so forth (and indeed factsaboutontology generally)aredeterminedby thebeliefs and practicesof those who groundtheuse of the term. In SectionsII and III I will thengo on to consider some consequences of thisconclusion for methods of knowledge acquisi-tion andthe limits of possible knowledgeaboutthe ontologyof art.

i. Direct ReferenceTheoriesandArt-KindTermsHilaryKomblithhas argued hatartifactual-kindterms functionin ways parallelto natural-kind

terms, since, for example, Martiananthropolo-gists could simplypointat a sampleof apparentearth artifactsandcoin a term 'glug' to refer tothat kindof thing, therebyestablishingreferenceto an artifactualkind even thoughthe Martianswho coin the term may have no idea what thenatureof that artifactualkind is.5 Nonetheless,to overcome the qua problem and establish'glug' as a would-be artifactual kind term(rather han as a would-bephysical-,chemical-,or biological-kindterm), the Martians must atleast associate the term with some sort of kind(e.g., artifactualkind), with a broadconcept ofwhat sorts of featuresare relevant to member-ship in a kind of that sort as opposed to thosefeatures relevant to membership in, forexample, a given chemical kind. Korblithseems to acceptthis, and takesthe relevantsortsof features or artifactual indsto be functional.(Othershave arguedagainstthe view that func-tionalfeaturesare what arerelevant o artifactual-kindmembership.)7One might try to argue, analogously, thatthose who would ground he referenceof an art-kind term may do so merely by pointing to asample (say, of objects from a very differentculture)and coining a termfor works of art ofthat kind. But again, to do so, such would-begroundersmust at least have some base-levelconceptionof whatsortof kind an art-kinds, andwhat sorts of featuresarerelevant to belongingto the same art-kind (as opposed to thoserelevant to belonging to the same chemical-,biological-, orphysical-kind).What general sort(s) of feature(s) could beappealedto in orderto unify objects into art-kinds suchas paintings,symphonies,or novels?Clearly no common chemical, physical, orbiological features are necessary or sufficientfor membership n such kinds. Nor is commonfunction a plausible way of delineating art-kinds, since, for example, works of music maybe created to serve (and may actually serve)manydifferent unctions,ornone. Resemblanceis also not aplausibledemarcatingeature,sinceeverything resembles everything in so manyways that this is useless as a unifying criterionwithoutspecifyingthe sorts of resemblance hatare relevant to belonging to the same art-kind.But the sort of resemblance that is relevantseems to vary by art-kind(e.g., visual resem-blance being relevant to paintings but not to

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The Journalof Aestheticsand ArtCriticismworks of literature),and so seems to presupposeratherthan aid in demarcating hese basic art-kinds.

Onecommonfeature hatseems to distinguishmembers of any art-kind,or any artifactual-kind, from mere members of natural kinds isbeing the product of human intentions. Theproductsof humanactivities may of course beclassified andreferred o in anynumberof ways(economically, causally, physically, etc.). Butcentralways of classifying them as artifactsofparticular kinds involve classifying themaccording o the intentions nvolved in their cre-ation(rather hanaccordingto theirphysical orchemical structure,etc.). Thus Paul Bloom hassuggested that the core of artifactconcepts isthe idea that,in each case, the thingswere suc-cessfully created with the intention that theybelong to that very (artifactual) kind; forexample, somethingis a chair only if it is theproductof a successfulintention o make a chair(as opposedto beinga fortuitously haped ree).8Similarly, one promisingproposal is that atleast one sort of feature necessary to unifyobjects into such art-kinds such as paintings,symphonies,andnovels is thattheybe theprod-ucts of the same sorts of intentions (namely,intentions to make somethingof thatkind).9Itdoes seem apt to say that somethingis a paint-ing only if it is the productof an intention tomake a painting(as opposedto the mere unin-tendedbyproducton adropcloth of a processofpaintingwalls), and thatsomething s a work ofmusic only if it is the productof an intentiontomake a work of music (thus distinguishingthenormal sound of people adjustingradios fromthatcomprisinga performanceof Cage's 1956"RadioMusic").On this view, an artist's inten-tions would determine what sort of work (ifany) he or she creates-for example,whether adance or a paintingis being createdby certainmovements thatinvolve the spreadof pigments,therebyalso determiningwhich of its featuresare essential (e.g., having roughlythis arrange-ment of pigments), and which accidental(e.g.,having been createdby way of roughly thesegestures). (This, of course, does not entail thatan artist's intentions to create a work of acertain kind always succeed, or that an artist'sintentionsdetermine heproper nterpretationrvalue of his or her work, or the style or valuekinds to which it belongs.)

For this proposalto be plausible, we wouldhave to allow thatintendingto make somethingof the relevant kind does not requirethat allmakershave use of the same word, or thattheymust be able to refer back transparentlytoextant members of the kind. We would alsoneed to allow that intentional creation mayinvolve only intentionalselection andappropri-ation rather than constructingor reshapinganobject. But it seems plausible enough thatintendingto create a chairby appropriating ndnot changing anything about this stump, orintendingto create a sculptureby appropriatingand not alteringthis piece of plumbing, is anact of intentional creation just as, on AlvinGoldman's view, negations of basic act-types(e.g., intentionallynotraisingone's handduringa vote) are also act-types.l? So understood,being created with the same sort of intentiondoes seem plausibleas at least a necessarycon-dition forentities to belongin the sameart-kind.But can one then establish the referenceof anart-kind term semi-ostensively as "whateverwas createdwith the same sort of intentionasthis was" and go on to investigate the onto-logical status of members of the kind (aboutwhich all speakersmaybe ignorantor in error)?ii. TheNeedfor an Ontological ConceptionNo-even if one accepts all of the above,grounders till cannot establishthe referenceofan art-kindterm with no furtherconcept thanthat(or even thanthatplus resemblanceamongkind members), and go on to investigate thekind's ontological status. For "being createdwith the same sort of intention" s not specificenough to disambiguateamongthe manyonto-logically different sorts of thing that may bepresentbefore grounders,and so the qua prob-lem arises again and prevents would-begroundersfrom establishing a univocal refer-ence for their term if that is all they have inmind.To see this, consider the analogous case ofaction-kinds-for, as has often been noted,there aremanysimilaritiesbetween actionsandartifacts,as both are (in a sense) productsofhuman intentions.11Just as actions performedmay be layeredso that one may intendto raiseone's hand, and also intend to thereby cast

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Thomasson TheOntologyofArtandKnowledge n Aestheticsa vote for a particularbill, so may artifacts(among them works of art) be layered so thatone may intend to create a particularmusicalperformanceand therebyto also create a new(repeatable)musicalwork,or intendto performan act of storytelling and also intendtherebytocreate a certainliterarywork.12Similarly, onemay intendto createthreepaintingsandtherebyto create an altarpiece, or intend to writetwenty-seven installmentsfor a magazine andtherebyto create a novel. Thus it is not neces-sarilyor even normallythe case that,in a givencontext, a would-be grounderof an action-kindterm has members of exactly one action-kindbefore him or her, or that a would-be grounderof an art-kind ermhas members of exactlyoneart-kindbefore him or her.On the contrary, t isentirelytypical that an artist ntends to createasong by playing a tuneor a triptychby paintingthreepanels.Suppose a would-be grounderof an action-kind termis standingbefore a bunch of peoplein a field andpointsto one of themsaying "thatkind of action I will call zaybing." Such anattempted grounding is hopeless since it isentirelyambiguouswhich of the many types of(intended) actions the person is performing(say, moving his or her right arm, touchinganotherperson, tagging someone, making an"out,"helpinghis or her team to win the game,etc.) is beingnamed; t is even ambiguouswhenthe supposedsampleaction of thattype beginsand ends (taken over a longer spreadof time,relevantactionscould includeplayingbaseball,passing the time on a Sunday afternoon,improvingone's athletic skills, etc.) Similarly,without a furtherconceptionthan "workof artlike this," t will remainambiguouswhichof themany intended art-kinds instanced before awould-be grounder(each of which may havestrong internalresemblancesamong members)the termrefers to.So it seems that in order to unambiguouslygroundthe reference of a generalterm to namea kind of work of art, the groundermust notonly have the idea that the reference of his orhertermwill be an art-kind,but must also havea backgroundconception of what ontologicalsort of art-kindhe or she meansthetermto referto, establishingexistence conditions and iden-tity conditionsfor works of thatkind. Such anontological conception then disambiguates

potential reference by determining the onto-logical kind referred o by the art-kind erm(if itsucceeds in referringat all), establishing, forexample,whether he relevantart-kind s to be akind of activityor object,a concreteindividualor the abstractpatternexemplifiedby thesecon-crete individuals, and establishing where awork's spatial and/or temporalboundaries lieand the conditions under which one and thesame worksurvives.

Having such a background conception ofcoursedoes notrequire hatspeakers or makers)have detailedandsophisticatedontologicalcon-cepts in mind when they attempt to refer topaintings, songs, or stories. Normally, suchontologicaldisambiguations achievednot by aphilosophicaland explicit decision on the partof groundersaboutwhattheirterm will referto,but ratherby appeal to background practicesalreadyin place that co-evolve with the use ofthe art-kind erm.Thus,whetherwe are intend-ing to refer to a concreteor abstract ndividualis linked to factors like whether we consider itessential to go to a particularplace at a giventime to see the work of art (as, e.g., we do forpaintings but not for works of literature).Whetherwe intendto refer to an activity or anobjectis similarly inkedto whether t is appro-priate to ask, for example, when the workoccurs,begins, or ends (as is suitable for playsand musical performances,but not sculptures).Whatlevel of work is intendedis expressedbypracticesregarding,for example, whether it ispossible to physically move, buy, or sell thework, or only to buy or sell, for example, per-formance or reproductionrights, and whetherwe would count the work as destroyedif someparticularphysical object were destroyed.Theextent and limits of the object are similarlyreflected in practices such as when we arriveand when we clap, and what is and is notproperlyremarkedupon in reviewing the work(e.g., commentson theframeordirtyback of thecanvasaretreatedas inappropriateo reviewinga workof traditionalpainting,andcommentsonthe drinksavailableat intermissionare treatedasinappropriateo reviewinga play).Such backgroundpractices thus embody atacit ontological conception of what sorts ofthings works of that kind are, which (under-stood by grounders)disambiguatesthe refer-ence of the relevantkind term, and determines

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TheJournalof Aestheticsand Art Criticismontological featuresof the membersof the kind(if any) picked out by the term.These featuresmay then be drawn out in more formalphilo-sophicaltheoriesof the ontology of the workofart-explicitly describing, for example, theirrelevant formal category (object, event, etc.),existence conditions and relations to humanintentions ndphysicalobjectsandprocesses,andtheirboundaries nd ndividuationonditions.13The need for an ontological conception todisambiguate the potential reference of ourtermsseems to be quite general,for wheneveragrounderattempts o establishthereferenceof aterm, there will in fact be a great many onto-logical kinds of thing available for reference,frombiologicalindividuals, o collections of par-ticles, to abstract ypes, createdtypes, qualities,events, and so on. For reference to be estab-lished, we must disambiguateamong them. Ifso, then it is not just for art-kind erms,but forall terms,thatgrounders'conceptsestablish theontologicalstatusof the referent if any)of theirnew term. Nonetheless, this general point hasoftenbeen overlooked.This can be attributed tleast in part,I think,to the fact thatdiscussionsof causaltheories of referencehave largelybeenundertakenwith ratherprecise sorts of natural-kind termsin mind,for example, species terms,chemical-kindterms, andthe like. These termsare each specific enough that they are alreadyuniquely associated with background onto-logical assumptions that provide the neededdisambiguationamong the diverse ontologicalkinds present in a groundingsituation,and sothe specific role played by ontological concep-tions is easily missed. But if we considerinsteadart-kind erms,it becomes obvious thatto disambiguate eference, t is essential that wenot just associate our term with some or othersortofkindsupposed obe named e.g., art-kind),butwith anontologicalconceptionthatprovidesat least some of the necessarydisambiguation.Studyingart-kinderms s thusparticularly elp-ful, since it helps reveal the role of specificallyontologicalconceptions n establishingreferencewherethismightotherwisebe overlooked.

II. EPISTEMICAND METHODOLOGICAL ONSEQUENCESIf the above is somethinglike the rightaccountof what determines the ontological status of

worksof art of variouskinds, then studyof theontology of art (indeed, of ontology generally)cannotproceedalong the discoverymodel withwhich we began.We cannot discover the onto-logical status of paintings, symphonies, ornovels first by referringdirectlyto this kindofthing and then investigating ts trueontologicalnature. Instead, the background ontologicalconception of groundersdetermines the onto-logical status of members of the art-kindreferred o by the term(if the term refers at all).The ontological status of paintings, sympho-nies, or works of literature s thus not somethingwe can discover by investigations into themind-independentworld; instead,we must fol-low the method of analyzing the conceptionembodied in the practices of those competentspeakerswho groundandregroundreferenceofthe term. As a result, although competentgroundersof the term's referencemay not havean explicit ontological view stated in formalphilosophical terms, their background onto-logical conceptionof the sort of entity they aretalking about is not subject to the kinds ofmassive errorto which everyone's beliefs aresubject,according o the discoverymodel.

These resultsagain seem to be quite generalwheneverwe are talking about the ontologicalstatus, identity, and survival conditions ofworks of art, persons, social institutions,arti-facts, and so on. If they arecorrect,they showthat ontological knowledge is always to beacquired by way of this kind of conceptualanalysis,andcannot be conceived on the modelof an empirical nquiryaboutmind-independentfacts thatmayturnout to radicallyoverturnourpriorbeliefs andconcepts.Perhapsthis is already tacitly recognizedbythoseworking n the ontologyof art,who gener-ally do attemptto evaluate theories at least inpartby their consistency with ordinarybeliefsandpractices.Madeexplicit, though,this obser-vation has some important practical conse-quences-especially for aesthetics. For recentaestheticshasproducedsomethingof a boom indiverse views about the ontology of art,manyof which are radically revisionary views, forexample, that despite popularbelief, all worksof art (including paintings and noncast sculp-

tures)areaction-typesrather hanindividuals;14or that literaryworks are eternalabstracta hatcan neither be created nor destroyed;or that

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Thomasson TheOntologyofArt andKnowledge n Aestheticsplays do notmerely present ictionalindividualsand events, but are themselves fictionalobjects;15 r thatdespitecommonpractice, anytranscription f a musical work must be a differ-ent work (as JerroldLevinson somewhattenta-tively suggests);16 or that no painting orsculpturecan ever be repairedor restoredbyreplacing broken or worn-out parts, howeverminor.17If the abovearguments recorrect, uchradicalviews cannot be presentedas discoveries aboutthe "realtruth"of the ontology of works of artthat may overthrow commonsense and showthatwe are mistakenin treatingworks as indi-vidualscapableof being boughtandsold, thingscreatedat a certaintime, or as being transcriba-ble or restorable.For the only way to find outthe truthaboutthe ontologyof the workof art sby way of conceptual analysis that teases outfrom our practicesand things we say the tacitunderlyingontological conceptionof those whogroundthe reference of the term,perhapsmak-ing it moreexplicit, smoothingout any apparentinconsistencies, and showing its place in anoverall ontological picture. Radical solutionscannot be seen as discoveries about what theontological standingof any art-kindreally is,but only as proposals about how we shouldchange our practices-not because they arewrongin the sense of beingbased on tacitviewsthat are inconsistent with the real facts, butonly, perhaps, because the proposed changewould be clearer,less prone to vagueness, andso forth.(Mostoften,I think,suchproposalsarebasedin following somesingle strandof currentpractice through to its extreme limit, at theexpenseof others.)But although such massive mistakes aboutthe ontologyof art are notpossible, the limits ofepistemic privilege must be carefully acknow-ledged: the relevantepistemicprivilege is onlycollective, not individual, and concerns onlyontologicalfeatures of the kind referred o. Theabovealone does not entailthat there s anypro-tectionfromerrorabout,forexample,thecausalrole of the works of artin the relevantculture,any functionsthey can or do serve, theirhisto-ries of production,aestheticproperties,and soforth.18All groundersare assured of (collec-tively) is that,if there is any art-kind eferred oby the terms they attemptto groundthe refer-ence of, it has the ontological standing they

commonly (if tacitly)understandandtreat it ashaving.III. ONTOLOGICAL HALLOWNESSAND THE LIMITSOFKNOWLEDGEThe determinationof facts about the ontologyof artby humanconcepts,beliefs, andpracticeshas consequencesnot only for the methods ofacquiringknowledgein the ontology of art,butalso regarding he nature of the facts involved,and the limits of possible knowledge in thisarea.The discoveryview has it that the worldisfully determinate, o that for any propositionP,either P or not-P is the case, with one beingmade determinatelytrue and the other deter-minatelyfalse by independent acts of the worldso thatthere s, at least in principle, hepossibil-ity of discoveringthe truthor falsehoodof anyscientificclaim.Butthis does notseem to be the case in mattersto do with the ontology of art,since manyawk-wardquestionsarise for which it is hardto giveany precise and determinateanswer without itseeming arbitrary and inappropriate. Forexample, what percentage of the paint in apainting may be replaced in restorationwhilepreserving the same painting? What sorts ofeditingortranslation an and cannota T. S. Eliotpoem survive? Is a poem created if the poetthinks t upto himself orherselfand is promptlyrun over by a bus? How manymistakes,andofwhatsort,maybe made in a performancef it isto count as a performance of the relevantmusical work? We can now see why thereseems to be no good way to answermany suchquestionsandwhy we will err if we try to treatthe ontologyof art on the discoverymodel.Even if the mind-independentworld is fullydeterminate (so that, for any propositionP involving mind-independentacts, either P ornot-Pis thecase), it is certainlynot the case thathumanbeliefs andconceptual systems are com-plete (so that,for any propositionP, eitherP ornot-P is believed,accepted, or treated as beingthe case). As a result,anywherethe criteria orapplyinga predicateare determinedby humanbeliefs and practices, risks of indeterminaciesandvaguenessinevitablyariseas a result of theintensionalityof humanbeliefs. To borrow anexample from Kit Fine, suppose we define the

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The Journalof Aesthetics and ArtCriticismpredicate nice' as applied o numbersas follows:n is nice if n>15, n is not nice if n


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Thomasson The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aestheticsthinking that wildly revisionary theories mayreveal the real truth of the matter, at the expenseof everyone's beliefs and concepts, and intothinking that we should in principle be able togive precise answers to any questions one caresto pose. The case study of art-kinds suggests,however, that facts about the ontological statusof members of art-kinds referred to by termslike 'painting,' 'sculpture,' and 'novel' aredetermined by the beliefs and practices of thosewho ground the use of such terms and, moregenerally, that the same goes for the ontologicalstatus of the referents of other terms. As aresult, the study of ontology has crucial andwide-ranging differences from the discoveryparadigm of knowledge, including differencesin the sorts of epistemic privilege that are avail-able, the kinds of ignorance and error that arepossible, the appropriate methods for acquiringknowledge, and the limits of what can beknown. Noting the inappropriateness of thediscovery paradigm has particularly importantconsequences for aesthetics, where it can poten-tially help us to avoid being taken in by revi-sionary theories (by noting that these are at bestproposals, not discoveries), to avoid beingembarrassed by unanswerable questions orforced into offering inappropriate answers, andto determine the proper standards for evaluatingclaims about the ontology of art.

AMIEL. THOMASSONDepartment f PhilosophyUniversityof MiamiCoralGables,Florida33124

INTERNET:[email protected]. I have arguedfor the relevance of issues in aestheticsto other general issues in metaphysicsin my Fiction andMetaphysics (CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999) and in"TheOntologyof Art," n TheBlackwell Guide to Aesthet-ics, ed. PeterKivy (Oxford:Blackwell,2004).2. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, Language andReality,2nded. (MITPress, 1999), p. 91.3. Of course some have arguedthat we can be mistakenin thinking,orexample, hat ermssuch as 'cat' or 'kangaroo'refer to biological species, since it could turn out that the

things referred to by 'cat' are little demons (see SaulKripke,Naming and Necessity [HarvardUniversity Press,1972], p. 126), or that 'kangaroo'refers to a kind of robot(see RichardMiller, "A Purely Causal Solution to One ofthe QuaProblems,"AustralasianJournalof Philosophy70[1992]: 427). I have arguedagainstthis elsewhere (in myunpublishedOrdinaryObjects),but in any case little hangshere on exactly how precise the relevant disambiguatingconcept must be-the crucialpoint is only that theremustbe a disambiguating ntologicalconcept.4. Thomasson,"TheOntologyof Art."5. Hilary Korblith, "Referring to Artifacts," ThePhilosophicalReview 89 (1980): 109-114.6. Amie L. Thomasson, "Artifacts and Other HumanCreations,"n Creationsof theMind,ed.JosephMargolisandStephenLaurence OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).7. For example, Paul Bloom, "Intention,History andArtifactConcepts,"Cognition60 (1996): 1-29, and AmieL. Thomasson, "Realism and Human Kinds,"PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch67 (2003): 580-609.8. Bloom, "Intention,Historyand ArtifactConcepts."9. See KendallWalton,"Categoriesof Art,"Philosoph-ical Review 79 (1970): 334-367, and his "CategoriesandIntentions:A Reply," The Journal of Aesthetics and ArtCriticism32 (1973): 267-268.10. AlvinGoldman,A TheoryofHumanAction(PrincetonUniversityPress,1970),p. 18.11. See, for example, Risto Hilpinen,"On Artifacts andWorksof Art,"Theoria58 (1992): 58-82.12. See Goldman,A Theoryof HumanAction.13. One consequenceof this view is thatthe ontologicalstatus of the objects referredto by terms like 'painting,''musicalwork,'or 'sculpture'may varyover time or acrossculturesas the backgroundontologicalconceptionsof thosewho ground and regroundthe reference of the term vary(see my "FictionalCharactersandLiteraryPractices,"TheBritish Journalof Aesthetics 43 (2003): 146.)14. GregoryCurrie,An Ontologyof Art (New York: St.Martin'sPress, 1989), p. 8.15. John Dilworth, "The Fictionality of Plays," TheJournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism60 (2002): 263-273.16. Jerrold Levinson, Music, Art, and Metaphysics(CornellUniversityPress, 1990), p. 234.17. MarkSagoff, "OnRestoringandReproducingArt,"Journalof Philosophy75 (1978): 459.18. So, similarly, acceptingthat the ontologicalstatus ofspecies is establishedby grounders'ontological conceptionsdoes not precludegenuine discoveries andpossibilities forerrorabout,for example, whetherit is a species of fish ormammal,what its preciseDNA structures, how it evolved,and so on.19. KitFine, "Vagueness,TruthandLogic," reprintednVagueness:A Reader, ed. RosannaKeefe and Peter Smith(MITPress, 1997),p. 120.20. Compare Stephen Schiffer, "Language-CreatedLanguage-IndependentEntities,"Philosophical Topics 24(1996): 159, andMarkJohnston,"TheEnd of the TheoryofMeaning,"MindandLanguage3 (1988): 38-39.

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