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Institute of Pacific Relations

America Maneuvers in AsiaAuthor(s): Miriam S. FarleySource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 10, No. 13 (Jul. 14, 1941), pp. 148-155Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021920 .

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148 FAR EASTERN SURVEY

authorities.

In 1941, however, the situation was changed com?

pletely. The rice crop failure forced the Wang Ching-wei Government to import rice on its own. Shortly after

the firstmunicipal imports of rice arrived in Shanghai,rice shipments arrived for the Nanking Government

which weretransshipped immediately by

steamer and

rail to Nanking. Further arrivals were to be distributed

in Hangchow, Wasih, and other cities located in

hitherto prosperous rice-growing regions. In mid-Mayriots broke out in Sungkiang, a transportation center

along the Shanghai-Hangchow railway, heavily gar-risoned by the Japanese Army since 1937 and an im?

portant entrepot for central China rice. Popular dis-

content was provoked by the fact that Chinese con?

sumers found their local rice dealers quoting Shanghai

prices. The Japanese rice crisis was now casting its

shadownot

only upon Shanghai but deepinto

thoseurban areas of central China which Japan succeeded in

holding and which she is trying to incorporate into her

New Order.

r. w. B.

America Maneuvers in Asia1

By MIRIAM S. FARLEY

SinceJapan's attack on China confronted the United

States with amajor challenge

to what it hadlongconsidered its vital interests in the Pacific, the course

of American Far Eastern policy has puzzled many ob-

servers, including the Japanese. In one respect, the

United States has been thoroughly consistent: it has

never deviated from its support of certain broad prin-

ciples of international conduct such as the sanctity of

treaties, the peaceful settlement of disputes and free-

dom of international trade. These principles, as inter-

preted in Washington, were diametrically opposed to

the Japanese conception of a New Order in eastern

Asia. Nevertheless, while Japan vigorously sought to

carve out her New Order, the United States has beenslow to implement its declared policies in the field of

action. In this field it has been cautious, hesitant and

apparently inconsistent, as in giving material aid to

China while permitting war materials to be freely ex?

ported to Japan. Many have defended this policy as

one of deliberate and skillful maneuvering in a compli-cated situation; many have denounced it as weak-

kneed or even hypocritical.The tortuous course of American policy is, of course,

chiefly the result of the multiplicity of influences enter-

ing into its formation: the predilections of high of?

ficials, the conflicting pulls of public opinion and ofpressure groups, considerations of internal politics and

economies, and the rapidly changing international situ?

ation as a whole. The outbreak of war in Europeushered in a new phase in which international factors

have played an increasingly important part in shapingAmerican policy toward the older war in China, now

merged in a world struggle from which the United

States found it impossible to remain aloof.

(1) This articlesummarizesrecentdevelopments n U. S. FarEastern policy,which are recordedmore fully n a chaptercon?tributed y thepresent uthorto a new edition of T. A. Bisson'sAmerican

Policyin the Far East: 1931-1940

(Inquiry Series,Institute f Pacific Relations,New York, 1940), to be publishedshortly.

That highly intricate drama has now reached, in Mr.

Churchill'sphrase,

its fourthclimacteric,

with Ger?

many's invasion of the Soviet Union. As with the other

three?the fall of France, the Battle of Britain in 1940

and the United States lease-lend bill?the effects of this

new shift in the balance of power will be felt in the Far

East. Since September 1939 the American attitude to?

ward Japan has fluctuated, broadly speaking, with the

military fortunes of Great Britain: the brighter Brit-

ain's prospects, the bolder America's stand in the Far

East, and vice versa. Initially, therefore, one might ex-

pect the United States to respond to the newest de?

velopment with redoubled firmness in the Orient; later

consequences would depend on the fortunes of war onthe Russian front. This simple pattern, however, is

complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union, now at

last caught up in the maelstrom of war, forms the land

bridge between Europe and Asia. Hence its belligerency

may be expected to affect Far Eastern politics directlyas well as indirectly.

It is not the purpose of this article to predict what

new political patterns may emerge in Asia, but rather

to provide a background for such predictions by trac-

ing the course of American Far Eastern policy as it has

developed since the beginning of the European war. In

this story the Soviet Union plays little part. Despitethe similarity of American and Soviet interests in the

Sino-Japanese conflict, despite the fact that both coun?

tries were giving aid to China, cooperation between

them has been conspicuous by its absence. This has

been due partly to ideological differences and conse-

quent mutual distrust; partly to the shock given Ameri?

can opinion by the Nazi-Soviet pact; partly to the fact

that the Soviet Union was regarded as a quasi-ally of

Germany, and constituted an actual or potential leak

in the British blockade.

The German-Soviet war has swept away many of

these obstacles to cooperation, and the American Gov?ernment has followed the British lead in pledging aid



JULY 14, I94I 149

to Russia in her struggle against German aggression.This opens up possibilities of new complications be?

tween the United States and Japan in case the latter

should, on Germany's behalf or on her own, try to in-

terrupt American-Soviet communications via Siberia.

These possibilities, however, may complicate but do

notbasically

alter the issues between the United States

and Japan, which are still concerned with Japan's bid

for hegemony in eastern Asia.

American-Japanese Issues

Those issues remain unsettled. Japan has not aban-

doned her pretensions; on the contrary,she has enlargedthem. The United States has conceded none of Japan'sclaims and its opposition has advanced, albeit halt-

ingly, from words to action. Yet recurrent propheciesof an early showdown have been refuted by events.

Neither Japan nor the United States really wants a

showdown?Japan because of weakness,the United

States because of its wider preoccupations. Neither con-

siders a showdown inevitable, and neither has yet given

up hope of attaining its major objectives without pre-

cipitating a trans-Pacific war.

When the long-predicted war finally broke in Europein September 1939, relations between Japan and the

United States had reached a critical stage. For two

years, while Japan and China had fought to a stalemate

on the battlefield, Japan and the United States had

engaged in verbal warfare with the same result. The

United States was cautiously girding its loins for

action. During the summer it had denounced its com?mercial treaty with Japan, thus clearing the decks for

possible economic reprisals. The initial effect of the

European war was to cause the United States to draw

in its horns; and the Administration, which had previ-

ously been ahead of public opinion in desiring action

in the Far East, now counseled caution in the face of

growing public demand for economic embargoes against

Japan.The events of August and September 1939 placed the

United States in a commanding position in the Pacific.

Japan, stunned by the German-Soviet agreement, was

for the moment diplomatically isolated. With GreatBritain and France otherwise engaged, the burden of

defending western interests in Asia devolved upon the

United States. The European conflict created a boom

market in war materials, in which America shared, and

left the United States as the only important industrial

nation whose supplies were available to Japan. Uni-

lateral sanctions appeared to be a practical possibilityfor the first time since 1937.

That the United States did not at once take advan-

tage of this commanding position was due chiefly to the

American Government's concern with events across the

Atlantic. Throughout the first, inactive stage of theEuropean conflict Washington was acutely conscious of

the possibility that the progress of the war in Europe

might call for new and far-reaching decisions on the

part of the United States. This led it to pursue a go-slow policy in the Orient. Also the British Government

at this time was courting Japan's friendship. American

officials may or may not have shared the British hopeof

enlisting Japanas at least a

passive ally.But the

United States was already identifying its interests with

those of Great Britain?a tendency which grew ever

stronger as the war went on.

At any rate the United States seems to have made an

effort, in the fall of 1939, to achieve a settlement of

outstanding issues with Japan. The first move was the

strong speech delivered by Ambassador Grew in Tokyoin October.<2) It served two purposes: to give notice

that the American attitude toward Japan's actions in

China had not been altered by the developments in Eu?

rope, and to bring home to the Japanese public, as dis-

tinct from Foreign Office officials, the depth of Ameri?can resentment at Japan's policies. Mr. Grew's main

emphasis, however, was on the preservation of Ameri?

can rights and interests in China rather than on the

preservation of China's integrity; and his speech was

noteworthy for the tone of conviction in which the

Ambassador insisted that his only aim in making so

frank a statement was to lay the basis for an improve?ment in Japanese-American relations.

Japan Worried

What took place in the conversations subsequently

held between Mr. Grew and Foreign Minister Nomurahas not been revealed; but if hopes of any far-reaching

agreement were entertained on either side, they were

disappointed. Japan was obviously worried by the im-

pending treaty lapse and sought to secure a new trade

agreement before the expiration of the old one; but

whatever price she may have offered, it was not accept-able. Nevertheless, after the treaty had expired on

January 26, the United States did not take advantageof the situation to impose discriminatory restrictions

on trade with Japan.

During 1939 various measures providing for an em?

bargo on shipments to Japan of war materials, such asmunitions, metals, petroleum products and machinery,had been introduced in Congress.<3) Strong public sup?

port for these proposals was indicated in public opin?ion surveys, and it was understood that such a measure

had a good chance of adoption. But the Administration

used its influence to keep them buried in committee.

Thus the United States, having exhausted the re?

sources of diplomacy unfortified by action to secure

respect for its rights in China, and having advanced

(2) Departmentof State Bulletin,Nov. 11, 1939,p. 509.

(3)For

summary, f.William W. Lockwood

(ed.),Our Far

Eastern Record (American Council, Instituteof Pacific Rela?tions,New York, 1940), p. 40.




to the brink of action, reverted once more to its old

tactics. These consisted of holding the sword of em?

bargoes over Japan's head, while countering each for?

ward move on her part with another gesture in aid of

China. On March 7, 1940, the United States announced

a credit of $20 million to China through the Export-

Import Bank,to be

repaid by shipmentsof tin.

Comingat a time when preparations were under way to inaugu-rate a central puppet government in China under Wang

Ching-wei, this move was regarded in Tokyo as an

"unfriendly act."(4) When the new regime was finallyinstalled at Nanking on March 30, Secretary Hull is?

sued a statement reaffirming the United States' recog-nition of Chiang Kai-shek's government at Chungkingas the legitimate government of China.(5)

The tone of Mr. Hull's statement contrasted sharplywith that of a speech delivered by the British Ambas?

sador, Sir Robert Leslie Craigie, in Tokyo only two

days before.(6) Sir Robert recadled the Anglo-Japanesealliance, stressed the essential similarity of British and

Japanese objectives, and declared his confidence in the

future of Anglo-Japanese relations. This speech was at?

tacked in the House of Commons as implying that the

British Government condoned Japanese aggression.Mr. Hull's statement indicated considerable divergenceof views between Washington and London on Far East?

ern questions?a divergence perhaps natural in view of

their respective circumstances. It was evident, however,that if it desired to pursue a more positive policy in

the Orient the United States would have to play a lone

hand.

Blitzkrieg in Europe

In April, the European war began in earnest. Hitler's

lightning occupation of Denmark and Norway was

followed by the conquest of the Low Countries and the

downfall of France. Great Britain, anticipating inva?

sion at any moment, prepared herself for a desperate

struggle. The United States, fearing for its own secur?

ity if the British fleet were lost, hastily enlarged its

armament program, rushed plans for hemisphere de?

fense, and meditated transfer of its fleet back to the

Atlantic. Had Japan struck boldly at this time in south?east Asia, she might well have been successful; but she

was handicapped by her unfinished war in China and

by divided counsels at home. Nevertheless she lost no

time in bringing pressure to bear on the British and

French for limited objectives, and met with little re?

sistance. To these moves Ihe United States offered no

opposition save for diplomatic protests.

Japan's first move was to secure from prostrateFrance closure of the Indochina-Yunnan railway and

the right to station inspectors in Indo-China. At the

same time, on June 19, she obtained Great Britain's

signature to an agreement ending, on terms favorable

to Japan, the year-old dispute over the Tientsin con-

cession.(7) More Japanese demands immediately fol?

lowed. On July 12 Great Britain yielded to pressureand

agreedto close the Burma Road to

shipmentsof military supplies for a period of three months. In

announcing this to Commons, Prime Minister Churchill

intimated that he hoped within that time to see a nego-tiated peace between China and Japan.(8) Secretary

Hull, on July 16, deplored the closure of the railwayand the highway as "unwarranted interpositions of

obstacles to world trade."(9) But although the United

States had doubtless been consulted in the matter, it

was evidently not prepared to give Britain such assur-

ances of assistance in case of need as might have in-

duced her to stand firmagainst Japanese pressure.

The retreat continued during August with the with?drawal of British troops from North China and

Shanghai. This led to a dispute between Japan and the

United States as to which should patrol the key centralsector of the International Settlement, formerly held

by the British. As neither side would give in, a compro?mise was effected by turning the disputed sector over tothe Shanghai Volunteer Corps.

So far, Japan's cautious but steady advance had been

opposed only by delaying tactics. During the autumn,however, there became evident a gradual stiffening ofthe Anglo-American attitude in the Orient, first clearly

manifested in the British decision to reopen the BurmaRoad. The new attitude resulted from a combinationof factors which had been discernible even in the sum?

mer, but which gained strength during the fall andwinter months.

Japan's Threat to Southeast Asia

Perhaps the most fundamental of these factors wasthe enlargement of Japan's declared aims, accompaniedby concrete moves in this direction, to include controlnot only of China but also of southeastern Asia?theheart of western imperial interests in the Orient.(10)

Here Great Britain, France, Holland and the UnitedStates shared a colonial empire rich in tin, rubber, oiland tropical products, whose economic value wasmatched by its strategic importance. The great fortressof Singapore dominated the approaches not only toBritish and other colonial possessions but to Australiaand New Zealand as well. With Singapore in the hands

(4) Statement of Foreign Office spokesman, Nezv YorkTimes, Mar. 9, 1940.

(5) Department of State Bulletin. Mar. 30, 1940, p. 343.(6) Text inAmerasia,May 1940,p. 125.

(7) Cf. ContemporaryJapan,July1940,p. 928.(8) Cf. T. A. Bisson, "Indo-China: Spearhead of Japan's

Southward Drive," Foreign Policv Reports, Oct. 1, 1940, pp.170-71.

(9) Departmentof State Bulletin,July20, 1940,p. 36.

(10) Cf.W. W. Lockwood and Michael

Greenberg (eds.),Shozvdown t Singapore?, AmericanCouncil,Institute f PacificRelations,New York, 1941.



JULY 14, I94I 151

of a hostile power these British Dominions would be

helpless and India would be in danger.Immediate as well as long-range considerations em-

phasized the importance of maintaining British com?

munications in this area. In her war against Germanyand Italy, Britain was relying heavily upon men, muni?

tions and raw materials from her easternempire.

For

the United States, also, southeast Asia was an impor?tant source of strategic materials. Moreover, Britain's

eastern empire, especially Australia and India, was

rapidly being developed as a self-sufficient military

base, capable of supplying and equipping troops for use

either in the western theater of war or, if need be, in its

own defense.(11)

Impetus to Japan's Southward Drive

The intensification of hostilities in Europe and par?

ticularly the fall of France were the signal for renewed

clamor in Japan for launching of the southward drivelong advocated by certain groups. Such pressure was

reflected in Foreign Minister Arita's speech of June 29,

1940, which laid down in broad though purposely vagueterms Japan's claim to hegemony throughout eastern

Asia.(12) This was answered by implication by Secre?

tary Hull in his statement of July 5, which rejected the

claims of both Germany and Japan to regional hege?

mony based on force, and repudiated the implied

analogy with the Monroe Doctrine.(13) But in Augustthe policy statement of the new Konoye Cabinet as-

serted in even more specific terms Japan's aim of con-

structing "a new order in Greater East Asia."(14)The second factor was Japan's drift back toward the

Rome-Berlin Axis, which was spurred by the fall of

France and doubtless encouraged by British and Ameri?

can passivity in Asia. This culminated on September

27, 1940, with the signature of the Tripartite Treaty,

accompanied by a fanfare undoubtedly intended to

convince the United States that further opposition to

the Axis allies would involve the risk if not the cer-

tainty of a two-ocean war. The effect of this threat,

however, was to inflame rather than to dampen Ameri?

can public opinion, and also to bring Japan within the

focus of the rising war sentiment, which had hithertobeen directed mainly against Germany. Moreover,

Japan's action in formally casting in her lot with Brit?

ain's enemies was a heavy blow to any hopes which

may have been entertained in London or Washingtonof dealing with Japan by the methods of appeasementat their own or another's expense.

Even so, Great Britain might under pressure of sheer

necessity have continued to give ground in the Far

East, had it not been for the gradual improvement,

during the fall and winter, of her own military pros?

pects in the west. The R.A.F. held its own in the air,the threatened invasion did not materialize, the British

and Greeks battered the Italians in the Mediterranean.

Britain's situation was still critical, but it did not seem

sodesperate

as in the black summer of 1940.

Behind Britain's increased optimism, and of decisive

importance in the evolution of American Far Eastern

policy, were the redoubling of America's drive for pre?

paredness after the summer blitzkrieg, and the growingcoordination of American military and diplomatic poli?cies with those of the British Commonwealth. Defense

appropriations reached sums unprecedented except in

time of war; another precedent was shattered in the

adoption of peacetime military conscription; economic

controls reminiscent of the first World War were set

up to speed munitions production; and, most significant

for Tokyo observers, Congress authorized in July 1940construction of a two-ocean navy representing an in?

crease of 70% over existing naval strength. After the

presidential election in November, America's role as

nonbelligerent ally of the British Empire was statedwith increasing frankness and vigor, and was imple-mented by various steps culminating to date in the

lease-lend bill, designed in the President's words tomake the United States "an arsenal of democracy."

Anglo-American Solidarity

That this growing Anglo-American solidarity might

be reflected in the Far East as well as in Europe wasemphasized by the important, though secret, discus?sions which took place in the autumn and winter of1940-41 between the governments of the United States,Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands. The

presence of an Australian minister in Washington was

symbolic of the United States' awakened interest inthe British Dominions in the south Pacific?and oftheirs in America. Apparently these conversations were

begun in Washington early in September, when Japanwas threatening Indo-China. They were continued

thereafter, but little information as to their content

was allowed to leak out. There can be little doubt,however, that during this period the possibilities of

joint action against Japan for the defense of Singaporeand adjacent areas were thoroughly canvassed. Thetechnical groundwork was unobtrusively being laid for

joint action if and when the various governments con?cerned should decide that action was called for.

Finally, an indirect but important consequence ofthe United States' rearmament program was the pro-gressive curtailment of American exports to Japan.The Sheppard-May bill, which became law on July 2,1940, gave the President broad powers to restrict or

prohibit the export of materials needed for the defenseprogram. This authority has been used to place under a

(11) Cf. Michael Greenberg, Britain Mobilizes Her EasternEmpire," Far Eastern Survey, Mar. 26, 1941,p. 58.

(12) ContemporaryJapan. Aug. 1940,p. 1077.(13) Department of State Bulletin, July6, 1940,p. 4.(14) ContemporaryJapan, Sept. 1940,p. 1224.




license system, by proclamations issued from time to

time, a large number of commodities including manywhich were important in Japanese-American trade. The

articles affected now include munitions, aircraft, scrap

iron, pig iron, many iron and steel products, many

types of machinery and tools, copper, lead and other

metalsand

chemicals,and most

recently petroleumproducts. The list now covers nearly all of the chief

export items except cotton, lumber and automobiles.

In only two cases?aviation gasoline and scrap iron?

was a complete embargo imposed, exception beingmade for Great Britain and countries of the western

hemisphere.(15)

V. 5. Restrictions Hit Japanese Trade

Export figures do not reveal just how strictly the

license system has been applied against Japan, but it

is evident that the American restrictions have proved

highly embarrassing. Total exports to Japan began

to drop sharply in November 1940, and in the first three

months of 1941 they were 48% below the level of the

previous year. As imports dropped less rapidly, most

of the active American trade balance has been wipedout. By March 1941 iron and steel, including scrap,had for all practical purposes disappeared from the ex?

port statistics; so had copper, zinc, aluminum, ferro-

alloys, carbon black, automobiles and ammonium

sulphate. Shipments of machinery, hides and cotton

had declined sharply (cotton because of Japanese, not

American, restrictions). Exports of petroleum remained

high, as did wood pulp, lead and borax. These productshave recently been put under license, with what conse-

quences remains to be seen.

These restrictions were not directed specifically

against Japan and carried no hint of invidious discrimi-

nation. They were dictated primarily by the require?ments of the United States' defense program and its

policy of aid to Britain. Nevertheless they had the ef?

fect of a partial embargo, the less easy to bear since

British Empire countries were also reducing shipmentsto Japan for similar reasons. The American regulations

have, in fact, called forth protests from Japan on sev?

eral occasions. Moreover, some of the licensing procla?mations were timed in such a way as to constitute an

implied rebuke and warning to Japan.The new trend of Anglo-American policy was not im?

mediately apparent. In September, when Japan renewed

her demands on Indo-China and secured the right to

establish air bases and maintain a garrison in the north?

ern part of the colony, the United States offered little

opposition. But it is possible that British and American

protests at Tokyo may have induced Japan to modifyher original demands.

Furthermore, the United States took several steps

indicating that although it might be retreating it had

not abandoned the field. On September 25 it announced

the extension of a $25 million credit to China throughthe Export-Import Bank, to be repaid by shipmentsof metals. The next day brought announcement of

the full scrap iron embargo?thefirst action under the

Sheppard-May bill with real teeth in it. News of the

embargo was released the day before signature of the

Three-Power Pact, of which the United States had been

forewarned. The pact, which created a sensation in

America, was greeted by Secretary Hull with a terse

statement to the effect that Japan's alignment with the

Axis was nothing new and nothing to get excited about.

During the autumn there were many indications of a

stronger attitude in Washington and London. On Oc?

tober 8 Great Britain confirmed her intention of re-

opening the Burma Road on the 18th. It was reported

that this action had been prompted by urging from theUnited States, strengthened no doubt by the discus?

sions of Far Eastern strategy which were then under

way. Early in October, also, the United States warned

its nationals to leave the Far East, which occasioned

some alarm in Japan. Japan's formal recognition of the

Nanking puppet government was countered by the

announcement on the same day, November 30, of an

American credit of $100 million to the Chinese Govern?

ment, half for the purchase of strategic commodities,half for the support of the Chinese currency. Ten dayslater Great Britain granted a credit of ?10 million,

similarly divided. Meanwhile both Britain and Americawere strengthening their Far Eastern defenses.

November Oil Agreement

The United States, while implementing its supportof China, was not however prepared to oppose Japan at

all points. On November 11a Japanese economic mis-

sion in Batavia reached an agreement with the Stand?

ard Vacuum (American) and Rising Sun (British) oil

companies, under which shipments of oil to Japan from

Netherlands India were greatly enlarged. The agree?

ment, which ran for six months, was renewed in May.

While Japan did not get as much oil as she had askedfor, partly because the British had previously placed

preemptive orders, this agreement nevertheless repre?sented a substantial victory. Presumably the United

States might have blocked it, either by putting pres?sure on its own oil interests and on the British, or by

giving the Dutch Government such assurances as would

have justified them in forbidding the oil to be exported.It would appear that the American Government con?

sidered such a course too risky.American foreign relations during the first two

months of 1941 were dominated by Congressional dis-

cussion of the lease-lend bill, during which it was madeclear that, while aid to Britain was the main object,

(15) The same applies to shipmentsof petroleumproducts

from the east coast only. (New York Times, June 21, 1941)."Moral embargoes" had previouslybeen applied to aircraft anda few other items.



aid to China was also contemplated. Secretary Hull,

testifying in support of the bill on January 15, de?

nounced Japan at length and with emphasis. Japan was

plainly worried and reiterated her peaceful intentions

in southeast Asia.

Doubt was east on these assertions, however, by

Japan'sactions in connection with Thailand's irreden-

tist war on Indo-China, which flared up during Janu?

ary. Japan induced both parties to accept her mediation

and a peace conference assembled on February 7 in

Tokyo, where a territorial agreement favorable to

Thailand was signed several weeks later. During these

negotiations, Japanese forces in northern Indo-China

were reinforced, a small detachment of troops was

landed at Saigon, and Japanese warships in consider?

able strength were operating offthe coasts of both coun?

tries. Press reports asserted that Japan was demand-

ing as the price of mediation the right to establish air,

militaryand naval bases in either or both countries.

Such bases would be within easy striking distance of

Netherlands India and Singapore.

War Scare in Pacific

Whatever the truth of these reports, the British Gov?

ernment, which was doubtless better informed than the

public at large, chose this moment to make an osten-

tatious display of strength in the south Pacific. British

and Australian air squadrons were sent to reinforce the

defenses of British Malaya, waters adjacent to Singa?

pore were mined, and troops were moved to the Thai?

land border. The climax was reached on February 13,when the Australian Advisory War Council announced

that the situation was one of "the utmost gravity," and

hastily summoned a Cabinet meeting. This was at-

tended by Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who had been

sent out from England in November to take charge of

coordinating British defense efforts in the Far East.

The United States backed the British stand by vari?

ous gestures, including renewal of the warning to its

nationals to leave the Far East. On February 11, just

as the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura,

arrived in Washington, President Roosevelt told his

press conference that, although he did not anticipatewar with Japan, such an eventuality would not inter-

fere with American aid to Great Britain.<16) This was

a clear intimation that neither German hopes of block-

ing aid to Britain by a Japanese diversion in the

Orient, nor Japanese hopes that England's danger

would divert American attention from the Far East,

were likely to be realized. On the following day the

President asked Congress for an additional defense

appropriation including funds for harbor improve-

ments and fortifications in Guam, Samoa and Alaska.

These were promptly voted although Congress had re-

JULY 14, I94I 153

fused funds for Guam on two previous occasions. On

February 15 Secretary Hull renewed his conversations

with the British, Australian and Dutch envoys.The brief war scare produced by the Australian de-

marche of February 13 soon subsided, but there was

evidence that Japan had been thoroughly alarmed. On

February18 the

ForeignOffice issued a statement cal-

culated to calm the apprehensions of the Japanese pub?lic and to reassure foreign powers as to Japan's peace-ful intentions. This brought an immediate responsefrom Undersecretary Welles, who observed that the

United States Government was more interested in

deeds than in words. It was revealed that American

bombers purchased by Britain were being flown to

Singapore, and that former American navy pilots were

acting as flying instructors in Netherlands India. The

United States reinforced its own air strength in the

Philippines and Alaska, while more Australian troops

were landed at Singapore.The Thai-Indochinese treaty was finally initialed

on March 11. Japan had achieved a succks d'estime,and had fortified her own position in both of these

highly strategic territories. There is no conclusive evi?

dence, despite continuing rumors, that she had secured

further military concessions from either country; in

fact the Japanese troops which had been sent to Saigonwere subsequently withdrawn. It was clear at any rate

that a firm show of resistance by Britain and the

United States had administered a check to Japanese

penetration of southeast Asia?for the time being at

least.American Attitude Stiffens

Passage of the lease-lend bill ushered in a new era

of American policy, the significance of which was em-

phasized by President Roosevelt in a ringing speechon March 15:

This decision is the end of any attempts at appease-ment in our land ... the American people . . . have

demanded, and got, a policy of unqualified, immediate,all-out aid for Britain, Greece, China, and for all the

governments in exile .. .

In January, Lauchlin Currie and Emile Despres had

been dispatched on a special mission to Chungking.According to reports, the purpose of this mission was

to ascertain China's specific needs for lease-lend mate?

rials; to advise the Chinese Government on measures

to solve its serious economic problems; and to urge

upon Chiang Kai-shek the necessity of maintainingChinese internal unity if American assistance were to

be effective.(17) Late in May it was stated in Chungkingthat arrangements had been made for the shipment of

some $100 million worth of American supplies to China

under the lease-lend bill.

(17) It has been reportedthat

the Soviet Government, nconnectionwith its pledge of continued assistance to China,offered imilar advice.(16) New York Times, Feb. 12, 1941.




While thus cementing its ties with China and stimu-

lating her resistance to Japan, the United States made

other gestures calculated to make Japan think twice

before fulfilling her agreement to support Germany in

case war should develop between Germany and the

United States?as seemed increasingly probable in the

spring of 1941. In March a flotilla of four Americancruisers and nine destroyers paid a visit to Australia

and New Zealand, where they were warmly received.

The visit emphasized the possibility of using American

warships in the south Pacific, basing them on Singa?

pore. A further intimation of Anglo-American-Dutchcollaboration was given in the two visits of Sir Robert

Brooke-Popham to Manila early in April, when he

conferred with American military and naval command-

ers and with the Dutch Foreign Minister, E. N.

van Kleffens, then on his way to Batavia. During June,

Japan suffered a sharp setback when her demands for

preferential economic treatment in Netherlands Indiawere categorically rejected by the Dutch Government.

The calm confidence displayed by the Dutch, and

Japan's passive acceptance of this rebuff, strongly indi-

cated that Britain and the United States were backingthe Dutch behind the scenes.

All these moves strengthened the impression, which

Washington undoubtedly desired to foster, that the

United States was determined to prevent any further

Japanese advances in southeast Asia. America mani-

fested a calculated indifference to the Soviet-Japanese

treaty of April 13, which was liberally advertised in

Tokyo as freeing Japan's hands for action in the south.Yet during May there were some indications of a less

stern attitude in Washington?coinciding with a stringof German victories in the eastern Mediterranean.

The President's speech of May 27, declaring an un-

limited national emergency and pledging the United

States to defend the freedom of the seas, made no ref-

erence to Japan. Japan was not included in the order

of June 14 freezing Axis assets in America. The Admin?

istration held out against considerable public pressurefor an oil embargo, although on June 20 all petroleum

products were placed under the license system and a

limited embargo, effective against Japan, was appliedto shipments from the east coast, where a shortagewas developing. Voices were again raised to urge an all-

round settlement with Japan which would free Amer?

ica's hands in the Atlantic.

Thus the situation stands as the European war enters

a new phase whose outcome may spell victory or defeat

for German arms. The main outlines of the American

Government's present policy seem reasonably clear.

That policy is to give enough support to China to

enable her to keep Japan actively engaged for the

present and eventually to take the offensive. With

the Chinese still in the field, Japan will hesitate tolaunch a drive in southeast Asia, which would em-

barrass the United States and Great Britain in their

struggle against Germany. As a further deterrent, Brit?

ish, American and Dutch defense forces in this area

have been strengthened to the point where the chances

of a successful Japanese attack would be at least prob-

lematical; and the bulk of the American fleet as yet

remains, so far as is known, in the Pacific. Restrictionof exports under the defense regulations slowly under-

mines Japan's economic strength.But at the same time the United States refrains from

applying the full potential weight of economic pressure.

Japan is permitted to continue normal trade in com?

modities not urgently required for the defense of

America and Britain. Shipments of American-owned oil

from the United States and from the Dutch East Indies

are allowed to continue, because it is feared that their

interruption would cause Japan, in desperation, to

strike southward and thus force the United States to

acquiesce or fight.

Hitler Chief Menace?

The object of this policy is to keep Japan busy in

China, to hold her southward drive in check, to keepher guessing, to weaken her slowly by gradual applica?tion of economic pressure, but to avoid any sudden or

drastic action which might precipitate war in the

Pacific, at least until accounts have been settled with

Hitler. This policy is based upon that plan of strategywhich assumes that the defeat of Hitler is the first

order of business, to which all else must for the time

being be subordinated. Japan can be dealt with later.In the meantime, she must be kept quiet?intimidatedif possible, pacified if necessary. Supporters of this

policy assert that limited concessions to Japan are justi-fied on tactical grounds in the present critical situa?

tion, but firmly deny that they represent "appease-ment" in the sense that they are based on the same

illusions which have brought that term into disrepute.Certain sections of American opinion challenge the

soundness of the United States' present policy on both

strategic and political grounds. These tactics, it is said,

merely encourage Japan gradually but steadily to ex?

pand the area under her control, at relatively smallcost. Since the New Order must be challenged sooneror later, let it be challenged now, before it has strength?ened itself by further acquisitions. Furthermore, Japanrepresents the weakest end of the Axis. Sound strategydemands that the weakest opponent be dealt with first.

By determined action now?including war if necessary?the Japanese threat can be quickly eliminated, and

America can then face Hitler without fear of an assault

on her rear.

Some critics further contend that America's present

policy is in fact "appeasement" not only in its objective

results but in that it is based on the hope?which theyconsider illusory?of an eventual accommodation with



JULY 14, I94I 1SS

a Japan purged of her more extreme military leaders

and rehabilitated under a businessman's government.The American Government, it is said, while deploringthe extreme measures taken by Japan in China, does

not wish to destroy Japan's military power but rather

to preserve Japan as a counterweight to Soviet Russia.

The United States'policy

toward Russia in herpres?ent emergency may throw some light on the authen-

ticity of this interpretation. However, while hope of

reaching some sort of satisfactory compromise with

Japan, and even of enlisting her nonbelligerent aid

against Germany, is undoubtedly entertained in some

quarters in Washington, the possibility that such hopes

may be realized appears remote. The record of the last

few years would indicate that neither Japan nor the

United States is prepared voluntarily to make sufficient

concessions to the other's point of view to secure agree?ment on fundamental issues.

As has been pointed out, American aid to the SovietUnion may create new points of friction with Japan,should the latter attempt moves which would interfere

with American shipments to Russia through Siberia.

For the present, however, Japan is playing a waiting

game. The addition of the Red Army to the anti-Axis

forces has tipped the scales in their favor, and so longas the Soviet Union remains unconquered Japan will

probably make no major move, either northward or

southward, which might precipitate a crisis. Should

Russian resistance collapse, Germany's stock, which

has declined somewhat since last fall, would rise to

new heights in Tokyo and the temptation to move inone or the other direction would be very strong. In that

event the long-postponed showdown might arrive under

conditions disadvantageous to the United States.

FormosanGranary Shrinking

Formosa (Taiwan) is one of Japan's granaries. In

the five years 1935-39, the island exported to Japan an

annual average of 4.6 million koku of rice, from an

average crop of 9.3 million koku. This amounted to

more than 6% of Japan's average annual consumption

of rice during the same period. In addition, Formosasupplies 85% of the sugar and almost all of the bananas

and pineapples consumed in Japan.Not only is Formosa's agriculture important to

Japan; it is of vital importance to the Formosans them?

selves. Almost the entire population of nearly six mil?

lion is directly or indirectly dependent upon agricul?ture. According to official estimates, out of a total grossvalue of production of ?845.2 million in 1938, agricul?ture was responsible for 54.5%. In this figure, many

agricultural products enter twice, first as agricultural

products and then as raw materials for industry. It is

quite possible that, of the net value of production, agri?culture makes up as much as 70% or 75%.

The year 1939 was a year of exceptional prosperityin the Formosan countryside, according to official sta?

tistics on the value of agricultural production. The total

value of such production increased by almost 20% as

compared with 1938, and was 42% above the total for

1936, the last prewar year. Especially rapid growth was

noted in the value ofspecial crops, chiefly sugar,

and

of animal products. However, the volume of most cropsin 1939 was below that of 1938. The sharp rise in values

noted above must be explained, therefore, chiefly bythe influence of inflation. Only sugar cane?for the

sugar year 1938-1939?tea, jute, tobacco and pine?

apples yielded larger crops than in the preceding year.

Especially remarkable was the reported rise in sugarcane production, from 151 to 214 million piculs. The

accuracy of this official estimate is open to question,for Japan and Manchoukuo suffered an acute sugar

shortage in 1939 and 1940?and 85% of Japan's sugar

supply comes from Formosa.Japan's sugar shortage in 1939-40 defies explanation,

if official figures are accurate. The empire's productionin 1938-39 was reported as nearly 28 million piculs,some 38% higher than the previous year, and even the

1939-40 figure was 10% higher than that for 1937-38.

Imports during 1939 and 1940 almost disappeared;

they were insignificant in 1938, although they had been

sizable in 1937. Explanation of the shortage might be

sought in increased exports to the yen-bloc area, but

statistics do not support this view: exports amounted

to little more than 2l/2 million piculs in both 1938 and

1939. Hoarding might account in some degree for theapparent shortage.

Formosa's sugar production fell by some 20% in

1939-40, and a further drop is predicted for the current

year. This is partially accounted for by bad weather,

pests and a typhoon in the second half of 1940. But

similar decreases appear in sugar production in the

Japanese South Sea islands, in Kagoshima, and in

sugar-beet areas of Hokkaido and southern Sakhalin.

To some extent this simultaneous decline of sugar out?

put in all producing areas of the Japanese Empire may,

therefore, be ascribed to common causes, especially the

general shortages of labor and fertilizer. In addition,however, the general conclusion seems inescapable that

1938-39 production figures were exaggerated.In 1940 Formosa's rice production also decreased to

less than 8 million koku, as compared with the high

figure of 9.8 million in 1938 and 9.2 million in 1939.

The government explained the rice-crop failure to the

natural causes noted above, all of which affected the

second-crop period (in Formosa two crops of rice are

usually raised). But production during the first periodwas only 4.2 million koku, less than in any year in the

previous period under consideration. The same factors

which impaired the sugar crop seem to have affectedFormosa's rice crops. Their incidence was, of course,

america maneuvers in asia

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