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8/8/2019 Alperovitz-Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

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Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American

Myth. New York: Knopf, 1995.

Dr. Gar Alperovitz is the Lionel R. Bauman Professor of Political Economy at the

University of Maryland. Like his previous writings, Alperovitz is a staunch critic of the Truman

administration and, as the title suggests, its decision to use the atomic bomb. This particular

topic has remained a divisive counterpoint in Cold War historiography. Writing in the post Cold

War world, Alperovitz reintroduces his argument debunking the commonly held belief that the

nuclear bombs dropped on Japan were for an easy conclusion to the war. He asserts that the war

was over before the decision was made, and Truman knew it. This single assumption is what the

rest of his monograph carries out with. Alperovitz, however, is unable to prove that the Japanese

were united in their desire for a peaceful conclusion to war, and thus, the single assumption is at

best speculation.

Alperovitz began writing this 1995 publication on the tail end of the Enola Gay exhibition

at the Smithsonian Institute. The controversy over the morality of extolling or even displaying

this infamous plane sparked a renewed interest in the origins of the Cold War, and in particular,

in the atomic bombs. Alperovitz uses many sources of key decision makers to make his case that

the decision to drop the bombs were immoral and more political than commonly asserted. The

generalized narrative of the consensus school is that the decision was purely militaristic.

Revisionists do not agree. Alperovitz set off to prove that Truman had other alternatives to the

atomic bombs, and to this end he succeeds. However, he does not adequately convince the

reader that all reasons for the eventual drop were non militaristic. The majority of his

monograph deals with the aftermath of the bomb and how a large effort was made in Washington

to sell the bomb, again, as a military-centric decision. He does have evidence from shocking

Andrew S. Terrell - HIST 6393: Empire, War & Revolution! Fall 2010

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speeches of Pentagon and State officials that look back at the atomic bombs as poor decision.

However, he does not delve into how much of these speeches could have been influenced by the

imminent Cold War posture enveloping the world.

What other historians often times concede to in argument, is the presence of a certain

morally ambiguous situation; we know now that Truman had reason to believe that certain

factions within Japan were willing to negotiate for peace granted their emperor remain in power,

and we also know the military were correct in assuming using the bombs would most certainly

end the war with expedience. What most historians do not concede is that the decision could

have been based on all known factors described and presented by Alperovitz and many others:

the Soviet threat and the question over shaping the post-war world, the desire to conclude the

manhattan project with the unprecedented killing of over 200,000 civilians. Alperovitz,

however, does make a convincing case if you agree to his notion that the Truman administration

could have assumed a united front from the people of Japan over peace talks or an eventual

surrender. Additionally, Alperovitz misrepresents key Japanese documents that have been

translated. He uses them to defend his presumptions of a united Japanese front when the

telegrams in truth only mention a shared interest of the cabinet to seek peace but not surrender.

Furthermore, the same sources cited by Alperovitz in 1995 reveal that of the proposals by the

Japanese for peace, none of them could have come to fruition without Truman committing

political suicide.1

For all its misgivings, however, Alperovitz does reiterate with strength the revisionist

approach to the origins of the Cold War. Though lacking in Japanese sources, the monograph is


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1 Diplomatic Message translations amongst Japanese in 1943-1945 are found in boxes 286-516 of theNational Security Agencys RG 457 collection at the National Archives.


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filled with evidence to defend many of his smaller arguments. If one was to accept his core

assumption over the decision, all arguments afterwards are more than adequately researched and

defended. Historical interpretations and debates are essential in keeping early Cold War history

present in the minds of successive generations, and to this end, Alperovitz does not disappoint.

What 21st century Cold War historians need to focus on now, is finding ways of incorporating a

multidisciplinary approach to include anthropology, sociology, military history, and psychology

in hopes of finding a common ground in the narrative over the peace talks that took place after

the bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the air raids that destroyed almost a hundred towns

and cities before the atomic decision. Instead of approaching the issue from the decision front,

we need to start at the conclusion and work our way back. This, one believes, will reveal much

for both sides of the ongoing debate.


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alperovitz-decision to use the atomic bomb

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