allen, james_experience as a source and ground of theory in epicureanism_apeiron, 37, 4_2004!89!106

8/9/2019 Allen, James_Experience as a Source and Ground of Theory in Epicureanism_Apeiron, 37, 4_2004!89!106

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90 James

llen

The Epicureans also defended theories about the nonevident causes of

astronomical phenomena like eclipses and much else besides. And they

achieved these

results,

or claimed to achieve them, by rationalist means:

inference

or

demonstration

from

signs

or

evidence furnished

by the

phenomena. By these measures, Epicureanism is a form of rationalism.

The aim of this paper is to compare Epicurean views about experience

to other views

available

in the Hellenistic period, including those of the

medical Empiricists.

In

this

way I

hope

to

throw light

on the

Epicureans

distinctive attitude towards experience, an attitude whose

af f in i t ies

with

empiricism sets Epicureanism apart f rom more orthodox forms

of ra-

tionalism but permits the Epicureans to base on experience theories

that

orthodox empiricists would

reject

as

unsupported

by

experience.

Talk

of

experience

involves a certain amount of

unclarity.

The word has

several

senses,

whose history would make an interesting study in its own

right. Present-day discussions

of

what

is

given

in

immediate experience,

where this means something

like

bare sensation prior to interpretation

or inference, or about the quality of conscious experience, use the term

in a way that would, I think, have been new to ancient Greek and Latin

speakers fami l ia r with the words experientia or

empeiria.

Clues that will help us understand the ancient conception of experi-

ence are furnished by the medical Empiricists reflections about their

terminology.

Galen s

Outline

o f

Empiricism

Subfiguratio

empirica;

hence-

forward Subfig emp), which

is

meant

to be a fa i thful

presentation

of the

Empiricists own views, makes a point about one term in the Empiricist

vocabulary

that

is

also true

of

others. Though

the

term autopsia , seeing

or observing for oneself, ought

strictly

to be applied to an activity, he

tells

us, it was

also used

by the

Empiricists

for

knowledge, namely

the

knowledge

one has as a

result

of

observing

for

oneself Subfig emp

47,

14-26). The Empiricists used two terms that are traditionally translated

as

experience , peira

and

empeiria.

The

Outline

o f

Empiricism defines them

not as

activities,

but as

psychic states

or

f o rm s

of

knowledge

notitia:

ãíþóéò).

Peira

is autoptic

knowledge ,

i.e., the knowledge one has as a

result of an episode of observation (44,6 ff. . Empeiria, on the other hand,

is

knowledge or memory of what has been observed to happen many

times in the same way Subfig emp 45,24;

50,23).

The mention of memory

is

significant because the Empiricists seem to have held that knowledge

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Experience

as a

Source 91

was a form of

memory

(Galen, On Therapeutic Method;

henceforward

Meth

med X 36, 3 K hn = fr. 46 Deichgr ber), but that is another story.

1

According

to

these definitions, then,

em peiria is a

kind

of

knowledge

that

arises

on the

basis

of

many episodes

of

observation, each

of

which

gives rise to an instance of peira. One has empeiria as opposed to peira

when

one has

observed something

often

enough

for the

knowledge that

one now has as a

result

to be

expressed

in a

theorem

Subfig

em p

45, 24

ff . ) . And this is the case when one is in a position to say, e.g., that the

administration of such and such a remedy in cases of such and such a

kind

is

followed

by

recovery always,

for the

most part, roughly half

the

time

or

rarely.

In

this favored

sense,

em peiria applies

to

expert knowl-

edge,

many instances

of

which, when they

form

a

cluster (Üèñïéóìá),

make up a

complete expertise

or art

On

Sects for

Beginners; henceforward

Sect

ingred SM

ÉÐ, 13-16 Helmreich).

And in

what

is

perhaps

the

most

privileged sense of all, the term

empeiria

applies to the art as a whole

Subfig emp 47, 26; 54, 10-13). This means that the contrast between

experience and reason is indirect. Experience as knowledge and the

activities that give rise to it are opposed to the activities of the

faculty

of

reason

(or a

special

form

of it) and the

knowledge

to

which they give

rise, and

reason

as a

faculty

is

opposed

to the

faculty

or

faculties which

are

responsible

for

experience (cf. Subfig

emp

86,23-87,12).

In Empiricist usage, however,

the

words

for

experience

are not re-

stricted to these meanings any more than autopsia is restricted to its

official meaning. Empeiria, in particular, is often used in place of peira,

and

both

are

frequently used

for the

activities

of

perception

and

obser-

vation that give rise to

peira

and

empeiria

in the

sense

of knowledge, just

as activity words like

autopsy

and

Observation

ôÞñçóéò)

are some-

times used of the knowledge to which the activities give rise Subfig emp

47,26-48,4;

48,11-21).

2

Nevertheless,

the

distinctions that

we

have seen

are available make it easier to characterize ancient empiricism. Art or

expertise

is

experience empeiria)

and

experience, both

in the

sense

of

empeiria

and that

of

peira, has its source in the activities of perception and

observation. This knowledge is confined to what can be perceived or

observed, items which are called phenomena, evident matters or percep-

tibles by the Empiricists. One can, however, supplement the experience

1 On this poin t see

Frede,

1990.

2 ðåßñá

for

å ì ð åéñß á [Galen], On the best

sect,

1131,

8-9

K

hn = fr. 51 Deichgr ber.

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92 James llen

one has as a result of one s own observation w i th history

É ó ô ï ñ ß á )

—

w hat one

learns

by

reading

and

evaluating

the

reports

of

other people,

which

is

ultimately based

on

their

own

observations

Subf ig emp 47,

14-26).

II

It

should

be

plain that

a

rather generous conception

of

experience, both

in

the

sense

of the

activities

of

perception

and

observation

and in the

sense

of the knowledge they yield, is presupposed. The phenomena or

evident matters that are perceived or observed are things like people,

animals, mountains

or

trees

as

well

as

certain states, qualities

and

activities o f theirs like being green or running or having a fever. Ques-

tions about how observation conceived in this way is ultimately based

on what modem philosophers

call

immediate experience or bare sensa-

tion receive little attention. Instead the

focus

is on how expert knowledge

complete

and

systematic enough

to

qualify

as an

art, e.g.,

o f

medicine,

can

arise

out of

observation

or

experience

of

people, their activities,

habits, diets, environments, symptoms and the like. Nonetheless, gener-

ous as this conception of experience is, it restricts experience to knowl-

edge

that

certain patterns

o f

sequence

an d

correlation among

phenomena obtain.

T he

causes which would explain

wh y the

patterns

occur and recur as they do can be grasped, if at all, only by means of

faculties other than those responsible

for

experience.

The

idea that

it is

only

facts

that

which

are

accessible

to

experience

is

behind a way in which we use the term empirical , e.g., when we speak

of

an

empirical

question . Our

point when speaking

in

this

way is

less

that the question has been or is likely to be resolved by experience than

that, because the truth at issue is not determined by laws of nature or

laws of reason or relations o f ideas or the like — and therefore cannot be

known

by

grasping

h ow it is

determined

in one of

these privileged ways

—

it is a contingent matter of fact that can be known, if at all, by

experience.

B ut it is

important

to

note that

it is

possible

to

grasp

facts,

which are not empirical questions in this sense, as empirical truths.

Something that

we

grasp

as a

fact that

on the

basis

of

experience

may be

th e

necessary consequence

of the

inalterable nature

of

things;

and

some-

one in a position to grasp it as the necessary consequence of

first

principles will grasp

it as

more than

a fact that.

Aristotle s theory

of

knowledge, for example, depends

on

a contrast between grasping a truth


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Experience as a ource 93

as a fact of experience and grasping that same truth as required and

explained

by

first principles.

The

disagreement between rationalism

and

empiricism,

as it is

usu-

ally

understood, presupposes

a

f ramework

of

common assumptions that

was

widely if not universally shared. They emerge especially clearly, for

instance, in the

account

of the

dif ferent epistemic conditions

at the

beginning of Aristotle s

M etaphysics

A l, 980a27 f f . , 981a27 f f . .

i)

Experience grasps only

facts that;

ii) The causes that supply the reasons w h y these facts obtain, if they

can be

known

a t

all,

are the

object

of a

separate rational

faculty;

iii)

Experience is prior to this rational faculty, whose insights, if and

when

possible, are

nonetheless somehow based

on

experience.

This

framework

was

treated

as uncontroversial by

many philoso-

phers and scientists in antiquity, especially in the Hellenistic period,

when just about everyone seems to have been committed to an episte-

mology that was broadly empiricist in the

sense

of taking all knowledge

to

be

based,

ultimately and in the last analysis, on a grasp of the

evident.

The Epicureans seem to have subscribed to an especially strong form of

this position. Pronouncements

of

theirs

to the

effect that

all

knowledge

either

consists

in or

arises

out of a

grasp

of the

evident

are not

hard

to

find

(e.g., Letter to Herodotus 38; Diogenes Laertius X , 32). Nonetheless I

mean to argue that the use Epicureanism made of the common empirical

tradition led them to

take

a position which the

f ramework

could not

accommodate or could accommodate only with very significant

qualifi-

cations. One way of putting this — though this too will require

qualifi-

cation

— is to say

that

the

Epicureans were committed

to a

still more

generous conception of experience.

Ill

W e

can see this, among other places, in the apparently exhaustive

scheme for assessing opinions as true or false proposed by Epicurus DL

X 34;

Ep

H dt

51-2; Sextus

Empir icus, M VII

211-16). Attestation

and

non-attestation Ý ðé ì á ñôýñç óé ò and ïõê Ýðé ì áñôýñçóéò )

apply

to

evident

matters; contestation

and

non-contestation

Ü íôé ì á ñôýñçóéò and

ïõê

Ü í ô é ì á ñ ô ý ñ ç ó é ò ) to nonevident matters. Falsity arises when an opinion

is

either

not

attested

or is

contested

by the

evident, truth when

it is

either


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94 James llen

attested or not

contested

by the

evident.

The

opinion that that

is Plato

over there, for instance, awaits attestation. It can legitim ately be accepted

as

true

if, upon closer inspection, it is attested or rejected as false if, under

th e

same conditions,

it is not

attested.

An

opinion about nonevident

m atters is contested when it has an observable consequence that obser-

vation

shows tobe

false; not

contested when

its

observable consequences

are not

shown

to be

false

by

observation.

Why the

mere absence

of

contestation should confirm th e truth of an opinion about the nonevi-

dent is a notorious puzzle to which we shall turn in a moment; the use

of

contestation to eliminate false opinions, on the other hand,

seems

not

to

present

a

problem. Thus

the

false opinion that there

is no void,

which

is the

contradictory

of the

true Epicurean doctrine,

is

contested

by the

evident fact that there is motion, as there would not be if there were no

void for bodies to move into — or so the Epicureans maintained

Ep

Hdt

40; Lucretius I 334 .

But

suppose

we

connect contestation

and

non-attestation

in the way

that seems most obvious. Then

a

false opinion about nonevident matters

will be contested when one of its observable consequences is not attested

in

the

appropriate

conditions .

Sometimes, when

the

observable conse-

quence

of the

thesis

to be

contested

is a

universal negative, e.g., that there

is no motion, this can be achieved by the attestation of a single counter-

instance, assuming that

we

grant

the

unobjectionable principle that

if P

is attested then not-P

is not

attested.

One

observed episode

of

motion

will banish

the

denial o f

void

and vindicate its contradictory.

Matters are not always so simple, however. Consider, for example,

the

Epicurean argument

for the

principle that nothing comes

to be from

nothing.

If it

did, then anything could come

to be

anywhere

at any

time

without the proper seeds, which is contested because not attested by

observation E p H d t

38;

Lucretius 1159 ff . ) .

Or the

argument that atoms

cannot

be of any

size because,

if

they were, there would have

to be

visible

atomic

bodies, which

is

likewise

not

attested

E p

H d t 55-6; Lucretius

II

496-9).

3

Yet as w e have seen, attestation and non-attestation appear to

establish only contingent matters of fact or empirical truths. A classical

3 To be

sure,

he adds

other reasons, e.g., that

it is not

possible

to

conceive

how an

atom could become visible. This may refer to his theory of vision, according to which

vision is caused by the flow of invisible atomic f i lms

from

the object being seen to

the eyes. The problem would then be how an atom of this size could interact with

the organs of

visual perception.


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Experience as a ource 95

empiricist, a Humean descendent of his, or indeed anyone who sub-

scribes to the

framework

described above, will patiently explain that the

fact that episodes

of

random spontaneous generation

or

absolutely

unbreakable

objects

have

not

been attested

in our

experience,

and

that

recorded history contains no traces of them,

does

not by

itself

entitle us

to conclude that one has not been overlooked or will not occur or be

found

in ten seconds, or ten years or ten million years. According to this

familiar way of looking at things, no amount of observation or experi-

ence by

itself

can rule it out as a possibility.

It

appears that something more

is

required

to

establish opinions

of the

kind that are candidates for contestation and non-contestation. W e must

somehow

be

able

to

tell that what

is

implied

by the

false

opinion

to be

contested, e.g., the manifest episodes of random spontaneous generation

that

are implied by the opinion that creation

ex nihilo

is possible or the

visible atoms that

are

implied

by the opinion

that atoms

can be of any

size, are not the sort or type or kind of thing that can happen or exist. But

attestation and non-attestation through or by means

of

the evident do

not seem to be equal to this task.

The

same result appears

to

follow

if we

approach matters

from

a

different angle.

The

principal candidates

fo r

contestation, which

can be

rejected as false if contested and accepted as true if not contested, are

theories,

for example, the theories about meteorological matters that are

discussed in the Letter

to P ythocles

Ep

Py th).

And the

main source

of

these

is analogy with the phenomena with us (ðáñ

ÞìÀí)

or, as translators often

put it,

in

our experience Ep

H dt

80). Inevitably it often happens that

more than one theory about the nonevident causation of a natural

phenomenon

suggested

by

analogy remains uncontested (cf. Lucretius

V I

703

f f . .

Yet it

appears that

the

status

of

such

a

theory

is not

like that

of

an opinion about an evident matter awaiting attestation by remaining

epistemically possible, i.e., possible for all we know or can say, as long

as it is not

falsified

by observation. Rather, Epicurus seems to have

regarded all the theories compatible with the phenomena as objectively

possible.

Indeed, he

seems

to

have held that they

are

true

in the

sense

of

being realized either a t some time in our world or in some other world

in the

infinite universe (Lucretius

V

526-33).

Now

suppose

that one could somehow be on the moon in the way

imagined by Aristotle in the Posterior

Analytics

and see which accounts

of

eclipses

or

waxing

and

waning

do not

obtain there

(I 31, 87b39; II

90a26). Apparently, on the Epicurean view, the fact that these theories

are not directly attested in these conditions would not show that they

are

false

as claims about what might be or what is true in some world.


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96

James

llen

Y et this is not how Epicurus treated our

failures

to observe episodes of

random spontaneous generation

or to find

a to ms

of

observable size.

These revealed that certain phen om ena — or

objects

or events that would

have

to be

phenomena

if

they we re capable

of

ex is t ing— are

not the

kind

of

things

that can exist at all, and thereby refute certain theo ries once and

for

all.

4

Trips to the moon or

efforts

to determine whether that is , say,

Plato

ove r there, by establishing contingent matters of fact, serve only to

show that an opinion is false here or a theory does not apply in this

cosmos.

The w ay in which the two pairs — attestation and no n-attestation, on

the

one hand, and conte station and non-contestation, on the other — are

both said

to

take place

through

the

evident

appears

to

conceal

a gap

between two quite dif ferent ways of grasping the evident and to leave

the relation betwe en them in the dark Sextus Em piricus M V II 216). At

any rate, this is how someone in sym pathy w ith the frame w ork that I

outlined above is likely to feel.

This suspicion is we ll foun ded, and it receives add itiona l sup po rt from

the use

Epicurus makes

of analogies

wi th

the

phenomena

in

establishing

theories about

the

nonevident. This

use

makes

the

most sense

if it

rests

on the assumption that a grasp of the evident puts us in

possession

of

truths not only, as we have seen, about w hat cannot be, but also about

what , in ve ry robust sense, can be. Near the end of the Letter to

Herodotus

Epicurus says:

seeing

in how

m any ways

the

like comes

to be

wi th

us

ðáñ Þìúí),

one

must theorize about

the

causes

áÀôé ïë ïãçôÝï í )

o f

astro-

4 The

discussion

of the

shapes

of the cosmoi in the

Letter to

Pythocles 88

migh t seem

to

count against this. There

it is

said that many shapes

are

possible because this

is

contested

by none of the phenomena in this cosmos, whose boundary it is not

possible to grasp. This could be

taken

to mean

that

the m an y possible cosmic shapes

are not

contested

since we

cannot grasp

the

shape

of our own cosmos, wi th the

implication that ,

if we

could,

all of the shapes apar t

from

the one

that

belongs to our

cosmos would be contested. In this case, the ir non-attestation here wo uld contest

the

possibility

of

their obtaining an yw here

at

all.

I

take

the

po int rather

to be

tha t

th e

many possible shapes

are not

contested

by

phenomena

wi th in

this cosmos,

whose

own

boundary,

like

the way in

w hich eclipses

and

many

othe r phenomena

come

about i n it , are,

as it

happens, unkno wn .


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Experience as a

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97

nomical phenomena ì å ô Ýù ñ á ) and everything nonevident (80). And in

th e

Letter to

Pythodes, he

offers multiple explanations for

a

host

of

meteorological

phenomena based

on

analogies with

the

behavior

of

medium sized physical objects that we can observe

from

close up.

If every possibility is realized somewhere or at some time in the

infinite universe, analogies suggested by observation of the phenomena

among

us

will suggest theories that stand

a

good chance

of

being true

in

th e sense

that they

are

true

of

some episodes

of the

phenomenon

to be

explained at

some time

or in

some cosmos.

But is

being suggested

by the

phenomena

sufficient

to show that a theory is genuinely possible, and

therefore true in this

way?

Perhaps, despite having a better chance of

being true on Epicurean assumptions than it would on other assump-

tions,

a

theory suggested

by an

analogy with

the

phenomena has,

so

far,

only been shown to be epistemically

possible.

It

could still

happen, for

all

w e know or can say, that it is not genuinely or objectively possible.

And

if this is so, we shall be

entitled

to accept it as a genuine possibility

only

after it has survived th e test of contestation by the phenomena. If it

does not survive, then it only seemed to be genuinely possible.

Some of Epicurus language

suggests

an interpretation along these

lines

or is

compatible with

it

Ep Pyth

92, 93,

98-9).

But

there

is

also

evidence suggesting that likeness of the right kind to a phenomenal

analogue

is

suff icient

to

establish

a

theory about nonevident causation

as true. In parts of the Letter

to Pythodes,

where explanations based on

analogies with the phenomena in our experience are discussed, these

phenomena

are

four times said

to bid or call

for

the

analogous explana-

tions

(87, 94,100,113). This may be merely suggestive, but in the same

work,

after

remarking that the waxing and waning

of

the

moon can come

about in all the ways in which we observe similar phenomena coming

about in our experience, and noting that the same is true of the way in

which the moon gets its light and presents a visage to us, Epicurus says

that someone

who

accepts

one of the

explanations

and rejects the

others

will be in

conflict

ìÜ÷ç)

with

the

evident (96). And, after reviewing

the

explanations for the varying lengths of nights and days over the course

of the year that are suggested by analogous occurrences in our experi-

ence, Epicurus insists that

it is

necessary

to

speak

of

meteorological

mat te r s

in a

manner

that is

consonant

or in

agreement

(óõìöþíùò)

with

the phenomena,

before

going on to say that those who accept only one

explanation are, once again, in

conflict

with the phenomena (98).

I t seems very much as if a theory s similarity to the phenomena is

sufficient

to

ensure that

it is in

agreement with them,

and

that being

in

agreement with

the

phenomena guarantees that

a

theory

is

true,

in the


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98

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sense of being possible and true somewhere

or

at some time, for it is

implied that to reject one of the explan ations based on analogy with a

phenomenon is to deny the reality of the phenomenon that it resembles.

Perhaps theories undergo a do uble test. W hen put

forward

as universal

explanations

holding of all times and places, they q ual ify as true if they

are merely not contested by the

phenomena

but w hen reform ulated as

claims a bo ut possibility, each has a co ntradictory, viz., the proposition

that

it is not

possible, which

is in

conflict with

the

phenomenon that

i t

resembles and which w as the basis of the ana logy tha t is its sourc e. This

would mean that theories — conc eived as c laims abo ut objective possi-

bility — follow from the phenomena to w hich they a re analogous. The

grounds that

the

phenomenon

on

which

an

analogous theory

is

based

furnish

for

accepting

the

theory would then complement

the

grounds

furnished

by the

fact

that the theory is not contested by the phenomena

quite generally.

Epicurus use of the vocabulary o f signs and sign-inference o f signs

that

seem

to

signify

how

nonevident m atters

a re by

being sim ilar

to

them

lends add itiona l support to this suggestion Ep Pyth 97; cf. 104). To reject

some possible explanations while giving a rbitra ry preferenc e

to one is

he

maintains,

to be

unable

to

grasp

the

phenomena

as

signs

and to be

carried into inconceivability (97). My

guess

is that the inconc eivability

that he means is that of denying that one instance of a type of behavior

is possible when other m anifes t instances of it show that behavior of that

type

is

possible.

For our present purpo se, w ha t m atters most is that E pic urus wa s able to

assign such

an

impo rtant part

to

an alogy because

he did not

share

the

assumptions about wha t

can and

cannot

fall

under

a

grasp

of the

evident

that are incorporated in the f ramework set out above. Ac co rding to these

assumptions, on the basis of such a grasp w e know only that things have

behaved as we have observed they did. This knowledge will make an

empiricist, who relies only on experience, expec t that events will coin-

cide, follow

and

precede

one

another

as

they have been observed

to

without

in any way

justifying

h is

expectation.

But

Epicurus

seems to

suppose that, in grasping the phenomena, we grasp how things can and

must

be. I am

tempted

to go

further

and say

that, acco rding

to

Epicurus

to

grasp the pheno m ena is, within limits and in pa rt, to und erstand the

causes at work by grasping the natures in virtue of which ordinary


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Experience

as a

ource 99

medium sized

objects act and

behave

as

they

do .

Understanding

how

and why they behave as they do, we thereby see how bigger objects

fur ther

away that are relevantly like them by sharing the nature respon-

sible for

their behavior must behave.

The

same holds

mutatis mutandis

for

smaller

objects

whose distance from

us m ay be

negligible,

bu t

which

are

too

small

for us to

perceive.

Grasping true theories about the nonevident extends and

deepens

our

understanding of the causes which explain and necessitate the behavior

we

a re able to observe, but the sharp line which the framework takes to

separate knowledge of the phenomena from the grasp of truths about

what

can and must be of the kind that f igure in causal explanations

appears

not to be a

part

of

Epicureanism .

5

For

adherents

of the

f rame-

work, anything that smacks

of

knowledge

o f

natures,

the

necessities they

impose and the possibilities they

open

up is knowledge of the nonevi-

dent, to be had, if it can be had at all, by inference or by means o f another

exercise of a special

rational

faculty

distinct from

experience. But as we

have seen, this

is not so

for Epicurus

and the

Epicureans:

the

grasp

of the

evident, which precedes and secures all knowledge of the nonevident,

must

itself

already be a grasp, however partial, of how

things

can and

must be.

Should we then say that the Epicureans were committed to a concep-

tion of experience still more generous and richer than the one enshrined

in the f ramework — the suggestion that I put forward fo r consideration

above?

6

Perhaps, bu t there are reasons to hesitate, most notably the fact

that this is not something any Epicurean ever says or I suspect, ever

would say.

The

framework takes experience

to be

coordinate with

evident matters or phenomena. They are accessible to experience, and

the

knowledge

o ne has of

them

is

experience.

A

better

way of

describing

the

distinctive character

of the

Epicurean

position, I

shall suggest, would

be to say that this coordination does not obtain in Epicureanism.

5 Perhaps this is what Epicurus is saying in a passage of the Letter to

Pythocles

where

he

notes that

signs

about celestial matters

are

furnished

by

certain phenomena

m

ou r

experience concerning which

it

is

seen

how they are

—

unlike celestial phenom-

ena themselves 87; c f. Ep Hdl 80).

N.B.

however, that this reading is based on an

emendation.

6

This

is

something

I

have

said

elsewhere.

See

Allen, 2001,196,236-9.


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100

James

llen

This becomes clear when we try to see wh at Epicurus and his follow -

ers though t abo ut ancient form s of em piricism. To jud ge by the available

evidence it is not a

subject that Epicu rus himself took m uc h

of an

interest

in .

7

Philodemus

is a

different

matter, however.

On Signs and

Sign-infer-

ences (henceforward On Signs) defends the so called m ethod of similarity,

which would allow

us to

infer, e.g., that

all

hu m an beings everywhere

are mortal

from

the

fact

that

those

amon g us are or that atoms behave

mutatis mutandis in the way visible bodies do from th e fact that visible

bodies behave in that wa y. The work is full of terms and notions from

empiricism, which retain th e

meanings

they have in it, e.g.,

peira

and

historia.

And

Philodemus directly confronts

the

problem that arises

already in Epicurus, nam ely how observation of a finite

sample

however

large of, say, hum an beings, can entitle us to conclude that all human

beings everywhere are

m ortal.

The

occasion for

the

work

is the

challenge

presented by unnamed opponents w ho raise precisely this problem . Yet

Philodemus does not credit

peira,

the activity, w ith any more powers or

take

the

knowledge

we

have

as a

result

of it to

extend

any

further

or

penetrate any more deeply than em piricism does.

8

Consider, how ever, Letter to H erodotus, 79 ,

where Epicurus rem arks that

w h a t

comes

under history

(É ó ô ï ñ ß á )

about

th e risings,

settings , eclipses

and like

matters

does not

contribute to

blessedness because

it

leaves untouc hed fears

that can

block

the way

to

happiness.

H is

point

is

that it is

possible

to have a great

deal

of

astronomical

knowledge

of

this kind while rema ining vulnerable

to

superst it ion, which

can be

banished only by a

grasp

of the

natures

( ö ý ó å éò ) and principal

causes

( íõ ñ é þ ô á ô ï é

á ú ô ß á é underlying

the

phenomena.

É ó ô ï ñ ß á ,

though

not the

exclus ive property

of

Empiricists,

was a key term of theirs, and this passage reads very much

like

a

rejection of

merely empirical astronomy in

favor

of a

version

that

satisfies

the

rationalists demand

for explanation by way of

natures

and

causes, albeit

fo r

reasons

peculiar

to E picureanism.

And

in his wo rk

On rhetoric,

using lang uag e

that

would

not

hav e been

out of

place

in a Platonist

inspired

by the Gorgias, he maintains

that

practices grounded

in

observation and history, ð á ñ á ô Þ ñ ç ó é ò and

É ó ô ï ñ ß á , which

he calls ô ñ é â á ß , are not

arts

properly speaking

Rhet

I I X X X 1 9 f f ; but cf. X X X V I I I 2 f f .


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Experience

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VI

How, then, are

we

able

to

infer

conclusions about

the

nonevident

from

the phenomena? A crucial part in the Epicurean account appears to be

played

by

epilogismos,

which, or at least the term for which, was, as we

noted, also used

by the

medical

Empiricists.

They stressed

two

features:

that

epilogismos

is concerned exclusively with evident matters, unlike

analogismos, the form of reasoning that is employed by the Rationalists

and

which allows them

to

deduce nonevident conclusions;

and

that

it is

the kind of

reasoning employed

by

ordinary human beings

in

everyday

life.

They

use it, for

instance,

of

inferring

one

evident matter, which

is

temporarily

nonevident,

from

another, which they

call

commemorative

signification elsewhere,

e.g.,

since

there is smoke, there is

fire Sect

ingred

10 23-4;

11,

9-10).

As I noted above, however, this is not how the Epicureans used the

term.

An earlier tendency to render it as

empirical inference

has been

much criticized. Though Philodemus speaks frequently of the

epilogismos

of the phenomena, and even, in one especially badly preserved passage,

of

the

application

of

epilogismos

to

what

has

been grasped

by

experience

peira) (fr. 4), a survey of Epicurean usage shows that it is

often

applied

to items that are not obviously empirical. Epicurus himself speaks of the

epilogismos of the end or telos, and one of Philodemus authorities,

Demetrius of Laconia, speaks intriguingly of his

opponents failure

to

apply

ep ilogismos to

their

own

method

of

inference (XXVII I13 ff.). What

is

more,

it is not

obvious that

the

rational activity designated

by epilo-

gismos is a matter

of

inference. Viewed in isolation, a few

passages

seem

to suggest that

epilogismos

is the inference of the nonevident conclusion

from evident signs (XX II37 ff.), but it is plain from a

fuller

survey of the

evidence that

epilogismos

belongs to a preliminary phase prior to the

inference

of a nonevident conclusion, for which the terms

sign-infer-

ence

(óçìåßùóéò)

or reasoning (óõëëïãßæåóèáé) are reserved.

9

Philode-

mus speaks of advancing or making a transition to a nonevident

conclusion through

or by

means

of epilogismos

because

epilogismos is an

indispensable precondition

for the

inference,

not the

inference proper.

The

noun

Ýðéëïãéóìüò and the

verb

Ýðéëïãßæåóèáé

occur

in

several

different constructions.

We find the

verb used with

a

direct

object and

9 Cf. Barnes,

1988,130-1,

Sedley, 1978, 27-34, and especially Schofield, 1996.


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102 James llen

the noun taking an objective genitive, e.g., the epilogismo s of the end or

of the phenomena which have already been mentioned.

10

The verb can

be

used

to

introduce

a

subordinate clause that with which

we

seem

to

come closest to reasoning as

inference

or

deduction.

11

And there are

constructions

in

which

the

verb takes

a

direct

object

and introduces

a

subordinate clause — the

consider

the lilies, how

they grow

construc-

tion especially

fam iliar

in Greek verbs

to

know , where the

subordinate

clause unpacks

in

propositional form what

it is one

knows

o/an

item

in

knowing it (Philodemus,

On Signs

XXVIII15-25;

cf. Epicurus,

Men

133,

where

the

construction

is

implicit).

Though

the

last construction

is rare, the

fact tha t

it is

possible

may

help

us.

Suppose

we

distinguish between

the

materials

to

which reason-

ing is applied and its upshot or result. I hesitate to say

conclusion

because I do not want to prejudge the question of whether the reasoning

at

issue is a fo rm of deduction or inference, though the premises of an

inference may perhaps be viewed as one kind of material and its conclu-

sion as one kind of upshot

or

result. The distinguishing feature of

epilogistic reasoning, signaled by the prefix

epi-

would then be that the

materials to which one applies it and that about which one knows, or

knows better, as a result are the same.

12

Passages in which epilogismos/epi-

logizesthai takes a direct object or objective genitive, signifying the mate-

rial to which epilogistic reasoning is applied, and passages in which

epilogismos/epilogizesthai introduces a subordinate clause, signifying the

upshot or conclusion of the reasoning, would then be incomplete speci-

fications

of part of a whole instance of epilogistic reasoning.

Whether every

use of

epilogismos

can be

made

to fit

this pattern,

I

do not

know.

But if

this

is the

basic idea,

it

might explain

some

things

about

both the Epicurean and Empiricist uses of the term. For instance,

though it is far f rom clear that this distinction is marked in Epicureanism,

according to the Empiricists, what distinguishes epilogismos

f rom

the

analogismos of the rationalists is that it never departs f rom the phenom-

10 W ith a direct object· E picuru s, E p H dt 72

Letter

to M enoeceus 133,

Principal Do ctrines

XXII,

Philodemus, O n Signs XIII

32. W ith an

objective

genitive-

Epicurus,

Principle

Doctrines

XX;

hilodemus, O n Signs XXII37 ,

XXVII 23.

11 Epicurus,

Vatican Sayings

35,

Ep Hdt

73; Phi lodemus,

On

Signs

XXVIII16

12

For these

ideas

ab o u t epilogismos an d analogismos see

Schofield, 1996, nn.

8 which

contains

suggestions of David

Sedley)

and 12


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104

James

llen

one another in certain pattern s and w ith certain re lat ive frequencies. O n

the basis of this knowledge he

can

in a manner of speakin g reason

about

the

phenomena

and form

reasonable expectations abo ut unob-

served observables

or

phenomena

to be. A s a

resul t

o f his

ep ilogismos

on

the other hand the Epicurean has a grasp h ow eve r incomplete and

partial of the natures and powers of the i tems he is s tudying . And on

this basis he is able to

infer

that unobserved and even

unobservable

item s

m ust be the same or similar.

V II

the

Epicureans had

as I put it

earlier

a

still m ore gene rous conception

of

experience than that admitted

by the f ramework

then

it is not one

they described

in

terms draw n from

the

standard em pirical v ocabulary.

The

activities that w ent under

the

head

o f

experience

remained capable

only of grasping facts that

devoid

of necessity and explanatory power.

you will Epicurean epistemology

depends

on a more than em pirical

grasp o r comprehension of the phenom ena or the ev iden t. It is pretty

clear that

epilogismos to

which Epicurus

had

a lready

appealed, w as

enlisted by Philodemus

Epicurean authorities

to

close

a gap

between

the deliverances of experience and the grasp of the phenomena that is

necessary if sign-inferences to the nonevident are to be possible. It is also

a

fair

guess that their opp onents responded

by

tak ing epilogistic reason-

ing to be a matter of inference or ded uction . H av ing elicited the admis-

sion tha t experience

b y

itself tells

us

no thing about

how

things must

be

they could then proceed

by

demanding

to

know

how an

inference

from

the

data

of

experience

can

yield

a

grasp

of the

phenomena which

is at

once the upshot o r result of epilogismos and a sufficient basis for sign-in-

ferences

to the

nonevident.

Thus if the f ramework cannot accom mo date Epicurean views it is

not

because

the

Epicureans explicitly disavow

the

assumptions that

compose it.

Indeed such evidence

as w e

hav e suggests they might hav e

been w illing to endorse claims ab ou t the limits of experience strictly so

called.

Y et the

fact

that they

do not

take experience

to be

coordinate w ith

the phenomena and as I put it earlier permit a more than empirical

grasp

or

comprehension

of the

phenom ena m ean s that this tells

us less

abo ut Epicureanism than it otherw ise m ight. This is not the com prehen-

sion

of the

phenomena that

w e

have when

w e

view them

in the

light

of

first

principles or as effects of their underlying causes because it is an

essential precondition

for

aetiology. A ccord ing

to

orthodo x adherents

to


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Experience as a

ource

105

th e

f ramework, experience plays this

part ,

whereas

for

Epicureans,

experience

merely prepares the wa y

for

the more than empirical grasp

of th e phenomena that in turn supports rational insights about nonevi-

dent matters.

If

experience

were simply

the

name

for the

grasp

or

comprehension

of the

phenomena that precedes aetiology, then

the

Epicureans

would disavow th e restrictions on empirical knowledge

imposed

by the

f ramework.

suggest that we look at matters in this way. Sometimes, when

philosophers like Plato

and

Aristotle defended

one

position

and op-

posed another, they were

not

taking

a

familiar position

in a

dispute

that

was

already being conducted along

wel l

defined lines

so

much

as

creating

a new way of

understanding

th e

issues.

When

th e

medical

Empiricists

defend

th e

claim that experience

can by itself

give rise

to

artistic knowledge, it is an impoverished

form

of experience, experience

as conceived and marked o ff from reason by Plato and Aristotle. But it

is doubtful that earlier figures

w ho

made large claims

for

experience

drew

the

lines quite

so

sharply. Rather,

from the

point

of

view

of

Plato

and

Aristotle,

it was

probably

fairer to say

that they

failed to see

that

knowledge of the kind which they

assumed

could be explained by

experience

and

perception alone actually requires

a

separate rational

faculty with distinctive powers of its own. In this respect, as in others,

Epicurus is something o f a throwback.

14

Bibliography

Allen,

James.

2001.

Inf erence

from Signs:

Ancient

Debates

about

th e

Nature

o f

Evidence.

Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Annas, J. and Grimm,

R.H.,

eds. 1988.

O x f o r d

Studies in Ancient Philosophy suppl. vol.

Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press.

Barnes, Jonathan. 1988. Epicurean

Signs ,

in Annas and Gr imm, eds. 91-134

De Lacy, P.H. and H.A., eds. 2nd edn. 1978. Philodemus: On Methods

of

n f e r e n c e Naples:

Bibliopolis.

14 I am grateful

fo r

comments and criticism to the

participants

in the conference, to the

speakers

and audience at Philoso phy in Assos, Ju ly 2004, where I

delivered

a paper

related to this one, and to the participants in the

Pi t tsburgh/Athens Symposium,

October

2000,

where

I first

presented some

of

these ideas

as a

commentator

on

Michael Frede's paper,

Experience

in the ancient Empiricists


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106 James Allen

Deichgräber, Kar l , ed 2nd edn 1965 D ie

g riechische

Empinkerschule

Sammlung der

Frag

mente

und

Darste l lung

der

Lehre Ber li n W ei dm a n n

Everson,

S. ed.

1990. Companions to

Ancient

Thought

Epistenwlogy. Ca m br i dge : Ca m bridge

Universi ty Press.

Frede, M. 1990. An empiricist view of know ledge: m em orism , in Evers on , ed 225-50.

Frede,

M. and Striker, G ., eds. 1996. Rationality

in

Creek

Thought .

Oxford: Oxford Univers ity

Press.

Schofield, M . 1996. Epilogismos: An Appraisal , in Frede and Striker, eds 221-37.

Sedley,

D.

1973.

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5-83


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