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Alberti & Marshall Local Theories and Conceptually Open-Ended Methodologies

Benjamin Alberti & Yvonne Marshall

Cambridge Archaeological Journal19:3, 34557 2009 McDonald Institute for Archaeological Researchdoi:10.1017/S0959774309000535 Received 1 April 2009; Accepted 20 May 2009; Revised 30 July 2009

Animating Archaeology: Local Theories andConceptually Open-ended Methodologies

We use ontology, here, to mean the possibility ofgiving credence to other worlds, not simply as a noblerelativizing but ultimately hypocritical gesture but

as a means to force the production of new materialconcepts. We argue that ontological breakthrough(Henare et al. 2007) in archaeology is possible if indig-enous theories are taken seriously as ontologies ratherthan epistemologies and combined with insights fromontologically relational and inherently indeterminate.Animism, then, is not a resource for theory but asource of theory.

Archaeological references to ethnographiesserve to enhance or measure the accuracy of ourinterpretations, and have proven a productive sourceof analogies for past life and as illustrative material

for theoretical debate, especially around the notionof object agency (e.g. Gell 1998; see Brown & Walker2008). The philosophical underpinnings of animistbeliefs and practices are rarely treated as theory intheir own right, but rather as mistaken epistemolo-gies. In contrast, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2006,16) has argued that to avoid such epistemologicalpick pocketing we must treat non-Western theoriesin a symmetrical way to western theories (sensu

Here we have a peculiar ontology which we couldto be thought.

Giorgio Agamben, What is a paradigm?

Introduction: from culture to ontology

It is apparent that accounts of non-modern worlds conceptualizing reality. As archaeologists, then, howdo we access and write about worlds that could beentirely incommensurable with our own world ofexperience? What theoretical and methodologicaltools are necessary for the task? Even to speak ofmultiple ontologies can seem oxymoronic. Ontologyis supposed to carry the weight of the real world, to be

the ground of action and understanding for archaeo-logy as for other social and natural disciplines; and soto pluralize it sounds like a trivialization, or a post-modern discursive trick. Conversely, the plural risksthe suggestion of synonymy with culture. Both ofthese very real possibilities are symptoms of preciselythe elision of ontological concerns by epistemologicalones engendered by modernity (Henare et al. 2007;Latour 1993; Rollason 2008; Viveiros de Castro 2003).


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Animating Archaeology

Latour 1993). Similarly, anthropologist Tim Ingold,and feminist philosopher and physicist Karen Barad,both introduce us to relational ontology as a morefundamental account of the inherent dynamism and conceptualization allows. We nonetheless suggest thatthe globalizing tendency of both theorists is problem-atic. We need to challenge this tendency by refusingto grant priority to any particular theoretical positionand by adopting methodologies that are responsiveto alternative ontologies. A methodology grounded inthe potential for alternative worlds to become manifestin archaeological material is adapted from Henare etal.s (2007) call to take seriously apparently anoma-

lous claims in ethnography about the congruence ofmeaning and thing.In this article we explore the theoretical pos-

sibilities of an archaeology which takes ontologicalalterity seriously. We begin by discussing some offor new kinds of ontology put forward by Viveirosde Castro, Tim Ingold and Karen Barad. We thenconsider how their ideas might enable new ways of

northwest Argentina (Figs. 14). What emerges is thepossibility that the local ontology was one in which

however, bodies and body-pots required constant

Archaeology, animism, and object agency

animating spirit or soul (Tylor 1993 (1871)), theresurgence of interest in animism has included itsreformulation as a type of relational ontology (e.g.Descola 1996; Ingold 2000; Alberti & Bray, this issue).

Ethnographic accounts of other peoples worlds aresimultaneously the main provocation and the chiefresource to think about ontological alterity througharchaeology. The nature of their inclusion has been-beliefs (see Alberti & Bray, this issue). Animismhas been incorporated both as a source for modelsof past life, an analogical usage, and a resource forarchaeological theory. The notion of object agencyillustrates how productive such incorporation hastheory. Also revealed, however, is a potential barrierto understanding the world as quite literally other,as the notion itself relies on a leap of faith.

The incorporation of a focus on animism inarchaeology has paralleled an interest in exploringethnographic analogies that challenge taken-for-granted concepts, such as personhood (e.g. Fowler2004), gender and sexuality (e.g. Weismantel 2004),and materiality (e.g. Parker Pearson et al. 2006). Thisethnographically rich work has been enormously pro-ductive of theories and analogies for archaeologicalconsumption i.e. as fuel or leverage for under-standing past lives (Fowler 2004; Thomas 2004, 241).

Broadly we agree with Thomas (2004, 241) when heargues that the most important role of ethnographicof prehistoric societies but in troubling and disruptingwhat we think we already know. Nonetheless, modelsthe application of analogies are likely to recover varia-tions of particular epistemologies (worldviews), ratherthan ontologies (worlds) precisely because of thetendency to reduce others ontologies to epistemolo-

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gies in the present. In other words, epistemologicalconcerns posit culture or belief as a lens through whichwe know a singular the world, whereas ontology isconcerned with what it is we consider the world to

universal given and the former culturally variable. Assuch, analogies will likely remain fascinating episte-mological alternatives to a Western worldview (whatwe know), rather than alternative ontologies (whatis real to us), if a uni-natural model remains dominantin archaeology (see Viveiros de Castro 1998; 2003).things, we argue that object agency exposes a lackof commitment to other peoples worlds and theories,acting as a cognitive trap that prevents archaeologistsfrom launching a fully ontological inquiry. The issue

our theories.

Recent theories of materiality in archaeology,especially in relation to the notion of object agency,clearly converge with ethnographic accounts ofother peoples relations to their environment and 2004; Ingold 2000; Sillar 2004). A stress on the activerole of material culture (Hodder 1986) has evolvedinto thinking of objects or material as agents (e.g.the idea is conceptually uncomplicated things do, potential agency of materials or objects, the notionof secondary agency, popularized by Gell (1998),helped convince people of the analytical legitimacy ofsuch non-human agents. The term implies a distinc-tion between human agency and a kind of objectagency as its derivative (e.g. Robb 2005). In particularcircumstances certain things can act as stand-ins foragents through a process of abduction. Some objectsclearly do have natural properties that mean they quiteliterally can act on people (for example trees fall) andpeople act as if objects could act (for example Alfred

be unimportant whether such beliefs are true; what ishad agency. Non-Western peoples beliefs in animacywere a key inspiration for Gell (1998) and continue toimpact archaeology through his work. As Brown &Emery (2008, 302) contend, activity between humanand non-human agents can be revealed once the mod-ern dichotomy that splits the world into people andthings has been suspended and we seriously acceptthat some of what we recover in the archaeological

important nonhuman agents.

Even though the potential for archaeologicalinterpretation and theory building on the basis ofanalogies with animist practices is clear, they are

fundamentally limited when it comes to uncoveringpast ontologies because the leap of faith required not taken. At root is a confusion of ontological withepistemological claims. As Viveiros de Castro (2003)has noted, other peoples ontological commitments(their worlds) have been converted by anthropologyinto epistemologies (worldviews). As such, the incom-mensurability of other peoples worlds with ourscan only ever be understood at the level of culturalmistaken, fragmentary and partial representationsof our singular ontology, synonymous with nature.

Consequently, what we see in the use of interpretiveethnographic analogies and notions such as objectagency is a greater acceptance of epistemologicaldiversity, but not necessarily a means to access otherontologies. In fact, the notion of object agency,especially in its secondary agency form, relies on theresearchers conversion of an ontological claim into anepistemological one, allowing us to adopt a relativiststance in relation to others beliefs about the worldwithout actually subscribing to such beliefs (a formof hypocrisy: Viveiros de Castro 2002, 1323). Thus,our apparent commitment to their beliefs masks theabsence of our belief in their actual commitments.

Procedural equivalence in theory

The potential for archaeology to uncover ontologicalalterity partly lies in sidestepping the elision of onto-logical claims by epistemological ones and realizingthe potential in others theories of the world. Viveirosde Castro (2002, 115; 2003) has explored what hap-pens when the natives discourse functions withinthe anthropologists discourse in such a way (that)

(W)hat happens when we take native thought seri-ously? When the anthropologists aim ceases to be toexplain, interpret, contextualize and rationalize thisthought, and becomes one of using it, drawing outproduce on our own? (Viveiros de Castro 2003, 11)

In apparent agreement, Ingold (2006, 19) argues weshould reanimate Western thought on the basis of


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to our misconceptions of how the world really is onthe basis of animists accounts, Viveiros de Castro (e.g.2004a) rehabilitates indigenous thought as an intel-lectual resource for problematizing Western categoriesof thought and the notion of a world as it really is,

whether relational or otherwise. Neither is the answerto privilege other peoples accounts of the world, as innativism (which is not Ingolds project), but rather toengage other peoples ontological or conceptual work asprocedurally equivalent to what we do as anthropolo-gists; properly speaking, their theories are anthropolo-gies too (Viveiros de Castro 2003; 2004a, 4; 2006, 16).

The taking seriously of native thought, then,means that instead of neutralizing it through theapplication of universal concepts, it is treated asphilosophically challenging, a potential equivalent towestern philosophical doctrines (Viveiros de Castro2003). Viveiros de Castro (e.g. 1998; 2004a,b) applies

his argument that Amazonian thought as thoughtshould impact anthropology and humanity by think-ing through the implications of perspectivist theory.He uses the label perspectivism to designate a typeof cosmology common to Amazonian groups, but alsoto intervene in the relativism/universalism antinomythrough a consideration of the nature/culture questionas it manifests itself in Amazonian thought (2003, 56;2006, 14). Instead, therefore, of the notion of a unitarynature and many cultures each with its own culturalperspective on that nature (i.e. multiculturalism), personhood in which souls (human and non-human)share a common origin and unity, while bodies and1998; 2004a, 3, 6). Ones world (nature) is dependenton the body that one occupies. However, one sharesconcepts with other souls; therefore, how one seesthe world will remain the same across species. Insteadof multiculturalism and uninaturalism (the dominantWestern model), one gets uniculturalism and multi-naturalism: a unitary or constant epistemology andvariable or plural ontologies.

Perspectivism entails a rethinking of the natureof relations. In a reconceptualization of anthropologys

fundamental task of comparison, or translation, Vivei-ros de Castro (2004a, 18) shows that to talk of beingrelated in the West implies having something in com-mon; perspectival relationality, in contrast, is foundedbetween the two modes of relation is revealed in theuse of brother as the common idiom of relatednessin the west versus brother-in-law or cross cousina common relation to a third term; in the second

mode the relation is one of diametric opposition, i.e.the terms are linked by that which separates them(Strathern 1992, as cited in Viveiros de Castro 2004a,underlying premise of perspectivism is a background

-(Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 1819). By contrast, inthe West to relate is to assimilate, to unify, and toidentify, producing analyses that posit a continuityon the basis of a shared ontology (nature). In theprecise extent to which they are not saying the samething about synonymic concepts. For anthropology,the danger of the Western mode lies in imagining an

resulting from a desire for ontological monism, thatis, relations of identity such as that imagined by socialconstruction the distinction between a real worldof brute facts and human world of institutional ones(Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 16, 20).

To assume we need to know exactly the metaphysicalunderpinnings of alternative ontological possibilitiesseems to suggest we need to re-ground other peoplestheories in the truths of our natural sciences. That isnot our intention. Rather, understanding the funda-mentally relational ontology of the physical world inthe ground for imagining the possibility that otherpeoples worlds are as they say they are. In otherwords, pluralizing ontologies may not be enoughto break a habit of mind that refuses to grant a literalrather than metaphorical presence to indigenouspeoples worlds or the past.

The physical world as objective fact has beentaken as the ground of reality since at least the adventof modernity (Latour 1993; Viveiros de Castro 1998;

2003; see Thomas 2004). The remit of science has beento reveal the immutable yet hidden truths of nature.Tim Ingold (2000; 2006; 2007a,b) and Karen BaradWestern theoretical animism, challenge the Cartesianassumption of an separation of the world into2007), the physical world and the world of ideas(Ingold 2007a, 3). Their solution is to re-invigorate


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a concern with the dynamic, ultimately relationallyconstituted, and inherently indeterminate state ofnature. According to Barad (2007, 151 emphasis in

original), .

To demonstrate how the generalized ontologi-cal indeterminacy is resolved into local determinacy,Barad (2007, 813, 99106) develops the example of thewave-particle duality paradox of quantum physicsparticle, yet these are mutually exclusive states. InBarads reading, there is no paradox: the entiretyof the material conditions necessary to conduct themeasured (in this case, an electron). A wave or particle

includes both apparatus and object. In other words,there are no independent, individual things (objects,subjects, etc.) with pre-determined properties oridentities, only things-in-phenomena. The conceptswave and particle are not properties intrinsic tothe electron, but are quite literally embodied by thelarger apparatus, so that each concept is material conditions of an apparatus determine the boundariesand properties of the measured object as well as themeasuring apparatus.

For Ingold, the relational constitution of being meshwork in contrast to interconnected points,or a set of pre-determined objects (Ingold 2006, 13).and mutate (Ingold 2007b, 35). According to Ingold(2007b, 35), every thing is itself an entanglement ofrelations, including both persons and things, which from the relations themselves, but rather bundlesof relations. The environment itself, as a domain ofentanglement, consists of the interwoven growth ofmany such relational beings.

Similarly, for Barad, relational phenomena and

not objects are ontologically primitive and thereforeconstitutive of physical reality (Barad 2007, 140, 151).Things exist only in relation to other things. In contrastto a substance ontology, subjects and objects withdeterminate boundaries and properties are outcomesof relationships and do not precede them. An impor-tant consequence is that what we call the objectivesubjects but rather the phenomenon as a whole (i.e.

both object and apparatus). Ingold also insists thatthings or materials do not have pre-occurent proper-ties but are processual and relational; properties arepoint about the properties of stone as opposed to the

notion of the materiality of stone:Stoniness, then, is not in the stones nature, inits materiality. Nor is it merely in the mind of theobserver or practitioner. Rather, it emerges throughthe stones involvement in its total surroundingsincluding you, the observerand from the manifoldways in which it is engaged in the currents of thelifeworld. (Ingold 2007a, 15)

Just as electrons do not bring with them propertiesthat pre-exist the phenomenon in which they aremanifested or measured, the properties of stone arenot internal to it as stoniness. Properly speaking,the properties of stone are properties of the larger

phenomenon of which the stone and observer areconstitutive parts.

If things were to stop their action of relatingthey would no longer be. If relations are ontologi-cally prior, then the world is inherently animatedand dynamic. In Ingolds account, life is continuallyin a process of generation, of re-birth; agency issynonymous with life, while for Barad, agency is anto the notion of object agency, then, agency is not

simply refusing humans sole propriety over agency, asthe democratizing notions of secondary agent (Gell1998) and actant (Latour 1993) imply. As Sillar (thisGardner 2008; Gell 1998; Joyce & Lopiparo 2005; Robb2008), but in Barads and Ingolds accounts, those rela-tions are not between pre-existing entities, but are theis less a choice between external natural causes andof ongoing material-discursive practices that produce

Both Barad and Ingold propose meta-ontolo--gies yet with the same implied claim to universality.Barads ontology provides a generalized explanationfor the mechanism of ontological constitution and - and pluralization. Ethnography is central to Ingolds


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the problem of the relationship between these global,and implicitly singular theories and ontologies, andthe status of other peoples ontological claims. Asimilar point could be made about the meta-ontologyunder-girding symmetrical approaches in archaeol-

ogy (e.g. Olsen 2003; Witmore 2007; see also Henareet al. 2007, 7). To propose a relational ontology basedneeding an animating human hand to enable agencyand action, but it does not necessarily place us on apath to ontological alterity (multiple worlds) such asthe Amazonian ontologies discussed by Viveiros deCastro. This requires a further step which dependsupon taking seriously the cross reality challengeswhich emerge from anthropological and archaeologi-cal accounts of other worlds.

Open-ended conceptuality

In a discussion of the methodological implicationsof new theories of agency in archaeology, Dobres &Robb (2005) argued that theory, method, and method-ology need to be thought and practised together ratherthan sequentially. Drawing on Viveiros de Castrostheories, Henare et al. (2007) propose a methodologyfor anthropology that gets at ontological alterity. Inline with Dobres & Robb (2005), they argue that theoryproduction must be ongoing rather than pre-deter-mined. Present analytic approaches are problematic, (Henare et al. 2007, 5) and thus deny the possibilityinto pre-existing schemas. In contrast, they developa heuristic concept of the thing, which is treated as(1988) person); the things themselves as they areencountered act as conduits for concept production(Henare et al. 2007, 7). New analytical frameworksand theory are produced as a result of the encounter,not prior to it.

This methodological minimalism opens upanalyses, enabling apparent anomalies to provide a

route into ontological alterity (see Bray, this issue).Conventionally, anomalous things are treated asepistemological conundrums the solutions to whichare thought to lie in expanding familiar interpretivecategories to encompass them (Henare et al. 2007, 6;e.g. Holbraad 2007 on the history of mana interpreta-tions). To get around the conventional separation of athing and its meaning, Henare et al. (2007, 23) adoptthe anti-representationalist strategy of radical essen-

themselves, rather than immediately assuming thatthey signify, represent, or stand for something else.Holbraads (2007) work among the If diviners of Cubareveals the powder-power, ach, as neither an isolat-able concept nor thing. Approached by an If diviner

who thinks powder is power and vice versa, we neednot assume that our representations are inadequate;nor need we try to explain why someone (or someculture) might think powder were power. Holbraad(2007) shows that refusing the separationbetween thing and concept enables him to thinkthrough a new concept (powder-power) and explainIf ontology as constituted by motility and transcend-ence. In another example, Marshall (2008) examinesthe confusion experienced by European explorershigh rank among the Nuu-chah-Nulth people ofthe North American Northwest Coast despite their

or insignia. The only example described was a rainhat depicting whaling scenes presumed to mark outa chief. But even the rain hats did not, in fact couldnot, signify rank or status because persons were notstabilized and marked out as particular kinds of being,needed to maintain themselves in a state of constantand states. In this process material objects were takenup to enable such movement, not to designate, displayEuropean newcomers were perplexed.

Refusing the separation of concept and thing is happening within the physical sciences too. Therevelatory potential of anomalies also drives Barads(2007) work (for example, the wave-particle dualityparadox). If within the terms of their own theories thehard sciences are able to encompass the possibility thatphysical reality itself, as conceived by Western science,is fundamentally relational, then concept productiondirected at archaeological material must also encom-

heuristic potential. Archaeologists and anthropologists-ering anomalies. Holbraads and Viveiros de Castrosanthropological accounts have an underdevelopedof the irreducibly material nature of archaeologicalconcept-things, their prosaic character (Holbraad2007, 208) will necessarily have greater weight in theinvestigation and rethinking of concepts.


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millennium northwest Argentina

Research currently being conducted by Alberti onmaterials from northwest Argentina, particularly

biomorphic pots, is the grounds for elaboration ofintelligible (Alberti 2006; 2007; Figs. 14). This is nota case study or example, which would entail actuallyunderstanding the logic of the ontology of the pots,but rather an extension of the theoretical discussion.A contrast is drawn between two possible approachesto the Argentinian material in order to illuminate the which rests on questions of an epistemological nature,would be to treat the pots as representations of an

animist (or perspectivist) worldview. Here, analogieswith ethnographic parallels are useful. The secondperspectivism as a set of theoretical possibilities mustbe adopted in order to understand the pots.

The anthropo-zoomorphic vessels and burialmaterial from the La Candelaria and San Francisco -lennium reveal exaggerated anatomical features,human/bird or human/animal hybrid forms, andbiomorphic protrusions or mamelones (Figs. 23;-mals in a naturalistic style. Much of the material wasrecovered by collectors, so contextual data are sparse.of urn burials in proximity predominate; the materialrecovered archaeologically largely comes from suchburials (Baldini et al. 2003; Heredia 1968; 1975). Whilethe material shares characteristics with a tradition thatencompasses many of the cultures of the wider area,no canon for the imagery has been developed (Alberti2007; DeMarrais 2007; Lazzari 2005).

When faced with this body of material the imme-diate question is what does it mean? A conventionalanswer is that it represents the beliefs of past peoples.The task of archaeologists is then to re-constructmore-or-less accurate interpretations of the underly-ing meanings inherent in the vessel forms and theira generally Andean framework of beliefs, they aretaken to indicate or to have been involved in ritualand other activities (e.g. DeMarrais 2007; Gonzlez

1977; Llamazares & Sarasola 2006). Thus, here a focusfrom the pots, perhaps on the basis of analogy withethnohistoric or ethnographic accounts. As such, in anearlier publication Alberti (2007) made the case thatthe location of the La Candelaria and San Franciscocultures, wedged, as it seemed to him, between the from his material Amazonian cosmological content,an analogical usage.

Following representationalist logic, analogicalcorrespondence could be sought between the form ofthe vessels and the content of Amazonian myth. The LaCandelaria material corresponds well with some ele-ments of Amazonian cosmology. The hybrid pot forms(e.g. Fig. 3) recall the widespread Amazonian beliefin a transition point from mythic time when humans

and animals were not yet clearly distinguished tocurrent-day discrete identities (Lvi-Strauss 1969). represent shamanic journeys, where distinct pointsof view were achieved by hallucinogen-inducedcorporeal transformation (e.g. Llamazares & Sarasola2006; Prez Golln 2000). More adventurously, the of form could indicate the existence of the mythical

Figure 2.


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turbulent course below the separate surface of thebodies that separate species (e.g. Figs. 24; Viveirosde Castro 2007, 159). As such, an argument could bemade that the vessels are the material embodimentof myth manifested through the establishment of

given greater force by their material permanence.However, analogical reasoning, while important fornot necessarily actualize the ontological potential ofthose worlds. The logic of the myths themselves, iftreated as the discourse of the Given (Wagner 1978,as cited in Viveiros de Castro 2008) rather than stories,also reveals the unlikelihood of the pots representingmythic events. If identity conceived as disorganizedbodies (Viveiros de Castro 2007, 158) is an ongoing

state, a truth established by myth itself, then to suggestthat the pot represents this story is to remove thepot from that world. To follow the logic of the theoryin its own terms would necessarily entail understand-ing the pot as part of the same ongoing process of

identity and world formation. It is quite probable that(e.g. DeMarrias 2007, 255; Llamazares & Sarasola 2006,645) and that a connection exists between present-dayAmazonian cosmologies and the archaeological mate-rial. A representationalist approach assumes that thething as sign vehicle reveals a story or set of cultural -strated, a simple representationalist logic is actuallycounter to the terms of perspectivist theory itself. Toadopt such an approach to understanding the mate-

This is not to say that forms of representation did notexist, but they would not necessarily be of the kindthat we would immediately recognize (see Viveirosde Castro 2007 for an alternative Amazonian logic ofrepresentation). Thus, assuming a straightforwardrepresentationalist approach to the meaning of thepots undermines the possibilities of discovering theontological logic they embody.

to reveal anomalies as such, one which is literalist (i.e.non-representationalist) and suspicious of potentiallyneutralizing universal concepts, such as body orgender (Viveiros de Castro 2003). For example, theLa Candelaria pots viewed conventionally are things which is understood as the imprint of culture, i.e. asa representation of a body. In contrast to Holbraads(2007) powderpower analysis, the confoundingthing-concept is already fully entailed in the initialencounter. A twofold anomaly, this is in fact a pot-body, where neither thing (pot) nor concept (body,as representation) matches exactly what we expect.An array of ontological possibilities are opened up,our access to which will be guided by the anomoliesof the material (once released from the thing/concept

dualism) and the theory we bring to bear. Generalpossibilities include a notion that all body-pots arenot distinct; or to break a pot and to break a body hasthe same material consequences). All of which is notto say that local representational regimes did not existor are not, potentially, relevant to the understandingof body-pot. However, the logic of representation

Figure 3.


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cannot be assumed and should be explored in eachcase (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 2007). Nonetheless, therelationship between body and pot is likely more thanmetaphorical. For example, when indications of sexon body-pots are found among the corpus (e.g. Fig.

4) the conventional question is one of seeing throughthe quirks of the local representational idiom ofgender to the biological body that is presumed to beits referent. Within Western taxonomic schemes thepresence or absence of certain sexed characteristicsis one of several vaguely similar forms. The shallowgroove impressed in the clay between the legs alongwith the presence of nipples conventionally are takenas a representation of a female. The consequence, of

are lost within the general analytic frame of sex/genderand binary sex. In contrast, on the basis of the mate-rial itself we could produce a new, locally conceivedtheoretical framework that built from such apparentanomalies. It is not necessarily the case that we haverepresented here a belief that bodies were consideredpot-like or pots were considered body-like, a simplemetaphorical relationship; rather, the concept body-pot is a literal element of La Candelaria ontology.Once we treat the material as it is presented to us,the question gives way to or even In other words,body-pot?

To animate these pots means thinking throughthem in terms of appropriate theories that are likelyto reveal their alterity as ontological rather thanepistemological. Examining the pots in light of the perspectivism, two inter-related possibilities emerge: -ently unstable, and that the pots can be understood as

determinacy a potential belonging to indeterminateWorking with the concept of the chronically

unstable body elaborated on the basis of the theoriesof the northwest Amazon group, the Wari, by Apare-cida Vilaa (2005; see Conklin 2001), Alberti (2007)argued that the La Candelaria and San Francisco potsand skeletal material indicated a concern with shor-ing up the body, preventing its transformation intoanother body with another point of view. Combining

the perspectivist theory of the corporeal seat of iden-tity with Ingolds (2007a) argument that materials arecan argue that the volumes and forms of the ceramicsdo not so much represent anything as participatein an everyday concern with the instability of mat-

ter. Ingolds (2007a) challenge to the common-senseas materiality which lead to essentialism (i.e. stone ishard because of its stoniness), stretches the concept ofof the body-pot (i.e. as an extension of the conceptbody over pot, and likewise of the concept pot aswas its natural condition.

Figure 4.


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With that general idea in mind, one way to under-the body-pots as revealing notions about relatedness-ference. As such, the body-pot is not an agglomeration

Barads (2007; see above) notion of phenomenoncaptures a way to formalize the relationship in whicha local resolution of generalized indeterminacy occursthought of in an additive sense, their forms could be -ing determinate certain characteristics, such as

-ence does not signify sex, or even create a relationof identity between that pot and a real woman. Tothink in terms of instability and in terms of an indif-as sexed.

their own intelligibility (Barad 2007; Ingold 2007a).The existence of a strong correspondence betweenthe actions it engenders. As such, separate worlds of,active practices do not exist. Rather, all processes andactions are natural ones. Hence, to work on a body,part of their natural processes, not as a cultural actionview stable are such natural practices as they arenot considered cultural over and against a naturalbody (Conklin 2001; Vilaa 2005). In the same way,

too has to behave appropriately and to maintain itspoint of view or intelligibility (Barad 2007). In thecase of the pots this parallelism between bodies andBody-pots were worked on in an indistinguishableprocess to bodies, arguably to prevent their transfor-mation and keep their points of view and bodies from

on the body-pot in Figure 4, such as the impressedto provide stability. For example, if times were hard,as has been argued through osteological analyses ofthe La Candelaria culture associated population at Las

Pirguas caves (Baldini et al. 2003), it could be argued -nent. Therefore, pots were mended, urn burials werere-opened, bodies were increasingly rearticulated,burned, or buried in novel ways (Baldini et al. 2003).The processes in which such material transformationswere involved (whether natural or cultural), such asthe stages of making, using, and eventually depositinga body-pot, were all aimed at bringing something intobeing from a generalized background of unindividu--

some inherent quality of the substance that we under-stand that material to be or become. The body-pot inits alterity reveals itself as the possible embodiment dependent. The body-pot, therefore, embodies theantinomy of stability and instability, the instability ofhuman-authored or not. Consequently, the questionof agency is reversed: the issue is no longer howthings get movement (i.e. agency) but rather howthey stabilize.

Conclusion: chronically unstable theories

The language of ontology is important preciselybecause it counteracts the tendency to see indigenousthought as fantasy, which happens when the nativespoint of view is reduced to a metaphor or worldview(Viveiros de Castro 2003, 14). The analogical use ofanimism in archaeology can shed light on an incred-ible array of cultural practices and beliefs, but it cannot

of the analogy dictate. In contrast, the theoretical andmethodological starting point adopted here enablesus to feel the actual (rather than derived) impact ofanimist theories on our interpretations. Our argumentis that to get at ontological alterity through the pastrequires an approach that is open to the possibilityof plural ontologies. Animist theories of the world,such as perspectivism, present just such possibilities,of Barad and Ingold. Importantly, we are not simply


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advocating theoretical eclecticism the outcome hasbecause general frameworks limit our datas ability toextend our theoretical imagination (Holbraad 2007,

Source theories that problematize ontology are likelyto enable novelties to emerge from any archaeologicalmaterial. There is no reason to assume that one theoryis more or less appropriate than another from theoutset. As such, the relevance of perspectivist theoryfor archaeological explanation is not limited to expla-nations of perspectivists. Archaeological ontologiesand contexts rather than general frameworks applied and materials (archaeological and otherwise) will

emerge.

Similarly, the categories of Western thoughtthrough which we operate are clearly obeying a spe-as the gaps in dualist structures can be deliberate andthemselves the object of thought (Viveiros de Castro2006; see Alberti & Bray, this issue), the engagementbetween Western categories and archaeological mate-rial is unscripted even if the terms of the debate aregiven. The traditional concepts of body and potenable particular pasts to emerge and are archaeologi-cally indispensable for all sorts of analyses. However,archaeological anomalies can also drive the reformula-tion of categories, whether the goal is to produce newconcepts (Henare et al. 2007) or to stretch our exist-ing categories of thought (Viveiros de Castro 2006).Others are clearly struggling to enable alternativeontologies to break through the over-determinationof dualist structures. For example, Marshall (2000)of gender in a set of Northwest Coast stone objectsresulted from his consistently dividing the materialaccording to dualistic structures yet being sensitive toand searching for a way to articulate the complexity

of the material.The ontology of the past is present in the waysin which it is brought into determinate meaning byour writing about it. To say that both people andpots require work to prevent their transformation isto suggest a commonality between people and potswhere one is not expected. To incorporate that ideainto future production is to change the terms of the useof the concepts in the discipline. This is not so much aproposition about the past as an intervention, a work

of conceptual elaboration in the present. It remainsto be seen whether the potential ontological alterity the para-ontologies implicit in our material canbe made to reveal new worlds.

Acknowledgements

of the Museo de la Universidad Nacional de Tucuman,Argentina, for assistance researching material in their col-lections and for permission to reproduce photographs. BAis grateful to Chris Fowler and Jo Brck for the invitationto chair a session as part of their theme, MaterializingIdentities, at WAC-6, Dublin 2008. The present article hasits roots in the paper delivered to the conference. Thank youto Tamara Bray, co-organizer and co-editor of this issue, andall the participants in the session for stimulating discoursearound the topic of animating archaeology. John Robb andan anonymous reviewer provided important constructive

were unable to fully address their concerns here. We aregrateful to Carl Martin, who provided invaluable editorialadvice; and to Framingham State College philosophers JoeDAndrea, Paul Bruno, and Doug Seale, who put up withincessant questions about ontology. Thank you to KarenAlberti, without whom this article could not have been

Framingham State College100 State St

Framingham, MA 01701

[email protected]

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