al-qaeda chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 9-7-1-south asia to far east-4-the...

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 9-7-1-South Asia to Far East-4-The Malacca Strait

While we are looking somewhere else; The AQ battle space and playing Field.

" An often overlooked theater in the Global War on Terror is the world’s oceans, a vital highway of the globalized world economy. The waters of Southeast Asia have more incidents of piracy than any other part of the world. The Malacca Straits is an important water route as about 600,000 ships from many countries use the waterway to transport their goods so we have to be responsible for the safety there.

Nearly 60 percent of the world’s seaborne oil, to reference one oft-cited and important example, passes through the Straits of Malacca and of Hormuz

“It must be reaffirmed that secure seas including safeguarding the Indian Ocean are

vital for Sri Lanka’s security. Our special concerns are the routes connecting the Eight degree Channel, the One and half Degree Channel, the Equatorial Channel in an around Maldives, and the Ninth Degree Channel. Ten Degree Channel and to the Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits, and the Lombok Straits,” Sri Lanka Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, said.

ISIS issued a rallying cry to the Muslims of Indonesia in Aug by sharing a disturbing picture of a baby lying next to an AK47 and hand grenade. A note beside the sleeping toddler, signed off with 'Indonesia', read: 'Uncles and aunts come and fight in Syria for jihad wherever you are.' While the terror group continues its battle for superiority in Iraq and Syria, Islamic State's ideology and propaganda videos are drawing in Muslim supporters from as far as south-east Asia. 'ISIS poses a real threat to south-east Asia,' a counter-terrorism expert at the RAND think-tank told MailOnline.

A worrying survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre discovered 72 per cent The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.

–Winston ChurchillCdW Intelligence to Rent of 11 01/05/2023

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of Muslim Indonesians want shariah law to be implemented in the country.

Indonesian prisons have become 'a central hub for terrorist recruitment,' a terrorism expert who works as a senior analyst at the RAND think-tank said.

The Philippines-based terror group the Black Flag Movement - known as the Khalifa Islamiah Mindanao - has also declared its support for ISIS. 'While ISIL's influence in the Philippines is not thought to be as extensive as either Malaysia or Indonesia, there are definite indications that the group has sought to extend its reach to the country,' Dr Peter Chalk told MailOnline

'One of the concerns that leading thinkers have right now is those marginalized Muslims in South East Asia, in Burma. [They're] only a step away from Indonesia and Malaysia where there's already a clear recruitment strategy there.'

A propaganda video released in March revealed ISIS's south-east Asian branch has also been training young boys to become the next generation of jihadi killers. During the video, the so-called 'Cubs of the Caliphate' say they are not afraid to face 'the enemies of God' and promise to become 'mujahideen' - or soldiers of God.

The region overtook Somalia as the main piracy hub in 2014. The Malacca Strait is one of the most strategic sea lanes in the world and it's also one of the most dangerous. Since 2010, attacks on ships have more than doubled every year.In the first 10 months of this year, there were 174 reported incidents of piracy, including 12 attempts. That's more than the number for all of 2013. Most of the targets have been oil and palm oil tankers. Pirate syndicates are often found to be professional joint ventures between business people and freelance pirates waiting in the harbours for jobs. Most pirates come from Indonesian fishing villages. The syndicates often use insiders who are part of the crew and even navy personnel.

Asean will do whatever it takes to counter the Islamic State (IS) threat, said Defence Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein. "Our united stance as well as our strong condemnation against IS and similar organisations demonstrate the gravity and urgency of this problem. "It sends a clear signal that we take the issue of terrorism seriously and will do whatever it takes to counter these threats together, as a resolute front," said Hishammuddin in his opening remarks at the Asean Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) retreat.

Of Pirates and Terrorists. BY BILL ROGGIO | April 27, 2005 | An often overlooked theater in the Global War on Terror is the world’s oceans, a vital highway of the globalized world economy. Al Qaeda has shown an interest in attacking shipping in the past, including the failed attack on the USS The Sullivans and the successful attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the successful attack on the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002. Attacks on shipping allows al Qaeda to disrupt the global economy, divert resources to protect the seas, and serves as vehicle for recruiting (the video from the USS Cole attack was used extensively in al Qaeda’s recruiting circles, with Osama bin Laden praising the suicide bombers). Al Qaeda is not merely interested in destroying shipping; they are also interested in using vessels to close maritime lanes and to conduct sea borne mass casualty attacks. Last year intelligence reported al Qaeda was planning such an attack:

The terrorists have been discussing plans to seize a vessel using local pirates. The hijacked ship would be wired with explosives and then directed at other vessels, sailed towards a port or used to threaten the narrow and congested sea routes

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 11 01/05/2023



around Indonesia.

Piracy is a global problem that has existed since man’s first venture into the ocean; however the modern pirates operate in the world’s most dangerous areas, which also happen to site along the world’s vital oil transit chokepoints.

Five of the seven oil transit chokepoints are in areas of operation of Islamists: the Straits of Malacca (Indonesia/Thailand/Malaysia), Straits of Hormuz (Iran/Oman), Bab el-Mandab (Yemen/Horn of Africa), the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline, and the Bosporus/Turkish Straits. And recent intelligence indicates al Qaeda is establishing a base of operation in Panama to infiltrate America and attack the Panama Canal.

The co-opting of pirates by al Qaeda should come as no surprise, as often Islamist groups are engaged in illegal activities to finance their operations. Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiah, is often engaged in piracy, as are the Philippine affiliates Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group. The pirates and terrorists are often one in the same, or if not, are in close cooperation.

Austin Bay recounts a piracy attack off of the coast of Yemen, where two fast boats attempted to board and hijack freights, but were repelled by the crews. The ships were scouted prior to the attack. Eaglespeak has two recent accounts of piracy. One incident occurred off of the eastern coast of Somalia. The ship was boarded but the status is unknown weeks later. The other incident occurred off of the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, where pirates seized a tin transport and were able to dock it in a Malaysian port. This incident highlights the lack of security and the very real danger that exists in Southeast Asia. Had al Qaeda conducted such an attack with a fuel tanker, the impact would have been devastating.The US has established a strong presence in the Horn of Africa, with a task force operating in Djibouti. The Straits of Hormuz and the Panama Canal are also under the watchful eye of the US Navy. The Straits of Malacca are a more difficult problem, as this area has the highest incidence of piracy. Al Qaeda’s presence in Southeast Asia is strong. The Straits of Malacca serve as the world’s most vital transit point for oil and commerce, and the local





governments are reluctant to cooperate to secure the area:Abu Sayyaf leaders working with Jemaah Islamiah, had introduced scuba diving training for guerillas to prepare for attacks at sea . Marine terrorism is a red button issue in South-East Asia with the Straits of Malacca of particular concern. Up to a third of world trade and half its oil supplies pass through the narrow channel each year. However, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have rejected US offers of assistance to help secure the waterway.

Some refuse to recognize the need to commit international resources to patrol the Straits of Malacca, and instead view attempts by the United States to increase their presence in the reason – yet another opportunistic plot to expand The Empire:

The issues in the Straits of Malacca are no longer related to international law but increasingly to geopolitics. It is about maritime powers imposing their will on coastal states and their excuse to enforce jurisdiction in national waters I suspect talk of instability, terrorism and bomb-floating vessels are excuses by some maritime powers and institutions to claim a stake in the governance of the strategic waterway.

I also suspect that all the loose talk is intended to provide legitimate excuses for external powers to intervene with their navies to rewrite the rules of engagement in straits used for international navigation. The Malacca Straits is their pilot scheme.This attitude is perhaps the most difficult obstacle to overcome in this war. Domestic and foreign leftist groups and governments have portrayed American security interests as 21st Century Colonialism, and world governments do little to dispel this notion. This is ironic; particularly in the case of maintaining safe passage in the world’s oceans, as American’s attempts to keep the sea lanes open also happen to coincide with the security interests of the major world economies. France, Germany, China, and a host of nations, including those of the Middle East who depend on oil exports to bolster their regimes, are dependent on the US Navy to maintain order on the open seas. Yet they promote the notion of American imperialism, which hinders the much needed cooperation between the United States and various world governments. Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

One Belt, One Road: China’s response to the US “pivot”By Peter Symonds , 4 December 2015 At two top-level gatherings in Asia last month—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia Summit—US President





Barack Obama again exploited maritime disputes in the South China Sea to press his “pivot to Asia” agenda—consolidating an economic bloc through the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and military ties and alliances throughout the region, all directed against China.Even before the “pivot” was formally announced in 2011, the Obama administration, in response to the deepening global economic breakdown, began shifting focus to the Indo-Pacific region in a bid to counter the perceived threat posed by a growing China to American hegemony. Simply by virtue of its sheer economic size, China is cutting across the longstanding economic and strategic relationships established after the end of World War II based on US pre-eminence.Confronted with the TPP, from which China is excluded, and an extensive US military build-up throughout the region, the Chinese regime has been forced to react. Its response is conditioned by the class interests it represents—the tiny super-wealthy oligopoly that enriched itself through the processes of capitalist restoration during the past three decades. Broadly, Beijing has sought to appease Washington while at the same time engaging in an arms race that can only end in one way.In 2013, the new leadership of President Xi Jinjing and Premier Li Keqiang elaborated an extensive geo-political strategy that drew together and extended existing strands of foreign policy. Its aim is to extricate China from its strategic encirclement by the US and its allies, while opening up further trade and investment opportunities for Chinese capitalism. Known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Silk Road, or One Belt One Road (OBOR), the scheme envisages massive infrastructure development to link the Eurasian landmass, as well as Africa, both by land and sea.

One Belt, One Road. By offering substantial investment in infrastructure as well as burgeoning trade and economic benefits, Beijing is hoping to draw countries across Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa into its plans and thereby blunt the US “pivot.”At the East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Chinese Premier Li made a definite appeal to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders, highlighting China’s commitment efforts to establish land transport links from southern China throughout South East Asia as well as the upgrading of port facilities in the region. He pledged $US10 billion for the next phase of the China-ASEAN special infrastructure loan.





As well as boosting economic relations between China and ASEAN, with two-way trade projected to reach $1 trillion by 2020, the land linkages have a strategic aim—to lessen China’s dependence on shipping lanes through South East Asia to import energy and raw materials from the Middle East and Africa. Beijing is well aware that US military strategists regard a naval blockade, including by control over the Malacca Strait, as a crucial element of their war plans against China.China hosted the fourth China-Central and Eastern European (CCE) summit at which Li highlighted the role of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Baltic States as “the east gateway to Europe and along the routes of the Belt and Road initiative.”

He said he wanted to work with all 16 countries represented “to build the China-Europe land-sea express line and promote connectivity in Europe.” China signed a deal with Hungary and Serbia to build a high-speed rail line between their capitals, as part of a broad plan for a rail link to the Greek port of Piraeus. Li also announced investments in port facilities in the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas but gave no specifics.

Beijing’s pitch is above all directed toward the major European powers—all of which are part of the formal NATO military alliance with the United States. While China’s European diplomacy has been developing for years, three key visits in late October and early November—President Xi’s trip to Britain, and the visits by French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to China—highlight the economic and strategic issues, as much for Europe as for China.Britain, France and Germany all have their own imperialist ambitions in Eurasia, which have been further fuelled by the worsening global economic breakdown and the slump in Europe, in particular. With the emergence of China as the world’s largest cheap labour platform and second largest economy, all the major powers—the US, Japan and European—are driven to maximise their economic engagement and investment, and thus their influence in Beijing.

In an article published on the Europesworld.org website in May, Wang Yiwei, director of the China-Europe Academic Network, openly spelt out China’s strategic aims, declaring: “With the rise of the United States, Europe entered into a decline which recent attempts at integration have been unable to reverse. Europe is now faced with a historic opportunity to return to the centre of the world through the revival of Eurasia.”

At this stage, the One Belt, One Road initiative remains largely in the realm of grandiose and general ideas. The Chinese government issued a document this March entitled “Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” It was short on specifics and long on the rhetoric of “peaceful coexistence,” “win-win cooperation” and the advantages of closer economic integration.Insofar as the broad outlines are known, the land-based Belt involves the construction of 80,000 kilometres of high-speed rail links, with a major route running from the Chinese city of Xian, historically the starting point of the Silk Road, to Europe, through Urumqi in China’s western Xinjiang province and Central Asia to Moscow and Europe. Other rail lines include one from southern China through South East Asia to Singapore and another from Xinjiang through Pakistan to the Chinese-built port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.The plans include a major expansion of roads, oil and gas pipelines and digital cables, along with power production and energy grids. As well as providing an impetus for economic growth in China’s undeveloped inland regions, the infrastructure proposals are designed to provide an outlet for China’s production overcapacities and profitable





opportunities for Chinese corporations. The maritime Road focusses on the expansion of port facilities, particularly in

South East Asia to develop sea transport from China to Europe, and in Kenya to integrate Africa.

Beijing has proposed to allocate up to $1.4 trillion to finance the huge array of infrastructure projects and is setting up financial institutions alongside the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Together with the provision of money, China is calling for measures and agreements to reduce or remove trade barriers, economic red tape and other obstacles to economic integration.An initial $50 billion has been provided to the recently established Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is projected to have at least $100 billion in funds. Another $40 billion has gone into the Silk Road Fund for projects in Central Asia. China has announced $46 billion to finance the China-Pakistan economic corridor. China has also made an initial contribution of $10 billion to the BRICS-led New Development Bank, set up in August. The China Development Bank has declared that it will fund up to $1 trillion in One Belt, One Road projects.

The Chinese government proposes next year to begin a five-year period of planning projects with its OBOR partners with a view to starting the projects’ full-scale implementation from 2021 and completion in 2049.

The economic prospects of the One Belt, One Road scheme have already had an impact in Europe. In March, Britain broke ranks with the US and signed up to the Chinese-backed AIIB to take advantage of the financial opportunities that could open up. Other European powers rapidly followed suit. Chinese academic Wang Yiwei commented: “The New Silk Road Initiative could help redirect the centre of geopolitical gravity away from the US and back to Eurasia… The recent decision by France, Germany, Italy and the UK to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank goes in this direction, and represents a major shift in European attitudes towards Asia, and China in particular, that clearly departs from the US position.”US imperialism, however, is not going to stand by and allow moves to integrate Eurasia by China and the European powers, from which it is marginalised or excluded altogether. American strategists have long regarded Eurasia—a region with 70 percent of the world’s population and over half of global output—as central to its global hegemony.In his 1997 book T he Grand Chessboard, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote: “For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia... Eurasia is the globe’s largest continent and is geopolitically axial. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions... Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played.”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US has sought to bring the vast Eurasian landmass under its domination. Its own Silk Road Strategy, first outlined in 1999, has guided its interventions and intrigues in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and the Caucuses. The “war on terror” provided the pretext for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the installation of a puppet regime to provide Washington with a base of operations in neighbouring Central Asia.

While not an elaborated or necessarily coherent strategy, the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,” along with its provocations and interventions in Ukraine and Syria, implicitly drives toward the break up and subjugation of China and Russia, in order to bring the Eurasian landmass under US hegemony.

Speaking about the TPP in October, President Obama declared: “When more than The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.

–Winston ChurchillCdW Intelligence to Rent of 11 01/05/2023



95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules.” But if the US is unable to dictates terms to the world through the TPP, and its counterpart for Europe, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, then as it has done over the past three decades, it will resort to military provocations, interventions and war.

The vision of a One Belt, One Road scheme peacefully integrating Eurasia is no more viable than a united capitalist Europe. Fuelled by the deepening global economic crisis, the divisions and rivalries among the major imperialist powers within Europe and with the United States and Japan, will only intensify as each scrambles to secure its interests. The chief destabilising factor remains US imperialism, which has repeatedly demonstrated its determination to offset its historic decline through the use of military force, even if that could plunge the world into a catastrophic war.

3 December 2015, India's Strategic Opportunities What should India’s foreign policy focus on in the years ahead? The answer, according to Manish Tewari, is twofold. New Delhi should work to 1) contain Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, and 2) leverage its unique experience to help the West respond to radical Islamism.By Manish Tewari for European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

There are medium-term strategic opportunities for India to both east and west. The first such prospect lies in the fallout from the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will affect Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. China funded a $34 billion network of highways, railways, and pipelines across the length of Pakistan to transport oil and gas from the Pakistani port of Gwadar to the Chinese city of Kashgar, in order to resolve the “Malacca dilemma” – China’s dependency on the Malacca Straits, which connect the Pacific and Indian Oceans, for oil and gas imports. Resolving this issue via the Pakistan corridor could diminish the ability of other states to use Malacca as leverage and lead to increased Chinese pugnacity in the South China Sea, as it would seek to act on its historical claims in the region. The question would then be: how to restrain China?

This article was originally published by The European Council on Foreign Relations on November 2015.India’s strategic and foreign-policy choices over the coming decades will require it to revisit its central principles. What is India today and what version of India should its policies serve? Should territorial limits alone define India’s foreign policy, or should it include its hydrocarbon interests in Africa, Latin America, Russia, and the Middle East?

Should it extend to the defence of the Indian diaspora (including its wealth and resources), and the transnational corporate empires of Indian oligarchs? Would India be prepared to leverage its hard power to protect and preserve these interests? Who should India engage with in the world, given that it is not only nations that affect India’s interests, but also non-state actors, rogue states, and private interests?Is it time to open either formal talks or backchannels with these actors – for instance, with the Afghan Taliban or with the Somali tribes that have elevated piracy to statecraft? A separate question is whether India should engage in full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, either within or outside the “One China” architecture. Another uncertainty is the relationship with Iran: until recently, the United States and its allies wanted India to reduce imports of Iranian oil to less than 10 percent of its total imports, but following the nuclear deal India may seek enhanced engagement with Iran to offset Chinese power in the region.





Do its bridges with Iran still exist?Does India have the institutional and intellectual nimbleness to adapt to these shifting sands of realpolitik? There are multiple answers to these dilemmas, and no “one-size-fits-all” response. Unfortunately, the Indian establishment has not even begun to ask itself these questions, and no substantive debate has begun, either inside or outside government.A t the same time, global debates filter into India’s thinking on international affairs. These exchanges include (but are not restricted to): the efficacy of the neoliberal economic order in addressing poverty and deprivation, and the human impact of the doctrines of regime change and the responsibility to protect. They also include balancing the principle of climate justice with the impact of climate change around the world, restructuring the institutions of global governance to reflect the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century, balancing the fight against terrorism with the preservation of civil liberties, and campaigning for defined rules of engagement in cyberspace. Notwithstanding the challenges that need to be surmounted in the arena of strategic conceptual thinking, India has the capacity to play a key role on two issues of global import. The first is containing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, and the second involves leveraging its unique experience to help the West respond to the spectre of radical Islamism.Security cooperation

There are medium-term strategic opportunities for India to both east and west. The first such prospect lies in the fallout from the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will affect Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. China funded a $34 billion network of highways, railways, and pipelines across the length of Pakistan to transport oil and gas from the Pakistani port of Gwadar to the Chinese city of Kashgar, in order to resolve the “Malacca dilemma” – China’s dependency on the Malacca Straits, which connect the Pacific and Indian Oceans, for oil and gas imports. Resolving this issue via the Pakistan corridor could diminish the ability of other states to use Malacca as leverage and lead to increased Chinese pugnacity in the South China Sea, as it would seek to act on its historical claims in the region. The question would then be: how to restrain China?

That is where India becomes relevant to the countries of east and even north Asia, as it sits on the head of the Indian Ocean straddling the sea lanes of commerce from the choke points of the Straits of Hormuz right up to the Malacca Straits.

Its airbase in Campbell Bay (Nicobar Islands) is just 240km from the mouth of the Malacca Straits. Even with the Pakistan economic corridor in place, a bulk of the equity minerals and other resources extracted by the Chinese would still have to traverse the Indian Ocean, Andaman Sea, and the Bay of Bengal right below India’s perch, providing it with a unique opportunity to act as a balancer against Chinese brazenness in the South China Sea.Collective security cooperation could then provide the necessary thrust for India and the southeast, east, and north Asian countries to move towards a closer strategic embrace, notwithstanding their individual economic links with China. From the Indian perspective, it could transform the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” – a definition of the region that includes both oceans – into a strategic and economic reality. It may eventually pave the way for a loose coalition between India, the US, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and even Australia, which could ultimately be the only option for keeping the global commons open across the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the decades ahead. Because the South China Sea is at the conjunction of these two oceans, keeping it stable and protected from Chinese belligerence would become India’s





primary strategic task in the decades ahead. An obvious spin-off from closer security cooperation would be a further deepening of trade and commerce with these countries. Enhanced economic and cultural interaction would not only add to India’s prosperity, but also provide additional avenues for the exercise of soft power.

India and Islam. As India turns its gaze west it sees the forces of religious bigotry and unabashed brutality galloping across the region, erasing territorial boundaries. The attempt to reorder the Middle East once again following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire has miscarried miserably as civil wars rage across the region. Europe, at the same time, is overwhelmed with the blowback of refugees as millions flee the war zones.

However, in this tragedy lies another opportunity for India. As al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), the Taliban, and numerous other militant Islamist groups prepare for the final push from Turkey to Pakistan in Asia, it would leave the countries of Europe and the few democracies of west Asia with no option but to cooperate more closely with each other.

Not only would closer security cooperation become an imperative, but also, at a syncretic level, India can offer its unique experience, having been for centuries the interface between an aggressive Islam and multi-religiosity. India is perhaps the only country which, from 1000 AD onwards, has synthesised Islamic influence by assimilating it into its culture without allowing it to fundamentally alter its social ethos. Despite the sword, India did not allow Islam to substantially alter the demographics or even the cultural moorings of the subcontinent. It created, through assimilation as opposed to a clash of civilisations, an enlightened version of Indian Islam which has existed cheekby- jowl alongside other faiths for hundreds of years.India offered its experience to the US after 9/11 as a means to find an honourable accommodation with Islam in the long run, but the binary mindset of the Bush administration failed to grasp the lesson. The Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment and the then-Indian government’s foreign-policy strategists engaged with each other, but the US officials did not have the patience to wade through the subtleties and complexities.1

Without learning from India’s experience, the challenge of reining in revivalism and its brutal manifestations will continue to bedevil the liberal compact. On a different level, since the US remains the power balancer, despite its disastrous policies in the Middle East, and since Israel has an existential stake in the stability of the region, a trilateral axis between the three powers may become a necessity, despite India’s position in favour of a Palestinian state. This again would translate into enhanced cooperation across a wide spectrum that could benefit India in more ways than one.

Internal challenges. What are the internal constraints that inhibit India from taking on these issues and occupying its natural place in the global order? They include non-traditional security challenges. For example, on World Population Day – 16 July 2015 – India officially reached the 1.27 billion mark. The socio-economic data, as benchmarked by the deprivation index, tells an alarming tale: notwithstanding ten years of robust state intervention, large sections of the population remain very vulnerable. Providing quality education, generating 12 million jobs annually, and dealing with the growing frustration among large sections of overqualified young people doing below-par jobs remains a challenge.Large areas of central and eastern India are still in the grip of leftwing extremism, while the Indian state has a limited footprint. The northeast as well as the northwest periphery continues to simmer. What India requires at the moment is two decades of “internal





consolidation”, and for that it requires peace on its borders, which remains elusive.India would have to develop its own version of “exceptionalism” to engage with the world as it consolidates internally. Therein lies the dilemma for the Indian policymaker. Strategic opportunities do not remain open indefinitely, but the Indian state lacks the institutional capacity to deal with the world and its country simultaneously.

1 Based on the author’s conversations with the late RK Mishra, member of India’s parliament and former editor of the Patriot. He was Prime Minister Vajpayee’s backchannel to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the early years of Vajpayee’s administration.




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