aitp security sig april 2011

34
Mobile Attack Implications Nicholas J. Percoco Senior Vice President and head of SpiderLabs

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Page 1: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Mobile Attack Implications

Nicholas J. Percoco Senior Vice President and head of SpiderLabs

Page 2: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Agenda

•  About Trustwave SpiderLabs •  Attack Vector Evolution •  Mobile Attack Cookbook •  Conclusions •  Questions?

Page 3: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Who is SpiderLabs®?

SpiderLabs is the elite security team at Trustwave, offering clients the most advanced information security expertise available today.

The SpiderLabs team has performed more than 1,000 computer incident response and forensic investigations globally, as well as over 10,000 penetration and application security tests for clients -- more than any other provider.

Companies and organizations in more than 50 countries rely on the SpiderLabs team’s technical expertise to identify and anticipate cyber security attacks before they happen.

Featured  Speakers  at:  

Page 4: AITP Security SIG April 2011

SpiderLabs – Our Mission

To  con2nually  deliver  the  most  advanced  exper2se  in  informa2on  security  in  order  to  protect  the  digital  assets  of  clients  worldwide  from  a  growing  spectrum  of  malicious  a=acks.   We achieve this by: •  Recruiting top of market talent from the

information security community

•  Performing research in lab facilities in Chicago, London, Sydney and Sao Paulo

•  Using Standardized methodologies and

central QA processes to ensure quality and consistency

Page 5: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

SpiderLabs International Footprint

Languages   spoken:   English   French   Spanish   Greek   German   Portuguese   Mandarin  Cantonese  Japanese  Hindi    Zulu    Ndebele  Xhosa  Setswana  Sesotho  Shona  

In  country  presences:  Australia  -­‐  Brazil   -­‐  Canada  -­‐  Hong  Kong  -­‐   India  -­‐  Mexico  -­‐  Spain  United  States  -­‐  United  Kingdom    

Page 6: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Attack Vector Evolution

Page 7: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

0  

1  

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3  

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1950   1960   1970   1980   1990   2000   2010  

A"ack  Vectors  Over  Time  

Social  Networking  

Mobile  

Client-­‐Side  

Wireless  

Applica2on  

E-­‐mail  

Network  

Physical  

Page 8: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Attack Vector Evolution

1980s: Physical

Page 9: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

1990s: Network

Page 10: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2000s: E-mail

Page 11: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2000s: Application

Page 12: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2000s: Wireless

Page 13: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2010s: Client-Side

Page 14: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2010: Client Side (Malware)

1.  Targeted Attack

2.  Drive-by Infection

3.  Manual Installation

Page 15: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2010s: Mobile

Page 16: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2010: Mobile

1.  Mobile Phishing Attacks

2.  Mobile Ransomware

3.  Fake Firmware and Jailbreaks

Page 17: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2010s: Social Networking

Page 18: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Attack Vector Evolution

2010: Social Networking

1.  Malware Propagation

2.  Personal Information Exposure

3.  Data Mining

Page 19: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Attack Vector Evolution

0  

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1950   1960   1970   1980   1990   2000   2010  

A"ack  Vectors  Over  Time  

Social  Networking  

Mobile  

Client-­‐Side  

Wireless  

Applica2on  

E-­‐mail  

Network  

Physical  

Page 20: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook

Page 21: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook

Page 22: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

Ingredients •  Motivation •  Reversing Skills •  Creativity •  Motivation Process •  Step 1 – Pick a Platform to Target •  Step 2 – Find a Vulnerability •  Step 3 – Select a Payload •  Step 4 – Build the Payload •  Step 6 – Select a Payload Delivery Method •  Step 5 – Test it Out

Page 23: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

Step 1 – Pick a Platform to Target

•  Es2mated  are  20%  of  the  Smartphone  Marketshare  

•  Many  users  are  non-­‐technical  •  Jailbreak  community  does  the  vulnerability  research,  so  you  don’t  have  to  

•  Many  user  don’t  EVER  update  their  device  to  the  latest  iOS    

Page 24: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

Step 2 – Find a Vulnerability

•  Leverage the “Jailbreakme.com” vulnerabilities •  Affect iOS 4.0.2 or earlier – still likely 50% of the user base

•  What is it?

•  The “star” PDF Exploit – Code execution −  Classic stack overflow −  Leverages IOSurface (IOKit) bug for privilege escalation and sandbox escape

•  The IOKit Vulnerability – Priv. escalation / escaping the sandbox −  Kernel integer overflow in handling of IOSurface properties −  Calls setuid(0) inside Safari getting root

•  The Jailbreak Phase – Set up residence on the iDevice −  Patches out Kernel code signing −  Installs a basic jailbreak filesystem along with Cydia (apt-get)

Page 25: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

Step 3 – Select a Payload

Implement a Weaponized Jailbreak •  Patch out a “security” check comex had incorporated

•  The jailbreakme.com PDFs had code to ensure they’d been downloaded from “jailbreakme.com”.

•  Patching out all the GUI pop-ups •  Didn’t want the victim to realized they were being hacked

•  Build a modified wad.bin with our “rootkit”

Page 26: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

Step 4 – Build the Payload

SpiderLabs Research built Custom-written iOS “Rootkit”

•  Patched UNIX utilities like ‘ls’, ‘ps’, ‘find’, ‘netstat’ from the JB filesystem •  Hiding our tools from actual jailbreakers

•  Port knock daemon called “bindwatch” fakes its name on argv[0] •  Spawns a bind-shell called, wait for it …. “bindshell” also fakes argv[0] •  Trivial app to record AIFF on the mic – remote eavesdrop •  Patched VNC to hide itself a little better

•  Nice Open Source iPhone VNC server by saurik •  Runs via a DYLIB in MobileSubstrate •  Mostly just removed the GUI config plist from System Preferences •  Coded a trivial CLI obj-C program to configure and start VNC

without the GUI

Page 27: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

Step 5 – Select an Payload Delivery Method Many methods can be used:

•  Fake Jailbreak site •  SEO optimized site to target an organization •  Phishing attack •  Hack a popular site and install within the mobile version

Page 28: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Mobile Attack Cookbook – The Recipe

Step 6 – Test it Out

Credit:  Eric  Mon2,  Trustwave  SpiderLabs  Research  

Page 29: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Conclusions

Page 30: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Motivations For Attackers

•  There  are  over  a  half-­‐billion  devices  on  3G  networks  

•  By  2020,  there  will  be  10  billion  devices  

•  60%  of  all  users  carry  their  devices  with  them  at  ALL  Fmes  •  For  high-­‐profile  and  business  folks  that  is  near  100%  

•  A  typical  smartphone  today  has  the  same  processing  power  as  a  PC  from  8  years  ago,  plus:  •  Always-­‐on  network  connec2vity  •  Loca2ons  aware  thanks  to  GPS  

   

Page 31: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

Motivations for Attackers

•  Users  accessing  highly  sensiFve  informaFon  via  smartphones  is  the  norm  

•  Users  trust  a  smartphone  over  a  public  computer  or  kiosk  •  Never  ques2on  their  smartphones  integrity  

•  CommunicaFon  Services  Providers  (CSPs)  must  allow  for  governments  to  access  subscribers  communicaFons  •  Case:  In  the  UAE,  E2salat  pushed  a  “performance  update”  to  all  their  Blackberry  subscribers.  

•  Reality:  Malware  was  inten2onally  pushed  down  to  allow  intercep2on  of  data  communica2ons.  

   

Page 32: AITP Security SIG April 2011

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Conclusions

•  It  is  possible  and  feasible  to  write  malware  for  a  mobile  device.  

•  With  a  li"le  work,  automated  funcFonality  can  be  embedded  

•  Li"le  a"enFon  is  being  paid  to  smartphone  security,  while  everyone  trusts  their  device  to  perform  criFcal  tasks.    

•  In  the  next  10  years,  we  will  see  an  explosive  growth  in  the  number  of  a"acks  against  smartphones  and  other  mobile  compuFng  device  plaUorms.  Will  we  be  prepared?  

Page 33: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Questions?

Page 34: AITP Security SIG April 2011

Copyright Trustwave 2011

SpiderLabs®

SpiderLabs® is an elite team of ethical hackers advancing the security capabilities of leading businesses and organizations in over 50 countries. More Information: Web: https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs Blog: http://blog.spiderlabs.com Twitter: @SpiderLabs