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ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT§ Before 1947 tensions were mounting between Palestinians and the growing Jewish

population.

§ Conflicting ethnic and religious identities in the region both of which laid a strong

nationalist claim to the same land.

§ 1948, November – the UN approved the partition of Palestine.

§ Widespread violence erupted between local Arab resistance groups and Jewish groups, like

Haganah. § At the height of the fighting was the battle at Deir Yassin – a massacre by Lehi and Irgun

forces. Both Israeli and Palestinian officials exaggerated the details of this event, the latter’ s

plan backfired as instead of stirring resistance it caused thousands of Palestinians to flee.

§ This period was so violent and disruptive that historians, such as Avi Shlaim, have called the

time between November 1947 and the creation of Israel the ‘ first unofficial phase ’ of the

1948 war.

WAR OF INDEPENDENCE / THE CATASTROPHE of 1948

§ State of Israel declared May 14th, 1948

§ Immediately afterwards, forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon attacked Israel.

§ Zionists still maintain the overriding Jewish perspective at the time: that the Arab forceswere united in their determination to destroy the newborn Jewish state and cast the Jews

into the sea.

§ However, although the military experts of the Arab League had worked out a unified plan

for the invasion, King Abdullah – who was given nominal command of all the forces –

wrecked the plan by making last-minute changes.

§ King Abdullah’ s objective was not to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state but to

make himself master of the Arab part of Palestine. Indeed, King Abdullah did attempt to

engage in secret ‘negotiations’ with Israel to facilitate this.

§ All of the Arab states were moved by dynastic and / or national interests, hidden behind by

the guise of securing Palestine for the Palestinians.

§ The inability of the Arabs to coordinate their diplomatic and military plans was in no small

measure responsible for the disaster that overwhelmed them. Israel’ s leaders knew of these

divisions and exploited them at the official outbreak of hostilities .

§ It has always been assumed that the Arabs enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority – a

monolithic Arab adversary waging war on a tiny Israel, David vs. Goliath.

§ However, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) significantly outnumbered all the Arab forces

arrayed against it by almost 2:1.

§ The IDF initially had inferior military hardware at their disposal, however the first truce

brought illicit arms supplies from Czechoslovakia which decisively tipped the scales in their

favour.

§ Revisionist historian Efraim Karsh, ‘The final outcome of the war was not a miracle , but a

reflection of the underlying Arab - Israeli military balance ’.

§ Israel negotiated bilaterally with its neighbouring Arab states, beginning with Egypt, and

concluded separate armistice agreements with each of them.

§ The first Arab-Israeli war was officially over by July 20, 1949 when the last armistice

agreement was signed between Israel and Syria.

§ Israel expanded its territory from 55% allocated by the UN to 79% (most of the rest

annexed by Jordan).

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§ Israel expelled all the Arab forces from Palestine (exc. Arab Legion which maintained

control of WB)

§ Palestine was erased from the map.

§ Palestinian historian Edward Said, ‘ Palestinians were left out in the cold ’ .

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

§ Israel was economically exhausted, but had superior organisation and morale, a tremendous

sense of achievement and a confident outlook on the future.

§ The victory showed the advantages of direct action over negotiation and diplomacy, and

seemed the only direction that could possibly be taken from then on.

§ However, peace was elusive in the region.

§ Traditional Zionists: Martin Gilbert, this was due to ‘ Arab intransigence ’ .

§ Revisionist historians: post-war Israel was far more intransigent than the Arab states and

bears a larger share of the responsibility for the political deadlock that followed the

hostilities.

§ Avi Shlaim: ‘the real question facing Israel at that critical point in its history [ after the first

war ], should not have been whether peace with its Arab neighbours was possible , but at

what price ’.

§ 750,000 Palestinian refugees had fled from, or been forced out of, Palestine, and were livingin bleak refugee camps along the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in various neighbouring

states, such as Lebanon.

§ 385 towns were taken over and large parts of 95 other towns

§ ¼ of all buildings were taken by Israelis (over 200,000 homes and businesses)

§ Palestinians were in a far worse position than they would have been had they accepted UN

Res. 242.

§ Skilled Palestinian workers went to the major Arab cities – some gained citizenship (in

Jordan), education and entry to the army / civil service (in Lebanon), while others had no

rights at all (in Egypt).

§ Most refugees went to UNRWA camps, which had little sanitation or medical facilities. § Pan-Arab position: Israel alone had created refugee problem and must not be allowed to

evade its responsibility to solve this problem

§ Israeli position: Arabs created refugee problem because they started the war in the first

place and Israel was not responsible in any way.

§ Israel did not accept the UN resolutions which gave refugees the right of return and / or

compensation.

§ Palestinian views as to why no Palestinian state emerged:

- the US supported Israel and prevented Palestine emerging

- British hostility and duplicity destroyed Arab leadership, enabling Zionists to takeover and expel Arabs

§ Israeli views as to why no Palestinian state emerged:

- Arab state did emerge as an expanded Jordan

- No Palestinian state should exist west of the Jordanian River because ‘Jordan is

Palestine’

§ Various plans were proposed within Israel for a separate Palestinian government. Ben-

Gurion actively discouraged political planning of any kind and sought to solve most

problems by military means, pressing Israel’ s military advantage.

§ Avi Shlaim: ‘ As a result , Israel ’ s Arabs felt increasingly marginalised and frustrated ’.

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POLITICAL ISSUES IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN 1967

§ Refusal of Arabs to recognise Israel

§ Refusal of Israelis to recognise Palestine

§ No solution to the refugee problem (Israel refused to acknowledge the rights of Arabs)

§ US support for Israel

§ Israel’ s extreme retaliatory strikes over small guerrilla raids

§ Rise of Pan-Arab nationalism

§ Great divide over Suez crisis

SOCIAL ISSUES IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN 1967

§ No equal rights for Arabs in Israel – limited living space (1ha per Israeli vs. 0.1ha per Arab),

few education opportunities, stunted economy

§ Tension between Zionists and Arabs – ‘siege mentality’ and fear of ‘ subversive fifth column ’

§ No solution to the refugee problem

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§ The PLO became an independent organisation, run by Palestinians, with the sole aim of

destroying Israel in order to liberate Palestine.

§ By the late 1960s the majority of those involved in the struggle had joined the PLO.

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CHANGING PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI RESPONSES TO THE

CONFLICT PALESTINIAN

§ Palestinian nationalism initially lay in the hands of Arab regimes where it was largely

ineffective.

§ After 1948, independent resistance groups, like Fatah, refuse to recognise Israel and

conducted raids

§ After 1967, PLO under Arafat took an extreme stance – attaining global recognition but fewsuccesses.

§ Defeat in the 1967 war discredited Arab regimes, spearheading Palestinian liberation and

‘ vindicating Arafat ’ s strategy ’ .

§ Fatah and other Palestinian groups began to take hold of the liberation drive by increasing

raids on Israel. Arafat also used the victory at Karameh to canvas Palestinian cause on an

international level.

§ Late 1960s to mid-1970s: PLO used terror to disrupt Israel and draw attention to the cause.

§ In 1974, with the fear that Arab nations would trade land for peace with Israel (and

Palestinians would miss out), Arafat introduced moderation of Palestinian tactics,

introducing diplomacy to armed struggle.

§ Rabat Summit: PLO recognised as ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.’

§ PLO’ s recognition of Israel and the phased-plan pursued by Arafat marked a change in

‘official’ policy, but the rise of fundamentalist religious groups, such as Hamas, continued a

belligerent stance towards Israel, e.g. George Habash’ s continued terrorism

§ Intifada – shows the new generation’ s willingness to oppose Israel through non-violent

methods, independent of external agencies.

§ 1988 – Arafat proclaims independent Palestinian state, rejects terror and acknowledges

Israel's right to exist. This shows further moderation in the Palestinian approach and a

willingness to use diplomatic means to achieve goals

§ The progressive Palestinian moderation resulted in Western pressure for Israel to make

peace in the 1993 Oslo accords. However this was a peace enforced from on-high and both

sides had misgivings.

ISRAELI

§ Israel’ s responses to terrorism and cross-border raids are part of a harsh, retaliatory policy

consistent from its inception

§ 1967 – self-confidence grew; nationalist sentiment intensified

§ Israel disregarded UN Resolution 242 and kept territories for ‘strategic depth’

§ Increasing terrorist acts are met by harsh Israeli military responses in the hopes of forcing

the ‘harbouring’ countries to cast out the PLO. Jordan does so 1970; Lebanon after the civilwar.

§ Israel initiates ‘facts on the ground’, a creeping annexation of the occupied territories;

military settlements to provide security. This gradually forces Palestinian dependence on

Israel for work and imports

§ 1973 – Yom Kippur War: Labour government’ s arrogance regarding Arab impotence

discredited – increase in Israeli conservatism. Recognition of the necessity of peace with

Arabs.

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§ 1977 – Likud government: Begin initiates deliberate policy of creating settlements, citing

religious rights. This is an acceleration of a process initiated by the Labour government – a

more extreme level which becomes a complicator for peace.

§ Begin manipulates Camp David accords – Israeli nationalism prevents actual progress over

OT

§ Conflicted response to OT:

- Oriental Jews relied upon Palestinian under-class to elevate them from social and

economic under-class

- Sephardic Jews had less of an attachment to Palestinian underclass, although it does

support the economy. They were generally more willing to trade land for peace

§ 1978-1982 – Israel continues policy of two-fold reprisals against PLO attacks from Lebanon.

Sharon’ s violent push into Beirut in 1982 causes public outcry internationally, and also

within Israel

§ Israel responds harshly to the intifada, using violence to break up riots (Iron Fist Policy),

assassination of Abu Iyad, etc. The attempts to end intifada with violence attracted

international and domestic condemnation, and inevitably failed.

§ Shamir Plan created in response to the failure of aggressive policy, outlines negotiation

with Arabs which fails§ 1993 – Rabin signs Oslo Accords. However it was a peace enforced from on high and did not

carry down to regular Israelis

§ Rabin’ s assassination shows a division of opinions over peace.

§ Perez maintains commitment to Oslo, but responds harshly to attacks from Muslim

extremists which provokes fear in Israeli population

§ Netanyahu denies Palestinian state, and supports Occupied Territories – this is a reverse of

Rabin’ s efforts

§ Israel’ s democratic system has caused inconsistencies in policy. Avi Shlaim: ‘ divisions lay not

only between parties but within parties ’ .

§ Religious fanatics, e.g. Herut, Likud and Zionists are attached to OT as part of Eretz Israel. They are responsible for the continuation of the settler movement

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NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION

OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES § 1948, 15 May – War of Independence

§ 1949, 24 April – King Abdullah of Jordan officially annexes West Bank and East Jerusalem

§ 1967, 5-10 June – Six Day War

§ 1967, 22 November – UN Resolution 242

§ 1977, May – Menachim, Begin and Likud win Israeli elections

§ 1987, December – Intifada

§ 1988, July – King Hussein renounces claims to the West Bank

§ 1993, September – Israel and PLO recognise each other and sign Declaration of Principles

on Palestinian interim self-government

§ The 1947 UN Partition plan proposed a division of the mandated territory into an Arab and

Jewish state with Jerusalem under international control.

§ Israel, however, ended the war controlling many of the areas allocated to the Palestinians.

The remaining territory was absorbed into Egypt (Gaza Strip) and Transjordan (West

Bank).

§ Possible collusion with the Jordanian King and Ben-Gurion over this matter is a

controversial area.

§ Israel captured both WB and GS in 1967. UN Resolution 242 introduced the ‘Land for Peace’

formula to normalise Arab-Israel relations

§ WB problematic: having absorbed over a million hostile Palestinians, Israel constantly

feared a vengeful ‘fifth column’ and so restricted the movements and rights of Palestinians.

§ Israel: the material prosperity of Palestinians improved under occupation – when the

economy was absorbed into Israel’ s the labour force was given greater opportunities for

unskilled work

§ By 1981, Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories numbered about 100,000. Theycontrolled 30% of the land and 90% of the water supply. By 1988 this had increased to

50% of the land. Some claim that if the issue of water could be agreed upon , peace would

be possible in the region.

§ By the 1980s, a whole generation of Palestinians had grown up under Israeli control; their

political status uncertain, their civil rights severely threatened, and a large proportion living

in abject poverty.

§ Approximately half of the male workforce was commuting each day into Israel proper in the

1980s, constantly reminded of the difference in quality of life. This led to the first intifada

ISSUES:

§ Right of return for millions of displaced Palestinians§ Israeli settler movement

§ Legal status / autonomy of the Palestinian state

§ Israeli wall

§ Security for Israelis and Palestinians

CONSEQUENCES:

§ Intifada:1987 and 2000

§ Continued terrorist attacks in Israel and Occupied Territories

§ Continued repression of Palestinian nationals

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TERRORISM/VIOLENCE AND THEIR IMPACT ON ISRAELI

AND PALESTINIAN COMMUNITIES PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE:

§ After 1948, mainly guerrilla raids (esp. pre-1970) and terrorism (assassinations, bombings,

hijackings)

§ Until 1970, ‘Fedayeen’ raids were common. Between 1949 and 1956 alone , 400 Israelis were

killed

§ International terrorism campaign launched in the aftermath of Black September. Nearly

500 attacks carried out on international targets, mainly by Black September and the PFLP

§ Islamic terrorism and suicide bombings became major features in the conflict after the 1987

Intifada, with 172 Israelis killed by 1991.

§ Since 1967, 2,178 Israelis have been killed in terrorist attacks

ISRAELI VIOLENCE:

§ Largely carried out by the military. To punish perpetrators of terrorist attacks and / or

discourage future attacks

§ Policy of ‘massive retaliation’ has remained constant since the 1948 war: from the

destruction of Qibya and 60 civilian deaths under Ariel Sharon in 1953 → ‘operation peace

for Galilee’.

§ Since 1948, 5,144 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli military operations

§ Noam Chomsky labels Israeli military actions of ‘deterrence’ in the OT ‘ state terrorism ’

EFFECTS:

§ RECOGNITION – terrorism was extremely successful strategy in bringing ‘Palestinian issue’

to the attention of the world. Milton-Edwards and Hinchclife: ‘ However , Palestinians

became synonymous with terrorism the world over ’

§ BITTERNESS / HATRED / DISTRUST – inevitable result of a cycle of violence is perpetuated

hatred. For years the PLO were marginalised by Israelis for their terrorist past, but moreimportantly, at a basic level, Israelis and Palestinians were alienated from each other by

continuing violence

§ RADICALISATION – violence of Israeli occupation and the apparent hopelessness of the

Palestinian position have driven Palestinian youth towards fundamentalist Islam.

Richard Ben Cramer: these religious radicals are now perceived as ‘leading the national

struggle ’

Israeli politics have been radicalised by violence. The idea of a life and death struggle, of a

‘nation under threat’ – established after the holocaust and during the four wars – has been

further ingrained by Palestinian terrorism. A clear example of this process can be seen in

Benjamin Netanyahu’ s 1996 election victory after a string of destabilising suicide bombings. § INSTITUTIONALISATION – Ben-Cramer and Milton-Edwards / Hinchcliffe: continuing

violence ingrains violence and violent people in the political system. Five of the last six

Israeli prime ministers have been ex-generals. Cramer: ‘the army ate the state ’ . This

situation installs people in power who potentially have a vested interest in conflict .

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ATTEMPTS AT PEACEMAKING 1978, September – Camp David Accords

§ Negotiations – Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Palestinian representatives – to settle the question

of WB and GS.

§ Self-governing Arab authority would replace Israeli military forces in OT for 5 years.

§ From the signing of the accords (September ‘78) until the signing of the peace treaty

(March ‘79), both Sadat and Begin were under intense domestic political pressure not to

make concessions. § Disagreements broke out almost immediately among Carter, Begin and Sadat as to exactly

what had been agreed

§ The Camp David Accords contained provisions that have formed the basis of all subsequent

peace negotiations. However, they simply ignored the issue of Jerusalem and the future of

the Golan Heights.

1982, September – The Reagan Plan & The Fez Plan

§ As soon as the PLO left Beirut in 1982, US President Reagan proposed the Reagan plan and

the Arab League put forward the Fez Plan.

§ Palestinians rejected Reagan Plan: it did not support Palestinian state, rather a Jordanian-

Palestinian state. § Israelis rejected Fez Plan: it did not include Arab peace with Israel and demanded total

Israeli withdrawal from ‘all Arab territories’.

1987, December – The I n t i f ada

§ A result of the gradual shift of resistance into the OT – a new style of rebellion which

seriously challenged the sustainability of occupation.

§ Edward Said: ‘The intifada combined the character of a civil rights movement with that of a

national struggle for independence ’

1. ‘Iron Fist’ Policy (Jan ‘88) – Yitzhak Rabin: subject to harsh military and economic pressure ,

in the

end , they will be broken 2. The Shamir Plan (May ‘89) – diplomatic response based on principles of Camp David.

§ The initial decentralised and varied methodology of the intifada confused Israelis and local

initiatives showing potential for sustainability.

§ The movement faded out due to ruthless Israeli repression and the PLO’ s attempts to

centralise the movement (this decreased the level of popular participation and marginalised

local leaders, allowing semi-militant groups, such as Hamas, to become the main players).

1988, December – The Stockholm Declaration

§ Arafat recognised Israel and condemned and rejected terrorism in all its forms .

§ Shift in PLO policy gained international support, however Israel refused to accept PLO

peace initiatives until the Palestine National Covenant and 1974 ‘phases plan’ was amended. 1990, August – Gulf War

§ Arafat’ s solidarity with Iraq badly damaged the PLO’ s reputation and resulted in political

and economic setbacks as Arab states withdrew diplomatic and financial support.

§ In the aftermath, when an Arab-Israeli peace process was placed high on international and

regional agendas, the Palestinians were in a weakened position forced to make political

concessions to keep the Palestinian issue at the forefront of discussions.

1991, October – Madrid Peace Conference

§ Participation in peace talks meant addressing the question of territorial compromise.

§ Shamir was not willing to negotiate.

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§ By mid-1992 it became clear that peace between Israel and Arabs and an interim settlement

with the Palestinians was an impossible target.

§ However, Madrid talks marked a historic turning point.

§ Martin Gilbert: ‘The belligerents had met around the same table , and were talking directly

to each other for the first time since the first Arab - Israeli war , forty - three years earlier ’

1993, September 13 – Oslo Accords; Declaration of Principles

§ Mutual recognition, phased redeployment of Israeli troops and Palestinian interim

government in WB and GS for 5 years while permanent peace treaty and final status of OT

were worked out.

§ Israel-PLO accord ratified by Knesset and Palestine National Council.

§ Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe: ‘Secrecy was the key to the ‘ success ’ of the Oslo talks;

negotiators were free from the external pressures and interference which had characterised

the Madrid process ’

1995, September 24 - Oslo II

§ Broadest and most concrete agreement concluded.

§ Facilitated limited withdrawal from WB, implemented election of Palestinian Authority

(PA) and Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and partitioned control of OT between

Israeli military and PA. § The agreement was never implemented in full.

§ The Oslo experience makes clear that there will be no chance for a genuine settlement of

the conflict unless the process is consistent with the Geneva Conventions , international law ,

and Palestinian rights .

1995, November 4 – Yitzhak Rabin assassinated

§ Rabin brought a credibility to the peace process that no other Israeli leader possessed .

§ Major setback for peace process which stalled in his absence, while terrorist attacks

intensified.

1996, May – Netanyahu becomes prime minister

§ ‘Obstructionist’ to peace§ Netanyahu: terrorism was a weapon that could be successfully countered.

§ He persisted in the controversial construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem.

§ 4 September 1996, yielding to internal and external pressure, Netanyahu finally met Arafat

at the Eretz checkpoint near Gaza. The two shook hands which was largely symbolic but

there was no real progress in implementing the peace accords.

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INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT § After WWII, the decline of colonial powers, Britain and France, saw rise in influence of

Superpowers in the region.

§ Rivalry and competing interests of the US and Soviet Union have made major impact on

politics and conflict in the Middle-East.

§ Ian Bickerton: ‘ no real issue between the US and the Soviets over the partition of Palestine ’ .

§ Reasons for US involvement:

- domestic political pressure applied by American Zionist lobbying- Truman’ s personal sympathy towards Jewish refugees

- economic (oil) and strategic interests in the region

- containment of communist expansion in the region

Groisser: ‘ US significantly influenced others in the UN ’

§ Reasons for Soviet involvement:

- way of extending influence in the region

- hoping region would become a predominantly socialist area

- economic (oil) and strategic interests in the region

- counter influence of US in the region

§ Peter Hinchcliff, ‘both competed for influence to safeguard oil interests and strategic

routes ’

§ Lesch: ‘ From 1956, the value of the Middle East became contemporaneously linked to the

emerging cold war between the US and Soviets ’

§ Both created client states to act as local proxies and allies.

§ The US created intensive support for the Israelis while the Soviets favoured the Arab states

§ Both supplied and supported each side with aid and arms

§ Bickerton: ‘ US refusal to fund Nasser ’ s Aswan Dam sparked the Suez crisis ’

§ The US developed ‘special relationship’ with Israel as ally, recognising it as a strategic utility

§ The Soviet Union also increasingly supported the Arab states.

§ Both pushed their respective client’ s interests while avoiding direct involvement. War by

proxy.

§ Tibi: ‘ the Superpowers carried out intervention in the region in an indirect way after 1956’ .

§ Both sides intentionally stirred nationalistic sentiments of ‘clients ’ while

supplying both with the weaponry and assistance with which to pursue a

militaristic means to an end .

§ From 1973, Soviet influence began to wane as it faced internal and economic problems

§ US took on a more dominant role in the region .

§ PEACE – subsequent pre-eminence of US meant it was able to pursueprogressive peace agreements as a means of safeguarding interests .

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