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Agricultural Extension in Ghana Results of a Survey of Agricultural Extension Agents in Six Districts
Cory Belden, Regina Birner, Felix Asante and Leah Horowitz
Draft currently under revision. Please do not quote
Comments welcome.
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Introduction
The Conceptual Framework
Applying the Framework: Agriculture Extension in Ghana
I. Mission and Functions
II. Competition with Other Sectors
III. Organizational Capacity and Incentives
i. Institutional Set‐up
Description of Employees
Internal Structure
Decentralization
ii. Strategic Planning and Overall Management
Targets and lack thereof
Gender Strategies
Coordination
iii. Resources and their management
Human Resources
Physical Resources
Financial Resources: Management
iv. Methods
Processes
FBOs
Communication and Interaction
IV. Organizational Motivation
i. Self‐perceptions
ii. Incentives
iii. Job Satisfaction
iv. Corruption
V. Other Factors
i. Expensive Inputs and Defective Markets
ii. National agriculture constraints
VI. Organizational Performance
i. Assisting FBOs
ii. Training and Information Dissemination
iii. Daily Fieldwork
iv. Client Satisfaction
VII. Impact at the Farm Level
i. Adopting Technology
ii. Notes on female impacts
iii. FBOs: Procuring Inputs and Marketing
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Acronyms
AEA: Agriculture Extension Agent
DA: District Assembly
DCE: District Chief Executive
DDO: District Agriculture Development Officer
DAES: Directorate of Extension Agent Services
LGS: Local Government Service
MDA: Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MoFA: Ministry of Food and Agriculture
RADU: Regional Agriculture Development Unit
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Introduction The following paper provides an in‐depth review of the agriculture extension agent and service in the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Ghana. The data used to conduct the analysis was taken from the
2008 ISSER‐IFPRI survey, and includes results from the AEA, FBO, household, and District Assembly
questionnaires. The bulk of the report analyzes the first mentioned, in which a total of 47 AEAs and 23
DDOs were interviewed to make a total of 70 respondents in the Western, Brong Ahafo, and Northern
regions1. Though this study focuses primarily on national extension issues, the data is disaggregated
into regions and districts when necessary; in this case, it can be assumed that if aggregated, the three
regions included showed similarities in responses.
The review and analysis is organized using the framework developed by Birner and Wittmer (2009). The
first section of the paper outlines and describes the rationale for choosing this conceptual framework,
while the second applies it to the Directorate of Agriculture Extension Services. Conclusions follow at
the end of the paper.
Conceptual Framework This section describes the conceptual framework that was used for the PEIR. The conceptual framework
presented here covers the Directorate of Agriculture Services (DAES), specifically at the district level.
This same conceptual framework was used to assess the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) as
well, thus applying it to a Directorate within the MoFA proves useful. Figure 1 illustrates this
framework, which draws on standard approaches in organizational assessment (e.g., Lusthaus, Adrien,
Anderson, Carden, & Montalván, 2002) and specific applications to the agricultural sector (e.g., Birner et
al., 2006). The ultimate goal of strengthening the DAES is to improve their performance, which is
indicated by the right‐hand side box of the framework. The boxes left of the performance box indicate
how different factors, which can be influenced by reform efforts, act together in influencing
organizational performance.
I. Mission and Functions
The starting point for identifying strategies to strengthen DAES in the agricultural sector is to identify the
functions that the public sector should take over in support of agricultural development. Ideally, the
functions of DAES and their missions should be derived from the agricultural development strategy of a
country. The role that the public sector needs to play to address the market failures that are inherent in
agricultural development and to reach societal objectives has been subject to intensive political debate,
especially with regard to structural adjustment. Ultimately, it is a political choice as to how much state
involvement a country chooses to pursue in its agricultural sector. As Figure 1 indicates, the strategies,
and as a consequence, the mission and the functions of agricultural DAES within MoFA are the outcome
of a political process, which is influenced by the political, economic, administrative and socio‐cultural
1Please note: West Gonja in the Brong Ahafo region has significantly less data than other districts.
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conditions that form the environment of agricultural Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs), as
indicated in Figure 1.
As also indicated in Figure 1, the strategy and the mission and functions need to fit with the
characteristics of the agricultural sector, including the predominant farming systems, the major crops
and livestock commodities produced, the farm size structure, the organization of the agricultural sector,
and the existing input and output markets and value chains. More than the current state of agriculture,
it is the potential for agricultural development that should drive the agricultural development strategies
and policies of a country, and the mission and functions of agricultural DAES derived from it.
II. Coordination and Competition
The way in which the DAES interacts with their clients, especially farmers, and with other stakeholders
obviously plays an important role for their performance. Some reform strategies attempt to create
competition between extensions services and alternative service providers from the private sector and
NGOs. Additional competition exists between sectors of development. If government and political
officials choose to allocate resources to other development initiatives, like education, agriculture
services often take a back seat in rural communities. Since the extension agents are expected to
facilitate the emergence and development of farmers’ organizations, while interacting with key
stakeholders like input dealers, buyers, and district assembly members (DA), the ability of the DAES to
effectively communicate with officials and their farmers is imperative improving agriculture potential.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Source: Authors
Agricultural strategies and
policies
Characteristics and potential of the agricultural sector
*Agro‐ecological conditions
* Farming systems
* Crops/livestock
* Farm size structure
Country context
* Political system
* Administrative system
Mission and functions of the Ministry of Agriculture and related agencies
Intermediate outcome:
Organizational motivation and functioning
* Mission‐orientation
* Accountability * Functioning of processes in practice * Relationship with politicians * Corruption and mismanagement
Organizational performance
* Effectiveness in fulfilling functions, e.g., promoting useful technologies; Supporting market development * Efficiency
* Sustainability
* Adaptability
Institutional set‐up
* Types of MDAs
* Internal structure
* Decentralization
Strategic planning &overall management* Planning processes* M&E, data mgmt. * Coordination
Methods
* Approaches used to fulfill functions, incl. technologies
Other factors
outside MoFA control e.g., weather, international prices
Organizationalcapacity and incentives
Political process
Ultimate impact
Reaching sector goals
* Food security
* Growth and poverty reduction * Environmental sustainability
Coordination and competition
Interaction with clients and stakeholders (farmers, agribusiness, NGOs)
* Competition with other service providers
* Coordination /facilitation
* Ability of clients to formulate demands and hold Ministry accountable
Resources and their management
* Financial resources * Human resources * Infrastructure
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III. Organizational Capacity and Incentives
The extent to which the DAES is able to fulfill their mission and functions depends on their
organizational capacity and incentives. As indicated in Figure 1, their organizational capacity is shaped
by the strategy, the organizational environment and the agricultural sector. Organizational capacity is a
function of
1. the institutional set up, which comprises the internal structure of DAES;
2. the available resources in terms of human capital, financial resources and infrastructure; and
3. management, which includes leadership style, procedures used for planning, monitoring and evaluation, human resource management, financial management, and the role that coordination plays in managing the organization.
i. Institutional set‐up
The institutional set‐up of the DAES, which can also be referred to as governance structures, includes
the following aspects:
Internal structure: Important aspects of the internal structure of DAES include their internal
organization, the levels of hierarchy within the organization, their degree of autonomy, their
degree of decentralization or deconcentration, and their relation to regional and local
governments. An important aspect of institutional design is the assignment of different
functions and activities to different units and different levels to effectively perform the assigned
functions. From the organization’s perspective, decentralization may be desirable to keep
distant staff accountable and its mission relevant to local needs. However, there are also trade‐
offs involved in decentralization, and it is an important aspect of an institutional assessment to
identify the appropriate type and level of decentralization for different functions.
Relations between the DAES and other organizations: A third aspect of the institutional set‐up of MDAs in the agricultural sector refers to the relations and coordination mechanisms that exist
among them, and between them and other organizations in the public sector, the private sector
and civil society. MDAs may outsource or contract out activities to the private sector and civil
society, for example, in the field of extension.
The institutional set‐up of the DAES typically mirrors that of MoFA’s. Thus, changes in the institutional
set‐up therefore require MoFA’s approval and at times, legislative action, as the Directorate is usually
included in general public sector reforms, such as decentralization. The institutional set‐up typically also
reflects a historical legacy, which in many developing countries still relates to the colonial system of
public administration that they have inherited, but also reflects the various trends of public sector
reforms that have occurred in recent decades.
ii. Strategic Planning and Overall Management
While institutional set‐up and capacity can be considered to be the “hardware”, the way in which the
resources available to the DAES are managed can be considered to be the “software.” Important aspect
of management include the following:
Leadership role and style that the managers play at different levels;
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Planning processes used at different levels, including coordination of planning processes at different levels; involvement of stakeholders, especially farmers’ representatives in the planning
process; aligning planning with budgets and implementation activities;
Monitoring and evaluation systems, and use of information from M&E for management
purposes;
Information flows and coordination mechanisms within and among MDAs, and between MDA
and with other actors.
iii. Resources
The mission and the functions that the DAES is supposed to fulfill also influences the capacity in terms of human resources, physical infrastructure and financial resources that they require. The effectiveness in managing these resources has an important influence on the organizational performance. Important assessment aspects include the following: Human Resources
o Manpower: This aspect refers to the numbers, qualifications and skills of the staff in different units and at different levels;
o Management of human resources, including the strategies that are applied to create incentives, using rewards and sanctions, as well as the strategies to maintain and increase the level of skills and qualifications of the staff members.
o Motivation and mission‐orientation of staff, which results from human resources management and other factors.
Financial resources o Availability and allocation of financial resources: amount of financial resources available
for salaries, maintenance of infrastructure and investment, and operations, predictability and reliability of resource flows; generation of own revenues; allocation of resources to different tasks.
o Financial management, including aspects of transparency, timeliness, accountability and auditing;
Physical infrastructure o Availability and allocation: buildings, vehicles, communication infrastructure, and
equipment available to MDAs have to fulfill their functions; o Maintenance of infrastructure
iv. Service Methods
The organizational capacity of the DAE influences the methods and technologies that the agency can use
to fulfill its functions. Methods and technologies are primarily the way in which the organization chooses
to deliver services; for the extension agent, this includes how they interact with farmers, conduct
demonstrations, and spend time on certain activities.
IV. Organizational Motivation and Functioning
Organizational capacity and the use of methods and technologies influence what can be called the
“organizational motivation” (cf. Lusthaus et al., 2002) or “organizational functioning” of the agency in
question. It is important to acknowledge organizational motivation and functioning of the DAES as an
“intermediate outcome”, which influences their performance. This intermediate outcome is influenced
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by the wider institutional environment of the DAES, for example, by the general bureaucratic culture, or
the nature of the political interference that may be taking place. In pursuing institutional reforms, this
“intermediate outcome” is often neglected, based on the assumption that by changing the institutional
set‐up, the capacity, the management or the methods, better performance can be achieved. To which
extent such changes lead to better results, however, on the way in which the staff of the DAES reacts to
these changes. Aspects of organizational motivation include the following:
Accountability that is created within the organization, and with actors outside the organization. This will include accountability to parliamentarians, the president, the private sector, civil
society, and, in particular, the farmers. In decentralized systems, accountability to decentralized
government units, such as the district administration is relevant, as well. Accountability may be
fostered by pressures from the political sphere, but it is also influenced by choices within the
organization. For example, adopting participatory planning methods will increase accountability.
Organizational culture within the DAES is an important factor, which is influenced by the
management, but also the history of an organization and its wider administrative environment.
Functioning of processes, such as planning and budgeting in practice. It is important to consider
the actual functioning of such processes as an intermediate outcome. The success of introducing
a new process, for example, participatory planning, is strongly influenced by the way in which
this process is actually implemented. Informal processes and attitudes are very important in this
regard, and they support or undermine the formal processes that an organization tries to adopt.
Relationship with politicians: The actual relationship between the DAES and politicians is an important intermediate outcome, which is influenced both by the management of the
organization and the political‐administrative system. This relation may range from constructive
forms of accountability to types of political interference that undermine the ability of DAES to
fulfill their functions effectively.
Extent of corruption and mismanagement that occurs within DAES. This is another important
intermediate outcome, which is influenced both by the organizational capacity, by the methods
used (since they may differ with regard to the scope for corruption they create), and by the
wider political and administrative environment.
V. Organizational Performance
The ultimate goal of public sector reform in agriculture is improving the organizational performance of
DAES. Important dimensions of the organizational performance in the DAES include the following:
Effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling their functions;
Sustainability of the operations;
Adaptability to new tasks and challenges;
Effectiveness in fulfilling the functions that the DAES is supposed to fulfill is obviously the key aspect of
organizational performance. Specific indicators of effectiveness can be developed for the each of the
functions that the DAES is in charge of. For example, for the promotion of new technologies, an
indicator of effectiveness is the ability of the agricultural administration to identify promising
technologies and promote them in a way that actually reaches the farmers.
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The efficiency criterion adds an economic dimension to the effectiveness criterion. In view of limited
resources, it is important for DAES to fulfill their functions with the lowest possible costs. The
sustainability criterion is also important, considering the experience that programs often have limited
effect after donor support ends. Finally, adaptability is an important performance criterion, taking into
account that the Directorate has to adapt to the changing conditions of agricultural development.
VI. Other Factors
Factors like weather and international prices that exist outside of the extension agent’s mandate and
control, greatly affect the ultimate impact of the DAES. These other factors must be acknowledged and
monitored, not only identify agriculture challenges that may be solved by other sectors or actors, but to
also assess the ability of the DAES to positively impact or influence them. The DAES should be
constantly adapting the changes occurring outside of their said mandate.
VII. Ultimate Impact: Reaching Sector Goals
The performance of the DAES and other Directorates within MoFA influences the achievement of the
agricultural sector goals, such as food security, increased agricultural production and improved
livelihoods of farm families. To assess organizational performance, it is essential to collect indicators on
these ultimate outcomes. For the DAES, the impact and indicators are typically at farm and community
level.
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Applying the Framework: The Agriculture Extension Service in Ghana
I. Mission and functions
The Ghanaian agriculture extension agents are a part of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture
Department, and are one of the eight Technical Directorates involved in increasing agriculture
productivity. The Directorate of Agriculture Extension Services “oversees agricultural technology
diffusion through the management of extension delivery service”, and envisions “establishing an
efficient and demand‐driven extension service in a decentralized system, through partnership between
the government and the private sector for the provision of quality service to our clients”2. The DEA is
expected to generate extension policy, provide services and information to FBOs and farmers,
collaborate with private agencies and NGOs, promote research‐extension‐farmer linkages, and monitor
and evaluate all extension activities organized by MoFA.
The AEAs and DDOs are at the district level, operating in the District Agriculture Development Units.
These Units report to the Regional Agriculture Development Units, which serve as supervisory agencies
for all DADUs located within their respective region. The Central Ministry then guides and monitors the
activities of the RADUs.
District Agriculture Development Officers (DDOs) report to the Deputy District Director, and supervise
the AEAs. Their objectives include guaranteeing “effective and efficient delivery of agriculture services
to clients, and ensuring that zonal programs are demand driven and oriented towards promoting
agriculture productivity of the district”. As their principle responsibility is supervising the AEAs, duties
include providing monthly trainings for AEAs, monitoring agent work, ensuring participation of AEAs in
RELC planning sessions, reviewing reports, mapping routes and guides for AEA activities, and analyzing
agriculture failures and successes in the district.
AEAs function at operational areas and are the agriculture public service provider closest to the farmers.
Their objective is “to advise farmers and other stakeholders in the application and adoption of
appropriate technical know‐how”, and duties include creating agriculture profiles, contacting farmers
and FBOs, assisting farmers in diagnosis of problems, establishing mini‐demonstrations, promoting
HIV/AIDS and gender awareness, developing viable farmer groups, providing information on credit
support and marketing, submitting reports to the DDO, and conducting on farm adaptive trials. As
aforementioned, the DDO is responsible for supervising and guiding these activities3.
II. Competition with Other Sectors
To begin, it is important to note that agriculture and its services compete with other development
sectors in national budgets, and with household and political attention. Based on community
2 All responsibilities taken from MoFA website: http://www.mofa.gov.gh/agricultural_extension_services.html 3 DDO and AEA job descriptions taken from the MoFA Handbook on Roles and Responsibilities of MoFA Staff Under Decentralization. June 2005. pg 49 & 58.
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interactions with key community actors (see Table) and household participation in local groups (see
Table), it is evident that agriculture is often at the bottom of the development agenda.
TABLES BLANK: Community member interactions with officials and groups, HH perspective
Actor (N=7308) % interact with
Unit Committee member 71Assembly person 72.6Village Chief 69.3Political Party Functionary 47.5WATSAN member 45AEA 38FBO member 28.7
As illustrated, households are much more involved in PTA, self help, and church groups, than with
Financial Credit Unions and Cooperative Societies, while both the AEAs and FBO members are the two
least contacted community actors. Whereas these groups may be difficult to join (for example, because
of asset requirements), and most villages have limited access to FBOs and AEAs, the low rates of
community involvement in agriculture already raises questions concerning accessibility and effective
information dissemination.
Though also an aspect of ‘other factors’, roads and livelihoods and their rankings in the household and
district assembly survey should be mentioned here, as it pertains to the agriculture’s competition with
other pressing development needs in Ghana. Given nine choices, households and district assembly
members were asked to rank problems facing the country in 2008; though assembly persons ranked
water and sanitation more frequently, both groups listed roads in the top three. Livelihoods were also a
principle constraint; however, households give it a much higher ranking. This is a serious challenge, as
despite community concerns related to agriculture livelihood, assembly persons consider other issues
more pressing than agriculture productivity. That said and considering slim public resources, it can be
assumed that extension and other farm activities are neglected.
TABLE B.5: Top ranked constraints overall, district and household perspective
Group Rank Constraint 1 Constraint 2 Constraint 3 Overall
Households First Water= 316 Water=200 Livelihood=214 Water=632N=1391 Second Roads=200 Sanitation=181 Roads=133 Livelihood=532
Third Livelihood=145 Livelihood=173 Sanitation=133 Roads=488
District First Water=28 Water=18 Education=10 Water=55
Assembly Second Roads=21 Sanitation=18 Livelihood=15 Roads=47
Third Sanitation=14 Roads=15 Sanitation=13 Sanitation=45
A final note pertaining to sector competition is DA involvement in local organizations. While there are
eleven assembly respondents on the Agriculture Production Committee (APC), only one participates in a
credit union, another in a cooperative society, and two in a farmers association. The remaining 32
Group (N=7773) Participate in Meeting (%)
PTA 51.6
Church Group 45
Self help group 22
Cooperative Society 11.2
Finance Credit Union 10
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members involved in these three organizations are on other District Committees and not on the APC. In
general, DA participation in these agricultural organizations is low. Compared to rates as high as 30% for
PTAs and 21% for church groups and WATSAN, less than 9% of DA respondents participate in farmers
associations, and less than 6% in credit unions. In addition, the majority of APC members did not rank
roads or livelihoods as a top ranked problem. These issues, along with low community participation,
suggest that agriculture productivity and relevant activities are not a district priority, but are rather
neglected. With this limited attention, extension services and the quality therein suffers, as district‐
wide intervention strategies and accountability for DAE services are likely minimal.
III. Organizational Capacity and Incentives
i. Institutional‐set up
Description of Employees To begin, a brief overview of the extension respondents will be given. In this particular survey, ten of
seventy respondents are female. The average age of respondents is 47, and while wisdom and technical
know‐how comes with age, this is also concerning as the extension agents are aging out. Agent
ethnicities and languages are similar across districts with Ewe being the most prominent; however in the
Northern region, Dagomba is more prevalent. Farms are commonly owned among AEAs and DDOs
(71.4%) with 40.8% leasing or renting the land, and 8% sharecropping. Four of every five respondents
also claim they have never received inputs from MOFA to use on their farm. A final comment on general
extension profiles is migration. Almost three fourths are the first generation to reside in the community
in which they currently live, demonstrating the common movement extension agents are either asked,
or required to take part in. Internal Structure
A result of MoFA’s decentralization in 1997, District Assemblies were incorporated into DADU decision‐
making procedures with the intention of generating a more effective accountability system and
increasing the quality of local public resource allocation. This is one reason why DA participation in
extension and other agriculture activities is important. However, and as illustrated previously, DA
involvement in these activities is limited and inconsistent, which can be attributed to the fact that the
Central Ministry remains in control of all funds for agriculture purposes. The tables and discussion
below illustrate these issues.
First of all, DA and AEA interactions are worth noting. Table Blank highlights, by district, important
aspects concerning meetings and interactions between AEAs and DAs. Clearly, the two interact;
however there is some variance in responses, most notably the meetings with DAs from the agent
perspective, in which district meetings range from 1.8 to 24.8 per year. This is surprising, as some kind
of standardization format would be expected as a result of decentralization and attempted DA and
DADU integration. Though similar elsewhere, the Assembly respondents in the Brong Ahafo region
report a much higher rate of AEA services, while DAs report on average, that 85.1% of the meetings
produce satisfying results. Though the relationships investigated between DA meetings and AEA
effectiveness did not produce significant results, the meetings between the two could be further
analyzed because of their possible implications for DEA’s internal structure and path to decentralization.
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TABLE: Meetings between AEAs and DAs, per year
District Meetings with district, AEA pers.
Meetings with AEA, district perspective
AEA visits community (%)
DA travels to location (%)
A1 1.8 3.1 50 78.7
A2 9.3 10.3 40.9 55.6
B1 4.9 3.3 46.1 76.7
B2 2 5.8 46.7 50
C1 24.8 4.6 87.5 64.3
C2 5.5 7.6 76.5 68.4
(N=total) 35 141 110 119
Another approach for exploring the internal structure of the extension service is to examine various
lines of communication. As illustrated in Table D.2, DAs seem to follow the expected decentralized line
of communication and duty when faced with agriculture‐related concerns. Though a bit convoluted in
the middle rows, a consistent hierarchy of contact exists in the ‘never’ and ‘several times per month’
rows according to actors. The only issue of concern is the DA’s interactions with the DCE and Line
Ministry or AEA. The DA evidently speaks more often with the DCE, and while this is logical in relation to
district public resources, it is not in regards to agricultural constraints. If the Central Ministry controls
agricultural development funds, and the regional and district levels allocate them, why would DAs
contact the DCE so frequently about agricultural issues, and not the Ministry or extension agents? As
explained in the 2007 Ghana Decentralization Review, “in practice [districts assemblies] do not play a
major role in the provision of water, sewerage, electricity, health, education, and roads. These major
services are provided by parastatals and deconcentrated services established by Central Government.”
In essence, though the decentralized internal structure intends to include DAs, their role in agriculture,
beyond political involvement, may be ineffective. Further evidence shows even stronger results.
GRAPH D.2: Contacting Officials and Networkers directly related to Ag problems, DA perspective
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Beyond the direct agriculture contacts listed above, is another network of stakeholders that have
impacts on this sector in Ghana. When assembly respondents were asked to state which official actors
they contact for issues like credit constraints, agro‐processing, and the lack of livelihood opportunities, a
similar scenario appears (see Table BLANK). While DCEs are referenced the most, MoFA only accounts
for 1.6% of those contacted, which is less than any other official. Again, this raises concerns about both
internal structure and the effectiveness of the decentralized system. Ultimately, if DAs are
communicating little with MoFA (on any level), information networks between the two are somewhat
dismantled. Furthermore, this implies that the DCE, District Administration, and DADU could be
repeating development efforts and implementing uncoordinated interventions.
Table BLANK: Actor contacted for problems related to agriculture, DA perspective
Actor %
DCE 42.2 District Coordinating Office 15.6 District Planning Officer 14.1 District Department of MoFA 1.6 Presiding Member of Assembly 3.1 Chief 4.7 Unit Committee Member 6.3 Community 3.1 NGO 9.4 (N=total) 497
AEA perceptions of decentralization The AEA perception of decentralization is also important concerning the effectiveness of the MoFA
system, as agents are the direct link in bringing appropriate agriculture services to households and
communities. That said, the AEA perception of decentralization is positive overall, as illustrated on
Table BLANK below. However, there are notable negative feelings captured in a number of responses,
including that the reform made no difference in the agents’ work.
TABLE: What Changed, AEA perspective
What Changed %
Better supervision, resources 40Director has decision‐making power 15No difference or worse off 15Travel distance reduced 10To much work for AEAS 7.5(N=total) 40
Agents were also asked what became better and worse after decentralization. While only 65% provided
insight for why the system is worse, almost all respondents gave positive feedback, indicating a higher
satisfaction rate for the new system. When agents were asked what became worse, the majority (30%)
describes a lack of transparency in funds, as well as issues related to lack of resources and increased
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workload. Other positive results included more efficient delivery of services (26.3%) and improvements
in the staff situation (18.4%).
Finally, though decentralization is generally viewed positively, only a little over half of AEAs and DDOs
have heard about the Local Government Service (LGS). While 60% of respondents feel this policy
addition will improve extension services, 40% are wary about the new service due to potential
‘ineffectiveness’ and political problems. While difficult to understand these perceptions as these AEAs
named benefits of decentralization and the majority are also satisfied with their job, the data does imply
that MoFA needs to introduce and begin clarifying this department addition. With over half of extension
respondents unaware of this change, though the LGS has been in MoFA plans for seven years, it seems
that AEAs are not often informed or consulted about changes or policy plans at superior levels.
Evidently, the DAES institutional set‐up, considering attempted decentralization, needs further
clarification and structure, particularly at the district level where extension services are implemented.
ii. Strategic Planning and Overall Management
Targets and lack thereof Targets are minimal and vague in the Ghanaian extension service. Though 87.8% of AEAs claim to have
targets for work, they are clearly inconsistent and focus little on outcome. While FBOs, gender, and
income are all mentioned as target criteria for AEA input activities, almost half of agent respondents
cited “other” as a condition, but gave no verbal description for it (see Table BLANK). As illustrated
below, target criterion does not necessarily have a high fulfillment rate.
TABLE BLANK: Target criteria for inputs, AEA perspective
Target for inputs % Fulfillment %
FBO 21.7 80.8
Gender 19.6 65.4
Income 15.2 58.1
Other 43.5 76.8
(N=total) 46 39
AEAs were also asked to describe the district targets as displayed on Table BLANK. While 9% of targets
could be considered related to some kind of outcome, the rest are associated with general visits and
demonstrations, implying that actual productivity goals are almost nonexistent. In addition, the most
commonly named target only reaches 31% in each district, indicating that even within districts, dynamic
approaches for extension agents’ work are minimal4. By disaggregating the targets by region, variation
becomes further visible, highlighting the difficulty of achieving both national top‐down and farmer
demand‐driven strategies for increasing agriculture productivity.
4 Example of uncoded responses for one district= “help 30 farmers to construct modern pans, teach 40 farmers, 25 cassava farmers, multiplication of seeds, use of chemical fertilizer, rice production, land development”.
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GRAPH BLANK: Target prevalence, percentage, by region
Targets are also set by multiple actors. While 17.5% report that the DDO generates targets, the district
director at 15.8%, the Central Ministry at 12.6%, and the Regional Office at 2.4%, the majority of
respondents set the targets themselves. Not only does this raise more questions concerning strategic
and adequately devolved target setting, it suggests that AEAs may not be held accountable to any kind
of target. Surprisingly, even targets reported to come from the Central Ministry are broad. As it could
be considered one of the ultimate goals and expected linkages, targets have no significant relationship
to farmers adopting new technologies (.3909). Clearly, without targets, measuring outcomes and
monitoring agent activities is impossible.
Gender Strategies All in all, it appears that AEAs and other government officials have a positive perspective on female
ability to contribute to agriculture; however this is less prominently reflected in practice. Farm size, FBO
participation, and the number of people taught in the field all maintain significantly lower figures for
women even though over three fourths of AEAs feel women and men are equally efficient farmers.
Similarly, while almost all AEAs feel that males and females have equal opportunity of being promoted,
female agents are 30% less likely to apply for it.
In addition, though progress is being made in targeting females for extension services, it is a bit unclear
who is promoting this initiative. Based on the AEA survey, it appears that only half of the respondents
consider targets set forth by MoFA (at all levels) to be gender sensitive. On the other hand, 69% feel
they themselves target farmers based on gender, thus indicating that either AEAs are more conscious of
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gender issues compared to their supervisors, or that their perceptions and understandings of true
gender targeting may be limited.
Coordination In conclusion of Strategic Planning and similar to the interactions between assembly members and other
officials, AEA social networks deserve some attention. Overall, it appears that extension agents
approach specific and appropriate stakeholders for particular needs or services (see Table D.1), which is
very useful in identifying power relationships and others’ roles in agriculture development. In addition,
the AEAs claim to interact for various reasons, with the assembly members, suggesting that some
decentralization processes (not accountability mechanisms) are occurring at the district level. The only
point of further interest is the role of the Chief compared to that of the DA. As displayed, the AEA
consults or informs the Chief as often as the DA member. Although this could mean the extension agent
plays some kind of role as the messenger between the Chief and DA, it could also very well denote an
informal power that the Chief retains within the community. This is an important detail, as the Chief
could further participate in intervention strategies or campaigns to encourage farmer productivity.
TABLE D.1: Dialogue between AEAs and other actors, AEA perspective
Purpose First Second Third N
Planning/mgmt meetings Unit Committee20.3
DA Staff20.4
Assembly person 16.7
24
Organize/meet community Unit Committee34.8
Chief34.8
Assembly person 26.09
23
Loan repayment, credit access Rural Bank70.3
Chief7.4
30
Buy, price, receive inputs Input Dealer68.6
Farm Gate Buyer8.6
NGO 8.6
35
Training, new technology Ag Researcher38.7
Regional MOFA22.9
31
Monitoring, Inspection Regional MOFA80
Assembly Person31.6
Unit Committee 31.6
10
Find markets, obtain food prices Farm Gate Buyer78.6
Input Dealer14.5
14
Info on programs, involvement NGOs23.8
Assembly Person19
Ag Researcher 19
21
To discuss problems in comm. Assembly Person30
Chief15
NGO 15
20
iii. Resources and their Management
Human Resources Human resources are crucial aspects in maintaining quality and satisfied extension agents. Beginning
with agent qualifications, and as demonstrated on the table below, the overwhelming majority of AEAs
go to training college. DDOs are typically educated in tertiary school.
TABLE BLANK: Education, AEA and DDO perspective
Level of education AEA (%) DDO (%)
Middle/JSS 2.2 0
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Training College 84.8 17.4
Tech/Professional 2.2 0
Tertiary 10.9 73.9
(N=total) 46 23
Both the AEA and DDO have previous agriculture work experience, much of it within MoFA as technical
or production officers. In addition to standard education, 58.6% of respondents participate in
professional trainings either before or during their time as an AEA or DDO. The topics of these trainings
vary widely (see Table BLANK), including both technical and organizational themes (such as
administration). While these topics are surely beneficial to extension staff, there are gaps in important
strategic subjects like marketing and gender while the lack of strong focus on a particular subject could
imply that MoFA employees are quite diversely qualified.
TABLE BLANK: Training Topics for AEAs, AEA perspective
Topic %
Crop production 22
Administration 17
Pest control 11
Marketing 9
Land and water mgmt 5
Gender 2
Financial mgmt 2
(N=total) 100
The wide scope of trainings themes that AEAs are involved in may be a result of the diverse training
organizations available to them. Only 25.5% are professionally educated through MoFA, while other
training entities include projects like the Cashew Development Project, research institutes such as the
Soil Research Institute or the Savannah Agriculture Institute, and NGO/IGOs like GTZ and the World
Bank. Though beneficial that the quantity of these training sessions are increasing over time, the
variability in training topics and methodologies could pose problems for specific MoFA‐promoted
strategies or technologies.
Agents continue their education primarily through training schools and in‐service trainings, while other
available MoFA information resources are rarely accessed. These other resources include the Research
Extension Linkage Committee (RELC), agriculture research stations, and demonstration schools, none of
which are mentioned as popular avenues for education. Not only were the latter two barely reported as
involved in AEA professional development, only 42.5% of agents are aware of RELC’s existence. DDOs
have a much higher rate of the RELC awareness than the AEA, which suggests a human resource
information hierarchy exists in MoFA. According to the DDO job description, DDOs are responsible for
passing this information and human resources on to their agents. This is imperative, as effective
extension requires service providers to be consistently updated on innovative technologies.
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Another key aspect of human resources is supervision, or monitoring and evaluation. Approxiamately
87% of AEAs and DDOs state that their supervisor visits them in the field and is around when needed5,
while the overwhelming majority believe their supervisor knows enough about their activities to know
whether or not they are doing a good job. Similarly, 75% disagree that supervisors are hard to please,
and of these repondents, a third agree that farmers never complain. Though seemlingly positive
responses, this could be an indication of relaxed supervision. Only 23% of AEA respondents know
someone in the district who was subject to sanctions. And while the reasons for the sanctions are
logical: failure to submit report of time, poor work performance, and failure to account for money, the
disciplinary actions were minimal6. Considering the lack of formal targets, AEAs and DDOs may not be
adequately evaluated.
Salaries of course, are also an important area of both incentive and accountability. Unsurprisingly, as
salaries in MoFA are typically lower than other Ghanaian Ministries, almost all AEAs do not feel that
MOFA staff paid equally to others in comparable departments. Furthermore, of the over two thirds of
respondents do not agree that their salary encourages their work, 55% also disagree that the salary
provides a decent standard of living. Clearly and just from these few figures, the salary for extension
agents should be reconsidered.
Physical Resources Without the need to present detailed descriptives, it is important to note that there are severe gaps in
physical resources available to agents. 73% of AEA staff does not believe they have the resources to
carry out their work as required, while the majority disagree that the inputs for the work come regularly.
Moreover, while the overwhelming majority used materials in their demonstrations and trainings, 65.2%
purchased these from personal resources and only 21% are able to access them from their office. Three
quarters also report that they do not receive protective clothing.
Financial Resources: Mismanagement Transportation is also an aspect of lacking resources for extension, yet is related to financial
mismanagement as illustrated by the allocation of travel funds. While the majority of AEAs believe that
the workload and farm distance is manageable, two thirds disagree that mobility to their operational
area is easy. While this discrepancy is likely due to poor road conditions, the way that MoFA allocates
resources could also be part of this problem, as many agents receive insufficient funds for travel. While
having access to a motorbike does not increase the agent’s field time or impact their hours worked
(.639), the time spent traveling is often longer than the time spent on the activity once arrived. Wassa
West and West Gonja report a significantly higher transport time than other districts, proving that
extension agents’ travel times are varied throughout regions (.0003)7.
TABLE BLANK: Transportation descriptives, AEA perspective
Transport type % Time to travel (min)
Own motorbike 60.3 51
5 Majority of respondents report to DDO, DDOs report to Municipal Director of Ag. 6 Sanction‐ withhold transport allowance (N=5), Warning (3), and embargo on salary.
7 Listed in field book (H).
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Public transport 22 52
Foot 11.5 65.7
Rented motorbike 2.9 37
(N=total) 340 330
Given diversified travel needs, relationships between distances, and travel funds would be expected. On
the contrary, there are no significant relationships between travel funds and sub‐operational areas,
number of households served, or distance to locations. Though AEAs report an average fuel spending
rate of 84.3GHC per month, they only receive 51.5GHC in T&T, and while small, a significant relationship
between the number of meetings the AEA attends at the district level, and T&T allocation exists. (‐
T&T=2.33+.0483(# of mtgs)‐ p=.002).
Though a trend in motorbike acquirement is on the rise8, mobility equipment and T&T allocation should
be reviewed as they are clearly key components to extension services. Improving the accuracy and
records of agent mobility is also crucial for good financial management, while MoFA as a department
should consistently lobby and/or partner in efforts to pursue improved roads to generate better
extension access and marketing possibilities.
iv. Methods
Unsurprisingly, the methods that AEAs use for increasing agriculture productivity vary widely, from
demonstrations to forming farmer‐based organizations to assisting with loan repayments. While agents
are likely stretched, and based on in‐service trainings, somewhat unqualified for so many types of work,
insights can be gained by exploring how AEAs interact with farmers, train FBOs, and other related
subjects. Processes
Examining the responses of AEAs concerning the farms they service and hours they work is a useful
method to explore the agents’ processes, in which ultimately leads to outcomes and performance. AEAs
work on average, in nine sub‐operational areas9. Because of lack of data, estimates for the number of
households sold can only be made for the Western region; AEAs claim they assist 430 of 609 (N=48)
farms in each community they serve. This number is quite high, particularly when considering the low
rates of community interactions and participation in meetings with the AEA. Similarly, only 40% of
community members surveyed said an AEA is living in their community. These diverging perceptions of
AEA presence and work scope could be explained by a number of reasons; one being a reflection of the
poor reporting on part of the AEAs, and/or two, the lack of extension service awareness on part of the
community. Table A.1 below goes into further community farm detail from the AEA perspective,
specifically highlighting the stark differences between male and female farm size. It is also curious that
while 45% of male farmers are viewed as farming for home consumption, only 32% of females are
involved in this type of production, which appears somewhat skewed according to traditional gender
roles.
8 Slowly increasing acquirement‐ 4‐5 in early 2000s, 9‐10 in 06‐07. 9 1‐5 electoral areas in each operational area; meaning AEAs serve anywhere from 9‐45 DAs.
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TABLE A.1: Description of households served for Western region, AEA perspective
Males Females
Number of HH works with 383 47
Farm Size 6.6 2.5
Largest Farm size 25.4 8.1
Smallest Farm Size 3 1.8
Farmers for consumption (%) 45 32
(N=total) 59 58
To continue, extension agents report that 60.2% of their time is spent in the field, 17.5% in the district
office, 16.3% in in‐service trainings, and 10.4% doing “other things”. Coupled with hours worked and
long travel time, AEAs have questionable quality time with farmers. As explained by the Table B.1, AEAs
often work below the expected hours, and during Harmattan season, could be seen as working part‐
time as over half of AEAs work under 30 hours. This is particularly concerning when the overwhelming
majority of AEAs feel that staff in their district office work the required hours.
TABLE B.1: Hours worked for three seasons, AEA perspective
Hours worked (%) Normal Harvest Harmattan
Under 21 10.2 17.7 35.3
21‐30 11.7 20.6 22.1
31‐40 32.4 29.4 26.5
41‐50 32.4 17.7 13.2
More than 50 13.2 14.7 2.9
(N=total) 68 68 68
Moreover, if assuming a five‐day work week, simple calculations conclude that the average AEA only
spends a little over three hours in the field per day, which means they complete only one farmer‐related
activity per day. As derived directly from AEA field books, the average daily time (3.3 hours) spent in the
field varies significantly based on the type of activity performed (f=.000), and as illustrated on table
BLANK on page blank, workshops and reporting (often non‐field activities) take the most time. Thus, the
actual agent records, in many ways, contradict their responses above.
FBOs Of the numerous stakeholders involved in and affected by extension services in Ghana, farmer‐based
organizations are some of the most influenced by AEA activities. FBO surveys were collected in the
same districts that AEAs were interviewed, and 76.6% of the 46 total respondents were male. As AEAs
are often the primary MoFA connection to these organizations, a brief overview of the Ghanaian FBO is
presented below.
Table D.1 highlights some of the key FBO descriptives from the AEA perspective. Evidently, both the
number of FBOs and agro‐processing facilities varies significantly by district, while the AEA claimed s/he
was responsible for forming 75‐100% of all farmer organizations in their operational area. Individuals,
not households, typically account for FBO membership, and both genders have uniformly contributed to
the average fifty percent growth rate since the organizations were first established.
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TABLE D.1: FBO statistics in Western region, AEA perspective
District # of FBOs in area # of Agro‐processing facilities # of FBOs responsible for forming
A1 4.5 2.3 3.1
A2 15.9 6.6 12.9
B1 10.1 11.7 8.5
B2 9 9 9
C1 5.2 3.1 2
C2 6.5 3 5.5
(N=total) 50 43 41
FBOs elect two thirds of their official leadership, including the Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer, and
another quarter are elected through consensus by users, thus denoting some democratic processes.
Elections are also occurring on a more regular basis with time. Though a seemingly well‐defined
leadership body exists, 64% of AEAs believe that once an FBO is established, members do not have the
capacity to maintain the organization themselves; this detail becomes crucial in explaining why AEAs are
devoting at least half of their time and trainings to administrative and managerial activities.
Communication and Interaction Good communication, even as viewed by AEAs, is a key feature of effective extension methods. The
table below illustrates how the AEA and DDO typically interact with their clients, while agents also
report holding additional planning meetings; on average, 12 at the community level, and 16 at the
operational level per year.
TABLE BLANK: How AEAs interact with farmers, by district, AEA perspective
Where Western Northern Brong Ahafo
Travel to farm 38.3 29 30.6
Trainings, demonstration 19.2 19.4 38.9
At an FBO 10.7 29 14.3
Visit in homes 12.7 16.1 12.2
(N=total) 47 31 49
Although AEAs claim to interact with farmers in their sub‐operational areas, the prevalence of meeting
an FBO more than once is rather low. In fact, 61% of FBO respondents have only met with an AEA once,
suggesting that interactions are ad hoc and inconsistent with some groups. Education plays a role in
how often AEAs meet with FBO members. Displayed in the graph below, FBO members with higher
education meet with AEAs more often. This could be beneficial if information from the educated person
is being passed to other members, but if it is not, this could indicate that FBOs with less educated
persons are neglected10.
10 The position the respondent holds is not related significantly to how many times met with AEA (F=.0013).
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GRAPH D.1: Meetings with AEA, based on education, FBO persepctive
Interactions between regular community members, and FBOs or AEAs are also crucial to understanding
extension service methods. Taken from the household survey, 28.7% of respondents interact with a
member of an FBO, and 37% do with AEAs on a yearly basis. While the latter figure means that almost
400 people communicate with an extension agent over a given year, the rate of interaction with other
officials (i.e. DA or Unit Committee) is much higher, many of them hovering around 70%. Like the FBO,
many interactions with the AEA only occur once or twice. Pertaining to coordination and strategy, those
respondents who interact with FBO members are not often the same as those who meet with the AEA.
This may represent a deficiency in agents, as it appears that some FBOs do not receive extension
services.
Finally, 63.1% of households have not heard of a variety of formal FBOs, including the Ghana Coffee,
Cocoa, and Shea Nut Farmers Association, the Ghanaian National Association Farmers and Fishers, and
the Association of Award Winning Farmers. Only two percent are registered members in these
organizations, again demonstrating the limited community awareness pertaining to agriculture
development and services.
Client Profile Another aspect of methodology in extension is the profiles of community members that AEAs serve.
Based on occupation, the majority of members participating in meetings or interactions with the AEA
and FBOs are farmers, followed closely by students (See Table). Both the AEA and FBO are very involved
with those unemployed or not in the labor force as well.
TABLE BLANK: Client occupations, FBO and AEA, Household perspective
FBO Participants % AEA Participants %
Students 32.6 Farmers 33.2 Farmers 30.3 Students 30.5 Not in labor force 18 Not in labor force 16.6 Traders 9 Traders 5 Unemployed 5.6 Unemployed 7.3 (N=total) 178 (N=total) 259
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While the majority of members interacting with AEAs and FBOs have no education, age, gender,
migration, activity in politics, private donations, owning assets, and paying taxes do not play a significant
role in defining who interacts with them. Surprisingly, owning livestock and/or economic trees also has
no significant relationship to interacting with AEA. Indeed, the majority of those who own economic
trees never interact with an AEA or FBO. Unless owners of these assets are already well‐endowed, it can
be assumed that economic opportunities are being lost. Based on the AEA targets previously discussed,
and the occupational and educational profiles of involved members, it can be assumed that most
participants are some of the most poor in Ghana. While these aims should be continued to prevent
idleness, increased income inequality, and reduce poverty, placing a stronger focus on those persons
with the assets, or mobilizing an FBO around them, could increase productivity more effectively. This is
especially true when needed inputs are expensive.
IV. Organizational Motivation and Functioning
i. Self‐perceptions
Already clear, the quality of AEA job performance fluctuates considerably as observed through the
variance in hours spent working for certain types of activities. In order to understand what might
account for these differences in AEA performance, it is important to review the AEA’s perception of him
or herself and their respective colleagues. The table below outlines the characteristics of a good
performing agent as viewed by the respondent. Being a good communicator (patience, listening,
language) and maintaining a ‘friend to farmers’ attitude is the most important feature of a good
extension agent. Following this personality‐associated trait is the timely reporting and achieving of
targets, the key word here being ‘timely’. In open‐ended responses, AEAs included punctuality in almost
every reference to reporting, indicating that there may be a positive pressure on the agents to relay
information to superiors often and on time. On the other hand, technical comprehension is only
mentioned in 27 out of 170 responses, implying that this type of knowledge is considered a lesser
feature of a well‐performing AEA. Therefore, it is not surprising that AEAs promote a broad range of
technologies, with minimal strategic design. These responses also suggests that AEAs are teaching,
perhaps too often, farmer demanded technologies (attempting to farmer please), rather than those
proven to be the most effective.
TABLE C.1: Good performing agent, AEA perspective
Characteristics %
Good communicator, friend to farmers 23.9
Timely (in submission of reports, achieving targets) 16.8
Knowledgeable, can get the job done 13.4
Hardworking, always present 11.9
Regular visits to farmers 9.9
Proper Assessment and reporting of farmers situation 8.4
(N=total) 202
In similar regard, insights related to AEA motivation can be found in the agent perception of the bad
performing agent (see Table). Comparable to the possible pressure on agents to report regularly and on
time, the majority of respondents see irregular reporting and field visits are the top characteristic of a
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poor performing AEA. Interestingly, AEAs feel laziness is the second worst characterstic, which suggests
that lack of motivation is somewhat common among extension agents. This could be attributed to
failing activities (like low adoption rates) or stress related to inaccessible inputs and credit (to be
discussed).
TABLE C.4: Bad performing agent, AEA perspective
Characteristics %
Does not report, visit farmers regularly 25.8 Laziness, lack of motivation 21.6 Unknowledgeable; inability to conduct demonstrations 14.2 Poor communication skills, bad relationship to farmer 14.2 Is absent from work 14.2 Drunkenness 5.3 (N=total) 63
ii. Incentives
Incentives provide additional insight to the organization motivation of extension agents. To begin,
43.5% of all respondents have received an extension agent award; however reasons for this designation
are difficult to understand, as there is no significant relationship between the awarded agent and farmer
meetings, houses serviced, or the number of people adopting. Table C.5 below displays the AEA’s
perception of the biggest success in their career. As illustrated, the majority feel the most significant
success is when the best farmer comes from their operational area. This could imply that AEAs are
working the most with a select few farmers to increase their productivity, with the purpose of winning
awards. If this is the case, the award incentive needs to be reviewed, and perhaps changed from single
farmer to group or districts awards. Following the best farmer is the adoption of new technologies, a
positive and more appropriate indicator of AEA success. In fact, AEAs who cited adoption of
technologies as success also cited, at the least, a 38% higher adoption rate in the field compared to
those who named other reasons for success.
TABLE C.5: Biggest success in career, AEA perspective
Success % Applied for promotion % Of those who applied, promoted %
Best farmer came from operational area 26.9 31.8 0 Farmers have adopted new technologies 16.4 18.2 40 Introducing new technologies 10.5 11.4 66.8 Winning best AEA award, or promotion 9 6.8 66.8 Increased productivity 4.5 2.3 0 (N=total) 67 67 28
Promotion is another form of incentive for AEAs, and likely an important contributing factor to their
motivation. In 2008, 65.7% applied for a promotion and while 37.9% were advanced, another third
were still waiting to hear back, an indication of a slow HR process in MoFA. Only two of twenty were
promoted without being interviewed, and speaking with the district director, or other official actors,
does not have a significant relationship with promotion (.956). Interestingly, the majority of people
applying for promotion also felt their biggest success is having the best farmer (see Table) while the
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runner‐up, adopting new technology, only accounts for 18.2% of those who applied. This suggests that
AEAs with the best farmers are more likely to apply for promotion. However, having the best farmer
does not mean the AEA is promoted, as agents who responded that their biggest success was having the
best farmer were not promoted at all in 2008, denoting that the AEA perception of being a successful
employee is different from the MOFA superiors’ perception. Finally, 77% of AEAs that applied for
promotion will apply for the next opportunity that arises. While this figure shows that promotion as an
incentive to perform better is functioning, because supervision is lax, the agents promoted may not be
the most qualified.
iii. Job Satisfaction
AEA motivation can also be explored through the job satisfaction lens. As recorded in the AEA survey,
72% of respondents are satisfied with their jobs. Table C.6 highlights a number of issues significantly
related to this satisfaction, and the implications of these findings are described below.
TABLE C.6: Job Satisfaction and Indicators, AEA perspective
Related to job satisfaction: % agree/disagree, p value
Without subsidies, farmers will not use modern inputs. 69 disagree .021
Salary encourages you to work. 64 disagree .001
Salary/benefits are decent for standard of living. 54 disagree .047
MOFA staff promoted based on merit. 68 disagree .082
Performance appraisals carried out in a fair way. 90 agree .043
MOFA staff have to worry about losing their job in the near future. 64 disagree .071
MOFA staff receive salary on time. 59 agree .091
Often disagree with policies or programs we are asked to implement. 65 disagree .004
Hardly any political interference. 66 agree .001
Farmers never complain. 56 agree .037
(N=total) 69
Concerning the above, two overarching issues necisitate expansion: one, that AEAs will stay with the job
despite the poor salary, and two, that the perception of political interference is minimal. First of all, as
these responses are from those agents who report job satisfaction, it would be expected that salaries
are considered acceptable. However, as illustrated on multiple points, the majority claim that the salary
is insufficient. As for political issues, those agents satisfied with their job report less political
interference than those unsatisfied. On the other hand, almost 70% of these respondents disagree that
MoFA staff are promoted based on merit. Both of these demonstrate dismantled accountability
mechanisms, and are likely a result of the lack of competing agencies and employment options for the
AEA. Because of limited options, AEAs will remain in the MoFA department with little ability to demand
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a higher salary. Similarly and as demonstrated by the high rate of AEAs applying for promotion, agents
hope to move up the Ministry chain of command. Thus, they are more prone to turn a blind eye to
political issues. This leaves MoFA superiors with too much freedom. Based on these findings, clearer
accountability mechanisms should be generated to ensure transparency and fairness in the allocation of
resources, promtion, and in other related matters.
AEA perceived constraints to the MoFA mission also impact both organizational motivation and job
satisfaction. Mobility and transportation are the highest rated constraint to success, which is not
surprising givern the low travel funds and poor road conditions in Ghana. Additional top constraints,
access to credit and inputs, are for the most part, outside of the AEA mandate and control. However,
perceived constraints related to HR are also prevelant. Poor salaries as aforementioned, mismanagent,
and inadequate staffing all play a major role in diminishing motivation for quality AEA work. Lack of
support to AEAs also includes insufficient and tactless trainings, which as demonstrated in the resources
section, seems to be common. Farmers clearly have a role in motivating the agents as well, as at least
10% of respondents feel bad attitudes block extension success.
TABLE B.7: Achieving MOFA mission, AEA perspective (N=152)
iv. Corruption
As a lack of transparency in funds is the principal reason given for decentralization’s negative
contributions to extension, it may be useful to note a few responses concerning corruption. Of the 38%
that believe corruption or the misuse of funds is present in their district office, two thirds feels that
some kind of political interference or policy disagreement exists, and another two thirds reject the
notion that MoFA staff is hired based on merit. 84% of these respondents also claim that corruption
exists in the head or other offices11. While not necessarily surprising, it is important to note that, in
essence, two of every five extension agents feel strongly about funds mismanagement and political ill‐
wills.
11 All relationships have a significance level at 5%.
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V. Other factors
The following section addresses two of the most severe impediments to both agricultural productivity
and extension services, both of which are largely outside of DAES control and mandate. These
constraints not only present in Ghana, but common throughout agriculture‐dependent states African
states attempting to increase economic growth. Moreover, these constraints are not easily resolved, as
multiple international and national actors and policies contribute to the collective action problem, while
economic stability and sustainable growth are essentially prerequisites for overcoming the obstacles. To
the affliction of extension services, the barriers to gaining inputs and marketing output are of the
utmost distressing, quite literally putting agents out of action, and farmers far from success.
i. Procuring the inputs and selling the output
When comparing responses from AEAs, FBOs, and District Assembly persons, it becomes obvious that
credit constraints, markets, weather, loan repayment, and inputs are the top interrelated obstacles
preventing agriculture growth in Ghana. In Table B.2, AEAs were given 15 options and asked to choose
the top three constraints facing farmers. The results are clear, as each district reported a similar pattern
of related issues that are often outside of their control.
TABLE B.2: Biggest constraints facing farmers, AEA perspective
District (N=209) First Second Third
A1 Access to credit29.6
No markets14.8
Marketing of Produce14.8
A2 Access to credit22.2
Marketing of Produce17.8
Weather Failure13.3
B1 Access to credit28.9
Weather Failure17.8
Marketing of Produce11.1
B2 Access to credit33.3
Pests and diseases33.3
Post‐harvest losses33.3
C1 Marketing of Produce23.5
Access to credit19.6
Weather Failure13.7
C2 Marketing of Produce26.3
Access to credit21.1
Post‐harvest Losses18.4
Before continuing, it should also be noted that the above constraints are similar for both males and
females. The only significant difference in constraints based on gender is food processing. Food
processing is highlighted as a top constraint for females in two different regions, perhaps revealing that
women typically perform this job. In fact, while food processing makes for 11.2% of the total constraints
for women, it is only referenced 1.4% for males. This difference is important, as it could provide motive
for a more gender‐strategic extension design, where AEAs could promote certain technologies that
better harmonize with more traditional gender roles.
FBOs report similar constraints when providing information on the most important topics discussed in
the last year. These percentages highlight a number of important issues. For one, they correspond with
the AEA perspective. Secondly, FBOs are more concerned with capital limitations rather than improved
agricultural practices. While increasing improved technique and productivity accounts for 11.4% of the
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topics discussed, specific techniques like applying chemical fertilizer have a low prevalence. Though
farmers could simply desire the ‘easier’ route to increased income, it is plausible that Ghanaian farmers
are hitting a ceiling, in that new technologies require inaccessible or expensive inputs. At the same
time, even if farmers procure inputs and obtain a higher rate of production, post harvest losses are
common (as noted in the AEA responses), likely the result of malfunctioning or non‐existent markets. If
these external capital constraints are as common as it appears in Ghana, new technologies and
extension services are rendered ineffective. This high risk of failure also explains low community
participation in agriculture services.
TABLE B.3: Most important topics discussed in last year, FBO perspective
Topics Percent
Access to credit and inputs 24.0
Repayment of Loans, financial management 13.9
Increasing improved technique and productivity 11.4
Organizational Development of FBO 11.4
Marketing and Pricing 8.9
Chemical Fertilizer 5.1
Livestock care 3.8
(N=total) 62
District Assembly members reference analogous issues, and with even more insight. Not only do capital
constraints reign at the top of the list of crop production obstacles, but DA responses are more specific.
With high cost of inputs and high cost of fertilizer in the top three constraints, it can be assumed that
credit is needed to purchase these expensive technologies. Scarcity of labor is yet another factor;
because the opportunity costs of remaining in a rural agriculture‐driven area are much higher than
migrating to work in urban locations, retaining adequate labor to increase farm productivity proves
difficult. It is with these high costs of various inputs, coupled with weather risk and poor marketing, that
productivity is stagnated despite extension efforts12.
TABLE B.4: Biggest constraints in crop production, DA
List of DA constraints %
High cost of inputs 15
Financial difficulties 12.9
Infertile land/high cost of fertilizer 10.2
High cost/scarcity of labor 8.8
No markets and unstable prices 8.8
Poor road conditions 6.4
Access to credit 6
12 Note: Low education/poor extension service and pests/disease mentioned as a constraint 20 times (4.76%).
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Lack of equipment 5.7
Poor weather 5
(N=total) 420
Obtaining credit from banks is further limited. 80% (eight in total) of FBOs did not receive credit in the
last year, and 47% of those that did, were located in the Brong Ahafo region. This is important for two
reasons: one, that the region could stand as working example for others, and two, that potentially
harmful credit inequality may be on the rise as a result of an exclusive allocation or intervention
strategy. The latter could be true due to the location of the Agriculture Development Bank, where the
majority of FBOs received their credit provided under a government program. The credit process is also
unclear. Only one out of five FBOs had to provide a business plan and the amount of GHC distributed to
each member was poorly recorded. Only 50% were able to pay back the loan, reportedly due to crop
failure, weather, and poor pricing, while there is no significant relationship between AEAs and farmer
interactions for gaining credit access. This could either indicate that banking credit is almost entirely
outside the realm of extension activities, or that AEAs do not provide adequate information on how to
access it.
From the three perspectives reviewed above, it can be gathered that extension services are hindered by
externalities. Even if agents were to appropriately teach new technologies and organize farmer groups,
as long as inputs are expensive, weather is failing, and markets are unavailable, credit will continue to be
limited due to severe default risk, which ultimately results in ineffective extension.
ii. National agriculture constraints
Poor quality of roads, while named a leading barrier to development, is also a serious impediment to
extension services, as demonstrated through responses on achieving MoFA’s mission. While poor road
conditions surely impact farmers’ ability to market output, it also slows extension agents’ transport time
and stretches financial resources. The Table below lists some of these national constraints related to
agriculture, through the DA and household perspective. Lack of credit facilities is at the top.
TABLE B.6: Specific constraints in primary problems, ranked by household and district 1‐4
Household District
Livelihood
Lack of credit facilities 1 = 359 1 = 31
Not enough non‐ag employment 4 = 151 3 = 11
Lack of opportunities for agro‐processing 2 = 188 3 = 11
Lack of market to sell crops/output 3 = 164 2 = 12
Total 862 65
Roads
Poor quality of roads 1 = 445 1 = 57
No connectivity 2 = 110 2 = 10
Total 555 67
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VI. Organizational Performance
i. Assisting FBOS
As assisting FBOs is one of the AEAs mandates, comparing AEA activities to the FBO needs is an effective
way of analyzing AEA organizational performance. As illustrated in the table below, FBO original
interests include both factors in and outside agent control and responsibilities. These will be further
discussed below.
TABLE BLANK: Original reasons for forming the FBO, FBO perspective
Reasons %
Access to credit 35.1 Group action increases productivity and income 28.7 Access to inputs 8.5Training, new techniques 7.5Women’s rights 2.1(N=total) 94
Beyond these initial reasons for creating the FBO, two major FBO processes deserve attention pertaining
to AEA influence, particularly because AEAs are responsible for “developing viable farmer groups”. One
is member contributions, and the other is registration. Most importantly and as illustrated on Table
BLANK, about one third of members only make contributions when needed and an additional third make
them on a monthly basis (see Table). Reimbursements rates are broad, and those members who
contribute labor are the highest compensated.
TABLE BLANK: FBO member contributions and compensation, FBO perspective
Forms of contribution (N=) % % compensated
Monetary 27.2 57.6
Land 19.2 20
Labor 35.1 73.3
Women’s Labor 16.6 66.7
(N=total) 151 60
Given that labor is the primary form of contribution, it is logical that many FBOs do not have the
monetary resources to purchase inputs or equipment, and need credit to conduct many of their
activities. Registration is also an important area of agricultural improvements. Only 32.6% (N=12) of
FBOs are registered through the District Assembly or the Department of Cooperatives. As expected,
there are numerous explanations for this deficiency, including the costs and transport constraints linked
to the average 78.7km travel distance to the registration location, as well as the fees required to
complete the process. While the average fee is said to be 64.7GHC, almost half of all respondents
named additional payments necessary, primarily including bribe obligations like “tips to staff” and
“money to speed the process”. Additionally handicapping is the time it takes to register: while it only
takes an average of three days to open a bank account13, respondents state that it takes anywhere from
13 Bank account not required for registration, but 80% opened an account anyway.
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two hours to three years to complete the process. Similarly, 68.2% of FBO interviewees claim that they
have generated bylaws. As only one quarter of the FBOs receive a template in which to follow, bylaws
for the organizations look vastly different from one another. The wide variance in responses for what
should be standard procedure exemplifies an insecure FBO establishment in Ghana, and the need for
improved extension and farmer service systems.
ii. Trainings and Information Dissemination
Though AEAs, FBOs, and DAs consider access to credit, access to inputs, and poor markets as top
constraints to increasing productivity, there is a noteworthy gap between these perceptions and the
trainings and activities of the extension agents (in part because these issues are somewhat external).
AEAs were asked to name ten technologies they recently promoted or taught to farmers (see Table).
Improved seed and agro‐chemicals are the most taught topics, and while they address poor soil and
weather conditions, because accessing the inputs to utilize them seems difficult, extension resources are
might be wasted. Key topics like food processing, marketing of farm produce, and financial literacy are
all rarely taught, although as demonstrated, farmer constraints exist for all three. Furthermore, the four
main topics below only account for approximately one third of the 25 total technologies listed on the
survey. While this could be beneficial as famers are exposed to multiple skills and tools, it is also very
plausible, like targets, that this breadth hinders a real increase in productivity. It may be more effective
for extension agents to focus on a small amount of effective technologies, or at a national or regional
level, use one or two well‐designed intervention strategies that perhaps could also focus on making
inputs and selling output more attainable. In this manner, productivity levels could be better observed,
and farmers perhaps more attentive to the technologies that work, not just those rendered newest or
most popular.
TABLE C.1: Most Taught Topics, AEA perspective, by district
District Topic 1 (%) Topic 2 (%) Topic 3 (%) Topic 4 (%) Total %
A1 (N=88)
Improved seed 10.2
Chemical fertilizer9.1
Planting technique9.1
Agrochem‐ pests 8 36.4
A2 (N=107)
Improved Seed 10.3
Agrochem‐ pests10.3
Chemical fertilizer8.4
Planting Technique 8.4 37.4
B1 (N=121)
Improved Seed 9.1
PH storage/hand.7.4
Animal House Cons7.4
HIV/AIDS 7.4 31.4
B2 (N=150)
Chem fertilizer 9.3
Improved Seed8.7
Agrochem‐ pests8.7
Herbicides 8.1 35.3
C1 (N=111)
Improved Seed 9.9
Agrochem‐ pests9.9
PH storage/hand.8.1
Herbicides 8.1 36.0
61.7% of FBO leadership and 40% of regular members received some type of training, averaging at 2.7
days length, in the last three years. While a little over half of these are provided by MoFA, the
remaining are private and NGO sponsored (see Table BLANK). This suggests that other actors are
interested in, and supportive of the FBO as a strategy in Ghana. Beyond the mismatching of trainings
and current constraints, FBO respondents reported a very different principle topic taught by AEAs.
Though agriculture subjects were mentioned, FBO management issues, including administration, group
formation, bookkeeping, and leadership accounts for majority of the training themes. While both
developing the FBO and promoting agriculture technologies are in AEA mandate, the two disciplines
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require very different skills. Attempting to both organize groups and teach technologies could
overwhelm, or even more, confuse the job duties of the extension agent, especially without clear
targets. Moreover, because as little as three hours are spent in the field, AEAs do not have adequate
time to handle both duties effectively.
TABLE C.2: Topics taught to FBO by AEA, FBO Perspective
Topic (N=40) % # of trainings in last 3 yrs Primary sponsor Secondary sponsor
FBO management 27.5 1.7 MoFA (6) NGO (4)Agro‐chemicals 17.5 5.6 MoFA (4) Private company (2)Livestock training 15 3 MoFA (3) Private company (2)Other agriculture technique 15 2 MoFA (3) Private Company (1)Planting technique 10 3 MoFA (2) Private company (2)Financial management 7.5 1.7 Private company (2) NGO (1)
To continue, reporting reasons for meeting with AEAs (outside of training sessions), FBO respondents
claim that 37% of all interactions are related to financial management (access to inputs and credit
included) and organizational issues. While the other remaining topics are related to agricultural
practices, again, technologies vary widely. In this regard and unlike the AEA responses, improved seed is
referenced only twice, and neither meetings nor trainings provide information on marketing processes.
iii. Daily field work
The records in the AEA field book tell a different story altogether. Not only do they reinforce unclear
targeting, the field book activities present a different collection of topics compared to those mentioned
above. FBO management is noted very little, and input procurement and outputs are not documented
at all. Equally important, the field book demonstrates ineffective recordkeeping, despite the fact that it
should be used for both AEA supervision and district agriculture trend watching. Crops and specific
descriptions of them are rarely logged, while the most common notation is “field visit”. This is hardly
useful in tracking the AEA’s activities. Furthermore and as previously noted, important strategies
included in AEA responsibilities like gender and marketing, are not strongly present.
TABLE BLANK: AEA activities, AEA field book
Activity (N=346) % Hours to complete activity
Field Visits 13.9 3.6Related to livestock 12.4 2.5Related to crop production 9.5 2.8Reporting, data collection, mgmt 9.3 4.6Related to maize 7.8 4Group Meeting 7.5 2.3Related to agro‐chemicals 7.2 2.5Workshop/training 5.8 6Demonstrations 5.5 2.7Seed handling and planting 5.2 2.3Processing, storage, marketing 2.9 3.2Nutrition and health 1.5 1.6
iv. Client satisfaction
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To conclude, 88.7% of FBO respondents are satisfied with the interactions and services provided by the
AEA. While this is positive feedback, much of this satisfaction rate comes from a low demand for
services, as illustrated by limited community interactions, and the lack of extension competition, as
there are few competitors that offer similar services for free. This leaves few options for FBOs and
farmers, resulting in a high satisfaction rate for any extension they can access despite its level of quality.
Until farmers are more aware of government extension mandates and agent requirements, citizen
accountability for their activities will remain limited.
VIII. Impact at the Farm Level
i. Adopting technology
Though 88.74% of FBO respondents state that they apply the AEA‐led training topics immediately to
their work, the number of farmers adopting new technologies is rather low. While comparisons can only
be made in the Western region, where AEAs assist approximately 430 farmers, only 87 adopt the new
technologies demonstrated. As seen from the Table A.2, this adoption varies significantly by district,
with Tolon Kumbungu reporting the highest rate14. Furthermore, the most recent GLS Survey suggests
that only around a fifth of households adopt improved practices. Both the internal workings of the
extension system and expensive inputs and defective markets contribute to this shortcoming.
TABLE A.2: Number of people adopting technology, AEA perspective, by district
District Mean # people adopting new technology
A1 43.7A2 120B1 18.6B2 347C1 44.5C2 63(N=total) 521
ii. Notes on female impact
To begin, female farmers, though it appears that they are somewhat included and involved in FBOs and
AEA activities, interact with agents less than would be expected based on target criterion and agent
perceptions. For one, females in FBOs are less educated15, and while this is probably a reflection on
cultural and federal issues, it does play a role in extension. As aforementioned, AEAs meet with
educated members of FBOS more often, thus automatically implying that female members tend to be
excluded from agent attention. In the same regard, though females hold elected FBO positions, the
most common position, the Treasurer, may not be fully utilized. In this regard, 67% of members who
receive compensation for their contributions to the FBO did not collect this reimbursement from the
Treasurer (who is often female), but rather the Chairperson or Secretary. This further indicates that
14 For T.G., some survey responses were much higher than the average (as high as 3000). Somewhat of an outlier, the adoption rate average is likely lower. 15 Females‐ 55% had no education, Males‐19% no education, 46% primary, and 16% O level/SSS. 34.1% of females can read and write, 80.1% of males can.
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while females are perceived to be effective farmers and organizers, their qualities and potential to
increase agriculture productivity is often neglected.
iii. FBOS: Procuring Inputs and Marketing Output
Marketing output is a form of AEA impact, as one of the ultimate goals of farmers is to sell crops through
increased productivity. Because much of this increased productivity depends on the availability of
inputs, input procurement is also reviewed below. The farmers’ ability to do accomplish either of these
activities, though also influenced by other factors, depend largely on the quality, scope, and methods of
district extension services.
As demonstrated in Graph BLANK, FBOs and AEAs have quite a different perspective on the amount of
credit needed to procure inputs, and how often this credit is repaid. However, AEAs do seem to have
some kind of impact on the input procurement as a significant relationship exists between the number
of times FBOs meet with the AEA and how many inputs are procured (f=.0305). This could suggest that
MoFA extension agents should further incorporate input procurement into their extension strategy,
particularly if their connections to private dealers are strong. The credit discrepancies, though not easily
explained, could be rendered as misunderstanding in part of the FBO respondent, as both the AEA and
FBO reported similar figures for banking credit.
GRAPH BLANK: Input Procurement, AEA and FBO perspective (N=43, 21, 18)
Of the 44.2% FBOs that procured input, a third purchased seed (see Table BLANK), and only one
respondent hired tractor services. A feature of the market constraint, all inputs were sold in various
units‐ seed were purchased in kilograms, maxi bags, mini bags, bowls, and even trees; table BLANK
highlights the two primary units of sale for each input.
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TABLE BLANK: Units for input procurement, FBO perspective
Input (N=34) Total type procured (%) Primary Unit (%) Secondary Unit (%)
Seed 32.5 Mini bag (36.6) Kilogram (27.3)Fertilizer 23.5 Mini bag (87.5) Maxi bag (12.5)Pesticides/herbicides 20.1 Liter (57.1) Kilogram (14.3)Tractor Service 2.84 NA NA
The cost of the inputs, whether purchased from a private input dealer or MoFA16, averaged 26.5GHC
(not enough data to disaggregate by input), and the interest rate, while zero for all input dealers, ranged
from 0‐50% for MoFA. Distance from the input seller, while significantly higher for the Western region,
averaged 33.3km, and most members use public transport and rented or owned vehicles to travel. It
should also be noted that registering with the Department of Cooperatives or MoFA (discussed in
Methods) has no significant relationship to receiving credit for inputs, and indication that the
importance of FBO registration in increasing agriculture productivity may be limited.
Though the AEA survey did not cover outputs, only six of 43 FBOs reported that they marketed output in
the previous year. A total of eight crops are mentioned as sources of these outputs, but the most
common is oil palm in the Western region, accounting for 61% of all marketed crops. Reporting on price
and units is unsurprisingly poor, and again, no significant association exists between AEA meetings/
trainings and FBOs who market output. Although five of the six FBOs who sold crops interacted with an
AEA, the majority that did not sell output did as well. While state trading organizations purchase the
majority of the output (see Table BLANK), other buyers like farm gates, and market traders, purchase a
much wider variety of crops. Furthermore, and interestingly, all of the FBOs who market output are
close to the selling location. This is likely a feature of the Western region, which is geographically closer
to major ports. In turn, this suggests that only those FBOS who have well‐established and neighboring
international markets have more opportunity, though small, to sell output.
TABLE BLANK: Buyers of marketed crops, FBO perspective
Buyer (N=19) % Crops purchased
State trading organizations 47.4 Oil palm Farm gate buyers 26.3 Oil palm, groundnut, beans, pastureMarket Traders 15.8 Cocoa, okra, eggplant Exporters 10.5 Not specified
With marketing output at only 14% for FBOs and procuring inputs at 44.2%, more focus should be
allocated to markets and selling crop output. The prevalence of post‐harvest losses is likely directly
related to the fact that FBOs and farmers do not have places to sell the surplus. Not only are defective
markets decreasing farmers’ motivation to adopt new technologies and increasing the prevalence of
rural‐urban migration, without income to repay input credit, FBOs and other smallholders continually
fall into debt. Though also an externality, AEAs could place more focus on marketing strategies.
16 15/34 purchased inputs from MoFA, 18/34 from private input dealer.
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CONCLUSIONS Revamping Strategies
Matching the national agriculture scheme to farmer demand‐driven and local strategies is not
easy. This is even more difficult when RADUs, who are the national‐district linkage, have little
say in either. Discussing and attempting to better coordinate these strategies, specifically in the
DAES and in each government level, would help to manage the divergent perceived agriculture
needs at the national and local level.
Agent interventions for both farmers and FBOs are clearly diverse and broad. Developing a
district strategy, in which all agents follow, could be more effective in increasing community
productivity. Focusing on only the most effective and relevant technologies should be included
in this strategy.
Promote promising options.
Gender strategies‐ food processing, specifics for women.
Formalizing Targets and Measuring Outcomes
An aspect of strategy, formal and clear targets generated at all government levels, could be
developed for extension agents. AEAs could then be monitored and evaluated based on their
performance in achieving these targets. This would also help clarify and correct the current AEA
perception of ‘success’.
Targets would be more effective if they were focused more on productivity and not process.
Outcome oriented targets would also clarify the mandate of the agents.
Field books could reflect these targets, and be more specific. Recording activity, crop, number
of farmers serviced, whether this farmer is a “new” or “regular” client, and the distance traveled
or costs related may be a more efficient way to keep track of district agriculture activities. This
would also assist in allocating travel funds appropriately.
Questioning Qualifications
Agents are asked to perform a number of very different disciplines that require multiple
trainings. Creating ‘administrative’ and ‘technological’ extension agent positions may boost the
qualifications of AEAs (because agents would require more specific expertise), as well as reduce
the agent workload.
Agents could also receive more targeted trainings based on their district agriculture strategy.
These trainings should include more gender and marketing topics, as both of these subjects are
part of the AEA mandate and current constraints.
MoFA should consider expanding the educative resources for the extension agent. RELC and
other participating research organizations could be more involved with extension agents. DDOs
and other superiors could better disseminate information about these resources to the AEAs.
Reconsidering ‘other’ factors
More included in mandate of AEA (achieving input and output issues)—focus on adding value.
New schemes to ensure loan repayment, working with partners for credit access.
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MoFA could reduce the negative impact of externalities by implementing more appropriate
technology like irrigation systems.
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Integrating DA involvement
Decentralization, funds.
Accountability mechanisms, DA campaigns and community awareness.
Improving Incentives and Human Resources
Salary and benefits.
Supervision (targets).
References