aging demographics and problems

8/6/2019 Aging Demographics and Problems

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THE GREYING OF ASIA : DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS

Mercedes B. Concepcion

*Professor, University of the Philippines Population Institute, QuezonCity Metro manila, the Philippines*

1. Introduction In mid-1995, the world's elderly population (herein defined as

persons 60 years and older) was estimated at 542.7 million, nearlyequaling Africa's population in 1985. One in eleven of the earth'sinhabitants is at least 60 years of age. Fifty-five per cent of the world'selderly are women, underscoring their lower levels of mortality ascompared to men.

Changes in age distributions, which are occurring as a consequenceof declines in fertility and mortality levels, have led to two distincttrends. One is the ageing of population, the other is its juvenation.However, according to the United Nations (1988), the most dominant

trend from the mid-1980s to the first half of the 21st century, in boththe more and the less developed regions, will be the ageing of populations. In many low fertility and low mortality countries, naturalincrease can no longer sustain population growth and such countriesmay expect a decline of their population size. At low fertility levels, theimprovement of mortality, particularly at old age, will be a major factorin the growth and ageing of populations. In the Third World, populationageing is primarily a result of the diminution in the proportions at theyounger ages, a result of falling fertility. As both fertility and mortalitylevels continue to descend to much lower levels in the less developedregions, their age distributions will very closely resemble those of the

more developed regions in 1950.Over half (52 per cent) of the world's senior citizens dwell in Asia;

four in every fifteen are concentrated in Eastern Asia1, one in sixinhabit South-Central Asia, about one in fifteen live in Southeast Asiaand the remainder reside in Western Asia. Less than two in five (39 percent) of the world's elderly are to be found in the more developedregions. Of this proportion, 64 per cent are located in Europe, 22 percent live in North America, 12 per cent reside in Japan and theremaining 2 per cent in Australia and New Zealand. The ageing and feminization of the world population is clearly

evident in table 1 where the projected male population for Europe,

aged at least 60 years in 1995, makes up about one-sixth (16 per cent)of the total male population whereas the corresponding proportion of women comprises two-ninths (22 per cent). Thirty years later, theEuropean elderly male population is forecasted to reach almost aquarter (24 per cent), while their female counterparts are expected toaccount for three-tenths (30 per cent) of all women in the Europeanregion. The corresponding proportions in 2050 are anticipated to reach28 and 34 per cent, respectively. Eastern Asia, which reports one-ninth



of its female population as elderly, will be a close second to NorthAmerica's elderly female populations in 55 years' time (27 vs. 29 percent). The fractions of male elderly in Eastern Asia are foreseen to risefrom one-eleventh (9 per cent) in mid-1995 to nearly a quarter (24 percent) by the mid-21st century.

A significant fraction of this expansion will be due to greater femalelongevity at the very old ages. In 1995, as shown in table 2, Europeanmen aged 80 and older constitute close to 12 per cent of the maleelderly population; women aged 80 and over formed 19 per cent of thefemale elderly population. By 2050, with improved life expectancies,one in five elderly European men are foreseen to be at least 80 yearswhile the analogous proportion for women is anticipated to be two inseven. Parallel proportions for Eastern Asia reveal that the very oldmen and women make up and over 11 per cent of the 1995 elderlypopulation, respectively. By the middle of the coming century, thecorresponding percentages are contemplated to be 15 and 22 per

cent.



The following sections will describe the rapid greying of Asia andOceania, concentrating on the changes in age structure using relevantindicators; the sex ratios, life expectancy, urban-rural residence andmarital status of the elderly, and the support ratios which measure thepotential stress that shifting age structures place on a society. Theindicators were calculated using data from the United Nationspublications: The Age and Sex Distribution of the World Populations:The 1994 Revision (1994), The World Population Prospects: The 1994



Revision (1995) and the special issue on Population Ageing and theSituation of Elderly Persons of the Demographic Yearbook (1993).Supporting data, where appropriate, were obtained from cross countrystudies on ageing undertaken by the Economic and Social Commissionfor Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in connection with its projects on

Emerging Issues of the Ageing of Population(1989) and on Local-LevelPolicy Development to Deal with the Consequences of Population Ageing(1994). In this chapter, Western Asia is excluded in thediscussion except for comparative purposes and only those countriesin the Pacific area for which data are available in the United Nationspublications are included.



2. Current Situation and Prospects

Across Asia, populations are ageing rapidly. In some of the countries,notably China, population ageing will proceed much faster thancomparable socio-economic growth, an unprecedented development inworld history. In fact, ageing, like transformations in birth and deathrates, does not take much time any more. While it took France some140 years to double the proportion of its population, 60 year sandolder, to 18 per cent in 1976, only 45 years will pass in China before



improved health care and low fertility allow the percentage of theelderly to increase from 6 per cent in 1970 to 14 per cent in 2015.

3. Age Structure Changes

3.1 Population 60+ The transition from high to low levels of fertility and mortality

induces profound alterations in age structure. As decreases inmortality usually precede similar declines in fertility and since thediminution in mortality at elevated levels tends to be particularlysalient for infants and children, the age structure becomes younger atthe demographic transition's early stages. When significant decreasesin fertility are initiated, the age structure trend changes direction andthe population starts to age. Continued fertility decline and extensivemortality decreases at middle and older ages contribute to furtherpopulation ageing. The accompanying figure 1 shows the trend in the proportions of the

elderly between 1950 and 2050 for Asia and Oceania. Although these

two regions are at different stages of the demographic transition, theirage structures are following and are projected to follow the course of the transition. It is evident that in 1950, the latter's percentage of persons 60+ surpassed the former's by about 5 percentage points. Acentury later, it is foreseen that the proportion of elderly Asian womenwill exceed that of their male counterparts in Oceania but will still lagbehind their Pacific sisters by 3 percentage points.

In mid-1995, as recorded in table 3, Japan (22 per cent), Australiaand New Zealand (17 per cent each) and Hong Kong (16 per cent) hadthe largest proportions of women elderly in the region under review.On the other hand, while Japan reported the highest proportion of

elderly men (18 per cent), Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong hadaround 14 per cent of their male population aged 60. Singapore andthe Republic of Korea both reported 11 per cent of their femalepopulation to be 60 years or older while the analogous proportion forChina was 10 per cent. The lowest female fractions were those of Vanuatu, East Timor and the Solomon Islands - about 4 per cent. Thecountries with the lowest male elderly ratios were Cambodia andSamoa (3 per cent). The rest of the countries had percentages rangingfrom 5 to 9 per cent for women and 4 to 9 per cent for men. By 2050,two in five Japanese women will be at least 60 years of age; thecorresponding fraction for Japanese men will be one in three. In

contrast, only one in nine women and one in ten men in Afghanistanare foreseen to belong to the elderly group. Among the subregions,South-Central Asia will lag behind its mates in Eastern andSoutheastern Asia and Oceania. Table 3 also reveals that with very fewexceptions, the percentges of women elderly surpass those of men.

The absolute increase in the number of elderly is another way of examining population ageing and is the most relevant to policyplanners and service providers. Among the countries, China is



projected to have the largest absolute increase--nearly 160 million--inthe number of persons aged 60 and over between 1995 and 2025. Thisincrease represents more than half (52 per cent) of the addition to thecountry's total population during the 30-year period. Similarly, theincrement to India's elderly population in the same period is estimated

to be about 106 million, over two-ninths (23 per cent) of the increase inthe country's total population between 1995 and 2025.

The relative increases of the population 60+ in the coming decadesas presented in table 4, manifest an accelerating trend, peaking duringthe period 2010-2030 and falling rapidly thereafter. During the twenty-year period, 1990-2010, Asia's senior citizens are projected to grow by70 per cent, doubling in the next twenty years before plummetingdown to about 50 per cent. Oceania's increase is more moderate -about 50 per cent in the period 1990-2010, advancing to 66 per centduring 2010-2030, and subsiding to 28 per cent in 2030-2050.

Notable deviations from this trend are Japan where growth is

projected to stall and even turn negative after 2010-2030; Hong Kong'sincrease is expected to become negative during the period 2030-2050,while Singapore is anticipated to evince a status quo during the sameperiod. Other slow growers are the Republic of Korea, Australia andNew Zealand.

Worth noting too are the lower percentage increases reported forwomen 60+ as compared to men 60+ in Eastern Asia and in Australia-New Zealand during the period 1990-2010. Nowhere else in the tworegions under review is a similar pattern evident.3.2 The oldest-old

The most common way to look at population ageing is to consider

changes in the proportions of the elderly as just discussed. Another isto examine the relative growth of age groups over time. The agecomposition of the elderly population is being altered because of thetendency of the older age groups within the elderly population toexpand more rapidly. Countries which have undergone a rapid fertilitytransition in the recent past are ageing the fastest compared to thosenations where the transition proceeded at a more moderate pace.

The ageing process currently observed and projected for developedcountries (and for developing countries in the coming century) ischaracterized by a disproportionate growth of the very old and of widows due to higher male mortality. Important age differentials are

uncovered when the population 60 years and older is divided into threegroups, those aged 60-69 years, those 70-79 and those 80 years andolder. In 1950, persons in the 'young-old' category (60-69 years of age)numbered 65 million in Asia and Oceania, comprising 68 per cent of their total elderly population. Forty-five years later, this group isestimated to exceed 175 million and is projected to swell to 615 millionin 2050. For the 'oldest-olds' (80 years and older), the increase will bemuch faster. The population of this group which was 4.5 million (5 per



cent of all elderly) in 1950, is estimated to be close to 25 million inmid-1995 and is anticipated to reach 192 million (16 per cent of thepopulation 60+) by the year 2050. By 2050, the 'young-olds' will onlyaccount for one half of the total elderly population, a decline of 18percentage points in a century.

The large increase in the 'oldest-old' is evident in both developedand developing regions, and among women and men. Of the totalpopulation 80 years and older in 1950, 38 per cent came from thedeveloping world. By 1995, this proportion rose to 44 per cent; in2050, it is expected to approach 72 per cent. The parallel proportionsfor Asia and Oceania were 33 per cent in 1950, 40 per cent in 1995and 58 per cent in 2050. Of the world's women 80 years and older in1950, 36 per cent came from the less developed regions; a proportionwhich grew to 40 per cent in 1995. Fifty-five years thereafter, thefigure is foreseen to reach 70 per cent. The corresponding fractions forAsia and Oceania are 32, 37 and 57 per cent. These figures

demonstrate that Latin America and Africa will be catching up withtheir Asian and Pacific counterparts by the 21st century. Notable is thefact that the proportions of the very old women are almost identical tothose for the total population.

Table 5 discloses that for the most part, in the subregions of Asiaand Oceania, the percentage increases for women 80 years and older,for certain subregions during the next two decades, exceeded those formen for the periods, 1950-1970 and 1970-1990. From then on, thereverse will take place with the exception of South-Central andSoutheastern Asia and the small island countries of the Pacific. By2030-2050, the proportional increases among those who are at least

80 years of age will be smallest for women and men in Australia andNew Zealand.



3.3 Population 70+ compared to those 60-69 Still another way of indicating the fast growth of the older age

groups is to express the population 70+ relative to those aged 60-69as listed in table 6. For Asia as a whole in 1970, the numbers of womenand men in their 70s or older were over half those in their 60s. By1995, the ratio had risen to 62 per cent. Thirty years hence, it isanticipated to reach 70 per cent. By the mid-21st century, thepopulation 70+ is foreseen to almost equal that of the 60-69 year-olds.

Oceania's ratios were much higher - 74 per cent in 1970, 97 per cent in1995, dropping to 94 in 2025, but reaching a high of 130 per cent in2050.

In 1970, the lowest percentages of the populations 70 years andolder compared to those in their 60s were reported by Samoa (25 percent), Afghanistan (37 per cent), Maldives and the Lao People'sDemocratic Republic (40 per cent). The highest proportions werereported by the Solomon Islands (80 per cent), Australia (78 per cent)and New Zealand (76 per cent). In East Asia, the fractions ranged froma low of 44 per cent for Hong Kong to a high of 65 per cent for Japan. In

South-Central Asia, the highest proportion recorded was that of Pakistan (61 per cent), the lowest, Afghanistan (37 per cent). ForSoutheastern Asia, the percentages varied from a low of 40 per cent inthe Lao People's Democratic Republic to a high of 63 per cent in thePhilippines. In Melanesia, the difference between the lowest (PapuaNew Guinea) and the highest proportions (Solomon Islands) was 35percentage points.



By the middle of the coming century, the numbers of those who willbe at least 70 years of age will equal or even double the number of those in their 60s. This will be true for the Eastern Asian countries, withthe exception of Mongolia, for Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Thailand in Southeastern Asia, and for Australia, New Zealand, New

Caledonia and Guam in Oceania.3.4 Populations under 15 and over 60 The size and proportion of the population under 15 years of age are

more directly affected by recent fertility changes than are other agegroups. However, it is the change in old age mortality that directlyinfluences the population aged 60 years and older more than any otherage group. Also, the variation in the proportion of children in apopulation is to some extent related to the shift in the proportion of theelderly as well as to other age groups.

The comparison of the proportions of elderly to those of the child

population indicates which age group is dominant and whether thetrend is one of juvenation or ageing. The trend disclosed in table 7 isdefinitely one of ageing. At the turn of the century, Japan is expectedto be the first Asian nation to have its elderly population exceed itschild population; although as early as 1995, the proportions of Japanese female elderly already had this distinction. By 2025, Japan isprojected to be joined by Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore,Australia and New Zealand. A quarter of a century later, all the rest of the East Asian countries, India, Sri Lanka, Brunei Darussalam,Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Fiji, New Caledonia, Guam, FrenchPolynesia and Samoa are anticipated to join the list.

3.5 Median ages When a population ages, the share of the older people in the

population increases while the share of children and youth decreases,resulting in a rise in the median age. As disclosed in table 8, Asia as awhole had a median age of 24.6 years in mid-1995 compared to theworld's 25.3 years. Among the Asian sub-regions for the same period,Eastern Asia was found to have the highest median, 28.3 years, whileWestern Asia had the lowest, 21.2 years. Oceania's median age was29.8 years with the Australia-New Zealand sub-region topping this by3.5 years. By 2030, Asia's median age is projected to climb to 33.6years and that of Oceania to 35.8 years. A score of years thereafter,

the median ages of Asia and Oceania are forecast to rise further to37.7 and 38.5 years, respectively.

Among the Asian countries, Japan ranked first with a median age of 39.3 years in 1995. In second place was Hong Kong with 34.1 years.Bringing up the rear were the Maldives, 16.7 years; the Lao People'sDemocratic Republic, 17.6 years; and Pakistan, 17.9 years. Among thecountries in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand headed the list with



median ages of 33.6 and 32.1 years, respectively. At the bottom wasSamoa with a median age of 16.3 years.

The trend projected in the coming 35 years for Eastern andSoutheastern Asia is for steadily mounting median ages, with the pace

decelerating in the following two decades. To illustrate, Hong Kongwith its 1995 median age of 34.1 years is anticipated to have half of itspopulation below the age of 50.6 years in 2030, an annual averageincrement of 0.47 per year. In 2050, its median age is forecast to be 53years representing a yearly average increase of only 0.12 years.Indonesia had a median age of 23.1 years in 1995, which went up to34.1 years in 2030 and to 37.7 years in 2050. These levels implyannual average expansions of 0.31 and 0.18 years, respectively. Onthe other hand, the projected median ages for South-Central Asia andthe small island countries of the Pacific exhibit a continuous upwardtrend. A case in point is that of Nepal whose 1995 median age was

18.6 years. By 2030, the median is foreseen to attain 26.9 years or anannual average growth of 0.24 years. In 2050, the median is expectedto reach a level of 33.8 years, indicating an addition of 0.34 years perannum. Papua New Guinea's median age in 1995 was 20 years,projected to move up to 27.7 years in 2030, representing a yearlyaverage increment of 0.22. By 2050, the median age is forecast to riseto 34.1 years or an annual average addition of 0.32 years.4. Other Indicators 4.1 Sex ratios for the elderly and the total population

Sex ratios of the elderly reflect the differential mortality andmigration that have occurred over the lifetimes of cohorts. Although

more boys than girls are born worldwide, men tend to have highermortality rates than women at all ages, which accounts for imbalancesin sex ratios at older ages. As has been stated earlier, in mostcountries of the world the ageing of the population implies a greaterincrease in the number of elderly women as compared to elderly men. Thus, ageing societies are increasingly becoming disproportionatelyfemale.

Sex ratios among the elderly are projected to decline in the comingdecades as seen in table 9. In general, elderly women are expected tooutnumber elderly men in 2025 and in 2050, but to a lesser extentthan in 1995. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives and Pakistan,

which had elderly sex ratios exceeding 100 in 1995, as a consequenceof past high maternal mortality, will witness the reverse in the nextcentury.

In contrast, the majority of Asian and Pacific populations as a wholeare forecast to continue having sex ratios favouring men. Among allthe countries, Cambodia has the lowest sex ratio (93), but is projectedto achieve a gender balance in the decades to come. Japan's sex ratioof 96.4 in 1995 is predicted to remain almost stationary through the



year 2050. On the other hand, Cambodia, whose projected sex ratiowas 93 in 1995, is expected to achieve a gender balance in the comingcentury. The same is true for Viet Nam.4.2 Life expectancy among the elderly

Around the middle of this century, life expectancy at age 60 in the

countries of Asia and Oceania, with available data, was of the order of 12-14 years, being generally 1 to 2 years longer for women than formen. By 1990, life expectancy at age 60 for women in the countriesshown in figure 2 varied from 17 years to 24 years. The range for menwas 15 years to 20 years.

These ranges mask considerable differences among countries. A Japanese woman who reached 60 years of age in 1990 could expect tolive a further 24 years, on average, compared with women of the sameage in the Philippines or Malaysia whose life expectancy would bearound 18 years. Men's life expectancy is uniformly lower thanwomen's due primarily to the effect of the former's less healthy

lifestyles during adulthood compared with the latter. Male lifeexpectancy at age 60 varied from about 15.4 years in the Philippinesto 20 years in Japan.

Moreover, as demonstrated in the 1991 United NationsDemographic Yearbook (table 3), there were some quite significantchanges in life expectancy at age 60 over the period 1960-1990compared with the average gains for women and men mentionedearlier. Perhaps the most outstanding example is Japan where lifeexpectancy at age 60 for women had increased by 7 years, or almost40 per cent, since 1960. For men, the corresponding increase was 5.3years, or 35 per cent. Among men in this region, the most impressive

increase in life expectancy at age 60, was observed in Australia (2.9years).4.3 Urban-rural residence

Between 1980 and 1990, most of the elderly population in Asia andOceania were to be found in rural areas. According to the special issueof the United Nations Demographic Yearbook on the elderly, theexceptions were Hong Kong, Japan, Brunei Darussalam, IslamicRepublic of Iran, Australia, New Caledonia and New Zealand.

Data for the 1980s revealed that only one in twenty elderly lived inNepal's towns and cities. The comparable proportion was 13-14 percent for Bangladesh and Afghanistan. Around one-third of the elderly in

the Philippines and Malaysia were urban residents while thecorresponding fractions in Australia and Hong Kong hovered around 90per cent.



As illustrated in figure 3, from just over one-half (Mongolia) to aboutnine-tenths (Vanuatu) of the elderly resided in villages around 1990. Incontrast, only one in nine of New Zealand's elderly and less than three-tenths of Japanese senior citizens were rural dwellers.4.4 Marital status

The distribution of marital status is a function of historical process

that is embedded in cohorts as they reach the older ages and indeed,preceding cohorts that are already aged. In this respect, marriage,remarriage, divorce and widowhood play a vital role. The currenttrends reflect past developments.

While data on marital status have improved in terms of age detail atthe older ages, there are still serious difficulties in obtaining time-series information for many countries, particularly the developingones. Categorization of marital status is subject to considerable



differences between countries in the manner in which separation istreated. In addition, statistics on consensual unions may be variouslyrecorded and reported. This is a matter of emerging concern in manycountries, not only in the developing but in the developed countries aswell.

Data on marital status of the population 60 years and older around1990 for selected Asian and Pacific countries show a large genderdifference (see figure 4). Noteworthy is the majority of male elderly inthese countries (with Japan leading the group) who are still marriedwhile from nearly two-fifths to close to three-fifths of their womencounterparts in Vanuatu and Indonesia, respectively, are alreadywidowed. In fact, two to four times as many women as men werewidowed, due in part to the greater longevity of the women and towider social acceptance of remarriage among widowers than amongwidows. Fewer women than men had never married except in Japanand Vietnam. One in six of New Caledonia's male elderly were still

single; the analogous proportion for women was one in eight. The general picture obtained from figures 3 and 4 is supported by

multi-country studies conducted by the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) in the 1980s, the ESCAP studies of ageing in Malaysia(Arshat and others, 1989), Republic of Korea (Choe, 1989) and SriLanka (Perera, 1989) and the more recent (1994) ESCAP Project onLocal-Level Policy Development to Deal with the Consequences of Population Ageing in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailandand Viet Nam.4.5 Support ratios

Policy makers are concerned with the relationship between

changing age structures and varying demands on social services andsupport structures. An important illustration of this relationship was thepost-Second World War baby boom in the developed countries. Thisposed a problem for the educational system in the 1950s when largenumbers of students began to exceed the capacity of existing schoolsand teachers. However, when the successively smaller birth cohorts of the mid-1960s attained school age, the educational system was facedwith progressively smaller entering classes. Consequently, schoolservices were reduced; many schools were closed or converted toother uses.

table 10 As a population ages, supply and demand issues also are

created. The elderly place different demands on support systems thanthe non-elderly. Expanding numbers of elderly may strain pensionschemes, housing supply and health care systems. Growing numbersof elderly also imply rising health care costs, particularly as peoplesurvive to older ages and require more expensive medical treatment.

Approximate measures of potential 'stress' that shifting agestructures may place on a society are called support (or dependency)ratios. The total support ratio is commonly defined as the number of



persons under age 15 and over age 60 per 100 persons aged 15 to 59,the so-called productive ages. The elderly support ratio is defined aspersons 60 and older per 100 aged 15 to 59. There are inherentimprecisions within these indicators, not the least of which is the factthat many people over age 60 are still economically productive.

Likewise, not everyone in the 'productive' age group is economicallyactive. Official retirement ages vary between 55-65 for women and 60-65 for men, although many individuals continue to work beyond officialretirement age. Despite such measurement problems, support ratioscan be used broadly to exemplify the changing pressures that agenerally dependent population component might exert on society'stax base.

With major fertility declines, Asia's elderly support ratios whichaveraged 13 in 1995 are expected to reach 22 in the year 2025 and 36by 2050. But it is in East Asia where the aged dependency is projectedto double as early as the first quarter of the coming century. For

example, table 10 demonstrates that Hong Kong's working agepopulation in 2025 is projected to bear the burden of 63 persons aged60+ compared to 22 in 1995; the comparable figure for Japan will be59 elderly persons as against 32, thirty years earlier. In Singapore, thepopulation of working age will have to support 51 elderly persons inaddition to children, an increment of 36 dependents since 1995.Nowhere else is the burden posed by the elderly as heavy. Thenumbers of dependent elderly in the year 2025 are foreseen to varybetween 7 in Samoa to 41 in Australia. By mid-21st century, theburden placed by the elderly on the working age population is forecastto range from 22 in the Solomon Islands to 48 in the Republic of Korea.

5. Social Implications of Population Ageing

5.5 The family and household Age structure changes have an impact on the family as an

institution and on the conditions of women. As a population ages, thesize and structural type of the family is altered. Likewise, householdswhich are the basic units within which employment, consumption andsavings decisions are taken, would be both smaller in size and older instructure. Throughout this century, the average household size hasbeen shrinking in most countries of the world. Much of this change has

been due to a mounting proportion of one-person households. Myers(1992) reports great increases, more than double in some cases, in theproportion of older persons living alone in most developed countries inthe past 30 years. In England, for example, the proportion had grownfrom 7 to 17 per cent among men and from 17 to 45 per cent of olderwomen between 1951 and 1981. In developing countries, averagehousehold size has in some cases expanded, following the juvenationof the population resulting from gains in infant and child survival. But



this picture is expected to alter in the coming decades as thedeveloping countries follow the trend of the more developed regions.

The nature of families is linked intimately with household structureor co-residency patterns. The number of generations included in thehousehold and the length of time during which several generations live

together seems inevitable as a result of demographic ageing (Kono,1988; United Nations, 1994). Among Japanese households, 54 per centincluded three generations, which denoted that the elderly werenormally taken care of by their child or their child's spouse (Kono,1994). This trend could endanger the extended family's survival byplacing intolerable burdens on the younger generation.

From the family's viewpoint, the lengthening of joint survival is animportant aspect of the demographic transition. As individual survivalis prolonged, joint survival lengthens even more than proportionately.Moreover, the age difference between spouses contracts as do thosebetween parent and child and between siblings. By extending joint

survival, low mortality raises the proportion of one- and three-generation families relative to two-generation families (Ryder, 1988).

The marital status of older persons is an aspect of family structurethat deeply affects their living arrangements, support systems andindividual well-being. In some cases, support provided by an olderwomen to her husband may, on one hand, leave her physically andfinancially drained and lacking any support of her own when he dies.On the other hand, unbroken husband-wife families provide acontinuity of the marital bond established through the life course. Thus, they constitute a multiple support system for spouses in terms of emotional, financial and social exchanges. The provision of care in

coping with ill-health from chronic diseases and functional limitationsbecomes increasingly important at older ages. To a large extent,marital status also determines the living arrangements of olderpersons. While independent living arrangements generally characterizethe situation for married couples in most developed world societies, itis far from universal in other regions of the world. Finally, it isfrequently reported that married persons tend to enjoy higher levels of survival, mental health, use of health services, social participation andsatisfaction compared with older persons who never married (Myers,1994).5.6 Conditions of women

Ageing has led to a decline in the numbers of men relative towomen due to the latter's advantage in mortality at all ages, leading toa gender gap in life expectancy. While the world as a whole had about80 elderly men per 100 elderly women in mid-1995, the developingregions were estimated to have 90 men per 100 women for the sameperiod, a situation echoed in the Asian region. This imbalance widenswith age so that those at the oldest ages and with the utmost need forcare, are far more likely to be women.



One of the most important developments in the twentieth century isthe extension of women's economic activity. In many countries,however, the women 60 years or older have considerably lowerincomes than elderly men primarily due to smaller pensions. Divorcedwomen suffer the greatest economic hardships because they are

generally not covered by the pension schemes of their formerhusbands.In general, as a reaction to growing opportunities in the economy,

women in ageing populations had adopted strategies which implicitlyassumed that their major care giving responsibilities were to children.As more and more women joined the labour market, its opportunitiesassumed greater importance to them. In particular, the more recentexpansion in women's education made younger women workersrelatively more useful to their employers than older women. Hence, insome countries, older and less-educated women have commencedincreasingly to care for the offspring of their employed daughters

and/or daughters-in-law.In many countries, the elderly look to women of childbearing age to

minister to them. As greater numbers of women join the labour force,their time must perforce be taken up not only by bearing and rearingchildren, but also by catering to the demands of the growing number of elderly in the households. At the same time, the caregivers will beapproaching the age when they themselves will be joining the cohortof senior citizens (Concepcion, 1994).

If the family is to remain the locus of care, the logic of populationageing requires both women and men to be involved in this activity.Many women are starting to resist the presumption that they should

take on total responsibility for family and household care. The choicemight have to be made in the near future between establishinginstitutions to replace the family in care giving or having men assumea growing share in the burden of caring for their children and ageingparents.

6. Economic Implications of Population Ageing

6.1 Labour supply The increase in the old age dependency ratio as evident in both the

developed and less developed countries is expected to accelerate inthe early part of the 21st century. Many industrialized countries,including Japan, have experienced a rise in the average age of

employed persons. The number of young economically active personshas shrunk while the working populations aged 35-54 years and those55 and over have expanded.

In the developed economies, the expected growth of theeconomically-active population and rapid technological change mightcreate problems in maintaining full employment until the turn of thecentury. Thereafter, the ageing of the labour force would lead to loweroverall unemployment, with relatively more unemployment among



older workers. Firms might substitute capital for human resources,modernizing their plant and equipment or redeploying production tocountries with ample low-cost workers.

The ageing of the labour force may significantly transform the wageand employment structures of firms. The growing number of older

workers might narrow wage and salary differentials to the benefit of younger workers and might also induce a loosening in the rigidity of tenure arrangements.

Job opportunities for older persons are determined by the relativesupply of, and demand for, older workers. Industrial structure is one of the principal factors governing the labour market prospects of olderpersons (Durand, 1975). In self-employment and the agriculturalsector, older workers find it easier to phase into retirement byswitching job assignments and by reducing hours. Self-employmentand employment in family-related activities also tend to be greater inthe rural sectors. Thus, countries that are less urbanized and have a

larger agricultural sector are expected to have higher labour forceparticipation among older persons (Chen and Jones, 1989; Arshat andothers, 1989; Choe, 1989; Perera, 1989).

Labour force participation rates among the elderly in the countriescomprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)remained quite high at ages above the official retirement age (Chenand Jones, 1989). This serves to underscore the point that only a minorfraction of the ASEAN populations except Singapore, are in wage andsalaried employment affected by compulsory retirement ages. In self-employment, economic needs force a lot of people to continue workingas long as they are able to, albeit sometimes at a reduced pace. In

agriculture, where the elderly workers were concentrated, the pace of work can readily be adapted to the skills of the elderly, who in someinstances may help out only in the busy seasons.

In the developing countries, the increasing dependency burden of the ageing population would be more than offset by the decreasingdependency burden of young people during the early stages of ageing.However, the total dependency ratio is likely to rise rapidly in the earlypart of the coming century. Industrialization, accompanied by themechanization of agriculture is likely to reduce the opportunities of theelderly for self-support. Increasing urbanization and social mobility,smaller families, and the entry of married women into paid

employment would leave them less time to care for elderly parents.6.2 Savings and investment

In the developed countries, the elderly did not stop saving in oldage, but actually continued to increase their net worth. In the case of Japan, Kono (1988) observed that the effect of a low official age of retirement in conjunction with a high life expectancy had contributedto a high savings rate.



Demographic ageing might affect rates of capital formation. If aparental generation expected greater life expectancy, they mightreduce the net transfer of capital to the next generation, thus slowingthe rate of economic growth. In India, the property owned by parentswas generally transferred to sons at the death of the household head.

The common view was that lengthening life expectancy of the agedparent would reduce incentives for the young to remain on the farm. Acontrary view supported by the evidence was that experience wasconsidered important in India and that the presence of an elder in thehousehold increases productivity. Thus, sons were less likely to beabsent, the older the household head (United Nations, 1994). On theother hand, if parents expected a longer retirement period, they mayhave a greater incentive to invest in the human capital of their childrenas a source of old-age support. Furthermore, demographic ageing isaccompanied by smaller family size so that if the total amount of theintergenerational transfer was constant, there would be a larger net

transfer per child (Tabah, 1988).6.3 Intergenerational transfers

It has been generally assumed that the persistence of the extendedfamily and multi-generational living arrangements denotes that theelderly in the developing world are well cared for by their familymembers. Older persons transfer property to their children whoassume responsibility for household tasks and care for their ageingrelatives. The studies in Pakistan (Afzal, 1994) and Thailand(Phalakornkule, 1994) undertaken under ESCAP auspices have shown,however, that elderly parents were central contributors to theeconomic support of the households. The contrary was found in

Indonesia (Wirakartakusumah, 1994) where only 22 per cent of elderlywho lived with their children or grandchildren contributed to householdexpenses. The sources of support differed by country with Indonesiareporting other sources apart from salaries; Pakistan, salaries and/orsavings as well as other sources; and Thailand, income from work andrelatives. These studies indicate that support of the elderly by theirchildren at home is delayed until later ages than are being measuredby the broad age category of 60+.

Income from one's own economic activity and from pensions andprovident funds were more important for men than for women. Thepercentage of male respondents who cited pensions or provident funds

ranged from 5 per cent in Thailand to 6 per cent in Malaysia. Therewere no comparable figures for the Philippines (Chen and Jones, 1989). The majority of elders in Sri Lanka had no definite source of incomeafter retirement. Only one in nine elderly received a pension with fivetimes more urban dwellers receiving pensions than rural residents.

Remittances from family members who migrate for better economicopportunities can be an important source of inter-generationalredistribution of income within the family. This is particularly true in



more agricultural economies. The strength of the migrants' motivationto return or to bring their families to join them often determines thedegree to which these remittances may be viewed as investment forthe migrants future return home (often after retirement). Alternatively,migrants may send money for philanthropic reasons or as part of an

implicit contract to contribute to their parents' well-being, without anyintention of returning to take advantage of their investment in thefamily. But upon retiring, they may return as the pension they receiveis insufficient for subsistence in the city environment (Hugo, 1988;Lucas and Stark, 1984).6.4 Pension schemes

As populations age, the share of old age pensions in total publicexpenditure will increase significantly. In part, this will reflect thedecline in the public expenditure requirements of children. Populationageing, by increasing the cost of public old age pensions, makesnecessary either a reduction in benefits, an increase in contribution

rates, financing from other sources or some combination of thesepolicies. In the event that contribution rates are increased, thediminished burden of child care should give families a greater capacityto absorb the tax increase while maintaining their real disposableincome per capita.

The negative economic effects on pension plans of populationageing could be significantly reduced by policies designed to increasethe activity rates of physically- and mentally-able older persons.Eliminating compulsory retirement and raising the age of eligibilityfrom 60 to 65 years could reduce the expenditures of some socialretirement systems by half.

In most developing countries, pension systems are virtually non-existent, covering only a small portion of the population such asgovernment workers. Even then, many are simply provident fundsproviding lump-sum payments upon retirement which are inadequateand quickly spent. Most older workers, then, work to much moreadvanced ages than is the case for the more developed regions. Onretirement, such elderly return to live with one or more children,depending almost entirely upon family support. A case in point is thatof the Philippines where coverage under the government pensionscheme was limited to only 8 per cent (Domingo, 1989). About 15 percent of Malaysian men enjoyed employment benefits as contrasted

with 5 per cent for Malaysian women (Arshat and others, 1989). Thenumber of Korean elders receiving public welfare is very low (Choe,1989). The reason is that the government-level social welfare systemin not well established in the Republic of Korea. The majority of eldersin Sri Lanka had no definite source of income after retirement. Onlyone in 9 elderly received a pension, with 39 per cent of the urbandwellers receiving pensions as contrasted with 8 per cent of ruralresidents (Perera, 1989). Thus, public pension plans might have in



egalitarian implications for the transfer of resources between differentsocial classes of the same generation as well as the transfer of resources between generations.

7. Summary

The ageing of populations is a worldwide phenomenon, anineluctable consequence of decreasing fertility and lengthening lifeexpectancy. The population 60 years and older is enlarging both inrelative and in absolute numbers. As the population age structurerectangularizes, intergenerational and intercohort relations need to bere-appraised and altered.

The structure and relations of families are being modified by thesefertility and mortality changes. Greater numbers of generations livetogether in families for much longer time periods. New relationshipsare evolving quickly within these kin groups. Simultaneously, the

change in the acceptability of alternative family patterns and thevariation in social and economic status between generations within thelarger society have contributed to alterations in the family.

The earlier sections underscored several demographic aspects of population ageing that deserve attention. One, is that as aconsequence of falling fertility, the size of the population of non-working-age relative to the size of the working-age population isexpected to swell in the developing regions within the next half century. Two, since the sex ratio tends to be lower at older ages,population ageing implies a greater increment in the number of elderlywomen than in that of elderly men. Three, owing to the tendency of

the older age groups to increase more rapidly, older persons willconstitute increasingly higher proportions of the population 60 yearsand older. Four, population ageing and the more rapid populationgrowth in the developing regions than in the developed regions willlead to more and more fractions of the world's elderly concentrated inthe developing countries.

The analysis of fertility and mortality effects on age structure leadsto several important policy implications. First, even if fertility andmortality were to remain constant at current levels, the ageing of populations will move forward in the decades to come. Demographichistory has already built in an age-cohort structure that makes

population ageing almost unavoidable in the future. Second, althoughthe populations of developing countries are considerably younger thanthose of the developed countries, it is foreseen that the former willfollow the course of population ageing experienced by the latter. Inaddition, the pace of population ageing in Africa, Asia, Latin Americaand Oceania will surpass that of the remaining major regions of theworld. Finally, it should be stressed that until nearly the middle of the21st century, the growth in the size of the population 60 years and



older will be determined solely by mortality variations because thesepersons have already been born.

The considerable numbers of elderly in the Asian and Pacific sub-regions will require a vast effort on their part, and on the part of families, governments and private organizations, to ensure that the

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Perera, P.D.A. 1989. Emerging Issues of Population Ageing in Sri Lanka.Asian Population Studies Series No. 98. Bangkok, Thailand: Economicand Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.Phalakornkule, S. 1994. Country Policy Development for the Elderly at the Local Level in Thailand .. Asian Population Studies Series No. 131-E.

Bangkok, Thailand: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and thePacific. Tabah, L. 1988. 'The economic and social consequences of demographic aging'. In Economic and Social Implications of Population Aging. United Nations publication ST/ESA/SER.R/85United Nations. 1988. 'Global trends and prospects of aging populationstructures'. In Economic and Social Implications of Population Aging.United Nations publication ST/ESA/SER.R/85.1994. Ageing and the Family . United Nations publication (Sales No.E.94.XIII.4).Wirakartakusumah, M.D. 1994. Local Level Policy Development on

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