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AGENDA

City of Gainesville

Citizen Election District Review Committee ____________________________________________________________

Public Meeting of October 2, 2012

Tuesday, 5:00 p.m.

Room 16, Basement of City Hall

_______________________________________

I. CALL TO ORDER

Stephanie Sims, Chair

II. ROLL CALL

III. ADOPT AGENDA

IV. APPROVE MINUTES (B)

Minutes of August 28th

, 2012 and September 18th

, 2012 Citizen Election District Review

Committee Meeting and Public Hearing

V. PRESENTATION BY DR. KENNETH WALD ON REVISED REPORT

REFLECTING COMMENTS MADE AT PUBLIC HEARING. (B)

RECOMMENDATION:

Committee approve revised report and recommend adoption of Plan 1 District Map.

VI. DISCUSSION OF PRESENTATION TO CITY COMMISSION ON THURSDAY,

OCTOBER 18, 2012.

VII. MEMBER COMMENT

VIII. PUBLIC COMMENT

IX. ADJOURNMENT

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(B)

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MINUTES

City of Gainesville Citizen Election District Review Committee

____________________________________________________________

Meeting of August 28th, 2012 Tuesday, 5:00 p.m. Room 16, Basement

City Hall _______________________________________

I. Call to Order

Stephanie A. Sims, Chair, called the meeting to order at 5:03 p.m.

II. Roll Call Members Present: Juanita Miles Hamilton John Hudson Jim Painter Stephanie Sims Dan Smith Caleb Stewart Member(s) Absent: Brendon Rivard Staff Present: City Attorney, Marion Radson Assistant City Attorney, Sean McDermott Consultant, Dr. Ken Wald Senior Strategic Planner, Lila Stewart Clerk of Committee, Karen MacFarlane III. Adopt Agenda

John Hudson motioned for an adoption of the agenda. Juanita Miles Hamilton seconded. Motion carried 6-0.

III. Approval of Minutes John Hudson motioned for approval of the July 18, 2012 minutes. Caleb Stewart seconded. Motion carried 6-0. IV. Report by Dr. Kenneth Wald, Consultant

Dr. Wald summarized the update of his report and analysis of the results of the August 14 primary election. He provided his presentation as backup.

V. Discussion of Public Hearing Scheduled for September 18, 2012 at 6:30 p.m. at the City Hall Auditorium Karen MacFarlane informed the Committee of the advertising for the public hearing in the Gainesville Sun and the UF Alligator, along with the Channel 12 notice. Dr. Wald will provide a presentation to the public which includes all proposed district plans. The Committee agreed that maps of the four (4) proposed plans along with the current district map should be available for public viewing at the hearing. VI. Discussion of October 2, 2012 Meeting Agenda and the October 18th, 2012 Presentation to the City Commission

Marion Radson updated the Committee on the process and timeline for the City Commission.

IX. Member Comment No member comment. X. Public Comment No public comment. XI. Adjournment The meeting adjourned at 6:12 p.m.

**These minutes are not a verbatim account of this meeting. A video recording from which the minutes were prepared are available from the Clerk of the Citizen Election District Review Committee located in the City Attorney’s Office of the City of Gainesville.**

MINUTES

City of Gainesville Citizen Election District Review Committee

____________________________________________________________

Meeting of September 18th, 2012 Tuesday, 6:30 p.m.

City Hall Auditorium _______________________________________

I. Call to Order

Stephanie A. Sims, Chair, called the meeting to order at 6:30 p.m.

II. Roll Call Members Present: Juanita Miles Hamilton John Hudson Jim Painter Stephanie Sims Dan Smith Caleb Stewart Member(s) Absent: Brendon Rivard Staff Present: City Attorney, Marion Radson Assistant City Attorney, Sean McDermott Consultant, Dr. Ken Wald Clerk of Committee, Karen MacFarlane III. Adopt Agenda

John Hudson motioned for an adoption of the agenda. Juanita Miles Hamilton seconded. Motion carried 6-0.

III. Introduction by Stephanie Sims, Chair

Stephanie Sims, Chair presented the purpose of the Citizen Election District Review Committee and City Commission’s charge to the Committee. IV. Presentation by Dr. Kenneth Wald, Consultant

Dr. Wald presented his report and recommendation which included all proposed district plans.

**These minutes are not a verbatim account of this meeting. A video recording from which the minutes were prepared are available from the Clerk of the Citizen Election District Review Committee located in the City Attorney’s Office of the City of Gainesville.**

V. Public Comment Evelyn Foxx Bob Karp Yvonne Hinson-Rawls VI. Member Comment Dan Smith suggested that the data for proposed District Plans 2, 3 and 4 minority populations be presented in a different format for better understanding by the Committee and the public. Marion Radson, City Attorney, reminded the Committee of the upcoming meeting on October 2, 2012 and the Committee’s final recommendation to the City Commission on October 18, 2012. XI. Adjournment The meeting adjourned at 7:25 p.m.

Redistricting Gainesville after the 2010 Census:

A Report to the Citizen Election District Review Committee

Prepared by

Kenneth D. Wald, Ph.D

Consultant

Report 4.01

Prepared for Committee Meeting on October 2, 2012

9/22/2012 4:26 PM

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The municipal charter requires Gainesville to adjust the borders of its (four) City Commission

single-member districts to insure they produce districts that are “equally proportioned in

accordance with the State Constitution and the Constitution of the United States” (Gainesville,

FL 2012). The charter further requires the City Commission to assess the districts “not less

frequently than within the second year following each decennial census” (ibid). With the

completion of the 2010 decennial census, the charter mandates a review of district boundaries at

this time and, if needed, revision of the districts.

Accordingly, this report

1) summarizes the principles that guide redistricting and the practices of the city since the

adoption of a mixed at-large/single-member election system in 1987;

2) analyzes the populations of the existing districts and adjudges them inconsistent with the

standard of equitable proportion in the city charter and federal law;

3) presents four redistricting plans that appear to meet the minimal criteria for constitutional

districts;

4) evaluates the four plans on several criteria;

5) recommends one of those plans, Plan 1, for adoption by the City Commission

In preparing this report, I have drawn on materials provided by the Bureau of the Census, the

Alachua County Supervisor of Elections, the office of the City Attorney, and other sources.

Although I have benefitted greatly from discussions with the members of the Citizens Review

Committee and the city staff, as well as comments from the public, the analysis and

interpretation of these materials have been my responsibility.

Municipal Redistricting Standards

Major Criteria

In assessing any current or proposed changes to municipal election districts, there are two critical

legal standards. Districts must be configured so they (1) are equal in population and (2) avoid

diluting the capacity of minority voters to elect their preferred representatives.

Federal, state and local law mandate that districts have equal populations. The degree of

population equality is assessed by the “total plan deviation” which must be 10% or less for local

governments unless there are extremely compelling reasons to exceed that target. To calculate

total plan deviation, simply divide the city’s total population (those enumerated by the Census as

residents) by the number of districts. This produces the target population for each district. Then

calculate the percentage difference between each proposed district’s population and the target

population. Then add together the deviation of the smallest and largest districts without the signs.

So if the largest district is 4% over the target and the smallest is 3% under the target, the total

plan deviation is 7%. The 10% guideline must be satisfied at the time district boundaries are first

drawn. Recognizing that populations change constantly, the federal and state courts do not

require redistricting more than once every ten years

The second critical legal standard, sometimes known as “affirmative districting,” is driven by the

goal of insuring that the equal rights of minority voters to elect their preferred representatives are

not compromised by splitting up or otherwise diluting the potential electoral power of

geographically concentrated minorities that have historically experienced discrimination. In the

words of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, racial minorities should not have “less opportunity

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than other members of the electorate . . . to elect representatives of their choice” (42 U.S.C. §

1973[b] [2000]). Toward this end, redistricting authorities are encouraged to construct “majority-

minority” or “minority opportunity” districts by combining areas with large minority

concentrations into one or more districts (Levitt 2010, 47).1 When redistricting takes place,

localities should assess how changes in district boundaries might affect the political fortunes of

minority voters in such districts.

Traditional Districting Standards

The courts have also identified what are called “traditional districting standards” that should be

considered in assessing districting plans. These criteria are useful guidelines and should be

followed but local governments have generally been given some leeway in meeting them.2 I

focus here on (1) contiguity and (2) compactness.

The concept of contiguity generally means that “districts have to be connected in some way”

(Cain et al 2006, 7). The Florida Supreme Court has affirmed the dictionary definition of

contiguous for state legislative districts as “being in actual contact: touching along a boundary or

at a point” while noting that the requirement for a contiguous district is not satisfied “when a part

is isolated from the rest by the territory of another district” or when the lands “mutually touch

only at a common corner or right angle” (Supreme Court of Florida 2003). However, in Shaw v.

Reno (509 U.S. 630 1993), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that governments could depart from

“traditional districting principles” such as contiguity for objective reasons other than racial

considerations. As the City Attorney has opined, while contiguity should be maintained

whenever possible, it is not mandated by state or local law (Office of the City Attorney 2012, 3).

Additionally, maintaining the integrity of the county’s voting precincts is a valid neutral reason

for departing from the strictest definition of contiguity.

Compactness similarly has a commonsense definition that connotes tightness and geographical

concentration, something that implies “box-like districts” without too many edges or protruding

fingers (Cain et al 2006, 7). As statisticians have developed dozens of different formulas for

calculating this quality, there has been absolutely no consensus on how compactness should be

defined and measured (Fryer & Holden 2007, 2). In the absence of “manageable standards”

(ibid), the courts have accepted districts that appear to meander across territory and deviate

substantially from the box shape.

In practice, drawing district lines to satisfy both the major legal criteria and traditional district

standards involves trade-offs. Maximizing any single goal—say achieving exact population

equality or insuring equal access to representation by minority voters—may well undermine

compactness. There is also potential tension between these standards and the local norms and

practices that have traditionally governed the creation of district lines.

Local Standards

Beyond these federal and state mandates, communities are free to consider other factors in

drawing election districts provided they do not seriously impair the baseline standards. In the

1For a useful discussion of some of the issues involved in assessing vote dilution, see Persily (2007).

2Although these standards are explicitly identified in the “Fair Vote” amendment to the Florida Constitution, the

City Attorney has informed the Committee that this legislation does not apply to local government districts.

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twenty-five years since the hybrid at-large/single-member district system was adopted,

Gainesville’s redistricting process has developed several norms.

Incrementalism: Anyone who compares the maps accompanying the district plans below with

earlier incarnations will note the stability of the district boundaries over time. While there have

been changes due to annexations, other sources of population change, and evolving baseline

standards, the proposed redistricting plans in this report produce districts that closely resemble

those first adopted in 1987. Even when the number of single-member districts increased from

three to four in 2002, there remained a recognizably east Gainesville (District 1), northwest

Gainesville (District 2) and southwest Gainesville (District 3) district with the new District 4

comprising mostly mid-town and the University of Florida campus. Each of these districts has a

somewhat distinctive socioeconomic profile that defines what the law describes as “communities

of interest.” By minimizing changes where possible, this stability makes it easier for residents to

identify their districts and for elected representatives to try to insure that the needs of district

residents are articulated during the legislative process.

Transparency: Gainesville has maintained an open process of redistricting in which a

professional consultant works with an appointive city committee in public meetings, one of

which is advertised as a public hearing. The recommendations of the Committee are then

referred to the City Commission as part of the normal legislative process.

Precinct Boundaries: All of the plans adopted by past City Commissions have used election

precincts as the building blocks of election districts. Although considered from time to time,

splitting precincts has been rejected for both administrative reasons and because Gainesville’s

precincts constitute relatively homogeneous areas with easy access to a central polling station.

While splitting precincts might reduce plan deviations or facilitate other goals, precincts have

remained wholly within a single district because there was no need to do otherwise. In any case,

the Alachua County Supervisor of Elections, who both draws precinct boundaries (as mandated

by state law) and administers local elections under contract with the city, has indicated that it is

not possible to split city precincts for local elections.

Continuity: Gainesville limits commissioners by law to two consecutive three-year terms. It also

requires commissioners to reside in the district they seek to represent at least six months before

the election and to reside “continuously” in the district for the length of their term.3 Because

district elections are staggered over time, redistricting might potentially render a commissioner

ineligible for reelection by moving his/her precinct of residence into another district. In practice,

the City Commission has never received a plan that would redistrict a first-term Commissioner

out of his/her district nor has this consultant ever recommended such a plan.

The federal Voting Rights Acts explicitly empowers redistricting authorities to consider the

ongoing relationship between an elected official and a constituency. Redistricting out an official

who is otherwise eligible for re-election certainly undermines the relationship between the

official and the constituency, denying voters the opportunity to make their own choice based on

accountability.

3If redistricting moves a Commissioner from the district he or she represents, the Commissioner is allowed to serve

out the term until the next election.

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Although the Florida legislature has redrawn Congressional districts that move incumbents out of

their former districts, the parallel with the Gainesville City Commission does not bear scrutiny.

To begin with, the sheer complexity of redistricting a large and dynamic state presents a giant

jigsaw puzzle that may make it impossible to maintain continuity in representation. In fact, the

steady increase in U.S. House seats allotted to Florida demands changes in district boundaries

that undermine long-term representation.

But the analogy breaks down, I would argue, because of the difference in qualifications for

office. Members of Congress cannot be required to reside in a particular district because the

Constitution denies Congress and the states power to set additional qualifications beyond age,

citizenship and state residence (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 [1969]). As such, an

incumbent U.S. Representative may run for re-election even if s/he no longer resides in the

district which previously sent the representative to office. Given the staggered nature of district

elections for the Gainesville City Commission, that same option is not automatically available to

a sitting first-term commissioner. The Commissioner who is redistricted “out” would have to

move his/her legal residence to a new district or choose to run in one of the three at-large

districts with a very different constituency. Hence the Congressional example is not very

instructive.

Analyzing the Current (2002) Districts

Verdict

The first task is to determine whether the four districts adopted in 2002 still satisfy the

requirements of Gainesville, the state of Florida and the US Constitution. Because of changes in

precinct boundaries and geographically concentrated population growth, I conclude that

Gainesville must redraw the boundaries of the four single-member City Commission

districts adopted in 2002.

Issues with precincts: In redrawing Gainesville’s precincts, something that occurs routinely

after each census, the Supervisor of Elections was constrained by a new state law to insure that

precinct boundaries no longer crossed census blocks, the basic unit of enumeration used by the

Bureau of the Census (2011 Florida Statutes, Title IX, Chapter 101, Section 001, Section 24, ch.

2011-40, amended subsections [3] and [4], effective July 1, 2012). This law and the growth in

the number of early and absentee voters prompted far more extensive changes to precinct

boundaries than in the past, submerging some old precincts into others, splitting some precincts

among four or more new precincts. I will refer to the new precincts that became official in July

as the 2012 precincts to distinguish them from the precincts used to draw the Commission

districts in 2002.

(Map 1 about here)

There is no way to reproduce the exact borders of the 2002 districts with the new precincts. Map

1 illustrates the problem. New Precincts 12, 38, and 57 are split between the old Districts 1 and 2

and Precincts 19 and 59 are split between old Districts 1 and 4. Precincts 23 and 31, which used

to be wholly contained within District 4, have been redrawn and now extend west, well into

District 3 as it was configured in 2002. Moreover, Precinct 12, which used to be wholly

contained in District 2, has now been extended south and east across NW 13th St (into District

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1). Most of Precinct 19 is within old District 1, with the exception of the SW corner of Depot

Ave and S. Main St. which is part of the old District 4.

Because of these split and overlapping precincts, the post-2012 districts (which will be used for

the next municipal elections in 2013) must of necessity have different borders than the districts

adopted in 2002.

Population Growth: The Commission districts drawn ten years ago also need to be changed

because of Gainesville’s growing population. The city’s annexations (Annexation Chronology

2012), the continued growth of the University of Florida, and natural population change have

combined to increase the city’s population by about 10.5% since the last redistricting in 2002.4

The net result of this growth is a population of 124,092 that yields a precinct target of 31,023.5

When the districts were realigned in 2002, the total plan deviation was 9.7% (Wald and

Comenetz 2002, 24).

How does subsequent population change affect Commission districts in 2012? Table 1 shows the

plan deviation if I assign each 2012 precinct (whether newly-drawn or not) to the commission

district in which it was entirely or mostly located prior to the reprecincting process described

above. Summing the 2010 enumerated population in those precincts indicates the magnitude of

the population changes that have to be made to the four districts. The total plan deviation, the

sum of the largest positive and negative percentage deviations (ignoring signs), is now an

astounding 62%. To get back to population equality as required by federal, state and local law,

District 1 will require about 10,000 new residents to bring it close to the target and District 3

must be reduced by approximately 10,000 residents to regain balance. District 2 will have to lose

about 1500 residents and District 4 will require an infusion of about 1200. As Districts 1 and 3

are on opposite sides of the city and do not meet at any point on the map, they cannot be brought

into population equality by any simple one-to-one exchange of precincts. The new residents of

District 1 can only come from precincts that are currently in District 2 or District 4 and the

residents of District 3 who must be redistributed to reduce the population of the district will

inevitably end up in those same two districts.

(Table 1 about here)

Complications

It will help the Commissioners understand why I recommend Plan 1 (below) if they recognize

four factors that further complicate redistricting in this cycle:

4The city added about 6400 new residents in a 2008 annexation in the SW 20

th Avenue area including I-75. A 2009

attempt to annex about 3600 residents on the east side, which would have added a significant number of African

Americans to the city and to District 1, was defeated decisively. Adding the 6400 new residents to the contiguous

District 3 pulled the districts out of alignment in 2008. A review in 2009 concluded that the absence of reliable data

about population in the precincts and the imminence of the 2010 census made it prudent to defer redistricting until

the current period. (See City of Gainesville. Citizen Election District Review Committee. Legistar No. 080871,

2012). 5There is a difference of 262 between the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 population figure for Gainesville (124,354)

and the figure of 124,092 used as the target district population in this report. Close inspection of Census blocks

shows the Bureau includes in the city of Gainesville parts of Precincts 15 and 51 which are outside the city limits

and part of county-only precincts as defined by the Supervisor of Elections. Removing the 262 residents in these

census blocks brings the city’s population to 124,092.

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1. By coincidence, all four commissioners who currently represent the single-member districts

are in their first terms, thus eligible to seek re-election for a second three-year term. That

increases the prospect that changes in district boundaries could render certain commissioners

ineligible to seek a second term.

2. Second, the city is moving ahead with an annexation proposal on the November, 2012

ballot.6 If it proceeds and passes in whole or part, that could throw the new districts out of

population equality. While the changes would not become official until mid-2013, after the

next round of city elections, they might require further adjustment of district lines.

3. Another city committee has been considering changes to the election calendar and ballot

labels among other topics. Should these changes be incorporated, they might have spillover

effects on whatever redistricting plan is adopted by the City Commission in 2012.

4. Finally, as I noted above, the City must be attentive to the impact of new boundaries (and

new residents) on the political rights of minority voters. This applies to District 1, the only

district with enough black voters to constitute a voting majority or plurality. In the past, I

used previous election results to estimate with a high degree of accuracy how the movement

of precincts in or out of District 1 would affect the ability of those minority voters to elect

representatives of their choosing. Because of the change in precinct boundaries, I have less

data available to perform that analysis in 2012. I discuss below the issue of potential minority

vote dilution in District 1.

Plan Options7

After exploring more than a dozen scenarios (each with multiple options) to balance the four

districts, I have identified four potential plans for redistricting the Gainesville City Commission.

Each is plausible in the sense that the plans meet the standard of population equality, make a

good faith effort to satisfy other traditional redistricting standards, and do not on their face

appear to dilute the equal rights of minority residents. None splits a precinct. Each plan retains

the basic geographic configuration of districts in the eastern, northwestern, southwestern and

central/midtown/UF areas of the city. These plans are represented by maps 2-5 in the appendix.

Beauty being in the eye of the beholder, it’s possible that some observers will find distinctive

advantages to this or that feature of a particular plan. For example, Plans 2-4 move Precincts 55

and 12 into District 1, which might be more appropriate than District 2 in terms of demography

and community of interest. Plan 1 puts part of the old Precinct 19, which was formerly in District

1, back into that District by virtue of the precinct’s partial amalgamation with Precinct 59. Plan 4

might strike a reader as producing somewhat “boxier” looking districts, suggesting a more

compact overall plan than the alternatives.

6Voters in three areas of the two precincts affected will be polled separately so only parts of the entire area might

enter the city. 7The development of these plans was based on mapping and other technical assistance provided by Crystal

Goodison. Ms. Goodison is the GIS Database Administrator for the University of Florida GeoPlan Center. She

holds a B.A. in Geography and a M.A. in Urban & Regional Planning from the University of Florida, with a

specialization in Planning Information Systems and a certification in Interdisciplinary Geographic Information

Systems. She has 14 years experience in the field of Geographic Information Systems and over 7 years experience

with geospatial data management and relational database management systems. She was a member of the 2009

Citizen Election District Review Committee.

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As I will recount below, I think these subjective benefits are outweighed by differences between

plans in the degree to which they (a) risk dilution of minority voting power and (b) follow the

norms previously employed in Gainesville redistricting. For those reasons, I recommend only

Plan 1.

Plan 1 rebalances the population of the four districts by moving Precinct 59 from District 4 to

District 1, transferring Precinct 44 from District 3 to District 4 and then shifting Precinct 61 from

District 2 to District 3.8

Plan 2 requires five precinct shifts: It moves Precincts 12 and 38 from District 2 to District 1 and

Precincts 24, 26 and 40 from District 3 to District 2.

Plan 3 moves seven precincts. The plan moves Precincts 12 and 38 from District 2 and Precinct 7

from District 4 into District 1. It also moves Precinct 24, Precinct 26, and Precinct 40 from

District 3 to District 2. Precinct 25 is shifted from District 1 to District 4.

Plan 4, the final option, moves six precincts between districts. Specifically, Precincts 12 and 7

(both in District 2) and Precinct 27 (District 4) move into District 1. Precinct 40 shifts from

District 3 into District 2, Precinct 5 transfers from District 4 into District 3 and Precinct 44 goes

from District 3 into District 4.


Table 2 presents basic population data on the four plans. The interested reader will find a

detailed racial/ethnic breakdown of the census population for each of the four plans in Tables 3A

through 3D.

Rationale for Recommendation of Plan 1

Apart from its acceptable plan deviation which is well within the guidelines, Plan 1 has four

advantages over the alternatives which prompt me to recommend it.

First, it better follows the Gainesville tradition of incrementalism by moving only three

precincts.

Second, Plan 1 can best handle the expansion of population if the November, 2012 annexation is

implemented in whole or in part. Note that the two smallest districts under Plan 1, #2 and #3, are

both below the target population of 31,023. The annexation areas are adjacent to these two

districts and could be absorbed into the existing districts without doing much violence to the

population equality standard. This would avoid the expense of a new round of redistricting in

2013.

Third, only Plan 1 offers the possibility of continuity of representation by allowing all incumbent

district commissioners to seek a second term. Plans 2 and 3 would prohibit the incumbent in

District 3 from seeking a second term while Plan 4 similarly debars the District 4 incumbent

commissioner from seeking re-election in that district. I’ve indicated I consider such action

unfair to voters and unnecessary given the option of Plan 1.

8The following discussion uses the new precinct numbers.

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Finally, Plan 1 provides a minority influence district (District 1) that best safeguards the rights of

minority voters to select representatives of their choosing. Because that claim may seem counter-

intuitive given the data in Table 3, which details the racial/ethnic composition of District 1 under

each plan, it requires some explanation.


As noted above, the Voting Rights Act enjoins localities from redistricting that dilutes the voting

power of minority citizens. “Vote dilution” arises when racially polarized voting—significant

differences in preferred candidates between minority and non-minority voters— interacts with

changes in district boundaries. If a plan increases the probability that the candidate preferences

of minority voters will be defeated by the preferences of non-minority voters, the courts will

often sustain claims of vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act. Some vote dilution may be

unavoidable within a jurisdiction where the non-black share of the population grows faster than

black population or the black population becomes more widely dispersed across all parts of the

city. In Gainesville, moving some of the black population into precincts that are no longer inside

District 1 (as was done in the “reprecincting” earlier this year) will accentuate the tendency

toward dilution. These trends appear to explain why the black share of the total population in

District 1, which reached 61.7% in 2002, is lower in all four plans.9

The relevant question is whether Plan 1 does as well as or better than the alternatives in

preserving the political character of District 1. At first glance, the answer appears to be “no”

because the black population share of District 1 under Plan 1 drops to 48%, 4-6% below the

alternatives. But as political scientists have documented, racial population percentages from the

census are not good predictors of how districts perform in real elections (Brace et al. 1988). To

determine the probable impact of redistricting on the chances of minority voters to elect their

preferred representatives, it is more realistic to rely on data from elections than just census

tabulations. As Lisa Handley (2011) noted in a presentation to the National Conference of State

Legislators, the effectiveness of minority districts in representing minority voters can be assessed

when “Election results from previous contests that included minority-preferred candidates [are]

recompiled to reflect results in proposed district(s).” When I perform that analysis in Gainesville

using results from the August 14, 2012 primary election, it demonstrates that Plan 1 minimizes

vote dilution more so than the three alternatives.

Minority Vote Dilution Under Four Plans in Gainesville

Using final results from the August 14th

primary elections, the first conducted with the newly

defined precincts, I determine minority vote dilution under the four plan proposals by comparing

the outcome in the six precincts that formed the core of old District 1 with the results that occur

in the proposed new District 1 area under the four plan options for 2013. It’s worth emphasizing

that

1. The core precincts that made up the new District 1 (precincts 13, 19, 25, 28, 33, and 55)

do not coincide exactly with the old District 1 due to the changed precinct boundaries.

9The same decline is apparent in black share of the voting age population (which was 54.8% in 2002).

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2. The District 1 configuration in Plan 3 contains five of the six core precincts, dropping

new Precinct 25 to achieve closer population equality among the four districts.

3. The elections that provide these data were not contested only in District 1 but also in

precincts outside the Gainesville city limits.

4. All these elections except for the School Board District 2 seat and the Florida House of

Representatives seat in District 20 were partisan primaries whereas Gainesville municipal

elections are formally non-partisan.10

These shortcomings are unavoidable because the change in precinct boundaries eliminated direct

comparisons with elections conducted before July 2012. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that

these discrepancies generate much prediction error. The six precincts that I describe as the “core”

of old District 1 will be the core of District 1 under the new precinct boundaries. Because

precinct 25 contributed less than 7% of the votes cast in the six core precincts, its removal from

District 1 in Plan 3 does not substantially change the results. Regarding point #3 above, it is hard

to see how the awareness that voters in other precincts and areas were also participating in any

particular election should alter the preferences of voters in the Gainesville precincts.

Even the partisan nature of the elections is unlikely to be consequential for analyzing vote

dilution. The six core precincts of the new District 1 (which closely resemble the old District 1)

are overwhelmingly Democratic. As of the end of July, three fourths of the registered voters in

the District 1 core were Democrats, leaving less than 10% Republican and the remaining 18%

embracing non-party status. In the August, 2012 Democratic and Republican primaries for

County Commission Seat 1, the only office with competitive, contested primaries in both parties,

fewer than 10% of the actual voters in the District 1 core were registered as Republicans. Had

Republicans and non-party registrants been able to join Democrats in voting for these offices, it

might have increased racial polarization in voting somewhat but probably not enough to

differentiate among the four plan options for District 1.

To identify the candidate preferences of minority voters, I simply identify the candidate who

won the most votes in the District 1 core precincts in the five contests used for this analysis—

School Board District 2 seat, County Property Assessor, County Commission seats 1 and 3, and

the State House District 20 seat. In addition, I also indicate if the candidate was formally

endorsed by the African-American Accountability Alliance, a group that hosts voter forums for

residents of east Gainesville (Tinker 2012). The candidates with the “4A” endorsement are

indicated by a grey filling in the column header. The votes received by the preferred candidates

in the August 14 primary are reported, first by the core precincts, and then by the four District 1

plans that augment the core with other precincts. The “Dilution” column reports the percentage

change in the preferred candidates’ vote share in the reconfigured District 1 from what was

registered in the six core precincts, the old District 1 more or less. A positive number indicates

that the preferred candidate of the minority community in the core precincts did better in the

enlarged District 1 than the core while a negative sign indicates the preferred candidate in the

core precincts of District 1 did less well when the District boundaries were changed to bring in or

10

Although Florida has a closed primary system, which permits only registered members of a party to vote in a party

primary, all registered voters are allowed to participate if only one party has a primary and there are no candidates

from the other party or write-in candidates who have qualified for the ballot. Under this system, all registered voters

were eligible to vote in the contest for House District 20 where only two Democrats qualified for the ballot.

-10-

remove other precincts. The final column averages the dilution across the five offices. The

results are presented below in Table 4.


Comparing the dilution percentages across the four plans, it is clear that Plan 1 produces

by far the lowest level of vote dilution. The average deviation between District 1 as proposed in

Plan 1 and in the core precincts of the old District 1 was less than 1.5%. The “winner” of the core

precincts would also have won a majority in four of the five races under the Plan 1 scenario for

District 1 and come in a virtual tie for first in the other contest. By contrast, Plans 2 and 3

average three times the dilution of Plan 1 and the Plan 4 configuration scored over four times the

dilution percentage of Plan 1.11

Anyone who looks only at the census data on total population or voting population broken down

by race in Table 3 may find these results difficult to comprehend. After all, based strictly on

demographics, the District 1 in Plan 1 has the smallest percentage of African American residents

and adults of the four options. Yet it yielded the voting results that best reflected the preferences

of minority voters in the District 1 core precincts. How can this be?

To understand why the actual outcome differed so much what one would expect based simply on

demographics, consider the almost 7% difference in the District 1 outcome between the showing

of Alonzo Perkins in the County Appraiser’s primary under Plan1 (52.2%) and Plan 4 (45.4%).

Under both these plans, the new District included the six core precincts of the old District 1. In

Plan 1, these precincts were augmented by adding Precinct 59 while precincts 7, 12 and 27 were

added to the core to make up District 1 in Plan 4. The two major factors that account for the

different electoral outcomes of the two plans are voter registration and voter turnout in these

added precincts.

In Precinct 59, barely half the voting age population registered to vote in the August primary. In

the three precincts added to District 1 under Plan 4, by contrast, almost 85% of the voting age

population was registered for the same election. That massive (30+%) discrepancy in

registration percentages was reinforced by similar differences in turnout among registered voters

on August 14th: Only 7.9% of the registered voters in Precinct 59 who were eligible to cast a

Democratic primary vote for Property Appraiser actually did record a vote. But in the three

precincts added to District 1 in Plan 4, the turnout rate was 26%--more than 3 times as high.

Putting these registration and turnout gaps together, voters in Precinct 59 contributed only one-

eighth of the total votes cast in the District 1 Appraiser’s primary under Plan 1 while voters in

the three added precincts under Plan 4 cast fully one-third of the votes in the same (hypothetical)

District 1 primary.

Why did this produce a substantially lower vote for Perkins in the District 1 boundaries under

Plan 4? Although the precincts added to the District 1 core bring in substantially more voting age

11

The gap between Plan 1 and the three alternative plans is even greater if one looks only at the House District 20

primary which was open to all registered voters without regard to party affiliation and in which party labels did not

distinguish the candidates. This was also an open seat in which incumbency did not matter and neither candidate had

previously run for public office. Under these circumstances, which resemble the conditions of a Gainesville

municipal election, Plan 4 produced nearly 5 times the dilution of Plan 1 and the gap between Plan 1 and the two

other options also grew apace. This reinforces the point that vote dilution should be assessed by votes, not

population percentages

-11-

residents in both plans, far more of them register and vote in the three precincts added under Plan

4 than the sole precinct added in Plan 1. Further, because the voting age population added to

District 1 in both plans is much more likely to be white than in the six core precincts, the higher

registration and turnout rates in the Plan 4 additions almost certainly change the racial

composition of the voters much more than does Plan 1. When there are substantial differences

between the candidate preferences of white and non-white voters, as there apparently were in this

election, Plan 4 is thus more likely than Plan 1 to tilt the composition of the electorate decidedly

against the candidate preferred by minority voters.12

The lesson is that the black percentage of

the census population is neither a reliable indicator of the political character of a precinct nor a

good predictor of the political character of a reconfigured District 1.

This comparison assumes that the differential rates of electoral participation in the two

configurations are stable patterns that will persist over time. The extensive changes in the

boundaries of precincts 7 and 12 permit only a comparison between Precinct 59 and Precinct 27

whose boundaries have been largely intact over time. Based on past Gainesville elections,

Precinct 27 has uniformly (and appreciably) higher levels of registration and turnout than

Precinct 59—especially in “low stimulus” elections for nonpartisan city offices. These

differences in registration and turnout have persisted over time because of the demographic

character of the two precincts. Precinct 27, which incorporates the “Duck Pond,” is composed

primarily of stable neighborhoods with single family homes. Although it has some areas that

resemble Precinct 27 (and Precinct 27 also has some rental housing), Precinct 59 has a much

higher proportion of rental housing and college student residents than Precinct 27. The

socioeconomic differences between the two precincts are striking. The median family income

(which roughly tracks owner-occupied households) and median household income (a good

indicator of rental households with unrelated residents) in Precinct 59 are one third to one half

the comparable figures for Precinct 27. Precinct 59 much more closely fits District 1

socioeconomically than does Precinct 27.13

These demographic differences largely explain the political differences between the two

precincts. Research on political participation and local political activism has long emphasized the

powerful causal effect of what is called “community attachment” (Alford and Scoble 1986,

Strate et al 1989). Community attachment, in turn, is highly correlated with long-term residence,

homeownership, membership in associations, middle age, and other variables—traits which are

much more pronounced in Precinct 27 than Precinct 59. Hence the registration and turnout

differences between Precincts 27 and 59 will persist into the next decade absent massive

demographic changes or extraordinary voter mobilization in the two areas.

Amidst all these numbers, it’s easy to lose sight of the central question about the changes in

District 1 boundaries: Will minority voters still have a reasonable opportunity to elect

representatives of their choosing? Since it was first created, District 1 has without exception

12

Had this election been open to Republican and non-party registered voters as well as Democrats, as is the case for

municipal elections, the two plans would have added about the same total number of voters (ca. 2650). There is no

reason to assume this enlarged electorate would have altered the patterns of vote dilution differently under Plans 1

and 4. 13

Although I do not have data on comparative educational attainment, such data if available would almost certainly

confirm the characterization. The American Community Survey only reports educational attainment at the Census

block group level for the population 25 and older, screening out the college student residents of Precinct 59 who

have attained only a high school degree.

-12-

elected an African-American commissioner with deep roots in East Gainesville.14

It did so

despite census data that suggested that it would not be easy for the minority voters of the district

to elect their preferred representative. From 1988-1992, the black population of District 1 was a

bare 51% of the total population and a minority of registered voters. From 1993 through 2002,

the black population dropped further to 47.5% and the black share of the voting age population

was a mere 38%. Even in 2002, when the district was last revised, blacks constituted only 55%

of the voting age population and probably a minority of the registered voters. Based on census

data, District 1 has never been a typical minority-majority district yet it has consistently

produced electoral outcomes that reflect the preferences of minority voters.

Moreover, the primary election last August provided real-world tests of whether black candidates

could carry District 1 in its new configuration. The toughest of these tests featured contests in

which a black candidate faced a white opponent in an election marked by a high degree of

racially polarized voting. Those are precisely the conditions that most seriously threaten the

ability of minority voters to elect their preferred candidates. As a rough measure of polarized

voting, I calculated the difference between the vote share of the minority candidate preferred in

the core District 1 precincts (which have a black voter registration majority of 58%) and that

candidate’s vote share in the entire county where blacks constitute just 17% of registered

voters.15

Using a 20% difference between the preferences of the predominantly black core of

District 1 and the predominantly white Alachua County electorate as an indicator of polarization,

I found three of the elections marked by a high level of racially polarized voting: School Board,

Property Appraiser, and District 20 State Representative.16

As Table 4 showed, the black

candidates in each of these races won a majority in the District 1 proposed by Plan 1. Based on tangible election results rather than census data, the evidence strongly indicates that the

new District 1 will behave politically much like the old District 1.

If this discussion sounds familiar, that is because precisely the same issue arose in 1992 when

Gainesville first revised the district boundaries after a census. On that occasion too, District 1

needed to be augmented and the choice came down to a plan that included much of the current

Precinct 59 versus an option that included Precinct 27.17

As is the case in 2012, the 1992 plan

with Precinct 59 reduced the black population share more than the Precinct 27 option. But with

unchanged precincts and ample data from previous elections, I demonstrated using the same

techniques employed with the 2012 primary data that adding Precinct 27 would reduce the vote

share of minority candidates in District 1 by a larger margin than would the addition of Precinct

59. The City Commission thus added Precinct 59 to District 1. Over the next decade, this

addition did not diminish the capacity of black residents to elect their preferred candidates.

Because the underlying demographics and patterns of registration and turnout are not radically

14

The legal goal of equal representation would be the same if black voters strongly preferred a white candidate over

an African-American opponent. However the elections in District 1 have never produced that outcome. 15

The racial breakdown of the core District 1 registered voters was obtained from data provided by the Alachua

County Supervisor of Elections. The county-wide voter registration data breakdown by race came from Florida

Department of State (2012). 16

It’s worth emphasizing that two of these three cases involved elections that were open to all voters, not just

partisans. The School Board race was unusual in that all three candidates were black yet one of them, who was

thought to be a creationist, did much better among whites than blacks. This produced racially polarized voting

despite the absence of a white candidate. In the County Commission race where a black candidate competed against

a white opponent, the gap was only 8%. The black candidate had lived, worked and held public office in a small

town in the southwestern corner of Alachua County and was not well known in Gainesville. 17

Precinct 23 was then a major part of what is now Precinct 59.

-13-

different in 2012, I believe history will repeat itself if the city adopts Plan 1—as I recommend it

should.

-14-

References

“Annexation Chronology 2002-2012.” 2012. Provided by Lila Stewart, Senior Strategic Planner,

Administrative Services, City of Gainesville.

Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman, Lisa R. Handley and Richard G. Niemi. 1988. "Minority

Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice." Law & Policy 10: 43-62.

Cain, Bruce E., Karin MacDonald and Iris Hui. 2006. Competition and Redistricting in

California: Lessons for Reform. Berkeley, CA: University of California, Institute of

Governmental Studies.

Florida Department of State. Division of Elections. 2012. “Primary Election: County Voter

Registration by Race, July 16, 2012.” Accessed 21 September 2012 (http://

http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2012/PRI2012_CountyRace.pdf).

Fryer, Roland G., Jr. and Richard T. Holden. 2007. Measuring the Compactness of Political

Districting Plans,” Working Paper 13456. Cambride, MA: National Bureau of Economic

Research. Accessed 22 September 2012 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w13456).

Gainesville, Florida. 2012. Code of Ordinances. Part I. Charter Laws. Article 2.02(2). Accessed

6 July 2012 (http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10819).

Handley, Lisa. 2011 (January 21-24). “Vote Dilution: Measuring Voting Patterns by

Race/Ethnicity.” Paper presented to the National Conference of State Legislatures National

Redistricting Seminar, Washington, DC. Accessed 19 August 2012

(http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/Vote_Dilusion.pdf).

Levitt, Justin. 2010. A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting. New York: New York University School

of Law, Brennan Center for Justice.

Office of the City Attorney, City of Gainesville. 2012 (July 18). “Municipal Redistricting

Standards and Legal Principles.” Memorandum to the City Election District Review

Committee.

Persily, Nathaniel. 2007. "The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act." Yale Law

Journal 117: 174-254.

Supreme Court of Florida. 2003. “In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 25E.” No.

SC03-1912. Decided December 4, 2003.

Tinker, Cleveland. 2012. “4As Endorse Candidates in 5 Local Races.” Gainesville Sun (4 July).

Wald, Kenneth D. and Joshua Comenetz. 2002. “Redistricting the Gainesville City Commission

Following Annexation: A Report Prepared for the Charter Review Committee.”

Tables

-15-

Table 1

Estimated Census 2010 Population of Current Districts

(based on assigning current precincts to the 2002 districts in which they were mostly located)

District

Total

Population

2010

Population

Deviation

Percentage

Deviation

1 21,230 -9,793 -31.57%

2 32,506 1,483 4.78%

3 40,538 9,515 30.67%

4 29,818 -1,205 -3.88%

Total 124,092

62.24%

-16-

Table 2

Basic Population Data for Proposed Plans

Plan

District

District

Population

District Voting-

Age Population

%

Deviation

Plan 1

1 31,236 25,598 0.69%

2 30,020 23,996 -3.23%

3 30,481 27,591 -1.75%

4 32,355 30,325 4.29%

Totals 124,092 107,510 7.53%

Plan 2

1 29,277 22,482 -5.63%

2 30,695 25,221 -1.06%

3 31,959 29,752 3.02%

4 32,161 30,055 3.67%

Totals 124,092 107,510 9.30%

Plan 3

1 29,315 22283 -5.51%

2 30,695 25221 -1.06%

3 31,959 29752 3.02%

4 32,123 30254 3.55%

Totals 124,092 107510 9.05%

Plan 4

1 31,351 24,652 1.06%

2 30,610 24,694 -1.33%

3 30,416 27,968 -1.96%

4 31,715 30,196 2.23%

Totals 124,092 107,510 4.19%

-17-

Table 3

Racial/Ethnic Composition of District 1 in Four Plans

Plan

Total Pop 2010 Black

% Black White

% White Hispanic

% Hispanic

Asian Pop % Asian

Other Races Pop

% Other Races

Total Population in 2010 Census

1 31,236 14,974 47.9 11,792 37.8 2,243 7.2 1,569 5.0 658 2.1

2 29,277 16,335 55.8 10,074 34.4 1,737 5.9 534 1.8 597 2.0

3 29,315 16,279 55.5 10,271 35.0 1,694 5.8 446 1.5 625 2.1

4 31,351 16,240 51.8 12,021 38.3 1,848 5.9 549 1.8 693 2.2

Plan Pop 18+

2010 Black VAP

% Black VAP

White VAP

% White VAP

Hispanic VAP

% Hispanic

VAP Asian VAP

% Asian VAP

Other Races VAP

% Other Races VAP

Voting Age Population (18 and older) in 2010 Census

1 25,598 10,663 41.7 11,136 43.5 1,935 7.6 1,447 5.7 417 1.6

2 22,482 11,445 50.9 8,955 39.8 1,333 5.9 458 2.0 291 1.3

3 22,283 11,322 50.8 9,052 40.6 1,239 5.6 365 1.6 305 1.4

4 24,652 11,426 46.3 10,915 44.3 1,444 5.9 474 1.9 393 1.6

-18-

Table 3A

Racial/Ethnic Composition of All Districts in Plan 1

District


% Black White

% White Hispanic

% Hispanic

Asian Pop % Asian

Other Races Pop

% Other Races


1 31,236 14,974 47.9 11,792 37.8 2,243 7.2 1,569 5.0 658 2.1

2 30,020 4,861 16.2 20,484 68.2 2,429 8.1 1,496 5.0 750 2.5

3 30,481 3,882 12.7 20,301 66.6 3,505 11.5 2,070 6.8 723 2.4

4 32,355 4,825 14.9 19,141 59.2 4,191 13.0 3,371 10.4 827 2.6

District Pop 18+

2010 Black VAP

% Black VAP

White VAP

% White VAP

Hispanic VAP

% Hispanic

VAP Asian VAP

% Asian VAP

Other Races VAP

% Other Races VAP


1 25,598 10,663 41.7 11,136 43.5 1,935 7.6 1,447 5.7 417 1.6

2 23,996 3,331 13.9 17,320 72.2 1,792 7.5 1,172 4.9 381 1.6

3 27,591 3,266 11.8 18,659 6.76 3,180 11.5 1,921 7.0 1,921 2.1

4 30,325 4,081 13.5 18,362 60.6 3,945 13.0 3,241 10.7 696 2.3

Table 3B


District


% Black White

% White Hispanic

% Hispanic

Asian Pop % Asian

Other Races Pop

% Other Races


1 29,277 16,335 55.8 10,074 34.4 1,737 5.9 534 1.8 597 2.0

2 30,695 2,617 8.5 23,434 76.3 2,391 7.8 1,565 5.1 688 2.2

3 31,959 5,486 17.2 17,753 55.6 4,476 14.0 3,431 10.7 813 2.5

4 32,161 4,104 12.8 20,457 63.6 3,764 11.7 2,976 9.3 860 2.7

District Pop 18+

2010 Black VAP

% Black VAP

White VAP

% White VAP

Hispanic VAP

% Hispanic

VAP Asian VAP

% Asian VAP

Other Races VAP

% Other Races VAP


1 22,483 11.445 50.9 8,955 39.8 1,333 5.9 458 2.0 291 1.3

2 25,221 1,823 7.2 19,939 79.1 1,825 7.2 1,239 4.9 395 1.6

3 29,752 4,650 15.6 16,983 57.1 4,175 14.0 3,278 11.0 666 2.0

4 30,055 3,423 11.4 19,600 65.2 3,519 11.7 2,806 9.3 707 2.4

-19-

Table 3C


District


% Black White

% White Hispanic

% Hispanic

Asian Pop % Asian

Other Races Pop

% Other Races


1 29,315 16,279 55.5 10,271 35.0 1,694 5.8 446 1.5 625 2.1

2 30,695 2,617 8.5 23,434 76.3 2,391 7.8 1,565 5.1 688 2.2

3 31,959 5,486 17.2 17,753 55.6 4,476 14.0 3,431 10.7 813 2.5

4 32,123 4,160 13.0 20,260 63.1 3807 11.9 3064 9.5 832 2.6

District Pop 18+

2010 Black VAP

% Black VAP

White VAP

% White VAP

Hispanic VAP

% Hispanic

VAP Asian VAP

% Asian VAP

Other Races VAP

% Other Races VAP


1 22,283 11,322 50.8 9052 40.6 9052 5.6 1239 1.6 305 1.4

2 25,221 1,823 7.2 19,939 79.1 1,825 7.2 1,239 4.9 395 1.6

3 29,752 4,650 15.6 16,983 57.1 4,175 14.0 3,278 11.0 666 2.0

4 30,254 3546 11.7 19,503 64.5 3613 11.9 2899 9.6 693 2.3

Table 3D


District


% Black White

% White Hispanic

% Hispanic

Asian Pop % Asian

Other Races Pop

% Other Races


1 31,351 16,240 51.8 12,021 38.3 1,848 5.9 549 1.8 693 2.2

2 30,610 3,926 12.8 21,955 71.7 2,445 8.0 1,550 5.1 734 2.4

3 30,416 3,828 12.6 20,025 65.8 3,718 12.2 2,110 6.9 735 2.4

4 31,715 4,548 14.3 17,717 55.9 4,357 13.7 4,297 13.6 796 2.5

District Pop 18+

2010 Black VAP

% Black VAP

White VAP

% White VAP

Hispanic VAP

% Hispanic

VAP Asian VAP

% Asian VAP

Other Races VAP

% Other Races VAP


1 24,652 11,426 46.3 10,915 44.3 1444 5.9 474 1.9 393 1.6

2 24,694 2,721 11.0 18,528 75.0 1836 7.4 1225 5.0 384 1.6

3 27,968 3242 11.6 18,728 67.0 3427 12.3 1971 7.1 600 2.2

4 30,196 3952 13.1 17,306 57.3 4145 13.7 4111 13.6 682 2.3

-20-

Table 4

Vote Dilution under Plans 1-4

in August 14, 2012 Primary Elections

School Board #2 Property Assessor State House #20

Plan Precincts %

McNealy Dilution

% Perkins

Dilution %

Watson Dilution

Core 13, 19, 25, 28, 33, 55 59.26%

54.15%

77.76% Plan 1 + Precinct 59 57.58% -1.68% 52.16% -1.99% 74.76% -3.00%

Plan 2 + Precincts 12 & 38 54.60% -4.66% 48.40% -5.75% 68.98% -8.78%

Plan 3 7, 12, 13, 19, 28, 33, 38, 55 54.16% -5.11% 47.84% -6.32% 66.83% -10.93%

Plan 4 + Precincts 7, 12, 27 57.37% -1.90% 45.35% -8.80% 61.29% -16.47%

County Commission #1 County Commission #3 All

% Lopez

Dilution %

Hutchinson Dilution

Average Dilution

Core 13, 19, 25, 28, 33, 55 50.33%

63.97% Plan 1 + Precinct 59 48.88% -1.45% 64.86% 0.89% -1.45%

Plan 2 + Precincts 12 & 38 46.68% -3.64% 63.72% -0.25% -4.62%

Plan 3 7, 12, 13, 19, 28, 33, 38, 55 45.63% -4.70% 64.72% 0.75% -5.26%

Plan 4 + Precincts 7, 12, 27 40.84% -9.49% 68.86% 4.89% -6.35%

-21-

Map 1

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Map 2

-23-

Map 3

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Map 4

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Map 5

agenda city of gainesville citizen election district ... · completion of the 2010 decennial...

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