UPDATES IN PROPERTY REGISTRATION, MORTGAGES, CONDOMINIUMS AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

(August 2014)

(Based on Agcaoili, “Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds)”, 2011 ed., and “Reviewer in Property Registration

(With Sample MCQs and Suggested Answers)1

Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili2

REGALIAN DOCTRINE Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification and other natural resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.3 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.4 Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.5

                                                                                                                         1 Published by Rex Book Store. See also: “Law on Natural Resources,” and “Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Laws (with MCQs and Suggested Answers). 2 Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili finished law at the University of Sto. Tomas. He obtained a degree in Management at the Asian Institute of Management. A former Chief of Legislative and Research Section, Bureau of Lands, he was appointed Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General in 1975, and Assistant Solicitor General in 1984. In 1995, he was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. He was Chairman of the 13th Division upon his retirement from the court. Justice Agcaoili is a Professor of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) and Professorial Lecturer of the UP Institute for the Administration of Justice (UP-IAJ). He teaches law at UST and UP. He is an Appellate Court Mediator and Voluntary Maritime Arbitrator. A delegate/participant in several international conferences, he wrote a paper entitled “Environmental Protection: The Convergence of Law and Policy” which he read during the 20th Biennial Conference on the Law of the World held in Dublin, Ireland in October 2001. Described by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno as “isa sa mga eksperto sa mga karapatan sa lupa (one of our experts on land rights),” Justice Agcaoili is the author of three books: “Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds),” “Law on Natural Resources and Environmental Law Developments,” and “Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Proceedings.” (Tel.: 922-0232, 552-9636, 0920-9506384; E-mail: oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com) 3 Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014; Secretary of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. 172775, Oct. , 2008; Arbias v. Republic, GR No. 173808, Sept. 17, 2008; Alcantara v. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008; Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007;Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006; Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129862, March 21, 2002; Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011. 4 Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91, 101-102. 5 Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 272, 291.

2

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,6 embodies the principle of State ownership of lands and all other natural resources as provided in Section 2, Art. XII, to wit:

“All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.”

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND ANCESTRAL LANDS In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,

7  petitioners

challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), on the ground that it amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title. After due deliberation on the petition, the Supreme Court voted as follows: seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7) others voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed, and the validity of the law, deemed upheld. Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that the Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government,

8  where the United

States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes, declared:

“It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”

The rights of ICCs/IPs may be acquired in two modes: (a) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (b) by Torrens title under the Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands only. THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION

                                                                                                                         6 Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570, Sept. 27, 2006. 7Supra. 8212 U.S., 449; 53 Law Ed., 594.

3

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.9

The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.10 The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.11 PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, as expressed in Legarda v. Saleeby,12  a 1915 decision, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. The Torrens system aims to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable,13  and to relieve the land of the burden of known as well as unknown claims.14

However, the Torrens system does not furnish a shield for fraud,15 nor permit one

to enrich himself at the expense of others,16 otherwise its acceptability is impaired.17                                                                                                                          9 Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1997, 230 SCRA 550. 10 Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424; citing Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, 1986 ed., p. 32. 11 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865, 874. 12GR No. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915, 31 Phil. 590, 31 Phil. 590; see also Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 59731, Jan. 11, 1990, 181 SCRA 9; National Grains Authority v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-68741, Jan. 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 388. 13Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural, GR No. 14167, Aug. 14, 1919, 39 Phil. 996. 14SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, supra. 15Rodriguez v. Lim, GR No. 135817, Nov. 30, 2006, 459 SCRA 412; Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 125585, June 8, 2005. 16Ibid. 17Ermac v. Ermac, GR No. 149679, May 30, 2003, 403 SCRA 291.

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REGISTRATION NOT A MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely a procedure to establish evidence of title over realty.

18� It is a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. A certificate of title is not a source of right. It merely confirms or records a title already existing and vested.

19 The mere possession

thereof does not make one the true owner of the property.20

Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.

21

DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TITLE” AND “CERTIFICATE OF TITLE” Title may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.22 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION Registration in a public registry works as constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, provides:

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration. — Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.

REGISTRATION OF LANDS: GOVERNING LAW PD No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD) in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by

                                                                                                                         18Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 83383, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 630; Vagilidad v. Vagilidad, GR No. 161136, Nov. 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 94. 19Tiro v. Phil Estates Corporation, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26, 2008 563 SCRA 309. 20Borromeo v. Descallar, supra. 21 Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011. 22Castillo v. Escutin, GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258.

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Section 4 of PD No. 1073, specifies those who are qualified to apply for registration of land.

PD No. 1529 issued on June 11, 1978 covers both ordinary and cadastral registration proceedings, and supersedes Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act No. 2259, or the Cadastral Act, governs cadastral proceedings. JURISDICTION Regional Trial Courts have plenary jurisdiction over land registration proceedings and over all petitions filed after original registration of titles.23 But first level courts may be delegated to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases (a) covering lots without controversy or opposition, or (b) contested lots where the value does not exceed P100,000.00.24

The registration court may now hear both contentious and non-contentious cases.25 All petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered.26 REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529 IS A PROCEEDING IN REM

Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication, posting and service of notice.27 The purpose of the publication is to (a) confer jurisdiction upon the court over the res, and (b) apprise the whole world of the pending registration case so that they may assert their rights or interests in the land applied for. CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS Lands of the public domain are classified into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber, (3) mineral lands, and (4) national parks. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.28 Public land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land.

                                                                                                                         23 Sec. 2, PD No. 1529. 24 Sec. 34 BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691. See also SC Circular No. 6-93, dated November 15, 1995. 25 Averia v. Caguioa, GR No. L-65129, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 459; Ligon v. Court of appeals, GR No. 10771, June 1, 1995, 244 SCRA693. 26 Secs. 2 and 108, PD No. 1529; Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, Adm. Mater RTJ-92-836, Aug. 2, 1995, 247 SCRA 9. 27 Sec. 23, PD No. 1529; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ribaya, GR No. 113549, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 223. 28 Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII, Constitution.

6

Under Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.29 Sec. 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Possession of inalienable public lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

“SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural; (b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for town-sites and for public and quasi-public uses.” (CA No.

141 or the Public Land Act).

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.30

Specifically, the following are not capable of alienation or disposition for titling

purposes: Lands intended for public use and for public service

Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.31� Art. 420 of the

Civil Code provides that the following are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar

                                                                                                                         29 Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014. 30 Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011. 31Art. 419, Civil Code.

7

character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

32� Rivers, lakes and lagoons Art. 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:

(1) Rivers and their natural beds;

(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;

(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;

(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds; x x x

All other property of the State, which is not of the character mentioned above, is

patrimonial property.33� Property of public dominion, when no longer needed for public

use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.34

If land sought to be registered forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river, the decree or title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any right or title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the Torrens system.35 In Cachopero v. Celestial,36 it was held that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion.37 Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds are likewise inalienable.38 Under Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, "the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth."39 The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of

                                                                                                                         32Art. 420, ibid. 33Art. 421, ibid. 34Art. 422, ibid. 35 Republic v. Sioson, GR No. L-13687, Nov. 29, 1963. 36 GR No. 146754, March 21, 2012; 459 Phil. 903 (2003). 37 See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011. 38 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Rio, GR No. L-43105, Aug. 31, 1984. 39 Ibid.

8

any kind.40

In the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, shall be considered as forming part of the open space requirement under PD No. 1216. Open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."41

Forest lands

Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. Courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone.42 The subsequent release of forest lands as A and D lands does not validate a previous grant.43

Mineral lands Mineral land means any area where mineral resources are found.

44 Mineral

resources, on the other hand, means any concentration of mineral/rocks with potential economic value.

45 The ownership of mineral resources is provided in RA No. 7942,

known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. In Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa,46 the Court, through Justice Cruz, held that “(t)he Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private.”

Possession of mineral land, no matter how long, does not confer possessory rights.

47� Thus, a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain

classified as mineral lands. Any title issued over non-disposable lots, even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

48

Foreshore and reclaimed lands The term “foreshore land” has been invariably defined as “that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide” or “that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately

                                                                                                                         40 Art. 51, ibid. 41 Pilar Development Corporation v. Dumadag, GR No. 194336, March 11, 2013. 42 Collado v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002; Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 75672, April 19, 1989. 43 Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296. 44 Sec. 3(ac), RANo. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) 45Sec. 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, as amended. 46 GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160 SCRA 228. 47 Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 88883, Jan. 18, 1991. 193 SCRA 71. 48 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Dumyung, GR No. L-31666, April 20, 1979, 89 SCRA 532.

9

covered by the ordinary flow of the tides.”49�The Philippine Fisheries Code defines

foreshore land as a string of land margining a body of water; the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.

50

Foreshore lands are inalienable unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain.

51 In Republic v. Court of Appeals and

Republic Real Estate Corporation,52 the Court held that foreshore lands – or “that strip of

land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide” or “that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides” - belong to the public domain intended for public use. The controversy in this case involved lots which are now part of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP). On March 5, 1962, the government through the Solicitor General sought to nullify the reclamation agreement between Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation on grounds that there were no “foreshore lands” in Pasay City which could only be the subject of lawful reclamation under the then prevailing law, RA No. 1899; that the area was already reserved as a national park, hence beyond the commerce of men; and that the agreement was executed without any public bidding. The Supreme Court, in a decision penned by Justice Purisima, sustained the government’s action and nullified the reclamation agreement as being ultra vires and contrary to law. It held that the reclamation involved “submerged areas” or “all sea” and not "foreshore lands" as allowed by said law. The land is now occupied by the Cultural Center of the Philippines. Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means are inalienable. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,53 the Court held that only when actually reclaimed from the sea can submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Mangroves swamps Mangrove swamps or manglares are forestal and not alienable agricultural land.

54� In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,

55� it was held

“that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or mangrove                                                                                                                          49 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation, GR Nos. 103882 and 105276, Nov. 25, 1998, 299 SCRA 199. 50 Sec. 4(46), RA No. 8550. 51 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, GR No. 133250, Nov. 11, 2003. 52 GR No. 103882, Nov. 25, 1998. 53 GR No. 133250, May 6, 2003. 54 Director of Forestry v. Villareal, GR No. L-32266, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598. 55 GR No. L-36847, July 20, 1983, 151 SCRA 88; see also Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 74957, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 679.

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lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.” This was reaffirmed in Director of Forestry v. Villareal

56� where the Court

categorically declared that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests and, therefore, not subject to disposition until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. The Fisheries Code makes it unlawful for any person to convert mangroves into fishponds or for any other purposes.

Watersheds Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man.57 The Constitution expressly mandates the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the country’s watershed. In Tan v. Director of Forestry,

58� the Supreme Court reiterated the basic policy of

conserving the national patrimony, as exemplified by the government’s withdrawal from entry, sale or settlement of forest reserves for watershed, soil protection and timber production purposes. Military or naval reservation Land inside a military or naval reservation cannot be registered.59 To segregate portions of the public domain as a military reservation, there is need of a presidential proclamation to that effect. In Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.,60 it was held that a military reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, or any part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition unless it is first reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense.

Protected areas

RA No. 7586 provides for the establishment and management of a national integrated protected areas system referred to as the “National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992). NIPAS is the classification and administration of all designated protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. The illegal possession or sale of rights of portions thereof is prohibited under the NIPAS Act.

Pursuant to Section 19 of RA No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1955,

                                                                                                                         56Supra. 57 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 112526, Oct. 12, 2001. 58 GR No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302. 59 Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. GR No. 156951, Sept. 2, 2006. 60 GR No. 156951, Sept. 22, 2006.

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mining operations are not allowed in old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness area, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law in areas expressly prohibited under the NIPAS and other laws. National park refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wilderness character which has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any form of exploitation.61 National parks,62 protected areas and nature reserves63 are inalienable. WHO MAY APPLY FOR REGISTRATION Under Section 14, PD No. 1529, the following may apply for registration:

(1) Those who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under

the provisions of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river

beds by right of accession or acquired under existing laws;

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 (Public Land Act), it is provided as follows:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto may apply for the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.

NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SEC. 14(1), PD NO. 1529 AND SEC. 48(b), CA NO. 141 There is no substantial difference between Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 and Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141. In both, the applicant must show that (1) the land is alienable and disposable (A and D) public agricultural land; and (2) he has been in open, continuous exclusive and notorious possession thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since

                                                                                                                         61 RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. 62 Palomo v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997. 63 RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992

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June 12, 1945, or prior thereto.64 Both refer to original registration proceedings, are against the whole world, and the decree of registration for both is conclusive and final. REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION UNDER SEC. 14(1), PRD IN RELATION TO SEC. 48(B), PLA

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. Under Section14(1) of PD No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”65

Possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted

and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.66

In Malabanan v. Republic,67 the Court en banc reiterated that the law does not require that the land subject of registration should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, or since June 12, 1945. It is sufficient that the land is already declared as alienable and disposable land at the time the application for registration is filed so as to entitle the possessor to registration.

Originally, Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 provided for the possession and

occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1984. This was superseded by RA No. 1942 which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The law, however, has been amended by PD No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, but became effective on May 9, 1997,68 which now requires possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.69

                                                                                                                         64 Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation, GR No. 170724, Jan. 29, 2007; Reyes v. Republic, GR No. 141924, Jan. 23, 2007; Republic v. Manna Properties, GR No. 146527, Jan. 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 247. 65 Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014; Republic v. Cortez, GR No. 186639, Feb. 5, 2014;.Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011; Victoria v. Republic, GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 413 (2005). 66 Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012, citing. Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, Sept. 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391. 67GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172; see also Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 438; also Republic v. Rizalvo, GR No. 172011, March 7, 2011. 68 Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014.

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But PD No. 1073 cannot impair vested rights of applicants who had complied

with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942. In Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014, the Court held that an applicant who, by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for 30 years prior to the effectivity of PD No. 1073 on May 9, 1999, or at least since May 8, 1947, may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS MAY ACQUIRE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN On the basis of their capacity “to acquire or hold lands of the public domain,” the following may acquire private lands:

(1) Filipino citizens;

(2) Filipino corporations and association as defined in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and, by exception,

(3) Aliens but only be hereditary succession; and (4) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship can both

“acquire” or “hold” lands of the public domain, the limitation being up to a maximum of 5,000 square meters if urban land, or 3 hectares if rural land.70

Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities “qualified to acquire

or hold lands of the public domain.” Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. The fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.71 Aliens, however, may lease private lands.72

The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon. Land cannot sold to an alien and is

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         69 Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, GR No. 173775, Oct. 8, 2008; Republic v. Sarmiento, GR No. 169397, March 13, 2007; Republic v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183; Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA 359. See also RA No. 6940, dated March 28, 1990. 70 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Reviewer Primer, 2000 ed., 515; Sec. 8, Art. XII, Constitution; RA No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179. 71 Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009. 72 Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461; Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.

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allowed to recover the money spent for the purchase thereof. The provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.73

Pursuant to Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, “a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.” This means that pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179 dated March 28, 1996, implementing Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, any natural born citizen who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land, or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes.

But where a Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen in a foreign country has

“reacquired” his Philippine citizenship under the terms of RA No. 9225, dated August 29, 2003, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” the area limitation under RA No. 7042 may no longer apply since the law expressly grants him, as any Filipino citizen, the same right to “enjoy full civil and political rights” upon the re-acquisition of his Filipino citizenship. CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE LAND IS DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF ITS ACQUISITION, NOT REGISTRATION The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired. Thus, a naturalized Canadian citizen who, while still a natural-born Filipino, acquired land from a vendor who had already complied with the requirements of registration prior to the purchase, can validly register his title to the land even if at the time of the filing of his application he was already an alien.74 He already had a vested right to the land.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapina,75 it was held that a foreign national may validly apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA No. 141). ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND BY PRESCRIPTION

In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,76 Section 14(2) must be considered in relation to the rule on prescription under the Civil Code as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not

                                                                                                                         73 Beumer v. Amores, GR No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012, citing cases. 74 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapiña, 235 SCRA 567. 75 GR No. 108998, Aug. 24, 1994, 235 SCRA 567. 76 GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012.

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automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.77 Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.78 The period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.79 Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.80 Open, continuous and exclusive possession of land classified as A and D land for at least thirty years segregates the land from the public domain and ipso jure converts the same to private property.81 The conversion works to summon in operation Sec. 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which authorizes the acquisition of private lands through ordinary prescription of ten years or extraordinary prescription of thirty years.82 ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND BY RIGHT OF ACCESSION OR ACCRETION

Under Article 420, paragraph 183

and Article 502, paragraph 184

of the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.

85 However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall

have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.                                                                                                                          77 Malabanan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009. 78 Republic v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 2012 79 Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, supra. 80 Id. 81 Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 56; See Arts. 1127 and 1134, Civil Code. 82 Lincoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic, GR No. 167652, July 10, 2007. 83 Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: 1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; . . . . 84 Art. 502. The following are of public dominion: 1) Rivers and their natural beds; . . . . 85 Art. 461, Civil Code.

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By law, accretion — the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water — belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms.86 The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.87 In Celestial v. Cachopero,88 it was held that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion.89

Article 457 of the Civil Code requires that the deposit be gradual and

imperceptible; that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.90 However, the accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. There must be a separate action for the registration thereof.91 Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and is not open to acquisition by adverse possession, unless subsequently declared as no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries.92 PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING PUBLIC LANDS A private corporation may not hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.93 The rule does not apply where at the time the corporation acquired the land, the same was already private land as when it was possessed by its predecessor in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the latter to registration.94

If the predecessors-in-interest of the corporation have been in possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then it may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land.

95 In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court

and Acme,96  it was held that a private corporation may apply for judicial confirmation of

the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first.

97

PUBLICATION, MAILING AND POSTING

                                                                                                                         86 Art. 457, id. 87 Republic v. Santos, GR No. 160453, Nov. 12, 2012. 88 459 Phil. 903 (2003). 89 See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011. 90 Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011. 91  Grande  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  5  SCRA  524.  92  Ignacio  v.  Director  of  Lands,  108  Phil.  335.  93 Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution. 94 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146 SCRA 509. 95Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 438. 96GR No. 73002, Dec. 29, 1986, 230 Phil. 590. 97Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., supra.

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Within five days from the filing of the application for registration, the court shall issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from date of the order.98 The public is given notice of the initial hearing by (a) publication once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation; (b) mailing of the notice to persons named in the application for registration and also to relevant government officials, and (c) posting of the notice on a conspicuous place on the land itself and on the bulletin board of the city or municipality where the land is situated.99 Publication in the OG shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.100 However, publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable requirement consistent with procedural due process.101 If amendment of the application is made to include additional area, a new publication of the amended application must be made, but not when the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion form the area originally applied for.102 OPPOSITION Any person, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file and opposition, based on right of dominion or some other real right, to the application for registration.103 But the absence of opposition does not justify outright registration. Since the presumption is that all lands belong to the State, the applicant has the burden of proving his imperfect right or fee simple title to the land applied for.104 The failure of the government to file an opposition, despite receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right to appeal a decision adjudicating the land as private property.105 IDENTITY OF THE LAND

As required by Section 17 of PD No. 1529, the application for registration must be accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands (now Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Bureau), together with the applicant’s muniments of title. No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands. In Director of Lands v. Reyes,106  the Supreme Court declared that the submission of the tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. But in Director of

                                                                                                                         98 Sec. 23, PD No. 1529. 99 Id. 100 Sec. 24, PD No. 1529. 101 Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, 27 SCRA 276. 102 Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531. 103 Sec. 27 PD No. 1529. 104 Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227. 105 Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007. 106GR No.L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.

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Lands v. Court of Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo,107  the Court considered the submission of a white print copy of the plan as sufficient to identify the land. The Court was more categorical in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Espartinez108  when it stated that “the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required x x x may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence.” EVIDENCE OF CLASSIFICATION OF LAND AS “A” AND “D”

In Republic v. Bantigue,109, the Court reiterated that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO 48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The applicant must establish the the classification of the land as A and D through a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute.110

Note, however, that in DENR Memorandum No. 564, dated Nov. 15, 2012, the

DENR clarified that issuance of the certification and the certified copy of the approved LC Map to prove that the area applied for is indeed classified as A and D is “within the competence and jurisdiction of the CENRO.”

In Llanes v. Republic,111 the Court allowed consideration of a CENRO

Certification though it was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. In Victoria v. Republic,112 the subject property was covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig conducted by the government. The Court held: “Such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.”

That there are building structures, residential houses and even government

buildings existing and standing on the area does not prove that the land is no longer considered and classified as forest land.113 EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION                                                                                                                          107GR No. L-56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586. 108GR No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 98. 109 GR No. 162322, March 14, 2012. See also Gaerlan v. Republic, GR No. 192717, March 12, 2014; Republic v. Joson, GR No. 163767, March 10, 2014; Republic v. Aboitiz, GR No. 174626, Oct. 23, 2013; Republic v. Dela Paz, GR No. 171631, Nov. 5, 2010; Republic v. T.A.N, 555 SCRA 477) 110 Ibid. 111 G.R. No. 177947, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 268-269. 112  GR  No.  179673,  June  8,  2011.  

113 Chang v. Republic, GR No. 171726, Feb. 23, 2011.

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Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 and Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529, the reckoning point of possession is June 12, 1945.114 It is only necessary that the land is already classified as A and D land at the time of the filing of the application for registration.115

Possession must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious under a bona fide

claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.116 Acts of a possessory character by virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient.117 Mere casual cultivation of land, the raising of cattle or grazing of livestock without substantial enclosures or other permanent improvements do not constitute exclusive and notorious possession under claim of ownership118 TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS Tax declarations and payment of taxes are not conclusive proof of ownership but have strong probative value when accompanied by proof of actual possession or supported by other effective proof.119 Declaring land for taxation purposes and visiting it every once in a while do not constitutes acts of possession.120 Tax declarations are not evidence of the right of possession unless supported by the other effective proof. But they constitute proof that the holder has claim of the title over the property.121 Payment of taxes is on an annual basis. Delayed declaration of property for tax purposes negates a claim of continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner.122 Hence, payment in one a lump sum to cover all past taxes is “irregular” and affects the validity of the applicant’s claim of ownership.123 But mere failure of the owner to pay taxes does not warrant a conclusion that there was abandonment of the property.124 SPANISH TITLES NO LONGER VALID PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

                                                                                                                         114Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, GR No. 158449, Oct. 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188.. 115Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172. 116  Sec.  14(1),  PD  No.  1529;  Sec.  48(b),  CA  No.  141,  as  amended;  Tan  v.  Republic,  GR  No.  177797,  Dec.  4,  2008;  Republic  v.  Herbieto,  GR  No.  156117,  26  May  2005,  459  SCRA  183  117 Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, GR No. L-4641, March 13, 1911, 19 Phil.32. 118Municipality  of  Santiago  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  120  SCRA  734;  Director  of  lands  v.  Reyes,  68  SCRA  177.  119 Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, id. 120Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214. 121  Municipality  of  Antipolo  v.  Zapanta,  133  SCRA  820;  Masagana  v.  Argamora,  109  SCRA  53;  Director  of  lands  v.  Reyes,  68  SCRA  177.  122 Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007. 123 Republic v. Tayag, 131 SCRA 140. 124 Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472.

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Spanish titles are no longer admissible as proof of ownership. The so-called Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is inexistent.125 In a case, TCT No. 451423-A was traced back to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which, in the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, was already declared null and void, and from which no rights could therefore be derived.126 JUDGMENT; DECREE OF REGISTRATION Within 15 days from entry of judgment, the court shall issue an order directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration and certificate of title.127 There is no period within which to issue the decree.128 While the judgment becomes final 15 days from receipt of notice of the judgment (as to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from receipt of the decision by the Solicitor General who represents the government in all registration proceedings),129 the court nevertheless retains jurisdiction over the case until after the expiration of one year from the issuance of the decree of registration;130 hence, the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when granted.131

Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding and the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Property Registration Decree which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.132

A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land

already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void.133 In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,134 the Court held that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from

                                                                                                                         125 PD No. 892, dated Aug. 16, 1976; Santiago v. SBMA, GR No. 156888, Nov. 20, 2006; Quezon Province v. Marte, GR No. 139274, Oct. 23, 2001; Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733; Director of Land v. Rivas, 141 SCRA 329. 126 De la Rosa v. Valdez, GR No. 159101, July 27, 2011. 127 Sec. 30, PD No. 1529) 128 Del Rosario v. Limcaoco, GR No. 177392, Nov. 26, 2012. 129 Sec. 1 (e), PD No. 478; Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71. 130 Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503. 131 Cayanan v. De los Santos, 21CRA 1348. 132 Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing cases. 133 Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011, citing Laburada v. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 333, 343-344, citing Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103558, November 17, 1992, 215 SCRA 783, 788.

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subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48135 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable.136 WRIT OF POSSESSION The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in the registration case but also against any one adversely occupying the land during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree.137 The writ does not lie against a person who entered the land after the issuance of the decree and who was not a party in the case. He can only be proceeded against in a separate action for ejectment or reivindicatory action.138 The writ is imprescriptible. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of possession139 and may be issued by a special order of the court. Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the issuance of a writ of possession.140 JURISDICTION: REAL ACTIONS

Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 confers exclusive jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts (1) in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; and (2) in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

On the other hand, Section 33 of BP Blg. 29 provides that Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         134 G.R. No. 45828, June 1, 1992, 209 SCRA 457, 463, citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47847, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 426, 433. 135 Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied). 136 Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011 137 Vencilao v. Vano, 182 SCRA 491. 138 Bernas v. Nuevo, 127 SCRA 399. 139  Gawaran  v.  Intermediate  Appellate  Court,  162  SCRA  154;  Lucero  v.  Leot,  25  SCRA  687.  140 Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523, March 9, 2011.

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of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs. An action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, hence, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertains to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila), in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction. Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.141 When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year, one may avail himself of accion publiciana to determine the better right of possession, or possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of possession. While an accion reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an ejectment case, such judgment constitutes a bar to the institution of the accion publiciana. 142 REMEDIES CONSEQUENT TO FRAUDULENT OR IRREGULAR REGISTRATION The aggrieved party has a number of remedies to question the validity of the decision. These include the remedies of new trial or reconsideration under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, relief from judgment under Rule 38, or appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court pursuant to Section 33, PD No. 1529. Under the property Registration Decree, the remedies consequent to fraudulent or irregular registration are: review of decree under Section 32; reconveyance under Secs. 53 and 96; damages under Sec. 32; claim against the Assurance Fund under Sec. 95; reversion under Sec. 101, CA No. 141; cancellation of title; quieting of title; annulment of judgment under Rule 47; and criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws.

Petition for review of decree. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

In Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia,143

the Supreme Court, citing Agcaoili, “Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds)”, stressed that

                                                                                                                         141 Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011, citing Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400. 142 Viray v. Usi, GR No. 192486, Nov. 21, 2012, citing cases. 143GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010, per Justice Peralta.

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courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud.

It has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court’s decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran,

144  there can be no possible reason

for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.

The rule on the incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one

year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to titles acquired through homestead or free patents.

145 It has been held that the date of issuance of the

patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases. Under the Torrens system of registration, the Torrens becomes indefeasible and

incontrovertible one year from the issuance of the final decree and is generally conclusive evidence of the ownership.146 The rule on the inconvertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to title acquired through homestead or free patents.147 Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished form intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment.

To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the

petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land; (b) he must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration; (c) the petition must be filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and (d) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.148

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation

which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.

The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing

litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.

                                                                                                                         144GR No. 24568, March 2, 1926, 48 Phil. 836. 145Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441. 146 Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 231 SCRA 88 (1992) 147 Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441. 148  Walstrom  v.  Mapa,  GR  No.  38387,  Jan.  29,  1990,  181  SCRA  431.  

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Reconveyance. (Sec. 96 PD No. 1529) An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful

landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.149

An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose

property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. It is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court. A notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court.150

As held in Medizabel v. Apao,151 the essence of an action for reconveyance is that

the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. The mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.152

Reconveyance does not aim to reopen proceedings but only to transfer or

reconvey the land from registered owner to the rightful owner.153 Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the parties.154 To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur:

(a) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant;

(b) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured

through fraud or other illegal means;

(c) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and

(d) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and

                                                                                                                         149 Leoveras v. Valdez, GR No. 169985, June 15, 2011. 150 Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011, citing cases. 151 G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 608. See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011 152 Pineda v. Court of Appeals. 456 Phil. 732, 748 (2003), citing Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 556, 561-562 (1998). 153 Bautista-Borja v. Bautista, GR No. 136197, Dec. 10, 2008; Daclag v. Macahilig, GR No. 159578, July 28, 2008; Esconde v. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603; Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 356. 154 Huang v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 198525, September 13, 1994.

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incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the fraud,155

or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.

156

A petition for review and action for reconveyance are no longer available if the property has already been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.157 There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

158

Action for reconveyance may be barred by prescription

(1) Action based on fraud - four years

(2) Action based on implied trust - ten years

(3) Action based on a void contract – imprescriptible

(4) Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in possession – imprescriptible

An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property, or the instrument affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the land and operates constructive notice to the world. Repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. 159

The 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the reconveyance is based on fraud which makes a contract voidable (and that the aggrieved party is not in possession of the land whose title is to be actually reconveyed). It does not apply to an action to

                                                                                                                         155 Balbin v. Medalla, GR No. L-46410, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 666, which held that: “An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.” 156New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, GR No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Kionisala v. Dacut, GR No. 147379, Feb. 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 206. 157 Fierro v. Seguiran, GR No. 152141, Aug. 8, 2011, citing Hutchinson v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262 (2005). 158 Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011; Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14. 159 Cabacungan v. Laigo, GR No. 175073, Aug. 15, 2011Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, 476 Phil. 641, 653 (2004).

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nullify a contract which is void ab initio. Article 1410 of the Civil Code categorically states that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.160 But prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right.

161

Laches may bar recovery

Where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.

162  This is the

basic principle of laches which may bar recovery for one’s neglect or inaction.

Cancellation of title In contrast to an action for reversion which is filed by the government, through the Solicitor general, an action for cancellation initiated by a private party usually in a case where there two titles issued to different persons for the same lot. When one of two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and ordered cancelled. Where two certificates of title are issued to different persons for the same land, the earlier in date must prevail, and in case of successive registration, the person holding under prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate. While an action for cancellation of title is usually brought by the aggrieved private party, the government, although it may have no proprietary interest in the property, is also vested with personality to bring actions for the cancellation of erroneously issued titles to protect public interest, preserve the integrity of the Torrens system, and safeguard the Assurance Fund as well. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved.

163

Action for damages. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

An action for reconveyance is not feasible where the property has already passed

into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. But the interested party is not without

                                                                                                                         160 Abalols v.Dimakuta, GR No. 164693, March 23, 2011. 161 Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011. 162Lucas v. Gamponia, GR No. L-9335, Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 277. 163 Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011

27

remedy – he can file an action for damages against the person responsible for depriving him of his right or interest in the property. This action may be filed against the applicant or person responsible for the fraud where.164 The action should be brought within 10 years from the date of the issuance of the questioned certificate of title pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code.165

Action for compensation from the Assurance Fund. (Sec. 95, PD No. 1529)

The requisites for recovery are: (a) a person sustains loss or damage, or is

deprived by any estate or interest in land; (b) on account of the bringing of land under the Torrens system; (c) through fraud, error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the certificate of entry in the registration book; (d) without negligence on his part, and (e) is barred from bringing an action for recovery of the land.166

The action must be brought within 6 years from the time the right to bring the

action first occurred.167 Reversion. (Sec. 101, CA No. 141)

The action is instituted by the government, through the Solicitor General, in all

cases where lands of public domain are held in violation of the Constitution168 or were fraudulently obtained.169 Where, for instance, land within the forest zone was the subject of a sales patent issued to defendant through fraud and misrepresentation, the Office of the Solicitor General may file an action for reversion and cancellation of title in the proper court in order that the land may be restored to the mass of the public domain.

The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an

annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a land registration court. Actions for cancellation of title and reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.170

Annulment of Judgment. (Rule 47, Rules of Court)

A petition for annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders of

Regional Trial Court for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. are no longer available must be based on (a) extrinsic fraud, (b) lack of jurisdiction171 and (c)                                                                                                                          164 Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9) 165 Castillo v. Madrigal, GR No. 62650, June 27, 1991. 166 Sec. 95, PD No. 1529. 167 Sec. 102, PD No. 1529. 168 Sec. 35, Chapter XII, Title III, EO No. 292. 169 Hermosilla v. Remoquillo, GR No. 167320, Jan. 30, 2007. 170 Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, GR No. 192975, Nov. 12, 2012. 171 Rule 47. Rules of Court.

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lack of due process.172 A petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.173

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.174

Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic

fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void.175 Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.176

In Yujuico v. Republic,177 the Court ruled that the action of the government for

reversion on the ground that the land was part of the Manila Bay was improperly filed with the RTC as the action should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Court governing annulment of judgments of RTCs.

But in Republic v. Ronman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,178 the Court upheld

the propriety of the OSG’s filing of a complaint for cancellation of title and reversion with the RTC since the land claimed by respondent was not the subject of an adjudication by the court in a registration case, hence Rule 47 on annulment of judgments is not applicable.

An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates

of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land.

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and

certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining title over the land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The

                                                                                                                         172 Diona v. Balangue, GR No. 173559, Jan. 7, 2013. 173 Section 3, id.; Galicia v. Manliquez, GR No. 155785, April 13, 2007. 174 Alcazar v. Arante, GR No. 177042, Dec. 10, 2012. 175 RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 7; Bulawan v. Aquende, GR No. 182819, June 22, 2011. 176 Bulawan v. Aquende, supra. 177 GR No. 168861, Oct. 26, 2007, citing Agcaoili, “Property Registration Decree and Related Laws.” 178 Supra.

29

real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the land in question.179 PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides that “in no case shall such (petition for review) be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.” An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.

180

A person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to

rely on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims which are annotated on the title, for registration is the operative act that binds the property.181  But a purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim that he acted in good faith.182

The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that, as regards immovable property,

ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded the sale in the Registry of Property. In Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, the adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens were annotated on the title on October 30, 1979 and December 10, 1979, respectively; the real estate mortgage over the subject property was registered by respondent only on March 14, 1980. The Court stated that the prior registration of a lien created a preference. Even a subsequent registration of the prior mortgage will not diminish this preference, which retroacts to the date of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens and the adverse claim.

The maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration.183 Thus, it has been held in a case that Mahinay’s notice of lis pendens having been registered ahead of Sorensen's real estate mortgage, the notice of lis pendens takes precedence over the real estate mortgage. The

                                                                                                                         179 Galang v. Reyes, GR No. 184746, Aug. 15, 2012. 180Rosales v. Burgos, GR No. 143573, Jan. 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 264. 181Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710. 182 Yared v. Tiongco, supra. 183 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358, 365 (1980) citing Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685 (1942).

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claim of Sorensen that the owner's copy of TCT No. 117531 does not contain any adverse annotation at the time the owners transacted with her is of no moment. Being in the nature of involuntary registration, the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the original copy of TCT No. 117531 on file with the Registry of Deeds is sufficient to bind third parties. It affects the whole world even if the owner's copy does not contain the same annotation.184 The phrase “innocent purchaser for value” in Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

185 But unlike private individuals, banks are expected to exercise greater care and

prudence in their dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract.

186

In St. Dominic Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

187 the Court, held

that where a Torrens title was issued as a result of regular land registration proceedings and was in the name of the mortgagor when given as a security for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage rights of the bank which had acted in good faith.

In Mahinay v. Gako,188

the Court ruled that when a mortgagee relies upon what appears on the face of a Torrens title and lends money in all good faith on the basis of the title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that the latter's title was defective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected.

189

In Blanco v. Esquierdo,

190 it was held that the right or lien of an innocent

mortgagee for value upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained his title thereto thru fraud. In this case, upon a complaint filed by the legal heirs of Maximiano, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-6582 for having been secured through fraud, and also the cancellation of DBP’s mortgage. The only question is whether the bank is an innocent purchaser for value. The Court answered in the affirmative. The bank was not a party to the fraud. The certificate of title was in the name of Fructuosa at the time of the mortgage. Hence, the bank had the right to rely on what appeared in the certificate and was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate. The remedy of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.

                                                                                                                         184 Mahinay v. Gako, GR No. 15338, Nov. 28, 2011, citing Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-903 (1995). 185Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, supra. 186 PNB v. Jumanoy, GR No. 169901, Aug. 3, 2011. 187GR No. 70623, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 577. 188 Supra. 189 Id., citing Penullar v. Philippine National Bank, 205 Phil. 127, 135-136 (1983), citing Director of Lands v. Abache, 73 Phil. 606 (1942) and Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494 (1960). 190GR No. L-15182,Dec. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 494.

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RULE ON DOUBLE SALE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Article 1544 of the Civil Code reads:

“ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person

acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in

good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.’’

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens

system, the law gives ownership priority to: (a) the first registrant in good faith; (b) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (c) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under the Torrens system.191 Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine ownership of an immovable property is the good or bad faith not of the seller, but of the buyer; specifically, to determine who first registered the sale with the Registry of Property (Registry of Deeds) in good faith.192 As against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.193

In Remalante v. Tibe,

194 the Court ruled that the civil law provision on double sale

is not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found to be fraudulent.

Likewise, in Espiritu and Espiritu v. Valerio,195

where the same parcel of land was purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other vendee should prevail.

196 The rule that where two certificates purport to include the same

land, the earlier in date prevails, is valid only absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.

197 On the other hand, while the execution of a public

instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, it only gives rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

198

                                                                                                                         191Abrigo v. De Vera, GR No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 544. 192 Cabigas v. Limbaco, GR No. 175291, July 27, 2011 193 Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011. 194GR No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138. 195GR No. L-18018, Dec 26, 1963, 119 Phil. 69. 196Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc., GR No. 171008, Sept. 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 350. 197Mathay v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 15788, Sept. 17, 1988, 295 SCRA 556. 198 Beatingo v. Gasis, GR No. 179641, Feb. 9, 2011.

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Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not

have — nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally. In a number of cases, an action for reconveyance has been treated as an action to quiet title.

199

PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGAL OWNERSHIP In Dewara v. Lamela,

200 the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and

Eduardo during their marriage, before the enactment of the Family Code. The issue is whether the property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, and whether the same may be subject to levy and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in a criminal case for serious physical injuries. Held:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

201

Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption.

202 The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without

judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.

203 23 Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when

the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. However, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.

In Ros v. PNB,

204 the subject property was acquired in 1968 during Ros and

Aguete's marriage. Ros mortgaged the property in 1974. Is the debt chargeable to the conjugal partnership? Held:

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract

                                                                                                                         199Ney v. Quijano, GR No. 178609, Aug. 4, 2010, and cases cited therein. 200 GR No. 179010, April 11, 2011. 201 CIVIL CODE, Art. 160; Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No. 159889, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 197, 203. 202 Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., 131 Phil. 790, 800 (1968). 203 CIVIL CODE, Art. 178; Villanueva v. Chiong, supra, at 202. 204 GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011.

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is voidable.205 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros' encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros' encumbrance of the subject property. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. For this reason, we rule that Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

FORGED DEED MAY BE THE ROOT OF A VALID TITLE Generally, a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title.206 But a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.207 CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

A certificate of title is conclusive of ownership. It enjoys the presumption of validity. Registration does not vest title: It is not a mode of acquiring ownership.208 It does not give any person any better title than what he lawfully has.209 Registration is merely a system of registration of titles to lands.210 A certificate of title is an indefeasible title and is conclusive as to the ownership of the registrant,211 the identity of the land,212 and its location.213As against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.214

While certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the

whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect

                                                                                                                         205 Vera-Cruz v. Calderon, G.R. No. 160748, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 534 citing Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, 28 August 2000, 410 SCRA 97. 206 Sec. 53, PD No. 1529. 207 Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011; Solivel v. Francisco, GR No. 51450, Feb. 10, 1989, 170 SCRA 218; Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-64159, Sept. 10, 1985, 138 SCRA 489; Director of Lands v. Addison, GR No. 23148, March 25, 1926, 49 Phil. 19. 208 Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 172; Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339; Avila v. Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148. 209 Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590. Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011. 210 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366. 211 Tan v. Bantegui, GR No. 154027, Oct. 24, 2005. 212 Demasiado v. Velasco, 71 SCRA 105. 213 Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626. 214 Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.

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a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other.215

If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate of title, the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.216

An original certificate of title issued by virtue of administrative proceeding is as

indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings. However, the indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.217 One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title.218 He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.219 CONVEYANCE AND OTHER DEALINGS BY REGISTERED OWNER

The general rule in dealing with registered land is set forth in Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529:

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. — An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land

insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the

                                                                                                                         215 Sta. Lucia Realty v. City of Pasig, GR No. 166838, June 15, 2011, citing De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 492 Phil. 643 (2005). 216 Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite, G.R. No. 161433, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 108, 115 and Mathay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115788, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 556. 217 Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011. 218 Sec. 44, PD 1529; Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011; Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283; Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710; Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738; Director of Lands v. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, 487 (1935); Quimson v. Suarez, 45 Phil. 901, 906 (1924). 219 Agricultural and Home Extension Development Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92310, September 3, 1992, 213 SCRA 563; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, supra.

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registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.

No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the

owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in the law (PD 1529) or upon order of the court, for cause shown.220

From the standpoint of third parties, a property registered under the Torrens

system remains, for all legal purposes, the property of the person in whose name it is registered, notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance, unless the corresponding deed is registered.221 Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.222 DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY REGISTRATION

As a rule, the order of entries in the Primary Entry Book determines the priority in registration.223

In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the

owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees be made within fifteen (15) days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim.224 AMENDMENT OR ALTERATION OF CERTIFICATES

The proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.225                                                                                                                          220 Sec. 53, PD 1529. 221 Narciso Peña, supra note 38, at 189. 222 Bulaong v. Gonzales, GR No. 156318, Sept. 5, 2011. 223 Id. 224 Bulaong v Gonzales, supra. 225 Paz v. Republic, GR No. 157367, Nov. 23, 2011.

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While Section 108, among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the

court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any memorandum appearing therein, the prevailing rule is that proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.226 Relief under the said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.227

The court has no authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and

that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value in good faith, or his heirs and assigns without his or their written consent.228 REGISTERED LAND NOT SUBJECT TO PRESCRIPTION No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.229 Thus, the right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership.230 Prescription is unavailing not only against the titled owner but also against his heirs.231 But ownership may be lost through laches232 which is failure or neglect to assert a right for an unreasonable length of time.233 CERTIFICATE NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK A certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding.234 Thus, in a complaint for recovery of possession, defendant cannot raise in the action the validity of plaintiff’s title.235 There must be a direct attack on the title via a separate action; but a direct attack may be made in a counterclaim or third-party complaint.236

                                                                                                                         226 Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CA, 463 Phil. 417, 431-432 (2003). 227Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, GR No. 163530, March 9, 2011;Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. CA, 339 Phil. 377, 389 (1997). 228 Id. 229 Sec. 47, PD No. 1529. 230 Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011, citing Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 107 (1985). 231 Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251; Guinoo v. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 235. 232 Fernando v. Acuna, supra, citing cases. See also Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277. 233 Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339. 234 Sec. 48, PD No. 1529; Tapuroc v. Loquellano, GR No. 152007, Jan. 22, 2007. 235 Gaiterio v. Almeria, GR No. 181812, June 8, 2011; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743. 236 Leyson v. Bontuyan, GR No. 156357, Feb. 18, 2005; Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011.

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What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.237 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.238 The prohibition against collateral attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, since such titles do not enjoy indefeasibility.239 REPLACEMENT OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATE

Section 109, PD No. 1529, governs the procedure for the replacement of a lost or destroyed owner’s duplicate certificate of title. Where the owner’s duplicate copy is not in fact lost or destroyed, a petition for the purpose is unwarranted as the court has no jurisdiction over the petition.240 RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATE

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.241 The lost or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in the custody of the Register of Deeds. When reconstitution is ordered, this document is replaced with a new one — the reconstituted title — that basically reproduces the original. After the reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted title.242

Reconstitution denotes restoration of the certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and conditions: it does not pass upon the question of ownership.243 For an order of reconstitution to issue, the following elements must be present:

(1) the certificate of title has been lost or destroyed; (2) the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest therein; and

(3) the certificate of title is in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.244

                                                                                                                         237 Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544, 547. 238 Lacbayan v. Samoy, GR No. 165427, March 21, 2011. 239  (Oliveros  v.  San  Miguel  Corporation,  GR  No.  173531,  Feb.  1,  2012.  240Camitan  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  GR  No.  128099,  Dec.  20,  2006.  241 Republic v. Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 600, 614. 242 Republic v. Vergel de Dios, GR No. 170459, Feb. 9, 2011. 243 Republic v. Santua, GR No. 155703, Sept. 8, 2008; Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008; Pinote vs. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12. 244 Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008.

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Reconstitution is governed by RA No. 26 in relation to Section 110 of PD No.

1529. Administrative reconstitution is also governed by RA No, 26, as amended by RA No. 6732, dated July 17, 1989. Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 describes the requirements for a petition for reconstitution while Section 13 prescribes the requirements for a notice of hearing of the petition. Non-compliance with the requirements deprives the court of jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.245

The requirements of Sections 2 and 3, RA No. 26 are almost identical. The enumerated requirements are documents from official sources which recognize the ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest. The phrase “any other document” in paragraph (f) of Sections 2 and 3 refers to documents similar to those enumerated.246

As held in Castillo v. Republic,247 liberal construction of the Rules of Court does

not apply to land registration cases.248 Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases.249 In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void.250

Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or

destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners.251

The absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, hence, the Republic is not barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for reconstitution if the same has no merit.252 ADVERSE CLAIM

An adverse claim is registered by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition starting the basis of the right claimed.253 The duty of the Register of Deeds to record the same on the title of ministerial.254 The notice of adverse claim is to apprise third person that there is controversy over the ownership of the land, such that any

                                                                                                                         245 Castillo v. Republic, GR No. 182980, June 22, 2011. 246 Republic v. Lagramada, GR No. 150741, June 12, 2008; Republic v. Santua, supra.; 247 Supra. 248 Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 249 Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 250 Caltex Filipino Managers & Supervisors Ass'n. v. CIR, 131 Phil. 1022, 1030 (1968). 251 Manotok v. Barque, GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008. 252 Republic v. Lorenzo, GR No. 172338, Dec. 10, 2012. 253 Sec. 70, PD No. 1529. 254 Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 79.

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transaction regarding the land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.255 The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529256 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. The existence of an easement of subjacent and lateral support need not be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.257

An adverse claim is not ipso facto cancelled upon the lapse of the thirty days from its registration. There must be a petition for the purpose to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard.258

Parties with liens annotated on the certificate of title are entitled to notice in an

action for cancellation of their liens.259 NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property.260 The title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest.261 Thus, one who buys land

                                                                                                                         255 Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279; Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011. 256 Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 provides: Section 70. Adverse claim. — Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be canceled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant. Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered canceled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. 257 Castro v. Monsod, GR No. 183719, Feb. 2, 2011. 258   Sajonas   vs.   Court  of  Appeals,   supra;   see   also  Duque-­‐Rosario   v.   Banco   Filipino   Savings   and  Mortgage  Bank,  GR  No.  140528,  Dec.  7,  2011    259 Crisologo v. Omelio, GR No. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321, Oct. 3, 2012. 260 Dela Merced v. GSIS, GR No. 167140, Nov. 23, 2011. 261 Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-902 (1995).

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where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest.262

A notice of lis pendens should contain (1) a statement of the institution of the action or proceeding; (2) the court where the same is pending; (3) the date of its institution; (4) a reference to the number of the certificate of title; and (5) an adequate description of the land affected and its registered owner.263 The notice is not a lien or encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those dealing with the property that it is under litigation.264 The litigation must involve the title to, or the use or occupation of, a specific property. It does not apply where the object of the suit is money judgment, or proceedings for the probate of will or administration of the estate of a deceased person, levy on execution or preliminary attachments.265 A notice of lis pendens subjects the interest of the transferee to the results of the pending suit. CONSULTA It is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register documents presented to him for registration. (Sec. 10, PD No. 1529). If the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the registrability of the document, the remedy is to elevate the matter to the LRA via en consulta. The same procedure may be availed of by the interested party.266 Appeal from the LRA decision may be taken to the Court of Appeals.267 JUSTICE OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI Philippine Judicial Academy Supreme Court 552-9636, 922-0232, 0920-9506384 Email: oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com

                                                                                                                         262 Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25, 1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513-514, citing Constantino v. Espiritu, No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1, 15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207, 232. 263 Sec. 76, PD No. 1529. 264 Republic v. Ravelo, GR No. 165114, Aug. 6, 2008. 265 Biglang-awa vs. Constantino, 109 Phil. 168. 266 Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152. 267  Calalang  vs.  Register  of  Deeds  of  Quezon  City,  231  SCRA  88.