against intrinsicness bricker

8/12/2019 Against Intrinsicness Bricker

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AAggaaiinnssttiinnttrriinnssiiccnneessss::AArreettuurrnnttootthheellooggiiccaallBRETT BRICKER

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Affirmative utilization of intrinsicness arguments against disadvantages has increased in recent years, despitethe lack of theoretical discussion surrounding their utility or legitimacy. There is a need to formally extendarguments about intrinsicness outside of the time and competitive limits of policy debate rounds. I argue thatthe academic disadvantages of intrinsicness arguments outweigh the benefits, even if some affirmative teamshave had success in using them. I will support this claim first by addressing the arguments in favor of

intrinsicness, and then providing a different, yet not revolutionary, model that judges and debaters can use toevaluate the intrinsic consequences of the affirmative plan.

Despite the effectiveness and widespread utilization of intrinsicness arguments in both high school andcollege policy debate, recent discussion of this tool has been limited. The most recent discussion has occurredon the Georgia Debate Union bloga discussion started by Will Mosley-Jensen, and continued by debatetheoreticians in the Comments section (Mosley-Jensen). Mosley-Jensen, drawing on previous articles by Soltand McKinney, argues that the use of affirmative intrinsicness arguments has significant educational benefitsfor academic debate. From these three articles I discern, and will address in order, two supposed benefits tousing intrinsicness arguments: first, that they are the logical approach to debate (Mosley-Jensen para. 3);second, that they aid in the removal of weak disadvantages (McKinney para. 14).

Those arguing for intrinsicness arguments, and debaters using them, often claim that a disadvantageshould not be considered because, [t]he rational policymaker would, of course, argue that the affirmative plan

should be done if feasible accompanying measures can also be adopted to prevent unwanted side effects(McKinney para. 5). This model of rational policymaking is flawed for three reasons.

First, this conception of a rational policymaker misplaces the role of the judge. The judge, quite clearly, isnot an individual with infinite power over all United States Federal Government action. If you dont believe me,look in the back of the room. Instead, the judge is an informed citizen evaluating the benefits anddisadvantages of a governmental proposal. This limited power of the judge makes immediate political orfinancial consequences of the plan entirely relevant. For example, a judge with power over all federal policymight not worry about the plans effect on the midterm election, given that this judge could just logically avoidall of the impacts to the disadvantage. However, a citizen-judge should be very concerned about politicalconsequences of the plan because those would likely be outside of their control. To argue that this is not alogical concern is ludicrous given that no judge, debater, or citizen will ever have power over every action ofthe Federal Government.

Quite the contrary, the concern of finite time, resources and political capital should be of great import tothose advocating political change. Not only are more politically expedient policies more likely to beimplemented, but social movements that attempt to change government policy often entertain significant coststhat make pursuit of other goals, at least in the short-term, less likely (Rosenberg 343). Therefore, the fact thata rational policymaker may be able to avoid negative consequences of the plan, the rest of us and by this Imean everyonehave no such luck. We cant hope to pass the plan and not cut NASA funding through amagical wand; rather, citizens should be actively concerned about the consequences of their advocaciesbecause the results will not be so easily avoided. This criticism applies to all affirmative intrinsicnessargumentswhether logical or empirical (Mosley-Jensen para. 2). If the political consequences of the plancause the GOP to win the midterm, prevent START passage or cause financial reform to pass, these areconsequences that must be accounted for by an engaged and concerned citizen. If the financial cost of theplan is so great that it would require tradeoffs with other programs, this must be accounted for as well. And, if

the plan were to collapse US-Japan relations, even if some other stop-gaps could serve to save therelationship, an active citizen must consider whether these solutions would be chosen, not simply whether theyshould.

Second, the rational policymaker argument assumes that rational policymakers are not concerned aboutpolitical consequences of the proposals that they support. Whether for good or bad, it is quite clear that politicsis at the forefront of every successful politicians concern. Whether manifest through the policies politicianssupport, or public statements they make, we shouldnt pretend as if policymakers dont take their own stock ofpolitical capital into account. This isnt a new phenomenon; its true of American politics since its conception:

This new and turbulent political world required the new nation s leaders to practice a kind of politicsboth resembling and diverging from the politics of today. Given that modern Americans hate politicians

1MA Candidate at the University of Kansas, NDT Champion


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and love their national icons, it is natural for them to assume that the greatest figures of Americanhistory never were and could not have been politicians. For example, they like to think thatWashington never had to do any fund-raising, that Hamilton was not interested in political spin, andthat Jefferson was an idealistic statesmanHamilton not only wasconcerned with political spinhewas a ferocious and prolific writer for the public press, defending his measures and assailing hisfoesFinally, rather than being a retiring philosopher with no gift for politics (as he sometimespresented himself), Thomas Jefferson was a master politician by the standards of his era. (Bernstein76)

If as debate theoreticians we are attempting to create the most logical, or real world form of debate, then it

follows (under this model) that disregarding political concerns should most certainly be avoided.Mosley-Jensen attempts to avoid this criticism by backtracking from the strength of his original argument,

stating:[T]he politics disad is not necessarily dead because of intrinsicness responses; there are politicalramifications of any policy and those political ramifications are usually carried out in the public arena.The disadvantage would simply have to be re-explained as a reason why the USFG would be forcedto take, or forgo, certain action because of a policy decision (December 6th Comments para. 10).

But it is unclear how, with the idea of fiat assumed in the intrinsicness test, that any plan would really force aseparate action to be forgone. Especially since affirmative intrinsicness arguments arentbound byimmediacy, there is not a single politics disadvantage that would be viable under his model. Mosley-Jensenprovides following example of a politics disadvantages that supposedly fits under this model:

[I]f the USFG were to ratify the CTBT that there would be a reaction among various lobbying groups

and political parties opposed to its ratification would mobilize. Whether they would specifically mobilizeagainst health care or Obama or future arms control measures is obviously up for debate, but that is asit should be. (December 6th Comments para. 10)

However, passing CTBT is certainly not mutually exclusive with health care or future arms control measures;therefore, even if passage of future policies becomes more difficult, this concern is irrelevant in the Mosley-Jensen model. If Mosley-Jensens backtrack really is the model of intrinsicness that he supports, then everyother piece of legislation is intrinsically tied to a plan that uses Congress:

The legislative process is laborious and time-consuming, and the time available for Senate floor actioneach year is limited. Every day devoted to one bill is a day denied for consideration of other legislation,and there are not enough days to act on all the bills that Senators and Senate committees wish to seeenacted. (Carr and Bach 8)

Assuming most intrinsicness advocates supporter a stronger model, then it is extremely difficult to think of any

viable politics disadvantagein fact I cannot think of one. Thus, the single greatest concern of most rationalpolicymakers (political feasibility) is only discussed when we remove affirmative intrinsicness from ourargumentative vocabulary. For some, this may beg the question of the educational value of the politicsdisadvantagethis concern will be addressed below.

Third, the rational policymaker argument justifies nearly infinite negative conditionality. Since the rationalpolicymaker argument is premised upon concerns of reciprocity with negative counterplans, intrinsicness (atits logical extreme) justifies similar negative abuses (Mosley-Jensen para. 4). For example, if affirmative teamsare allowed to intrinsically test each negative disadvantagepossibly each one in multiple waysthen, byhoisting the affirmative on their own petard, the negative can surely test the plan and each advantage inmultiple ways as well. While the advantages and disadvantages of conditionality are beyond the scope of thisarticle, unlimited conditionality is most assuredly an unfair and un-educational tool for the negative.

These three reasons provide sufficient evidence to negate the benefits of the rational policymaker

argument in support of affirmative intrinsicness arguments. This model misplaces the role of the judge,misjudges concerns of rational policymakers, and has theoretical implications that may justify an expansion ofa harmful trend in policy debateunlimited negative conditionality.

The second major argument used by those advocating affirmative intrinsicness arguments is theireffectiveness in the removal of weak disadvantages (McKinney para. 14). However, it is not just the removalof weak disadvantages, it is the removal of nearly all impacts. For example, if the plan resulted in U.S. armssales to Taiwan, intrinsicness would remedy that impact. If the plan resulted in the U.S. attacking Iran, anintrinsicness test would be sufficient to terminate that impact. And, if the funding for the plan traded off withother major priorities, the intrinsicness test to take funding from other places would remedy this impact as well.While more than just politics disadvantages are at risk from affirmative intrinsicness arguments, usually the


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disadvantages that are discarded are politics disadvantages of some nature. I will defend the politicsdisadvantage from two angles: first, its theoretical legitimacy; second, its educational legitimacy.

Politics disadvantages come in all shapes and sizes. Some are based on the process of the plan beingimplemented, some are based on the political blame or credit associated with the plans implementation, thereare Obama Good, Obama Bad, and even disadvantages based on the political capital of the first lady. As ageneral rule, a politics disadvantage is more viable if the plan has extreme political consequences and theimpact of the disadvantage relies on some political calculation to be implemented (or blocked). While this islong-winded, and obvious to some, I want to make clear that I am not defending every politics disadvantage;rather, I am defending the importance of discussing political consequences of an affirmative plan. Whether the

plan influences the START debate or NMD is beyond my concernas long as it is clear that affirmativeintrinsicness discards all politics disadvantages. I will leave it up to the debaters to figure out the likely politicalimpact of the plan on other political endeavors.

First, from a theoretical perspective, debate should focus on political consequences because if the negativecan win that political concerns are an inherent barrier to the affirmative, then this discussion is core negativeground. While arguing against inherency of the affirmative is rarely a winning strategy for the negative, itstheoretical underpinnings must not be forgotten (Bates 16). Inherency is valuable not just to prove that theaffirmative has not occurred yet, but also to ensure that there is something existential guaranteeing the planwill not occur in the status quo. In many instances this existential barrier is politics itself. Therefore, if theaffirmative is able to argue that politics acts as the inherent barrier to the plan, then it is surely within thenegatives theoretical right to argue that the political barrier preventing the plans passage is beneficial (Bates17). Absent discussion of this inherent barrier affirmative teams will most certainly choose affirmatives that the

only inherent barrier is politics, therefore significantly limiting any negative ground.Second, discussing the political consequences of affirmative plan ensures a more valuable education than

whatever the value of affirmative intrinsicness is purported to be. Politics disadvantages encourage studentsto research the political issues of the day, and stay up to date with the quickly changing global concerns.While topic committees of both college and high school topics do a thankless job, the politics disadvantage isthe best way to keep the educational value of debate fresh throughout the year, even as parts of the topicbecome stale. This is not a reason to prefer a bad politics disadvantage to a good case turn, or more specificstrategy, but it is a strong argument to not discount a whole set of disadvantages entirely. Especially given thepolarized state of Congress under the Obama administration, the political consequences (good or bad) mustbe up for discussion.

Finally, I propose a model for affirmatives to answer weak disadvantages or disadvantages that are notsufficiently triggered by the affirmative. Affirmative teams, instead of using the rational policymaker argument

as a permutation, should use a similar argument against the uniqueness of the link. If disadvantages really areweak, or not triggered by the affirmative, then why must the affirmative use a permutation or rely on a faultymodel or intrinsicness to beat the disadvantage? Instead, affirmative teams should argue:1) Intervening actors will prevent the disadvantage impacts, but not the plans impacts.2) The disadvantage doesnt have a unique link because the plan is insufficient to alone trigger the link.Either, other issues will trigger the link, or the threshold of the link is so strong that the plan is too weak toinfluence the impact.These two arguments rely on similar themes that intrinsicness advocates support. They both teach logic,research and rationality. However, they dont rely on introduction of a new fiated action (even if called a test)to defeat the disadvantage.

Affirmative intrinsicness, while an interesting thought experiment, has had its day. The arguments insupport of intrinsicness are weak and better accessed by a discussion of intervening actors and link

uniqueness than by the current incarnation of affirmative intrinsicness. Surely, this discussion will not endhere. I urge respondents to focus on the inadequacies of the model explained above, instead of rehashing thebenefits of affirmative intrinsicness. This will hopefully allow the discussion to move past the impasse ofintrinsicness good vs. bad, to a model of just what exactly it means to be intrinsic to the plan.


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Works Cited

Bates, Benjamin. Inherency, Strategy and Academic Debate. Rostrum. 2002. 76(5): 15-18. Print.Bernstein, Richard. The Founding Fathers Reconsidered. Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.Carr, Thomas and Stanley Bach. The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor: An Introduction. SenateResources. 2002. Web. 16 May 2010.McKinney, T.A. Rehabilitating Intrinsicness. Debaters Research Guide. Wake Forest University, 1991.Web. 15 May 2010.Mosley-Jensen, Will. Theory of Intrinsicness. Georgia Debate Union. Georgia Debate, 04 December 2009.

Web. 15 May 2010.Rosenberg, Gerald. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1993. Print

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