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After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a StableMultipolarityAuthor(s): Charles A. KupchanSource: International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 40-79Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539379

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After

ax

Americana

Charles . Kupchan

Benign Power, Regional Integration, nd

the Sources of a StableMultipolarity

I

An era of unprece-

dented peace appears to

be

at hand

as the

twenty-firstentury raws

near.

The

world's major powers enjoy cooperative

relations, emocracy s takingroot n

many countries hathave long suffered

nderauthoritarian ule, nd the world

economy s becoming ncreasingly

iberalized

and

integrated. ontrary

o the

dire

predictions

f a

return o a Hobbesian

world,

the end of the Cold War has

not been accompanied by the fragmentationf international rder and the

emergenceof rivalry mong

atomisticnational

units.1

A sobering reality,however,must temper optimism about the emerging

international andscape. The peace and prosperity

f

the current ra rely too

heavily on a single ngredient:American

power. The United States serves as a

critical xtraregional

alancer

in

Europe

and

East

Asia,

is the

catalyst

behind

multilateral fforts

o

combat aggression

and peacefullyresolve ong-standing

disputes,

and is the

engine

behind the

iberalization

f the world

economy.

But

America's preponderance and

its will to underwrite nternational rder

will

not last indefinitely.ven if theU.S. economy grows at a healthyrate,Amer-

ica's share of world product and its global

influencewill decline as other arge

countriesdevelop and become

less enamored

of

following

America's lead.2

Charles

A.

Kutpchan

s Associate

r-ofessorf

nternational

elations

t

Georgetozvwnniversity

nd

Senior

Fellow t theCouincil n Foreign elationis.

The author would

like

to thank

participants

n

seminars

at the

following nstitutions

or their

thoughtful omments:Hebrew University, olumbia

University, niversity f California t San

Diego, Council on ForeignRelations,GeorgetownUniversity, niversity fCalifornia t Berkeley,

Harvard University, kazaki Institute Tokyo), the American Center (Tokyo), and the Danish

Institute

f

International

Affairs

Copenhagen).

The critiquesof Michael Barnett,RichardBetts,

Albert

Fishlow,Gary Hufbauer,Clifford upchan,

JosephLepgold,GideonRose, Peter Trubowitz,

Ole

Waever,

Fareed

Zakaria,

and the

reviewers

of nternational

ecuri-ity

ere

particularly elpful.

For research ssistance,

would like

to

thank

JasonDavidson, Delphine Park,

and Mira

Sucharov.

1. See, for xample, John

J.Mearsheimer, Back to theFuture: nstabilityn Europe after

he Cold

War,

nternational

ecuirity,

ol. 15, No.

1

(Summer

1990), pp. 5-56.

2. For general analysis of

the secular processes throughwhich the locus of preponderant

power

changes over time, see

Robert Gilpin,

War and

Change

n World olitics

Cambridge,

U.K.: Cam-

bridge University ress, 1981). During the second half

of the twentieth entury, .S.

economic

output has fallenfrom oughly ne-half oone-quarter fgross world product.See Jeffreyrankel,

Regioncal radiniglocs

in the World

conomnicystem Washington,

.C.: Institute or

nternational

Economics, 1997), p. 6.

Ioteoiiatioinal

Seciiritiy,

ol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79

?

1998 by the President

nd

Fellows of

Harvard

College

and the Massachusetts nstitute

f Technology.

40



After

ax

Americana 41

Furthermore,he

American electoratewill tireof a foreign olicy that

saddles

the

United Stateswith such a disproportionate

hare of

the burden

ofmanag-

ingthe

nternational ystem.America's

unipolar moment

will

not last long.

To

assume that

nternational

rder

can indefinitelyest

on

American

hegemony

is both illusory nd

dangerous.

How should the

prospect of waning American power affect heconduct

of

American grandstrategy?3 everal prominent chools of thought uggestthat

the

decline ofAmerican hegemony need not

be cause for concern;peace will

outlast American

preponderance.

The

optimists ontend that democracy,

lo-

balization, thespread of international

nstitutions,nd changes in the

sources

of

state power are

eroding

national

boundaries

and

making warfare

n obso-

lete

tool of statecraft.4he end of the twentieth

entury, owever,

s n6t the

first

ime

n

history hat students

of

international olitics have proclaimed an

end to war.

In

the

years leading up to

World

War

I

and again during

the

interwar

period, scholars and

diplomats

alike

argued

that economic interde-

pendence,technological nnovation, nd societalaversion to thehorrors f war

were making armed conflict historical rtifact.5

f

today's optimists rove

to

be

as wrong as

yesterday's,

here

is

good

reason to

be

worried about

the

potentialconsequences

of

a relativedecline

in

U.S.

power.6

Even iftheoptimists re right hat

nternational oliticshave entered more

peaceful era,

the

waning

of

American

hegemony

till

provides

cause

for larm.

3. Even if American hegemony asts for decades more, debate about crafting posthegemonic

order should take place now, while U.S. preponderance s still sufficient o maintain the status

quo. It is farmore prudent o put in place the foundation f a durable orderby design than simply

to wait until current rrangements nravel. Many analysts gree thatU.S. preponderancewill not

last, but few have given thought o how the prospectof decline should affect .S. grand strategy.

One exception s Christopher ayne. Layne calls for U.S. grand strategy f offshore alancing to

conserve U.S. resources and to help protect he United States fromgettingdragged into distant

conflicts. e failsto address, however,how to promotepeace as the United States withdraws

from

existing ommitments.nstead, he makes the case that he United States should simply

tand

aloof

from he regional conflicts ikely o emerge n the wake of

an

American retrenchment.ee Layne,

From Preponderance to OffshoreBalancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, nter-inatioinal

Security,

ol.

22,

No.

1

(Summer 1997), pp.

86-124.

4.

On the democratic

peace, see Bruce Russett,Grasping

the

Democratic

eace

(Princeton,N.J.:

PrincetonUniversity ress, 1993); and Michael Doyle, Liberalismand WorldPolitics, American

Political cienceReviezv, ol. 80, No.

4

(December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.

On

the decliningutility

f

warfare, ee Richard Rosecrance,The Rise of theTradinigtate New York: Basic Books, 1986); and

JohnMueller,Retr-eatroin oomsday: he ObsolescencefMajor

War

New

York:

Basic Books, 1989).

5.

See,

for

xample,

Norman

Angell,

The Great lliusion

New

York:

G.P.

Putnam's

Sons, 1911).

6. Importantcritiques of the democraticpeace hypothesishave been collected

in

two edited

volumes: Michael E. Brown, ean

M.

Lynn-Jones,

nd Steven

E.

Miller, ds., Debating

he

Demnocratic

Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is

Democracy he

Answver?

Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).



Internationalecurity 3:2 | 42

Although scholars disagree about whetherbipolar or multipolar ystemsare

more stable, most agree that both are less stable than unipolar systems.7 he

end of America'sunipolarmoment nd

thereturn o

multipolarityhusthreaten

to trigger tructural ources

of

competition

that

may

well override

other

sources of peace. Indeed,

the

ongoing

debate between realists nd institution-

alists of various stripes essentially

revolves

around

pitting

tructural ources

of competition gainst ideational and institutional ourcesofcooperation.8

Structure, owever, may

be the

solution,

not an endemic source

of

rivalry

thatmust be overcomeby antidotes such as democracy,globalization,and

international nstitutions.

f

order devolved from tructure

tself,

ather han

fromefforts o tame systemicforces, hat order would be more durable and

self-sustaining.

he

prospect

ofthe end of American

hegemony

thus raises a

crucial

question:

Is it

possible

to construct stable

multipolarity?

I

argue

thatthe United States should

prepare

for

he

nevitabledecline of ts

preponderanceby encouragingtheemergenceof regional unipolarity n each

of theworld's three areas of industrial nd military ower-North America,

Europe, and East Asia. Unipolarity t

the

regional

level will

offset hrough

structural orces

the

fragmentation

nd

rivalry

that

otherwise

would

likely

accompany

the decline of American

hegemony.

Because

even

global

wars start

at the regional level, securing peace

within

regionsis an essential first tep

toward

securingpeace globally.

I

introduce

the notion

of

benign unipolarity

o

map

out the

logic upon

which

my analysis rests. Benign unipolarity efers o a hierarchical tructure

in

which a preponderantgeographic core establishes a hub-spoke patternof

influence ver a weaker periphery. s in an empire, he core exerts powerful

centripetal

orce

ver the

periphery y

virtue f

ts uncontested

reponderance

and

the

size and

scope

of its

economy.

In

contrast

to a

classical empire,

however,regional order emerges from consensual bargain between core and

periphery,

ot from oercion.

The

core

engages

in

self-restraintnd agrees to

subject

the exercise of its

preponderant power

to

a

set of

rules

and

norms

7.

On the greater tability

f

bipolarity, ee KennethN. Waltz, The Stability f a Bipolar World,

Daedalus,Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and Mearsheimer, Back to the Future. For

arguments n favor of multipolarity,ee Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, Multipolar Power

Systems and International tability, World olitics,Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390-406. For

general discussion of polarity and stability, ee Stephen Van Evera, Primed for Peace: Europe

after he Cold War, nternationalecurity, ol. 15,

No. 3

(Winter 990/91),pp. 5-57; and Michael

Mastanduno, Preservingthe Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy fter

the Cold War, nternationalecurity, ol. 21,No.

4

(Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.

8. See the exchange between JohnMearsheimer

and

his critics

n

Promises, Promises: Can

Institutions eliver? Internationalecurity, ol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-93.



After ax Americana 43

arrived at through multilateralnegotiation. n return, he periphery

enters

willingly nto the core's zone of nfluence.Regional spheres of nfluence gain

become the main ordering formations n the international ystem,but these

spheres are based on voluntary, ot forced,participation. urthermore, rder

emerges preciselybecause of the withholding nd moderation of power, not

its unfetteredxercise.Benign unipolarity hus holds promise fordampening

competition mong regions as well as withinthem.

I argue that consensual unipolar formations re already emerging n North

America, Europe, and (to a lesser degree) East Asia, but that scholars and

policymakersneed to understand more fully heir ttributes nd take explicit

steps

to

encourage

their

further evelopment. The challenges ahead vary

considerably cross

these three

regions.

North America has long been unipolar. Unipolarity ame about through

willful ct of structural ransformation-the malgamationof the United States

into

a unitary tate. Since America's rise as a great power, ts preponderance

has been a key factor n preventingmajor nterstatewar in the region.Because

the

uncontestedpower of the United States now endows North America with

a natural

unipolarity,

he

key challenge is taming

the

unilateralism

made

possible by preponderance and deepening the consensual character f

Amer-

ica's relationshipwith ts neighbors.

Europe has long been multipolar-and suffered he consequences. Since the

close of World

War II, however,

Western

Europe has pursued an

ambitious

experiment imed at eliminating he

ll

effects f multipolarity y transforming

its structure o unipolarity. he vehicle for doing so has been European inte-

gration and the construction f the European Union (EU), a process that has

succeeded in

establishing preponderant ranco-German ore at

the center f

a consensual

regionalformation.

With the

help

of

America'sprotectiveguar-

antees, Europe's

core

engages

in

strategic estraint

nd exercises ts

power

in

a

benignmanner.

n

return, urope's smallerpowers

have

willingly

ntered

the

regional

formation. ot

only

has interstate

ivalry

een

all

but

eliminated,

but the

core exerts

powerfulmagnetic ttraction

ver the

periphery, reating

an effective

hub-spoke pattern

of

governance. Indeed,

the

continent's

new

democraciesarenow clamoring tthegatetobecome part of Europe's unipolar

construction.The key challenges ahead are to ensure the integrity f the

Franco-German oalition and Europe's unipolarity ven as American power

wanes and Europe's border moves eastward.

East Asia has long been, and remains,multipolar.America's military res-

ence

continues

to

hold

in

abeyance the competitive ockeying that would

otherwise

merge.

Unlike

Europe, however,

East Asia has not taken

advantage



International

ecurity

3:2 | 44

of the luxuryprovided by an extraregional alancer

to

proceed

with its

own

political ntegration. ostwar

Germany ntegrated

nto

Europe

even

as

Europe

integrated nto the West.

n

contrast, ostwar Japan

was

deeply integrated

nto

the

community

f

capitalistdemocracies,

but its

ntegration

nto

East Asia has

been shallow and only economic

n form. he

region'smajor

stateshave

strong

political ties to the United

States,

but not to one another.

In

this

sense,

America's presence,althoughit keeps the peace fornow, also stands in the

way

of the

intraregionalntegration

needed to

ensure

stability

n

the after-

math

of

American hegemony. East Asia has a long way to go

if it

is to

construct consensual

regional

formation

apable

of

overcoming

ts

danger-

ous

multipolarity.

An effort o bridge realistand idealist approaches to the preservationof

peace guides this

exploration

nto the

construction

f

a

new

international rder.

I recognizethepervasive

role

that

power

will

continue o play in international

affairs nd

the extent o which

power asymmetries

will

serve as

inescapable

determinants f order.It is no accident that

empires

have been the most

pervasive provider

of

orderthroughouthistory

At the

same time, profound

material nd ideational

changes

over the

course

of

the

twentieth

entury

ave

made classical empires

obsolete,

established consensual

politics

as

an interna-

tional norm,

and removed

many

of

the

traditional ncentives

o coercive and

predatorybehavior. The notion ofbenign unipolarity ests not on the denial

of

power realities,

but

on the

opportunity

o channel

through

willful

agency

the

manner

n

which, and

the

ends

to

which, power

is exercised.

n

addition,

I

am seeking

to

help break down

the

barriers

between

security

tudies

and

international oliticaleconomy by bringinggeopoliticsback into the study of

regionalism.

n

the pages thatfollow, explorethestrategic mplications f an

internationalandscape

increasingly haped by

flows of trade

and capital and

the economic

implications

of

an international tructurencreasingly harac-

terizedby regional concentrationsf

power.9

9. The limitations f current hinking bout the emerging nternational ystem tem n part from

the high disciplinarywalls that still stand between international olitical economy and security

studies. The study of regionalism nd institutions uch as the EU, the North AtlanticFree Trade

Agreement NAFTA), and the Asia PacificEconomic Cooperation forum APEC) remainsprimarily

the domain of economists and political economists trained to think bout exchange and wealth

creation. The study of geopolitics,polarity,

nd

institutions uch as the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization NATO), the Organizationfor ecurity

nd

Cooperation

n

Europe, and the Associa-

tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remainsprimarily he domain of security pecialists.

A

limiteddegree of fertilizationcross these disciplinary arriers s occurring, owever. Theoretical




I begin by

laying out

the

logic of benign unipolarity. then discuss the

descriptive and

prescriptive mplications of the notion for North America,

Europe, and East Asia. In the final ection,

theorize about the dynamics that

would

characterize nternational olitics n a worldof benign unipolar regions,

exploringhow to effect heir nternal ohesion as

well as cooperative relations

among

them.

The Logic of

BenignUnipolarity

The promotionofintraregional eace is the

logical starting oint of efforts o

construct stable

nternational rder to follow

Americanhegemony.10

f

neigh-

bors are at peace with each other, hey are

likely to

be

at peace with-states

further

field.

f

neighbors re at war with each

other,

tates

further

field

are

likely to become

involved,

both to

contain

the war

and

to

prevent

the emer-

gence

of

a powerfulvictor

with

extraregional

mbition.

Regionalunipolarity rovides orderand stability hrough ower asymmetry

and the structural ierarchy hatfollowsfrom t. The

preponderance

of the

leading regional

statediscourages othersfrom

alancing against

t

and enables

the eader to underwrite he

nstitutions nd norms of regional

order.

Whereas

roughlyequivalent power produces balancing

and contestation ver leader-

ship, asymmetry roduceshierarchy

nd a

core-periphery attern

f

relations.

perspectives traditionally eserved for the study

of economic bodies are being used to

study

securitybodies.

See, for example, John Duffield, Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The

Contributions f Regional SecurityRegimes, Review f nternationaltuidies,ol. 20, No. 4 (October

1994), pp. 369-399. And theoretical erspectives

raditionally eservedfor he study of geopolitics

and security re being applied to groupings uch

as the EU. See, for xample, Ole Waever's work

on European integration,n particular, Europe's Three Empires:A Watsonian nterpretationf

Post-WallEuropean Security, n Rick Fawn and Jeremy arkins, ds., Internationalociety fter he

Cold War New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1996), pp. 220-260.

I

am

indebted

to Waever for

nitially

inspiringme to apply the logic of empires to the

EU and, consequently, o otherregional bodies

traditionally iewed primarily s trade groupings.

For a contemporary erspective

on

the geopo-

litical mportance f regional ones of nfluence,ee Charles WilliamMaynes,

A

WorkableClinton

Doctrine, Foreign

olicy,

No. 93 (Winter 993),pp. 3-21.

For more general works

on

contemporary

regionalism, ome of which do touch on

geopolitical concerns, ee Peter Katzenstein nd Takashi

Shiraishi, ds., Netzvorkozver: apan

nd

Asia (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1997);

Edward

Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., The Political

Economnyf Regionalism New York: Columbia

University ress, 1997); David Lake and PatrickMorgan, eds., RegionalOrders:Butildingecuirityn

a

NezvWorld University ark: Pennsylvania StatePress, 1997); Jeffreyrankel and Miles Kahler,

eds., Regionalismiind Rivalry:Japan nd the United

States

n

PacificAsia (Chicago: University

f

Chicago Press, 1993);

and Louise

Fawcett

and Andrew

Hurrell, ds., Regionalismn

n

World olitics:

RegionalOrganizationnd International rder

Oxford,U.K.: OxfordUniversity ress, 1995).

10. On promoting egionalpeace as a pathway to

global stability,ee Joseph . Nye, Peace nParts:

Integrationnd Conflictn Regional

Organizationi

Boston: Little,Brown, 1971).




Asymmetry y itself

oes not preventbalancing,however.The

character f the

leading state and the

manner nwhich t wields its power also

determinehow

other states react

to preponderance.Cores that engage

in

self-binding nd

exercise theirpower

in a

benign

manner are unlikely to trigger alancing.11

Indeed, the benign exercise

of

power

gives rise to

the

trust, hared interests

and identities,

nd international

nstitutions ssential to

escaping anarchy

nd

fostering community

f states

within

which

the

rules

of

self-help

ompetition

no longer apply.12

In contrast, tates that

exercise unfettered ower and that

engage

in

predatory

nd exploitativebehavior are likely to

trigger alancing

coalitions

and

strategic ivalry. ocking

n

regional peace

means getting ight

both the structure

nd the character fpower.13

11. I define the terms benign and self-binding s follows. Self-binding s

the mechanism

throughwhich states render theirpower benign. Self-binding as quantitative, ualitative, and

proceduralcomponents. n quantitative erms, elf-binding ntails state'swillingness o withhold

power, to refrain rom ully xercising

ts resources nd influence.This

strategic

estraint

may

be

codified, as

in

the cases of contemporaryGermany

and

Japan,

or it

may

be

embodied only

in

practice.The qualitative omponent f self-binding oncerns he ends to which power is exercised.

Benign states

seek to

manage

rather

han maximize

power,

to

promote oint gains

rather han to

behave in an extractive nd exploitativemanner, nd to erectorders based upon the notion that

the spread of shared norms and identities nd the formation f community t the international

level can overcome competitive elations mong atomistic tate units. The procedural component

of self-binding ntails a preference

or

multilateral ver

unilateral nitiative.

Benign states favor

consensual governance, nd resort o unilateraldecisionmaking nlywhenmultilateralismailsto

produce

an

acceptable

outcome.

12. The.notion that great powers have character nd pursue differentypes of behavior has firm

roots

n

classical realism.Classical realists egularly istinguish etween revisionist

nd

status quo

powers. See,

for

example,

Arnold

Wolfers,

The Balance of Power

in

Theory

and

Practice,

n

Wolfers, d.,Discord nd Collaboration:ssays n nternationaloliticsBaltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins

University ress, 1962);

Randall

Schweller, Tripolarity

nd the

Second World

War,

nternational

Studies

Quarterly,

ol.

37,

No.

1

(March 1993), pp. 73-103; Schweller, Neorealism's Status-Quo

Bias: What Security Dilemma? Security tudies,Vol. 5, No.

3

(Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and

Mastanduno, Preserving he Unipolar Moment.

am

extending

his

typology o include benign

powers.

Revisionist

tates

seek

to

overturn he

prevailing ystem hrough cquisitive

and

preda-

tory trategies. tatus quo states seek to preserve the prevailing ystemby pursuing competitive,

but not

acquisitive, trategies. enign states

eek not

ust

to

preserve he status quo,

but

to deepen

its stability nd cooperative character y reassuring ther tates and fostering onsensual govern-

ance through he withholding s well as theexerciseofpower.Thekey difference etweena status

quo stateand

a

benign tate tems from iverging onceptions

f

the sources

of

order

nd

stability.

Stability

n a

world

of

status quo states

stems from the

absence

of

strategic rivalry among

satisfied-but atomistic

nd

self-regarding-state

nits

still

residing

n

an

anarchic environment.

The security ilemma does not operate because no revisionist tate exists to trigger t. Stabilityn

a

world of benign states

stems from uccessful

efforts

o carve out nonanarchic

pace through

promoting ooperation, rust,

nd

shared values

and

identities.The securitydilemma does

not

operate

because states

no

longer

reside

in an

anarchic, elf-help etting.

13. Consider how important oth the structure nd character f power are to the stability f the

current nternational ystem.

The

asymmetry

ssociated

with

American

preponderance

creates

structural

hierarchy.

ther

major

states are not

balancing against

U.S.

preponderance

in

part



After

ax

Americana 47

Benign unipolarity

epresents means of

combining he right tructure ith

the

right haracter. he

structural ierarchy hat

ccompanies power asymme-

try s a potent peace-causing

agent. Hierarchy

lone is not enough,however;

the

emergence of a stable orderalso depends on

the benign character f the

core and its willingnessto

forge consensualbargainwith theperiphery. he

core

agrees

to

engage in self-binding.n return, he

periphery andwagons and

agrees to enter

nto the core's sphere of influence.

This bargain provides the

core with

what

it

wants-a

regional

order

to its

liking at low cost. It also

provides the peripherywith

what it wants-the tamingof the core's

power by

exposing it to the moderating nfluences f a

multilateral ramework.

ower

asymmetries reatehierarchy, ut order

emergesbecause power is withheld t

the

same time that t is exercised. This bargain also

sets

in

motion a gradual

process

throughwhich individual states come to

equate their

own

interests

and

identity

with

the nterests nd

identity

f the

region

as

a whole.

Regional

cohesion thenrestsnot

only

on

a coincidence

of

separate national

nterests,

ut

also on a nascentsocial character nd sense of

community.14

Daniel Deudney's concept

of negarchy provides furthernsight

nto the

logic of

benignunipolarity.15Consensual regional formations

rovide

order

by

mixing

traditionalhierarchy

with

elements of

negarchy-order

that

emerges

through elf-binding, hrough

he

constraint

nd moderationof

power

rather

than ts

unfettered

xercise.Like the

U.S.

Constitution,

which

uses

particular

configurations f

negatives

and

an

elaborate

system

of

power-constraint

devices

to establish domesticorder,benign

unipolarity

elies on

a

system

of

negotiated hecks and

balances to establish nternational rder. t s thisnotion

of mixing empowermentwith disempowerment, f hierarchywith mecha-

nisms that check the

advantages of

preponderance,

that

is at

the

heart of

benignunipolarity nd the

conception

of

regional

order thatfollows from t.16

because of stark power

asymmetry,

ut also because they view U.S.

intentions

s

benign, not as

exploitative

or

predatory.Were

U.S.

behavior

to become

predatory,

ts

preponderance would

trigger he

formation

f balancing coalitions, uch as those formed gainst

Germany nd Japan

n

the 1930s.

14. See Ole Waever, Integration as Security, n Charles A. Kupchan,

ed., Atlantic

Security:

Contending isions New York:Council on ForeignRelationsPress, 1998);

and PeterJ. atzenstein,

United Germany

n

an Integrating urope,

in

Katzenstein, d.,

Tamed ower:

Germany

n

Europe

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1997).

15. Daniel Deudney, The PhiladelphianSystem: overeignty, rmsControl,

nd Balance

of

Power

in

the American States-Union, irca 1787-1861, nternational rganization, ol.

49,

No.

2

(Spring

1995), pp. 191-228.

16. It is the power-checking uality of benign unipolaritythat distinguishes t from ts main

conceptual competitor-hegemony. According to hegemonic stability

theory,

he

stronger

he

hegemon and the more able it is to provide public goods, the more stable the order.See Robert




The power-constraint

evices that

work togetherwith asymmetry

o pro-

duce benignunipolarity

ake two forms.First, ore

states erect nternalrules

and

institutions hat check

their xternal

power.

Societal

norms

against coer-

cive intervention,

hecks and balances

among branches of government,

nd

constitutional

imitson the use of force

re

examples.

Second,

core stateserect

external

rules and institutions

hat bind themselvesto other

states.17For

ex-

ample, the institutionshatgovernthe Franco-German oalition, nd theEU

more generally,

heckthe power

of ndividual states, stablishmechanisms

for

collectivedecisionmaking

and

initiative,

nd

promote

the

spread

of

region-

wide interests

nd identities.18

Keohane, After

egemnony

Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress,

1984), pp. 31-32. In contrast,

benign unipolarity merges

not

from he hegemon's mposition

oforder, ut throughnegotiation

between the core

and its

surroundingperiphery.

he result s

a hierarchical rder that s more

multilateral n spirit nd practice han

that

envisaged

in

hegemonic tability heory. urthermore,

order emerges through

the

withholding

of

power

as well as its

application.

In

this

sense,

and

contrary o hegemonic tability heory, weaker core and one that xercises elf-restraintill lead

to

a more

cohesive

and durable

regional

formation

han will a

stronger

nd

domineering

ne. The

less preponderant nd the more benign the core, the more t relieson bargains to establishorder

and the

ess fearful maller states are

of

exploitation esulting

rom

gross power asymmetries.

The differences etween hegemony nd benign unipolarity elp resolve

a long-standing uzzle:

why regional

nstitutions

n

Europe

are

far

more

developed

than n North

America or East Asia.

If

power asymmetry

lone were the main determinant

f

institutionalized egional order, the

reverse should be true. The United States and Japan have been more preponderant

n

their

respective egions

than has

been eitherGermany

or the Franco-German oalition.For measures of

the

relativepreponderance

of the United

States,Japan,

nd Germany

n

theirrespectiveregions,

see Josteph rieco, Systemic

Sources of Variation

n

Regional

Institutionalization

n

Western

Europe, East Asia,

and

the Americas,

n

Mansfield nd Milner,

hePolitical conomy fRegionalism,

pp. 173-175.

The notionof benign unipolarity xplains why regionalism n Europe is the most advanced.

Europe's less stark symmetries ngender greater eliance

on

consensual

governance. f Europe is

to construct

nipolarity,

t must

do so

throughnegotiation

between core and periphery.North

America's unipolarity omes without trying ecause of U.S. preponderance.

As a result, nstitu-

tionalized governance s emerging nly gradually, s the United Statesrecognizes the advantages

associated

with

withholding ower

and

playing by

the rules of

multilateralism.

n

Asia as well, a

combination

of

starkasymmetries

nd fear about whether

the core

will

exercise ts power

in

a

benign

manner

has

inhibited he

emergence

of nstitutionalized

egional

order.Power asymmetry

must

be pronounced enough

to establish

hierarchy,

ut not so pronounced that it inhibits a

consensual regional

formation. or a similar

argument

bout the extent o whichless hegemony

may produce more regionalism, ee Donald Crone, Does HegemonyMatter?The Reorganization

of

the

PacificPolitical

Economy,

World

olitics,

Vol.

45,

No.

4

(July

993), pp. 501-525.

17.

I

include

both forms

f

power

constraint

n

the notion

of

self-bindingntroduced bove. Daniel

Deudney and John kenberry se the term co-binding to refer xclusively to externalpower-

constraintdevices

in

which

states

bind one another.

See

Deudney

and

Ikenberry,

Structural

Liberalism: The Nature

and

Sources

of Postwar

Western

Political

Order,

Review

of

nternational

Studies

forthcoming).

18. The

power-constraint

evices thatmoderate external elations

mong

EU

members re not as

robust as

those that

govern

nternal

politics

within

the United

States,

but

they

are based

on

the

same

underlying ogic. Indeed,

were

European integration

o

deepen considerably

n

the

years

ahead and lead to

a

federal

union,

the

power-constraint

evices

that now

operate among its




These power-checkingdevices endow contemporary

nipolar

formations

with

quite differentttributes han theirhistorical

ntecedents-empires. To-

day's cores

will

exercise nfluence ver theirperipheries hroughmore subtle

and less coercive

means

than n

previous eras.

Multilateral

nstitutions

nd the

indirect

nfluence

f

markets, apital flows,

nd information ave

replaced

the

direct ntrusions f colonial rule. n addition, ores will rely

more on the spread

of shared values and identitiesto facilitategovernance and engender cohe-

sion.19

urthermore, oth core and periphery

will

be morecost-sensitive han

in the past. Consensual participationmeans that the

periphery an exit f t is

no longer reaping benefits r deems that the core is nothonoring ts commit-

ment to self-binding. ore states too

will

be more cost-sensitive han

during

previous eras, tendingto see foreign ommitments s liabilities

rather

han

as

assets.20 his

strategic tinginess

means that

ontemporary

nipolar

formations

will

not fall prey to overextension, s

did

many classical empires.21

On the

contrary, hey

will

be

exclusive groupings of

the

wealthy

and soon-to-be

wealthy. Whereas imperial cores used to extend their reach over far-flung

possessions of littleeconomic

or

strategicvalue, today's have-nots are

likely

simply

to be

ignored.

CONSTRUCTING

POLARITY AND THE

SOURCES

OF STRATEGIC RESTRAINT

The notion of benign unipolarity requires two conceptual amendments

to

conventional ccounts of

polarity

nd structure. he first tems from he claim

that

polarity can be willfullyconstructedrather

than

being

an immutable

product of the distribution f power among nation-states.22 o call for the

individual states would be transformed nto constitutional hecks operating within a single,

amalgamated polity

19. See G. John kenberry nd Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and

Hegemonic Power,

nter-

iationalOrganization, ol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-315.

20. Recenthistory as played an important ole n bringing bout this reevaluation f the benefits

of maintaining extensive external commitments.The colonial empires of the early twentieth

century ollapsed

in

partbecause thecores became unable to supportthe

wide

range

of commit-

ments theyhad acquired. So too were both great powers of the late twentieth

entury hastened

by costly nd futile ttempts o maintainorder n theirrespectiveperipheries.

21.

See Paul

M.

Kennedy,

The

Rise and

Fall

of theGreatPowers New

York:Random House, 1987);

Jack nyder,Myths fEmpire Ithaca,

N.Y.:

CornellUniversity ress,

1991); and Charles

A.

Kupchan,

TheVutlnerabilityfEmpire Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1994).

22. A

mildly constructivist erspective nforms he analysis throughout

his article.

A

starting

assumption

s that nternational tructure an be

shaped by

willful

gency

and practice

nd is not

simply

n

immutableproductof the distribution f materialpoweramong

stateunits.

Cooperative

interaction mong statescan shape identities nd interests,

n

turn

reating

hared understandings

of structure hat

diverge

from

raditionalnotions of

self-help

nd competitive narchy. ee Alex-

anderWendt, Anarchy s What StatesMake of t, nternationalr-ganization,

ol.

46,

No.

2

(Spring

1992), pp. 391-425. My analysis differs romWendt's

n

an important espect.

Wendt s a structu-




construction

f

regional unipolarity

ssumes that

agents

have considerable

control

ver structure. his claim does

not

represent

s radical

a

departure

s

it initially ppears. History provides many examples of

willful

processes of

integration nd amalgamation that transformed tructure. he United States

once consisted

of

separate

and

competitive

tate units.

t

became a

single pole

through federation.

About

one

hundred

years later,Germany

overcame its

multipolarity hrough ts own process of unification. urope is now

in

the

midst of a similartransformation.

t

is

not

becoming

a

single pole,

but the

EU

is

endowing Europe

with a

unipolar

structure

hrough

he

establishment

f

a

preponderantFranco-German oalition-what

I

call a pluralisticcore -that

governs

n

a

hub-spoke pattern

ver

its

periphery.23

hese instances

of

geopo-

litical engineering ake time,

but

theyhave succeeded in producing structural

transformation.

The second conceptual amendment stems fromthe claim thatpoles have

character

and that the manner

in

which

they

exercise their

power shapes

relationswiththeir maller neighbors s well as withotherpoles. The attrib-

utes

of international

tructure re determined

by polarity,

ut

also

by

the

character

f

the

poles. Self-regarding

nd

competitive

ehavior s

not endemic.

Indeed, my analysis rests on the

claim

that strategic estraint nd the

with-

holding of power are becoming embedded features f contemporary nterna-

tional politics. Because

a core's

willingness

to

engage

in

self-binding, ot ust

its preponderance, s central

o

the peace-causing effects

f

benign unipolarity,

justifying

his

claim is

necessary

to

complete

the

logical

foundation of

my

argument.

Core states are exercising their power in a more benign fashion than in

previous historical ras forfivemain reasons.24 irst, hanges

n

the sources of

ralist nd takes sovereign tates

to be the

key

unit of

analysis. nteraction etween states can alter

how statesunderstand heattributesf a given structure,utpracticedoes not change structure-

as definedby the distribution f materialpower.

In

contrast, am arguingthatcertain tates-

France and Germany are prime examples-engage

in

practices that pool sovereignty nd,

in

so

doing,

transform he units that constitute

tructure,

ot

ust

the attributes f a

given

structure.

23. AlthoughFrance and Germanymaintain eparate national governments nd capitals,they re

engaging

n

practices jointdecisionmaking, single

market nd

currency,

nd

jointmilitary orces)

that

pool sovereignty, ive

the

coalition attributes

f

unitarygovernance,

nd therefore ndow it

withaspects of constituting single pole. I am relying n the notionof a pluralistic ore to capture

the

type

of

political

unit

represented y the

Franco-German

oalition.

24. An

intellectual ension dmittedly xistsbetween my claim

that

trategic estraint

s

becoming

an embedded feature f nternational olitics

nd

my nsistence

n

the

need for

tructural ources

of

stability.Why bother

with

constructing

rder based on structural

ierarchy

f

the exercise of

strategic

estraint

ill

itselfmoderate

competition?

tructural ources of

stability

ortwo

reasons

remain mportant

ven

in

a

world

of

benign

states.

First, lthough benign great powers

refrain



After ax

Americana 51

state power have diminished the returns o predatorybehavior. Technology,

information,nd productivity ave replaced land and labor as the key deter-

minants of wealth, making trade and investment ar more effective ools of

statecrafthan territorialonquest.25Nuclear weapons and the proliferation

f

sophisticated onventionalweapons also make conquest more difficult.

iber-

ating wealth creation from questions of territorial ontrol enables core and

periphery o pursue joint gains through ooperative strategiesmore regularly

than

during previous eras. In addition, economic and technological ransfor-

mation gives core states considerable nfluence ver their maller neighbors.26

In sum, core states can get what they want and thinkthey deserve without

resorting o overt forms f coercion.

Second, changesin prevailing nternational orms encourage benign behav-

ior.Were a regionalpower to attempt o coerce ts neighbors nto a hierarchical

order,

both

its victims

nd

extraregional tates would resist.So too might

ts

own

population oppose

such

coercive

behavior. Order that

emerges through

consensus is thus likely to be cheaper and more durable than order that

emerges through

coercion.

Accordingly, ores face normative-and,

conse-

from redatory ehavior, hey tillexpect the advantages, nfluence, nd prestige hat accompany

superiority. o take seriouslythe notion of carvingout nonanarchic pace does not mean denying

that power still matters great deal. Germany, or xample, exercises elf-restraintn Europe and

works hard to embed the national state n a supranationalpolitical pace, but nonetheless xpects

to be the EU's most influential ctor.To pretendotherwise nd resist he hierarchy hat devolves

frompower asymmetrieswould only alienate major states and provide incentivesfor them to

diverge from enign behavior.Second, structural ources of stability rovide nsurance gainst the

breakdown of unit-level ources that are more prone to unforeseen hock and rapid change. The

Concert

of

Europe, for xample, functioned moothly s long as the governing egimes

n

its five

members adhered to agreed norms of behavior. The revolutionsof 1848, however, ed to wide-

spread domesticupheavals thatunderminedtheConcert, apidly bringing ompetitive alancing

back

to

a multipolarEurope. Had structural ources of stability lso been operative, European

peace may well have weathered the unit-level hanges that caused the Concert to unravel. See

Charles

A.

Kupchan and

CliffordA.

Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security,

nd the Future of

Europe, Internationalecurity, ol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161. On the revolutions

f

1848and the end of the Concert, ee pp. 142-143,n. 81.

25. See,

for

xample, Rosecrance,The Rise of

the

Trading tate; nd Van Evera, Primed

for

Peace,

pp. 14-16. For a contrary iew arguing thatconquest stillpays in the contemporary ra, see Peter

Liberman,Does Conquest ay? (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1996).For a critiqueof

Liberman's arguments, ee Charles Kupchan's review of his book

in American

olitical

Science

Review, ol. 91,No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 1008-1009.

26. Consider the effect f preparations for monetary union on the political economies of EU

member states or the extent

to

which the international ommunity's ntervention

n the Asian

economic crisis

has affected omestic politics

and

business practices

n

the region.

n

addition,

peripheral

states

usually

need to meet certain

political criteria

o

gain

access to

contemporary

regional formations,nducing them to carryout domestic reforms. onsider the powerful effect

that prospectivemembership

n

the EU and

NATO

has had on

reform

n

Central Europe.




quently, nstrumental-incentives

o

self-bind ven when preponderancepro-

vides them the option of resorting o coercive

behavior.

Third, the spread of democracy makes more likely the benign exercise of

power. Cores ruled by democraticregimes tend

to

pursue

moderate

foreign

policies

toward other democracies

for

both

institutional nd normativerea-

sons.

On the nstitutional

ide,

the checks and balances associated withdemoc-

racy constrain he conduct of foreignpolicy and limitthe resourcesthat the

state allocates

to

foreign engagement. Open

debate also

tends to

produce

centrist

olicies.

On the normative

ide,

democracies

develop

a mutual

respect

based on

their hared commitment o

the

rule

of law and

consensual

politics.

Conflictsof interestbetween them are therefore ettled through peaceful

means.27 n addition, common domestic norms nurture a shared sense of

community, elping

to

forge

transnational

pace

in

which the rules

of

self-

help competitionno longer apply.

Fourth, ngoing processes of integration re normalizing nd institutional-

izing self-binding ractices.Forexample, pluralistic ores coresthatconsistof

more

than one

state) produce

an intrinsic

inding

effect

hat

extends nto the

core's

relationship

with

ts

periphery. ustaining

the coherence of the

Franco-

German coalition

requires bargaining

and self-limitation

n

behalf

of both

parties,

which

n turn

moderate the nfluence

hat

he coalition

wields

over the

periphery.

The

EU

as

a

whole,

because

it

institutionalizes

ower-constraint

devices

internationallyust

as

a

constitution

oes

so

domestically,

nd be-

cause

it

promotes regionwide

nterests nd

identities,

einforces

elf-binding

practices.

Fifth,manyofthe world's leading regional powers have undergone moder-

ating social transformations.

he

political and social legacy of WorldWar II

reinforces

elf-binding

n

Germany

and

Japan. Societal aversion to war and a

commitment

o

wielding

nfluence

hrough ther hanmilitarymeans continue

to

limit

the scope

of external mbition n

both countries.28 ven

in

the United

States,

whose

territory

as not been

subjected

to the

devastation

of

war since

the

nineteenth entury,

version to the use of force

nd the potential oss of

life

runs strong.29

27. See Russett,

Grasping

heDemocratic

eace; and Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics.

28. See PeterJ.

Katzenstein,

CulturalNorms nd National

Security: olice and Militaryn

Postwar

Japan Ithaca,

N.Y.:

Cornell University ress, 1996); and Thomas U.

Berger, Norms,

Identity,

nd

National Security, n

PeterJ.Katzenstein, d.,

The Culture

fNationalSecurity: orms nd

Identity

in World oliticsNew York: Columbia

University ress,1996), pp. 317-356.

29. JohnMueller argues

in

Retreat rom oomsday hat this social transformationas

been

driven

by moral change;

war has become unthinkable. dward Luttwak blames declining

birthrates nd




RELATIONS BETWEEN BENIGN POLES

Even if benign unipolaritypromotes regional

order in the manner outlined

above, theformation f unipolar regionswould be undesirable

f the resultant

blocs ended up in a security

ompetitionwithone another.My prescription

would then constitute recipe for triggering

onflict mong regional behe-

moths, not for securingglobal stability. or four

reasons,

however,

benign

unipolaritywould make for more peaceful relationsnot just within regions,

but also between them.

First, recisely ecause benign unipolar formations

re instruments or

man-

aging rather than accumulatingpower, they

would dampen, not stimulate,

interregional ivalry. he

self-binding nd consensual

bargaining hat

onstrain

the exercise of power

within regions would also operate between regions;

power

that

s checked

at

the regional level

will

be

similarly

hecked

at the

extraregional evel. Benign regional formations

y theirverynature

turn heir

energies inward ratherthan outward, seeking

to hold power

at

bay,

not to

project t. The European Union provides an excellent llustration. he EU is

often riticized or

ts failure o forge commondefensepolicy

and

its

unwill-

ingness to assume a greater

defense role beyond its boundaries,

but thepur-

pose

of the EU

is

tomanage power within,

not

outside, Europe.

Accordingly,

it

has been designed

with

a host

of

checks

and balances

that moderate com-

petitive

behavior among

its members and

that

constrain

ts

ability

to

project

power externally.

hat

the

EU

is

inwardly

focused s evidence that

ts

experi-

ment n geopolitical

engineering

s

working

well. Consensual unipolar

forma-

tions are-and would be seen by actors

in

other regions as-providers

of

security nd stability, otblocs withpredatory ntent.30

Second, interregional elations

would benefit rom

he

deeper intraregional

integration ssociated

with benign unipolarity.Relations

between

regions

would be moderated because

relations

within hemwould be

cooperative

and

consensual. Consider

the cases

of

Europe

and

East Asia.


has to some extent come at

the

expense

of Europe's

external

ties,31

ut

the

the resultant

eluctance o lose children

n

battle s a major

factor

hanging

ttitudes oward war.

See Luttwak Where Are

the Great Powers? ForeignAffairs,

ol. 73,

No. 4 (July/August 994),

pp. 23-28.

30. Compare

Russia's indifference

oward the prospect fEU enlargement

o ts staunch

opposition

to NATO enlargement. espite

the aggregateeconomicand

military ower of

EU member tates,

Russia sees

the EU as a benign formation hat

does not threaten

ts security.How regional

groupingsperceive

the character

f each other'spower

will

be

farmore mportant

han

capability

itself n determining

he tenorof nterregional

elations.

31. The Common Agricultural

olicy and othertariff nd nontariff

arriershave discriminated

against extraregional

tates,but they have been

central

to

the

political deals struck n orderto



Internationalecurity

3:2 | 54

internalpeace and stability hat ntegration as engenderedhave contributed

to Europe's abilityto sustain cooperative relations

withoutside powers. As a

result, Europe is set to enjoy internal stability nd hence cordial external

relations ven as the

United States retracts

he

protective

mbrella

that

nitially

made possible European integration.

n

contrast,East Asia

has

been well

integrated nto the global economy,

but in

a way that has stunted ts own

political ntegration. ngoing intraregional ivalries

nd

competitive ockeying

complicate

ts relations

with

outside

powers.

Absent America'sprotective

m-

brella, these rivalries

would

likely ntensify,mbroiling

East Asia in conflict

and

jeopardizing

ts

engagement

with

other

regions.

Puttingregional ntegra-

tion beforeglobal integration

will

help construct enign

unipolarity n each of

the

world's

three

main areas

of

military

nd industrial

power,

in turn

aying

the

groundwork

for

peaceful nterregional

elations.32

Third, the constraints

n

political centralization

nherent n a unipolar re-

gional formationwould check the concentration f power under a single

authority, ecreasing

the ikelihoodthat t would evolve intoa unitary egional

behemoth.

Benign regional

formations

re

more than

groupings

of

national

stateseach of

which

retains he traditional

rerogatives

f

sovereignty,

ut less

than federations

hat

centralize governance

and sublimate the autonomy of

theirconstituent nits.

And

although these formations

ave a nascent social

character that is rooted

in

a sense

of

community

nd

shared identity, his

deepen integration nd create a

unipolar

structure.

ntraregional rade as a percentage

of

total

trade

s

higher

n

Europe

than n North

America and East Asia.

As

of 1990,

ntraregional xports

as a percentage ftotalexports tood at roughly 0 percentforEurope and roughly 0 percentfor

North America and East Asia. See

Grieco, Systemic Sources

of

Variation, p. 172. Interestingly,

the United States during the earlypost-WorldWar

I

years did not object to

European protection-

ism, preciselybecause Washington

ppreciated the geopolitical significance ffostering egional

integration. ee Frankel,Regional

Trading locs,p.

5.

32. My argument estson theassumption that an increase n commercial ivalry

etween regions

would not result n security

ompetition.This assumption

in turn

rests on the

hypothesis

that

commercial ivalries ecome

security ivalries nly

when for

therreasons thepartiescome to see

each other as

geopolitical

rivals. For

example, economic competitionbetween Britain and the

United

States could

today

lead to a

security

dilemma

only

if for

reasons other than commercial

rivalry he two partiesno longerheld

benign images

of

each other.

A

perceptionof threat nd

malign ntent s necessary o transform

conomic competition nto strategic ivalry. ow commer-

cial

rivalries volve

into violent conflict as received

nsufficientttention

n

the

scholarly itera-

ture.Forthoughtful nalysis of one case study and initialhypotheses, ee JackLevy and Salvatore

Ali, From CommercialCompetition o

StrategicRivalry o War: The Rise ofAnglo-DutchRivalry,

1609-1652,

n

Paul Diehl, ed., TheDynamics fEnduring ivalriesChampaign:

University f llinois

Press, 1988), pp. 29-63. The argument hat

benign

states tend to

pursue absolute,

as opposed to

relative,

ains

with

each other

s of direct

relevance here.

See

Duncan

Snidal,

Relative Gains and

the Pattern

f

nternational ooperation, American

olitical cience

Reviezv,ol. 85,No.

3

(Septem-

ber 1991), pp.

701-726.




identity oexists with distinct

ultural and linguisticdifferences hat serve as

barriers o centralization nd thetransfer f political oyalties to an authority

beyond the nation-state.33ven as regionsevolve into unipolar structures,hey

are not likely to amalgamate into

single poles of power under a central

authority.34

Finally, onsensual regional

formations re unlikely o evolve into predatory

behemoths because they would

unravel fromwithin f they sought to do so.

For reasons just outlined, the

separate national units in regional formations

will

retain a significant egree of

autonomy and will not amalgamate into a

unitary ederal tructure. ccordingly,

f core statewere to develop predatory

ambition and

pursue aggressivebehavior, ts immediate neighborswould

be

the most threatened.The pursuit of such ambition and the explicit massing

of

power

it

would entail would thus constitute violation of the consensual

bargain

at

the heart of benign

unipolarity.Were France,

for

example,

to

act

upon its rhetoricand seek to turn

the

EU

into a global imperial power,

Germany tself nd France's smallerneighborswould be thefirst o resist.The

return f geopolitical ambition to Europe would therefore e far more likely

to trigger ntra-European alancing and

the end of the Franco-German oali-

tion than

it

would the emergence

of

the EU

as

a

global power. Regional

multipolarity, ot an aggressiveregional unipole, would be the result.

The

Rise

ofBenign nipolarityn North

merica,urope,

and EastAsia

My aim in this section s to demonstrate hat benign unipolarity s not ust a

theoretical

construct,

but a

geopolitical

formation hat holds considerable

promise

of

becoming a reality. provide evidence thatbenign unipolar regions

are

in

fact

taking shape

and

are

having

a

powerful mpact

on

the

emerging

international rder.

33. For discussion of ascriptive, inguistic, nd cultural barriers to amalgamation, see Ernest

Gellner,

Nations

nd

NationalismIthaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1983), pp. 64-73.

34. As Fareed Zakaria has recentlydocumented, the United States did not pursue ambitious

external policies until the locus of authority hifted from the individual states to the federal

government nd fromCongress to the executive branch. See Zakaria, From Wealth

o Power:The

Unusual Origins f America'sWorldRole (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1998). Even

though regional blocs would contain enormous power capabilities, their decentralized nature

would limit heir bility o projectpower externally.n this respect, he federal spirations oming

from some quarters in Europe~ hould be discouraged because their fulfillment ould trigger

external mbition nd foster nterregional ecurity ompetition.




NORTH

AMERICA

North

America has

enjoyed

a

relatively eacefulcentury

nd has

been

spared

the greathegemonicwars

that ost so

many

ives

in

Europe and East Asia. The

reason is straightforward:

orth America

has been

unipolar.

ts

major states

have not fought for supremacybecause American

preponderance naturally

establishes regional

hierarchy.

he United Stateshas

throughout

he

century

enjoyed

an

uncontested dvantage

in

economic and

military ower. Today

U.S.

gross domestic product

(GDP) is eight times that of Canada

and

Mexico

combined,

while U.S.

military xpenditure

s

twenty-seven

imes

hatof

ts

two

neighbors.35

Mexico

and

Canada

send some 70

percent

of their

xports

to the

United

States,

while

the United States sends

in

return

nly

25

percent

of its

exports.36

he

power

of the U.S. market nd

the

threat r

reality

of

military

intervention ave long

ensured thatNorth America,

Central America, nd the

Caribbean

fall

within

America's

sphere

of

military

nd economic dominance.37

That unipolarity omes

so easilyto NorthAmericahas

in

factworked against

the establishment f more formal nstitutions f regionalgovernance. nstead,

U.S.

preponderance

creates

a de

facto core

and a

surroundingperiphery.

A

hub-spoke patternof intraregional elationshas evolved

largely throughthe

operation

of the market nd America's unilateral

fforts-including

irect nd

indirectmilitary ntervention-to

create a security nvironment o its liking.38

Since

the

mid-1980s,

rder based on de facto

power asymmetries

as

given

way to a regional formation xhibiting

he de

jure

characteristics f benign

unipolarity.39he North

AmericanFree Trade

Agreement

NAFTA) institution-

alized a

regional

order based

on

consensual bargaining between core and

35. International nstitutefor StrategicStudies (IISS), The MilitaryBalance, 1997-1998 (London:

OxfordUniversity ress, 1997), pp. 18, 37,

221. In

1990 U.S.

GDP

was fivetimesthatofall of Latin

America combined. See Peter Smith,Talons f theEagle: Dynamics f

U.S.-Latin

American

elations

(New York: OxfordUniversity ress, 1996), p.

224.

36.

Andrew Wyatt-Walter,Regionalism,Globalization, and

World

Economic Order,

n

Fawcett

and

Hurrell,Regionalistn

n World

olitics, .

101.

37. For a succinct verview of the history f American nvolvement n Central nd South

America,

see

Smith,

Talons

f

the

Eagle.

38. Steady increases n intraregional lows of trade and investmentwere largely

market-driven,

with nstitutions ollowingfrom nd not preceding high evels of economic nterdependence.

ee

Albert Fishlow and Stephan Haggard, The United States and the Regionalization of the

World

Economy (Paris: Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development, 1992), pp. 17,32.

39. The United States to some degree engaged in the quantitative nd qualitative components

of

self-binding

well beforethe 1980s. Had

it

not,

ts

preponderance

would

likely

have

triggered

ar

more

balancing

in

the

periphery.

t

was not until the

1980s, however,

that

the United States

also

began

to

practice procedural self-binding-that s,

to

prefer

multilateral o unilateral nitiative.

American power was thus exercised

n

a relatively enign manner with some notableexceptions)

well before

he

1980s,

but

became

more

benign

with the

shift oward regional multilateralism.



After

ax

Americana 57

periphery

nd a

new American

willingness

o

subjectthe exerciseof ts

power

to a multilateral

ramework.40he original dea

for, nd impetus behind, the

agreement

ame from

Canada and Mexico.

Both

countries ould do

nothing

o

change the

asymmetriesn their

relationshipwiththe United

States,but they

could make a deal to

subject U.S.

policy to the constraints f a

multilateral

framework.As Stephan

Haggard and Albert

Fishlow put it,

NAFTA reflected

the effortsy weakercountries obind the UnitedStates to clear

rules. '41 he

agreement

n

many

respectsrepresents he

periphery'sdecision

to

structure

and control

de facto

power asymmetries y

design, ratherthan to let them

operate by default.42

The United States was

attracted o the deal in part

foreconomic

reasons:

to

gain marketaccess and

cheaper labor and to use

the threat

of

hemispheric

regionalism

o

encourage

Japan

and

Europe

to

move

forward n

the

Uruguay

Round trade

negotiations.43 ashington lso

used

NAFTA to

pursue

a

host of

order-relatedbjectives.NAFTA was to

lock

in

political

and economic reforms

inMexico,strengtheniberal politicalforces ywidening themiddle class, and

attract

oreign apital

to

Mexico, which would bolster

the economy

and

pro-

mote

politicalstability.44

conomic growth nd political reform

would in turn

help

stem

the tide

of

illegal immigration

nd

facilitate

fforts

o limit

drug

trafficking.he

agreement lso contains

measures for environmental

leanup

and

protection.

The

United States was thususing a

host of subtle formsof

penetration o

promote

stability n its periphery.45

ooking outward from he

core,

NAFTA

40. For discussion of the

evolution of consensual

strains

n U.S.

policy,

ee

Augusto

Varas,

From

Coercionto

Partnership:

A

New Paradigm for

Security

Cooperation n

the

Western

Hemisphere,

in

Jonathan

Hartlyn,

Lars

Schoultz,

and

Augusto Varas, eds.,

The

Unlited

tates nd

Latin

Amnerica

in the

990s: Beyond heCold

War Chapel Hill:

University fNorthCarolina

Press, 1993), pp. 46-63.

41.

Fishlow

and

Haggard, The

United States

and

the

Regionalization of the World

Economy,

pp. 8,

23.

42.

Canada

and

Mexico have not

always

dealt

with U.S.

preponderance

by willingly

ubmitting

to

American power and seeking

to modify tsconduct.

During

the

Cold

War,

n

part

because

U.S.

attention nd power were

concentrated

lsewhere,Canada in

particular ttempted omix

balanc-

ing and

bandwagoningand to

resistU.S. influence

y developing linkages

to extraregional tates

and

multilateral orums.NAFTA

represents considered

shift o

a

policy

of

bandwagoning

in

which

both Canada and

Mexico have decided

to seek

leverage over U.S. power rather han

to

resist t. See AndrewHurrell, Regionalism n theAmericas, n Fawcett and Hurrell,Regionialism

in

Wor-ld

olitics, p.

269-273.

43.

Wyatt-Walter,

Regionalism,Globalization, nd

WorldEconomic Order,

p.

85.

44.

For

a

concise summary of the

motivationsbehind

NAFTA,

see

Hurrell, Regionalism

n the

Americas, pp. 269-273; and

Smith,Talons f theEagle,pp.

245-260.

45.

The Clinton

administration'sescue of the

plunging peso in 1994-95,

forexample,resulted n

an

extraordinary

egree ofAmerican

nterventionn the Mexican

economy.

n

return orU.S. and




representedmuch more than a trade agreementand was

to

a

considerable

extent vehicle

for

recastingMexico's political economy

n America's

image.

As Andrew Hurrell remarks, nstitutionalized egionalism

n North

America

is

part

of a broader

rethinking

f relations

.

.

which has

important trategic

and

geopolitical mplications. 46

n

effect,

AFTA resulted

from

deal struck

between a periphery ooking to tame and moderatethe behavior

of

the core

and a core ookingtoenhance tsability o shape regionalorder.47 nd despite

the core's reluctance to extend this bargain further

outh-Congress

denied

President

Bill Clinton fast-track

egotiating uthority

n

1997-other states

n

the Americas

are

pressing

for

entry

nto the club.

EUROPE

Europe has long suffered

he

effects f multipolarity.

he

Napoleonic

Wars,

he

Crimean

War, he

wars

of

German

unification,

nd

the

two

world wars

are

all

testimony

o

the destructivepotential

of

rivalry mong proximatepoles

of

power.Since 1945Europe has pursued a novel solution to its structural nsta-

bility:replacing multipolarity

with

unipolarity.

Most

Europeans would object

to the notion that the EU

is

an instrument or endowingEurope withunipo-

larity; onventionalwisdom holds that ntegration s meant

to banish power

politics

fromthe

continent,

ot recast

t.

Nevertheless,


has

from

he outset

had

potent geopolitical objectives.

n the words of

Robert

Schuman,

a

founding

ather

f

European integration,

Because

Europe

was

not

united, we have had war.... The action to be takenmust

first f all concern

France and

Germany.

his

proposal [for coal and steel

community]will create

thefirst oncretefoundationfor European federationwhich is so indispens-

able for the

preservation

of

peace. 48 Europe's smallerpowers came to wel-

International

MonetaryFund assistance,Mexico was obligated to deposit its oil export

revenue at

the Federal Reserve

Bank of New York and to introduce stabilizationplan that

covered fiscal

and monetary

olicy,banking reform, nd social

programs.

46.

Hurrell, Regionalism

n the

Americas, p. 272.

47. Regionalism n

North America lacks the explicit dentity-buildinggenda found in

Europe.

The scope and character f Americanpreponderance n

part explains why. n light f thepowerful

cultural magnetism

of

the

United States, asserting distinctive

dentity nd preserving ultural

autonomyremain

ssues of considerablepolitical aliency nboth Canada and Mexico.

Despite the

fearof America's cultural mperialism nd theabsence of more overt dentity-buildingnstru-

ments, urveydata

reveal that he attitudes fAmericans,Mexicans, nd Canadians are

converging

around

a

set of core values. See Ronald

L.

Inglehart,Neil

Nevitte,

nd

Miguel Basanfez,

he North

American

rajectory:ultural, coniomic,

nd

Political

Ties

mong

he

United

tates, anada,

nd Mexico

(New York:Aldine de

Gruyter, 996).

48.

Schuman

quoted

in

Gregory Treverton, merica,

ermany,

nd the

uture

fEuropePrinceton,

N.J.:Princeton

University ress, 1992), p.

104. Even scholars who have

focused

primarily

n the

economicimplicationsof the EU acknowledge that

the overridingmotivation ehind

the foun-



After

ax

Americana 59

come

this

effort o renderbenign the

continent's ower center, ven

if

partici-

pation in

Europe meant entering regional

order craftedprincipallyby the

Franco-German

oalition.

The United Statesplayed a central ole in

enabling Europe to

pursue unipo-

larity.America'smilitary resence

essentially ook securityssues off he Euro-

pean agenda, buying time for

economic and political ntegration o

proceed.49

The process of integrationhas produced an effective nipolarity that has

succeeded not only in

eliminating ompetitive alancing

among Europe's ma-

jor

powers; the EU also exerts powerful

entripetal orce

cross the continent,

with most currentmembers ager to

participate n the nnercircleof monetary

union and many ofEurope's new

democracies waiting mpatiently or dmis-

sion

to

the

club.

Constructed,

s

opposed to

natural,unipolarity,

nd a

pluralistic

ather han

an

amalgamated core, endow Europe

with a center that has

quite different

attributes han that of North America.

Although more unwieldy than an

amalgamated core, a pluralistic ore encourages consensual formsof politics

because the

pulling

and

hauling

of

coalition

management

act as

an

internal

check and

make negotiation nd

compromise centralfeature

f

governance.

Compromise

within

the core

encourages

compromise

between the core

and

the

periphery. ore

self-binding

s

also far moredeeply

ingrained

n

societal

attitudes n

Germanythan

it

is in

the United

States.

Germany

s as

averse

to

unilateral

ction as

theUnited States s fond of t. A

large part

of

the reason is

the extent

o

which

Germanyhas come

to

equate its own interestsnd

identity

with

those of a

broader

European

construction.

n

the words of

Peter Katzen-

stein,German interests, ursued through ower and bargaining,werefunda-

mentally haped by the institutional

ontext f Europe and the

Europeaniza-

tion

of

the

identity

f

the German state. 50

The

power asymmetry etween core and

periphery

n

Europe

is

also less

stark

than

it is

in North America.

The GDP

of

the Franco-German

oalition s

about 80

percent

of the

GDP

of all

other EU members combined.

Franco-

German defense

spending represents

oughly

85

percent

of

that of

all

other

dation of the European Economic

Communitywas to bind Germany o France so that here

would

never be a repeat of the threewars that heyhad fought ver the precedingcentury. ee Frankel,

Regional

Trading

locs,p. 241.

49.

Some analysts contend

that

theprocess of integration emains dependent on

a

U.S. presence

and

that the

EU

would

be

unable to sustain its political coherence were America's strategic ole

on the continent o wane. See

Joseph

Joffe,Europe's American Pacifier, oreign olicy,No. 54

(Spring 1984), pp. 64-82; and Robert

Art, Why WesternEurope Needs the United States and

NATO, Political cienceQuarterly, ol. 111,No.

1

(Spring 1996), pp. 1-39.

50. Katzenstein, United Germany n

an Integrating urope, p. 15.




EU members

ombined.51

Furthermore,symmetries n defense capability re

temperedby Germany'scontinued reluctance

o

assume defense responsibili-

ties commensuratewith its size because

of

the legacy of

World War II

and

because America's presence

n

Europe

obviates

the

need for

greaterGerman

role. Again, ess stark symmetry

orks

to

the

advantage

of

regional

cohesion.

The core does not have sufficient reponderance orelyon unilateral nitiative

and thus depends more heavilyon compromisewiththe periphery,n turn ein-

forcing he consensual bargain at the heartof Europe's constructed nipolarity.

Europe's unipolar structures reflectedn its patterns

f

governance.Despite

formal nstitutions

hat

seek

to

diffuse

uthority

cross

member

states,

most

decisions withinthe EU arise

from

agreementsstruckbetween France and

Germany.

The union's

major

initiatives-the

single market,monetaryunion,

and enlargement-have

emanated

primarily

romParis and

Bonn,

not from

other European capitals

or from

the

EU

bureaucracy

n

Brussels.52

his

core

draws the periphery owardthecenter hrough oth nducement therewards

ofinclusion)and threat the punishment fexclusion).

The prospect

of material

gain

has

ostensibly

een the EU's

drivingforce,

ut

geopolitical objectives

ie

just

beneath

the surface.

ndeed,

the evolution

of

the

EU is to a large extent he story f consensual bargaining mong member tates

over the construction

f

benign unipolarity.

onstitutionalized

elf-binding

n

Germany,

he checks

and

balances

intrinsic o the

Franco-German

oalition,

he

institutional iffusion f power across member states-these are

all

mecha-

nisnts

that

serve

to mix

empowerment

nd

disempowerment,

o

create order

throughpower asymmetry,

ut also

through

he core's

willingness

to

reduce

the benefits fpreponderanceand engage in consensual bargaining.

European monetary

nion

(EMU)

is

only

the most

recent

xample. Germany

will

voluntarily

ind

its

power by handing

over

control

f

ts

monetary olicy

to

a

supranational uthority

hat

governs through

onsensus and that s

politi-

cally ndependent.53

ther

European

states will

have

greater nput

nto

mone-

tary ssues,

and the

euro,

not the

deutsche

mark,

will

be

Europe's

dominant

51. IISS, TheMilitary alance, 997-1998,pp. 46-100.

52. Katzenstein, United Germany n an Integrating urope, pp. 26-27, 42-43. On decisionmak-

ing and the evolutionof EU institutions,ee RobertKeohane

and

StanleyHoffmann, ds.,

The

New

European onmmunity:ecisionmakingnd nstitutionalhange Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1991);

Alberta Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics:nstitutionsnd Policymakingn the New EuropeanCommunity

(Washington,

D.C.:

Brookings nstitution, 992);

and Andrew

Moravcsik, ed.,

Centralization

r

Fragmentation?: urope before he Challenges f Deepening,Diversity, nd Democracy New

York:

Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998).

53.

On European monetary union,

see

Peter

Kenen,

Economic

nd

Monetary

Union

in

Europe

(Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge University ress, 1995);

and

BarryEichengreen nd Jeffreyrieden,

eds., The Political conomy fEuropeanMonetary nificationBoulder,

Colo.:

Westview Press,1994).



After

ax Americana

61

currency. t the same time,however,

Germany s effectivelyxporting ts own

monetary policy to its neighbors;

ultimately, he EU will have a political

economy

crafted

n

Germany's mage.Moreover,

he

primary mpetus behind

EMU came not fromministries f

financeor firms oing business in Europe,

but from oliticians oncerned bout

the geopolitical tructure f Europe. EMU

is first nd foremost bout

embedding the German state inside a broader

Europe and preventing the returnof national rivalries, not about wealth

creation. As Chancellor Helmut

Kohl has stated, In reality, he policy of

European integration omes down to

the question of whetherwe have war or

peace

in

the

twenty-firstentury. 54

lthoughthe economic benefits o smaller

powers remain unclear,they play along because the deal deepens a unipolar

structure hat

moderates and renders more

benign the behavior

of

Europe's

power

center.55

Europe exhibitsmany of theattributes f a benign unipolar formation. he

core's

nfluence ver

the periphery peratesthrough ormal nstitutions

s

well

as a host of subtle mechanisms-the market, he allure of entry nto Europe's

dominant

political formation, nd

the propagation of a sense

of

community

and common

identity.56

t

the same time, inguistic nd cultural differences

constitute

atural

barriers

o

centralization

nd

political malgamation, eaving

the EU

straddling

the national and

supranational realms. Europe's

core

also

exhibits the

cost

sensitivity

nd

strategic

restraint hat

are

characteristic

f

benign unipolarity. he EU's inability o make progress n forging

common

foreign

nd

security olicy and itsfailed efforts

o

address on its own the

war

in Bosnia

illustrate hat the union suffersmore from the underprovisionof

external ngagement han from heoverprovision nd overcommitmenthar-

acteristic

f

previous

eras.

7

Finally,

he EU

promises

to remain a club

for

the

54.

Helmut

Kohl, speech at the University f Louvain, Belgium,February , 1996, s cited

n

Kohl

Issues New Warning o Britain ver EU Reform, Agence France-Presse, ebruary , 1996. On the

motivations behind monetary union, see also Wayne Sandholtz, Choosing Union: Monetary

Politics and

Maastricht, nternationzalOrganization,

ol.

47,

No. 1

(1993), pp. 1-40;

and

Joseph

Grieco, State Interests nd InternationalRule Trajectories:

A

Neorealist Interpretation f the

Maastricht

Treaty

nd

European Economic and Monetary Union, Security tudies, ol. 5, No.

3

(Spring 1996), pp.

176-222.

55. For an analysis suggesting that poorer economies in Europe's south do not stand to benefit

economicallyfrommonetary nion, see ErikJones, Economic and MonetaryUnion: Playing with

Money, nMoravcsik,CentralizationrFragmentation?;nd Lloyd Gruber, Power Politics nd the

Transformationf European MonetaryRelations, paper presented at the annual meetingof

the

American Political Science Association,San Francisco,August 1996.

56.

The

EU has

deployed a host of community-building echanisms, ncluding flag

and

soon

a

common currency, ultural, ducational, and media programs, nd a European parliament.

57.

The

incorporation f France s partof a pluralistic uropean power center acilitates ermany's

ability o

be an

underprovider f security. ermany nd France have arrived t a division of abor

in which

Bonn serves as the engine behind economic integrationwhile Paris focuses more on



International

ecurity 3:2

| 62

wealthy nd soon-to-be-wealthy,

xcluding the poorer statesto Europe's south

and east.58

EAST ASIA

East Asia today resembles

Europe prior

to its

successful experiment

with

constructedunipolarity.59 uspicion

and

political cleavage

still

characterize

relations among the area's major

powers. Many East Asian states are in the

midstof rapid political nd economic

change,producingdifferencesn domes-

tic structure

nd

wide disparities

n growthrates across the region-the same

volatile

mix that

riggered

war in

Europe twice

this

century.60 keydifference,

however,distinguishes oday's

East Asia from

yesterday's urope:

a

peacetime

American presence.Whereas

Europe fellprey

to

destructive ivalry uring ts

era

of

multipolarity,

merica's

role as

an

extraregional

alancer

keeps

in check

the competitive ockeying

hat

mightotherwise rigger

war

in

East Asia.

Although

America's

presence

in East Asia is

indispensable,

the

particular

nature

of

U.S. engagement

also has

high

costs:

it

impedes

the

intraregional

political-militaryssues.

France's

force-projectionapabilities,

ts

willingness

to use

them,

nd its

nuclear weapons make it well suited to this role. Nevertheless,

rance

demonstratesmore nterest

in flexing ts muscles in former olonial areas

in

the Middle East

and

Africa han

in

working to

deepen the EU's ability o manage security

within

Europe.

The

EU's power

center

hus promises

to continue ts strategic tinginess nd to remainreluctant o take on increased commitments.

ee

Philip

H.

Gordon, Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy,

nternational

ecurity, ol. 22,

No. 3

(Winter 997/98),pp.

74-100.

58. Although the EU

has

formalized ts economic relationship

with

Turkey

nd

has

developed

a

set of informal ies with states

in

North

Africa and the

Middle East, these statesare not likely

candidatesformembership.

59. Japan's economic preponderance

has

in

recent

decades

endowed

Asia with

aspects

of

unipo-

larity. n 1990 Japan's GDP representedover 70 percent of East Asia's total GDP. See Grieco,

Systemic Sources of Variation, p.

174.

Japan's economic preponderance does not, however,

produce effective egional unipolarity orthreereasons. First,Japan

does

not

maintain

military

establishment ommensurate

with ts

economic

capability

nd in fact

huns

regional eadership

n

the securityrealm. It relies almost entirely n the United States to manage regional security.

Second, the legacy of World War

II

and the absence of reconciliationwith former dversaries,

including China,

mean that

Japan

is

not

viewed as

a

benign power

within

the region. Japan's

commitment o self-binding herefore

oes not have the

same reassuring

effect s

Germany's.

Accordingly,were Japan to pursue

a

more ambitious regional role,

its

neighbors would likely

engage

in

balancing

ratherthan

bandwagoning. Third,

China's rise and the absence

of

a Sino-

Japanese coalition ncreasingly

ilute

Japan's

economic

predominance.

On

China's

growing

eco-

nomic power and its effect n regional patterns f nfluence, ee MarkSelden, China, Japan, nd

the Regional Political Economy of

East

Asia, 1945-1995,

n

Katzenstein

and

Shiraishi,

Network

Power, p. 306-340.

60.

For

discussion

of the

potential

ources of

nstability

n East

Asia,

see

Aaron

L.

Friedberg, Ripe

for

Rivalry:Prospects

forPeace

in a

MultipolarAsia,

International

ecurity,

ol.

18,

No.

3

(Winter

1993/94),pp. 5-33;

and RichardK.

Betts, Wealth,Power,

nd

Instability:

ast Asia

and

the United

States

after he Cold

War,

nternational

ecurity,

ol.

18,

No. 3

(Winter 993/94),pp.

34-77.




integration ssential to long-term

tability.American might and diplomacy

prevent conflict,

ut

they do

so

by

keeping apart the parties

that

must

ulti-

mately earn to live comfortably longside each other

f

regional stability

s to

endure.

A

comparisonwithEurope is again

instructive. hroughout

heCold

War,Europe took advantage of the

security rovided by America's protective

umbrella o redress he nstabilityntrinsic

o its multipolar tructure. ermany

addressed its darkerpast and soughtreconciliationwith tsneighbors.Europe

integrated tself nternally t the same

time that it was integrated nto the

Atlantic ommunity.

In contrast, sia has not taken

advantage

of

the peace afforded y America's

presence to pursue its own political

ntegration.61Individual countrieshave

bilateral security lliances with the

United States, but not with each other.62

Indeed, Washingtonhas generally

discouraged regional forums that do not

include the United States. Furthermore,

apan's unwillingnessto

confront ts

behavior during World War

II

and to seek reconciliationwith its former

adversaries continues to stand in the way of more cooperative intraregional

relations. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has formalized an

agenda

for

conomic ntegration

n

theAsia

Pacific

egion,

ut

the driving

orce

behind APEC

is

the United

States, gain making

order n East Asia

dependent

on an extraregional ctor.This arrangement

may be good

for he nternational

economybecause

it

encourages open

trade across

the

Pacific. t

may

also

be

good

for

the United States because

it

enhances American

influence

n

the

Pacificregion. It is bad forEast Asia in

the long run, however, because

it

impedes the consolidation

of a

hierarchical

egionalordercapable of providing

stabilityn the aftermathfAmericanhegemony.63

61. Peter Katzenstein ontendsthatregional ntegrationin Asia has proceeded much further han

meets the eye; the absence of visible forms f nterstate ooperation s in part a product of social

and political norms that favor informalpolitical and economic networks over European-style

institutions.ee Introduction: sian Regionalism n ComparativePerspective, n Katzenstein nd

Shiraishi,Netzvorkouwer, p. 1-44. I agree with Katzenstein hat tate-society elations nd political

norms

in

East Asia are quite different romthose in Europe. Regional integration

n East

Asia

therefore ollows ts own path

and

would likely be less institutionalized han

in

Europe even

if

further long. But I maintain that political ntegration n the region s still at a very ow level in

relative terms, argely because of tensions and rivalries mong East Asia's major states and the

extent o which the United States remains the main conduit forcontact mong them.

62. ASEAN is a clear exception, ut it does not nclude, and indeed was formed n part to balance

against,theregion's major powers.

63. It is of

course impossible to prove

the

counterfactual:

hat

regional ntegration

n East

Asia

would have proceeded much furtherf the United States had not discouraged it and insisted on

creating hub-spoke pattern f relations

with

Washington t

the

center.Available evidence makes

clear,however,

hat American

opposition played

a

significant

ole

in

dissuading Japan

and other

regionalstatesfrompursuing Asia-only multilateral orums.On the evolution of this hub-spoke




If

the benign unipolarity

that

has

brought peace

to North America

and

Europe is to emerge

in East Asia, the region must focus

on

its

own internal

integration, ot

on its integrationnto an American-led

global order.The first

step would be

the consolidationof a Sino-Japanese

coalition.Were a Sino-

Japanese power

center

to

cohere,

t

would

enjoy

uncontested

preponderance

in East Asia. The combined GDP

of China and Japan s today close

to three

timesthatof all otherEast Asian states.Defense expenditures n Japanand

China

amount to

1.4

times

what

other regional

states combined spend

on

defense.64 hese

asymmetries

will

only increase

in

coming years

as Chinese

economic

and

militarygrowth

continues.

Although

a distant

prospect,

the

formation f a pluralisticpower

centerof China and Japan is

the essential

starting oint

for

constructing

stableregionalhierarchy.65

s

long

as balanc-

ing rather hanconsensual bargaining

characterizes

he relationshipbetween

East Asia's two most powerful tates,

cooperativeregional order

will

remain

out of reach.66

Inasmuch as economic ntegrationaid the foundationforEurope's political

integration, ast

Asia is beginning

o head in the rightdirection.

ntraregional

economic

integration

ncreased

dramatically

fter he marked

appreciation

of

the yen nthemid-1980s, iving

rise

to

a hub-spoke

pattern f trade and capital

flows with

Japan

at

the center.67 nlike

in

Europe,

however,political

ntegra-

patternof security elations

nd

Washington's fforts o

maintain t, see Bruce Cumings, Japan

and NortheastAsia into the

Twenty-firstentury, p. 136-168,

and

Susume Yamakage, Japan's

National Security

nd

Asia-Pacific'sRegional

Institutionsn the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 275-305,

both n Katzenstein nd Shiraishi,

Network ower;Frankel,Regional

rading

locs,pp. 266-267; and

Edward Lincoln,Japan'sNewGlobalRole Washington, .C.: Brookings nstitution, 993), pp. 186-

191. For evidence thatfearofU.S. disengagement eads to greater

ooperationbetween Japan and

Korea, see VictorCha, Alignmenet

espiteAntagonism:he

ULited

tates-Korea-Japaniecuirityriangle

(Stanford,

alif.:

StanfordUniversity

ress, forthcoming).

64.

Data from

ISS,

The

Military alance, 997-1998,pp.

173-198. included

in these

comparisons

all Asian members of APEC,

including Australia and New Zealand. Hong Kong's GDP was

counted as part of China's,

while Taiwan's GDP and defensespendingwere included as part of

the aggregate periphery.

65.

I

ask

skeptical

readers to think ack

to 1945 and

question

how

likely

t

then eemed thatFrance

and Germany would form

coalitionthatwould become the core of

a

peaceful

and

integrated

Europe. To be sure, France and

Germanybenefited rom onditionsnot present n Asia: a common

external hreat nd

similar

evels of economic

and

politicaldevelopment.Nevertheless,

s

China

continuesto modernize, ts economy and domestic political

environmentre likely to followthe

same trajectory s other developing states in East Asia. Moreover,as the Concert of Europe

demonstrated, imilarity f domestic regime type

is

not necessary

for great power cooperation.

Britain nd France were developing parliamentarynstitutions,

hile

Prussia, Russia,

and Austria

were

staunch

defenders f monarchy.

66. See

Susan

Shirk,

Asia-PacificRegional Security:

Balance of Power

or

Concert

of

Powers?

in

Lake and Morgan, Regional

Orders, p. 245-270.

67.

On

the

degree

to

which,

and the

mechanisms throughwhich, ntraregional

rade and invest-

ment flows have positioned Japan

at the centerof

a

regionaleconomy, ee Frankel

and

Kahler,




tionhas not followed

fromdeeper economic ntegration.

ncreasing rade and

investmentwithinEast Asia were driven

principally y the

market nd prox-

imity; multilateral

ystem f management APEC) followed from,

ather han

preceded,

de

facto ntegration.68

ome members

of APEC

have

attempted

o

institutionalize he forum

nd to expand thescope of ts dialogue

beyond trade

liberalization o includepolitical and security

ssues,69 ut efforts

o put secu-

ritymatters n itsagenda have thus farbeen futile.The Associationof South-

east

Asian

Nations and

the

ASEAN

Regional Forum

(ARF)

have had

more

success in addressing

security ssues.70They

have, however,focused primarily

on

resolvingdisputes

among Asia's smaller tates nd on pursuing

confidence-

building measures,not

on forging cooperative security egimefor

he region

as a

whole. And the recent economic turmoil in East

Asia has distracted

attention rom

hesecurity genda.

The main obstacle

to

deeper political ntegrations

thatbalancingcontinues

to

predominateover

bandwagoning,

thus

preventing

oth intracore nd core-

peripherycohesion. It is the quality of power, not the quantity, hat is the

problem.The

asymmetries ecessary

o

construct hierarchical rder

exist,

ut

states n the regionare not

yet confident hatpower asymmetries

will

manifest

themselves

in

a

benign

manner and that a

regional order,

f

one were

to

emerge,

would be

consensual. America's

presence

holds

more overt formsof

balancing

and

competition

n

abeyance,

but it

does not

repairpolitical

and

ideological cleavages-a

task only regional

statesthemselves

an

perform.

or

now, historical

memories nd the absence of reconciliation ontinue o

fuel

fear

of a more

assertive

Japan. n addition,

China's

repressiveregime

and confron-

tational rhetoric aise appropriate questions about the purposes to which it

will

put

its

increasing power. Indeed, ASEAN

countries resisted

the

estab-

lishment of APEC and continue to oppose

its institutionalization recisely

Regionalismind Rivalry; nd the

chapters by T.J.Pempel, Takashi Shiraishi,Richard

Doner,

and

Mark Selden in Katzenstein nd

Shiraishi,

Network ower.

68. See RobertGilpin, APEC in a

New International rder, n Donald Hellmann

and Kenneth

Pyle, eds.,

From

APEC

to

Xanadu

(Armonk,N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 30-34. For a thorough

description f APEC, see Yoichi

Funabashi, Asia Pacific usion:Japan'sRole n APEC

(Washington,

D.C.: Institute or nternational

conomics, 1995).

69.

Hadi Soesastro, The Institutional ramework for APEC: An ASEAN

Perspective,

n

Chia

Siow Yue, ed., APEC: Challenges ndOpportunitiesSingapore: nstitute f SoutheastAsian Studies,

1994).

70.

ASEAN foreignministers egan in 1994 to host consultationswith their

ounterparts

rom he

United

States, Japan, Canada, the EU, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand,

Russia, China,

Vietnam,Laos, and Papua New Guinea. This multilateral orumbecame known as the

ARF. India

and Burma

became members

6f

the ARF in 1996. See Yuen Foong Khong,

Evolving Regional

Security nd Economic nstitutions,

outheast sian Affairs995 (Singapore: nstitute fSoutheast

Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 48-60.



Internationalecurity3:2 | 66

because of

fear

that t could become a vehicle

for

East Asia's

dominant

powers

to impose a regional order

of theirown making.71

Peace within enign

UnipolarRegions

Benign unipolarity

s

in

the midst of

takingshape

in

North

America and

Europe. It is a more distant vision in East

Asia.

If

regionalunipolarity s to

develop

and serve as a

source

of structural

tability

s American

hegemony

wanes, policymakers nd

scholars alike need to

think

hroughhow

to encour-

age

the construction nd maintenance

f

consensual

regional

formations.

What

variables

will

affect heir nternal ohesion and determine

whether

heypros-

per

and

deepen

or

lose

momentum nd

unravel?

THE CHARACTER AND

COHERENCE

OF REGIONAL

CORES

The

trajectory

f

regional

cores

will

be the most

mportant

eterminant

f

the

evolution of regional formations.

Regional

cores must exercise

power

and

leadership sufficientosustain unipolarity. t the

same time, hey

must engage

in

self-binding

nd withhold

power to ensure that

symmetry

roduces

band-

wagoning

rather han

balancing.

The power centers of North

America,

Europe,

and East

Asia each face a

differentet ofchallenges.That North

America's

core

consistsof

a

preponder-

ant,

unitary

tateboth enhances

and

impedes

cohesion. North

America

enjoys

natural

unipolarity

and the

stability

that

accompanies

it. In

addition,

the

United States

provides

a level of consistent

eadership

that a

pluralistic

ore

cannot. But thescope of Americanpreponderancemeans thatthecorewill be

less

inclined to governthroughdeal-making;

tarkasymmetries

iminish the

need for

negotiated outcomes.

Moreover,peripheral states,

preciselybecause

they

fear

exposure to

the

core's unchecked

power,

still

face

incentives

to

balance

against

rather han

bandwagon

with the

United States.

n

this

sense,

the

unitarynature

of

American

power

and

purpose paradoxically tands

n

the

way

of consensual integration

n

North

America,

nd

may

ultimately

eave the

region

with more

fragile

nd less

developed

institutions f

governance

than

those

n

Europe

and East Asia.72

Especially

because the United States acks the

societal commitment o self-binding resent nGermany nd Japan, tselected

71.

Soesastro, The Institutional ramework orAPEC,

pp.

46-47.

See also Fishlow and Haggard,

The United States

and the Regionalizationof the WorldEconomy, pp. 29-33.

72.

This

is

an

important nd counterintuitive oint. Pluralisticcores, preciselybecause

power

resources nd authority re divided between two (or

more) separate states,may be more

conducive



After ax Americana

67

leaders must consciously

resist the unilateralist option made possible by

American preponderance and rely on consensual bargaining to deepen re-

gional order.

The main challenge facing

Europe's core is preserving he Franco-German

coalition even as the Cold War

recedes into the past

and

France

and

Germany

confront host of domestic

challenges. The most immediate problem stems

from agging economicperformance.As the austerity ccompanyingprepara-

tion for

monetary nion continues nd as high unemployment ersists, ebate

over structural

djustment nd reform

f

the welfare ystem

will

intensify,nd

French nd German eliteswill

be tempted o blame Europe and each otherfor

the dislocation. Unless both

sides resist this temptation, ot only the single

currency,ut also theintegrity

f

the

Franco-German oalition,

will

be

put

at

risk.73

Generational

change

will

also

pose increasing problems

for the Franco-

German

coupling.

For

youngerGermans and French,who have lived through

neither the horrors of World War II nor the formidable task of patching

together Europe at peace,

escaping

the

past

will

no longer

serve to

legitimate

the

European enterprise.74urope's current eaders

must

therefore enerate

new

arguments o ensure that he nextgeneration etains n abiding apprecia-

tion of the

Franco-German coalition.

The

adaptation

to

global

economic

change,

the

inclusion

n

Europe

of the continent's

mergingdemocracies,

nd

the construction f a new political

space

that

allows

the

national

state

to

exist

comfortably longside

a

supranational union

must now

provide

the

impetus

behind

integration.

ut the

Germans and

the

French also need to

arrive at a

common vision ofwherethe EU is headed, a processthatwillbe more difficult

than t

appears.

than amalgamated cores to the cohesion and durability f regional formations. he states that

comprise pluralistic ore need to strike bargain

with

each other

bout

power sharing,

nd

thus

will be more inclined to negotiate with the periphery bout regional governance.

n

addition,

peripheral tates will be less likelyto balance against the core because neither ts resourcesnor ts

authority re concentrated n a unitary tate.

73. See Roger C. Altman and Charles A. Kupchan, Arresting he Decline of Europe, World olicy

Journal, ol. 14, No.

4

(Winter1997/98), pp. 1-9. For a pessimistic ssessment of the long-term

consequences of a single currency,ee MartinFeldstein, EMU and International onflict, oreign

Affairs, ol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 60-73.

74.

YoungerGermans, ncludingBundestag membersfromKohl's own party, ave made clear that

they are more at ease with the national state and less intenton sublimatingGermany nside a

broader

Europe. So

too are

younger French ess fearful

f

rivalry

with

Germany

and thus less

intent n holding theirneighbors n a tight mbrace. See One Europe, Up to a Point, Economist,

September 4, 1996,p. 48; and AAdyPollak, The Attitude o Europe Is Hard-Headed Acceptance,

Irish

Times,May 20, 1996, p. 10.



Internationalecurity 3:2

| 68

French and German

leaders

in

fact hold incompatibleconceptions

of the

ultimate objectives

and characterof the

union. For Germany,Europe

is a

construct

ormoderating

nd

managing

power-for ensuring

that the conti-

nent never

again falls prey

to the destructiveforces of

national rivalry. or

France,theEU is more about

amassing and projecting ower,

aggregating he

union's

military nd

economic resources

so that t can assert tself s a global

player.The EU is to do for

Europe what the national state

s no longerstrong

enough

to do forFrance.

Meldingthese competing

visions ofEurope

will

requirecompromise

by both

parties.

The Germans

will need to assume

greater

defense

responsibilities

withinEurope, and

the French

will

have to realize thattheirvision of

the EU

is not only

politicallyunattainable,

ut also strategically

ndesirable.Pressing

the EU to focus

on

projecting ower

externally

ather han

managing

power

internally

isks

triggering

oth discord

within

Europe

and

competition

be-

tween

Europe and otherregions.

Paris should

instead seek to strengthenhe

ability

of the Franco-German

ore

to

manage security

n

Europe

as America's

role on the continent radually

diminishes.75

Effecting

he coherence of a pluralistic

core

in

East Asia is a far

more

formidable

task than

in

Europe.76

China and

Japan

have

yet

to

engage

in

a

substantive

ilateral

dialogue

thatcould

serve as a basis forreconciliation nd

partnership;

oth

prefer

o deal

with the United States rather han

with

each

other.77

he

key challenge

ahead is to nurture new coalition between China

and

Japan

hat nables them

o construct nd

manage

collectively

hierarchical

75. The Labour Party's 1997 victory

n

Britainraises the novel possibility

hat London mightbe

able to help

Paris and Bonn

forge compromise

vision. Prime MinisterTony Blair appears to be

pushing Britain oward much deeper

engagement

n

the EU. The first rip f

Blair'sforeignminister

was to Paris and Bonn, not Brussels or Washington, nd the Labour government

s far more

receptivethan ts predecessor to Britain's

ventual participation n monetary nion. It is at least

conceivable

thatBritainwill over timetake on a guidingrole

n

the evolutionof the EU. The British

share Germany'sperception

f the EU as an instrument or

binding

and managing power,but also

share

France's

appreciation

of the

mportance

f

power projection.

n

addition,

Britain ould

help

define a middle road between

Germany'sdesire to embed the national state

in

a supranational

union and France's Gaullist nsistence

n preserving strongnational state.

76.

For a sober assessment

of the

trajectory

f Sino-Japanese elations uring he 1990s, ee Michael

Greenand BenjaminSelf, Japan'sChanging

China

Policy:

From

Commercial

Realism toReluctant

Realism, Survival,Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer1996), pp. 35-58.

77.

As one indicator f

these

preferences,

he number of Chinese and

Japanese

students

tudying

in the United States faroutweighsthe

number

studying

n

each

other's

ountries.

The number of

Japanese

students

n the United States

outweighs

the number

n

China

by

almost

six

times.

The

numberof Chinese students

n

the

United

States outweighs

the number

n

Japan

by ustover three

times.UNESCO,

Statistical

earbook,

996

(Lanham,

Md.:

UNESCO Publishing

and Bernan

Press,

1997), section 3, pp.

397-402.




regional order

n

East Asia.78 fthe European experience s any indication, his

task

will

requiredecades ofdeliberate ffortoovercomethepastand construct

the habits and institutions f

partnership.

APEC provides a useful starting oint, but only that; America's role is too

prominent. nstead,

Washington should explicitly eek to facilitate more

substantive

Sino-Japanese

dialogue. Even if it comes at the expense of trade

flows across the Pacific or of American nfluence n East Asia, the formation

of

a

Sino-Japanese

oalition

is

essential if

regional integration

s to

advance

beyond

the

economic realm.

The United States should stay engaged militarily

to

buy

time

for

this

regional power center to cohere, but Washingtonmust

ensure

that

t no

longeropposes or stands

n

the way of direct ontactbetween

East Asia's two main

powers. Furthermore,Washington should welcome

China's call for

pan-regional

forum hat

does

not

include

the

United States-

as

long

as the

body

serves

as

a

vehicle

for

regional ntegration, otbalancing

against

U.S.

power.79

Two factorswill play particularly mportant oles in shaping Sino-Japanese

relations.The first oncernsJapan'swillingnessto confrontts past in order to

close

the

enormous

gap

thatremains

betweenJapanesebehavior

and

regional

perceptionsof Japanese ntentions.

Although Japan's

constitution estricts

he

use

of force to self-defense

missions and Tokyo actively

shuns international

leadership and diplomaticunilateralism, eighboring tatesremaindistrustful

of

Japan.80

his

gap

between

behavior

and

perception

s

largely

the

result of

Japan's

failure o

address

its

wartime ctions and to

pursue

reconciliationwith

the victims

of

its

aggression.81 The

benign effects f Japan's self-binding

will

continue obe diluteduntiltheJapanese rereadyto hold themselves ccount-

able for their behavior.

So too

will

recent

talk of

an Asian way and

the

emergence

of

a

regional

dentity

mean

little

until

the

Japanese

are

prepared

to

78. For

a

similar view

of

the

importance

of

Sino-Japanese partnership, ee Robert Manning,

Haunted by a Bitter ast, Impact 1 (December 1996), pp. 10-13; and Manning, Burdens of the

Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-JapaneseRelations

in

the Emerging nternational ystem,

Washington uarterly, ol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 994), pp. 45-58. See also Akira Iriye,China nd

Japan

in

the

Global ettingCambridge,Mass.: Harvard University ress, 1992); and Mark Selden, China,

Japan,

nd the

Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995,

n

Katzenstein nd Shiraishi,

Networkower, p. 306-340.

79.

See JamesKynge China to Embrace ASEAN in Pursuitof New Order, inancialTimes, ugust

25, 1997, p.

3.

80. Thomas U.

Berger,

From Sword to

Chrysanthemum:Japan's

Culture

of Anti-militarism,

Internationalecurity, ol. 17, No.

4

(Spring 1993), pp. 119-150.

81. For

a

thoughtful reatment f the different ays in which Germany nd Japan have dealt with

their espectivepasts, see Ian Buruma, The Wages f Guilt New York:Meridian, 1994).



International

ecurity 3:2 | 70

acknowledge

that their

ast attempt

t

community-building-theGreaterEast

82

Asia

Coprosperity

phere-was

part

of a darker and

predatorypast.

The second key determinant f

whether a

pluralisticcore coheres

in

East

Asia is the manner in which China exercises its increasing power. Chinese

behavior

will

to some extent e

shaped by

its external

nvironment. s China's

power rises,

ts

neighbors hould

seek to strike he same

deal that

EU

members

struckwithGermany: greater ay forChina in shapingthe termsofregional

order

n return or

elf-binding

nd China's

willingness

o

play by

the rules of

multilateralism. rawing China into the core of a hierarchical egional

order,

even

if

Beijing's ntentions re still somewhat uncertain,promises to expose

China to

the same

processesof

moderation nd

liberalization hatotherdevel-

oping economies

face

as they

enter the

global

market.

The gradual and cau-

tious embrace

of

China

in

a

multilateral

ystem

f

regional governance

will

by

no means ensurethatChina exercises tsgrowing power in a benign manner.

It

will,however, ncourage self-binding y giving

China

a voice commensurate

with tspower. twill also facilitate conomicopenness, strengtheniberalizing

coalitions,

and nurture

moderating

middle class-all of which make

more

likely China's peaceful ascendance and the gradual formationof a Sino-

Japanese partnership.83

SUSTAINING

THE BARGAIN BETWEEN CORE AND

PERIPHERY

Benign unipolar

formations

ely

on

a sustained

consensus between core and

periphery,

ot

ust

on an initial

bargain.

Each side

must

hold up

its

end of

this

bargain

and remain satisfiedwith the other's

performance. ore, periphery,r

both can otherwise exit. Existing iterature n regionalismunderscores the

extent

o which

economic ncentive nd sustained

growthoftenfacilitate nte-

gration nd regional cohesion.84

n

thisrespect, herecent conomic downturn

in East Asia

represents substantial etback.85

What

are theothermain chal-

lenges to the cohesion of unipolar formations?

82.

For discussion of an

emerging

Asian

identity,

ee Yoichi

Funabashi, The Asianization of Asia,

ForeignAffairs, ol. 72, No. 5 (November/December1993), pp. 75-85.

83. On the ability f economic openness to foster olitical nd economic reformn China, see Susan

Shirk, Internationalizationnd China's Economic Reforms, n RobertKeohane and Helen Milner,

eds., Internationalizationnd Domestic olitics Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge University ress, 1996),

pp. 186-206. On the relationship etween iberal domesticcoalitions nd regional cooperation, ee

Etel

Solingen, Democracy, Economic Reform,

nd

Regional Cooperation, Journal f Theoretical

Politics, ol. 8, No. 1 (January 996), pp. 79-114.

84. See,

for

example, Ippei Yamazawa,

On

Pacific

Economic

Integration, conomic ournal, ol.

102, No. 415 (November 1992), pp. 1519-1529.

85. Because

of the domestic

reforms eing mplemented

n the wake of

the crisis nd because East

Asia enjoys savings

and

investment ates

that are

50 percent higherthan those

in

Europe and




THE DURABILITY OF SELF-BINDING.

Unlike classical empires, which often

foundered as a result of revolts from

periphery eeking greater utonomy,

benign unipolar formations re farmore likelyto fall prey to revoltsfrom he

core. t s now the core that

ccepts

imits n

its

behavior by exercising trategic

restraint nd subjecting tself o the

constraints f a multilateral ramework.

Self-binding an therefore o only so

far beforecore states

will

calculate that

the gains of sustaining benign unipolarityno longer outweigh the costs of

diminished autonomy.This insight

calls into question the conventionalwis-

dom that ntegrationmust keep moving

forward fregionalformations re not

to unravel.86

It

is hard to imagine, for example,

that France and Germany would as a

matter f course submit to the

will

oftheir maller partners

n

the EU should

Paris and Bonn regularly e outvotedon matters f central oncern.

n

North

America, taming the unilateralist

rges of the United States is a far greater

challenge

to

regional integration

han

is encouragingtheparticipation f

the

periphery.ndeed, in Europe and NorthAmerica alike,an expectantperiphery

presses for entrywhile core statesequivocate, fearful f new obligations and

constraints.

And

China's

willingness

to moderate the

scope

and character f

its regional ambition s the single most important eterminant fwhethera

consensual

hierarchy

volves

in

East

Asia. As

policymakers hape regional

structures f

governance, they should seek an equilibrium point along

the

spectrumof integration-one sufficient

o commit

the

core

to

engage

in

self-

binding,

but not

so ambitious that t nduces

the

core to

renege

on the

bargain

thatunderpins regional order.

SECURITY.

During past eras, core states oftenfell prey to their excessive

concern bout

security

n

their

peripheries.

n

contrast, oday's major

states

re

more likelyto exhibit

nsufficient

oncern about security

n

the

periphery.87

Whethercontemporary nipolar formations ace

unraveling

because of

the

underprovisionof securitydepends

primarily

on the evolution of

strategic

thinking

within

respectivecores.

Three main

pathways

exist

through

which

NorthAmerica,many analystsforesee return o robust

growth

or he

region.

See Steven Radelet

and Jeffreyachs, Asia's Reemergence, ForeignAffairs, ol. 76, No. 6 (November/December

1997), pp. 44-59. Reformof the Japanese economy and the expansion of domestic demand are

particularlymportant o Asia's

recovery. ncreased Japanese mports rom ts weakened neighbors

will not only help stimulate

growth, ut also deepen regional economic ntegration.

86. See, forexample, Waever,

Integration s Security.

87.

Compare recent

with

earlier developments

in the

Balkans. At the opening

of this

century,

Europe's great powers raced to carve up the region,oftendecreasing theirown security hrough

excessive engagement.At the

close of this century, urope's powers did theirbest to stay out of

the Balkans, decreasing theirown security hrough oo little ngagement.




core statescould, over time, dopt a moreexpansivedefinition f their ecurity

interests.

First,economic interdependencebetween

core and

periphery

could reach

levels sufficiento induce cores to make deeper sacrifices

n

meeting trategic

challenges

in the

periphery. uring

the 1994-95 economic turmoil n Mexico

and the 1997-98 turmoil

n

East

Asia,

for

xample,

the nternational

ommunity

pursued extraordinary

measures to

prevent

more

widespread

financial risis.

In this respect,

t

is not unimaginable thateconomic nterests

would

be strong

enough

to warrant

military

ntervention

n

the

periphery

should

financial

stability

e threatened

y

revolt

or

internal haos.

Increasing

evels of nterna-

tional trade and investment

s

well

as

considerable sensitivity mong the

globe's main financialmarkets

will

put pressure

on

core

states to

run

the

risks

associated

with

maintaining

economic

stability

n

their

respective

zones of

influence.

Second, as contemporary egional

formationsmature

and

core states

sink

further osts nto their

development,

order-relatednterests

may

come

to

play

a more dominant role

in

motivating

core behavior.

If

regional

formations

continue to evolve into

order-providing nipolar structures,

heir

leading

members

will

have a greater

nterest

n

making

the

sacrificesnecessary to

maintainthem.88

Finally, he process

of

community-buildingould lead

to

a sense of shared

identity ufficient o contribute o core-periphery ohesion and broaden con-

cept's

of

self-interest.he

history

f classical

empires

s

replete

with

examples

of the

ability

f socialization nd

ideational

convergence

o

undergird mperial

management.89 o too have shared identity lements been strongenough to

induce states to come to one another's assistance for emotive rather than

strategic

reasons.90

Elites

and

publics

in

contemporary egional

formations

88. NATO members, or xample, eventuallyfound the will to intervene

n

Bosnia with sufficient

force

not

because the ntrinsic osts of the conflict rew ntolerable, ut argelybecause theyfeared

that continued paralysis would have corrosive effects n NATO and transatlantic elations.See

speech by President William Clinton, Peace in Bosnia: A Dividend of American Leadership,

December 6, 1995, delivered to the Committeefor American Leadership in Bosnia, Washington,

D.C., U.S. Department of State, Dispatch Supplement, ol. 6, No. 5 (December 1995), p. 22; and

WilliamOdom, PuttingOut the Balkan Fire, Foreign ffairs, ol. 74, No. 6 (November/December

1995), pp. 152-153.

89. See Ikenberry nd Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power.

90. During the 1930s,for xample, the

French

ame

to

view

the

oss of

certain

mperialpossessions

as tantamountto losing metropolitan erritory.

t

was

emotive attachment,however,

not the

intrinsic trategic alue of thepossessions,that haped these attitudes. ee Kupchan,

The Vulner-

ability fEmpire, . 258.



After ax

Americana

73

might develop

similar extraterritorialllegiances, endowing these

groupings

with more cohesion and durabilitythan

would be predicted by a narrow

calculation of

materialcosts and benefits.

Peace

among

BenignUnipolarRegions

My analysis

should not be interpreted s a call for the end of

American

hegemony and

the deliberate devolution of

the international ystemfrom

unipolarity to tripolarity.nstead, I take the

eventual waning of American

hegemonyto be

inevitable,making t

unavoidable that the internationalom-

munitywill have

to choose between striving or benign tripolarity y

design

or

settling

for a

competitivemultipolarity y

default.91

he

case

for

benign

tripolarity

ests in

part on the arguments,outlined

above,

as

to

why

the

formation f three

regional

blocs

would

not

trigger

he

security ompetition

traditionally scribed

to tripolarity: he

three

regional formations

would

be

instrumentsfor managing power, not amassing it; interregionalrelations

would benefit rom ntraregional eace;

cultural nd linguistic arrierswould

inhibit the

political centralizationneeded to

project power externally; nd

regions would

unravel fromwithin

f

theircore states developed

predatory

intent.92 t the

same time, the management of

interregional

elationswould

rise in

importance and necessitate the

following amendments

to the

policy

agenda.

REGIONALISM

VERSUS GLOBAL MULTILATERALISM

CurrentU.S. policy is guided by the conventionalwisdom thatglobal multi-

lateralism

should take precedence over regionalism.The more open

regions

are to

one

another,

he betterrelations

will

be

among

them.

Regional

trade

arrangements

re

therefore esirable

only

if

they

do not come at the

expense

of

global

trade.93

My analysis challenges

head-on

this

conventional

wisdom:

91. Christopher ayne argues in

favor of multipolarity y default, ontending hat the return f

multipolar ompetition mongEurasia's major powers will embroilthose states n

regional rival-

ries,reducing heir bility nd

inclination o engage in security ompetitionwiththe United States.

Layne does not provide compelling rguments, owever, s to why the United States would find

major wars in Europe and East

Asia any less threatening o its national security han

n

the past.

See

Layne,

From

Preponderance

to Offshore alancing.

92. For discussion of thepotential

or stable tripolarity,ee Schweller, Tripolarity nd

the Second

World

War, esp. pp. 80, 99-100.

93.

See, for xample,JagdishBhagwati,The World rading ystem t Risk Princeton,

.J.:

Princeton

University ress, 1991); RobertHormats, Making Regionalism Safe, Foreign

Affairs,

ol.

73,

No.



Internationalecurity 3:2 |

74

according

to

the

logic

of

benign unipolarity, egionalism

should

take

prece-

dence over global multilateralism. conomic and political integration t the

regional evel are essential buildingblocks ofglobal integration. lobal multi-

lateralism s therefore esirable only

if

it does not come at the expense of

regional ntegration nd the construction f

stable

regionalorders.APEC might

ensure vibranttrans-Pacific

rade,

but

it

does not serve

the interests

f

inter-

national stability

f

putting

America at

the

center

of

East Asia's

only inclusive

multilateral tructure mpedes the consolidation of a self-sustaining egional

order.The same

logic applies

in

reverse

to

the EU. The EU's

protective

ariffs

may create an irritant

n

transatlantic elations,but they are well worth this

cost

if

they

contribute o

the

coherence of

a

stable

unipolarity

n

Europe.

Contemporary egional

formations re

geopolitical structures,

ot mere

trade

groupings.

The

obsession of policymakers

with

global multilateralism hould

accordinglygive way

to

a new

emphasis

on

regionalism.94

INTERREGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

As policymakers nd scholars devote increasing ttention o deepening and

managing regional formations, hey

will

also need to

recast institutions or

governing

relations

mong regional

blocs. Bodies such as the

Group

of

Seven

(G-7),

the

UN

SecurityCouncil,

and the World Trade

Organization provide

potential

forums or

ddressing

an

interregional genda,

but

they

end

to

focus

on

resolving

hort-term

isputes

rather han on

facilitatingong-term oopera-

tion.

Accordingly,

directorateof

core

countries should be established to

develop

a

set of rules

of

the

road

and

a common vision of

how regional

groupingswill fit ntoglobal structures. his directorate,which mightreplace

the

G-7,

would

consist of

the United

States, France, Germany,Japan,China,

and

perhaps

Russia

(for

reasons

discussed

below).

The

body

would

serve as a

global concert of major powers, monitoring

nd

coordinatingrelationsboth

within

nd

among regional groupings.

2 (March/April 1994), pp.

97-108;

Fred

Bergsten,

APEC and

World Trade, ForeignAffairs, ol.

73, No.

3

(May/June 994),pp.

20-26;

and

Frankel,Regional rading

locs.Frankel

nalyzes

in

detail

the circumstances nder whichregional trading rrangements acilitate lobal liberalization.

94. Recent experience suggests that greateremphasis on regional trade would not lead to sig-

nificant ecreases in

interregional rade. Economic ntegration

within

East Asia, forexample, has

not come at the expense of its

extraregional

rade. Between 1970 and

1990, East Asia's share of

world trade doubled,

while

its intraregional

rade

grew

from

0 to

41

percentof its total trade.

See Peter Petri, The East

Asian Trading

Bloc: An

Analytic History,

n

Frankel and Kahler,

Regionalism nd Rivalry, . 42.

See also T.J.Pempel, Transpacific orii:Japan and the Emerging

Asian

Regionalism,

n

Katzenstein

nd

Shiraishi,

Network

ower, p.

81-82.




ECONOMIC STRAINS AND THE ALLURE OF PROTECTIONISM

As regional formations eepen and their political saliency n memberstates

rises, the risk ncreases that economic shock or prolonged periods of

lagging

performance

will

lead to protectionism nd interregional ivalry.When

politi-

cal leaders turn

to protectionism o cordon off heirnational economies

from

marketdisturbances nd find short-termix o lagging performance,

hey re

likely to favor intraregional ver interregional ies, especially if theyhave

already codified regional trade agreements,have high levels of interdepend-

ence with their

neighbors, nd have sunk costs in the maintenanceof intrare-

gional cohesion.95 Precisely because the logic of my argumentprivileges

regional over global trade arrangements,members of consensual regional

formations

will

have to take special precautionsto guard against

retreat

nto

protected trade blocs. A directorate f core countries could

accordinglybe

tasked with

monitoring nterregional ariffsnd flowsof trade and investment.

THE

GEOPOLITICS

OF

EXCLUSION

A

major

weakness

of

an

international rder based

on

benign

unipolarity

n

North

America,Europe, and East Asia is its effect n excluded

actors.

Contem-

porary regional formations re clubs for successful states,

not failed or

poor

ones. As a

result, hey exclude those areas of the globe

that are most

in

need

of

integrationntoglobal markets nd councils.The proliferation

f

weapons

technology

s

also raising the stakes of instability

n

developing regions.

The

recentnuclear tests

n

India and Pakistan underscorethe potentialfor

danger-

ous arms

racingamong developingstates.And assumingthatrelations

mong

the world's major powers remain cooperative,revisionist tates n thedevel-

oping world, especially

those armed

with

weapons

of mass destruction nd

those

whose size and

population make them locally

dominant

powers,

will

emerge

as the

principal challengers

o the status

quo.96

Cordoning

off

privileged regional formations rom nstability

n

the devel-

oping world,

from

rogue states,

nd from he effects

f

collapsing

states will

be ineffective

nd may well backfire.Exclusion tends only

to make matters

worse by exacerbating economic duress and by breeding resentment nd

95. The experienceof

the 1930s provides ample evidence of the

allure of retreatingnto exclusive

trading zones in

response to external economic shock. The collapse of an open trading order

contributed oth to thedomestic dislocationthatfueled fascism nd

to the go-it-alone ttitudes

that undermined ecurity ooperation among the democracies.

96.

See RobertChase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy, Pivotal

States

and U.S. Grand

Strategy,

ForeignAffairs, ol. 75,

No. 1 (January/February996), pp. 33-51.



Internationalecurity 3:2

| 76

insecurity.

t also reinforces

he sense of solation

that

fuels

revisionist

egimes

and their

laims of encirclement.97nstead,

regional formations

hould seek

to

include such states

n their espective

ones of nfluence,

eekingto draw them

into the

nternationalommunity

hrough he same centripetal

orce

hatpulls

the periphery

oward the

center.98 regional

division

of

abor makes the

most

sense over

the ongterm,

with North

Americanstates

focusing

n Central

and

SouthAmerica,European countries oncentratingn the Middle East, Africa,

and Southwest Asia,

and

East Asian states

focusing

on

South and Southeast

Asia.

The

potentially

negative consequences

of exclusion

also

apply to

Russia,

which is falling nto

a geopoliticalno-man's-land

between

a risingEast Asia

and a Europe

that s expanding

toward

Russia's

borders.

Two courses

of action

deserve

consideration. irst,

Russia could

be

encouraged

to

reconstruct

ts own

regionalformation y

deepening the Commonwealth

of

IndependentStates.

The key

problem

s that this formationmay prove

to

be

coercive rather

han

consensual in character.fexcluded frompreponderantformations o its east

and west,

Russia

may

well construct union aimed at

power

accretion

ather

than

power

management.

The

preferable

lternative s forthe EU and

NATO

to open

theirdoors to

Russia and seek to incorporate he

former oviet

Union

into a

broaderEuropean construction.99

t

present,

neither he EU nor

NATO

is keen to extend its

reach beyond Central

Europe. Both institutions

ear the

dilution

and diminishing

ffectiveness

hat

accompany

large membership.100

97. On the foreign olicies

of revolutionary tates nd how outside powers should deal

with them,

see StephenM. Walt,Revolutionnd War Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University ress,1996).

98. Isolating

revisionist tates

may

be

appropriate

n

certain

cases, especiallywhen the state

in

question is deliberately ttempting

o export nstabilityhrough errorism r overt

acts of aggres-

sion against

its

neighbors.

As recent

experiences

with

Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba demonstrate,

however,diplomatic solation

and

economic sanctions

have not proved effectivenbringing bout

regime change.

99. IncludingRussia in NATO would further ransform

t

from collectivedefense

to a collective

security rganization.

This transformations

in turnnecessary to ensure that NATO's continuing

enlargement

oes not

draw

new

dividing ines

and trigger alancing among excluded states.For

further iscussionof Russia's inclusion

n

a broader

Europe, see JamesGoodby,EuropeUndivided:

The New

Logicof

Peace

n U.S.-Russian

Relations

Washington,

.C.:

United

States nstitute f Peace

Press, 1998).

100. In addition, a Europe

that ncludes Russia would

find tselfwith two noncontiguouspower

centers-a Franco-German oalition and Russia. At least on deductive grounds,this formation

could

trigger

ntercore alancing

as

opposed to cooperation.

A pluralistic ore of contiguous states

should

be more stable than one of

noncontiguous

states.

Contiguity

forces

powerfulstates

to

extremes-either

o move

in

lockstep o avoid competition

r to be

rivals

n

a searchfor uperiority.

Core statesthat re

separated

by

an

expanse

of and are more ikely o

have mixed

relations.They

will

likelycompete for

dominance

n

the area between

them. But

this expanse

of and also serves

as a

buffer,making

t

unnecessary

for the

parties

to

choose between close

partnership

nd open

rivalry.

rom

this perspective,

Russia's inclusion n Europe would not

lead

to the

union's

unrav-



After ax Americana

77

Nevertheless, nsuring

that Russia is included

in

Europe

should

be

a central

item on the agenda as core states seek to address and redress the geopolitics

ofexclusion.

Conclusion

America at present rguablyhas more nfluence ver nternational olitics han

any

other

great power

in

history. ccordingly,

t

may seem paradoxical

to

call

upon the United States to begin preparingfor the demise of Pax Americana.

However,

t is

precisely

because of ts

preponderantpower

and the

stability

t

affords hat the United States has the ability and the luxury to look beyond

the horizon.

Preparing

for

the future ntails neither

he retrenchment or the

disengagement

of

American power. On the contrary,

he United States should

sustain

global hegemony foras long

as it

can.

But

in

the meantime,

t should

follow three guidelines to ensure that American unipolarity,

when

its

time

comes, peacefullygives way to a benign tripolarity.

First,the United States must deepen its commitment o self-binding nd

ensure that t exercises ts

preponderantpower

with restraint nd moderation.

Doing so means strengthening ultilateral nstitutions nd relianceon consen-

sual

forms

f

international overnance.As the leading state

n

the

world,

the

United

States, through hebenignexercise of itspower,

will

both

enable and

encourage through

emulation others to do the same.

More

important,

he

United States needs to buy more time forunipolar regional formations o

develop. Behavior that nduces balancing against U.S. power would

lead to the

untimely emise ofAmericanunipolarity,n turn nterruptingheprocesses of

regional ntegrationmade possible by America'sbenign eadership.The United

States must therefore void unilateralismand

overbearing behavior,

which

promise only to squander Americanpreponderance

nd

precipitate remature

return o a competitivemultipolarity.101

eling,

but it

would impair ts coherenceby diluting ts core.

It is

also

worth

notingthatunipolar

formations ave existed without geographically ixed core.

The

Carolingian Empire established

by Charlemagne in the late eighth

century,

or example, was ruled from court that

traveled

throughout he imperial realm. It is at least conceivable that Brussels could one day become

Europe's effective ower center r thatEurope could be governed by a mobile core,circumventing

some of the problems involved in including Russia in a broader Europe. On the

Carolingian

Empire, ee Louis Halphen, Charlemagnend theCarolingian mpire, rans.Giselle de Niee

(Amster-

dam: North-Holland,1977); and Heinrich Fichtenau, The Carolingian mpire New York:

Harper

and

Row, 1964).

101. On the mportance f basing U.S. grand strategy n multilateralism,ee JohnGerard

Ruggie,

Winning

hePeace:

America nd WorldOrder n theNew Era (New York:Columbia University

ress,

1996).




Second, the

United

States should

make the

consolidation

of

pluralistic ores

in Europe and East Asia a top priority. ven

if

Washington oses some of its

leverage abroad as a result,

t s

in

America's ong-term

nterest o foster

enign

centersof power

in

both

regions.

The United States should

help strengthen

Europe's core by dealing with France and Germany collectivelyratherthan

individually.A Paris-Bonn-Washingtonialogue could

be formalized

hrough

regularministerialmeetings.102The United States should also encourage nitia-

tives such as the ointvisit to Moscow

in

March 1998 of German Chancellor

Helmut Kohl and FrenchPresidentJacques

Chirac. And

to

the extent

ossible,

Washington hould encourage greaterFranco-German ooperationand activ-

ism in managing European security.

Moving

China

and

Japan

toward

partnership

s a far

more

complicated

task.

The United States must begin simplyby making

clear that

t

supports

a

much

more dense

and

independent

bilateral

relationship

etween

Beijing

nd

Tokyo.

The United States needs to remain engaged

to

reassure both parties,

but

must

no longer stand in the way of a Sino-Japanese approchement.n this respect,

the United States should make clear

to

Japan

that ts

strategic ependence

on

American power

is not a viable

solution

to its

security

needs

over the long

term. To

help pave

the

way

for a

regional alternative,Washington

should

encourage Japan

to

address

openly

its wartime

behavior,

the

only lasting

antidote

to the historical memories that continue to

poison Sino-Japanese

relations. The

United

States should simultaneously press hard

to

initiate a

meaningful ecurity ialogue

between

Beijing

and

Tokyo.

The

agenda

should

include regular sharing of information, xchange of militarypersonnel and

politicians,and joint exercises,as well as discussion of territorial isputes,

theatermissiledefense, nd disposal

of

chemicalweapons. The UnitedStates

should also facilitate

ncreasing economic cooperation between China and

Japan, particularly

n

the areas of

transportation

nd

energy nfrastructure.

Again, the United States should

serve

as

a

catalyst

for

bilateralprogramsthat

then

proceed

under theirown

steam.

Third,

the United States needs to

give regionalismprecedence over global

multilateralism-even at the

expense

of

global

trade flows-and

pay greater

heed tothe geopolitical mplications fregional ntegration. he success of U.S.

policies in theAmericas, Europe, and East Asia should be measured not by

their

bility

to maximize American

nfluence,

ut

by their bilityto promote

102. Should Britain ontinue to deepen its engagement

n

the EU, London mightbe included

in

this dialogue as well as in the global directoratementioned bove.




self-sustainingnd peaceful regional orders. PresidentClinton is

right

that

America s the world's indispensable nation. But the United States

must use

that unique stationto make itselfdispensable and to erectregionalstructures

of order

capable

of

withstanding

he demise of

Americanpreponderance.

The

days ofPax Americanaare numbered.Now is the timeto ensure that

he global

stability nd prosperitythas fostered re not.

after pax americana

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