africa's fragile states: empowering extremists, exporting terrorism

8/7/2019 Africa's Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism

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Twelve o the twenty states deemed by the Failed

States Index (FSI) to be at greatest risk o collapse

in 2010 are in Arica.1 These ragile and ailed states

account or much o the continents ongoing conict,

instability, and humanitarian catastrophes. State ail-

ure raises the risk o personal insecurity, lawlessness,

and armed conict. Such persistent and randomizedinsecurity undermines all aspects o ordinary lie, orc-

ing people to stay in their homes and close their busi-

nesses or ear o violence. Under such circumstances,

residents become willing to support or accept virtu-

ally any groups that are able to restore orderbe they

warlords, local gangs, or organized criminal syndicates.

Among the violent actors that ill the power

vacuums o Aricas ragile and ailed states are Is-

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Aricas Fragile States: EmpoweringExtremists, Exporting TerrorismBy Zachary Devlin-Foltz

A P U B L I C A T I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Aricas ragile states create political and security environments that enhance the leverage o Islamistextremists in their ongoing struggle with moderates or inluence. Countering extremism in Arica,thereore, cannot be separated rom building stronger, more legitimate states.

Robust state security operations can neutralize extremists in the short term. However, they are aninsufcient long-term counterextremism strategy unless coupled with opportunities or moderates toengage in the political process.

In ragile states, maintaining moderate Islamist support or the state should be a central stabilization objective.

H I G H L I G H T S

N O . 6 / A U G U S T 2 0 1 0

lamist extremists. By providing security and basic

services, they hope to gain greater public acceptance

o their ideological agendas. A states ailure to assert

a monopoly on legitimate orce accordingly opens

the door or extremists to build their bases o politi-

cal power. O the twelve high-risk states in Arica,

eight have populations that are one-third or moreMuslim,2 a eature that more than doubles a states

risk o instability3 and provides ertile ground or Is-

lamist extremists.

Many o these countries have seen the increas-

ing inuence o Islamists in recent years. Islamists

share the belie that politics, as well as personal

lie, should be based on Islam. They envision an

ideal Islamic state in which shariah, Islamic law,


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orms the basis or political authority. Most Mus-

lims in Arica are not Islamists. And most Islamists

are not violent. But their rising inuence coincides

with recent threats posed by violent Arican ex-

tremists. In July 2010, Somalias Islamist militia al

Shabaab detonated three simultaneous explosions

that targeted two venues in Kampala, Uganda,

showing the fnal World Cup match, killing near-

ly 80 Ugandans and oreigners. Islamic militancy

has also been growing across the Sahel, ueling

concerns that this will spawn more terrorism in

Arica. Arican Islamists, urthermore, have been

implicated in terror plots on the continent and

abroad. Perhaps the most high-proile case con-

cerned Omar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, a Nigerian

who attended Islamist schools in Yemen and alleg-

edly attempted to set o a bomb on a U.S.-bound

airliner on December 25, 2009.

The platorm certain Islamist movements pro-

vide extremist ideologies can also create an incuba-

tor or international terrorists, much as the rise o

the National Islamic Front in Sudan and the Tali-

ban in Aghanistan in the 1990s led to the shelter-

ing o al Qaeda. I not properly engaged, then, Ari-

cas active Islamist movements pose a serious danger

to security at the individual, national, and interna-

tional level. However, common misperceptions o

Islamist movements have led to misguided policies

to curb their inuence. A better understanding o

Islamists and how their relationship with broadersociety changes in the context o state ragility can

inorm more eective counterextremism and coun-

terterrorism policies in Arica.

FRAGILE STATES AND

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

Though their adherents oten share broad long-

term goals, moderate and extremist Islamists do not

work together in most stable states. Both may seek a

shariah government, but extremists use o violence

strikes most moderates as counterproductive, costly,

and wrong. Conversely, extremists judge moderates

to be in dereliction o their religious duties or their

reusal to adopt jihad, or holy war.

This changes when a state is weak or ails. I a

government does not credibly provide security and a

peaceul means or moderates to pursue their political

ends, moderates may come to see violence as their

best or only option. I moderates remain nonviolent

under such conditions, they risk loss o credibility, not

to mention attacks and intimidation rom groups that

do use orce. But i moderate Islamists use o violence

helps to reestablish local stability, they can gain sup-

port even rom those who do not share their ideol-

ogy. Once moderates take this step, however, whether

out o political strategy or necessity, the main barrier

to their cooperating with extremists disappears. The

eect is to empower extremists, who gain greater

credibility and acceptance rom larger swaths o the

population.

In short, there is a general inverse relationship

between extremist Islamists inluence and state

strength. In stable contexts, extremists tend to oc-

cupy a marginal ringe o the political space. As the

level o ragility increases, however, they tend to

move to center stage. The state, moderates, extrem-

ists, and other actors accordingly adapt their goals

and strategies to changing circumstances. This ra-

gility-extremism nexus has unolded in a variety o

ways in Arica.

Egypt and Algeria: Capable Security Sectorsand Isolated (but Enduring) Extremists. The Mus-

lim Brotherhood (MB) is Egypts most well known

moderate Islamist organization. Its extremist coun-

terpart, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), has waged vio-

lent jihador over 30 years and is a key component

o al Qaeda. Both groups believe that Muslim soci-

eties should be governed by Islamic shariah states.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood has remained

Zachary Devlin-Foltz is coauthor with Binnur Ozkececi-

Taner o State Collapse and Islamist Extremism: Re-

evaluating the Link, Contemporary Security Policy 31,

no. 1 (April 2010).

i moderate Islamists use oviolence helps to reestablish local

stability, they can gain supporteven rom those who do not share

their ideology


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essentially peaceul or the last ew decades, pursu-

ing its agenda through social programs and electoral

competition. By contrast, Egyptian Islamic Jihad

has employed violence consistently throughout its

existence. The MB and EIJ criticize each other bit-

terly. The Brothers call the jihadis terrorism dan-

gerous and counterproductive while the extremists

denounce the MB or luring young Muslims away

rom holy war.

EIJs ounding leaders began their Islamist careers

in the Brotherhood. They broke away in the late

1970s ollowing over a decade o brutal state oppres-

sion in which hundreds o Brothers were arrested and

many executed. The crackdowns convinced many o

these young Islamists that the Egyptian regime was

waging a war on Islam and that Muslims had a duty to

resist violently, however high the costs. By contrast,

the MBs moderate leaders concluded that violence

would only invite more oppression while alienating

an Egyptian public that preerred peace.

Egypts capable security sector exploited this

wedge between moderates and extremists to urther

weaken the EIJ. It launched another round o violent

oppression, this time specifcally targeting extrem-

ists or imprisonment and torture. Such repression

raised the costs o Islamist violence such that only

those who saw holy war as a duty, or at least a glo-

rious pursuit, remained committed to it. Though it

ofcially remains banned, the Brotherhood became

Egypts primary opposition party, and many experts

believe it would win a truly ree and air election

today. Meanwhile, as the extremists were isolated

and were languishing in jails or in hiding, their po-

litical clout waned. Intermittent domestic terrorist

campaigns during the 1990s kept EIJ and other ex-

tremists in the headlines but never translated into

political power. By the late 1990s, most extremists

had renounced violence, whereas the remaining EIJhardcore ultimately moved abroad and joined al Qa-

edas international jihad.

Algeria provides a similar example in which the

state used a combination o oppression and amnes-

ty to push moderate Islamists away rom violence.

However, just as in Egypt, that policy unintention-

ally drove Algerias most extreme Islamists to join

al Qaeda, orming al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

(AQIM) in 2006. During a bloody civil war that

raged or most o the 1990s, brutal violence won Is-

lamist rebels little more than heavy-handed repres-

sion rom the state and political alienation rom the

public. Many Algerians originally sympathized and

supported the Islamists ater the military nullifed the

1991 elections they were likely to lose. However, as

the civil war raged on and the violence grew more

shocking and seemingly gratuitous, the public and

most Islamists grew tired o the destruction. Violence,

or them, was a means to an end, and they abandoned

it once it proved ineective. By the mid-2000s, only

the extreme Salafst Group or Preaching and Com-

bat, known by its French acronym GSPC, remained

armed and active.

Just as had happened in Egypt, Algerian extrem-

ists who reused to renounce violence alienated the

general populace and a mainstream Islamist move-

ment that preerred peace. Whereas the GSPCs

extremist predecessor recruited up to 500 new fght-

ers a week during the 1990s, recent estimates o the

GSPCs and AQIMs manpower rarely exceed 1,000.4

Stripped o its moderate members and politically mar-

ginalized, the group joined al Qaeda hoping to fnd

abroad the relevance it lost at home.

Algerias and Egypts robust security measures

were able to target extreme Islamists and dissuade

moderates rom pursuing strategies o violence.

However, while extremist violence proved a costly

and unproductive strategy in Egypt and Algeria,moderates have been provided ew opportunities

or nonviolent political participation. This perpetu-

ates the ongoing tension among Islamists over the

respective benefts o peaceul engagement versus

violence. Moreover, while the extremist threat is

subdued, it persists.

Nigeria: Limited State Capacity and Restrained

Extremism. Moderate Islamists have considerable

while extremist violence proveda costly and unproductive

strategy in Egypt and Algeria,moderates have been provided

ew opportunities or nonviolentpolitical participation


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inluence within the political system in predomi-

nantly Muslim northern Nigeria. In 1999 and 2000,

with the somewhat reluctant consent o the national

government, several northern states made shariah o-

fcial criminal law. Secular laws continued to apply to

non-Muslims, but state governments could now en-

orce their interpretation o Islam among those they

deemed Muslims. Using legal ofcial means, northern

leaders had taken a signifcant step toward establish-

ing Islamic governance.

Muslim leaders diered in their zeal or Islamic

law. Some were genuine Islamist ideologues, while

others were political opportunists seeking to bolster

their own credibility. In every case, however, pro-

ponents o ofcial shariah claimed that the national

governments shortcomings in maintaining law and

order justifed the introduction o religious law. I

the secular state could not secure the streets, they

argued that Muslims should be allowed to do so via

Islamic law.

Subsequently, many northern states saw the

growth oshariah enorcement militias called Hisbah.

In addition to destroying alcohol and harassing flm-

makers, the militias arrested common criminals, helped

direct trafc, and responded to public emergencies and

accidents. These gangs were not sanctioned by the na-

tional government. Nevertheless, by replacing or out-

perorming the government in many ways, the Hisbah

gained popular support and made it easier or Islamist

politicians to justiy backing them and harder or non-

Islamists to avoid, at minimum, condoning their work.5

In the words o one national Islamic group, The Ni-

gerian police orce as constituted today cannot by any

stretch o imagination be a substitute or Hisbah.6

The Hisbah themselves are diverse and difcult

to categorize. Many o their rank-and-fle members

are unemployed youth who need no more motivation

than the minimal salaries and social prestige aordedto militiamen. Some Hisbah activity, however, sug-

gests extremist intentions. In several cases militias

have summarily punished Muslims or insuicient

piety rather than turn them over or trial in ofcial

religious courts. In other instances the Hisbah are ac-

cused o violence against minority groups and Islamic

sects even though the victims did not necessarily

contravene shariah.7

Indeed, the Hisbah are oten more extreme than

the state politicians and ordinary citizens who sup-

port them. Accordingly, that support has limits. The

police have clashed with the Hisbah in some states,

attempting to curb their zealotry and prevent them

rom threatening state authority. In Borno State, or

example, the state government and national police

launched an aggressive crackdown on the extrem-

ists oBoko Haram. The group demands Islamic rule

throughout Nigeria and had launched a wave o

violence against the states Christians as well as the

government. During clashes with police in July 2009

hundreds o extremists were killed, some allegedly

while in detention. Northern Islamist leaders con-

demned the extremists and expressed their solidarity

with the Borno government.8

Mainstream Islamists have a stake in the current

system: they run northern state governments. As ben-

efciaries o the status quo, these leaders are unlikely

to support attempts at radical change. However, many

moderate Islamist leaders cooperate with militant ex-

tremists such as the Hisbah because they fll the many

security gaps let by the national government. Appeas-

ing and exploiting the extremists without threaten-

ing ofcialdom, moderate Islamists have adapted to

Nigerias limited but enduring state. Whether moder-

ates will be able to permanently keep the lid on these

competing pressures remains to be seen.

Somalia: A Security Vacuum and Powerful

Extremists. I the Nigerian states ailings providedlimited opportunities or extremists, the Somali states

complete collapse provided a much broader political

opening. Since its 1991 civil war, Somalia essentially

has been without a government. Let stateless or so

long, Somalis have created various local institutions

designed to fll in or ofcial government in essential

areas. Starting in the mid-1990s, neighborhood lead-

ers established shariah courts to provide law and order.

by replacing or outperormingthe government in many ways,

the Hisbah gained popularsupport and made it easier orIslamist politicians to justiy

backing them


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Originally, most courts ocused on securing the streets,

limiting their activities both geographically and politi-

cally to reect the priorities o ordinary residents and

clan and business leaders.

By 2005, however, more ambitious Islamists had

managed to organize many courts into a loose co-

alition called the Union o Islamic Courts (UIC).

The UICs leadership included both moderates, con-

cerned mostly with security and maintaining public

support, and extremists bent on coercing their way

to an Islamic state. They joined together to fght

Somalias many predatory warlords. For moderates,

deeating the warlords consolidated the UICs power

and pleased their constituents. For extremists, the

warlords, some o whom received U.S. support to

pursue al Qaeda suspects, were agents o the West

and the chie obstacle to jihad in Somalia. Pro-

tracted state collapse and its attendant chaos uni-

fed these enemies and temporarily superseded their

many dierences.

The UIC never achieved ull unity o command,

and its more moderate leaders struggled to control

their extremist allies. Nevertheless, the coalition

might have held or some time had Ethiopia not in-

vaded Somalia in December 2006 to remove what it

saw as a threat on its border. The incursion split the

Islamists. The extremists, most notably the group al

Shabaab, launched an underground insurgent cam-

paign, while many moderate UIC leaders decided to

negotiate with the Ethiopians. In eect, the presence

o Ethiopian troops made violence less productive or

the moderates, who could no longer build support by

taking and securing territory.

For the extremists, however, the Ethiopian inva-

sion brought a oreign, non-Muslim army into the

equationand against which they could rally na-

tionalist and Islamist sentiments. Al Shabaab went

on to declare itsel an al Qaeda afliate. Though alQaeda operatives had long used Somalia as a place to

hide and stage attacks elsewhere, al Shabaab provided

the organization its frst signifcant oothold in local

Somali politics.

The Islamist split in Somalia continues. Even a-

ter Ethiopian troops withdrew in 2009 and the mod-

erate Islamist Sheikh Sheri Sheikh Ahmed became

president o a government o national unity, al Sha-

baab remained in the armed opposition, preerring to

fght the moderates rather than join them in peace.

For their part, most non-Islamist power brokers, be

they clan elders or businesspeople, continue to pri-

oritize security and their own local authority. Some

strike deals with al Shabaab, some with other armed

groups, and still others with the government. Though

each no doubt has ideological preerences, the over-

riding necessity o securing sel, amily, and business

drives them to side with whoever can most credibly

protect or threaten them.

Mali and Senegal: Legitimate States and Sus-

tained Security. In West Arica, Mali and Senegal,

low-income states with considerable legitimacy, rep-

resent an alternative model or conronting extremist

threats. Both use a combination o political openness

and relatively robust security institutions to deuse

radicalism. As a result, they have avoided the tur-

bulence posed by violent Islamists seen in Somalia,

Egypt, and Algeria.

In Mali, the 1990s brought political liberal-

ization ater years o autocracy. This created space

or segments o civil society, including Islamists, to

expand their role in social and political lie. Some

Islamists subsequently began challenging the gov-

ernments handling o intergroup inequality and

economic underdevelopment.9 Despite their criti-

cism o the state, however, most Islamists have

chosen to inluence it rather than overthrow it.

The legitimacy o the state, moreover, provided it

great credibility in dealing with these competing

interests, allowing it to defne the parameters o this

engagement within the context o the broader in-

terests o society.

Mali has simultaneously engaged in active coun-

terterrorism operations and security cooperation,

with both international and regional players ensuring

a strong state response to extremists who choose touse orce despite the peaceul opportunities available

to Islamists.10

Senegal has also cultivated a long tradition o

religious moderation and military proessionalism.

This has been reinorced by a decades-long strength-

ening o democratic processes and state institutions

in which the interaction between religious groups

and politics can be reely debated and even publicly


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challenged in a constructive eort to deine the

boundaries and linkages between the secular and

the religious.11 Accordingly, relationships between

Senegalese politicians and Islamic leaders, though

complicated and evolving over time, have generally

been harmonious. When Senegalese Islamic lead-

ers break or bend historical norms by opining on

politics, the oicial response has been to tolerate

and engage them rather than conront them.12 For

example, marches against government policies by

Islamic youth groups in the 1990s prompted govern-

ment ofcials to publicly consult with opposition

leaders and undertake reorms that addressed some o

their grievances while marginalizing those pursuing

solely violent strategies.13

At the same time, the state has shown itsel will-

ing and able to counter hard-line extremist threats.

Leaders o more radical Islamist groups who persis-

tently incited and organized violence have been ar-

rested and prosecuted. Restrictions have also been

applied on radical groups until they have proven able

to organize and operate peaceully.14 Under these cir-

cumstances, the proessionalism and capacity o the

Senegalese security orces engenders considerable

trust and cooperation rom the general public, acili-

tating valuable inormation sharing.

This approach o consultation and openness

coupled with frm but lawul responses to obstinately

violent actors has managed to oster a mature and

exible political environment in which opposition

views, including those o moderate Islamists, are aired

peaceully. While not without problems, the balanced

approach taken by Mali and Senegal, combining po-

litical legitimacy and inclusivity with robust security

institutions, has proven eective in maintaining sta-

bility while mitigating extremism.

THE FRAGIL ITY-EXTREMISM NEXUS

Islamism is a complicated ideology, and its in-

teraction with national politics and the state only

adds to the complexity. Nevertheless, as experi-

ences in Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Somalia, Mali,

and Senegal demonstrate, certain patterns emerge.

States with capable security sectors, such as Egypt

and Algeria, make violence a costly strategy, driv-

ing a wedge between moderates and extremists by

prompting the ormer to renounce violence. By con-

trast, in states that are unable to provide adequate

security, moderates may adopt violent strategies to

capitalize on the publics desire or stability and to

deend themselves rom those who take up arms.

Indeed, where no overarching authority can punish

those using violence or political means, all politics

is likely to become violent. This enables extremists

to fnd common cause with moderates without any

change in either groups underlying ideologies.

Such political gains make extremists much

more inuential in ailed states than in stable ones.

That inuence allows them to rustrate subsequent

stabilization eorts. Somalias al Shabaab is a prime

example o this phenomenon. Having exploited the

states weakness to orm coalitions with moderate Is-

lamists and gain backing, or at least acquiescence,

rom non-Islamist leaders, the group continues to

orceully resist eorts to rebuild the Somali state,

in part because al Shabaab recognizes that its inu-

ence would decline dramatically in a stable society.

In contrast, while Nigeria is in many ways a defcient

state, it has sufciently capable institutions to make

violence a costly strategy or extremists. Armed resis-

tance would provoke a powerul government response

and cost moderates the inuence they enjoy within

the current system.

But state strength alone provides only a tempo-

rary fx to the threat o extremists. The Egyptian and

Algerian states maintain their control with heavy-

handed methods and have accumulated poor human

rights records. Their brutal approach, however, urtherradicalizes extremists, pushing them toward al Qaeda.

With their moderate members sheared o, prospects

or domestic political gains slim, and their own pas-

sions hardened by conlict, imprisonment, and tor-

ture, extremists have more reason than ever to join

the global jihad.

By contrast, Mali and Senegal provide plenty o

room or Islamists to pursue their agendas within a

where no overarching authoritycan punish those using violenceor political means, all politics is

likely to become violent


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7

transparent, democratic political ramework. As a re-

sult, moderate Islamic leaders in both countries are

invested in the status quo and see little reason to

undermine the government. While both countries

have aced some largely externally driven security

challenges, their reasonably capable security orces

have wisely rerained rom indiscriminate responses

against Islamists. This reinorces the credibility o

the state while ensuring that neither extremists nor

state responses to them damage the accommodation

between moderates and government.

STABIL IZ ING AND SUPPORTING FRAGILE

STATES TO COUNTER EXT REMISM

A key lesson rom this analysis is that proactively

strengthening ragile states is a strategic investment

with payos or both stability and narrowing the

space available or extremists. This means that coun-

terextremism and counterterrorism strategies in A-

rica cannot be separated rom building stronger, more

legitimate states. Moreover, stabilizing ragile states

is not just a matter o building security institutions

but a multisectoral eort. As the cases o Mali and

Senegal demonstrate, legitimacy counts enormously.

Creating inclusive environments empowers moderate

Islamists relative to extremists. This is the case even

in low-income states.

When conronting extremist threats, Aricas

leaders should adopt a nuanced approach that com-

bines aggressive but consistent law enorcement

against true extremists while maintaining nonviolent

political options or moderates. A vibrant religious

civil society with the right o political participation

will draw most Islamists away rom violence. Mean-

while, a reliable security apparatus will prevent ex-

tremists rom sabotaging these peaceul accommoda-

tions and imposing violent politics on non-Islamists

and Islamists alike.Where extremists in ailed states pose an inter-

national threat, external military intervention or

individual strikes provide only short-lived results.

Counterterrorism operations alone do not address

the opening that state weakness oers violent ex-

tremists to expand their inuence. Indeed, such

strikes or operations without concurrent and sus-

tained eorts to stabilize ailed states can backfre.

This was the case in Somalia where, despite the

Ethiopian armys vastly superior military power,

blunt and indiscriminate tactics were extremely

unpopular among the Somali public. It had the

long-term eect o generating more popular sup-

port or al Shabaab than it could have earned on

its own while simultaneously pushing extremists

toward al Qaeda.

Stabilization eorts must also be careul to

protect civilian lives and respect local institutions.

Where residents have established their own security

arrangements, stabilization actors should work with

them evenand perhaps especiallyi they are oper-

ated by moderate Islamists. By cooperating with such

orces, governments gain inuential local partners

while simultaneously empowering moderates and

pulling them away rom extremists.

These policies will expose the ideological gap

between extremists and the rest o society. Let

alone at societys margins, intractable extremists

will be dangerous in their reliance on violence but

politically weak. Careully targeted law enorce-

ment, which respects civilians and moderates, can

contain these individuals without abusing the in-

nocent, radicalizing the moderate, or exporting

the extremist.

N O T E S1 The FSI is a joint eort o the Fund or Peace and Foreign

Policy that produces an annual ranking o world states based on 12

measures o weakness and the risk o collapse: available a t .

2 Chad, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, So-

malia, and Sudan. Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Maurita-

nia, and Sierra Leone are other at-risk Arican countries with

large Muslim populations.

3 Monty Marshall, Conict Trends in Arica, 19462004:

A Macro-Comparative Perspective, Center or Systemic Peace,

2005.

4 Lauren Vriens, Backgrounder: Armed Islamic Group,

Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved June 13, 2010 rom .

5 Council Donates Materials to Hisbah, Daily Trust, Sep-

tember 19, 2008.


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8

6 Sharia Council Cautions Government over Local Enorcement,Vanguard, July 2, 2001.

7 Conerly Carole Casey, Marginal Muslims: Politics and the Perceptual Bounds o Islamic Authenticity in Northern Nigeria,

Africa Today 54, no. 3 (Spring 2008), 8687.

8 Northern Govs Meet, Condemn Boko Haram Crisis, Vanguard, August 4, 2009.

9 David Gutelius, Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Terror, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (January

2007), 6465, 7172.

10 Mali Army takes al-Qaeda base,BBC, June 17, 2009.

11 M. Sani Umar, Islam and the Public Sphere in Arica: Overcoming the Dichotomies, inIslam and the Public Sphere in Africa,

Selected Proceedings o a Conerence Organized by The Institute or the Study o Islamic Thought in Arica (ISITA) Program o

Arican Studies, Souleymane Bachir Diagne and M. Sani Umar, eds. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, May 1719, 2007), 18.

12 Leonardo A. Villaln, Senegal: Shades o Islamism in a Suf Landscape, in W.F.S. Miles, ed.,Political Islam in West Africa:

State-Society Relations Transformed(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 171176.

13 Alexander Thurston, Why Is Militant Islam a Weak Phenomenon in Senegal? in Diagne and Umar, 18.

14 Ibid., 1113.

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Lessons Learned from PeaceOperations in AfricaPaul D. WilliamsAfrica Security Brief 3, April 2010

Navies vs. Coast Guards:Dening the Roles of AfricanMaritime Security ForcesAugustus VogelAfrica Security Brief 2, December 2009

africa's fragile states: empowering extremists, exporting terrorism

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