advanced maritime command and control (advanced mc2…

NAVAL AIR TRAINING COMMAND

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS CNATRA P-882 (New 01-18)

FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION

ADVANCED MARITIME COMMAND

AND CONTROL (ADVANCED MC2)

CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

2018

Distribution: This instruction is cleared for public release and is available electronically via Chief of Naval Air Training Issuances Website, https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/pubs-pat-pubs.asp.

iii

FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION

FOR

ADVANCED MARITIME COMMAND AND CONTROL (ADVANCED MC2)

CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

P-882

iv

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SAFETY/HAZARD AWARENESS NOTICE

This course does not require any special safety precautions other than those normally found on

the flight lines.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES .................................................................................................. iv

INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................v SAFETY/HAZARD AWARENESS NOTICE .......................................................................... vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... vii TABLE OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................x

CHAPTER ONE - FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE ............ 1-1 100. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1-1

101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE ................................................................... 1-1 102. WARFARE COMMANDERS .................................................................................. 1-4

103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS .............................................................. 1-5

104. COORDINATORS .................................................................................................... 1-6 105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMM. STRUCTURE...... 1-7

CHAPTER TWO - U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW ....................... 2-1 200. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 2-1 201. NAVAL AIRCRAFT PLATFORMS ........................................................................ 2-1 202. SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE PLATFORMS .................................................. 2-11

CHAPTER THREE - TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY...................... 3-1 300. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 3-1

301. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES........................................ 3-1 302. BREVITY CODES .................................................................................................... 3-2

303. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS ................................................................................... 3-2

CHAPTER FOUR - DATA LINK AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS

INTEGRATION ......................................................................................................................... 4-1 400. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 4-1 401. DATA LINK MANAGEMENT CONCEPT ............................................................. 4-1

402. LINK 16 AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATION ................................................... 4-3 403. EMCON ..................................................................................................................... 4-4

CHAPTER FIVE - SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS ........................................ 5-1 500. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 5-1 501. SURFACE WARFARE ............................................................................................. 5-1 502. OPERATIONAL GROUPS ....................................................................................... 5-5

CHAPTER SIX - SURFACE THREATS AND MISSIONS .................................................. 6-1 600. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 6-1 601. SAMS ......................................................................................................................... 6-1

602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW ........................................................................ 6-8 603. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS................................................................. 6-9 604. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS .................................................................... 6-12

605. IDENTIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS .................. 6-17

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CHAPTER SEVEN - SUW SENSORS AND EMPLOYMENT ............................................ 7-1 700. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 7-1 701. SURFACE WARFARE SENSORS .......................................................................... 7-1 702. SURFACE WARFARE SENSOR CHARACTERISTICS ....................................... 7-1

CHAPTER EIGHT - SURFACE SEARCH, LOCALIZATION, AND TRACKING

METHODS ................................................................................................................................. 8-1 800. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 8-1 801. SURFACE WARFARE SEARCH METHODS ........................................................ 8-1 802. SURFACE WARFARE LOCALIZATION METHODS .......................................... 8-4

803. SURFACE WARFARE TRACKING METHODS ................................................... 8-6

CHAPTER NINE - SURF. WARFARE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS ... 9-1 900. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 9-1

901. SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS ......................................................................... 9-1

CHAPTER TEN - STRIKE COORDINATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT ............ 10-1 1000. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 10-1

1001. STRIKE PLANNING AND COORDINATION ..................................................... 10-1

CHAPTER ELEVEN - STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ............................................. 11-1 1100. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 11-1

1101. STRIKE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ............................................................................ 11-1 1102. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS........................................................................ 11-6

CHAPTER TWELVE - AIRCRAFT SELF-DEFENSE CONCEPTS ............................... 12-1 1200. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 12-1

1201. AIRBORNE THREATS .......................................................................................... 12-1 1202. LARGE AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITIES ............................................................ 12-2

1203. THREAT DETECTION AND COUNTERMEASURES ....................................... 12-4

CHAPTER THIRTEEN - MARITIME STRIKE ................................................................. 13-1 1300. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 13-1 1301. MARITIME STRIKE MISSION PLANNING ....................................................... 13-1

1302. THE DYNAMIC TARGETING PROCESS ........................................................... 13-3 1303. MARITIME TACTICAL CONTROL ..................................................................... 13-6 1304. SSC CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................................................... 13-10 1305. AR/AI/SCAR ......................................................................................................... 13-12 1306. WAS STRIKE ........................................................................................................ 13-13

1307. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ................................................................... 13-14

CHAPTER FOURTEEN - SEARCH AND RESCUE .......................................................... 14-1 1400. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 14-1 1401. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES .................................. 14-1 1402. SEARCH AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT ................................................................ 14-2 1403. SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSET COORDINATION ........................................... 14-3 1404. SEARCH PATTERNS............................................................................................. 14-4

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1405. RESCUE/RECOVERY REPORTS ......................................................................... 14-4

1406. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION PLANNING ................................................. 14-5

APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY ................................................................................................... A-1

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TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1 Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram ............................................................ 1-1 Figure 1-2 Specialized Warfare Commanders ................................................................... 1-3

Figure 1-3 Functional Group Commanders ....................................................................... 1-6 Figure 1-4 Coordinators ....................................................................................................... 1-6 Figure 1-5 UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command ......................... 1-7 Figure 1-6 US Geographic Combatant Commands........................................................... 1-9

Figure 2-1 E-6B Mercury ..................................................................................................... 2-1

Figure 2-2 P-3C Orion .......................................................................................................... 2-2 Figure 2-3 P-8A Poseidon..................................................................................................... 2-3

Figure 2-4 EP-3E Aires ........................................................................................................ 2-4

Figure 2-5 E-2 Hawkeye ....................................................................................................... 2-5 Figure 2-6 F/A-18 Hornet..................................................................................................... 2-6 Figure 2-7 EA-6B Prowler ................................................................................................... 2-7

Figure 2-8 E/A-18G Growler ............................................................................................... 2-8 Figure 2-9 MH-60R Seahawk .............................................................................................. 2-9 Figure 2-10 MH-60S Knighthawk ....................................................................................... 2-10

Figure 2-11 C-2A Greyhound .............................................................................................. 2-11 Figure 2-12 Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear ................................................................................ 2-12

Figure 2-13 Amphibious Assault Ship ................................................................................ 2-13 Figure 2-14 Cruiser .............................................................................................................. 2-14 Figure 2-15 Destroyer ........................................................................................................... 2-15

Figure 2-16 Littoral Combat Ship ....................................................................................... 2-16

Figure 2-17 Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine ................................................................... 2-17 Figure 2-18 Attack Submarine ............................................................................................ 2-18 Figure 2-19 Guided-Missile Submarine .............................................................................. 2-19

Figure 3-1 Check-in Brief (MNPOTTA) ............................................................................ 3-4

Figure 3-2 Surface Contact Report ..................................................................................... 3-4 Figure 3-3 Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format ................................. 3-5

Figure 3-4 Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report) .............................................................. 3-5 Figure 3-5 Surface Picture Report (SURPIC) Page 1 ....................................................... 3-6 Figure 3-6 Surface Picture Report (SURPIC) Page 2 ....................................................... 3-7

Figure 4-1 Data Link Terminology ..................................................................................... 4-2

Figure 5-1 Ocean and Airspace Divisions........................................................................... 5-5 Figure 5-2 Bullseye Position Reporting .............................................................................. 5-7 Figure 5-3 Carrier Strike Group Airspace ......................................................................... 5-8 Figure 5-4 Expeditionary Strike Group Airspace ............................................................. 5-9 Figure 5-5 Operational Area ............................................................................................. 5-10

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Figure 5-6 MNPOTTA Check-in Brief ............................................................................. 5-11

Figure 5-7 Surface Contact Report ................................................................................... 5-11

Figure 6-1 SA-2 GUIDELINE ............................................................................................. 6-1

Figure 6-2 FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar ............................................................ 6-2 Figure 6-3 SA-3 GOA ........................................................................................................... 6-2 Figure 6-4 LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar .................................................................... 6-3 Figure 6-5 SA-5 GAMMON................................................................................................. 6-3 Figure 6-6 SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar ................................................................ 6-4

Figure 6-7 SA-6 GAINFUL .................................................................................................. 6-4 Figure 6-8 STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar .............................................................................. 6-5 Figure 6-9 SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar ........................................................ 6-5

Figure 6-10 SA-10 GRUMBLE ............................................................................................. 6-6 Figure 6-11 FLAP LID Fire Control Radar ......................................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-12 SA-20 GARGOYLE ........................................................................................... 6-7

Figure 6-13 TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar ................................................................ 6-7 Figure 6-14 MANPADS.......................................................................................................... 6-8 Figure 6-15 Houdong .............................................................................................................. 6-9

Figure 6-16 Kaman (Mod La Combattante II) .................................................................. 6-10 Figure 6-17 Vosper MK 5 .................................................................................................... 6-10

Figure 6-18 MK III Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................ 6-11 Figure 6-19 Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine ............................................................ 6-11 Figure 6-20 Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft .......................................................... 6-12

Figure 6-21 Sariwon Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-13 Figure 6-22 Komar Missile Boat ......................................................................................... 6-13

Figure 6-23 Najin Class Frigate .......................................................................................... 6-14 Figure 6-24 Shantou Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-15

Figure 6-25 Chaho Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................. 6-15 Figure 6-26 Romeo Class SS ................................................................................................ 6-16

Figure 6-27 Sang O Submarine ........................................................................................... 6-16 Figure 6-28 Group I Example.............................................................................................. 6-17 Figure 6-29 Group II Example ............................................................................................ 6-18 Figure 6-30 Group III Example .......................................................................................... 6-18

Figure 6-31 ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS .................................................... 6-19 Figure 6-32 Corresponding EO Imagry ............................................................................. 6-19

Figure 7-1 Surface Warfare Aircraft Sensors .................................................................... 7-1

Figure 7-2 Airborne Asset Sensor Capabilities .................................................................. 7-2 Figure 7-3 Surface Warfare Sensor Detection Range ....................................................... 7-3 Figure 7-4 Radar Horizon .................................................................................................... 7-4 Figure 7-5 Visual Horizon .................................................................................................... 7-4

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Figure 8-1 Parallel Search Pattern...................................................................................... 8-2

Figure 8-2 Bar Scan Search Pattern ................................................................................... 8-2 Figure 8-3 Expanding Square Search Pattern ................................................................... 8-3

Figure 8-4 Sector Search Pattern ........................................................................................ 8-4 Figure 8-5 Confidence Levels .............................................................................................. 8-6 Figure 8-6 Orbit Flight Pattern ........................................................................................... 8-7 Figure 8-7 Racetrack Flight Pattern ................................................................................... 8-7 Figure 8-8 Figure Eight Flight Pattern ............................................................................... 8-8

Figure 9-1 Zone Defenses ..................................................................................................... 9-1 Figure 9-2 MAC Comm. Format......................................................................................... 9-2 Figure 9-3 MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System Characteristics .......................... 9-3

Figure 9-4 MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System Characteristics .................................... 9-4 Figure 9-5 SM-2 Characteristics ......................................................................................... 9-5 Figure 9-6 AGM-84 Harpoon Missile Characteristics ...................................................... 9-6

Figure 9-7 AGM-65 Maverick Missile Characteristics ..................................................... 9-7 Figure 9-8 AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile Characteristics ................................................ 9-8 Figure 9-9 Weapons Overview Chart ................................................................................. 9-9

Figure 10-1 Strike Planning Cycle ...................................................................................... 10-1 Figure 10-2 Defense In Depth Strategy............................................................................... 10-4

Figure 11-1 E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System ......................... 11-1

Figure 11-2 Airborne Warning and Control System E-3 Sentry ..................................... 11-2

Figure 11-3 U-2 ..................................................................................................................... 11-2 Figure 11-4 RC-135 Rivet Joint ........................................................................................... 11-3 Figure 11-5 Drogue Refueling Apparatus .......................................................................... 11-3

Figure 11-6 Boom Refueling Apparatus ............................................................................. 11-4 Figure 11-7 KC-135 .............................................................................................................. 11-4 Figure 11-8 KC-10 ................................................................................................................ 11-5

Figure 11-9 KC-130 .............................................................................................................. 11-5 Figure 11-10 F/A-18 ................................................................................................................ 11-6 Figure 11-11 Omega K-707 .................................................................................................... 11-6 Figure 11-12 Q-4 Global Hawk ............................................................................................. 11-7 Figure 11-13 MQ-4 Triton ..................................................................................................... 11-7

Figure 11-14 MQ-1 Predator ................................................................................................. 11-8

Figure 11-15 MQ-9 Reaper .................................................................................................... 11-8

Figure 11-16 MQ-8 Fire Scout ............................................................................................... 11-9 Figure 11-17 Scan Eagle ......................................................................................................... 11-9

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Figure 12-1 Missile Guidance Systems ............................................................................... 12-1

Figure 12-2 Surface-to-Air Missile Flyout Phases ............................................................. 12-2 Figure 12-3 Components Producing IR Signatures .......................................................... 12-3

Figure 12-4 Flight Phases and Threats ............................................................................... 12-3 Figure 12-5 Antenna Placement of Radar Warning Receivers ........................................ 12-4 Figure 12-6 Onboard Countermeasures ............................................................................. 12-6

Figure 13-1 Weather Planning Rules of Thumb ................................................................ 13-2 Figure 13-2 Targeting Process ............................................................................................. 13-4

Figure 13-3 MAC Baseline Comm. Format ....................................................................... 13-6 Figure 13-4 Communication Nets ....................................................................................... 13-8 Figure 13-5 Target/Engage Comm. Examples ................................................................. 13-10

Figure 13-6 Investigate Tasking Example ........................................................................ 13-10 Figure 13-7 Rigging Example ............................................................................................ 13-11 Figure 13-8 Escalatory Response Options ........................................................................ 13-12

Figure 13-9 SCAR Targeting Example ............................................................................. 13-13 Figure 13-10 Standard Mission Report .............................................................................. 13-14

Figure 14-1 Search and Rescue Drop Kit ........................................................................... 14-2

Figure 14-2 International Search and Rescue Distress Frequencies ............................... 14-3 Figure 14-3 On-Scene Search and Rescue Frequencies .................................................... 14-4

Figure 14-4 Parachute Drift Table ...................................................................................... 14-6 Figure 14-5 Visual Search Altitude Table .......................................................................... 14-7 Figure 14-6 Sweep Width Determination ........................................................................... 14-7

Figure 14-7 Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (300 – 750 ft) ................... 14-8

Figure 14-8 Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (1000 – 2000 ft) ............... 14-8 Figure 14-9 Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (2500 – 3000 ft) ............... 14-9 Figure 14-10 Weather Correction Table .............................................................................. 14-9

Figure 14-11 Sweep Width for Daylight Detection Aids ................................................... 14-10 Figure 14-12 Sweep Width for Handheld Orange Smoke ................................................ 14-10

Figure 14-13 Sweep Width for Night Detection Aids ........................................................ 14-10 Figure 14-14 Sweep Width Life Jacket White Strobe ....................................................... 14-11 Figure 14-15 Altitudes for Forward Looking Infrared ..................................................... 14-11 Figure 14-16 Sweep Width for Forward Looking Airborne Radar ................................. 14-12

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FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 1-1

CHAPTER ONE

FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

100. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of the basic USN fleet organizational and command structure,

which includes the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), warfare commanders, functional group

commanders, and coordinators.

101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE

The post-Cold War has seen a rapid growth in the potential air, surface, and subsurface threats

facing our naval forces. This increased threat resulted, in part, from the numerous advanced

weapon systems, sensors, and delivery platforms now available on the open market.

Some of the countries supplying these advanced systems include North Korea, People’s Republic

of China, and the former Soviet Union. With more and more third world countries in possession

of these improved weapon systems, the reaction time available for friendly forces operating in

sensitive areas (e.g., Persian Gulf) decreases. The post-Cold War requires a realignment of

surveillance and reaction responsibilities with a much greater emphasis on decentralized

authority. The Composite Warfare Doctrine (Figure 1-1) provides a more effective means for

using the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) resources for tactical sea control.

Figure 1-1 Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram

This section summarizes the key roles and terms associated with the Composite Warfare

Doctrine, including OTC responsibilities, composite warfare structure, and Composite Warfare

Commander (CWC) responsibilities.

CHAPTER ONE ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

1-2 FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) Duties

The OTC is the senior officer with command authority over all forces within a maritime

Operational Area (OA). The OTC is the theater commander and is normally the numbered fleet

commander (e.g., 7th Fleet, 5th Fleet, etc.). Some of the more pertinent duties the OTC must

perform without delegations are:

1. Designate a force-wide CWC and alternate.

2. Direct and monitor operations.

3. Establish and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators)

promulgate policies for the force.

4. Establish C3 guidance; and establish force task organization if not already tasked by higher

authority. Specify chain of command between OTC, CWC, warfare commanders, and

coordinators.

5. Promulgate a force communications plan, including alternate plan; designating circuits and

frequencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.

Composite Warfare Command Structure and Capabilities

The Composite Warfare Command is a three-tiered structure that consists of warfare

commanders, functional group commanders, and resource coordinators. The OTC and CWC

lead the Composite Warfare Command with the CWC assigned by and directly subordinate to

the OTC. At times, the same commander/individual may share these roles. The CWC is

normally the CSG commander. Both of these commanders can assign specialized warfare

commanders based on mission requirements. In deciding the assignments and location of

warfare commanders and coordinators, the CWC should take into account the tactical situation,

size of force, and the capabilities of the available assets to cope with the expected threat.

The specialized warfare commanders (Figure 1-2) within the Composite Warfare Command are

the Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC), Information Operations Warfare Commander

(IWC), Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC), Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC),

Sea Combat Commander (SCC), and Strike Warfare Commander (STWC). The CWC structure

enables offensive and defensive combat operations against air, surface, undersea, electronic, and

land-based threats. With respect to a carrier strike group, the CWC can best control combat

operations from the carrier itself. Methodologically speaking, the CWC doctrine provides a

structure around which tactics can be executed.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER ONE


Figure 1-2 Specialized Warfare Commanders

CWC Limitations

The CWC doctrine is designed for macro CSG or task force level operations. Smaller task units

or elements may allow a separate Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to fulfill all sea control

functions him or herself. Tightly structured rules of engagement (ROE) may require the CWC to

maintain even more direct control of assets. Within the CWC doctrine, the multiple tasking of

CSG platforms without clear definition of priorities exists. The CWC and warfare commanders

must understand their responsibilities and how they may change in different tactical situations.

Composite Warfare Commander Responsibilities

The CWC is the officer to whom the OTC has assigned all of his/her authority and assigned

functions for the overall direction and control of the force. The OTC retains the power to negate

any particular action taken by the CWC.

CWCs have the following responsibilities:

1. Control the specialized commanders by providing guidelines for operational conduct.

2. Must remain cognizant of the tactical picture in all warfare areas and must be able to

correlate information from external sources that develop locally.

3. Role of the central command authority to designate plan execution to subordinate warfare

commanders for various missions.



102. WARFARE COMMANDERS

This section introduces the responsibilities and functions of the warfare commanders that consist

of the AMDC, IWC, ASWC, SUWC, SCC, and STWC.

Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) Responsibilities and Functions

The AMDC is responsible for the measures taken to defend a maritime force against attack by

airborne weapons. The AMDCs duties include defense against air and ballistic missile threats

unless a separate command has been designated. The AMDC reports to the CWC and collects,

evaluates, and disseminates surveillance information.

The AMDC carries out the following functions:

1. Recommends air defense warning conditions and weapons control status to the CWC

2. Recommends the air Surveillance Area (SA) to the CWC

3. Develops and implements the air surveillance and defense plan

4. Designates link management units

5. Issues criteria for weapons release and expenditure (using a matrix if applicable)

6. Coordinates and controls air surveillance

Information Operations Warfare Commander (IWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The IWC is responsible for shaping and assessing the information environment, achieving and

maintaining information superiority, developing and executing information plans, and supporting

other warfare commanders. The IWC is located onboard the carrier.

Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The ASWC is responsible for denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. The ASWC

collects, evaluates, and disseminates antisubmarine surveillance information to the CWC. The

ASWC is normally the Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) commander.

Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The SUWC is responsible for surface surveillance coordination and war-at-sea operations. The

SUWC’s responsibilities encompass operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval

surface forces and merchant vessels. The SUWC can best perform his/her duties from on board

the carrier due to superior command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)

and the proximity to surface surveillance coordination (SSC) and war-at-sea (WAS) tactical air

assets.



The SUWC establishes aircraft alert requirements, and the OTC retains alert launch authorization

unless specifically assigned.

Sea Combat Commander (SSC) Responsibilities and Functions

The responsibilities of the ASWC and the SUWC are combined into the sea combat commander

(SCC) role whenever the level of activity and the complexity of the various mission areas are

deemed manageable. The SCC establishes sea combat guidance and controls assigned assets to

implement the sea combat plan. The tactical DESRON commander normally assumes the role as

SCC.

Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The STWC’s responsibilities are to conduct operations to destroy or neutralize enemy targets

ashore. These actions include attacks against strategic, operational, or tactical targets from

which the enemy is capable of conducting air, surface, or subsurface support operations. The

overall mission of the STWC is typically offensive. The STWC is located on the carrier and is

normally the carrier air wing commander (CAG).

103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS

Warfare commanders may designate temporary or permanent functional groups or components

to conduct a specific activity that supports the overall mission. The establishing authority

determines the command authority of the functional group commanders.

Functional groups are subordinate to the CWC and are usually established to perform duties that

are more limited in scope and duration than those performed by warfare commanders. Their

duties generally span assets normally assigned to one or more warfare commanders. See

Figure 1-3 for the specific functional group commanders.



Figure 1-3 Functional Group Commanders

104. COORDINATORS

Coordinators are asset and resource managers who carry out policies of the CWC and respond to

specific tasking of either warfare or functional group commanders. Coordinators are highlighted

in Figure 1-4.

Figure 1-4 Coordinators



Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC): provides organic carrier air resources as tasked by

warfare commanders and the CWC.

Helicopter Element Coordinator (HEC): promulgates air and air plans for non-logistical

helicopters to support CSG operations.

Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA): acts as principle advisor to the SCC for

submarine matters when an SSN is assigned in direct support of the CSG.

Force Over-the-horizon Track Coordinator (FOTC): manages and collates all source (organic

and non-organic) contact information and designates contacts of critical concern to the CSG.

105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

The National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code provide the basis for

the establishment of combatant commands. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) established the

missions and responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands and establishes their

general geographic areas of responsibility (AOR’s) and functions.

The commander of a combatant command that includes a geographic AOR is a “geographic

combatant commander.” The commander of a combatant command with trans-regional

responsibilities is a “functional combatant commander.”

Figure 1-5 UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command



As of 2013, the UCP contains 6 geographical and 4 functional combatant commands:

1. Geographical combatant commands (Figure 1-6):

a. US Central Command

b. US European Command

c. US Northern Command

d. US Pacific Command

e. US Southern Command

f. US African Command

2. Functional combatant commands:

a. US Joint Forces Command

b. US Special Operations Command

c. US Strategic Command

d. US Transportation Command

Within any geographical combatant command, the Naval Component Commander is subordinate

to the combatant commander and may designate a CWC.



Figure 1-6 US Geographic Combatant Commands

U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW 2-1

CHAPTER TWO

U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW

200. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the characteristics of U.S. naval aircraft plus U.S. naval surface and

subsurface platforms.

201. NAVAL AIRCRAFT PLATFORMS

This section provides an overview of the mission areas, systems, and weapons of U.S. naval

aircraft.

E-6B Mercury Characteristics

The E-6B Mercury (Figure 2-1) is a communications relay and strategic airborne command post

aircraft that provides survivable, reliable, and endurable airborne C3. The aircraft is equipped

with an Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) for the remote launching of land-based

missiles. The mission range of the E-6B is 6600 nautical miles (NM).

Although this aircraft does not carry direct weapons systems, it is able to transmit a signal to

launch land-based missiles when required. The mission areas of the E-6B include C3, strategic

airborne command, and communications relay. The sytems that the E-6B carries are very low

frequency (VLF) communications with dual Trailing Wire Antennas (TWAs), Military Strategic

and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR), ALCS, Satellite Communication (SATCOM), and Digital

Airborne Intercommunications and Switching System (DAISS).

Figure 2-1 E-6B Mercury

CHAPTER TWO ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

2-2 U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW

P-3C Orion and P-8A Poseidon Characteristics

The P-3C Orion (Figure 2-2) is a four-engine, turboprop, antisubmarine and maritime

surveillance aircraft. The P-8A Poseidon (Figure 2-3) has the exact same capabilities as the

P-3C, but with more advanced sensors. The P-8A, which is based on the Boeing 737

commercial aircraft, should replace the P-3C by the end of this decade.

Originally designed as a land-based, long-range antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft, the

P-3C now provides surveillance of land and sea battle space. This aircraft also carries a mixed

weapons payload with a mission range of 2380 NM.

The mission areas of the P-3C include ASW patrol, battle space surveillance, maritime patrol,

deterrence, sea control, maritime security, and SAR.

These aircraft carry a Surface Search(SS) radar (APS-137 [P-3C] and APY-10 [P-8A]),

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR), Identification Friend

or Foe (IFF) equipment, Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Magnetic Anomaly Detector

(MAD), acoustic processing capability, sonobuoy launch capability, Electro-Optical/Infrared

(EO/IR) camera, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), countermeasures, data link, Multi-Mission

Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT), Automatic Identification System (AIS) (receive only),

and SATCOM.

The P-3C may carry such weapons as the AGM-84 Harpoon, AGM-84H/K Standoff Land-

Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), AGM-65F Maverick, MK 46/50/54 torpedoes,

Zuni rockets, mines, and bombs.

Figure 2-2 P-3C Orion

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER TWO


Figure 2-3 P-8A Poseidon

EP-3E Aires Characteristics

The EP-3E Aries II (Figure 2-4) is a land-based multi-intelligence reconnaissance aircraft based

on the P-3 Orion airframe. Recently upgraded from signal intelligence (SIGINT) to multi-

intelligence, the EP-3E is the Navy’s only land-based reconnaissance aircraft.

The EP-3E aircraft provide near real-time tactical SIGINT and full-motion video intelligence to

fleet and theater commanders worldwide. With sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas,

the EP-3E can exploit a wide range of electronic emissions from deep within a targeted territory.

The crew combines the collected intelligence with off-board data and disseminates the

collaborated information for direct threat warning, indications and warning (I&W), information

dominance, battle space situational awareness (SA), Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

(SEAD), destruction of enemy air defense, Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), and ASW applications.

The mission areas of the EP-3E include I&W, Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO),

SAR, and Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP).

This aircraft carries radar, IFF, ESM, EO/IR camera, data link, MATT, AIS (receive only), and

SATCOM systems. However, it has no weapons capability.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&ved=0ahUKEwjMt-O6tKbSAhVJWSYKHay-CW0QjRwIBw&url=http://topsy.fr/hashtag.php?q%3D#p8a&bvm=bv.148073327,d.eWE&psig=AFQjCNH73kWtrfYR18vlJHXN1X_mG_-jgA&ust=1487945597849137



Figure 2-4 EP-3E Aires



E-2C/D Hawkeye Characteristics

The E-2C/D (Figure 2-5) is the Navy’s all-weather, carrier-based, tactical battle management

Airborne Early Warning (AEW) C2 aircraft. It is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft whose main

feature is a 24-ft diameter rotating radar dome on top of the aircraft. The E-2C/D does not carry

weapons.

The mission areas of the E-2C/D include all-weather AEW, airborne battle management, C2,

surveillance coordination, air interdiction, counter-air control, Close Air Support (CAS)

coordination, time-critical strike coordination, search and air rescue (SAR) airborne

coordination, and communications relay.

These aircraft carry computerized radar (APS-145 [E-2C] and APY-9 [E-2D]), IFF, ESM, data

link, SATCOM, and AIS (receive only) systems.

Figure 2-5 E-2 Hawkeye



F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F Hornet Characteristics

The F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F (Figure 2-4) are all-weather fighter-and-attack aircraft designed

for day/night strikes with precision-guided weapons, AAW, SEAD, CAS, and Forward Air

Controller Airborne [FAC(A)].

The mission areas of the F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F include air interdiction, CAS, fleet air

defense, strike, reconnaissance, and tanking (F/A-18E/F only).

These aircraft carry the APG-65 radar (F/A-18C only), APG-73 radar (most F/A-18C/D aircraft),

APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar (most F/A-18E/F aircraft),

Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) pod, RWR, countermeasures, Joint

Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) (F/A-18E/F only), advanced data link

(multifunctional information distribution system [MIDS]), and multi-sensor integration.

Some of the weapons carried by these aircraft include the M61A1/A2 Vulcan, AIM-9

Sidewinder, AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile

(AMRAAM), AGM-84H/K SLAM-ER, AGM-84 Harpoon, AGM-88 HARM, AGM-65

Maverick, Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).

Figure 2-6 F/A-18 Hornet



EA-6B Prowler Characteristics

The EA-6B (Figure 2-7) provides protection for strike aircraft, ground troops, and ships by

jamming enemy radar, electronic data links, and communications. This aircraft, whose mission

areas include EW and SEAD, is a long-range, all-weather aircraft with advanced electronic

countermeasures capability.

The EA-6B carries such systems as communications jamming, EW, APS-130 radar (Search,

Ground Mapping, and Terrain-Avoidance radar), LITENING targeting pod (USMC only), RWR,

countermeasures, data link, MATT, and Improved Data Modem (IDM). The weapons that the

aircraft may carry are AGM-88 HARM, jamming pods, and bulk chaff pods.

Figure 2-7 EA-6B Prowler



E/A-18G Growler Characteristics

The E/A-18G (Figure 2-8), the fourth variant of the F/A-18 family of aircraft, is built with a

sophisticated EW suite to perform a wide range of enemy defense-suppression missions. The

aircraft is an Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) aircraft that integrates the latest EA technology.

The mission areas of this aircraft include EW, SEAD, and multi-mission capabilities (fight

escort, reconnaissance, tanking, and air defense suppression) shared with the F/A-18 Super

Hornet.

The systems that the E/A-18G carries are communications jamming, electronic warfare (EW),

APG-79 AESA radar, RWR, countermeasures, data link, and SATCOM.

Weapons carried onboard this aircraft include jamming pods, AIM-120 AMRAAM, AGM-88

HARM, and AGM-154 JSOW.

Figure 2-8 E/A-18G Growler



MH-60R Seahawk Characteristics

As the Navy’s next generation submarine hunter and Surface Warfare (SUW) helicopter, the

MH-60R Seahawk (Figure 2-9) will be the cornerstone of the Navy’s Helicopter Concept of

Operations (CONOPS).

The MH-60R and its mission systems, which will replace the fleet’s legacy SH-60B and SH-60F,

is designed to operate from both small ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) and carriers. This

aircraft combines the capabilities of the SH-60B and SH-60F, but does not carry the MAD sensor

that the SH-60B incorporated.

The mission areas of this aircraft include ASW, SUW, SAR, surveillance, Vertical

Replenishment (VERTREP), VHF/UHF/link communications relay, naval surface fire and

gunfire support, logistics (LOG) support, personnel transport, and medical evacuation.

The MH-60R carries SS radar, ISAR, IFF, ESM, acoustic processing with sonobuoy release

capability, dipping sonar, Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera, RWR, countermeasures,

data link, and Hawklink (helicopter-to-ship streaming video and data) systems.

The weapons carried on this aircraft include the MK 54 Torpedo, AGM-114 Hellfire, and a 7.62-

mm or .50-caliber (cal) machine gun.

Figure 2-9 MH-60R Seahawk



MH-60S Knighthawk Characteristics

The MH-60S is designed to perform VERTREP, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), special

operations support, mine countermeasures, and SUW. Originally designed to replace the aging

H-46D heavy-lift helicopter in the VERTREP role, the MH-60S also replaced the HH-60H with

its CSAR role.

With expanded capabilities, the mission roles have increased beyond VERTREP and CSAR to

include special operations support, transport, SUW, combat support, humanitarian disaster relief,

aeromedical evacuation, and mine countermeasures.

The systems that the MH-60S carries are ESM, FLIR camera, mine detection, RWR,

countermeasures, data link, and SATCOM. The weapons carried by the MH-60S are the

AGM-114 Hellfire, rockets, and machine guns.

Figure 2-10 MH-60S Knighthawk



C-2A Greyhound Characteristics

The mission areas of the C-2A consist of providing critical LOG support to CSGs and

transporting high-priority cargo, mail, and passengers between aircraft carriers and shore bases.

The C-2A does not carry any specialized systems or weapons.

Figure 2-11 C-2A Greyhound

202. SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE PLATFORMS

This section provides an overview of the surface and subsurface platforms and their mission

areas, systems, and weapons.

Aircraft Carriers, Nuclear (Nimitz Class) Characteristics

Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carriers (CVNs) (Figure 2-12), the world’s largest warships, are

surface platforms that serve as the centerpiece of USN forces. They carry over 60 aircraft of

various types and have the capability to deploy these aircraft over a wide area.

The mission areas of these carriers include power projection, forward presence, humanitarian

assistance, deterrence, sea control, and maritime security.

CVNs use air traffic control (ATC) radar, Air Search radar, ESM, EW, countermeasures, data

link, AIS, SATCOM, and various aircraft systems.

Sea Sparrow missiles, Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), and Rolling Airframe

Missiles (RAMs) are the typical weapons carried on the CVNs.



Figure 2-12 Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear



Amphibious Assault Ships (Wasp Class and Tarawa Class) Characteristics

The amphibious assault ship classes (LHD/LHA) (Figure 2-13) are capable of hosting

Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft operations. These ships are designed to

support the USMC tenets of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to

Objective Maneuver (STOM).

These classes of ships, which must be able to sail in harm’s way, provide a rapid build-up of

combat power ashore in the face of opposition. The mission areas include humanitarian

operations, amphibious warfare, and sea strike.

These ships use SS radar, 3D Air Search, MK 23 Target Acquisition System, ATC, EW,

countermeasures, data link, AIS, SATCOM, and various aircraft systems.

The weapons carried on these ships include Sea Sparrow missiles, Phalanx CIWS, RAMs,

.50-cal machine guns, and MK 38 25-mm machine guns.

Figure 2-13 Amphibious Assault Ship



Cruisers (Ticonderoga Class) Characteristics

Cruisers (CG) (Figure 2-14), which are large combat vessels with multiple-target response

capabilities, perform in a battle force role. These classes of ships are surface combatants capable

of supporting carrier battle groups and amphibious forces in multiple missions and operating

independently as flagships of Surface Action Groups (SAGs).

The mission areas include AAW, ASW, SUW, Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), Strike

Warfare (STW), and ballistic missile defense (BMD).

These ships carry the Air Search radar, Fire Control radar, SS radar, Aegis Combat System

(SPY-1), ESM, active and passive sonar (hull-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic

processing, sonobuoy launch capability, EW, two MH-60R or SH-60B LAMPS helicopters,

BMD (some ships), countermeasures, data link, AIS, Hawklink, and SATCOM systems.

The weapons that these ships carry include the MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS);

vertical launch Antisubmarine Rockets (ASROCs); Tomahawk cruise missiles; MK 46

torpedoes; MK 45 5-in, .54-cal, lightweight guns; and Phalanx CIWS.

Figure 2-14 Cruiser



Destroyers (Arleigh Burke Class) Characteristics

This class of destroyer warships (DDGs) (Figure 2-15) provides multi-mission offensive and

defensive capabilities. These ships can operate independently or as part of CSGs, ESGs, SAGs,

amphibious ready groups, or underway replenishment groups. The mission areas include AAW,

ASW, SUW, and STW.

These warships carry the Air Search radar, Fire Control radar, SS radar, Aegis Combat System

(SPY-1), ESM, active and passive sonar (hull-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic

processing, sonobuoy launch capability, EW, two MH-60R or Sh-60B LAMPS helicopters,

BMD (some ships), countermeasures, data link, AIS, Hawklink, and SATCOM systems.

The weapons that destroyers may carry include Standard Missiles (SM-2MRs); vertical launch

ASROCs; Tomahawk cruise missiles; Phalanx CIWS; MK 46 torpedoes; MK 45 5-in, .54-cal,

lightweight guns; and evolved Sea Sparrow missiles.

Figure 2-15 Destroyer

Littoral Combat Ships (Independence and Freedom Class) Characteristics



The littoral combat ship (LCS) (Figure 2-16) is a new family of surface ships for the US Navy,

and is a fast, highly maneuverable, networked surface combat ship, which is a specialized variant

of the family of US future surface combat ships known as DD(X).

LCSs are designed to satisfy the emergent requirement for shallow draft vessels that can operate

in the littoral (coastal waters) to counter the increasing potential threats of coastal mines, quiet

diesel submarines, and the potential of terrorists to carry explosives on small, fast, armed boats.

The two designs are quite different, although both satisfy the top level performance requirements

and technical requirements of the LCS program. Both achieve sprint speeds in excess of 40

knots and transit distances of more than 3500 miles. The ships can carry out aircraft launch and

recovery in conditions up to sea state 5. A core capability will be the deployment of Fire Scout

unmanned air vehicle and the unmanned ribbed boat.

Both classes of vessels are armed with the BAE Systems Land and Armaments (formerly United

Defense) mk110 57-mm naval gun system. The MK 110 fires MK 295 ammunition at a rate of

220 rounds per minute out to a range of nine miles.

Figure 2-16 Littoral Combat Ship

Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (Ohio Class) Characteristics



The fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) class (Figure 2-17) serves as an undetectable launch

platform for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). These vessels, whose mission area is

strategic deterrence, are designed specifically for stealth and the precise delivery of nuclear

warheads.

The systems on these vessels include SS radar, ESM, active and passive sonar (bow-mounted),

passive towed array, acoustic processing, and countermeasures.

The Trident II submarine-launched ballistic nuclear missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and

MK 48 torpedoes are the types of weapons carried on this class of submarines.

Figure 2-17 Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine

Attack Submarines (Los Angeles, Seawolf, and Virginia Class) Characteristics



This class of attack submarines (SSNs) (Figure 2-18) possessing booth speed and stealth is

designed to destroy enemy submarines and surface ships with their MK 48 torpedoes. Their

mission areas include ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), MIW, battle group

operational support, special operations support, and STW.

The systems carried on these vessels are SS radar, ESM, active and passive sonar

(bow-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic processing, and countermeasures.

Figure 2-18 Attack Submarine

Guided-Missile Submarines (Ohio Class) Characteristics



This class of guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) (Figure 2-19), with its superior

communications systems, provides a combination of strike and special operation mission

capabilities within a stealth platform.

In order to meet the needs of the nation’s strategic force, the U.S. required only 14 of its 18 Ohio

Class SSBNs. Taking advantage of the existing submarine technology, the decision was made to

transform the remaining four Ohio Class SSBN submarines into conventional land attack and

special operations support platforms, redesignating these submarines as SSGNs. The mission

areas include Special Operations Forces and STW.

The systems that these submarines carry are SS radar, ESM, active and passive sonar

(bow-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic processing, and countermeasures. The weapons

that these vessels may carry are the Tomahawk cruise missiles and MK 48 torpedoes.

Figure 2-19 Guided-Missile Submarine

DATA LINK AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION 3-1

CHAPTER THREE

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY

300. INTRODUCTION

This chapter includes a discussion of warfare commander call signs, weapon control statuses,

threat warnings, brevity codes, queries, and briefings.

301. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES

Call signs and threat warning/weapon control statuses provide an efficient and timely reference

to the commander in question or to the targeting instructions in the field.

A warfare commander is typically assigned a two-letter call sign associated with his or her

respective assigned duty. The call sign, which provides a clear picture of the command

organization, is a quick and easy reference for a commander to use in cross-warfare area

communications. The first letter (prefix) of each call sign signifies a specific composite warfare

organization. The second letter (suffix) of each call sign signifies a specific commander or

coordinator within a composite warfare organization

Each warfare commander has a primary commander in charge and a designated alternate

commander. If the primary commander is not able to take control of their particular warfare

area, the alternate commander takes control. The warfare commander, functional commander,

and coordinator have their own call signs the same as a primary commander and an alternate

commander. The prevalent composite warfare commanders/coordinators introduced in chapter

21 and their call signs are as follows:

OTC: The theater commander’s call sign is (AA). Normally the OTC is the numbered fleet

commander (e.g., Commander 5th Fleet) and is usually the rank of, Vice Admiral.

CWC: Delegated authority by the OTC for the overall direction and control of the force. The

CWC is normally the CSG Commander, call sign (AB), and is a Rear Admiral Lower Half

(one-star).

AMDC: Call sign (AW) is normally the CSG Cruiser CO with the rank of Captain (O-6).

IWC: Call sign (AQ) is normally the senior O-6 onboard the CSG staff.

SCC: Call sign (AZ) is normally the DESRON commander with the rank of Captain (O-6).

STWC: Call sign (AP) is normally the Carrier Air Group (CAG) Commander (CAG) with the

rank of Captain (O-6).

FOTC: Call sign (AF) is normally the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO), a limited duty

officer (LDO) onboard the CSG staff specializing in multi-tactical data link interface

architecture, planning, and operation.

CHAPTER THREE ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

3-2 TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY

Weapon Control Status

The OTC or the relevant warfare commander issues a weapon control status. This weapon

control status provides the commander’s general direction or policy for weapon employment for

all or part of a specific warfare area such as SUW, ASW, and AAW. The weapon control

statuses are: Weapons Free (open fire on any target that is not identified as friendly), Tight (Do

not open fire unless target is identified as hostile), and Safe (Do not open fire except in self-

defense or in response to a formal order).

Threat Warnings

Since threat warnings are informative, force or individual unit actions are not automatically

linked to the warning. Sometimes, an OTC orders temporary actions based on a certain

situation; however, threat warnings are typically issued as a direct result of detections and enemy

reports. The color codes that are applied to threat warnings denote the severity of the evaluated

threats. These color codes are Warning White (attack is unlikely without adequate warning),

Yellow (attack is probable), and Red (attack is imminent or has already begun).

Threat warnings apply to principal warfare areas and include, but are not limited to, AAW,

SUW, and ASW.

302. BREVITY CODES

Multi-service brevity codes are used by various military forces and, by design, are a universal

language not tied to any one particular branch of service. Brevity codes convey complex

information in simplified terms. They are intended to shorten, rather than conceal, the content of

a message. The latest edition of the Common Universal Brevity Code Manual is available for

download at the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Website. The hyperlink is

http://www.alsa.mil/library/mttps/brevity.html and CAC login is required. It is highly

recommended that each student downloads and studies the terms found in the ALSA Common

Universal Brevity Code Manual. These terms will be discussed in the CAI and MIL lessons

associated with this chapter and will be utilized regularly during simulator events. Students are

responsible for the knowledge of ALSA brevity words covered in this chapter’s CAI and MIL

presentations.

303. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS

Knowing how to respond to a query challenge (depending on location) is very important within

naval aviation. Knowledge of standardized briefs and reports is also critical to mission success.

Maritime Query Challenge Procedures

Freedom of the high seas includes the right of aircraft of all nations to use the airspace over the

high seas. The sovereignty of a state extends beyond its land area to the outer limit of its

territorial seas. The U.S. recognizes territorial sea claims up to 12 NM from a state’s land

http://www.alsa.mil/library/mttps/brevity.html

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER THREE

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY 3-3

boundaries. When U.S. military aircraft personnel experience different maritime situations,

specific procedures exist as described below.

A U.S. military aircraft that receives a challenge from an international authority while operating

in international airspace should advise the challenging authority that it is a U.S. military aircraft

and continue its planned route of flight. If a U.S. military aircraft is intercepted by foreign

aircraft, established DoD Flight Information Procedures and International Intercept Procedures

should be followed.

If intercepted in the territorial airspace of a foreign country, a U.S. military aircraft should

comply with the foreign authority’s directions to depart territorial airspace or directions to land

(provided a safe landing can be accomplished). If the aircraft lands, the crew should

immediately contact the applicable U.S. embassy for assistance.

Briefs and Reports

Standardized briefs and reports provide useful information regarding assets, capabilities, targets,

actions, and other data. The briefing formats that should be used are the Check-in (MNPOTTA)

Brief, Surface Contact Report, Maritime Air Control (MAC) Comm Format, Checkout Briefing

In-Flight Report (INFLTREP), and/or Surface Picture (SURPIC) Report.

The MNPOTTA check-in format (Figure 3-1) is used in conjunction with Maritime Air Control

communication which replaced the outdated MAS tactic and is used in armed reconnaissance/air

interdiction/strike coordination and reconnaissance (AR/AI/SCAR) missions with dynamic

targets requiring quick reaction times.



Figure 3-1 Check-in Brief (MNPOTTA)

The Surface Contact Report (Figure 3-2) provides standardized information on vessels or tracks

of interest. Line numbers are not transmitted.

Figure 3-2 Surface Contact Report

The baseline air-to-surface communications format for MAC (Figure 3-3) has been aligned to

closely resemble the one used for Tactical Air Intercept Control (TACAIC).



Figure 3-3 Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format

The Checkout Briefing (INFLTREP), shown in Figure 3-4, recaps actions taken during air

operations in maritime surface warfare (AOMSW) missions. Line numbers are not transmitted.

Figure 3-4 Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report)

The SURPIC Report (Figures 3-5 and 3-6) is a two-page guide with standardized information

about surface contacts. AOMSW assets complete the first page by using information from the

second page that best matches the details of the surface contact.



Figure 3-5 Surface Picture Report (SURPIC) Page 1



Figure 3-6 Surface Picture Report (SURPIC) Page 2


CHAPTER FOUR

DATA LINK AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION

400. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will explore data link and tactical communications integration terms, procedures,

and limitations. This includes discussions on data link management concept, limitations, tactical

communication, intelligence information reporting, transmission security, and emission control

(EMCON).

401. DATA LINK MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

In a multi-sensor environment, there is a need to organize data processing to achieve accuracy,

timeliness, and proper communication resource management. A poorly managed picture can be

confusing and lead to possible fratricide and/or incorrect target prosecution. A properly

managed picture improves situational awareness builder and acts as a force multiplier.

Proper data link management involves correct track reporting including maintaining one track

number for the life of the track. Link management is an all-operator responsibility. The JICO

heads the Joint Interface Control Cell and manages the complexity of the data link and electronic

battlefield and works to maintain successful continuous data exchange. This function, as

previously discussed, is normally assigned to a limited duty officer (LDO) attached to the CSG

staff.

Data link management, as performed by the JICO, consists of actions needed to dynamically

establish, maintain, and terminate Link 16 communications among participants. Some of the

ICO functions include monitoring network configuration, performing general link

administration, and assigning network roles to JUs.

The following terminology (Figure 4-1) is pertinent to data link management:

Term Definition

Reporting

Responsibility (R2 )

The responsibility assigned to a Joint Tactical Information

Distribution System (JTIDS) JTIDS Unit (JU) reporting a particular

track for that track. It is the objective to only have one unit report a

particular track. The JU with the highest track quality has this

responsibility. The JU with R2 is responsible for performing

calculations to keep track information up-to-date.

Track Quality (TQ) The number that a JU calculates and transmits to express reliability

of its information about the track.

CHAPTER FOUR ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

4-2 DATA LINK AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION

Term Definition

Conflict Resolution Procedures that a JU may use to ensure only one unit has R2 and

that a solution is reached for conflicting track reports by different

units.

EMCON A procedure used to minimize the likeliness of detection,

identification, and location of friendly forces by an enemy. It is

also used to reduce electromagnetic interference among friendly

systems.

Figure 4-1 Data Link Terminology

Track Origination

A track entry is built by an operator who initiates the entry from synthetic sensor data that

provides the following primary information: position, course, speed, and altitude. Each JU must

evaluate all tracks for which it has R2. Unknown, unevaluated tracks being reported in the link

are unacceptable.

Track Reporting

The JU that originates a track assumes R2 for the track unless a more appropriate JU (one that

holds a higher track quality) is available. It is incumbent upon operators to coordinate with the

FOTC as necessary to resolve R2 and other data link reporting issues.

Track Quality

Each JU’s data link tactical computer calculates its specific positional accuracy range. This data

is then used to develop a TQ value that ranges from 0-15. This TQ value is then used to assign

R2.

Conflict Resolution

If a track conflict arises, such as two units reporting different identification and track information

for the same track, the FOTC voice network, designated (AF), is used to resolve the conflict.

Link managers use the AF net to communicate proper track information via the FOTC to the

appropriate R2 JU.

Data Link Management Limitations

Multiple platforms may be participating in the data link at any given time. Each automatically

generates tracks and assigns TQ to those tracks. This requires constant vigilance on the part of

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER FOUR


the operator to properly manage the track data and ensure that it is reported correctly. Care must

be taken to follow proper procedures to avoid issues such as a split net or data loop.

402. LINK 16 AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATION

Link 16 improves upon the existing tactical data link (TDL) network by providing more

complete and more accurate tactical information, superior communications technology, and an

introduction of intelligence information reporting capability to the navy.

Specific Link 16 tactical communication improvements include greatly improved friendly force

location, identification and status reporting capability, positional accuracy improvements through

relative navigation (RELNAV), integrated voice and plain-text features, and improved

transmission security and anti-jam features.

Intelligence Information Reporting

Amplifying link reported tracks (real-time or non-real-time) with information gained by

intelligence sources other than traditional means is known as intelligence information reporting.

Any intelligence source can report this information and tie it to a data link track regardless of R2.

Intelligence information reporting sources include the EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance

Integrated Electronic System (ARIES) II, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and the Ship Signals Exploitation

Space (SSES).

The EP-3E ARIES II is the navy’s only land-based SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft. The 11

aircraft in the navy’s inventory provide fleet and theater commanders with near real-time tactical

SIGINT. With sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas, the EP-3E exploits a wide range

of electronic emissions from deep within targeted territory. Intelligence information from the

EP-3E can be quickly disseminated to airborne and surface command and control (C2) platforms

and incorporated into Link 16 track data.

The RC-135V/W Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft supports theater and national level

consumers with near real-time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination

capabilities. The Rivet Joint’s on-board sensor suite allows the mission crew to detect, identify,

and geolocate signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. The mission crew can then

forward gathered information in a variety of formats to a wide range of consumers via Rivet

Joint’s extensive communications suite.

In many navy ships, intelligence information used to amplify Link 16 tracks is gained in SSES.

SSES provides indications and warning support to the tactical watch standers and strike group

planners as well as real-time reporting and dissemination of time-sensitive products to national

and tactical-level decision makers.

Acceptance of the intelligence information for inclusion in track reports is at the discretion of the

tactical operators.



Link 16 Data Transmission Security

There are two layers of communication security provided by the JTIDS KGV-8 Secure Data Unit

(SDU); message security (MSEC) and transmission security (TSEC). MSEC is the encryption of

the message prior to transmission. TSEC is the encryption of the transmission itself. The SDU

stores both of these cryptovariables.

In addition to encryption of the transmission (time jitter and random noise), the TSEC

cryptovariable helps determine the frequency hopping pattern that spreads the signal across 51

discrete UHF frequencies at approximately 77,000 hops per second. This makes the transmitted

signal extremely difficult to both detect and jam.

Transmission of a Link 16 message includes the following: The terminal sends the message to

the Digital Data Processor (DDP). The DDP uses the MSEC cryptovariable from the SDU to

encrypt the message prior to the TSEC application. The DDP then “Encapsulates” the message

using the TSEC crypto-variable from the SDU.

A receiving JU whose SDU contains the identical MSEC and TSEC cryptovariables will be able

to unpack the transmitted message, decrypt the scrambled message within, and present it to the

operator as usable data.

403. EMCON

EMCON is the managing of the electromagnetic spectrum which covers everything from infrared

signals to satellite communications. EMCON operations are primarily conducted to conceal the

location of the carrier. Enemy ships have the ability to detect the carrier’s electronic emissions.

The EW module (AQ) is responsible for limiting the enemy’s effectiveness. To keep the CSG

from being detected, AQ can enact various EMCON procedures. There are four conditions or

levels of EMCON, each with its own plan delineating how the EMCON level is to be set.

EMCON DELTA: normal underway sailing. There are no emissions restrictions in condition

DELTA and the ship can transmit any mission-essential radiation.

EMCON CHARLIE: Set to disguise the carrier. All emitters unique to an aircraft carrier are

secured in order to keep an adversary from identifying the “mission essential” unit.

EMCON BRAVO: Further limits the ship’s electronic emissions, but still allows for

communication and data transfer.

EMCON ALPHA: The most restrictive EMCON level. Alpha is set when the ship wants to

disappear electronically. During EMCON Alpha, no emissions are allowed. To assist with

launch and recovery, a modified condition, EMCON Alpha-1, is put into effect when necessary.

Under EMCON Alpha, the carrier will be completely passive in Timber. An entity outside of the

EMCON circle (specified radius from the carrier) will assume Net Time Reference (NTR). The

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER FOUR


carrier can still receive the surveillance picture and other data link information while operating in

data silent mode. If necessary, Link 16 will allow the carrier to transmit necessary voice or text

data with a very low detection probability due to JTIDS spread spectrum frequency hopping.

SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS 5-1

CHAPTER FIVE

SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS

500. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine SUW and Operational Groups. The terms and limitations associated

with SUW will be discussed here as well.

501. SURFACE WARFARE

There are five missions specific to SUW that are covered in MC2 Common Core. Advanced

MC2/Common Core focuses on three of these: Surface Surveillance Coordination (SSC),

AR/AI/SCAR, and WAS strike.

Surface Surveillance Coordination (SSC)

SSC in maritime SUW provides reconnaissance and/or surveillance in support of the maritime

commander’s objectives. The SSC mission plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining

the common operating picture (COP).

The planning documents used for the SSC mission include Air Plans, Airspace Control Order

(ACO), Special Instructions (SPINS), Comm Card/Card of the Day, and various OPTASK

messages.

Air plans are published by the carrier air wing (CVW) and ESG. These plans are graphical

representations of flight operations that list the following: Call signs, tactical frequencies, launch

and recovery times, flight composition, and fuel and ordnance loads. Air plans contain navy

direct support (organic) sorties and common use sorties (when operating in a joint or coalition

environment with an air operation center and maritime component commander.

An ACO is an order implementing the airspace control plan, providing the details of the

approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. The airspace control authority (ACA)

establishes a dedicated airspace planning team to develop the ACO for CSG/ESG operations.

SPINS are used as the primary means to supplement and broadcast information contained in the

other planning documents. SPINS clarify any special instructions that are needed by the aircrew

to safely accomplish their mission. These instructions are published as baseline SPINS, weekly

SPINS, and daily SPINS. They include a section on airspace procedures and other sections, such

as tanker and cruise missile procedures, if they are required. SPINS may also include ROE and

combat identification criteria for air defense, including any additional guidance, directives, or

information for weapons systems operators and aircrew. These instructions could include host

nation restrictions, base defense zone procedures, and special weapons systems control

procedures.

CHAPTER FIVE ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

5-2 SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS

The Card of the Day or Card of the Week contains SPINS and maritime-specific daily code

words, system status base numbers and TACAN channels of Navy units. Comm Cards contain

the frequencies J Voice net numbers and names of the various communications networks

OPTASK messages convey detailed information about specific aspects of individual areas of

warfare and about tasking of resources. Types of OPTASK messages include communications,

LINK, LINK ID, air defense, SUW/SCC, Area of Operations (AO), commander’s guidance and

intentions, and preplanned response (PPR) documents.

Communications OPTASK messages define the satellite communications channels and the

secure and clear radio frequencies the CSG uses. As previously discussed, LINK OPTASK

messages provide all of the parameters for the use of the LINK capabilities, including net

assignments, track limitations, and crypto information. LINK ID OPTASK messages delineate

the appropriate LINK symbology for track assignments. Air defense OPTASK messages are

also called Air Defense Center (ADC) Daily Intentions Messages (DIMs). This type of message

outlines the naval vessels designated as firing units, Aircraft Control Units (ACUs), and

additional fleet air defense responsibilities. SUW/SCC OPTASK messages are also referred to

as SCC DIMs. This type of message contains the priority contact set for the Contacts of Interest

(COI), Critical Contacts of Interest (CCOI), and Vessels of Interest (VOI).

AO OPTASK messages contain the defined vital area (VA); SA; and the criteria needed for the

Classification Identification Engagement Area (CIEA). The commander’s guidance and

intentions OPTASK messages for prosecuting contacts contain various information including

engagement authority, Positive Identification (PID) requirements, methods to disseminate target

identification, Acceptable Levels of Risk (ALR), ROEs, target priorities, and restricted targets.

PPR OPTASK messages are the guiding documents for strike groups to follow in response to

numerous situations. Often, the PPR document drives the DIMs and provides guidance for assets

working with strike groups.

SSC assets may be scheduled on the Air Plan or reassigned from other missions real-time. For

preplanned SSC missions, detailed unit-to-unit coordination is critical. For reassigned SSC

assets, in-flight briefings should be conducted by the aircraft control unit (ACU). The ACU, for

SSC, AR/AI/SCAR and WAS missions is also known as the maritime air controller (MAC).

Maritime Air Support (MAS)

MAS is an SUW mission that is no longer used. It was defined as air action against hostile

surface targets at sea requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and

movement of maritime forces. MAS was a cumbersome and time-consuming mission and

became ineffective because the navy’s reaction time to today’s threat has significantly decreased.

MAS utilized complicated tactics and a detailed MAS 9-line briefing format. Streamlined and

updated tactics became necessary in order to effectively cope with the pop-up dynamic threats in

today’s maritime environment which require quick reaction times and dynamic targeting.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER FIVE


Maritime Air Control (MAC)

MAC is used when directing air action against hostile or potentially hostile surface targets at sea

that due to their inherent mobility and may require air assets to be quickly reassigned from other

missions. MAC utilizes a streamlined check-in process and a comm format similar to that of air

intercept control and the maritime dynamic targeting terms: INVESTIGATE, TARGET, and

SMACK for directive. The Maritime Air Controller uses Maritime Air Control when conducting

SSC, AR.AI/SCAR, and WAS strike missions. The MAC comm format replaces the MAS 9-line

brief and is far more universal in its application.

AR/AI/SCAR

AR/AI missions locate and attack targets of opportunity (TOO) in assigned areas. The SCAR

role may be air plan assigned or situationally assumed. The SCAR is primarily responsible for

the deconfliction of aircraft and weapons in an assigned area. AR/AI missions differ from the

outdated MAS mission in that detailed integration with surface forces is not required.

Since AR/AI missions do not require detailed tactical integration with maritime surface forces,

they can be tasked in the maritime domain. Maritime surface targets are considered dynamic

targets due to their inherent mobility.

SCAR missions in the maritime environment could be directed by the Strike Coordination and

Reconnaissance Coordinator, also known as the SCAR or the Sea Combat Commander (AZ) in

the SPINS or DIM.

WAS Strike

WAS strike differs from AR/AI in that it is the execution of DELIBERATE attacks, which are

offensive in nature, against symmetric enemy surface combatants and materiel. WAS may be an

airplan assigned mission or airborne assets may be re-roled to execute or support a WAS against

a recently located target.

Targets of Interest

VOI is usually assigned to specific vessels whose interest is derived from intelligence sources.

Certain surface contacts may be classified as COI and CCOI. COIs have tactical significance,

but may not be a threat to the force and have no real impact on mission completion. For

example, a COI may be defined as naval combatants operating in a particular area or unknown

surface contacts operating in a designated area. CCOI present a threat to the force, and their

locations must be identified for successful completion of the mission. CCOI could be potential

adversaries suspected of either terrorist or smuggling activity.



Airspace Designation

International law provides general provisions for the divisions between National and

International Airspace. National airspace extends to 12 NM off the coast of the respective

country, including any island or group of islands. While ships enjoy rights of innocent passage,

there are no automatic rights of entry for aircraft. Consent to fly into national airspace requires a

diplomatic clearance. Diplomatic clearances require full disclosure of aircraft contents and the

purpose of the proposed overflight. Aircraft in international airspace normally have freedom to

conduct all types of military operations subject to the requirements of due regard as defined by

the DoD Instruction 4540.01.

The U.S. does not recognize a specific altitude where airspace ends and outer space begins.

Every country has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, and

their domestic laws apply to activities in its territorial airspace. There are no legal requirements

for a nation’s airspace controlling agency to provide safety of flight.

Any activities conducted in the airspace of another country require the approval of that country.

Although several coastal nations have asserted claims intended to prohibit foreign warships and

military aircraft from operating in security zones extending beyond their territorial sea (12 NM

from their coast), these claims have no basis in international law and are not recognized by the

U.S. Operating in the national airspace above another country without permission would likely

be viewed as an infringement on that country’s sovereign rights and a violation of its territorial

integrity.

As military aircraft transit international straits, they are afforded the right of transit passage

through the international straits. Military aircraft must operate with due regard for safety of

navigation and monitor the guard or the appropriate international distress RF. While in the strait

exercising this right, aircraft must proceed without delay and refrain from any threat or use of

force against nations bordering the strait.

The Law of the Sea Convention

The divisions of the oceans and airspace per the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are

shown in Figure 5-1. The United States has not ratified the 1982 Law of the sea Convention due

to objections over part XI which establishes an international sea bed authority in order to

authorize sea bed exploration and mining and distribute royalties. The United States has,

however, expressed agreement with the remaining provisions of the convention.



Figure 5-1 Ocean and Airspace Divisions

502. OPERATIONAL GROUPS

Knowledge of operational groups, their AO, and how to approach them is essential to SUW.

Surface Action Group (SAG)

A SAG is a temporary or standing organization of combatant ships, other than carriers, tailored

for a specific tactical mission. A SAG may consist of one or more naval surface vessels with

rotary wing aircraft or unmanned aerial systems (UASs) that usually operate at low altitudes.

Airspace control and deconfliction will occur using the ship’s call sign on a pre-briefed

frequency. In the absence of a pre-briefed frequency, the ship should expect to be queried on the

international emergency frequency, guard. Aircraft should maintain a 5 NM standoff from Navy

SAGs unless cleared otherwise.

Carrier Strike Group (CSG)

A CSG consists of one CVN supported by other naval surface vessels with a significant number

of fixed-wing and limited rotary wing aircraft. A typical CSG might include one cruiser, a

destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates, and a CVW consisting of 65 – 70

aircraft. A CVW, previously called a Carrier Air Group (CAG), is typically made up of two

F/A-18F squadrons, a C-2A detachment, and one squadron each of F/A-18Es, F/A-18Cs, EA-

18Gs, E-2Cs, and SH-60s. A CSG may also include submarines, attached logistics ships, and

supply ships.



Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)

An ESG consists of air-capable amphibious ships supported by other naval surface combatants.

Like a CSG, an ESG conducts both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft operations. This strike group

also allows U.S. naval fleets to provide highly movable and self-sustaining forces for missions in

various parts of the globe.

Approaching a Strike Group

Air assets approaching CSGs or ESGs must establish contact with the initial controlling agency

responsible for detection and identification as soon as they are within radio range.

REDCROWN supports the maritime AMDC and is responsible for detection and identification

of aircraft approaching a CSG’s airspace and delousing friendly aircraft from enemy aircraft.

Marshalling, recovering, and launching of aircraft may occur within 5 NM of the carrier.

GREENCROWN is responsible for detection and identification of aircraft approaching an ESG’s

airspace.

Contact with REDCROWN or GREENCROWN must be established as soon as practical and in

accordance with the applicable theater operating procedures. When checking in with

REDCROWN or GREENCROWN, at a minimum the aircraft call sign (number and type of

aircraft), mission number, and position and altitude are required, if not already coordinated by

C2 aircraft for individual fighter and bomber flights. To provide the needed information for C2,

the BULLSEYE, TACAN cuts, established Geographic References (GEOREFs), and latitude

and longitude in accordance with SPINS should be used.

REDCROWN or GREENCROWN will verify AOMSW aircraft for IFF Mode 2/4. The IFF

Mode 2/4 will be either valid or invalid for the aircraft. If it is valid, AOMSW aircraft should

expect to receive SWEET, SWEET from REDCROWN or GREENCROWN. This indication

allows them to proceed on their mission. If IFF Mode 2/4 is not coming up as valid with

REDCROWN or GREENCROWN, AOMSW aircraft will receive a report of SOUR for Mode 2,

4, or both. Unless specifically addressed in the SPINS, AOMSW aircraft without valid IFF

MODE 2/4 will normally not be allowed to continue their mission.



Figure 5-2 Bullseye Position Reporting

Bullseye is an established reference point from which a contact can be located using bearing

(degrees magnetic) and range (nm). Command and control of maritime patrol and

reconnaissance (MPR) aircraft such as a P-3 or P-8 is typically regulated using bullseye

communication format. Bullseye reference points are published in the ACO and the current

bullseye in use is promulgated via card of the day, message traffic, or voice situation report

(SITREP) through AZ or AW. An example of bullseye position reporting is shown in

Figure 5-2.

CSGs and ESGs differ in their approach areas and procedures. Because of the large volume of

traffic within close proximity to a CVN, caution must be exercised when approaching CSG

airspace. The Carrier Control Area (CCA) is a circular airspace within a 50 NM radius of the

carrier extending from the surface upward to infinity under the control of Carrier Air Traffic

Control Center (CATCC). The Carrier Control Zone (CCZ) is a circular airspace defined by a

5NM horizontal limit from the carrier normally extending from the surface to 2500 feet. Non-

organic aircraft transiting the CCA must contact Strike and must be in positive control of the

tower inside of the CCZ. A diagram of CSG airspace is shown in the next figure.

. MACIE

Charlie, Pelican 01,

Standing by, Alpha Check.

Pelican 01, Charlie, Alpha

Check, MACIE 270/20.



Figure 5-3 Carrier Strike Group Airspace

STRIKE controls aircraft within 50 NM of a CSG. If an aircraft is transiting within 50 NM of a

CSG, it will check in with STRIKE, using the same format as REDCROWN. STRIKE has the

ability to provide radar control, but their primary duties are administrative accounting and IFF

verification of aircraft in CSG airspace.

TOWER controls airspace within a 10 NM radius of the CVN from the surface to an unlimited

altitude. Contact TOWER on the land/launch frequency. No aircraft should approach closer

than 10 NM without being in positive control of TOWER.

MARSHAL provides services for the CVN that are similar to an approach control. MARSHAL

establishes holding and airspace deconfliction during recovery at night and in poor weather

conditions. AOMSW aircraft may have to contact MARSHAL for deconfliction within an

approach area.

ESG airspace is similar in structure to the CCA/CCZ. It extends out to 50 NM and control is

provided by the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) call sign ICEPACK, amphibious ATC

call sign CENTER, and TOWER control. A diagram of ESG airspace is displayed in the next

figure.



Figure 5-4 Expeditionary Strike Group Airspace

If transiting less than 50 NM from the ESG, aircraft check in with ICEPACK using the same

format as GREENCROWN. ICEPACK controls aircraft within 50 NM of the Amphibious

Assault Ships that may include LHDs and/or LHAs.

CENTER, which controls aircraft within 10 NM from the LHA/LHD, is responsible for

providing IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions) approach and departure services. While

the LHA/LHD conduct operations, no aircraft should approach closer than 10 NM without being

under positive control of CENTER.

TOWER controls airspace within 5 NM of the LHA/LHD. Contact TOWER on the land/launch

frequency. No aircraft should approach closer than 5 NM without positive control from

TOWER.

Operational Area

A typical CSG/ESG operational area includes the VA, CIEA, and SA with specific criteria

required for classification and identification. The VA is centered on the high value unit. It is

possible to have more than one VA. The ability to escort, cover, and/or engage must be

maintained within the VA(s). Any potential threat must be monitored prior to entering the VA.

The CIEA is the area outside the VA, but inside the SA. Classification, identification, and

monitoring must be accomplished for all contacts detected within the CIEA. The SA,

determined by the CSG/ESG commander, is the area where organic and inorganic sensors keep

track of activity to prevent surprise contacts from entering the CIEA. A diagram of the

CSG/ESG operational area is displayed in the next figure.



Figure 5-5 Operational Area

Aircraft Control Unit

Maritime tactical air C2 is normally conducted by air and surface units under the broad category

of ACUs. ACUs must efficiently utilize assets to maximize search volume while maintaining

separation for controlled assets. In most cases, SSC assets will be controlled by a designated

ACU. Typical ACUs include airborne platforms (E-2/E-3) and surface vessels. ACUs support

SAGs, CSGs, and ESGs. The ACU for SSC, AR/AI/SCAR, and WAS strike missions is also

known as the maritime air controller (MAC).

Maritime Air Controller (MAC)

For preplanned SSC missions, detailed unit-to-unit coordination is critical. In addition, specific

remarks should be included in the SCC DIM, surface SITREP, and Air Plan. For dynamically

reassigned SSC assets, the controlling unit should conduct in-flight briefings. At a minimum, the

position, course, speed, and description of the contact, including type, class, name, and flag, if

known, should be briefed at a minimum, as well as the search area. Amplifying remarks, such as

known hazards, friendly or neutral forces, and threats should also be briefed.

Assigned search areas may be provided in sector search, directed, or autonomous formats. In

sector search format, bearing and range are received from a GEOREF or Bullseye. In directed

format, the MAC provides specific coordinates or bearings to the contact. In autonomous



format, the pilot controls the search. Assigned search areas can also be provided by Common

Geographic Reference System (CGRS) or Global Area Reference System (GARS) boxes.

MACs must efficiently utilize assets to maximize search volume and maintain deconfliction for

controlled assets. In most cases, SSC assets will be controlled by a designated MAC.

SSC flight leads check into the MAC using the MNPOTTA check-in brief (Figure 5-6). The

MNPOTTA brief is used to report assets and capabilities to the MAC. Aircraft checking in

should also pass any Alibis to include change in published or “FRAGGED” weapon load-out and

any degraded sensors or other systems. SSC assets must be prepared to transition to a SCAR,

WAS mission, or follow the indicated target (SHADOW).

Figure 5-6 MNPOTTA Check-in Brief

SSC assets also report contacts via a Surface Contact Report, as displayed in the next figure.

Figure 5-7 Surface Contact Report



Area of Operations Deconfliction

SSC assets should perform a number of actions in an AO deconfliction of surface contacts. They

should consult current ROE, SPINS, or intelligence reports for published stand-off distances and

pay particular attention to any other possible manned and unmanned aircraft in the area that may

be on Link-16, but not on the same frequency. SSC assets should also confirm deconfliction

methods with the airspace controller and maintain a 10 NM minimum standoff from a CVN

unless explicitly authorized. CVNs are generally referred to as MOTHER. The onboard

TACAN is referred to as FATHER. FATHER is the primary method of locating the ship;

however, the airspace controller will provide the CVN location information upon request.

SSC assets should assume that all surface contacts have a man-portable air defense system

(MANPADS) along with small arms. Assets should honor these threats by providing a sufficient

stand-off distance to the maximum extent possible. The self-defense systems for allied/coalition

ships may differ from those of the U.S. Navy. SSC assets will avoid crossing the bow of any

surface vessel, which is a threatening posture, to the maximum extent possible.

During an AO deconfliction, SSC assets should be aware that the method of friendly

identification is via the IFF Mode 4 or Link-16 PPLI (Precise Participant Location and

Identification). Approach will not be closer than 500 ft. from any surface contact, unless

directed otherwise in the SPINS or ROE. Friendly aircraft operating in the vicinity of Blue

Naval forces, equipped with the Phalanx CIWS, should be aware that certain aircraft flight

profiles may cause the CIWS to engage.

SSC assets should consider flying with digital cameras and binoculars to maximize search

volume, accuracy, and documentation of surface contacts. This consideration does not supersede

command or service guidance that may restrict the use of digital cameras and binoculars in

aircraft.

SURFACE THREATS AND MISSIONS 6-1

CHAPTER SIX

SURFACE THREATS AND MISSIONS

600. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses various threats to United States naval platforms to include surface-to-air

missiles (SAMs) and surface threats found in the CENTCOM and PACOM AORs (Areas of

Responsibility). This chapter also covers how to discern among gross naval vessel classes and

appearance groups as well as how to interpret ISAR imagery in the Multi-Crew Simulator

(MCS).

601. SAMs

A SAM is a missile designed destroy airborne aircraft or airborne missiles that is launched from

the ground. As airborne weapon system operators, it is important to be able to recognize the

various threat SAMS and their associated emitters represent. Knowledge of each system’s

emitters is helps identify the system using ESM.

SA-2 GUIDELINE

The SA-2 GUIDELINE Missile (Figure 6-1) is a Soviet designed, high-altitude, air defense

system. It is credited with the shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 while he was overflying

the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. The system uses a SPOON REST Early Warning Radar and a

FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar (Figure 6-2).

Figure 6-1 SA-2 GUIDELINE

CHAPTER SIX ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

6-2 SURFACE THREATS AND MISSIONS

Figure 6-2 FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar

SA-3 GOA

The SA-3 GOA Missile (Figure 6-3) is a Soviet missile system that has a short effective range

and relatively low engagement altitude. It also flies slower than many other SAM systems.

However, its two-stage design makes it very effective against maneuverable targets. Iraq shot

down an F-16 using this system during Desert Storm in 1991. The SA-6 uses a FLAT FACE or

SQUAT-EYE Target Acquisition Radar and a LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-4).

Figure 6-3 SA-3 GOA

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER SIX


Figure 6-4 LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar

SA-5 GAMMON

The SA-5 GAMMON Missile (Figure 6-5) was designed for the defense of the most important

administrative, industrial, and military instillations from all types of air attack. It is a very long

range threat. The SA-5 uses a BAR-LOCK Radar for target detection and tracking with

integrated IFF and a SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-6) for target tracking and

illumination.

Figure 6-5 SA-5 GAMMON



Figure 6-6 SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar

SA-6 GAINFUL

The SA-6 GAINFUL Missile (Figure 6-7) is a mobile, low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air

system of Soviet design. It was designed to protect ground forces from air attack. It has a short

range and uses the STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar (Figure 6-8) for target illumination.

Figure 6-7 SA-6 GAINFUL



Figure 6-8 STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar

SA-8 GECKO

The SA-8 GECKO Missile (Figure 6-9) is a highly mobile, short-range system. It is the first

mobile SAM system to incorporate its own engagement Radars on a single vehicle. The LAND

ROLL system is mounted on the front of the vehicle and is a derivative of the naval “POP

GROUP” system.

Figure 6-9 SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar



SA-10 GRUMBLE

The SA-10 GRUMBLE Missile (Figure 6-10) is a Soviet long-range system designed to defend

against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. It is regarded as one of the most potent

anti-aircraft missile systems currently in use. It also has the capability of being fitted with a

nuclear warhead. The system uses a TIN SHIELD Surveillance Radar and a FLAP LID Fire

Control Radar system (Figure 6-11).

Figure 6-10 SA-10 GRUMBLE

Figure 6-11 FLAP LID Fire Control Radar



SA-20 GARGOYLE

The SA-20 GARGOYLE Missile (Figure 6-12) is a variant of the SA-10. It is a newer, larger

missiles with performance improvements such as increased speed and range. It uses the

TOMB STONE Fire Control, Illumination, and Guidance Radar (Figure 6-13).

Figure 6-12 SA-20 GARGOYLE

Figure 6-13 TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar



MANPADS

These systems are primarily shoulder-fired weapons which are light and portable (Figure 6-14).

The missiles are about 5 to 6 feet in length and weigh anywhere from 37 to 40 pounds depending

on the model. Shoulder-fired SAMs generally have a target detection range of about 6 NM and

an engagement range of about 4 NM. Thus any aircraft flying at an altitude 20,000 ft or higher

are relatively safe.

Figure 6-14 MANPADS

602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW

Several advances in technology have allowed warship identification to progress significantly

beyond where it was just a few decades ago. We now have thermal imagery, acoustic signatures,

electronic emission analysis, imaging radar, and even wake detection devices.

In spite of these advancements in technology, the classification criteria which must be met before

a weapon can be released at an intended target remain difficult to achieve. The drawback to

technological solutions is that they are seldom 100% reliable. Often, they cannot tell with

absolute certainty that the contact under surveillance is the right target or even a target at all.

At some point during the targeting process, a positive recognition of the target is necessary.

Usually, only an accurate visual recognition (eyes on the target or using an EO/IR system) can

resolve this problem.



603. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS

Houdong

The Houdong (Figure 6-15) is a Chinese missile boat. It is based off of the Huangfen missile

boat, which is itself a copy of the Russian Osa class missile boat. It is armed with a four round

launcher for the C-802 cruise missile, as well as a turreted twin 30mm cannon and a crewed 23-

mm cannon for self-defense. Emitters associated with the Houdong are the SR-47A, DECCA

RM 1070A (Surface Search), and the Type 341 RICE LAMP Fire Control Radars. Crews may

also be carrying MANPADS.

Figure 6-15 Houdong

Kaman

The Kaman (Mod la Combattante II) class PCG (Patrol Craft Guided Missile) (Figure 6-16)

features a small-bridge superstructure forward of amidships. It has a 35mm 90 gun mounting on

the bow and a tall lattice mainmast aft of the superstructure. Four surface-to-surface missile

(SSM) launchers are installed aft of the superstructure with the forward two trained forward and

starboard while the aft two are trained forward and port. The Kaman is RGM-84A Harpoon and

C802 capable. Emitters associated with the Kaman are the UPZ-27N, DECCA 1226 surface

search, and the SIGNAAL WM-28 Fire Control Radar which is unique to the vessel.



Figure 6-16 Kaman (Mod La Combattante II)

Vosper MK 5

The Vosper MK 5 (Figure 6-17) features a long forecastle with 4.5-inch gun mounted forward.

It has a short pyramid mainmast just forward of amidships. It has a low-profile sloping funnel

well aft with distinctive gas turbine air intakes forward of the funnel. Sited on its afterdeck from

forward to aft are a C802 SSM launcher, Limbo A/S mortar and 35-mm/90 twin gun turret

mounting. Emitters associated with the Vosper MK 5 are the AWS-1 Air/Surface search radar,

DECCA 1226 Surface Search, DECCA 629 Navigation, and the SEA HUNTER Fire Control

Radars which is unique to the Vosper MK 5.

Figure 6-17 Vosper MK 5



MK III Class Patrol Boat (PB)

The MK III Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-18) has as speed of 30 knots and a 500 NM range at 28

knots. It has a 20-mm gun mounted forward. Its emitter is the RCA LN-66 Surface Search

Radar. Its crew likely carries MANPADS.

Figure 6-18 MK III Class Patrol Boat

Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine

The Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine (Figure 6-19) features a blunt, rounded bow and a flat-

topped casing that tapers toward the aft end. It has a long, low fin with vertical leading and after

edges and a flat top. Its hull-mounted diving planes are not visible and its rudder is barely

visible. It has a SNOOP TRAY MRP-25 emitter and is capable of launching Novator SSN-27

SIZZLER anti-ship missiles.

Figure 6-19 Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine



604. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS

Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft

The Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft (Figure 6-20) is a Chinese copy of the popular Soviet

Osa I Class missile boat. Armed with the SS-N-2 Styx SSM, it boasts a low-profile rounded

superstructure. It has a pole mainmast just forward of amidships with a surface search radar

aerial atop. It has four large, distinctive Styx SSM launchers, two outboard of the mainmast, and

two outboard of the fire control director. Its emitters are the SQUARE-TIE Surface Search

Radar, ROUND BALL Fire Control Radar, and SQUARE HEAD/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew is

likely armed with MANPADS.

Figure 6-20 Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft

Sariwon Class Patrol Boat

The Sariwon Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-21) has a long aft section with a composite

superstructure sectioned both forward and amidships with a tall lattice mast forward and a large

funnel stack amidships. It has 2 twin 57/80 cannons, 2 twin 37mm guns, 4 quad 14.5mm

machine guns, 2 five-tube antisubmarine mortar launchers and 2 rails for depth charges. Its

emitters are the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and SKI POLE IFF. Its crew is likely armed

with MANPADS.



Figure 6-21 Sariwon Class Patrol Boat

Komar

The Soviet Project 183R Class, more commonly known as the Komar (Meaning mosquito)

(Figure 6-22), is a class of missile boats, the first of its kind, built in the 1950s and 1960s.

Notably, they were the first to sink another ship with anti-ship missiles in 1967. The Komar has

two distinct launchers mounted aft facing forward used to launch either the STYX missile or

CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH missile. It has twin 25-mm/80 or twin 14.5mm machine guns. Its

surface search radar is the SQUARE TIE and it has SQUARE HEAD IFF.

Figure 6-22 Komar Missile Boat



Najin Class Frigate

Bearing a striking resemblance to the ex-Soviet Kola Class Frigates, the Najin (Figure 6-23) is

unrelated to any Russian or Chinese design. It is a long composite group II with two distinct

funnels one just forward of amidships and one just aft of amidships. It was originally fitted with

a trainable triple 21-inch torpedo launcher which was replaced in the mid-1980s with fixed

STYX missile launchers which were taken from Osa Class Missile Boats. This redesign is

inherently dangerous and even a minor missile malfunction would result in significant damage to

the ship. The Najin carries SS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH Missiles and its crew likely carries

MANPADS. It has a SQUARE TIE Air Search Radar, a POT HEAD Surface Search Radar, a

POT DRUM Navigation Radar, and a DRUM TILT Fire Control Radar.

Figure 6-23 Najin Class Frigate

Shantou Class Patrol Boat

The Shantou Class PB (Figure 6-24) has as speed of 45 knots, a 450 NM range at 30 knots, and a

600 NM range at 15 knots. It has two twin 25-mm/80 or two 37-mm or six 14.5-mm guns

(SINPO). All variants except SINPO have two 533-mm torpedo tubes. Its emitters are the SKIN

HEAD Surface Search Radar and the DEAD DUCK/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew likely carries

MANPADS.



Figure 6-24 Shantou Class Patrol Boat

Chaho Class Patrol Boat

The Chaho Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-25) has a speed of 37 knots and a range of 1300 NM at

18 knots. Its armament is one twin 23-mm/87 cannon, one twin 14.5-mm gun, one BM-21

multiple rocket launcher. It uses the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and its crew likely

carries MANPADS.

Figure 6-25 Chaho Class Patrol Boat

Romeo Class SS

The Romeo Class SS (Figure 6-26) is a class of Soviet Diesel-Electric Submarines built in the

1950s. By today’s standards, they are considered obsolete but are still used by adversary nations

in the PACOM AOR for patrol and surveillance missions. The Romeo’s top speed is 15.2 knots

surfaced, 13 knots submerged, and 10 knots snorkeling. It carries 533-mm torpedoes and has

SNOOP PLATE and SNOOP TRAY Radar.



Figure 6-26 Romeo Class SS

Sang O Submarine

The Sang O (Figure 6-27) is a simple submarine for use in the covert insertion of Special

Operations Forces (SOF), mining, and/or SUW. The submarine comes in two different variants,

one with torpedo tubes, and the other without. Both variants have the capability to lay mines.

The Sang O’s top speed is 7.5 knots on the surface, 8.8 knots submerged, and 7.2 knots

snorkeling. It has a range of 2700 nm at 7 knots. Variant 1 has up to four 533-mm torpedo tubes

and both variants can carry 16 bottom mines. The Sang O has a FURUNO Surface Search

Radar.

Figure 6-27 Sang O Submarine



605. IDENTIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS

Today’s weapon system operators are trained to use specific methodologies to classify ships

using imaging sensors, such as ISAR. The classification process requires highly trained

operators and is platform exposure time intensive.

A two-step approach is taken for target classification. During step one, incoming imagery is

enhanced and "focused" to provide an integrated, multi-frame summed target image, where key

features are extracted from the sensor video imagery. Target features are then compared to

feature sets of known ship types to derive a classification.

Ships are normally classified in a hierarchical fashion using the following levels:

Perceptual/Gross, Naval Fine, and Type/Class/Unit level.

During MCS simulator events, ISAR imagery will be used by the operator to identify the Gross

Class of a surface contact. Examples of Gross Classes are Combatant, Minor Combatant,

Submarine, Merchant, and Small Craft. Merchant vessels are further broken down into

Appearance groups which are determined by the size, shape, and location of the superstructure.

Appearance Groups

A Group I Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-28) has a superstructure greater than one-third the total

length of the ship. Passenger Ships generally belong in this appearance group.

Figure 6-28 Group I Example



A Group II Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-29) has a composite superstructure less than one-third of

the total ship length that is located amidships. These ships generally have a small block-like

superstructure with deck spaces devoted to cargo-handling equipment and hatches.

Figure 6-29 Group II Example

A Group III Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-30) has a stack aft. Stack aft means that the ships have

funnels located in the aft third of the ship; however, if should the superstructure exceeds one-

third the overall ship length, the ship will be considered a Group 1 vessel.

Figure 6-30 Group III Example



MCS ISAR Imagery

When ISAR Imagery of a surface contact is displayed on the MCS Tactical Plot (TACPLOT),

there will be two images (Figure 6-31). The image in the lower left corner is the raw ISAR. The

one in the upper right corner represents the digitized image of the contact that has been

processed, enhanced, and focused to show the vessel’s features with more clarity.

In the MCS, the perpendicular profile aspect of the vessel of interest will provide the best ISAR

imagery. When imaging using ISAR in the real world, a front or rear quartering aspect is

preferred. The following two figures depict an MCS ISAR image compared to its real world

image.

Figure 6-31 ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS

Figure 6-32 Corresponding EO Imagry

SUW SENSORS AND EMPLOYMENT 7-1

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUW SENSORS AND EMPLOYMENT

700. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss SUW sensor types and characteristics.

701. SURFACE WARFARE SENSORS

SUW sensors are found on a variety of U.S. naval platforms and include radar, ESM, EO/IR, and

Visual.

Anti-Surface Warfare Sensor Types

No single sensor works alone, but rather each works together to detect, localize, identify, and

track SUW targets of interest. Different aircraft carry a variety of SUW sensors (Figure 7-1).

Aircraft SUW Sensor

P-3C Radar, ESM, EO/IR, and Visual

P-8A Radar, ESM, EO/IR, and Visual

E-2D (E-2C) Radar, ESM, and Visual

MH-60R (SH-60B) Radar, ESM, IR, and Visual

Figure 7-1 Surface Warfare Aircraft Sensors

Frigates, destroyers, and cruisers also carry SUW sensors. These three types of naval ships all

utilize radar, ESM, and Visual sensors. Modern naval ships are now being outfitted with various

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to enhance EO/IR capabilities.

In addition to the SUW sensors, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers usually carry up to two

helicopters onboard. To enhance over-the-horizon (OTH) SUW, sensors onboard the helicopter

can be directly linked to the ship so that sensor data can be viewed in real time.

702. SURFACE WARFARE SENSOR CHARACTERISTICS

This section will discuss SUW sensor characteristics.

Naval Platform Sensors

The various sensors onboard the different naval platforms (e.g., ships and airborne assets) have

very similar characteristics. The platform’s speed and altitude contribute to the effectiveness of

various sensors.

CHAPTER SEVEN ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

7-2 SUW SENSORS AND EMPLOYMENT

Sensors differ for ships and airborne assets. Ship sensors are limited by OTH capability that

results from the ship’s limited position at the surface (Figure 7-2). They are also limited by

slower speed that reduces the ship’s ability to cover large search areas.

Airborne assets vastly enhance the SUW sensors by using altitude to increase SUW sensor range

and airspeed to maneuver across larger search areas. Compared with helicopters, fixed-wing

aircraft, such as the P-3C and E-2D, enhance SUW sensor capabilities by traveling at higher

speeds, covering larger search areas in a shorter amount of time, gaining higher altitude,

exhibiting longer endurance, and consisting of larger crews.

Figure 7-2 Airborne Asset Sensor Capabilities

Surface Warfare Sensor Range and Limits

Each SUW sensor has a theoretical limit to its maximum range of effectiveness (Figure 7-3).

The limiting factor in all cases is the altitude of the platform. ESM sensors have the farthest

detection range, followed by radar sensors, and lastly visual sensors.

Visual and EO/IR are difficult sensors to compare with regards to theoretical ranges because

these sensors are highly dependent on weather phenomena, such as moisture in the air, clouds,

temperatures, and haze.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER SEVEN


Figure 7-3 Surface Warfare Sensor Detection Range

Equations representative of the theoretical effective limits of radar, and Visual sensors are

described below. ESM theoretical distance is greater than that of radar.

The equation for the effective radar limit is distance (in NM) = 1.237 x square root of the

aircraft’s altitude (in feet). The next figure shows an example of the different theoretical sensor

ranges for radar based on altitude. A good rule of thumb is at 15,000 feet AGL, the radar

horizon is approximately 150 NM. For every 1000 feet above 15,000, add 5 NM to 150 to obtain

the approximate radar horizon. Below 15,000 feet AGL, subtract 5 NM from 150 for every 1000

feet to obtain the approximate radar horizon. For example, at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the radar

horizon is approximately 165 NM, while at an altitude of 10,000 feet the radar horizon is

approximately 125 NM.



Figure 7-4 Radar Horizon

An approximate estimate for the Visual horizon is distance (in NM) = 1.05 x square root of the

altitude (in feet). The next figure shows an example of the different theoretical visual sensor

ranges based on altitude.

Figure 7-5 Visual Horizon

Depending on the size of the target, Visual detection and identification is not very effective

above 3000 feet because eyesight is limited in its ability for picking up small contacts, such as

small boats, life rafts, and personnel in the water.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER SEVEN


Primary Sensor

When utilizing SUW sensors, a primary sensor must be identified. The primary sensor chosen

will affect the altitude of the aircraft. This predetermined altitude must be maintained in order to

maximize the effectiveness of the primary sensor. Throughout an SUW mission, a primary

sensor may change; therefore, subsequently altitudes will change in order to optimize the

theoretical effectiveness of a primary sensor. When a primary sensor changes, fuel endurance

must be considered due to the resulting change in altitude. If a mission has to leave on station

early due to improper fuel management, then a gap in SUW search coverage may occur.

SURFACE SEARCH, LOCALIZATION, AND TRACKING METHODS 8-1

CHAPTER EIGHT

SURFACE SEARCH, LOCALIZATION, AND TRACKING METHODS

800. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss the basic terms, procedures, and limitations associated with SUW

search, localization, and tracking methods.

801. SURFACE WARFARE SEARCH METHODS

A discussion of SUW search methods must include surveillance, type of instruments used, and

search patterns utilized.

Surface Warfare Surveillance

SUW begins with the surveillance of a defined area. The purpose of SUW surveillance is to

search a predetermined area to locate and classify a target of interest. A naval asset is usually

assigned a search area set by geographical parameters; however, a search area could

geographically move relative to a particular ship’s movement.

The search area is defined as the Operational Area (OA). Relative to ships, airborne assets are

typically given larger OAs due to their ability to cover more area because of their higher speeds

and increased Radar/Visual/ESM horizons due to altitude. The purpose of SUW searches is to

identify potential threats to naval forces in an expeditious manner.

Primary Sensors

Search methods are defined by the primary sensor to be utilized. Primary sensors used during a

search are Radar, Visual, or EO/IR.

Radar, an active sensor that can be detected by hostile units using ESM, is the most often used

primary sensor. In cases where an active system, such as radar, is not desired, Visual or EO/IR

(sector scan) is used as the primary sensor. Visual and EO/IR sensors are passive; therefore, they

are undetectable by hostile forces; although, shorter Visual ranges can make the aircraft

vulnerable to the potential target’s various weapons’ envelopes. EO/IR sensors are typically

used as secondary sensors to identify surface contacts from ranges where the surface contact

cannot hear or see the aircraft. Weather and atmospheric conditions can limit the effectiveness

of the EO/IR system. EO/IR cameras typically have normal condition, haze penetration, and

polarizer optical filters to help reduce certain environmental disturbances.

Search Patterns

One of the search patterns utilized in SUW is the Parallel search. This search pattern is used in

large search areas where uniform coverage is desired. The Parallel search pattern may be

utilized for either Radar, Visual, or EO/IR sensors. An example of a Parallel search pattern is

displayed in the next figure with “S” equal to track spacing.

CHAPTER EIGHT ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

8-2 SURFACE SEARCH, LOCALIZATION, AND TRACKING METHODS

Figure 8-1 Parallel Search Pattern

Other search patterns include Bar Scans, Expanding Squares, and Sectors. These search methods

are primarily used for visual searches, but may be utilized in conjunction with radar.

The prevailing weather conditions and their effect on visual detection ranges forms the basis for

calculating search pattern spacing requirements in a Bar Scan search. The visual detection range

must also be adjusted to account for the physical size of the search object. For example, if the

prevailing visibility is estimated to be 6 NM, and this distance is deemed an acceptable range for

identifying the search object (based on its size), then search aircraft should establish 12 NM

spacing (or twice the visual detection range) between search pattern legs. An example of a Bar

Scan search pattern is displayed in the next figure.

Figure 8-2 Bar Scan Search Pattern

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER EIGHT


The Expanding Square search pattern, shown in the next figure, employs the visual detection

range calculation noted previously in the Bar Scan search pattern description. However, the

Expanding Square search pattern typically originates directly over the Last Known Position

(LKP) of the search object. The first two legs are flown at twice the calculated visual detection

range; the next two legs are at four times the visual detection range, and so on. Each turn to a

subsequent leg in the search pattern will be flown in the same direction (e.g., left), and the new

heading will be 90° offset from the previous one.

Figure 8-3 Expanding Square Search Pattern

The Sector search pattern is performed so that the LKP of the search object is overflown during

each leg of the pattern. Each turn to a subsequent leg in the search pattern will be flown in the

same direction (e.g., right), and the new heading will be 120° from the previous one. Following

three passes over the LKP, the pattern is shifted 30° and flown in the same manner as the first.

An example of a Sector search pattern is displayed in the next figure.



Figure 8-4 Sector Search Pattern

802. SURFACE WARFARE LOCALIZATION METHODS

SUW localization methods involve the knowledge of the type of contact, what sensor is used,

ESM classification, and confidence level.

Localization

The localization process includes the employment of sensors to determine a contact’s position,

course, speed, and classification. Radar, Visual, EO/IR, and ESM sensors are used during

localization. Radar obtains the position and creates a course and speed for the surface contact.

For Visual or EO/IR sensors, position and movement of the contact are identified by visually

observing the course and estimating the speed based on the wake of the ship. Visual or EO/IR

sensors allow the operator to ID a surface contact by seeing what the contact is. The EO/IR

sensor has the obvious advantage over Visual with its ability to detect at longer ranges. ESM

may be used to triangulate the position of a potential threat by obtaining at least two ESM lines

of bearing for the same surface ship emitter. The characteristics of the specific emitter also aids

in the classification of surface contact.

With a radar contact, position, course, and speed can be easily obtained. Other sensors used in

conjunction with radar can assist in further classifying the surface contact.



Visual or EO/IR sensors are typically used in conjunction with radar to not only identify surface

contacts, but obtain designations/declarations such as friendly, neutral, or hostile.

ESM is a passive system utilized to classify surface contacts. The characteristics of specific

radar emission by surface contacts are detected and analyzed by the ESM. Co-locating a radar

contact with ESM classification allows the possibility of designating the vessel a contact of

interest and prioritizing the contact for identification.

In order to obtain an ESM Area of Probability (AOP), two SUW assets must report the

associated ESM emitter at the same time. The position where the two bearings intersect creates

an AOP. The AOP can be further refined by obtaining a third or fourth bearing line from other

SUW assets. An ESM AOP can also be defined by a single SUW asset receiving multiple ESM

bearings from the same emitter offset by at least 30°.

Surface Contacts

Visual, EO/IR, ISAR, and ESM sensors aid with classifying and identifying a surface contact.

The classification of a surface contact includes the previously discussed levels:

Perceptual/Gross, Naval Fine, and Type/Class/Unit level. Examples of Type/Class/Unit level

would be merchant types (e.g., Container Ship, Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO)) and combatant types

(e.g., patrol craft, destroyer) and class (e.g., Houdong, Houbei). Identification of a surface

contact is obtained from Visual or EO/IR sensors and includes hull number, name, and flag.

Confidence Levels

The five levels of confidence when reporting the identification of a surface contact are Unknown

(UNK), Non-COI/CCOI, Possible (POSS LOW/POSS HIGH), Probable (PROB), and Certain

(CERT). Confidence levels are decided by the Mission Commander (MC), and his or her

expertise coupled with experience are used in making the decision of the confidence level to

report to controlling units. Different confidence levels are described in the next figure.

Confidence Level Definition

UNK Insufficient data exists to classify the contact

Non COI/CCOI After investigation, the contact has shown to have characteristics

that exclude the possibility of it being the COI/CCOI

POSS A contact is assigned “Possible” if the available information on it

indicates a likelihood of it being the COI/CCOI but there is

insufficient evidence to justify a higher classification.

A POSS LOW contact cannot be regarded as a non-COI and

requires further investigation



Confidence Level Definition

A POSS HIGH contact is firmly believed to be the COI/CCOI but

does not meet the criteria established for PROB

PROB The contact has not been visually identified, but displays strong

cumulative evidence of being the COI/CCOI through multiple

sensors.

CERT Contact sighted and positively identified as the COI/CCOI by a

competent observer. If any doubt exists about the certainty of the

observation, the contact should not be classified as CERT.

Figure 8-5 Confidence Levels

Specific requirements for establishing these confidence levels may be delineated in the OPTASK

SUW OTC or warfare function command supplement. Consideration should be given to aircraft

capability and which elements/confidence level may be solved with onboard systems. As a

technique, a PID matrix may be developed based on these elements, but will likely require

approval from higher authority prior to use.

803. SURFACE WARFARE TRACKING METHODS

Tracking methods involve following a target, assessing its threat level, and choosing a suitable

flight pattern.

Tracking is defined as maintaining the position, course, and speed of the target. In the event a

surface contact must be tracked, the level of danger the surface contact poses to an aircraft must

be evaluated. For surface combatants, a standoff will need to be respected due to the ship’s

ability to launch SAMs or for smaller boats to utilize MANPADS.

With the utilization of imaging sensors, such as ISAR and EO/IR, the airborne unit can maintain

significant standoff distance from the surface contact. Utilizing a standoff distance, the surface

contact is tracked by utilizing the orbit (Figure 8-6), racetrack (Figure 8-7), or figure eight

(Figure 8-8) airborne flight patterns, as displayed in the figures on the following pages. For

MPR aircraft, the radar plot must be updated at least every 5 minutes, and EO/IR sensors are

used to track the ship’s activity.



Figure 8-6 Orbit Flight Pattern

Figure 8-7 Racetrack Flight Pattern



Figure 8-8 Figure Eight Flight Pattern

SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS 9-1

CHAPTER NINE

SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS

900. INTRODUCTION

This chapter covers the descriptions of SUW weapons and delivery platforms. The basic terms

and limitations of SUW weapons and employment are also covered.

901. SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS

SUW weapons and delivery platforms include the MK-15 Phalanx CIWS, MK-38, SM-2,

Harpoon Missile, AGM-65 Maverick Missile, and the SLAM-ER Missile.

Zone Defense

During maritime combat operations, U.S. naval surface combatants operate in the following

three layered zone defenses (Figure 9-1): the Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ), Joint

Engagement Zone (JEZ), and the Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). Each zone employs weapon

systems tailored for optimal performance based upon range. Additionally, shipboard weapon

systems exist that possess dual anti-surface and anti-air capabilities.

Figure 9-1 Zone Defenses

CHAPTER NINE ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

9-2 SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS

WARNING

In order to eliminate fratricide, aircrews operating in the vicinity of

surface combatants must understand that surface ships may operate

in a self-defense mode during maritime operations.

Types of Kills

Types of kills that aircrews may be instructed to achieve include Mobility Kill, Firepower Kill,

and Catastrophic or K-KILL. A Mobility Kill refers to disabling a ship’s ability to maneuver

(e.g., propulsion, steering mechanism, and personnel). A Firepower Kill refers to the damage

inflicted on a ship that destroys the ship’s weapons systems or substantially reduces its ability to

deliver weapons effectively. K-KILL refers to damage inflicted on a ship that renders it both

unusable and irreparable.

MAC Comm. Format

The MAS mission no longer exists. It has been replaced by multiple AOMSW missions that use

maritime dynamic targeting principles. This is necessary due to the nature of pop-up dynamic

maritime threats which require quick reaction times.

MAC is the updated Comm. format that is used to quickly reassign and direct air assets onto

maritime threats. The MAC Comm. format (Figure 9-2) closely resembles the format used for

TACAIC.

Figure 9-2 MAC Comm. Format

MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS)

The MK-15 Phalanx CIWS is a fast-reaction, detect-through-engage, radar-guided, 20-mm gun

weapon system. This system provides U.S. naval ships with an inner layer point defense

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER NINE


capability against those threats that have penetrated other fleet defenses, such as ASMs, aircraft,

and littoral warfare threats. The MK-15 Phalanx CIWS automatically detects, evaluates, tracks,

engages, and performs kill assessments on ASMs and high-speed aircraft threats.

The characteristics of the MK-15 Phalanx CIWS are described in the next figure.

Characteristic Description

Primary function Fast-reaction, detect-through-engage, radar-guided 20-mm gun

weapon system

Contractor Raytheon

Weight 13,600 lbs. or 6120 kilograms (kg) (Block 1B)

Type fire ASM and aircraft: 4500 rounds/min; Asymmetric threats: 3000

rounds/min

Magazine

capacity

1550 rounds

Caliber 20-mm

Ammunition Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot

Type M-61A1 Gatling Gun

Figure 9-3 MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System Characteristics

MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System

The MK-38 is a 25-mm machine gun installed for ship self-defense to counter High Speed

Maneuvering Surface Targets (HSMST).

The MK 38 was first employed aboard combatant and auxiliary ships conducting Mid-East Force

escort operations and during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Following the October

2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG 67), an improved MK 38 Machine Gun System (MGS) was

developed as a means to increase shipboard self defense against small boat threats. Installed

aboard several ships, the MK 38 Mod 2 MGS is a low cost, stabilized self-defense weapon

system that dramatically improves ships' self-defense capabilities.



The characteristics of the MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System are described in the next figure.


Primary function Ship board self defense against small boat threats.

Contractor Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center

Max Rate of Fire 180 rpm

Range 2700 meters

Caliber 25-mm

Figure 9-4 MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System Characteristics

Standard Missile-2

The SM-2 is a medium- to long-range shipboard SAM, which is launched from the MK 41 VLS.

It is the USN’s primary surface-to-air defense weapon and is an integral part of the Aegis

Weapon System (AWS) aboard the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class

destroyers. The SM-2’s primary missions are fleet area air defense and ship self-defense.

SM-2 Blocks currently in service with the USN are III, IIIA, and IIIB. These and other variants

of SM-2 are also in service with 15 allied navies.



The characteristics of the SM-2 are described in the next figure.


Primary

function

SAM

Contractor Raytheon

Propulsion Dual thrust, solid fuel rocket

Length 15 ft. 6 in or 4.72 m

Diameter 13.5 in or 34.3 cm

Wingspan 3 ft. 6 in or 1.08 m

Weight 1558 lbs. or 708 kg

Range Up to 90 NM or 104 Statute Miles (SM)

Guidance

system

Semi-active radar homing (IR in Block IIIB)

Warhead Radar and contact fuse, blast-fragment warhead

Figure 9-5 SM-2 Characteristics

AGM-84 Harpoon Missile

The AGM-84 Harpoon Missile is an all-weather, OTH, Anti-ship missile (ASM) system. The

features that ensure the high survivability and effectiveness of the AGM-84 Harpoon Missiles

include active radar guidance, warhead design, low-level cruise trajectory, and terminal mode

sea-skim and pop-up maneuvers. Surface ships, submarines, shore batteries, and aircraft

(without the added booster) are assets capable of launching Harpoon Missiles. In 1979, the air-

launched version of the Harpoon Missile was deployed on the USN’s P-3C aircraft. The

Harpoon Missile has been adapted for use on USAF B-52H bombers, which can carry 8 - 12

missiles.



The characteristics of the Harpoon Missile are described in the next figure.


Primary

function

Air, ship, submarine, and land-based coastal defense battery-launched anti-

ship cruise missile (ASCM)

Contractor The Boeing Company

Unit cost $1,200,000 for Harpoon Block II

Propulsion Teledyne Turbojet/solid propellant booster for surface and submarine launch

Thrust Greater than 600 lbs. or greater than 272.2 kg

Length Air launched – 12 ft. 7 in or 3.8 m; Surface and submarine launched – 15 ft.

or 4.6 m


Wingspan 3 ft. or 91.4 cm, with booster fins and wings

Weight 1523 lbs. or 690.8 kg, with booster

Speed High subsonic

Range OTH, in excess of 67 NM or 124 kilometers (km)

Guidance

system

Sea-skimming cruise monitored by radar altimeter/active radar terminal

homing

Warhead Penetration/high-explosive blast (488 lbs. or 224 kg)

Figure 9-6 AGM-84 Harpoon Missile Characteristics

AGM-65 Maverick Missile

The AGM-65 Maverick Missile is an Air-to-Surface (A/S) tactical missile designed for CAS,

interdiction, and defense suppression. This missile is effective against tactical targets such as

armor, air defenses, ships, ground transportation, and fuel storage facilities. The USN, USMC,

and USAF use variations of the AGM-65 Maverick Missile. The USN uses the AGM-65F

Maverick Missile on the P-3 and F/A-18 aircraft. The P-3’s AGM-65F variant uses infrared (IR)

targeting optimized for ship tracking. The USMC uses the AGM-65E Maverick Missile on the

AV-8 and F-18A aircraft. The AGM-65E Maverick Missile has a larger (300-lb or 126-kg)

penetrating warhead than other Maverick Missiles and is laser guided. The USAF uses the

AGM-65A/B/D Maverick Missiles on the F-16 and A-10 aircraft. The AGM-65A/B/D Maverick

Missiles use a 125-lb or 57-kg charge and are electro-optical (EO) guided.



The characteristics of the AGM-65 Maverick Missile are described in the next figure.


Primary

function

A/S guided missile; attacks and destroys armor, air defenses, ships, ground

transportation, and fuel installations

Contractor Raytheon

Unit cost $180,000

Propulsion Thiokol SR 109-TC-1 solid-propellant rocket motor; Thiokol SR 114-TC-1

(or Aerojet SR 115-AJ-1) solid-propellant rocket motor

Length 98 in

Diameter 12 in

Wingspan 28 in

Weight 462 – 670 pounds, depending on the model

Speed Supersonic

Range 17 NM

Guidance

system

EO (e.g., TV) in A and B models; Imaging IR (IIR) in D, F, and G models;

laser guided in the E model

Warhead 300-lb penetrating blast-fragmentation warhead; 125-lb shaped-charge

Figure 9-7 AGM-65 Maverick Missile Characteristics

AGM-84K Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response Missile (SLAM-ER)

The AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile is an air-launched, day or night, adverse weather, OTH, and

precision strike missile. This missile is an evolutionary upgrade to the combat-proven Standoff

Land Attack Missile (SLAM). There are significant capabilities of the AGM-84K SLAM-ER

Missile. It has a highly accurate GPS-aided guidance system, IR seeker, and two-way data link

with the AWW-13 Advanced Data Link pod for the Man-in-the-Loop (MITL) control. Other

significant capabilities include improved missile aerodynamic performance characteristics that

allow both long-range and flexible terminal attack profiles, ordnance section with good

penetrating power and lethality, and user-friendly interface for both MITL control and mission

planning. The AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile can be launched and controlled by naval assets,

including the F/A-18C/D, P-3, and F/A-18E/F. This missile is extremely accurate, and has the

best circular AOP in the USN’s inventory. It is also the only precision Standoff Outside of Area

Defense (SOAD) weapon used by the USN.



The characteristics of the AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile are described in the next figure.


Primary

function

Long-range, air-launched precision land-and-sea attack cruise missile

Contractor The Boeing Company

Date deployed June 2000

Unit cost $500,000

Propulsion Teledyne Turbojet

Thrust Greater than 600 lbs.

Length 172 in or 4.4 m


Wingspan 7.2 ft. or 2.2 m

Weight 1488 lbs. or 674.5 kg

Speed High subsonic

Range OTH, in excess of 135 NM or 250 km

Guidance

system

Ring laser gyro INS with multi-channel GPS; IR seeker for terminal

guidance with MITL control data link from the controlling aircraft;

upgraded missiles incorporate Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA)

Figure 9-8 AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile Characteristics



Weapons Overview

The chart in Figure 9-9 provides a compare/contrast overview of the primary functions of the

weapons discussed in this topic.

Figure 9-9 Weapons Overview Chart

STRIKE COORDINATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT 10-1

CHAPTER TEN

STRIKE COORDINATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT

1000. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will identify the terms, procedures, and limitations associated with strike

coordination and asset management. This will include a look at the deliberate strike planning

process, strike timeline coordination process, Defense In Depth strategy, Force Concentration,

and strike coordination fuel planning.

1001. STRIKE PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Strike Planning Process

Initial strike planning is dynamic and interactive. The Air Wing practices this process during

land- and carrier-based exercises (e.g., Air Wing Fallon) prior to deployment. Each squadron

representative provides a particular expertise that allows the strike team to quickly brainstorm a

complete, but rough, high-level plan. The strike planning process consists of the strike planning

cycle, strike planning functions, Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) intelligence

gathering and support functions, and automated support systems.

The strike planning process occurs within the context of a sequence of events called the strike

planning cycle (Figure 10-1). This repetitive cycle begins with the receipt of tasks and ends with

the collection of strike assessment data.

Figure 10-1 Strike Planning Cycle

CHAPTER TEN ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

10-2 STRIKE COORDINATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT

The strike planning function includes the creation of the strike plan and has the following steps:

1. Determine targets and target characteristics.

2. Assign weapons to achieve an objective level of damage.

3. Assess threats to ensure safe weapon delivery.

4. Determine which strike elements are needed.

5. Determine strike timing and Launch Sequence Plan (LSP).

6. Determine Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

7. Rehearse the strike.

Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC)

CVIC intelligence personnel acquire, analyze, and integrate data into usable intelligence

products. Carrier Air Wing strike planning teams use additional planning software and systems

within CVIC to mold the intelligence products into a comprehensive strike plan. The Strike

Intelligence Analysis Cell (SIAC) allows cohesion between Carrier Air Wing strike planning

teams and CVIC intelligence personnel.

Automated Support Systems

Automated support systems are used to process the extensive amount of data that influence strike

planning decisions. These systems and programs, such as weaponeering and weather prediction

software, combine strike operations with intelligence and support data to produce an executable

strike plan.

Strike Timeline Coordination Process

To coordinate strikes properly, timeline analysis is critical. Timing during and between strikes

must be carefully choreographed to account for weather, adversary reaction time, friendly fire

avoidance, and effective execution of a strike. Each phase of the timeline must be carefully

coordinated through TTPs. The timeline phases to be coordinated consist of the ingress phase,

target area phase, and egress phase.

Ingress Phase

In the ingress phase, the focus is on finding the target, and avoiding and/or suppressing threats.

The plan in this phase should aim for compromise among the required number of strike sorties,

the safety of the carrier, and the desire to achieve tactical surprise.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER TEN


Rendezvous Point: the point near the beginning of the strike route where all strike assets will

meet. The E-2 will complete “Alpha” checks with all assets. The strike lead will get a roll call

from the entire strike package and take note of any “alibis.”

(TCP): A point along the dogleg portion of the route that can be shortened in order to adjust the

time-on-target (TOT) so that it occurs as planned.

Initial Point (IP): The point at which the strike package sets their attack formation.

Target Area Phase

In the target area, terrain masking (if possible) and high speed should be used to minimize

exposure to threats. Deconfliction is accomplished by taking into account altitude, geographic

location, time, and weapon selection. Variance in time on target and post-delivery maneuvers

are important to avoid damage from blast fragments. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) also

begins in this phase.

Decision Point (DP): The DP is often colocated with the IP. It is the point at which the strike

lead makes the decision to transition from air-to-air mode to air-to-ground mode to attack the

target.

Target: The object being attacked. The bullseye is often colocated with the target.

Egress Phase

In the egress phase, aircraft regain mutual support quickly and use briefed procedures for

identifying returning aircraft. This process is especially important in the event of an equipment

failure. A higher probability of blue on blue targeting during egress exists, specifically for

strikes that are disrupted because of enemy aircraft or SAMs.

When necessary, jettison areas and pickup points are used in conjunction with combat search and

rescue (CSAR) efforts.

Egress Control Point (ECP): The last point on the strike route. A strike route can have multiple

ECPs in order to offer a choice of egress routes.

Tactical Strike Coordination Module and Joint Mission Planning Software

The Tactical Strike Coordination Module (TSCM) and the Joint Mission Planning Software

(JMPS) have preview modes to help uncover any timeline problems. These systems incorporate

smart algorithms to optimize timelines, thereby minimizing risks from threats and enabling

strikes to achieve greater success.



Additional Strike Planning Considerations

Other strike planning considerations include the decision to use Defense In-Depth and Force

Concentration strategies as well as fuel planning.

Defense In Depth Strategy

A defense-in-depth strike incorporates the coordinated use of multiple layers to protect the

integrity of the strike package. In Figure 10-2, the Sweeps push several minutes ahead of the air-

ground portion of the strike package in order to draw out and attrite any air threats.

Figure 10-2 Defense In Depth Strategy

Force Concentration

Force Concentration is the act of using overwhelming force over a smaller enemy force. By

enacting such overwhelming force, the disparity between the two forces alone acts as a force

multiplier in favor of the concentrated forces.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER TEN


Strike Coordination Fuel Planning

Fuel planning considerations are an important part of strike coordination and planning. The

initial planning process includes a fuel usage calculation. The amount of fuel necessary at

launch depends on the weight of aircraft that are heavily loaded with munitions and the length of

the route. Airborne refueling with tankers is carefully planned. The fuel plan must be robust

enough to accommodate unexpected events ranging from undetected SAM sites to tanker fallout.

STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 11-1

CHAPTER ELEVEN

STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1100. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss the roles of strike support aircraft and UASs.

1101. STRIKE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT

This section will discuss the roles of strike support aircraft, including E-8C Joint Surveillance

and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

E-3 Sentry, U-2, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and tankers.

E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

The E-8C JSTARS (Figure 11-1) is an airborne battle-management Command and Control,

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C2ISR) platform that provides theater ground and air

commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting.

The information gathered by the aircraft is relayed in near real time to the common ground

stations and to other ground Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

(C4I) nodes. The JSTARS is being outfitted with blue force tracking capability.

Figure 11-1 E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

CHAPTER ELEVEN ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

11-2 STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Airborne Warning and Control System E-3 Sentry

The AWACS E-3 Sentry aircraft (Figure 11-2) provides all-weather surveillance and C3. The

AWACS E-3 Sentry radar subsystem permits surveillance from the Earth’s surface up into the

stratosphere over land or water.

Figure 11-2 Airborne Warning and Control System E-3 Sentry

U-2

The U-2 (Figure 11-3) provides continuous day/night, high-altitude, and all-weather surveillance

and reconnaissance in direct support of U.S. and allied ground and air forces. The U-2 is capable

of collecting various types of imagery, including multi-sensor photo, EO, IR, and radar.

Figure 11-3 U-2

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER ELEVEN


RC-135 Rivet Joint

The RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft (Figure 11-4) provides near real-time, on-scene

intelligence capabilities to support theater missions, including collection, analysis, and

dissemination.

Figure 11-4 RC-135 Rivet Joint

Tankers

Aerial refueling, also referred to as air refueling, in-flight refueling (IFR), air-to-air refueling

(AAR), and tanking, is the process of transferring fuel from one aircraft (the tanker) to another

(the receiver) during flight. The procedure allows the receiving aircraft to remain airborne

longer, extending its range or loiter time on station. Tankers offload a portion of their total fuel

capacity to receivers. This is called “Give.” Tankers use two types of refueling apparatus to

offload fuel to receivers. These two types of apparatus are the drogue and the boom.

Drogue

The drogue is the Navy’s primary method of refueling. It hangs freely from the tanker as

depicted in Figure 11-5.

Figure 11-5 Drogue Refueling Apparatus



Boom

The boom apparatus is commonly used by the Air Force. Most Air Force tanking is done along

the spine of the aircraft. An operator onboard the tanker aircraft drives the boom and maneuvers

it into place. This method can also be used by Navy aircraft. The boom apparatus is shown in

Figure 11-6.

Figure 11-6 Boom Refueling Apparatus

The various fuel tanker aircraft supporting strike missions are presented below:

1. The KC-135 (Figure 11-7), which may carry up to 200,000 pounds of fuel, has the ability

to refuel aircraft using either a drogue or boom. This aircraft operates with the USAF and four

foreign nations.

Figure 11-7 KC-135



2. The KC-10 (Figure 11-8), which may carry over 350,000 pounds of fuel, also has the

ability to refuel aircraft using either a drogue or boom. This aircraft operates with the USAF and

the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF).

Figure 11-8 KC-10

3. The KC-130 (Figure 11-9), a tanker variant of the C-130 transport aircraft, carries over

45,000 pounds of fuel and refuels aircraft only using a drogue. The aircraft operates with the

USN, the USMC, and 11 foreign nations.

Figure 11-9 KC-130



4. Some models of the F/A-18 (Figure 11-10) may act as tactical tanker aircraft, carrying

29,000 pounds of fuel and refueling aircraft via a drogue. They operate with the USN and Royal

Australian Air Force (RAAF).

Figure 11-10 F/A-18

5. The Omega K-707 (Figure 11-11) refueling tankers may carry up to 160,000 pounds of fuel

and refuel aircraft using a drogue. The Omega KDC-10, which is identical to the KC-10, has

two wing pods and a 243,000 pound capacity, refueling using either a drogue or boom. Both the

preceding aircraft operate commercially with Omega Aerial Refueling Services, Inc.

Figure 11-11 Omega K-707

1102. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

This section will discuss the roles of UAS platforms, including RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-4 Broad

Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-8 Fire Scout

Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV), and Scan Eagle.



RQ-4 Global Hawk

The RQ-4 Global Hawk (Figure 11-12) is a land-based, high-altitude, long-endurance UAS used

for wide area ground surveillance. Sensors on the RQ-4 Global Hawk include SAR, Ground

Moving Target Indicator (GMTI), and EO/IR cameras.

Figure 11-12 RQ-4 Global Hawk

MQ-4 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Triton

The MQ-4 Triton (Figure 11-13) UAS includes long range ISR and global coverage and is

capable of maritime surveillance and reconnaissance, land target surveillance and

reconnaissance, strike support, SIGINT collection, and communications relay.

Figure 11-13 MQ-4 Triton



MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper

The MQ-1 Predator (Figure 11-14) and the MQ-9 Reaper (Figure 11-15) UASs were developed

to have the same roles and sensors. Both are land-based, medium-altitude, long-endurance UASs

used for interdiction and armed reconnaissance against critical moving targets. Sensors for the

MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper include a nose camera, daytime variable aperture TV camera,

nighttime variable aperture IR camera, and SAR. The primary differences between the Predator

and the Reaper are power and payload. The Predator has a 115 horsepower, 4-cylinder piston

engine and can carry up to 2 Hellfire Missiles. The Reaper has a 900 horsepower turboprop

power plant, is faster than the Predator, and can carry up to 4 Hellfire Missiles.

Figure 11-14 MQ-1 Predator

Figure 11-15 MQ-9 Reaper



MQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(VTUAV)

The MQ-8 Fire Scout VTUAV (Figure 11-16) provides SA and precision targeting support. It

has the ability to take off and land autonomously on any aviation-capable warship. The MQ-8

Fire Scout VTUAV has an endurance of longer than 6 hours and is capable of continuous

operations 110 NM from the launch site.

Figure 11-16 MQ-8 Fire Scout

Scan Eagle

The Scan Eagle (Figure 11-17) is a long-endurance, fully autonomous UAV that provides ISR

support during operational missions. It contains an EO/IR camera that transmits streaming video

and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications.

Figure 11-17 Scan Eagle

AIRCRAFT SELF-DEFENSE CONCEPTS 12-1

CHAPTER TWELVE

AIRCRAFT SELF-DEFENSE CONCEPTS

1200. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the concepts of aircraft self-defense and covers the topics of airborne

threats, susceptibilities of large aircraft, and threat detection and countermeasures.

1201. AIRBORNE THREATS

Airborne threats include air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs) are

fired from an aircraft with the intent of destroying another aircraft. A typical guided missile has

a propellant/motor, guidance system, and warhead. While there are numerous types of guidance

systems in use, this chapter will focus on Active, semi-active, and IR.

Short-range AAMs are typically designed for within visual range engagements with enemy

aircraft and home in on emissions from a target. Medium- and long-range AAMs are typically

employed for BVR engagements. Medium- and long-range AAMs rely on active or semi-active

guidance systems while short range missiles typically use an IR seeker for homing guidance.

These missiles and their guidance systems are described in the next figure.

Guidance

System Description

Active Active guidance systems have their own small radar system built into the

missile. There is no need for external data or command to be followed.

Semi-Active Semi-active guidance systems have a receiver that accepts signals

transmitted by a ground- or air-defense system radar.

IR In IR guidance systems, the missile homes in on heat signatures from the

target, such as heat from an engine. It uses a seeker for homing guidance.

A seeker is an onboard antenna sensitive to a specific energy source. The

most easily detectable energy source is IR or heat energy.

Figure 12-1 Missile Guidance Systems

SAMs are designed to be launched from the ground or a surface platform and are designed to

destroy airborne aircraft or missiles. SAMs are used for shooting down enemy combatants and

preventing the enemy from executing its mission. Almost all SAM systems go through three

phases of flight from launch to impact. These phases are boost phase, mid-course, and terminal

phase. During the boost phase, the guidance systems are usually disabled to allow the missile to

travel away from the launch platform safely. The missile spends most of its flight time in the

mid-course phase. Using the guidance system, the missile makes slight adjustments to intercept

its target. In the terminal phase, the missile maintains accurate tracking to intercept the target.

These three phases are depicted in Figure 12-2.

CHAPTER TWELVE ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

12-2 AIRCRAFT SELF-DEFENSE CONCEPTS

Figure 12-2 Surface-to-Air Missile Flyout Phases

Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) is another type of anti-aircraft system. AAA consists of powerful,

high-caliber guns and rapid-fire machine guns mounted to moving vehicles.

1202. LARGE AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITIES

All aircraft have vulnerabilities in their defenses. This section focuses on the susceptibilities of

large aircraft.

Large aircraft are capable of carrying large payloads for different kinds of missions. One of

might be the carrying of large fuel loads to increase on-station time, operating in all weather

conditions, and performing multiple missions. Attributes of large aircraft generally include slow

speeds, poor maneuverability, and very large fuel capacity.

Due to the size of their bodies and number of engines, larger aircraft give off RF and IR

signatures that are easy to detect. The next figure details the areas of the aircraft that tend to give

off IR signatures.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER TWELVE


Figure 12-3 Components Producing IR Signatures

Different kinds of SAMs threaten the different phases of flight. Vulnerabilities change according

to the mission types and components. Larger aircraft are more vulnerable to SAMs, especially

during the takeoff and landing phases of flight. The next figure illustrates the flight phases and

threats.

Figure 12-4 Flight Phases and Threats



1203. THREAT DETECTION AND COUNTERMEASURES

An aircraft’s best countermeasure is to avoid a threat. To accomplish this, a threat must first be

detected. Warning systems help the aircrew to take effective evasive actions and to employ

countermeasures against the threats as required.

Threat Detection

In order to have advanced notice of a missile attack, or even to detect the presence of a radar

system, the aircraft may carry a radar warning receiver (RWR). An RWR is designed to monitor

the RF environment continuously and alert crews about radar threats to aircraft. The pilot is then

able to take evasive action to defeat the threat based on RWR indications. The next figure

illustrates the typical RWR antenna placement.

Figure 12-5 Antenna Placement of Radar Warning Receivers

Providing timely warning against IR missiles is a challenge. IR missiles do not give any warning

of their presence prior to launch. Once airborne, they have a small, but visible, radar signature

based on their cross-section and an IR signature created by their burning propellant. IR missiles

are short range and can lock on and destroy a target in seconds. Missile Warning Systems

(MAWs) are used to provide timely, reliable warning of IR missiles in flight so that an

appropriate countermeasure response can be initiated. The challenge with MAW is to provide a

near-100% accuracy in detection and warning while minimizing false alarm rates.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER TWELVE


Laser Warning Receivers (LWRs) detect laser signatures from threats. The basic steps used by

LWRs to detect laser signatures are as follows:

1. Detect the signal.

2. Discriminate the real signal from false signals.

3. Characterize the laser.

4. Localize the source.

Countermeasures

Offboard countermeasures, also known as expendables, are countermeasures used to deceive a

threat by deploying offboard objects capable of reflecting signals, transmitting RF signals, and

emitting an IR signature.

Chaff is the oldest method of radar countermeasure. When ejected from an aircraft, chaff forms

the electromagnetic equivalent of a visual smoke screen that temporarily hides the aircraft from

radar detection. Chaff also serves to decoy radar allowing aircraft to maneuver or egress from

the area. It consists of small, precisely cut pieces of aluminum or aluminum coated glass that

disperse widely in the air when ejected from the aircraft and are designed to effectively reflect

specific radar signals based on their frequencies. In the air, the initial burst from a chaff bundle

forms a sphere that shows up on radar screens as an electronic cloud. The aircraft is obscured by

the cloud, which confuses enemy radar.

Flares are used against IR-tracking threats. Flares are effective against early types of IR

missiles, which utilize passive guidance and employ hot spot trackers. Emitting a high-intensity

radiant, a flare will lure a missile for a few seconds by providing a temporary alternative target.

Decoys receive a signal, modify it, and then retransmit an amplified signal. This process makes

decoys different from chaff, which only reflects the signal. Decoys were developed when

home-on-jam types of threats increased. The ALE-50 decoy is towed behind the host aircraft,

protecting the aircraft and its crew against RF-guided missiles by luring the missile toward the

decoy and away from the intended target. The ALE-50 has successfully countered numerous

live firings of both surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.

In addition to offboard countermeasures, there are several types of onboard countermeasures that

serve as another method of defense. The number of missiles to be engaged is one important

consideration in determining which of these systems to use. The next figure describes the

different onboard countermeasures.



Onboard

Countermeasure Description

RF Jammers RF jammers attempt to foul a missile’s radar with noise, preventing it

from detecting the target. The jammer must cover the full radar

frequency band. For larger aircraft targets, more jamming power is

needed.

Active IR Active IR countermeasures add modulated IR energy to the aircraft’s

signature in an attempt to jam an IR-guided missile. The detector

receives the energy sources, and the signal processor determines the

position of the target. The missile seeker tracks the highest radiant

intensity.

Jamming and

Chaff (JAFF)

With JAFF, an onboard jammer illuminates the offboard dispensed chaff

with either deception or a noise signal. Chaff can reflect two Doppler

effects, one from the tracking radar and the other from the onboard

jammer.

Laser Laser countermeasures have a short duration and low repetition rates, but

a high intensity. A laser has a plasma spark effect in the seeker head

close to the detectors. The energy from this plasma effect causes

jamming and blinding consequences. In addition to the possibility of

negatively affecting the electronics near the seeker, this energy may also

cause pits and scratches in optics, and debris formation.

Evasive

maneuvering

Evasive maneuvering is a countermeasure that is controlled by the pilot.

Some examples include route changing, agile flying, changing speed,

maneuvering in corkscrews, low flying, within-cloud flying, night flying,

and terrain masking.

Figure 12-6 Onboard Countermeasures

MARITIME STRIKE 13-1

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

MARITIME STRIKE

1300. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will cover Maritime Strike Mission Planning, the Dynamic Targeting Process,

Maritime Tactical Control, SSC, AR/AI/SCAR, WAS Strike, and Battle Damage Assessment

(BDA).

1301. MARITIME STRIKE MISSION PLANNING

The national airspace and maritime domain, as defined by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,

is the foundation for maritime strike mission planning. The DOD General Planning FLIP

contains information concerning ICAO procedures and procedures for operations and firings

over the high seas.

NWP 1-14M (The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations [July 2007]) sets

out fundamental principles of international and domestic law governing U.S. naval operations at

sea.

Additionally, Commander’s intent, the existence of timely and accurate intelligence, weather,

threat environment, aircraft capabilities, and effective communications must all be considered

when planning maritime strike operations.

Commander’s Intent

Commander’s intent should be detailed in a separate SUW section of SPINS or conveyed in the

DIM. This section should include specific guidance such as desired end state, objective

(including kill criteria), ALR, target priorities, restricted targets, amplifying PID requirements,

and delegation of weapons release/PID authority that are applicable to the mission at hand.

Intelligence

Timely and accurate intelligence is crucial when planning maritime strike missions. This

includes obtaining threat information, target descriptions, and the recognized maritime picture

(RMP).

Obtain threat information: Information regarding the threat’s air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-

to-air, and surface-to-surface capabilities is essential for selecting the appropriate tactics and

planning support assets for SUW force protection.

Obtain target description: This includes obtaining locating data and surface-to-air/surface-to-

surface weapon system information in the vicinity of the target or targets.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

13-2 MARITIME STRIKE

Obtain the RMP: Access to an updated and accurate RMP is crucial for a maritime strike plan to

be successful. The RMP will show all located COI/CCOI as well as friendly surface contacts

and neutral/commercial shipping within the CSG/ESG/SAG OAs.

Weather Considerations

Weather conditions may complicate the SUW mission. Poor weather conditions affect target

search/ID, targeting, and post mission assessment. Low ceilings and limited visibility can

degrade or inhibit the capabilities of EO/IR systems among others. Figure 13-1 covers some

general weather planning rules of thumb.

Figure 13-1 Weather Planning Rules of Thumb

Strong surface winds can generate rough seas that complicate low-altitude acquisition of surface

targets. Sea spray can reduce/negate the capabilities of the EO/IR systems for low-altitude

operation. Ships in heavy sea states can pitch vertically as much as 30 ft or more in addition to

having a roll component. Large vessel pitch and roll during heavy sea states can have a

significant impact on a weapon’s effectiveness against ships. Decreased impact angle and

moving laser spot are potential factors that must be considered.

Temperature differential: IR systems are thermal imagers that convert invisible thermal energy

into a visible image. IR systems operate as differential temperature measuring systems. They do

not display the actual temperature of a given area or object, but they accentuate the differences in

temperature between them. Thus, there must be a difference between the temperature received

from the object and the temperature received from the background for an IR system to display

the object effectively. Radical changes in water temperature (shallow versus deep water, gulf

stream, etc.) will affect thermal imaging systems.

Threat Environment

Threat levels within an AO will vary depending upon the threat and its capabilities against a

particular airframe. Planners should balance this threat level with the acceptable level of risk set

forth in the commander’s intent when determining the preferred aircraft tactics and weapon

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER THIRTEEN


employment techniques. Defining the threat environment should not be done without full

knowledge and consideration for the observed threat level and accepted level of risk.

Permissive threat environment: For the purposes of maritime strike missions, a permissive

threat environment is defined as one in which a sanctuary exists in the immediate vicinity of the

target. Typically, a permissive threat environment will facilitate a broader set of choices when

selecting aircraft type and weapons platforms.

Nonpermissive threat environment: For the purposes of maritime strike missions, a non-

permissive threat environment is defined as one in which a sanctuary does NOT exist in the

immediate vicinity of the target. A nonpermissive threat environment may dictate the use of

standoff weapons and/or alternate tactics such as low-altitude ingress and delivery.

Local Air Superiority: Theaterwide air superiority or supremacy is not required to conduct SUW

operations. However, local air superiority IS a key enabler. Air superiority may range from

local or temporary control to control over the entire theater. Multirole aircraft with the capability

to conduct self-escort (air-to-air and HARM capable as well as air-to-ground) into the target area

may be necessary in the absence of local air superiority. Range limitations, aircraft loading,

and/or tactics may degrade the effectiveness of aircraft in completing their mission.

SEAD is an activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air

defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. The level of SEAD effort is determined by the

threat level and the degree to which the threat must be reduced in order to engage a target.

Aircraft Capabilities

Maritime strike missions require aircraft that are capable of solving the F2T2EA kill chain

(which will be discussed in section 1302, THE DYNAMIC TARGETING PROCESS).

Typically, no single platform will be capable of accomplishing this alone and maritime strike

missions will require fused capabilities from multiple assets to ensure mission success.

Consideration should be given to each platform’s weapons carriage, weapons delivery, target

location, PID, C2, time on station, and communications capabilities.

Effective Communications

Communication nets between C2 and maritime strike assets must be clearly established and

consideration should be given to establishing dedicated frequencies when developing a

communications plan. Ideally, a frequency will be associated with each mission to enable asset

coordination.

1302. THE DYNAMIC TARGETING PROCESS

Targets that are identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the

deliberate targeting cycle discussed in Chapter 30 of this FTI titled: STRIKE COORDINATION

AND ASSET MANAGEMENT, must be prosecuted using a process known as dynamic

targeting. Dynamic targeting is normally used to quickly service pop-up threats or those threats



that present themselves during the course of conducting preplanned “deliberate” targeting.

Figure 13-2 illustrates how dynamic targeting fits into the overall targeting process.

Figure 13-2 Targeting Process

The dynamic targeting process consists of six distinct phases. They are Find, Fix, Track, Target,

Engage, and Assess. This process is commonly referred to as F2T2EA and is colloquially

known as the “Kill Chain.” Some of these phases can be accomplished simultaneously under

certain circumstances and the process is not necessarily linear, meaning some of the steps may

have to be accomplished over and over before being able to move on to subsequent steps.

Find Phase

The “find” phase involves ISR detection of an emerging target. The find phase requires clearly

designated guidance from commanders, especially concerning target priorities. The detections of

objects that meets sufficient criteria (established with commander’s guidance) to be considered

and developed as targets are known as “emerging targets.” Time sensitivity and importance with

respect to emerging targets may be initially undetermined.

Fix Phase

The “fix” phase positively identifies an emerging target as worthy of engagement and determines

their position and other data with sufficient fidelity to permit engagement. Data correlation and

fusion confirms, identifies, and locates the target resulting in its classification as either Unknown

(not a target), probable target (not time-sensitive target), or probable time sensitive target (TST).

If a target is detected by the aircraft or system that will engage it (e.g., a Predator armed with

Hellfire Missiles) or a battle management C2 platform such as an E-2C/D, this may result in the

find and fix phases being completed near-simultaneously without the need for “traditional” ISR

input. Today’s sensor technology permits “nontraditional” ISR sources to supplement the find,



fix, and track phases by integrating data from other-than-traditional intel platforms and helping

to build the RMP and COP which commanders can use to shorten the kill chain.

Track Phase

The “track” phase takes a confirmed target and its location, maintains a track on it, and confirms

the desired effect against it. This phase requires relative reprioritization of ISR assets, just as the

fix phase might, in order to maintain SA on the target. If track continuity is lost, it will probably

be necessary to re-accomplish the fix phase and, possibly, the find phase. For this reason,

warfare commanders also emphasize the importance of maintaining one data link track number

for the life of the track in their DIMS and SITREPs.

Target Phase

The “target” phase takes an identified, classified, located, and prioritized target, finalizes the

desired effect and targeting solution against it, and obtains required approval to engage it.

During this phase, target restrictions, such as collateral damage, ROE, and clear field of fire

(CFF) requirements are reviewed. This phase accomplishes the equivalent of “target validation.”

Engage Phase

In the “engage” phase, the target is confirmed as “hostile” and engagement is ordered and

transmitted to the pilot, aircrew, or operator of the selected weapon system. The engagement

orders must be sent to, received by, and understood by the “shooter.” The engagement should be

monitored and managed by the engaging component (in the maritime domain, this is call sign

AZ). In the joint maritime environment, it is the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander

(JFMCC). The desired result of this phase is successful action against the target.

Assess Phase

In the “assess” phase, predetermined assessment requests are measured against actions and

desired effects on the target. ISR assets collect information about the engagement according to

the collection plan and attempt to determine whether desired effects and objectives were

achieved. In the cases of most fleeting targets, quick assessment may be required in order to

make expeditious re-attack recommendations.

Additional Considerations

Engagement Authority: the authority to engage should be delegated to the C2 node that has the

best information or SA to execute the mission and direct communications to the operators and

crew of the engaging weapon system. At the tactical level, engagement authority usually resides

with the “shooter” for planned events being executed.

Managing increased risk: With compression of the decision cycle comes increased risk due to

insufficient time for more detailed coordination and deconfliction that takes place during



deliberate targeting. Commanders must assess risk early, determine what constitutes acceptable

risk, and communicate their intent.

1303. MARITIME TACTICAL CONTROL

As previously discussed, airspace and aircraft control is normally conducted by air and surface

units under the broad category of ACUs. ACUs must perform contact identification and

maintain deconfliction among aircraft. Typical ACUs perform these functions fulfilling roles as

airspace managers.

MAC

The MAC is an ACU serving as an extension of the SCC and is charged with providing C2 to

airborne assets operating within a designated maritime area of operations. MAC responsibilities

will primarily be determined by mission requirements, threat environment, as well as

commander’s intent.

Platforms capable of filling the MAC role are the E-2 Hawkeye, E-3 AWACS, P-3 Littoral

Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), P-3 ASUW Improvement Program (AIP), P-8 Poseidon, E-8

JSTARS, MH-60R, and surface combatants.

MAC Communications

Controllers must have a level of tactical understanding on par with the aircraft assets under their

control. In order clearly communicate and achieve consistent and effective control, a

standardized communication format is required. This is the previously discussed MAC Comm.

Format that is depicted in Figure 13-3. Each line of this format, which has been aligned to

closely resemble TACAIC Comm. format, is broken down and discussed further.

Figure 13-3 MAC Baseline Comm. Format



Line 1 (Call sign)

This is simply the call sign of the tasked platform followed by the MAC’s call sign in “you, this

is me” format.

Line 2 (Dynamic Targeting)

Although there are several forms of tasking that can be issued via line 2, the focus here is on the

three dynamic targeting brevity terms: Investigate, Target, and Smack.

Investigate: Verify specified elements of ROE, PID, CFF, and/or coordination of

forces on the referenced target/track.

Target: ROE, PID, coordination of forces, and commander’s guidance have been

satisfied. Correlation and CFF still need to be accomplished prior to weapons release.

Smack: Clearance to employ ordnance/fires on surface target. ROE, PID, CFF,

coordination of forces, and commander’s guidance requirements on the referenced

target have all been satisfied.

Line 3 (Group Name)

“Surface track number XXXX” with referenced Link 16 (TIMBER) track number. If MAC or

asset is negative TIMBER, the format will be “surface contact.” Any number of surface contacts

within a one nautical mile radius of each other will be reported as a GROUP.

Line 4 (Anchor Point and Location)

Bearing and range of target from digital bullseye.

Line 5 (Fill-ins)

Track Direction: cardinal/subcardinal and speed if known

Declaration:

SKUNK: Contact that has not yet been identified

ROBBER: Vessel identified as an enemy IAW theater criteria but does not necessarily

imply clearance to engage

HOSTILE: A contact identified as an enemy upon which clearance to fire is authorized

IAW theater ROE



NEUTRAL: A positively identified aircraft, ship, or friendly position whose

characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate it is neither supporting

nor opposing friendly forces.

Identification: If known, will be passed utilizing code words delineated via CSG Card of the

Day, Week, or SPINS. Pass information based on highest threat with regard to the weapon being

employed.

Strength: Pass if known any tactically relevant amplifying remarks:

Attack Axis (used when the MAC is required to Solve CFF for standoff weapons)

Location of friendly, neutral, and other hostile Surface contacts (if tactically significant)

Any additional information deemed tactically significant by the MAC

Communication Nets

Numerous communication nets are applicable when conducting maritime strike operations.

Figure 13-4 Communication Nets

Command Net: This net links the OTC and CWC with the various warfare commanders and

coordinators. Additionally, command nets provide a circuit to coordinate actions.



C2 Coordination Net: A circuit for C2 assets to communicate and coordinate C2-specific items

within an AOR

SCC Coordination and Reporting (C&R): A dedicated circuit between SSC/SCC

(SUWC/ASWC)/and operating forces. This net allows the warfare commander to maintain SA

and provide guidance and intentions for assigned assets. Also known as the AZ net.

Information Warfare Commander C&R: A dedicated circuit between the IWC and ISR assets.

Allows the IWC to maintain SA and provide guidance and intentions in order to coordinate with

assigned ISR assets to expedite the PID process.

Voice Production Net (VPN)/Special Reporting and Coordinating (SPRAC): Used for time-

sensitive tactical voice reports.

SSC Air Coordination: Used for the coordination and control of aircraft assigned to the SCC for

SSC.

Tactical Air Direction (TAD) Net: Used for control of tactical assets.

Communication Flow

The MAC is an extension of the SCC and must remain in communication with the warfare

commander on that specific coordination and reporting net. The specific communication nets the

MAC will be responsible for will vary based on both the mission and the MAC’s system

capabilities. After checking out with the applicable CSG/ESG administrative agencies, maritime

air assets will check in with the MAC using the MNPOTTA check-in brief on their assigned

frequency. This frequency will be based on the assigned mission and will most likely be found

on the CSG/ESG air plan.

All assets checking in with the MAC should expect a current SITREP including the status of

engagements, current threats, and airspace coordinating measures (ACMs). Depending on the

mission, the MAC will either maintain control of the asset or turn them over to the next

appropriate agency. The MAC may be able to request and/or receive information from

supporting ISR platforms to assist in or solve for PID and to better establish/maintain the

RMP/CTP/COP.

The MAC’s Contribution to the Kill Chain

Find, Fix, Track: The MAC will utilize onboard systems as well as supporting assets to conduct

a search of the operating area in accordance with commander’s intent in order to establish and

maintain the RMP/CTP/COP.

Target, Engage: All surface contacts meeting PID/ROE shall be prosecuted in accordance with

commander’s intent. MAC responsibilities during the engagement phase will vary based on

capabilities as well as the threat and operating environment. The MAC may direct assets to use



persistent surveillance (SHADOW) a target or direct jamming (MUSIC/BUZZER) when

airborne EA is required to support an engagement. Communication examples are in Figure 13-5.

Figure 13-5 Target/Engage Comm. Examples

Assess: MAC will collect inflight reports (MISREPS) from TACAIR as well as collect

information from ISR assets in order to provide commanders an accurate and current

RMP/CTP/COP. An important factor in the assessment phase is determining BDA. The MAC

must use onboard systems as well as supporting assets to make the best possible assessment.

This information will be used for follow-on decisions such as a re-strike.

1304. SSC CONSIDERATIONS

SSC may encompass all steps of the F2T2EA process. However, it focuses primarily on the

Find, Fix, and Tack phases. In most cases, assets will be controlled by the MAC. The MAC

must efficiently utilize assets to maximize search volume and maintain deconfliction for

controlled/assigned assets.

Flight leads will check in with the MAC using the MNPOTTA format. Upon check-in, SSC

assets can expect to be tasked to either investigate specific COIs/CCOIs or to scan their

respective search areas. Assigned scan search areas may be provided as a sector search using

bearing and range from a GEOREF/bullseye, a directed search where the MAC will give specific

coordinates or bearings to the contact, an autonomous or pilot-controlled “free-lance” search, or

a grid search where a specific GARS box will be delineated.

Figure 13-6 Investigate Tasking Example



Search patterns that aircraft can employ to locate surface contacts include the previously covered

search patterns; Bar Scan, Expanded Square, and Sector Search. Type/Class/Unit level

classification of surface contacts should include the two categories (Merchant or Combatant),

Type (patrol craft, destroyer), and class (Houdong, Houbei) as provided in the theater ship

recognition guide.

Identification of a surface contact requires obtaining the vessel’s name, hull number, and flag.

Rigging is a close approach overt procedure dependent on time available threat conditions and

commander’s intent (CCOI, COI, or VOI requirements). Rigging procedures allow SSC aircraft

to obtain critical ID of contacts in a non-threatening manner (e.g., not crossing the contact’s

bow)

Figure 13-7 Rigging Example

The ability and level to which a SSC asset can classify and identify a surface contact will depend

upon its sensors and certain environmental factors. The confidence levels: Unknown, Non-COI,

Possible (Low/High), Probable, and Certain are applied.

Even with PID established, the intent of an approaching vessel may not be known. In order to

ascertain the vessel’s intent, the MAC or on-scene commander can utilize escalatory response

options. The entire series of events do not have to be conducted during a single encounter with a

contact. The situation will dictate required actions. The contact’s response will help fill in the

elements of ROE.



Figure 13-8 Escalatory Response Options

SLEDGEHAMMER is a request for immediate air support. Once SLEDGEHAMMER is called

by the defended surface unit, air assets will be reassigned from other mission sets to identify

threat intentions and employ in an AR/AI/SCAR role if necessary. If an asset determines that a

surface contact poses an imminent threat to friendly or neutral surface forces, then they can

recommend surface forces declare “SLEDGEHAMMER.”

1305. AR/AI/SCAR

AR/AI is an airplan-assigned mission in which assets locate and attack TOO in assigned areas.

AR/AI aircraft can either support a SCAR mission or perform SCAR if required. Much like

SSC, AR/AI assets may be directed to scan designated areas. If AR/AI assets are able to locate

enemy surface contacts and ROE on those contacts is solved, then AR/AI platforms may employ

as necessary to attrite the threat. If a SCAR is coordinating engagements, then the SCAR may

issue TARGET or SMACK tasking to AR/AI assets.

For the purposes of AR/AI/SCAR in the maritime environment, the MAC is responsible for

channeling AR/AI/SCAR assets to designated scan areas or ongoing engagements. At a

minimum, the MAC should provide AR/AI/SCAR platforms procedural control, an appropriate

situation update, applicable sensor data or tracks of interest, and SA to other air assets and

surface-to-surface fires within the AO.

On initial check-in, the AR/AI assets will pass call sign, mission number, and position. If AR

assets are directed to support a SCAR in an ongoing engagement, the SCAR will need to provide

deconfliction between AR assets engaged in attacks. The SCAR can deconflict aircraft utilizing

vertical, lateral, or timing measures, or a combination of the three. If an AR platform detects



targets and PID/ROE are solved, the AR platform will employ per platform TTP to attrite the

threat. In the event that more targets are detected than can be serviced by the locating platform,

the locating AR/AI platform will assume the responsibility of the SCAR and request more assets

through the MAC.

After receiving tasking to TARGET or SMACK from the SCAR, assets must ensure that they are

correlated (surface contact correlation is defined as 1 NM) prior to weapons release. The SCAR

will never clear an AR/AI/ SCAR asset “hot.”

Figure 13-9 SCAR Targeting Example

AR/AI/SCAR assets will provide the SCAR with timely MISREPS to include BDA or remaining

threats. The SCAR will then make a determination whether additional assets should be assigned

to the target set for employment. Once all targets are serviced, the SCAR will return to the role

of an AR platform.

1306. WAS STRIKE

WAS strike is the execution of deliberate attacks which are offensive in nature against symmetric

enemy surface combatants and material. WAS strikes can be executed against maritime dynamic

targets by air, surface, and/or subsurface assets. WAS strike may also be an airplan-assigned

mission against deliberate targets selected during the conventional strike planning process. For a

preplanned WAS, all participating assets should attempt to be involved in the mission planning

process and flight briefing to the maximum extent possible.

Due to the dynamic nature of targets in the maritime environment, there are also times where

AZ, via the MAC, will retask aircraft to execute or support a WAS strike against a recently

located threat. Because the target is moving and is most likely operating in a nonpermissive

threat environment, the Find, Fix, Track portion of the kill chain will need to be updated by the

MAC. To accomplish this, the MAC will utilize both onboard and offboard sensors from ISR,

UAS, and MPR assets assigned to support AZ.

When accomplishing the target phase, in most cases, AZ will be designated as the weapons

release authority. AZ may choose to delegate weapons release authority to the mission



commander if PID and ROE are solved. Whether the WAS strike mission is preplanned or

dynamically tasked, the MAC will be responsible for updating the mission commander with

amplifying strike information.

Engagements will be IAW theater specific SPINS and individual service TTPs. For U.S. Navy

WAS strike TTP, reference NTTP TOPGUN Manual Chapter 48, “Maritime Employment.”

BDA assessment may prove difficult due to employment and standoff considerations in a

nonpermissive threat environment. In certain cases, BDA may require the use of theater or

national level ISR assets.

1307. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage to a target or target system resulting from the

lethal or nonlethal application of military force. BDA consists of assessments of physical and

functional damage, as well as the target system. Video, FLIR, or visual identifications are often

the means of recording BDA.

Aircrews may be instructed to achieve a Mobility Kill, Firepower Kill, or Catastrophic Kill

(K-KILL). A Mobility Kill refers to disabling a ship’s ability to maneuver (e.g., propulsion,

steering mechanism, and personnel). Mission Kill refers to the damage inflicted on a ship that

destroys the ship’s weapons systems or substantially reduces its ability to deliver weapons

effectively. K-KILL refers to damage inflicted on a ship that renders it both unusable and

irreparable. K-KILL is also referred to as a SINK KILL.

Standard Mission Report

Standard Mission Reports are critical for the passage of BDA and Bomb Hit Assessment (BHA)

during Maritime Strike. These reports are collected and evaluated by airborne C2. An example

Standard Mission Report is displayed in the next figure.

Figure 13-10 Standard Mission Report

SEARCH AND RESCUE 14-1

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

SEARCH AND RESCUE

1400. INTRODUCTION

This chapter covers terms, concepts, and procedures associated with airborne SAR mission

responsibilities, SAR equipment, SAR asset coordination, search patterns, rescue/recovery

reports, and SAR mission planning.

1401. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES

The mission responsibilities for SAR are divided among the Rescue Coordination Centers

(RCCs), SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC), and On-Scene Commander (OSC).

The RCCs are SAR facilities established worldwide by geographic location. The SAR

Coordinator is the individual with the overall responsibility for providing or arranging for SAR

services within the RCCs. Even if not directly involved in the search operation, the SAR

Coordinator must be informed and kept abreast of the progress of the search and rescue.

The SMC, designated by the SAR Coordinator, is responsible for the specific SAR mission (in

the case of a military search). In the case of a SAR effort by military personnel, the OTC or the

unit designated by the OTC shall assume the duties of the SMC.

The responsibility of the OSC, who is designated by the SMC, is to assist in ensuring that the

search plan is carried out properly by evaluating and making recommendations to the SMC to

alter the plan (if necessary). If the SMC is on scene, the SMC may handle the duties of the OSC.

Generally, the first search unit to arrive on scene or the unit with the best capability is designated

OSC.

The SAR Checklist is located in the Commander, Training Air Wing Six (CTW-6) In-Flight

Guide. The SAR Checklist contains instructions for Squawk 7700, reporting on currently

assigned ATC frequency or UHF/VHF Guard (243.0/121.5), establishing a BINGO fuel and

watching the fuel state, recording pertinent information, remaining on SAR common (282.8), and

designating and briefing the relief before leaving station.

When reporting on currently assigned ATC frequency or UHF/VHF Guard (243.0/121.5), it is

necessary to provide identification, situation (chutes, survivors), position (NAVAID,

Radial/DME), and intentions (assume OSC duties). Recording pertinent information includes

aircraft fire, number of survivors, access to site (via air, ground, or water), and assistance

currently on scene. When remaining on SAR common (282.8), the crew should assign/request

communications relay as required, assign aircraft to guide recovery team to the scene, provide

zone brief to incoming SAR, and control traffic in and around scene.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

14-2 SEARCH AND RESCUE

1402. SEARCH AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT

Crew requirements for SAR missions are in accordance with the appropriate aircraft

Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) NATOPS manual.

MPR aircraft may be directed to assist in SAR, primarily in the search phase, because of their

sensors and due to the fact they are capable of deploying a SAR kit. The P-3C lends itself to this

task with fast enroute speeds and good on-station endurance capability. To assist survivors when

located at sea, a SAR drop kit, consisting of two seven-man life rafts and an emergency

equipment container, has been developed for use by MPR units. The next figure illustrates how

the SAR drop kit should be delivered where Vs is the aircraft’s stall speed.

Figure 14-1 Search and Rescue Drop Kit

Survivor position-marking devices are used for marking positions or determining wind direction.

All pyrotechnic survivor position-marking devices should be stored in a dry, well-ventilated

magazine and out of direct sunlight or excessive/variable temperatures.

WARNING

Pyrotechnic devices (e.g., survivor position-marking devices)

should not be used in areas where flammable fluids or other

combustible materials may be ignited.

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS CHAPTER FOURTEEN


Survivor position-marking devices include the MK 25 smoke (marine marker), MK 58 smoke

(marine marker), MK 18 smoke (land marker), MK 79 MOD 0 and MK 79 MOD 2 (personnel

distress signal kits), MK 124 MOD 0 (marine smoke and illumination signal), SDU-36/N

(electric marine marker light), (SAR sonobuoy), and Datum marker (sonobuoy).

1403. SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSET COORDINATION

Assets must be coordinated recognizing their capabilities to support the operation of the SAR

mission. The frequency used to communicate during SAR depends on the situation. Distress

signals and on-scene communications have specified frequencies. The next figure lists the

communication frequencies and functions for international recognized SAR distress frequencies.

Frequency Function

500 kHz International Continuous Wave (CW)/Modulated Continuous Wave

(CW/MCW) distress and calling

2182 kHz International voice distress, safety, and calling

8364 kHz International CW/MCW lifeboat, life raft, and survival craft

40.5 MHz USA FM distress

121.5 MHz International voice aeronautical and shipboard emergency (VHF Guard)

156.8 MHz International FM voice distress, emergency (VHF)

243.0 MHz Joint/combined military voice aeronautical emergency and international survival

craft (UHF Guard)

406.0 MHz International voice aeronautical and shipboard emergency (UHF)

Figure 14-2 International Search and Rescue Distress Frequencies

The next figure lists commonly used on-scene SAR frequencies and their functions.

Frequency Function

2670 kHz Coast Guard HF working frequency

3024.4

kHz International voice SAR on scene (3023)

5680 kHz International voice SAR on scene

123.1 MHz National aeronautical SAR scene of action. International SAR scene of action

in U.S. and Canadian ICAO regions of responsibility in Atlantic and Pacific



Frequency Function

138.78

MHz U.S. military voice SAR on scene and direct finding (DF)

155.16

MHz

FM frequency used by some states and local agencies for coordinating SAR

operations

157.1 MHz Coast Guard VHF-FM working frequency (CH 22A)

282.8 MHz Joint/combined on scene and DF (UHF)

243.0 MHz Motor whaleboat/rescue helicopter communications

381.8 MHz Coast Guard Command net (working frequency between Coast Guard aircraft,

and cutters)

Figure 14-3 On-Scene Search and Rescue Frequencies

1404. SEARCH PATTERNS

SAR Recovery Units (SRUs) team aircraft and vessels together for the most advantageous use of

search patterns. Aircraft provide rapid coverage of the search area from a good search platform.

Vessels may provide better navigation, and may be able to quickly rescue a survivor sighted

from the aircraft. General types of search patterns include, but are not limited to, track line,

parallel, creeping line, square, sector, flare, homing signal, and contour.

Coordinated search formulas assist in the execution of coordinated search patterns. These

formulas take into account ship speed, aircraft turn diameter, general half searchleg timing, into

the wind half searchleg timing, downwind half searchleg timing, crossleg timing, and bowtie

solution.

Coordinated search patterns include the Creeping Line Single-Unit Coordinated (CSC) and

Creeping Line Single-Unit Radar (CSR). These patterns are variations of the Creeping Line

pattern. If the only available surface craft is a boat or larger vessel untrained in directing or

coordinating aircraft, the CSC pattern is used. If the surface craft is a Navy vessel or a Coast

Guard cutter, trained in directing or coordinating aircraft, the CSR pattern is normally used.

Search pattern considerations for aircraft and vessels include vessel heading and track, vessel

speed, aircraft heading and speed, aircraft turn diameter, aircraft crossleg time, aircraft searching

time, and pattern timing.

1405. RESCUE/RECOVERY REPORTS

A Search Unit Report occurs 10 – 20 minutes before arrival at the search area. The OSC

receives the report of the current weather at the scene on arrival. In a Search Unit Report, the

SRU reports to the OSC. The report includes call sign, ETA on scene, on-scene communications

capability, planned search speed, and on-scene endurance.



When an aircraft SRU reports to the OSC, the OSC accepts responsibility for flight-following

service. It is essential, therefore, that each aircraft SRU makes “OPS normal” reports to the OSC

at regular intervals. Normally, multi-engine aircraft will make reports every 30 min and single-

engine aircraft and helicopters, every 15 min. Upon completion of the assigned search period,

the SRU reports the results of the search to the OSC. If unable to report directly to the OSC over

an on-scene channel, then the report should be relayed through another SRU.

The Briefing Officer conducts a thorough briefing using the items on the Search Briefing

Checklist. If the search craft has already been scrambled, then this checklist should be used as a

guide for radio briefing. The brief should be condensed, as appropriate.

Search aircraft should contact the OSC 10 – 20 minutes prior to ETA on-scene. The OSC will

request that the search aircraft either confirm or provide the information in the On-Scene

Procedures section.

Situation Reports (SITREPs) must be transmitted by the OSC to the SMC upon arrival at the

search area, when change occurs, or every 4 hr. A SITREP includes number (numerically by

OSC); date/time group; search unit’s on-station arrival time, with an estimated off-station time;

on-scene weather, wind, and sea conditions; pertinent new developments; major modifications to

the search plan; requests for additional assistance; summary of the search areas with the

probability of detection; and recommendations.

Search aircraft should always keep a drift signal, smoke float, or sea dye marker ready for

immediate jettison. When any sighting is made, then a smoke float should be dropped

immediately. If survivors are sighted, or the scene of distress is located, then observe the

Survivor Sighting Procedures. If survivors are sighted, it is important to provide the OSC with

information from the Sighting Reports.

1406. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION PLANNING

Naval units must constantly be equipped to perform SAR responsibilities. Although the limiting

factor in most situations will be shortage of available space, commands are encouraged to add

authorized rescue equipment as necessary to increase mission readiness.

SAR mission planning (maritime) is an eleven-step process, of which five of the steps are

mandatory. These mandatory steps are one, four, nine, ten, and eleven. The following are the

steps for SAR mission planning (maritime):

1. Determine the type of incident and select a response based on the situation:

a. If an aviation incident and a bailout or an ejection have occurred: Go to Step 2.

b. If a surface position is known, or the incident involved a surface craft: Go to Step 4.



2. Obtain or estimate the following aircraft information (if applicable):

a. Ejection position

b. Ejection altitude

c. Aircraft direction of travel

d. Average wind speed, direction from parachute, and opening altitude to the surface

3. Determine the parachute drift. Follow the steps below to determine the parachute drift:

a. Enter the table (Figure 14-4) at the closest altitude to the parachute opening AGL

(vertical column).

b. Move across to the intersection of the appropriate average winds aloft speed. This

number represents the distance in NM that the parachute drifted.

Figure 14-4 Parachute Drift Table

4. Determine the visual search altitude. From the visual search altitude table below,

determine the recommended visual search altitude for the search object. As a general rule,

difference in sweep widths of less than 10% should be ignored when making altitude decisions.



Figure 14-5 Visual Search Altitude Table

– The sweep width is the width of a swath centered on the SRU’s track, where the

probability of detecting the search object (if it is outside the swath) is equal to the

probability of missing the search object if it is inside that swath (Figure 14-6).

i. If visually searching: Go to Step 5.

ii. If searching for a daylight visual distress signal: Go to Step 7.

iii. If searching for a night visual distress signal: Go to Step 8.

iv. If searching using any other sensors (e.g., IR, Radar): Go to Step 9.

Figure 14-6 Sweep Width Determination



5. Determine the uncorrected maritime visual sweep width. The following tables (Figures

14-7 thru 14-9) provide the uncorrected values (Wu) for sweep width for various search objects.

To determine the Wu, do the following:

a. Select the table for the type of SRU and enter the column, indicating the selected

search altitude and visibility.

b. Move down the column to the search object that most closely identifies the actual

search object and interpolate as required. This value is the Wu in NM.

c. Go to Step 6

Figure 14-7 Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (300 – 750 ft)





6. Determine the visual sweep width correction factors. Apply the correction factors to the

Wu, correcting the sweep width for flotation, fatigue, weather, and aircraft speed (as applicable):

a. Correcting for flotation (search altitudes) – For up to 500 ft. only, the values given for

sweep width for a Person In Water (PIW) may be increased by a factor of four

(multiply Wu by 4) if it is known that the person is wearing a personal flotation

device.

b. Correcting for fatigue – The degradation of detection performance during a search

can be significant. If feedback from the on-scene SRUs indicates that the search

crews were excessively fatigued, reduce the sweep width values by 10% (multiply Wu

by 0.9).

c. Correcting for weather – The table below can be used to determine the weather

correction factor. If weather conditions in more than one row apply, use the lower of

the two correction factors.

Figure 14-10 Weather Correction Table



d. Correcting for search aircraft speed – Enter the speed correction table with aircraft

type (fixed-wing or helicopter) and the speed flown. Move down the column to the

search object. This value is the speed correction. Interpolate as required. There is no

speed correction for surface SRUs. Go to Step 10.

7. Determine the visual distress signaling devices sweep width for day (Figure 14-11). The

estimated sweep widths for handheld orange smoke provided in the table (Figure 14-12) are for

winds of 10 kts or less. For winds over 10 kts, the smoke tends to dissipate and the sweep width

degrades to less than 2 NM. Go to Step 10.

Figure 14-11 Sweep Width for Daylight Detection Aids

Figure 14-12 Sweep Width for Handheld Orange Smoke

8. Determine the visual distress signaling devices sweep width for night (Figure 14-13 or

14-14). Go to Step 10.

Figure 14-13 Sweep Width for Night Detection Aids



Figure 14-14 Sweep Width Life Jacket White Strobe

9. Determine the sensor sweep width and altitude – IR (Figure 14-15). Sweep widths should

be approximated, using the operator’s best estimate of effective detection ranges for other target

types and FOV/scan width limits. The definition of the effective detection range is the range at

which the target will certainly be detected under prevailing conditions. The sweep width should

not exceed the effective azimuthal coverage of the IR system in use, regardless of target size. Go

to Step 10.

Figure 14-15 Altitudes for Forward Looking Infrared

Determine the sensor sweep width and altitude – Radar. The airborne radar with ISAR provides

high resolution, small-target detection, weather avoidance, sea surveillance, and Doppler display.

The sweep width ISAR system has special selectable features that enhance system performance

against weak targets. The sweep widths for conducting and planning airborne ISAR searches are

summarized in the table below (based on the following general recommendations):



a. Search altitude – 1500 ft. or lower

b. Search speed – 180 – 220 Knots Indicated Air Speed (KIAS)

c. Life raft searches – 16 NM range

d. Search full radar display – Search not limited by the distance between two parallel

searchlegs

e. Search cursor – May hide weak targets

f. Radar screen – Refresh when 1/4 of display in front of aircraft is off-screen

Figure 14-16 Sweep Width for Forward Looking Airborne Radar

10. Determine the track spacing. For any search area, the RCC and the SMC will specify the

required Probability of Detection (POD) and determine the Coverage Factor (C) accordingly.

Prior to direction from the RCC/SMC and to ensure that survivors are included, plot a search

area large enough, and use a coverage factor of 1.0. Use the equation C = W ÷ S, where W is the

sweep width, and S is track spacing (distance between two parallel searchlegs). This spacing

directly influences target electability. The optimum S yields maximum POD during the time

available, consistent with the economical use of available SRUs.

11. Select a search pattern. Follow the steps to select a search pattern and then determine an

applicable search pattern to use. Once on the scene, begin the search. It is important to continue

to monitor the situation on scene as it develops. If it is necessary, adjust the search plan.

GLOSSARY A-1

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

µsec microsecond

3D Three-dimensional

A/A Air-to-Air

A/FD Airport/Facility Directory

A/G Air-to-Ground

A/S Air-to-Surface

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery

AAR Air-to-Air Refueling

AAM Air-to-Air Missile

AAW Anti-Air Warfare

ACA Airspace Control Authority

ACC Area Control Center

ACM Airspace Coordinating Measures

ACO Airspace Control Order

ACU Aircraft Control Unit

ADC Air Defense Center

ADF Automatic Direction Finder

ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

Advanced MC2 Advanced Maritime Command and Control

AEA Airborne Electronic Attack

AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array

AEW Airborne Early Warning

AFB Air Force Base

AFCS Automatic Flight Control System

AGL Above Ground Level

AGM Air-to-Ground Missile

AI Air Interdiction

APPENDIX A ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS

A-2 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

AIM Aeronautical Information Manual

AIP ASUW Improvement Program

AIRMET Airmen’s Meteorological Information

AIS Automatic Identification System

ALCS Airborne Launch Control System

ALR Acceptable Levels of Risk

ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center

AM Amplitude Modulation

AMDC Air Missile Defense Commander

AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile

AMTI Airborne Moving Target Indicator

AO Area of Operations

AOMSW Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare

AOP Area of Probability

AOR Area of Responsibility

AP Area Planning

AR Armed Reconnaissance

AR Air-Refueling Track

AR/AI/SCAR Armed Reconnaissance/Air Interdiction/Strike Coordination

and Reconnaissance

AREC Air Resource Element Coordinator

ARIES Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System

ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center

ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile

ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

ASM Anti-Ship Missile

ASR Airport Surveillance Radar

ASROC Antisubmarine Rocket

ASW Antisubmarine Warfare

ASWC Antisubmarine Warfare Commander

ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY A-3

Acronym Definition

ATA Automatic Target Acquisition

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATFLIR Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared

ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

AWS Aegis Weapon System

BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BHA Bomb Hit Assessment

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BR Bearing Resolution

BRAA Bearing, Range, Altitude, and Aspect

BUNO Bureau Number

BVR Beyond Visual Range

BW Beam Width

BWE Beam Width Error

C Central

C Coverage Factor

C/A Coarse Acquisition

C&R Coordination and Reporting

C2 Command and Control

C2ISR Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance,

Reconnaissance

C2P Command and Control Processor

C3 Command, Control, and Communications

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and

Intelligence

CA Crab Angle

CAG Carrier Air Group

Cal. caliber


A-4 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

CAP Combat Air Patrol

CAS Close Air Support

CATCC Carrier Air Traffic Control Center

CB Citizen Band

CCA Carrier Control Area

CCZ Carrier Control Zone

CCOI Critical Contact of Interest

CENTCOM Central Command

CERT Certain

CFF Clear Field of Fire

CGRS Common Geographic Reference System

CH Compass Heading

CIEA Classification, Identification, and Engagement Area

CIRVIS Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence

Sightings

CIWS Close-In Weapons System

CIU Concurrent Interface Unit

cm centimeters

CNATRA Chief of Naval Air Training

CND Computer Network Defense

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding Officer

COI Contact of Interest

COMINT Communications Intelligence

COMNAVAIRFOR Commander, Naval Air Forces

COMSEC Communications Security

CONOPS Concept of Operations/Concurrent Operations

CONUS Continental United States

COP Common Operating Picture

CPD Crypto Period Designator


GLOSSARY A-5

Acronym Definition

CPS Cycles Per Second

CRC Cryptologic Resource Coordinator

CRM Crew Resource Management

CRT Cathode Ray Tube

CS Coarse Synchronization

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSC Creeping Line Single-Unit Coordinated

CSG Carrier Strike Group

CSR Creeping Line Single-Unit Radar

CTPM Common Tactical Picture Manager

CTW-6 Commander, Training Air Wing Six

CVIC Carrier Intelligence Center

CVW Carrier Air Wing

CW Continuous Wave

CWC Composite Warfare Commander

DA Decision Altitude

DA Drift Angle

DAISS Digital Airborne Intercommunications and Switching System

DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access

DAP Downlinked Air Parameter

DCT direct (code type)

DDP Digital Data Processor

DESRON Destroyer Squadron

DEWIZ Defense Early Warning Identification Zone

DF Direction Finder

DH Decision Height

DIM Daily Intentions Message

DINS Defense Internet NOTAM Service

DLRP Data Link Reference Point

DME Distance Measuring Equipment


A-6 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

DOA Direction of Arrival

DoD Department of Defense

DP Decision Point

DP Departure Procedure

DP/SID Departure Procedure/Standard Instrument Departure

DPG Digital Processing Group

DR Dead Reckoning

DSN Defense Switched Network

DST Daylight Saving Time

E East (when used with latitude and longitude)

E Eastern

EA Electronic Attack

ECHUM Electronic Chart Updating Manual

ECM Electronic Countermeasures

ECP Egress Control Point

EET Estimated Elapsed Time

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

EM Electromagnetic

EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility

EMCON Emissions Control

EO Electro-Optical

EOB Electronic Order of Battle

EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time

EO/IR Electro-optical/Infrared

EP Electronic Protection

ES Electronic Signature

ES Electronic Support

ESA Emergency Safe Altitude

ESG Expeditionary Strike Group

ESM Electronic Support Measures


GLOSSARY A-7

Acronym Definition

ETA Estimated Time of Arrival

ETE Estimated Time Enroute

EW Electronic Warfare

F2T2EA Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess

FA Aviation Area Forecast

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FACSFAC Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility

FAR Federal Aviation Regulations

FDC Flight Data Center

FDOA Frequency Difference of Arrival

FEZ Fighter Engagement Zone

FIC Flight Information Center

FIH Flight Information Handbook

FIR Flight Information Region

FIS Flight Information Service

FJU Forwarding JTIDS Unit

FL Flight Level

FLIP Flight Information Publication

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared

FM Frequency Modulation

FMS Flight Management System

FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operations

FOTC Force Track Coordination

FOV Field of View

fpm feet per minute

FRS Fleet Replacement Squadron

FS Fine Synchronization

FSS Flight Service Station

Ft feet or foot


A-8 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

FTC Force Track Coordinator

FWB Flight Weather Briefer

GARS Global Area Reference System

GEOREF Geographic Reference

GHz gigahertz

GMT Greenwich Mean Time

GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator

GNC Global Navigation and Planning Chart

GP General Planning

GPS Global Positioning System

GS Groundspeed

HAA Height Above Airport

HARM High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile

HAT Height Above Touchdown

HEC Helicopter Element Coordinator

HF High Frequency

Hr hour or hours

HSI Horizontal Situation Indicator

HWD Horizontal Weather Depiction

Hz hertz

I&W Indications and Warnings

IAF Initial Approach Fix

IAP Instrument Approach Procedure

IAS Indicated Airspeed

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICO Interface Control Officer

ICS Intercommunications System

IDM Improved Data Modem

IEJU Initial Entry JTIDS Unit


GLOSSARY A-9

Acronym Definition

IEM Initial Entry Message

IFF Identification Friend or Foe

IFR Instrument Flight Rules

IIR Imaging Infrared

ILS Instrument Landing System

IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions

in inch or inches

in Hg inches of mercury

INCSEA Incidents On or Over the High Seas

INFLTREP In-Flight Report

INFOCON Information Operations Condition

INS Inertial Navigation System

IP Initial Point

IR Infrared

IRU Inertial Reference Unit

ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

I&W Indications and Warning

IWC Information Operations Warfare Commander

JAFF Jamming and Chaff

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JEZ Joint Engagement Zone

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

JHMCS Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System

JICO Joint Interface Control Officer

JMPS Joint Mission Planning System

JNC Jet Navigation Chart

JNL JTIDS Network Library

JRFL Joint Restricted Frequency List


A-10 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

JU JTIDS Unit

kbps kilobits per second

kg kilogram

kHz kilohertz

KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed

K-KILL Catastrophic Kill

km kilometers

kt knot

kts knots

kW kilowatt

LAC Launch Area Coordinator

LAT/LONG Latitude and Longitude

lbs pounds

LCS Littoral Combat Ship

LDO Limited Duty Officer

LKP Last Known Position

LO Low Observable

LOG Logistics

LOP Line of Position

LOS Line-of-Sight

LSP Launch Sequence Plan

LSRS Littoral Surveillance Radar System

LWR Laser Warning Receiver

M meters

M Mach

m2 square meters

MAC Maritime Air Control or Controller


GLOSSARY A-11

Acronym Definition

MAD Magnetic Anomaly Detector

MAG VAR Magnetic Variation

MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense Systems

MAS Maritime Air Support

MATT Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal

MAW Missile Warning System

mb millibars

MC Magnetic Course

MC Mission Commander

MC2 Maritime Command and Control

MCA Minimum Crossing Altitude

MCS Multi-Crew Simulator

MCW Modulated Continuous Wave

MDA Minimum Descent Altitude

MEA Minimum Enroute Clearance

MEZ Missile Engagement Zone

MH Magnetic Heading

MHQ Maritime Headquarters

MHz megahertz

mi mile or miles

MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution System

MILDEC Military Deception

MILSTAR Military Strategic and Tactical Relay

min minute or minutes

MIOC Maritime Interception Operations Commander

MITL Man-In-The-Loop

MIW Mine Warfare

MIWC Mine Warfare Commander

MLA Mean Line of Advance

mm millimeters


A-12 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

MN Magnetic North

MOA Military Operations Area

MOCA Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude

MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft

MPR Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance

MPRF Medium Pulse Repetition Frequency

MRA Minimum Reception Altitude

MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile

ms millisecond

MSA Minimum Safe Altitude

MSA Minimum Sector Altitude

MSEC Message Security

MSL Mean Sea Level

MTI Moving Target Indicator

MTOT Mean Time on Target

MTR Military Training

MWWA Military Weather Warning Advisory

MWS Missile Warning System

N north

NADGE NATO Air Defense Ground Environment

NAFC Naval Aviation Forecast Center

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATOPS Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization

NAVAID Navigational Aid

NCCOSC Naval C2 and Ocean Surveillance Center

NC Navigation Controller

NCS Net Control Station

NDB Nondirectional Beacon

NDD Network Description Document

NDF Network Design Facility


GLOSSARY A-13

Acronym Definition

NFDC National Flight Data Center

NFO Naval Flight Officer

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NM Nautical Mile

NMS Network Management System

NOTAM Notice to Airmen

NPG Network Participation Group

NRaD Naval Research and Development Division

NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support

NTAP Notices to Airmen Publication

NTR Net Time Reference

NWS National Weather Service

O Immediate (message type)

OA Operational Area

OARS Omega Aerial Refueling Services, Inc.

OJT On-the-Job Training

OMFTS Operational Maneuver From the Sea

ONC Operational Navigation Chart

ONSTA On Station

OPAREAS Operating Areas

OPARS Optimum Path Aircraft Routing System

OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations Instruction

OPR Other Performance Reports

OPSEC Operations Security

OPTASK Operation Task

OPTASK LINK Operational Tasking Data Links

ORM Operational Risk Management

OROCA Off-Route Obstruction Clearance Altitude

OSC On-Scene Commander

OTC Officer in Tactical Command


A-14 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

OTH Over-the-Horizon

P Precision (code signals only)

P Priority (message type)

PA Public Announcement

PACOM Pacific Command

PAR Precision Approach Radar

PB Patrol Boat

PCG Patrol Craft Guided-Missile

PD Pulse Doppler

PD Pulse Duration

PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PIC Pilot-in-Command

PID Positive Identification

PIW Person In Water

PL Pulse Length

PLE Pulse Length Error

PMSV Pilot-to-Metro Service

POB Persons on Board

POD Probability of Detection

POS Protection of Shipping

POSS Possible

POSS HIGH Possible-High

POSS LOW Possible-Low

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PPI Planned Position Indicator

PPLI Precise Participant Location and Identification

PPR Preplanned Response

PPS Precise Positioning Service

PR Position Reference

PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency


GLOSSARY A-15

Acronym Definition

PRI Pulse Repetition Interval

PROB Probable

PRT Pulse Repetition Time

PRU Primary User

PW Pulse Width

QSL Query Station Location

R Routine (message type)

R2 Reporting Responsibility

R/S Reed-Solomon

R/T Receiver/Transmitter

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

RAC Risk Assessment Code

RADALT Radar Altimeter

RAM Rolling Airframe Missile

RB Relative Bearing

RCC Rescue Coordination Center

RCIED Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device

RCS RADAR Cross Section

RELNAV Relative Navigation

RF Radio Frequency

RM Risk Management

Rmax Maximum Range

Rmin Minimum Range

RMP Recognized Maritime Picture

RNAV Area Navigation

RNLAF Royal Netherlands Air Force

ROE Rules of Engagement

RP Reference Point

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade

RR Range Resolution


A-16 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

RSI Radiation Status Indicator

RTB Return to Base

RTF Return to Force

RTT Round Trip Timing

RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum

RWR Radar Warning Receiver

RWY Runway

S south

S/N (Ratio) Signal-to-Noise

SA Selective Availability

SA Situational Awareness

SA Surveillance Area

SAG Surface Action Group

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SC Screen Commander

SCAR Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (Coordinator)

SCC Sea Combat Commander

SDP Signal Data Processor

SDU Secure Data Unit

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Sec seconds

SEC Submarine Element Coordinator

SIAC Strike Intelligence Analysis Cell

SID Subscriber Identifier

SID Standard Instrument Departure

SIF Selective Identification Feature

SIGINT Signals Intelligence


GLOSSARY A-17

Acronym Definition

SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information

SIPRNet SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SITREP Situation Report

SLAM Standoff Land Attack Missile

SLAM-ER Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response

SLMM Submarine Launched Module Mine

sm Statute Mile

SM Standard Missile

SM Statute Mile

SMC SAR Mission Coordinator

SOAD Standoff Outside of Area Defense

SOCA Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority

SOF Special Operating Forces

SOI Signal of Interest

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SPINS Special Instructions

SPRAC Special Reporting and Coordinating

SPS Standard Positioning Service

SR Scan Rate

SR Slow Speed Low Altitude Training Route

SRO Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations

SRU SAR Recovery Unit

SS Conventional Submarine

SS Surface Search

SSBN Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine

SSC Surface Surveillance Coordination

SSE Spot Size Error

SSES Ship Signals Exploitation Space

SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile

ST Scan Type


A-18 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

STAR Standard Terminal Arrival

STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver

STW Strike Warfare

STWC Strike Warfare Commander

SURPIC Surface Picture

SUW Surface Warfare

SUWC Surface Warfare Commander

TACAIC Tactical Air Intercept Control

TACAN Tactical Air Navigation

TACC Tactical Air Command Center

TACON Tactical Control

TACPLOT Tactical Plot

TAD Tactical Air Direction

TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link

TAS True Airspeed

TB True Bearing

TC True Course

TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System

TCN Terminal Change Notice

TD Transponder

TDC Track Data Coordinator

TDD Target Detection Device

TDL Tactical Data Link

TDS Tactical Data System

TDMA Time Division Multiple Access

TDOA Time Difference of Arrival

TF Task Force

TG Task Group

TH True Heading

TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile


GLOSSARY A-19

Acronym Definition

T/M/S Type/Model/Series

TN True North

T/O Takeoff

TOC Table of Contents

TOO Targets of Opportunity

TOT Time on Target

TPC Tactical Pilotage Chart

TQ Track Quality

TSCM Tactical Strike Coordination Module

TSEC Transmission Security

TSR Time Slot Reallocation

TST Time Sensitive Target

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

TTY Teletype

TVM Track Via Missile

TWA Trailing Wire Antenna

UAS Unmanned Aerial System

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UCP Unified Command Plan

UHF Ultra-High Frequency

UIR Upper Flight Information Region

UMFO Undergraduate Military Flight Officer

UN United Nations

UNK Unknown

URG CDR Underway Replenishment Group Commander

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USNO United States Naval Observatory


A-20 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

UT Universal Time

UTC Universal Time Coordinated

V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing

VA Vital Area

VERTREP Vertical Replenishment

VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency

VIP Very Important Person

VLF Very Low Frequency

VLS Vertical Launching System

VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions

VOI Vessels of Interest

VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol

VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range

VORTAC VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range and Tactical Air

Navigation

VPN Voice Production Net

VR VFR Military Training Route

Vs Stall Speed

VSI Vertical Speed Indicator

VTUAV Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle

W watt or watts

W West (when used with latitude and longitude)

W Western

WARM War Reserve Mode

WAS War at Sea

WEZ Weapons Engagement Zone

WGS 84 World Geodetic System 1984

WPT Waypoint

WSM Waterspace Management


GLOSSARY A-21

Acronym Definition

WSO Weapons System Operator

WW Severe Weather Watch Bulletin

yd yard or yards

Z Zulu

Z Flash (message type)


A-22 GLOSSARY


advanced maritime command and control (advanced mc2…

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