April 2015Con Contentions Foundation BriefsAdvanced Level April Brief

Resolved:Committing United States ground combat troops to fight ISIL is in the best interest of the United States.

April 2015Table of Contents

foundationbriefs.comPage 12 of 182Table of ContentsTable of Contents1Definitions10Examining ISIS as a hierarchical state. DAT10An articulation of United States interests in Iraq and Syria. DAT10Topic Analysis One12Pro Evidence28Iraqi and Syrian Forces Need Ground Support29Syria lacks the needed manpower to combat ISIS. DAT29The Iraqi army needs crucial ground support. DAT29American troops are needed to keep the Iraqi army functional. DAT30Iraqi forces need unification brokered by a third party with boots on the ground. DAT31ISIS possesses American military technology, giving it an advantage over most other forces. DAT32Simply providing resources to Syrian rebel groups could backfire. DAT33Iraqi Army is incredibly weak, Fj33Iraqi Army is corrupt, Fj34Iraqi Army was soundly beaten by ISIS, Fj34Iraqi Army is too small to beat ISIS, Fj35More ground troops are needed, Fj35The Iraqi army does not have the weaponry to adequately combat ISIS. DAT36ISIS leadership is well trained, FJ36ISIS has well trained deputies, Fj37Boots on the ground would help recreate a Sunni Awakening38The United States needs to build a secure environment, Fj38The Sunni Awakening and Troop Surge was highly effective, Fj38The Iraqi government is already working with Sunni tribes, Fj39American troops are needed to resolve coordination problems40Militias and proxy forces are pursuing disparate agendas in combatting ISIS. DAT40Ground forces are needed where politics have failed. DAT41Airstrikes Dont Advance US Interests42The use of airstrikes hinges on cooperation with Bashar Assad and reticent allies. DAT42Airstrikes dont work in isolation, and local forces morale is too low. DAT43Hitting oil refineries has damaged the coalitions soft power. DAT44Airstrikes are admittedly not a part of the ultimate victory strategy. DAT45Airstrikes advance Iranian, not American, interests. DAT46Airstrikes are positioned to fail in Iraq and Syria. DAT47The need to end a humanitarian crisis48Boots on the ground are needed to fully liberate Iraqi towns. DAT48Airstrikes generate fake political legitimacy at the potential expense of personnels lives. DAT49The prolongation of air strikes enables Bashar Assads to continue committing war crimes. DAT50Defeating ISIS Requires Massive American Intervention51Case study: The ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi. DAT51ISIS strategy and fighters are far more adept than traditional terrorists. DAT52The only alternative to arming the peshmerga is boots on the ground. DAT53The status quo risks a costly prolonged stalemate with ISIS. DAT54Crucial American allies will only be galvanized by decisive action. DAT55The United States Has No Leverage With Its Coalition56The United States allies are hindrances in the war on ISIS. DAT56Turkey has actively subverted US interests. DAT57Ground Troops Make Airstrikes More Effective58Airstrikes are untenably imprecise without American ground troops supplying intelligence. DAT58Airstrikes are fundamentally a support tool. DAT59Keeping Iran at Bay Requires Strong US Intervention60Iran has a vested interest in fighting ISIS. DAT60Iran benefits from measured ISIS gains. DAT61Iraqi Shiite militias have been heavily influenced by Iran, Fj61Shiite militias may create a cycle of violence and retribution, Fj62Shiite militias vastly outnumber Iraqi Army forces in Tikrit offensive, Fj63The goals and harms of Iranian influence. DAT63The US cannot afford to look at ISIS as an isolated problem. DAT64America needs to fill the Iraqi and Syrian power vacuum on the ground. DAT65How Iran subverts US interests in both Syria and Iraq. DAT66Iranian Control Drives Sunni Extremism67Until Iranian control is subverted, groups in ISIS vein will flourish. DAT67Advancing American Interests With Its Allies68Israel is at substantial risk from ISIS territory gains. DAT68Ground Troops Are Needed For Lasting Peace69The United States must be able to enforce the return to political stability. DAT69The US needs military force to stabilize Middle Eastern governments. DAT70ISIS Is A Domestic Threat71As long as ISIS continues to attract foreign fighters, blowback is an issue. DAT71ISIS-driven Syrian instability is a threat to the West. DAT72The threat of blowback means the US cannot let ISIS convalesce in Syria or Iraq. DAT72ISIS fighters are a greater risk than other extremist counterparts. DAT73Using JSOC74JSOC can obtain important intelligence, Fj74Operation Arcadia, Fj74JSOC is incredibly lethal, Fj74Con Evidence75Airstrikes Are More Effective Than Ground Troops76Airstrikes have been extensive, Fj76Airstrikes are the only military commodity available in Syria. DAT76Air power enables native forces in resisting ISIS. DAT77ISIS has consistently lost its last few campaigns, Fj78Airstrikes can still be drastically increased, Fj78Airstrikes can cripple ISIS by cutting off vital infrastructure. DAT79The United States needs to address ISIS armor advantage. DAT80Economics, Not Militaries, Can Rapidly Defeat ISIS81The coalition can starve ISIS of crucial sources of cash flow. DAT81ISIS profit from oil has been vastly overestimated, Fj81Airstrikes have had a huge toll on ISIS oil revenue, Fj82BND not alone in its analysis, Fj82The act of governing is stretching ISIS resources thin, Fj82Dropping oil prices has severely hurt ISIS, Fj83Future airstrikes are bound to hurt ISIS further, Fj83Economic investment can deter ISIS recruiting. DAT84Economics and counterterrorism. DAT85Money fuels ISIS local legitimacy as a governing institution. DAT86The US Should Invest In States, Not Military Action87The US should work to deplete Iraqis and Syrians reliance on ISIS services. DAT87The impact of social investments. DAT88Socio-economic investment is crucial for preventing ISIS growth. DAT89Case studies on poverty and extremist recruitment. DAT90Iraqi resistance to ISIS must be internally-driven. DAT91The U.S. needs to combat economic instability radiating out from Iraq. DAT92ISIS staying power comes from governing more effectively than the state. DAT93Iraqs new government is still not inclusive towards Sunnis94U.S. initially excluded Sunnis, Fj94Sunnis became a highly marginalized minority, Fj94Malikis actions violated the democratic process, Fj95New government is very similar to the old one, Fj95Abadi has not successfully reached out the Sunnis, Fj96The Badr Organization is a highly toxic party, Fj97Possible Reforms, Fj97The Impacts of Funding Iraqi Kurdistan98The Kurds are the best American resource in Iraq. DAT98With American resources, the peshmerga are a legitimate, integral fighting force. DAT99The impacts of blocked funding for Kurdish fighters. DAT100Kurdistan should be foundation for achieving US interests without direct manpower. DAT101The peshmerga are a massive, unified, capable fighting force. DAT102The peshmerga have leverage over ISIS. DAT103The impacts of holding Kirkuk. DAT104The US needs to prevent ISIS from amassing foreign fighters. DAT105Direct Military Action Harms US Interests106Any independent use of force by the US would simply inflame the region. DAT106The US needs to use the resources of regional military powers, not its own. DAT107Putting US boots on the ground could cleave the coalition. DAT108Iran is backing up US interests in fighting iSIS. DAT108Ground troops interfere with US interests with respect to Iran. DAT110The long-term annihilation of ISIS must be spearheaded by Arab countries. DAT111Taking further military action would alienate Sunnis, creating instability. DAT112Destroying ISIS Is Not Americas Main Interest113Fighting ISIS creates more threats than can be addressed with ground troops. DAT113American allies surrounding iSIS-controlled areas need heavy investment. DAT114There is no strategic victory in simply reunifying Iraq. DAT115By focusing on ISIS instead of Assad, the US bolsters the groups recruiting efforts. DAT116Defeating ISIS will be more problematic than keeping it intact. DAT117US interests arent achievable militarily. DAT118Fighting ISIS helps Al-Qaeda119ISIS and al-Qaeda are at war with each other, Fj119Al-Qaeda is a worse enemy, Fj119The key difference between Al-Qaeda and ISIS is attitude towards the U.S., Fj120The Harms of Direct Combat in Iraq and Syria121By attacking in Syria and Iraq, the US risks globalizing ISIS. DAT121ISIS is adept at turning military losses into strategically salvageable situations. DAT122Keeping ISIS In Check Doesnt Require Troops123The instability of neighboring territories hinders ISIS. DAT123ISIS is likely to hit opposition from other extremist groups. DAT124A growing number of rebel groups can keep ISIS hands full. DAT125Militarily, ISIS is not self-sustaining. DAT126The primary threat to US interests is ISIS influence127Defeating the organization does nothing against a destructive ideology. DAT127Introducing ground troops will simply diffuse, rather than defeat, ISIS. DAT128Pro Counters129Proxy Fighters Are a Liability130Anti-ISIS Kurdish fighters are potentially leaving their own trail of destruction. DAT130Iran already has leverage with the Kurds. DAT131There isnt time to arm and train Syrian rebel forces adequately. DAT132The remaining capable military forces in Iraq answer to Iran, not the US. DAT133Supplying militias and wielding influence dont go hand in hand: a case study. DAT134Without its own troops, America risks ceding control for fighting ISIS to Iran by default. DAT135The Kurds are potentially unstable allies. DAT136The Shia militia fighting ISIS are as bad as ISIS itself. DAT137Even direct support for the Iraqi army is enabling sectarian conflict. DAT138Tikrit Offensive is an anomaly, Fj138ISIS Funding Cant Be Choked Off139The United States lacks the leverage to prevent state actors from funding ISIS. DAT139ISIS has integrated into Iraqs economy as a tax-levying entity. DAT140As a state, ISIS is too big to fail. DAT141Decisive Unilateral Action Is The Best Option142Coordination with native rebels or the coalition isnt tenable long-term. DAT142Without US intervention, continuing ISIS brutality bolsters Bashar Assad. DAT143Without a unified set of interests, there cannot be a decisive victory. DAT144Americas coalition allies are too disorganized to effect progress against ISIS. DAT145The US can only accomplish its broader interests after ISIS is eliminated. DAT146Collateral Damage of Airstrike Reliance147Escalating airstrikes in Iraq would simply worsen the humanitarian situation. DAT147Airstrikes collateral damage reinforces the ISIS dogma. DAT148In America, broad use of airstrikes against ISIS risks enabling executive overreach. DAT148Nonmilitary Action Doesnt Hinder Terrorism150Counter-terrorism isnt a socio-economic issue. DAT150There are no political solutions to the ISIS problem. DAT151ISIS cash flow is relatively impregnable152ISIS Is Still Expanding In Size and Power153The groups reach could expand East. DAT153ISIS has gotten the upper hand in perceived defeats. DAT154Con Counters155Airstrikes Are Effective Enough156Airstrikes have high potential, and they are a good way to get coalition partners involved. DAT156Airstrikes can be helpful even in packed urban areas. DAT157Airstrikes have stabilized the humanitarian and military situation in Iraq. DAT157Considering airstrikes inadequate overestimates the extent of US priorities. DAT158Airstrikes cant be judged as a short-term strategy. DAT159The U.S. Needs Intelligence Personnel160With the right command and control operatives, airstrikes can defeat ISIS. DAT160The United States needs intelligence personnel to address gaps in aerial targeting. DAT161Intelligence is needed to behead the ISIS organizational structure. DAT161ISIS is no longer a major threat163ISIS has been hit hard by airstrikes, Fj163ISIS has lost a massive amount of its military capability, Fj163ISIS is unlikely to gain more territory, Fj163Religious demographics limit ISIS from spreading, Fj163ISIS has lost a significant amount of territory, Fj164The risks of blowback due to ISIS continued presence is overstated. DAT165ISIS Lacks a Sufficient Strategy to Sustain Itself166ISIS propaganda isnt enough to sustain an influx of foreign fighters. DAT166Both logistically and politically, ISIS has isolated itself. DAT167The Iranian Threat Is Overstated168Iranian claims to power are secondary to national and sectarian struggles. DAT168Syria and Iraq are not breeding grounds for Iranian influence. DAT169Shiite militias have been working with Sunni tribes, Fj169Shiite militias are not monolithic in nature, Fj170ISIS Does Not Directly Threaten US Interests171The threat of ISIS is more local than it seems. DAT171Another Sunni Awakening is unlikely172The original Sunni Awakening was a facade, Fj172ISIS currently has control of tribal leaders, Fj173ISIS is stronger than AQI was, Fj174ISIS has eliminated potential threats from the Awakening, Fj174Another Sunni Awakening will require far more money, Fj174Cases176Pro Case177Introduction:177Contention One: The Iraqi Government is Weak177Contention Two: Iran is capable of filling the void178Contention Three: The United States ought to fill the void instead179Con Case180Introduction:180Contention One: Ground troops are unnecessary180Contention Two: Ground troops jeopardize American interests180Contention Three: Combatting ISIL shouldnt be the priority181

DefinitionsExamining ISIS as a hierarchical state. DATFilkins, Dexter. The Fight of Their Lives. The New Yorker. 29 September 2014. Web. 8 March 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/fight-livesTheISISthat swept into northwestern Iraq this June is remarkably different from its predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq. The earlier organization operated mostly in secret, and its leaders were uninterested in acquiring territory, believing that a fixed location creates unacceptable risks.ISISis led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who holds a Ph.D. in Islamic studies from Baghdad University and spent time in an American military prison in Iraq. At forty-three, he is said to be a flamboyant figure, a self-styled successor to Osama bin Laden. Baghdadis goal is to re-create the era of the caliphate, when an Islamic regime ruled from Constantinople to Morocco and the Arabian Peninsula.Al Qaeda in Iraq was run largely by foreigners;ISISis run by a council of former Iraqi generals, according to Hisham Alhashimi, an adviser to the Iraqi government and an expert onISIS. Many are members of Saddam Husseins secular Baath Party who converted to radical Islam in American prisons. Baghdadi has divided his conquered Iraqi lands into seven vilayets, the name given to provinces in the caliphate. Each vilayet has a governor, who answers directly to Baghdadi, but who is free to launch attacks as he sees fit. No permission is needed, Alhashimi said.Its impossible to cogently discuss foreign policy and military strategy without understanding how ISIS works: it is much more like a state than any other terror group, and it is also, relatively, exceptionally well-funded.

An articulation of United States interests in Iraq and Syria. DATKagan, Kimberly. Next Steps for U.S. Foreign Policy on Syria and Iraq. Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committees Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa. Institute for the Study of War. 19 November 2014. Web. 14 March 2015. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/HFAC%20MENA%20Iraq-Syria%20testimony%20--%20Kim%20Kagan%20--%20Nov%202014.pdfThe ISW is a non-partisan think tank focused on defense strategy.We must raise our gaze from the tactics of fighting the Islamic State. We need a strategy not only to disrupt and defeat the Islamic State, but also to reduce Iranian influence in the region rather than expanding it, to develop inclusive Iraqi security forces rather than sectarian units intertwined with militias and the Qods Force, and to bring the Sunni tribes in Iraq once more to the negotiating table to hammer out a revised political deal with the Shi'a dominated government in Baghdad rather than helping that government try to simply crush them. And we need a strategy in Syria. It must not hand Syria's Sunnis over to either the Islamic State or Jabhat al Nusra. It must not leave Assad in power. It must expel Lebanese Hezbollah from Syria. And it must find and build up a moderate opposition among Syria's Sunni, 'Alawites, and Kurds who will be able one day to form a new, inclusive government acceptable to the Syrian people. Any strategy that aims at lesser goals is a recipe for permanent sectarian and regional proxy war that will provide an excellent safehaven for al Qaedaaffiliated groups and Iranian terrorist allies in Syria, and will ultimately undermine any stability that might be achieved in Iraq as well.April 2015DefinitionsThe main takeaway from this card is that teams on both sides cannot fall into the trap of using the resolutions language to conflate fighting ISIS with US interests; while this would turn the resolution into a debate of whether American troops can successfully fight ISIS troops, this misses a large chunk of the resolution which allows teams to deal with overarching United States interests as contextualized by the ISIS problem. Topic AnalysisFor most debaters taking this resolution on, the United States military involvement in the Middle East has been a fact of life seemingly stretching into perpetuitythe backbeat to the soaring highs and catastrophic lows of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Because of this, its faded into the background. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts long ago slid into the depths of American consciousness, and even the Arab SpringSyria, Egypt, Libyawent from a boil down to a simmer in the sphere of American attention. Nothing has brought the conflicts in the aforementioned countries to the spotlight quite like ISIS. The group has thrown into sharp relief the multiple foreign policy failures of Western powers, the extent of divergent interests in Middle East powers, and the weakness of other Middle East states in light of rebellion and revolution. So, what makes ISIS the exception? That is to say, whats gotten the United States to seriously consider boots on the groundthe gung-ho synonym for combat troopsfollowing the effective withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, when other factors have not had the same impact?The short answer is scale. ISIS has achieved a scale unlike any other rebel group. This applies to every facet of its operations, which reads like a case study in successful insurgencies. ISIS has foreign recruits, taken from disaffected Middle East communities and thriving Western democracies alike. ISIS has a surprisingly deep well of domestic support, with Sunni outrage at Shia injustices having weight due to the combination of Nouri al-Malikis petty sectarian rule in Iraq and Bashar Assads reign of cruelty in Syria. ISIS has the logistics for military viability, with a massive cohort of well-trained fighters and a combination of modern Western technology (pilfered from the Iraqi army, among other sources) and workable Soviet arms. More troublingly, ISIS has the logistics for some semblance of economic viability. ISIS has deviated from the traditional extremist model of courting cash from well-heeled sympathizers from stable Middle East States. Instead, it has established a vast system of funding, including taxation (more on that later), sales of oil, and kidnapping ransoms. While ISIS still welcomes foreign funding, its refusal to rely on external factors has allowed it to steer clear of outside influence to a greater extent than other groups.Of course to the West, whats most striking about ISIS has been the cruelty. Public beheadings of Coptic Christians. Immolations of Jordanian pilots. Kidnapped British journalists conducting documentary-style tours, under duress, of ISIS-controlled cities. This isnt unique to ISIS brand of extremism; other groups, dating back to at least the 1960s, have resorted to pre-Middle-Ages-style cruelty as a component of their quests. As said previously, the issue now is of scale. What gives ISIS a particular significance in Western discourses on national security has been, essentially, marketing savvy. ISIS has shown itself to be adept at public relations, from the maintenance of social media accounts to the use of torture videos to play off coalition partners against each other. In short, ISIS has earned the consideration by the United States to re-commit boots on the ground (likely to Iraq primarily, then Syria given the general instability and lack of cogent strategy there). The resolution asks that debaters reconcile the threat of ISIS, the general state of the Middle East, and the goals of the United States, and see if commit ground troops is a policy option that comes out of the fray. Its a task that gets much easier when we break the resolution up into much smaller, more palatable chunks. With that in mind, lets deconstruct the resolution into something workable.(Note: Every graphic used for this topic analysis is cited both briefly in text, and with a superscript. A listing of the original sources for all graphics is found at the end of this analysis; I recommend reading them as part of an initial preparation process, as they generally offer good background while also fleshing out the arguments and background surrounding the data provided here.)ISIS: History and StrategyIn American popular consciousness, ISIS seemingly came from nowhere in 2014. More specifically, June 19, 2014the first day of RamadanISIS declared a caliphate subordinate to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, rebranding itself as the Islamic State. It was a bold strategy, and one that seemingly paid off for them. Having taken the strategic city of Mosul weeks earlier, ISIS was making huge leaps in acquiring territory. By the end of the month, ISIS controlled a 400 mile stretch of territory and had a net worth in excess of $1 billion. It was only after the taking of Mosul and the declaration of the caliphate that ISIS truly entered the mainstream as harbingers of medieval torture and destruction. The group dates back much further, however.At this point, its important to remember the sectarian nature of conflict in Iraq and Syria. Iraq, while nominally a single unit, is bitterly divided along sectarian lines1 (see map on previous page), with a central government which exercises less real-world control than its structure would indicate. Syria, of course, is well in the throes of a civil war. For ISIS, the enemy is not just the West, as glib American media narratives sometimes lazily or tacitly portray. Sectarian conflictparticularly between Shiites and Sunnishas ravaged the region since long before the latest series of American occupations. In particular, ISIS has been spearheading its own violent version of Sunni extremism. The group has thus found success in majority-Sunni areas. Iraq under former Nouri al-Maliki was explicitly Shia-controlled. As Maliki proceeded to purge his government and military of Sunni authority figures, he cultivated a culture of well-placed bitterness and frustration in the nations Sunni community. Some analysts have seen the rise of ISIS and its easy control of largely Sunni areas as the logical extension of sectarian-fueled divisions implemented by the Maliki government.The warpath taken by ISIS follows sectarian lines, as demonstrated by Christopher Blanchard of the Congressional Research Service2. Notice the upper Iraqi path follows along Sunni and Sunni Kurd areas closely. ISIS is a tactical group which focuses on establishing a viable state in the wake of its warpath, so taking control of areas more prone to initial sympathy to its cause (e.g. Sunni-dominated areas) becomes important. It is also self-financed, so areas of strategic economic and logistic areas are important to keep in mind. ISIS was the brainchild of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999, who used al-Qaeda seed money in Afghanistan to form Jamaat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad, or JTWJ. JTWJ fought in resistance of the American invasion of Afghanistan, secondary to the core groups America was aiming for: al-Qaeda and the Taliban. JTWJ later became a force in Iraq during that countrys own American-led occupation. The enemy was not only America, but Jordan and Shiites in general. A big viral story emerging around the ISIS immolation of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kaseasbeh was al-Qaedas condemnation of the action. Indeed, it seems counterintuitive to consider al-Qaeda as moderate relative to anything, but such is the case with its former partner, the JTWJ.Due to Zarqawis pledge of allegiance to al-Qaeda, JTWJ became al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI. Not, however, that this does not mean the group adopted al-Qaedas worldview. AQI was a separate, more extreme, and more terrifying entity whose reliance on the targeting of Shia civilians created a rift between AQI and al-Qaeda leadership. After several years of growth, AQI formed a coalition with several other insurgent groups in Iraq, leading to the formation of the Islamic State in Iraq, or ISI, spearheaded by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. This brings us to the end of 2006.The group we know todaya military force with a strong bureaucratic wingtook shape alongside the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq leading up to 2011. ISI shifted its headquarters to Mosul and began paying superior salaries relative to other militias or even the government. In tandem with its bureaucratic upscaling, ISI doubled down on violence in Baghdad. The past 3 years have seen ISIS strategically develop into the seemingly terrifying force we see today. It involved two year-long campaigns. The first began in July 2012 and saw ISI free critical imprisoned members, including 47 members of its core leadership and 500 more prisoners from Abu Ghraib. Beginning in July 2013, ISIS focused essentially on breaking local security forces. This included focusing on assassinations and levying threats against higher-level members of the Iraq military, which were backed up with shootings, bombings, etc.Understanding this history has consequences for debates. If were painting in broad strokes, we can categorize ISIS as a highly tactical fighting force. The liberation of Abu Ghraib was a carefully-planned operation involving a year of planning and preparation. It has been a not-incorrect consensus in Western news media that the failure of Iraqi security forces has been a function of low morale. Again, the not-incorrect picture is of American-trained, American-equipped Iraqi security forces, who possess far superior technology and numbers to their foes, laying down their arms and fleeing in the face of black flag-waving militants. This, to an extent, was by design. The exit of US troops from Iraq in 2011 left a power vacuum which local security forces were not strong enough to fill and tribal/militia groups were too fragmented to take up. With its particularly stingy focus on running a tight bureaucracy and its strong awareness of the fundamentals of recruiting and training fighters, ISI was perfectly positioned and prepared to run a long-term campaign of violent intimidation as a means of neutering the security forces left behind by the Americans. The strategic demolition of Iraqi institutions by ISIS is far from the most obvious proof of ISIS purported strength; the beheading of innocents on live video was enough to convince a majority of previously war-weary Americans that renewed action in Iraq was warranted, while the hesitation of Jordanians toward strong action against ISIS was burned along with the immolation of one of their pilots. This all plays into the Pros hands. Most of the information a lay judge may find intuitivethe beheadings, the torture, the sharia law, the seizure of territory, the very public nature by which ISIS has gone about the business of destructiongives the image of a group more resilient and fearsome than anything the United States has been accustomed to facing. It should not take many more strokes of the paint brush, off the bat, for Pro teams to complete the picture. Indeed, ISIS history is crucial in filling out the narrative. The calculated nature of its rise to power and the methodical nature of its organization all point to a threat that cannot be glibly handled by poorly-trained resistance groups or airstrikes alone.I diverged from my overview of ISIS history in July 2013, at which point I referred to the group at the time as ISIS, despite having referred to it as ISI in recalling the events of 2012. This is because in April 2013, Baghdadi issued a statement confirming that Jabhar al-Nusra, an offshoot of ISI operating mostly in Syria, would be folded back into ISI, forming ISIS. This did not sit well with Jabhat al-Nusra, as ISIS demands total control wherever it operates.It is details like this in the history of ISIS that can fuel Con argumentation. One big barrier Con teams may have to overcome is the previously mentioned popular perception of ISIS that equates power and brutality. Its easy to portrayplausiblyISIS as a singular unified force operating in Iraq and Syriathe idea that US intervention is required naturally follows from the painting of such a picture. In reality, the situation is much murkier, as shown by The Atlantics Martha Crenshaw3.The idea that ISIS is fighting a unified cause is perpetuated by the (legitimate) idea that ISIS is just like every other militant group in the region, in that it loathes the West. While this is true, it fails to give an adequate glimpse of the details. In reality, every group fights for a different cause. Animosity towards the West does not entail ambitions of another 9-11. For many groups, the impetus is resistance against governments which fuel sectarian strifeformerly al-Malikis Iraq, and still currently Assads Syria. These are typically Sunni rebel groups. There are also Shia groups, many Iran-funded, working to preserve the status quo. Add in the various factions and groups aligned with the independence-minded Kurds (including, particularly, the peshmerga), and it is no surprise that ISIS has a list of rivals (some of which agree with the cause but find the methodology abhorrent, like al-Qaeda). It may be important, then, for Con teams to actively combat the notion that ISIS is representative of extremism as a unified front. Its not. Every group has different goals, different value systems, and a different threshold for cruelty. By working to demonstrate the fractured nature of extremism in Iraq and Syria, and particularly the notion that ISIS has rivals of all stripes, the Con robs Pro teams of a huge asset with lay judges: the fear factor. By positioning ISIS as a slightly larger force butting heads against a multitude of resistance groups, the Con also de-isolates the United States as the sole game-changing actor in the Iraqi-Syrian conflict zone. In doing so, the Con can present judges with options for handling ISIS that do not revolve around ground troops. Its the beginning of a tenable framework. There is, of course, recourse for Pro teams. Further digging reveals that ISIS has forged numerous temporary alliances with rival Sunni groups to add manpower for offensives, and has shown some leeway in appointing leaders of controlled cities as a means of reconciliation. Defeating ISISAs Ive implied throughout this analysis, ISIS operations are redolent of professionalism. This extends to its ability to conduct military operations. Baghdadi has staffed his upper ranks with experienced men from the Iraqi army. The group has a longstanding bureaucracy dating back to its ISI days, and has thousands of experience military personnel experiencing its operations. This, by no means, is a green fighting force.The professionalism of ISIS conduct extends to its finances, which consist of a diverse revenue stream funding a set of well-controlled expenses. A majority of ISIS money comes from the sale of oil, although this ability has recently been crippled by coalition airstrikes on strategic oil resources in Syria. The MO for ISIS has been to take control of oil infrastructurevehicles, refineries, etc.and essentially have operations run as usual, with engineers and technicians recalled to continue running the plants. That said, ISIS has been unable to maximize its resources due to a dearth of technical personnel.While ISIS hostage exploits have been one of its most newsworthy features, the group is hardly reliant on this kind of extortion income. Its important to remember that while it is considered a terrorist group in the West, its self-declared statehood is a declaration that ISIS acts upon. In controlled cities, ISIS sets up its own bureaucracy, with rudimentary social services tacked on. In many Sunni-dominant areas, ISIS has been considered by some residents even to be a more stable governing force than the Baghdad-based central government. As such, ISIS operates like a corrupt state and reaps revenue in much the same way. Even in areas ISIS does not control, the group operates a shadow economy of sorts. ISIS currently levies transit taxes on western Iraqi routes, for instance, charging variables rates for trucks carrying different supplies and providing truckers with fake papers showing theyve paid official Iraqi customs taxes instead. The entire operation is relatively seamless and surprisingly professional-looking. That said, however, ISIS still controls less territory than the governments its resisting, has seen its cash flow reduced, its fighters killed, and some of its territory even clawed back. In particular, ISIS has found Kurdish territory beyond Mosul nigh impassable, with disciplined Kurdish fighting forces keeping ISIS fighters at bay and making strategic gains in taking back Kurdish territory. With this in mind, the United States has several strategic options on the table.AirstrikesThis has been the instinctive policy response in the United States to most conflict in the Middle East. As its sold to the American people, air strikes are a low-risk, high-impact way of taking care of problem spots without committing real resources to the cause.Of course, this is a disingenuously narrow interpretation of airstrikes utility, and, and it is one that Pro teams especially should hop on, should Con teams get lazy in defending the exclusive use of airstrikes. The worry simply isnt financial. Although air strikes are rather pricey on a per-strike basis, a ground invasion certainly is no cheaper. Some of the arguments on air strikes which are taken to be inherently true, however, have major holes. The first is that airstrikes are low risk. This is a destructive mentality to take, especially with respect to ISIS. The hostage situation surrounding the Jordanian pilot Kaseasbeh is glaring proof. While ISIS as a functional entity is not reliant on hostage-taking, this is crucial for its leverage in the international community. By taking both a Japanese hostage (two, actually) and Jordanian one, ISIS was able to play both nations wavering attitudes toward capitulation against each other, with Jordan capitulating after Kaseasbeh had already been killed. This bolstered the perceived power of ISIS, making rivals less likely to take bold action against it for fear of the groups power. Of course, introducing ground troops multiplies the problem of hostage-taking several-fold, but it would also lead to strategic gains to a far greater extent than what airstrikes alone would accomplish.Another assumption is that airstrikes have been a coalition activity. For a nation weary of unilaterally taking the most substantial action in the Middle East, and eventually unilaterally absorbing all the losses, the US populace (and decision-makers) is far more in favor of spreading around the responsibility, if possible. For the Con, this ideal is simple to articulate and entails that airstrikes in place of ground troops are the best option. Not only are they purportedly low-risk (see previous paragraph), but theyre also a means of getting the United States allies into the fray in a palatable waymany of the United States allies are equally hesitant toward boots on the ground. Up through February, this reasoning has seemingly failed to line up with the situation on the ground. Looking at Syria, of the slightly greater than 1000 total airstrikes having been launched, around 950 of them have come from the United States. The current coalition for airstrikes has been the US, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Airstrike action in Iraq has been entirely unilateral. With respect to individual airstrikes, it appears that the US has also been making larger, longer bombing runs on each one, compounding the imbalance between American action and that of its allies. Essentially, then, airstrikes have been conducted unilaterally.

Boots on the groundSo, what actually happens if the resolutions advocacy resolves and American combat troops enter the fray? There are multiple variants of the boots on the ground strategy, which makes this debate so compelling.For Pro teams, the ambiguity of the term combat troops is a huge opportunity for creativity in the realm of each individual round. In putting together an advocacy, Pro teams can contextualize their implementation of combat troops to fit their evidentiary narrative. Not only is this well within the purview of the resolution, but it helps to strengthen the Pros case by presenting a cogent vision for articulating US interests in the Middle East. One variant of putting boots on the ground is the surge strategy. While the ISIS incursion has helped to turn the recent history of Iraq into a slippery slope to failed statehood, its important to contextualize this with Iraq pre-2011. The surge strategy, to a certain extent accomplished objectives related to US military interests. Such is the advantage of introducing the worlds best funded, most advanced, highly equipped fighting force in overwhelming numbers against a foe with little consolidated power or resources at its disposal. There is no way that United States ground troops can fully rid Iraq of ISIS, much less Syria. The campaign has the potential to be brutal, particularly given that ISIS has American technology on its aside, as well as entrenchment in local affairs and a better working familiarity with its surroundings. That said, the United States is not bereft of assets, either. The US has aerial resources to back its combat forces up. The US has a slowly rejuvenating Iraqi security apparatus, which is currently trying to take back Tikrit with renewed vigor. And the US has the various regional forces at play in Iraq, including (crucially) the Kurdish peshmerga. All this is to say that any full-scale invasion isnt strictly unilateralthere are other resources at play to amplify American military power. Fundamentally, any large-scale incursion of ground troops spells the likely end of ISIS as a large, concentrated entity. Teams on the Pro should be cautious if advocating such a strategy. The biggest risk is of treating the resolution too crassly to be convincingsubstituting in the defeat of ISIS in its current form as a primary US interest.Teams on both sides will need to be forthright in their frameworking of the resolutionwhats at stake, what are the key US interests, and how does sending in ground troops impact that vision of United States interests? (Keep in mind that I have tacitly rewritten the resolution to say US interests, as this is a more direct way of stating the resolutions question.)Another interesting variant puts the United States in a support role, e.g. adding ground troops to embed with and work alongside security forces already in play. This is, of course, a lower-risk variant purely in terms of human lives. Pro teams are welcome to take this advocacy; however, it substantially alters the identity of the ensuing debate by narrowing it. In advocating a surge, the idea of military victory is implicit; theres little historical or tactical backing for the idea that ISIS will not be severely diminished by an overwhelming influx of American troopsthink over 250,000, compared to the roughly 30,000-50,000 (at the high end) which ISIS commands. The presumption of military victory shifts the debate to frameworks and hypotheticals, which can quickly balloon outwards: what happens when ISIS fighters disperse? Is this a permanent solution? Does the US even want ISIS quickly defeated? How does this impact other strategic goals? Will swift victory deteriorate the remaining stability of Iraq and Syria?Advocating for combat troops in support, meanwhile, turns military victory into a hypothetical. The question is simple: will ISIS be defeated? Do ground troops to any extent support US interests in the region? This isnt to say, of course, that debate will be stagnant when Pro teams advocate limited engagementsimply that it will flourish in other areas.Of course, Pro teams can also neglect the advocacy, instead focusing on the fundamental diplomatic and tactical differences between the introduction of ground troops to any extent or a lack thereof. While this is a tenable strategy, it opens up to Pro teams having to discuss the aforementioned two advocacies as hypotheticals, which dilutes the weight of any evidence the Pro has (simply because there isnt enough time to do everything justice in round).As a debater, I always found myself constructing specific advocacies (within the limits of whats acceptable in PF debate) as a way to keep debates focused away from hypotheticals and on topics where I know I could leverage the weight of my evidence and understanding of the topic into winning arguments. While I would recommend that, with respect to the logistics of ground invasions, Pro teams do the same. There has been little direct discussion of Syria in particular. This is because the situation is markedly different from Iraq: while Iraqi security is busy fighting ISIS, Bashar Assad appears still prioritized with terrorizing his own people. Most of the resistance to ISIS has come not from Assad but from a broken coalition of moderate rebels stuck between ISIS and an autocrat. For this reason, the logistics of introducing ground troops shifts markedly. Given the weakness and competition among the moderate rebels, theres little for US troops to support. The Syrian situation is where the advantages of specific advocacies start slipping away for Pro teams. Any surge is unprecedented for Syria and risks throwing US troops into a crossfire between Assad, ISIS, and moderate rebels while also undercutting Iran. Any support strategy could be shown as relatively ineffective, given the marginalization of the Syrian opposition. As such, regardless of how they treat the strategy of US boots on the ground, both teams need to be discerning in their treatment of Iraq and Syria. While the reach of ISIS uniformly spreads across the two countries, the logistics of dealing with it dont. The US has markedly different interests in both regions (see the next section), which makes it easy (and still improper) to paint with too broad of strokes and treat the ISIS problem as one and the same in Syria and Iraq. Proxy fightersBoth sides of the case may be forced into discussing this option above all others because this seems to be the contemporaneous US strategy for Syria. While the US has begun shipments of light arms to moderate Syrian rebels, the expressed intent of this action has been the ouster of Bashar Assad, not the eviction of ISIS. This can be huge for the Con, which Ill get into in the next section. Proxy fighters is simply implying that non-US troops fight for US interests. In Iraq and Syria, this inherently means that the fighters do not necessarily share US priorities. For Con teams in search of an advocacy, proxy fighters present themselves as a tempting, if flawed, advocacy option. One big plus, in context of this resolution, of proxy fighters is that the Con can subvert Pro arguments to their side. By advocating for the use of proxy fightersof the United States arming and/or training native Iraqi and Syrian militiathe Con can isolate the general benefits of boots on the ground as being Con points, as it is theoretically more in the United States favor to have someone else send their troops into the heat of battle. In simply arguing for the cost-benefit ratio of sending in boots on the grounde.g. total military victoryagainst the tiny costs of supplying those troops, instead of providing them, the Con can build a simple case with plenty of evidentiary weight, toward the accomplishment of US interests. This, however, risks assuming too narrow a vision of whats in the USs best interest.Whats in the best interest of the United States?This question absolutely needs to get answered before teams even begin building case. For something like the potential Con argument I outlined abovethat funding proxy armies gives the benefit of boots on the ground without proportional riskthe argument has weight because US interests are narrowly defined as the defeat of ISIS. In pragmatic terms, however, this is an incredibly narrow interpretation of United States foreign policy objectives. I read the question of Americas best interest as this: what achieves the biggest, most important objectives in United States foreign policy?To be clear, the United States will never appease everyone. There are too many players and interests surrounding ISIS for the US to simultaneously eliminate the self-proclaimed Islamic State and secure all its interests. The Economist (next page) illustrates this point further4. Every strategy has different outcomes, and every strategy pursues different foreign policy interests. Until a team can answer the fundamental question of this resolutionwhat are the United States interests?and back it up with some kind of reasoning, the resolution is undefinable. There is no foundation on which to build a case, Pro or Con. So, lets build a foundation.Military interestsOn the surface, asking about the military interests of the United States in the Middle East seems trivial: the United States wants the defeat of ISIS. More important than this, however, is stability. The worst policy outcome for the United States would be for debaters across the nation next April arguing this same topic, but with some different acronym for some other terrifying extremist group. The question of who wins is important as well. Remember, this is a sectarian conflict being spearheaded by a violently extremist group which sees the Shiites as infidels. Naturally, this has brought Shiite groups into the scrum, many of which answer, to some extent to Irans Shia regime. This also extends to Syria, where unsubstantiated reports have linked Bashar Assad to Iran, and decades of substantiated evidence have linked Assad to the kind of sectarian cleansing efforts that have seen other dictators ousted militarily by the United States.This is where the proxy fighter arguments can run into some thorns. If we boil down United States military interests in Iraq and Syria to two factorsvictory (over ISIS) and stability (across the entire geographic region)the latter point is difficult to argue. Fundamentally, whichever force comes out with the advantage is one that just won a brutal sectarian conflict. This is not the outcome that the United Stateswhich has been in pursuit of a unified government for Iraq since the original invasionwants to see, and it is unlikely to be stable.While the fight over ISIS has been mostly characterized as a religious Sunni-Shiite conflict, ethnic Kurds (which have their own Sunni and Shia populations) complicate the matter given their possession of large swathes of semiautonomous land in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, and their control of arguably the largest and most capable third-party fighting force in the region: the peshmerga (note that this is not a unity Kurdish fighting force, as there are dozens of other groups aligned with the Kurds). While the Iraqi army has been making substantial gains, recently, in beating back ISIS, the Kurds still possess a more skilled and motivated fighting force, albeit one lacking lavish American military resources. More fully supporting the peshmerga, which numbers at roughly 100,000, presents a stylish alternative to putting American troops back into Iraq.Advocating this blindly, however, risks marginalizing crucial US interests. Primarily, the issue is of enabling Kurdish independence. US leaders have repeatedly stated that this is an unwanted outcome. So in itself the enabling of the peshmergawho already have been seizing territory left behind by ISISworks directly against the interests of the United States in Iraq by giving the Kurds a stepping stone to independence. It also risks alienating partnerships. One is the alliance of Turkey, to which the United States has repeatedly capitulated (for minimal returns) in the name of securing a partnership. Turkey has a large Kurdish population which also lives somewhat independently, with any attempts at Kurdish independents requiring that the newly formed state scoop out parts of Turkey. In an ironic twist, however, Kurdistan is considered a model of what US interests in Iraq look like: a relatively stable state with a strong security apparatus and pro-West attitudes. This analysis is certainly not meant to discourage teams from certain advocacies. The beauty of a resolution like this is the multitude of possible solutions to a problem that is, to put it bluntly, rather intractable. I bring up the example of divergent US interests with respect to proxy armies to illustrate a crucial point: that any advocacy has interests it may fail to fulfill, and this is something teams need to be ready to properly weigh and contextualize in round.Strategic and diplomatic interestsInfluenceleverageis the currency of foreign policy. For the US, any strategic military victory in the Middle East, or anywhere, has little purpose if it doesnt offer any soft power in the region. To that end, the United States has several objectives.One has been the maintenance of existing relationships in the region. This has included its aforementioned coalition partners, and especially Turkey. This presents the United States with a tricky dilemma: many of these partners are hesitant to embrace or endorse the United States vision for the region. Turkeys President Tayyip Erdogan in particular has been adept at extracting diplomatic and strategic concessions from the United States without much in the way of real-world support. Perhaps more significant are the United States strategic interests in Iran, Iraq, and Syria.In Iran, the United States has to walk a tiny, multidirectional tightrope. From the Obama administrations perspective, the main goal with Iran is to secure a deal on Irans enrichment of uranium. As of this writing, no agreement has been hammered out, though this is likely change by the end of this month. At the same time, Iran, through its revolutionary guard, has been actively supporting and potentially commandeering Shia rebels in Iraq. While the United States and Iran are working toward the same general goal in Iraqthe destruction of ISISthe United States still needs to be sensitive to the impacts of its actions on the nuclear negotiations. This is even further complicated by Irans long-running policy of seeking active influence in the Iraqi government, an interest which directly contradicts the United States vision of a unified independent governing force. In Iraq, the goals are arguably less diplomatically murky. The objective, as has been stated repeatedly, has been stable governance: one government with genuine power, no sectarian interests, and a powerful, accountable security apparatus to keep order. While ISIS subverts all these ideals, certain solutions breed certain flaws with respect to the US strategy. For instance, prior to the ousting of Nouri al-Maliki, it was impossible to coordinate with the Iraqi government and in good faith believe the outcome to be a stable Iraq following the defeat of ISIS, given the aggressive incompetence of the former PMs regime. While the new government looks to be more inclusive, this isnt a guarantee.The situation is perhaps most complicated in Syria. This is due to a combination of two factors: the failure of the Syrian state, and the multiple competing interests at play for the United States. Optimally, for the United States, the outcome in Syria is the defeat of ISIS, the ouster of Bashar Assad, and the reintegration of moderate Syrian rebels into a nationalized security apparatus. The reality on the ground, of course, couldnt be further to this truth. The United States also must contend with multiple competing interests from coalition partners bordering Syria, as well as tendrils of Iranian interests.Its unlikely that the solution to ISIS advocated by any team will resolve every US interest in the region. However, it is critical for teams to be assured of what those interests are prior to the preparation of a case. Otherwise, the case doesnt work toward anything. It will be particularly important to weigh and assess these interests in round. By deciding on a hierarchy of United States interests (with empirical or analytical support, of course), teams have the authority to assert their frameworks over a debate. This alone can be enough to render the opposition irrelevant. Fundamentally, this issue comes down to rhetoric. There is a United States interest in every nation on Earth. The goal for teams arguing this debate is to isolate the most important of those goals and satisfy it, as best as possible, using US policy against ISIS. With a good understanding of US priorities, teams will find it easy both re-contextualize debate and to focus it on what would otherwise be an unmanageable set of issues and rebuttals. The proper US policy is different if the goal is ousting Bashar Assad than if a nuclear deal with Iran (which would find the elimination of Assad inexcusable) is the priority. The best foundation for this debate will be a prioritization of US interests using sound analysis. While I have brought up a litany of US interests, I have not provided any justification for ranking them in any particular order or focusing on them. The most important piece is being aware of the big players, and having the rhetorical creativity to account for these interests in formulating a case on US military strategy in the region.Concluding remarksAs a quick note, we generally refer to ISIL as ISIS throughout the brief. This is not an effort to skirt the wording of the resolution. The rationale is: 1) ISIS and ISIL, along with IS, are all abbreviations of what is officially a much longer name, and can be interchanged without changing the meaning.2) Having sampled a wide variety of news and analysis in the preparation of this brief, ISIS seems to be a near-consensus abbreviation for the group in question. IS and Islamic State are also popular. NPR is unique for having taken it a step further, using self-declared Islamic State in reference to the distinction between the ISIS caliphate and a sovereign state.3) The goal in every round is to translate weeks of information-gathering and reams of data into something cogent for a lay judge to understand. With a topic this big, every little bit helps. In that vein, it helps to use a term the judges will likely have heard repeatedly in traditional news mediaISIS, as opposed to the resolutions ISIL.Always remember that no matter how much evidence you may unearth on this topic, you still have four minutes to articulate most of it. Putting myself in the shoes of a lay judge, Ill take a PFer speaking at a reasonable pace and looking me in the eye while delivering a few quality arguments over a speaker tripping over themselves to throw more statistics and analysis at me. This topic enables debaters to indulge in computer-crashing amounts of research, but it can also enable debaters to use an abundance of evidence as a crutch for weak rhetoric, which is unacceptable. The great thing about this resolution is that while it presents nearly unlimited avenues, you have a choice of what road to take and pursue. I had a blast getting to know this topic, and I hope you do too. Good luck!

Daniel Tsvankin

Graphics Sources1. The Wider Impact of the ISIS Rebellion. XL Group. 2014. Web. 11 March 2015. http://xlgroup.com/~/media/fff/pdfs/db_special%20briefing%20on%20iraq_june%202014.pdf2. Blanchard, Christopher M. et al. Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response. Congressional Research Service. 17 September 2014. Web. 12 March 2015. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf3. Crenshaw, Martha. There Is No Global Jihadist Movement. The Atlantic. 11 March 2015. Web. 12 March 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/there-is-no-global-jihadist-movement/387502/4. Jihadist Friends and Foes. The Economist. 15 September 2015. Web. 15 March 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/09/daily-chart-11

April 2015Topic Analysis

Pro Evidence

Iraqi and Syrian Forces Need Ground Support

Syria lacks the needed manpower to combat ISIS. DATTerrible Swift Sword. The Economist. 23 September 2014. Web. 7 March 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/09/strikes-against-islamic-stateBy far the biggest problem is the absence of any ground forces to exploit the air offensive. It is still unclear which Islamist rebel groups America does not consider beyond the pale. Ahrar al-Sham, for example, has been ruled out because of its links with Jabhat al-Nusra. If the aim is to degrade not just IS but several of the other jihadist organisations that have attracted money and weapons, thus creating space for what remains of the moderate opposition, it may already be too late. It will be years rather than months before the Free Syrian Army, which now very belatedly seems about to receivetraining and weaponry, isa fighting force capable of taking on both IS and the regime of Bashar Assad.While airstrikes can be effective, its impossible for the United States to properly train local forces and wield soft power without combat forcesboots on the groundin Syria.

The Iraqi army needs crucial ground support. DATTerrible Swift Sword. The Economist. 23 September 2014. Web. 7 March 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/09/strikes-against-islamic-stateEven in Iraq, where there are ground forces to work with, progress is painfully slow. IS may have been contained as far as its march on Baghdad is concerned, but it is still capable of inflicting defeats on the Iraqi army. September 21st may have been the worst day for the army since the fall of Mosul in June. Its main base in Sunni-dominated Anbar province, under IS siege for a week, fell with the loss of between 300 and 500 soldiers either killed or taken prisoner. The majority of Iraqi Sunnis have yet to be convinced by the attempt to shape a more inclusive, less sectarian government in Baghdad.

American troops are needed to keep the Iraqi army functional. DATFilkins, Dexter. The Fight of Their Lives. The New Yorker. 29 September 2014. Web. 8 March 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/fight-livesBarham Salih, a Kurd who is a former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, told me that even before theISISoffensive the Iraqi Army was useful mainly as a piggy bank for its officers. At a meeting of senior generals earlier this year, Salih told me, the commanders noted that one of the lite armored divisions, meant to comprise more than ten thousand men, had dwindled to about five hundred. The divisions remaining officers were marking the men present and pocketing their wages. This is a corrupt system, Salih said. You have no division, all the units are gone, and the commanders are stealing all the money.A week after the Iraqi Army collapsed, I sat with Mohammed Ghafar, a twenty-eight-year-old soldier from Kirkuk. Ghafar, a Shiite Arab, told me that he had joined the Army, ten years ago, with pride. I needed a job, but the truth is that I joined to serve my country, he said. He was assigned to the 12th Division, which oversaw his home town. Ghafar earned a good salary, got married and had two children, and looked forward to a career as a soldier. The Army never functioned as well as he had hoped, Ghafar said, but it grew much worse in 2011, when the American military departed. Ghafar liked the Americans. He respected their professionalism and the training they offered, and, most important, he felt that they helped to keep his superiors honest. Everything changed after the Americans left, Ghafar said. The commanders steal everything. They sell it in the local marketclothes, boots, our equipment. Ghafar said that he was forced to buy boots at the local bazaar. In his unit, the absentee rate soared. Even the rations went bad, he said. We used to have the best food, Ghafar said. After the Americans left, all we got was eggplant. Eggplant at every meal! Breakfast, lunch, and dinner.The Iraqi army is a necessary local component of any effort aimed at achieving US interests. Without embedded US troops keeping morale steady and discipline up, its a liability that leaves the United States plugging holes all over Iraq.

Iraqi forces need unification brokered by a third party with boots on the ground. DATSalih, Mohammed. The Kurdish Are Coming. Foreign Policy. 16 June 2014. Web. 8 March 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/16/the-kurdish-are-coming/Iraqi leadership convened a meeting on June 11, attended by Maliki, to discuss ways to confront threats from ISIS. Neither the Kurdish president nor prime minister attended the meeting, and only lower-rank officials represented the Kurds. The meeting reportedly ended without producingan agreement.At the moment, the possibility of joint operations between Iraqi and Kurdish troops against ISIS militants seems slim. But with the danger posed by ISIS becoming more serious by the day, it is not unlikely that the KRG and Baghdad might in the coming weeks or months find common cause.As the ISIS war rages on, there does not appear to be any deal between the Kurds and Baghdad to jointly take on the group. In a statement shortly after ISISs capture of Mosul, KRGs Barzani said the Iraqi government had rejected an offer of "security cooperation" from the Kurds before the fall of Mosul.If the Peshmerga do unite with Iraqi troops, it will strengthen the hand of the weak Iraqi Army. At the moment, however, no deal for cooperation has been struck between the two sides. Most Kurds oppose aiding the Baghdad government and see the current conflict as a sectarian Sunni-Shiite fight between Arabs. For now, the Peshmerga are focused solely on defending their own territory and, when possible, expanding it. Their extensive combat experience and strong discipline mean they might be able to get what they want.With US boots on the ground in a supporting role, there is a greater chance of cohesion between Kurdish and Iraqi forces, kept together by American troops. This would significantly improve the scale and focus of the anti-ISIS effort.

ISIS possesses American military technology, giving it an advantage over most other forces. DATKhoury, Nabeel. Either the U.S. Defeats ISIS, or Iran Does. The Cairo Review of Global Affairs. 11 August 2014. Web. 9 March 2015. http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=637The Cairo Review of Global Affairs is the quarterly journal of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy (GAPP) at American University in Cairo.Even though the ideology of Al-Qaeda and that of ISISs are almost identical, indications are that ISIS is a more potent, and therefore more dangerous, organization than AQI. As lethal as the latter was, it remained an underground movement engaged in random acts of violence and terrorism that did not lead to any gains on the ground for the organization and its supporters. ISIS, by contrast, is acting very strategically, conquering territory and amassing the means to hold, consolidate, and possibly advance further into the Levant region. ISIS has further established a rudimentary system of government and is threatening to spread its control to the rest of the Islamic world. To back this rhetoric, ISIS has assembled a large army, recruiting heavily in the region and internationally. Inside Iraq, the organization has shown signs of having learnt from the mistakes of its predecessor, AQI, which alienated the Sunni community and lost its tribal leaders to coalition forces and the central government of Iraq.

ISISs sweep through northwestern Iraq has thus far been facilitated by the acquiescence of the Sunni population and the active participation of tribal forces against the Maliki government. Whereas AQI depended on funding from individual patrons from Iraq and the Gulf, ISIS appears to be self-funded. The organization has robbed banks; they have hijacked petrol trucks, oil refineries and, more recently, oil wells, to fund and arm themselves. ISIS has also cleverly taken over military bases in Syria and Iraq, gaining heavy weaponry in the process, notably armored vehicles and tanks. With the Iraqi army having hastily fled from major cities in the north, valuable American equipment is now in the hands of ISIS fighters, including possibly Abrams tanks. In the areas under its control, ISIS has called back to duty oil workers, engineers, and technicians to keep oil and water facilities operational and has apparently managed to sell oil and profit from it.ISIS has both a cohesive strategy and the technology to achieve it. This means that external forces are needed; neither the Iraqi army nor the Kurdish peshmerga (or any Syrian groups) have the same capabilities.

Simply providing resources to Syrian rebel groups could backfire. DATLang, Hardin et al. Supporting the Syrian Opposition. Center for American Progress. September 2014. Web. 11 March 2015. https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/IslamistsSyria-report.pdfLang was a senior fellow in the international security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.One particularly thorny challenge is how the United States will deal with hardline Islamists that oppose ISIS, including those fighting with the Islamic Front. Clashes with the Assad regime and ISIS, a crippling attack against its leadership, and the reported reduction in funding from state sponsors have put significant pressure on the Islamic Front. This has taken a toll on the cohesion of the Islamic Front, but the 40,000 to 60,000 so-called Syrian Taliban who fight under the Islamic Fronts banner remain greater in number and capability than the Free Syrian Army elements that are receiving U.S. assistance. As one senior moderate activist observed, The Islamic Front has a national-level objective and can mobilize and deploy fighters across [areas of responsibility] and localities.161 As the United States increases support for the Syrian opposition, policymakers must decide what role they see for these Salafi jihadi fighters. If the Islamic Front were to implode as an umbrella organization, there is a very real risk that many of its fighters will join ISIS. If it survives, a U.S.-backed moderate opposition may find itself in conflict with elements of the Islamic Front.Theres no tenable way for the United States to provide resources to Syrian resistance groups in a way that secures a definitive victory. Pro teams would be well-advised to establish criteria for US interests, such as total victory over ISIS, as a way keep debates clear and ensure cards like this one dont become inadvertently contentious in round.

Iraqi Army is incredibly weak, FjTerrors new headquarters The Economist. June 14, 2014.So absolute was the rout of Iraqs army in Mosul that soldiers stripped off their uniforms in the street and fled. The bodies of those left behind, some mutilated, were strewn amid burned-out troop carriers. Roughly 1,500 jihadists from the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), outnumbered by more than 15 to one, reportedly seized six Black Hawk helicopters as well as untold plunder from the vaults of Mosuls banks. They released thousands of prisoners from Mosuls jails. As the black flag ofjihadrose above government buildings, as many as half a million refugees sought sanctuary.

Iraqi Army is corrupt, FjLister, Tim. Battle for Tikrit: Despite billions in aid , Iraqi army relies on militias and Iran CNN. March 11, 2015.As then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki tightened his grip on power between 2006 and 2013, the high command of the Iraqi military became a political football -- with loyalty to al-Maliki prized above competence. He bypassed the defense and interior ministries and used elite units to pursue political enemies.The Institute for the Study of Warreported in 2013, "the lack of oversight on military appointments has allowed al-Maliki to choose his preferred officers (nearly all Shia) to head the most significant command positions in Iraq." Al-Maliki also began integrating Shia militia into army units.At the same time, the phenomenon of "ghost soldiers" went unchecked -- men who were either dead or AWOL but whose wages were still being paid, often to corrupt commanders. So the army, in numbers, looked much stronger than it was. In fact, by the time ISIS rolled south, the effective fighting force was less than a quarter of its peak strength of 400,000.

Iraqi Army was soundly beaten by ISIS, FjLister, Tim. Battle for Tikrit: Despite billions in aid , Iraqi army relies on militias and Iran CNN. March 11, 2015.Nearly half the army -- four divisions -- collapsed in short order as ISIS fighters stormed south from Syria in the early summer of 2014. ISIS used speed, discipline and ruthlessness in equal measure -- attributes the Iraqi army didn't have. It had also cultivated allies among members of Sunni tribes ready to act as a fifth column, and its fearsome reputation for wholesale executions of prisoners led many soldiers to strip off their uniforms and flee.

Iraqi Army is too small to beat ISIS, FjLister, Tim. Battle for Tikrit: Despite billions in aid , Iraqi army relies on militias and Iran CNN. March 11, 2015.Soon after taking office, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi fired 26 commanders and pushed 10 others into retirement.At the time a statement on his website stressed "the need to restore confidence in the security forces through real action and by combating corruption at the individual and institutional levels."U.S.-led efforts to train a new Iraqi army designed to defeat ISIS are well underway. The aim is to stand up 12 brigades each of about 5,000 troops -- including three brigades of Kurdish peshmerga. These should be ready for operations by the end of this year; the first brigade has already completed basic training.But as Harmer notes, "the Iraqi Security Forces are yet to go head-to-head with ISIS and win without help from the PMUs. ISIS is demonstrably more capable than the ISF."Clearing ISIS from well-entrenched defenses around Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, seems well beyond the army's capability. In November, Gen. Dempsey said that roughly 80,000 effective troops would be needed in any attempt to win the city.

More ground troops are needed, FjBoot, Max. Defeating ISIS Council on Foreign Relations. November 2014.Military requirements, not a priori numbers dreamed up in Washington, should shape the force eventually dispatched. The current force, even with the recent addition of 1,500 more troops for a total of 2,900, is inadequate. Estimates of necessary troop size range from 10,000 personnel (according to General Anthony Zinni, former head of Central Command) to 25,000 (according to military analysts Kim and Fred Kagan). The total number should include Special Forces teams and forward air controllers to partner with local forces as well as logistical, intelligence, security, and air contingents in support.

The Iraqi army does not have the weaponry to adequately combat ISIS. DATWilliams, Nathan. Armed and Ready: The Ranks and Weapons of the Islamic State. Harvard International Review. 20 February 2015. Web. 12 March 2015. http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/10539The Harvard International Review is a quarterly journal and website ofinternational relations published by the Harvard International Relations CouncilConcerning small arms and light weapons, the Islamic State has an ample stockpile of small arms in addition to an impressive range of heavy machine guns and anti-tank weapons. Contrary to popular belief, most of the Islamic States weaponry does not originate from the United States. Instead, Russian and Chinese arms are the first and second most common weapons amongst Islamic State militants, respectively. The large amount of Chinese and Russian manufactured weaponry results from various factors. Firstly, Russian and Chinese weapons are cheaper than arms manufactured in Western states. Secondly, Islamic State militants captured a good portion of arms from the Syrian Army. Given Syrian President Bashar al-Assads close ties with Russia and China, the origin of these captured weapons should come as no surprise. Thirdly, despite all the arms given by the United States to the Iraqi military, many fell into disrepair as a result of the Iraqi armys poor discipline and limited logistical capabilities.The advantage of US combat troops isnt simply skill or manpower. Its also simply the presence of a fighting force well-equipped enough to handle the task at hand. In terms of minimizing casualties, this is crucial for the American coalition.

ISIS leadership is well trained, FJPatel, David. ISIS in Iraq: What We Get Wrong and Why 2015 Is Not 2007 Redux Crown Center for Middle East Studies. January 2015.ISIS is different from its predecessor organizations in several important ways. First, it is led by Iraqis and these Iraqis are almost all former Baathists. The most thorough publicly available information on the leadership structure of ISIS comes from flash drives taken from the home of the organizations military chief of staff for Iraq, who was killed in a raid by the Iraqi military in Mosul in early June 2014. Nineteen of the twenty known top ISIS leaders at that timeincluding the entire cabinet, those serving in the war office, and the governors of Iraqi territory were from Iraq; the only exception was a Syrian in charge of ISISs media relations unit. Approximately one-third of those nineteen leaders were officers in Saddam Husseins military; several others were officers in Iraqi intelligence agencies.The people who lead ISIS are not disillusioned citizens turned ideologues; instead they are former military officials. As a result, they are well trained in the art of war, especially when compared to current Iraqi forces.ISIS has well trained deputies, FjHubbard, Ben and Schmitt, Eric. Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS New York TImes. August 26, 2014.He had a preference for military men, and so his leadership team includes many officers from Saddam Husseins long-disbanded army.They include former Iraqi officers like Fadel al-Hayali, the top deputy for Iraq, who once served Mr. Hussein as a lieutenant colonel, and Adnan al-Sweidawi, a former lieutenant colonel who now heads the groups military council.The pedigree of its leadership, outlined by an Iraqi who has seen documents seized by the Iraqi military, as well as by American intelligence officials, helps explain its battlefield successes: Its leaders augmented traditional military skill with terrorist techniques refined through years of fighting American troops, while also having deep local knowledge and contacts. ISIS is in effect a hybrid of terrorists and an army.These are the academies that these men graduated from to become what they are today, said the Iraqi, a researcher named Hisham Alhashimi.According to a map of the group developed by Mr. Alhashimi, the Iraqi expert, Mr. Baghdadi has 25 deputies across Iraq and Syria. About one-third were military officers during Mr. Husseins rule, and nearly all were imprisoned by American forces.

Boots on the ground would help recreate a Sunni AwakeningThe United States needs to build a secure environment, FjPatel, David. ISIS in Iraq: What We Get Wrong and Why 2015 Is Not 2007 Redux Crown Center for Middle East Studies. January 2015.After U.S. forces withdrew from their areas and in the absence of state resources, many of the sheikhs who had participated in Awakening movements were either killed or fled. Many today live in Amman or Erbil. A similar tribal uprising today is unlikely, because neither the Iraqi government nor distant U.S. authorities can credibly commit to providing a future flow of resources to groups that stand up to ISIS, and any sheikh considering doing so can reasonably expect any support that is extended to be only temporary. The earlier tribal uprisings spread quickly because many benefits were tied to being designated as the authority within a designated territory. Green and Mullens detailed account of the fight against AQI in al-Anbar in 20068 emphasizes how critical it was for coalition forces to build a security environment on the ground before tribes would rise up. Without U.S. or capable Iraqi government boots on the ground in Sunni Arab majority areas, such conferring of authority today would be meaningless. And sheikhs fear that the central Iraqi government will renege in the future on any promises made today.There needs to be U.S. boots on the ground to actually back up promises to Sunni tribes.The Sunni Awakening and Troop Surge was highly effective, FjKelly, James. Not Our Fight Alone: An Analysis of the US Strategy Combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Claremont McKenna College. December 1, 2014.The Sons of Iraq program, combined with deployment of an additional 20,000 American troops in 2007, was effective in drastically diminishing the presence of alQaeda throughout Iraq. By the end of 2007, AQI forces throughout Iraq had been decimated by over 70 percent, from 12,000 to 3,500. By 2009, Al-Qaeda in Iraq was effectively defeated as an army. The remaining members of the group consisted of alQaeda militants, some Sunni tribesmen, and former members of Saddam Husseins Baathist military. It appeared as if the al-Qaeda that had terrorized Sunni provinces, killed American soldiers and Iraqi security forces and carried out suicide bombings against Shia civilians for the past eight years had finally been defeated.

The Iraqi government is already working with Sunni tribes, FjKitfield, James. Can Another Anbar Awakening Save Iraq? Defense One. February 3, 2014.There is evidence that Maliki has finally awakened to the peril. After seeing the bloody fighting necessary forU.S.forces to clear Fallujah of insurgents in 2004 a battle that cost the lives of nearly 100U.S.Marines he has apparently ruled out ordering the Shiite-dominated Iraqi army into the city at this time. Instead this week he has rushed truckloads of guns and money to the Sunni tribesmen in Anbar, reportedly including $3.4 million for salaries, and more than 5,000 rifles and machine guns. Baghdad is now belatedly dangling more than $17 million for infrastructure improvements in Anbar as a further incentive, according toThe New York Times.This means that we will have the cooperation of the current Iraqi government in trying to fight ISIS the same way we fought AQI during the Sunni Awakening. In other words, we will not be alone in our efforts.

American troops are needed to resolve coordination problemsMilitias and proxy forces are pursuing disparate agendas in combatting ISIS. DATNewsome, Bruce. How to Defeat ISIS (and why it probably wont happen). The Berkeley Blog. UC Berkeley. 2 March 2015. Web. 12 March 2015. http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2015/03/02/how-to-defeat-isis-and-why-it-probably-wont-happen/Bruce Newsome is a lecturer in international relations at UC Berkeley.The ground component could be provided by local ground forces, but they are self-interestedly focused on securing their own claims, not on defeating ISIS. For instance, Kurdish ground troops and Western air strikes helped to drive ISIS out of Kobani, on the Syrian side of the Turkish border, but that battle lasted from October to January, when ISIS gave up, leaving few dead behind. In February, Kurdish troops advanced back to their self-declared borders short of Mosul, but the situation is properly described as a stalemate.Also in February, Turkish troops entered Syria to secure an Ottoman shrine, which they shortlyevacuatedto Turkey, again without any intent to defeat ISIS.On 20 February, a careless spokesman at Central Command (the US military command responsible for the Middle East) gave background information to journalists about aplan for Iraqi ground troops to retake Mosul in April or May, supported by Western air strikes, but Mosul is under ISIS control because Iraqi troops largely abandoned their posts last year, and Iraq has not observably improved its militarys will since then, except to negotiate more US tanks and helicopters.The Shia regime in Syria has been most engaged in fighting ISIS and its allies since they joined the rebellion there in 2011, while Iran has expanded its presence in Iraq since the US-led coalition defeated the Sunni regime in 2003, and supports proxies (such as Hezbollah) in Syria, but the US government has repeatedly ruled out military cooperation with either state.Until the United States establishes a definitive presence in Iraq and Syria, the counter-ISIS effort is a jumble of competing, sometimes apathetic interests which do little to advance US interests, even when supported by airstrikes.

Ground forces are needed where politics have failed. DATOttaway, Marina. ISIS: Many Faces, Different Battles. Wilson Center. Winter 2015. Web. 14 March 2015. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isis_many_faces_different_battles.pdfThe Wilson Center is a Congressionally-chartered public policy research forum. The political component to the battle against the Islamic State, which U.S. officials proclaim to be crucial, remains very weak. In Iraq, the inclusive government the United States insisted must be put in place is not radically different from the previous one. New Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has a much more conciliatory and friendly demeanor than the unapologetically sectarian and dour Nouri alMaliki. The cabinet is multi-sectarian in its compositionbut so was al-Malikis. And al-Abadi is still relying mostly on Shia militias openly supported by Iran to protect Baghdad and regain control in Diyala and Salahuddin provinces, which does nothing to gain the confidence of the Sunni population. The proposed National Guard, with provincial units controlled by their respective provincial councils, has not been formed, and the bill that would allow it to be formed has not been sent to the parliament. Adding to the tension, Shia militias have been accused of committing massacres of Sunnis in some areas of Diyala Province they liberated from the Islamic States control. And while the peshmerga is the key to winning back territory in the North, neither al-Abadi nor the United States has changed their position toward the autonomy of Kurdistan or control over Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Furthermore, Kurds bitterly complain that they are not receiving the heavy weapons they badly need because all military aid is filtered through Baghdad.In terms of sheer numbers, the pieces in Iraq for combatting ISIS are all there. Whats needed is a redux of pre-2011 American efforts, which saw American troops training and fighting with Iraqi ones, keeping morale high, discipline tight, and dissent minimal (relatively). Framing the problem this way, the Pro can avoid appearing to advocate a full-scale invasion of ISIS-controlled territory; ground combat troops can be effective in solving Iraqs particular problems in small numbers .

April 2015Pro

Airstrikes Dont Advance US Interests

The use of airstrikes hinges on cooperation with Bashar Assad and reticent allies. DATTerrible Swift Sword. The Economist. 23 September 2014. Web. 7 March 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/09/strikes-against-islamic-stateIn Syria, the risk remains that the main beneficiary of the American air campaign, at least in the short-term, will be Mr Assad. While there is no question of co-operation with his regime, it was apparently notified of the attack. It would seem that there is little danger of Mr Assad trying to use his relatively modern air defence system to shoot down coalition aircraft. Given the Iranian connection between Damascus and Baghdad, nor would it be surprising if intelligence on IS positions and assets was finding its way to American target-setters.A further question is when and to what extent Americas traditional allies will commit themselves fully to the campaign to destroy IS. Turkey, a NATO member, is a notable absentee from the coalition. It is suspected of having done a deal with IS to secure the release last week of 49 of its citizens who had been captured during the fall of Mosul. It has refused to allow the use of its huge air base at ncirlik for combat operations. France has flown one strike mission in Iraq, but its foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, has so far ruled out hitting targets in Syria, although he said on September 22nd that he saw no legal obstacle. Britains prime minister, David Cameron, appears to be determined to play a full role in the coalition against IS, but he is nervous of recalling Parliament until public opinion in favour of action has solidified. (A Commons vote on attacking Syria last year went horribly wrong.)Mr Cameron can at least console himself with the thought that the campaign is likely to be a long one.The United States risks jeopardizing its military interests (victory over ISIS) and its diplomatic interests (maintaining its coalition, weakening Bashar Assads grasp on power) by its continuing reliance on air strikes. Given that the biggest goal is still ISIS destruction, this leaves ground troops as a tenable unilateral solution for achieving American interests.

Airstrikes dont work in isolation, and local forces morale is too low. DATLimited Airstrikes Against ISIS a Bad Idea. Byman, Daniel L. Brookings Institution. 19 June 2014. Web. 7 March 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/06/19-iraq-airstrikes-bad-idea-bymanThe Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, DC. In any event, the size and strength of the Iraqi Army is not the problem -- it outmans and outguns ISIS by orders of magnitude. Rather, the Iraqi Army's problems involve leadership and morale. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has systematically isolated Iraq's Sunni and Kurdish communities and politicized the officer corps. Unsurprisingly, many Iraqis don't want to fight for whatthey see as Maliki's personal militia. Maliki has dismissed several officers due to the Army's recent dismal performance, but the perception that the Army is Shiite-dominated remains and perhaps has even grown as many Sunnis and Kurds deserted during the ISIS advances of the last week.If the Iraqi Army withers and runs when attacked, limited airstrikes will ultimately do little to push ISIS back. Air power can't conquer territory by itself. Even in the best circumstances, airstrikes must be sustained to have a strategic effect. And strikes must work in tandem with advances on the ground, so Iraqi forces can move in and occupy any territory from which ISIS withdraws. If strikes are limited in duration, ISIS can simply lie low, camouflaging its forces among the civilian population and avoiding the offensive until the spotlight moves off Iraq, as it inevitably will. If its forces are hit in one area, it can simply reoccupy the territory when the bombing ends. The United States must be prepared to strike often and repeatedly if it is going to play a major role in pushing ISIS back. This could take months even if all goes well.The effectiveness of airstrikes is contingent on troops holding enemy forces accountable when and where strikes cannot. This isnt a functional reality in Iraq.

Hitting oil refineries has damaged the coalitions soft power. DATLister, Charles. Cutting off ISIS Cash Flow. Brookings Institution. 24 October 2014. Web. 8 March 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/10/24-lister-cutting-off-isis-jabhat-al-nusra-cash-flowThe Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, DC. Disrupting ISIS oil income is more of a challenge that might meet the eye. Thus far, a great deal of focus has been placed on an erroneous assessment that ISIS is deeply reliant on selling its oil to foreign customers (in Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, Jordan and elsewhere). Instead, while this market focus does exist, it is decreasing. Since the summer, ISIS has been increasingly focused on establishing a durable internal market for its oil produce, thereby ensuring a reliable source of fuel for its own fleets of vehicles but crucially creating a source of dependence between civilians and its capacity to provide them cheap oil. In this respect, the fact that recent coalition strikes have targeted oil at its source rather than its means of transport or sale, for example may prove deeply damaging to the international communitys efforts to counter ISIS.