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Admission to CitizenshipAuthor(s): Herman R. Van GunsterenSource: Ethics, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Jul., 1988), pp. 731-741Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380894

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Admission to Citizenship

Herman R. van Gunsteren

Our social interaction consists very much in telling one anotherwhat right thinking is and passing blame on wrong thinking. Thisis indeed how we build the institutions, squeezing each other's ideasinto a common shape so that we can prove rightness by sheernumbers of independent assent. So much is this claim to intellectualindependence recognized as a basis of our social life that moralphilosophy takes its stand at that very point. This is why Durkheim'sidea that the social group acts like one mind is so repugnant.

GLOBAL JUSTICE AND LOCAL CITIZENSHIP

In order to be a person one needs a home base: a culture, an oikos(socio-economic security), citizenship (political and legal standing). Human rightsare important but in themselves are insufficient as a basis for personhoodin the present world. Human rights need institutional backing in order

to be effective. Prominent among these is citizenship. Citizenship is aninstitutional status from within which a person can address governmentsand other citizens and make claims about human rights.

Schemes to provide citizen status for every human being in the worldhave not been convincing. Efforts to develop a world citizenship havefoundered on the necessarily local character of citizenship. Citizenship,as we have known it up till now, is time, place, and cultural bound. It isa scarce resource that can remain a resource only as long as certainboundaries are maintained. The price

for effective standing and equalityamong citizens apparently is inequality between citizens and noncitizens,between insiders and outsiders. When applied at the world level, citizenshiploses its point or cutting edge.

Efforts to develop and practice global schemes for ajust distributionof local citizenship so that no human being will be without it have notbeen convincing either. As Walzer concludes in his attempt to developsuch a scheme, "The principle of mutual aid can only modify and not

1. Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,

1986), p. 91.

Ethics 98 (July 1988): 731-741

3 1988 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/88/9804-0009$01.00

731



732 Ethics July 1988

transform admissions policies rooted in a particular community's un-derstanding of itself."2

Simply accepting differential treatment of local citizens and nonciti-zens will not do, however. It is too often morally unacceptable in casesinvolving guest workers, stateless persons, and refugees from tyrannicalregimes (these states violate citizenship and human rights requirementsto such a degree that their 'citizens' are de facto not better off thanstateless persons).

What to do then? I propose to steer a middle course between ineffectualglobalism and immoral localism. The global perspective is to be used not

as a blueprint but as a corrective to localism. The way to work towardglobalism is to work with local pieces. The local citizen perspective shouldnot be suppressed or merely accepted as a regrettable remnant of irrationalloyalties, but it should rather be used as an indispensable basis for per-sonhood. It is to be improved on the basis of both global criticism andlocal experience and constraints.

In what follows I shall look at the question of admission to citizenshipfrom a local perspective. I address this question from within a particularconception of citizenship. In this, I differ from a theorist like Walzer whotries to develop a global perspective and brings in local considerationsonly as a second best after he has demonstrated that a global perspectivegives too little guidance and that practical admissions policies are dominatedby local considerations anyway. My primary interest is in developing arobust and defensible local Dutch liberal democratic conception of citi-zenship and then to inquire what guidance it gives on the nasty problemsof admission of those who wish to acquire it.

CITIZENSHIPWhat is a citizen? Citizenship is an answer to the question, "Who am I?"and "What should I do?" when posed in the public sphere. Citizens haveautonomy and judgment. Autonomy is not the same as having no ties,as being dependent on nothing and no one except oneself; exercisingjudgment is not the same as stating one's subjective and arbitrary opinion.Citizenship is more than a status; it is an office. It implies acting, doingsomething, bringing something about. Autonomy andjudgment are bothconditions for and intended outcomes of citizen action. A citizen is hewho has those two qualities to such a degree that he is and remainscapable of both ruling and being ruled.

The conditions for citizenship that have been developed in liberaldemocracies are political participation, judgment by one's peers (citizenjudges), socioeconomic security, freedom of organization (time, money,expertise), and knowledge (communicative competence, culture, infor-

2. Michael Walzer, SpheresofJustice (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), p. 51. See also

Bruce Ackerman, SocialJustice n theLiberalState (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,1980), p. 257.



van Gunsteren Admissionto Citizenship 733

mation). The outcome of citizen action is checked or controlled by con-

tinuing public debate between citizens, by protection of fundamental

human rights, and by the judgment of independent courts of law.This sounds like ideology, like an ideal without much practical sig-

nificance. Isn't the individual, who is supposed to be free and capable

of judgment, what he is precisely through the fact that he is part of

larger, supraindividual entities? In ordinary language, 'citizen' is a residual

concept used to refer to powerless members of the political community.

The others derive power and influence from what distinguishes themfrom ordinary citizens. Citizenship is a rather bleak and lifeless idea, as

we know from survey research, depth interviews, tax fraud and evasion,and distaste for military service (older generations have fought for the

citizen's right to bear arms). At the same time citizenship is coveted and

valued by outsiders (e.g., those who want asylum).

Why is it that such a central political concept does not arouse strong

feelings and well-elaborated ideas? Because of insiders, citizenship is amatter of fact, something that is self-evidently taken for granted. It only

becomes visible at its boundaries or in cases of disasters, such as Nazi

occupation. Internally, citizenship has no distinctive power. Everyone

around you has it, and therefore it can provide you with neither powernor identity. It is always difficult to see and understand the ways in which

things taken for granted are reproduced. Also a gradual increase of

hesitations and interruptions of such reproduction processes are often

not perceived, at least not before they have increased beyond repair.

The societal reproduction of matters self-evidently taken for granted

often becomes visible only when they have ceased to be self-evident. The

dangers that this blind spot poses are increased because the classical

theory of citizenship, as outlined above, has a number of notorious short-comings. On the basis of modern insights three of these can be remediedor circumvented: the relation between individuals and supraindividual

entities, the gap between ideal and reality, and the arbitrariness of citizen

judgments. I shall briefly indicate how.

INDIVIDUALS AND OTHER ACTORS

How individuals connect and depend on other associations,or the relations

between parts and wholes, has remained problematic for the social sciences

because of a recurrent failure to develop an adequate theory of action.Within a sociologistic approach there remains no place for action (actionis explained away, as it were, and renamed role or other behavior), while

in rational choice theory there are no historically embodied actors (the

choosing actor is an abstraction; how he acquires his values and truths-

and thereby his preferences-and how he critically checks and resetsthem remains in the dark; preferences are either postulated or simply

accepted in one of the guises in which they reveal themselves). Recent

theorizing by Rom Harre, Mary Douglas, Anthony Giddens,and others

has broken out of this impasse. Giddens, for instance, using an avalanche




of concepts and words, develops a theory of double structuration.3 In-dividuals are both product and producers of social relations of which

they form parts. Actorship is an emergent property of social relations,not a quality that every human being has by nature. Acting is "bricolage,"working with pieces of "material" hat are historicallyand socially available.

The traditional question whether a citizen is or is not a basic/foundingelement of the polity can be better answered now. Earlier thinkers-political atomists-conceived of separate bodies as separate individuals,as persons who could, if they wished to do so, freely transform themselvesinto citizens and a political community. Later thinkers criticized this vision.

The choosing self, they argued, was a myth, a product of passing historicalpatterns of interaction and conceptions of the self. The end of the so-called era of the individual, of humanistic thinking, would be near. Giddensand others propose a middle position. The self/citizen is indeed historicallyand socially produced; once having been produced it becomes a relativelyindependent source of transformation of social relations that generatedit in the first place; independence of the citizen becomes, moreover, acriterion for resetting and reordering such relations; often there is noway back, in the sense that modern complex social relations, systems,

and levels of provision cannot continue to function without citizen in-dependence (autonomy and judgment).

ARISTOTELIAN VERSUS KANTIAN CITIZENSHIP

The perspective developed here makes the gap between the theory andthe practice of citizenship less forbidding and barren. In the debatebetween Socrates and Thrasymachus about justice4 and in Kant's con-siderations of political expediency,5 we find a strict separation between

idea (ideal, normative conception) and practice. If practice does not fitthe idea, so much the worse for practice. This position provides so littlehold for people who have to act in practice that they reject the ideas asuseless and improvise their own solutions. Why not abandon the schemeof, on the one hand, b.zasic,rational, and immutable ideals and, on the

other, a given empirical reality? Neither ideals nor reality are simplygiven in this way. Ideais have been historically produced. For many ideals,the historical reality in which they emerged is an essential condition fortheir meaningful pursuit. This holds for the ideal of the Enlightenment,

which presupposes the existence of traditions against which to fight. Thisholds also for the ideal of an absolutely free individual, who is determinedby nothing external to his free will.6 Ideals and ideas should be seen in

3. Anthony Giddens, CentralProblems n SocialTheory:Action, Structure nd Contradictionsin Social Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1979).

4. Plato, Republic, bk. 1.

5. For example, Immanuel Kant, "Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorierichting sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis," lecture given in 1793.

6. Such an individual is nothing; see Michael J. Sandel, Liberalismand the Limits ofJustice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).




their specific relation to a specific historical reality. In particular, oneneeds to inquire in which historicalinstitutions they have become embodied.

Following this approach we end up with an Aristotelian, and not aKantian, notion of citizenship. Thus a conception of citizenship is inherently

related to a specific historical community, including its institutionally

embodied aspirations and possibilities for criticizing the community andits institutions. Striving for the realization of citizenship, then, is striving

for the best that is possible in the given circumstances. Citizenship is inthe making, not a safe possession of empiricists or normative theorists.

JUDGMENT

A third weakness of the classical theory of citizenship lies in its lack ofattention to and analysis ofjudgment. Citizenjudgments were considered

to be subjective and therefore immune to scientific or rational criticism.

Until recently, citizen theorists were ruled by the unfruitful dichotomyof the 'rational' and 'empirical' knowledge of scientific and other expertson the one hand, and the nonrational individual preferences and ideologiesof 'free' citizens on the other. Presently we are witnessing, fortunately,a revival of interest in judgment, as for example in the work of Gadamer,

Habermas, and Beiner. We exercise judgment, they say, in those situations

that require a decision, but for which there is not a decisive 'automatic'

formula, and which nevertheless contain elements that cannot be made

immune to criticism by labeling them as 'subjective.' Debate and criticism

concerning judgment rely on topoi (noncontroversial common starting

points of reasoning) and rhetoric. This is the realm of debate and criticism

situated between 'friends,' cocitizens. One is expected to understand and

acknowledge their positions because of a shared history and presentsituation. One is held responsible for one's judgment-and for action

based thereupon-by one's equals; that is, by citizens.In sum, from the fact that judgment is not objective, it does not

follow that judgment cannot be argued about and that it is irremediablysubjective. The renewed interest in judgment makes a more balanced

approach to both components of citizenship-autonomy andjudgment-possible. Exclusive attention to autonomy is not sufficient. In order to

decide if and to what extent someone is autonomous we have to ascertain

if and to what extent he is capable of sound judgment.On the basis of the foregoing we can review and repair the traditional

notion of citizenship a little. Citizenship is an office in a historical com-

munity. There are specific requirements for admission to, removal from,

and continuation in this office. The office itself can only be reproduced

by its actual exercise. In a republic, citizenship is the primary office. It

is at stake in all public action. Civil servants and politicians do not ceaseto be ordinary citizens when they hold office. All public action can be

judged in terms of its consequences for citizenship (just as it can be

judged in terms of its consequences for justice, the budget deficit, etc.).

A republic is a polity that is ruled and inhabited by citizens. A republic




can be conceived as a program for the reproductionn of citizens. A

republic may act only insofar as this is necessary for the design andimplementation of such a program.

ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS

What guidance does this revised conception of citizenship give in mat-ters of admission? An admission decision should be judged in terms of

its consequences for citizenship. Does it improve the quality of citizenship,does it enlarge the set of people who are admitted to citizenship, does

citizenship remain a realistic option for future generations? Answers to

these questions cannot be given here because they depend on judgmentin specific historical situations for which no general formulas or laws canbe decisive. What can be indicated here, however, is the direction inwhich answers may be found and the legitimacy (from the point of viewof citizenship) of various constraints that such answers are supposed to

satisfy.Posing admission requirements is not in principle illegitimate. Only

people who have certain capabilities can act as citizens. Requirements

for admission that follow from the conception of citizenship outlinedabove are (a) general citizen competence, (b) competence to act as amember of this particular polity, and (c) access to an oikos.

Requirementa.-The prospective citizen must be capable of dialogicperformance. He must, within limits, be ready to argue with other citizens,to talk and listen to them, and to form his judgment on the basis of such

dialogue. He must, also within limits, be able and willing to make hisactions conform to his talk.

Requirementb. -The prospective citizen must be capable and willing

to be a member of this particular historical community, its past andfuture, its forms of life and institutions within which its members thinkand act. In a community that values autonomy and judgment of itsmembers, this is obviously not a requirement of pure conformity. But itis a requirement of knowledge of the language and the culture and of

acknowledgment of those institutions that foster the reproduction of

citizens who are capable of autonomous and responsible judgment. Whatthis comes down to in Dutch admission practice is that prospective citizens

are required to know the Dutch language and to respect the laws of theland (this is shown by their not having committed major criminal offensesduring their stay in the country).

Requirement .-In order not to be forced to sell themselves or theirautonomous judgment into dependence, the prospective citizens shouldhave a reasonably secure access to the means of their continued existence.They must own property or have access to another source of income,for example, from ajob, social security,or the welfare state. The prospectivecitizen may, on various grounds, have secure and legitimate incomeclaims on the state that he wants to become a citizen of. But of coursehis applying for citizenship can in itself not create or reinforce suchclaims.




These three requirements of (a) dialogue and judgment, (b) culture

and identity, and (c) means of life and autonomy are implicit in theconception of citizenship outlined above. These are not minor claims.Can one ask that much from newcomers? Yes, if one does not apply the

requirements too rigorously. All one may ask for is clear intentional and

behavioral indications that the prospective citizen will "grow into" these

requirements in due time. That is, that such a growth process is clearly

under way.

Another objection to these requirements, often voiced in Dutch par-

liamentary debates, is that they violate equality because they demandmore from newcomers than is expected from quite a number of native

citizens. The objection is mistaken on two counts. What is at issue in the

first place is precisely whether newcomers will acquire the right to equal

treatment with Dutch citizens. Therefore a simple appeal to the principle

of equal treatment will not do. More argument is needed. In the second

place, the objection implicitly assumes that criteria for expulsion from

citizenship are the same as those for admission. Quod non. In practice,

and in most theories as well, these criteria differ. I would argue, with

Hannah Arendt, that expulsion from citizenship against one's will is

never permitted.Although these are stiff requirements, they leave ample room for

political discretionary judgment. Too much room, according to Walzer.

He maintains that "naturalization . . . is entirely constrained: every new

immigrant, every refugee taken in, every resident and worker must be

offered the opportunities of citizenship."7 If naturalization involves dis-

cretion, then, the citizens who decide about admission exercise tyranny

over "metics," over resident aliens who live among them but have nolegally guaranteed access to citizenship. Walzer wants internal policy

choice, or discretion, to be exercised exclusively at the moment of entryonto the territory. This is highly impractical. Entry decisions must often

be made quickly and on the basis of insufficient information. Walzer does

not seem to be the kind of person who will say "When in doubt, keep

out." Thus many will be admitted who do not fulfill the requirementsof citizenship. Isn't it wiser to allow for a transition period during which

applicant and receiving polity can learn more about each other by trial

and error, and only then make decisions about citizenship? AlthoughWalzer's proposal is not a good one, his argument that no democratic

polity can allow a distinction between citizens and metics, between first-

class and second-class citizens, merits serious attention. Further on I shall

argue that the position of metic is only acceptable when its duration is

limited.In contradiction to Walzer, Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith claim

that the decision to naturalize should be entirely politicaland discretionary.8

7. Walzer, p. 62.

8. Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith, CitizenshipwithoutConsent: llegalAliens n theAmerican

Polity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).




Citizenship, in their view, should be entirely based on mutual consent.They forget that one needs standing (status) in order to give or refuse

any consent whatsoever and that consent is constrained by identity onboth sides.

In my view the naturalization decision is partly constrained, partlyjudgmental and discretionary. Others agree, but present different re-quirements (constraints) than the ones developed above. In Ackerman'sliberal theory, for instance, mutual intelligibility is the only requirementfor admission. He would reject requirement b. But doesn't he forget that"theliberal vision is parasiticon a notion of community it officially rejects?"9

What about the well-known ascriptive criteria for granting citizenship,such as having been born on the territory or from a citizen-parent, orhaving lived on the territory for a considerable time? In principle thesecriteria constitute no more than prima facie evidence that one or moreof the three requirements developed above have been met. But thoseascriptive criteria play a more important role in exceptional cases, towhich I now turn.

ADMITTING APPLICANTS THAT DO NOT FULFILL

ALL THE REQUIREMENTSWhat is to be done with applicants for citizenship who do not fulfill allthe requirements for admission, but who are-de facto or de jure-stateless persons? I find arguments for admitting them compelling. Com-pare reasons for excluding the death penalty: 'we' would deny our identity,that is, who we are and what we hold human beings to be, if we were toadminister such a penalty. A similar argument can be made about statelesspersons regarding expulsion from or nonadmission to the territory. If

you keep them on the territory, you will eventually have to grant themcitizenship, because a prolonged existence as resident aliens in a societyof citizens is unacceptable from the point of view of citizenship developedabove. It would violate equality between members of the community byallowing second-class citizenship for some members to be a permanentor terminal station in their lives.

Second-class citizenship is not only a danger for stateless personsand refugees who have been admitted onto the territory but also forguest workers. Many regulations and practices are designed to keep them

out, to make their stay temporary only, and to prevent them from acquiringan oikosin the country where they presently work as 'guests.'10From thepoint of view of citizenship, such second-class citizens, such hybrids thatare part citizen, part stranger, are monstrosities. Monsters, as we know,should be eliminated or, if we cannot do this, should receive at leastspecial treatment and be kept in special and guarded places.

9. Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political

Theory12 (February 1984): 91.

10. See, for Austria, Rainer Baubock, "Auslanderarmut," Osterreichische eitschriftfiirPolitikwissenschaft 1986), pp. 403-23.




Thus it is understandable that people committed to equal citizenshipon the territory have developed arguments and policies designed to keepthis in-between category of half-citizens as small as possible. Recent policies

toward guest workers in Holland try to present them with a reasonableand clear-cut opportunity for choice between integration and re-migration.Schuck and Smith argue for a more inclusive and generous naturalizationpolicy and a stricter policy of admission to and expulsion from the ter-ritory.11

An increasing emphasis on strictpolicies of admission to and expulsionfrom the territory is currently prominent in most West European countries.The ingredients of this policy are quick decision making, no economic

refugees, and international coordination. Quick decision making is thoughtnecessary in order to avoid de facto settlement and acquisition of an oikos

on the territory. Economic refugees should not take the places that wereintended for 'real' political refugees. International coordination is needed

to avoid overflooding of some countries that are thought to be overly

generous (they should be brought in line), to achieve a reasonable dis-tribution of refugees over West European countries, and to repair 'leaks'in the system (for instance, as in East Berlin or Amsterdam).

Such a policy meets with considerable difficulties. Quick decisionmaking on matters of such importance is callousness when informationis scarce and unreliable, when language and cultural barriers are con-

siderable, and when there is no reasonable period during which the

partners involved can try each other out. What is the difference betweeneconomic and political refugees? Politics and economics, as we know,hang together. The only sure proof of being a political refugee seems

to be that one should have died but was saved by an inexplicable miracle.International coordination is a shadowy affair. Conferences between gov-

ernment ministers and civil servants are not public. Only select resultsare publicly announced. Impression management about the 'openness'of various Western European countries or about a fragile unitary Western

European admissions policy is a difficult affair, particularly if one wants

to impress persons in faraway countries who are involved in a domestic

struggle for life. On her return from a visit to her Italian colleague, theDutch undersecretary ofjustice, arrivingat the Amsterdam airport, recently

announced an important policy change: to refuse entry and a regularasylum procedure to refugees who could have asked for

asylumin another

country. Such violation of the rules of due process is a heavy price to

pay for international coordination.

Efforts to keep the category of half-citizens thinly populated have

odd consequences. Dutch citizens are not obliged to carry or show an

identity card (resistance to such an obligation dates from the Second

World War). Foreigners are obliged to identify themselves. Thus, in order

to prove that they are not obliged to identify themselves, Dutch citizens

11. Schuck and Smith.




are obliged to identify themselves as Dutch citizens. Finally, the strictpolicy of admission to the territory in no way solves the problem of illegalaliens and their children who live and are sometimes born on the territory.Their numbers are probably increased as a result of a stricter territorialadmissions policy, and their claims for naturalization lose none of theirforce because of it.

Second-class citizenship cannot be entirely avoided. It is an articulationof social and economic relations. Instead of trying to do away with italtogether, it seems wiser to accept it as a transitory status that is regulatedby rules of law and as a tryout period after which naturalization is notan automatic result. If we make the territorial admission decision final,

admission becomes in fact a lottery. I conclude that the conception ofcitizenship developed above cannot adequately deal with the realities ofsecond-class citizenship. It invites decision-making schemes for admissionthat are impractical and unjust in their outcomes.

EXCLUSION OF APPLICANTS WHO FULFILLTHE REQUIREMENTS

The problem here is one of numbers. Admitting all those applicants whofulfill the requirements would

endanger the continued reproduction ofcitizenship for those who are already in. For instance, this could makedemands on welfare state provisions for citizens too heavy (the total pieis too small to give each the piece that he has a right to as a citizen) orthreaten cultural cohesion and historical identity.

It is not difficult to imagine that there are such limits, but it is verydifficult to know where they are exactly or even roughly located. Manypeople fear that one does not even know when one is entering dangerousterritory near these borders and that one can know where they are located

only after one has unknowingly broken through them and no return ispossible.

Thus, in practice, citizenship in a number of countries is a scarceresource, and supply outstrips demand. To settle this by price informationis not an acceptable practice, except perhaps in Switzerland and on theblackmarket for migration. Allowing citizenship to be a buyable commodityruns counter to the very idea of citizenship. Citizenship is not for saleand is precisely intended to prevent people from having to sell themselves

or their votes.But what are we to do about numbers, about eligible applicants thatcannot all be admitted? What guidance can the conception of citizenshipgive here? Can it help set priorities? If a republic is conceived as aprogram for reproducingg citizens, one can compare costs and benefitsof admitting one or another applicant in this program. Better two cheapnew citizens than one expensive one. I hesitate to write this unpalatableformula down, but do so because it seems less bad than alternatives likea lottery or bribery.

Thus, proximity to local citizenship, both physical and cultural, wouldcount in an applicant's favor. The same holds for having an oikos, a




means of existence. But this is unacceptable. Setting priorities in terms

of proximity to local citizenship thus in fact means changing admissionrequirements altogether and giving priority to the well-bred and wealthy

applicants, priorities that the very conception of modern citizenship in

the welfare state was intended to do away with. I conclude that in the

question of numbers, this conception can give no guidance, except in a

negative way by excluding certain priorities.What about the 'need' of the applicant as a criterion? From the point

of view of citizenship this has no relevance except in an indirect way.

One can argue that the local conception of citizenship is an embodiment

of human rights aspirations and that therefore those whose need consists

in adequate human rights protection should be let in first.

CONCLUSION

A local conception of citizenship as developed above provides guidance

for deciding about the global distribution of local citizenships among

human beings. Or more precisely, it is practicallyavailable and not evidently

useless or unjust in its outcomes. It allows for and incorporates aspirations

for human rights for all and developments toward international coop-eration. The local conception and institutions of liberal democratic cit-

izenship do not sharply conflict with universal convictions and insights

about justice. It seems rather a useful vehicle for the practical realization

of these.On the other hand, I must also conclude that local citizenship as

outlined here may be useful, but it is certainly not enough. It cannot

adequately deal with the realities of second-class citizenship and great

numbers of eligible applicants.

POSTSCRIPT

There is another division between classes of citizens that is becoming

more prominent and that constitutes in a sense a real development of

world citizenship. We witness the emergence of an international business-

class citizenship that is multilingual, multicultural, and migrant. Early

examples of its members are Nazi rocket and nuclear scientists and other

'indispensable' people. Directing elites of modern societies "study at Har-

vard, work on the airplane or with international data banks, spendtheir

vacations in Morocco or the Seychelles. The national passport has changed

its meaning. Except for the United States, of course, it no longer indicates

that one belongs to an autonomous power, but is simply one condition

of having access to the 'cosmopolis' of modern communications and

modern financial (and technological, e.g.) transfers." 2 This new reality

requires new struggles to realize equality between citizens but in no way

diminishes the importance of problems of admission to traditional local

citizenship that are the subject of this paper.

12. Etienne Balibar, "Propositions sur la citoyennet6" (mimeograph), p. 8, also in this

admission to citizenship

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