administrative law and side notes(poli rview)

8/10/2019 Administrative Law and Side Notes(Poli Rview)

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Ang DatingDaan hostEliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against

Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan):

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]

Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] []Yung putang babae[,] ang

gumagana lang doon[,] []yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol

pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G

rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspensionafter a preliminary conference.

Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension

from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB.

HELD:

The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average

child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the USSupreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the

utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of

the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible

to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a

child literally rather than in the context that they were used.

The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible

administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an

order of suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under

its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said

that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of

Ang Dating Daan as a permitwas already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the

indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program. (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636,

April 29, 2009)

Dissenting Opinion:

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a separate dissenting opinion, said that a single government action

could be both a penalty and a prior restraint. The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month

suspension takes such form because it also acts as a restraint to petitioners future speech and thus

deserves a higher scrutiny than the context based approach that the majority applied. In voting to

grant Sorianos petition, the Chief Justice said that in the absenceof proof and reason, he [Soriano]

should not be penalized with a three-month suspension that works as a prior restraint on his speech.


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Moot and Academic Principle; Exceptions. (J. Abad)(Rodolfo Navarro v Exec Sec Ermita)

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts

from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave

violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount

public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principlesto guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Political Review Side Notes

Here are selected February 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:

Constitutional Law

Equal protection; requisites. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of

the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals

as determined according to a valid classification. The testdeveloped by jurisprudence here and

yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first,

third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the

differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of

the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 189698,

February 22, 2010.

Expropriation; private use. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments

power of eminent domainis subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular

public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements

partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to

keep the property expropriated.

Moreparticularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use

the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it

should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to

return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,
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the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for

the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which

the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of

law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to

the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the

property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular

purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the

former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the

amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain

has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Mactan-Cebu International Airport

Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Bernardo Lozada, et al.,G.R. No. 176625,

February 25, 2010.

Gerrymandering; meaning.Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of

representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin

G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined gerrymandering as the

formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate

or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to

comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one

island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It isan unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-

Villaroman. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 180050,

February 10, 2010.

House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET); jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over the

question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and

Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives

that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all

contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of

Representatives. Since party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives

no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their

qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of

the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office

as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
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relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al.

/Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs.House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et al.,G.R. No.

189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February 11, 2010.

Judicial review; requisites. The courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred

by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or

controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have

standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he

has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of

constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of

constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the second requisite

is absent in this case.

Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally

suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by

a favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal

stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the

presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult

constitutional questions.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court

held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,

provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax

measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in

question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental

importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their

prerogatives as legislators.


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Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the

Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that

he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of

such illegal act by public officials. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the

President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.

Judicial review; standing to sue. In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-

Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat Islands raises procedural issues. She contends that petitioners

do not have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of

Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its creation and are without substantial interest

over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she alleges that the petition is moot and academic

because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the

petition should be dismissed.

The contention is without merit.

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount

importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be

relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party

claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws,

even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes

aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in

keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept

themselves within the limits of the Constitution.

Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from

rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. The courts will decide a question

otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et

al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.

Local government; creation of province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local

government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation

of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of

the Constitution.

R.A. No. 9355 (creating the province of Dinagat Islands) is unconstitutional for its failure to comply

with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government

Code. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
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province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is null and void.Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs.

Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.

President; immunity from suit.Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity

from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity

heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of

government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his

co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the

matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the

President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly

clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987

Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency.

And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific

presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. Lourdes D.

Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.

Overbreadth. In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in

the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and

perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes)

outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go

unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be

placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that wouldcure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.

In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain

in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having

arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad

statute.

In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statuteswhich are, at

best, bold predictionscannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State

from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably

within its power and interest to proscribe. Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with

these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through

a total invalidation of the statute itself. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on

Elections,G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.


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Public assembly; modification of permit. In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor of Manila

gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been

heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may

warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,

since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the

standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition

to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a

substantive evil, which blankdenial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the

appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. Intergrated Bar of the

Philippines, represented by its National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs.

Honorable Manila Mayor Jose LitoAtienza,G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010.

Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment

under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the

Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as

provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these

posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but

are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare

assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of

MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-

officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for

Maritime Transport.

Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded

by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MAR INA was merely

an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for

Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a

member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the

MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary

(Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National

Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of

Trade and Industry Secretary.

It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary

capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both

appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions

of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible
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offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,

words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-

B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possess ion and

administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of

the office.

The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of

powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of

the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times

and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution

consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils

sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of

designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing

bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-

owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the

government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for

purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious

causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance

with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft

into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy,

if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and

employment. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,G.R. No.184740, February 11, 2010.

Administrative Law

Proceedings; evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof required

for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,

might conceivably opine otherwise.

In the present case, petitioners Order of May 18, 2004 finding respondent administratively liable for

neglect of duty, which implies the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee

arising from either carelessness or indifference, was adequately established by substantial

evidence. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) vs. Asteria E. Cruzabra,G.R. No. 183507, February 24,

2010.

Election Law

Appointive officials; filing of certificate of candidacy. Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates

Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position,


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including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in

government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his

office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA

9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and

rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned

only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running,

an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of

candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for

another position without forfeiting his seat.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso

in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the

Constitution and does not suffer from overbreadth. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.

Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. (Note: The Supreme Court reconsidered its

earlier decision of December 1, 2009.)

Automation project; validity. The contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint

venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International

Corporation (Smartmatic) is valid. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel R. Butuyan, Romel R. Bagares, et al. vs.

Commission on Elections, represented by Hon. Chaiman Jose Melo, et al., Pete Quirino-Qaudra (Petitioner-

in-intervention) Senate of the Philippines, represented by its President Juan Ponce Enrili (Movant-

Intervenor),G.R. No. 188456, February 10, 2010. (Note: The Supreme Court denied the motion to reconsider

its earlier decision of September 10, 2009.)

Ballot; tampering. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring Peano, based on the

results of the revision of ballots, the winner in the mayoralty contest for the Municipality of Alfonso,

Cavite. The ballots, after proof of tampering, cannot be considered reflective of the will of the people

of Alfonso. Mayor Virgilio P. Varias vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 189078, February 11,

2010.

COMELEC; ballot appreciation.The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en banc

proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining whether

the ballots to be recounted had been kept inviolate. The COMELEC cannot proceed to conduct a

fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof. Sandra Y Eriguel vs.

Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena,G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.

COMELEC; elevation to en banc without division decision. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-

judicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987

Constitution, which reads: SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two

divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election

cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.Allsuch election cases shall be heard and decided in
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division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission

en banc.

It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the

present case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and

en banc only upon motion for reconsideration.

Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency exercising

quasi-judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action is conferred

only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the parties; it

cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties.

Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court, more particularly so in election cases

where the interest involved transcends those of the contending parties.

This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of

discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard

and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-

C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc,

the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as

additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by

Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. Sandra Y

Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena,G.R. No. 190526, February 26,

2010.COMELEC; failure of elections. The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to

enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary

authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote.

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may

declare failure of elections. The COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of

elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election

Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for

the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous

causes.

The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the elections were suspended

before the hour fixed by law due to violence caused by undetermined persons, there was obviously a

failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct.


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The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure of

election (i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions

of fact, which can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of

the parties. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances of

grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. TheCOMELEC, as the

administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and

administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,

referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its findings and conclusions are generally

respected by and conclusive on the Court.

Petitioners allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent COMELEC en banc implies

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other

words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal

hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a

virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not present in

this case, as public respondent issued the COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on

the evidence on record and the law on the matter. Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun vs. Commission on

Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 170365, February 2, 2010.

COMELEC; injunction. If instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a TRO, a court opts to

decide the case on its merits with the result that it also enjoins the same acts covered by its TRO, it

stands to reason that the decision amounts to a grant of preliminary injunction. Such injunction

should be deemed in force pending any appeal from the decision. The view of petitioner Panliliothat execution pending appeal should still continue notwithstanding a decision of the higher court

enjoining such executiondoes not make sense. It will render quite inutile the proceedings before

such court. Mayor Jose Marquez Lisboa Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 184286.

February 26, 2010

COMELEC jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party

leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission

on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the

Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers

responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to

register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its

behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought

before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC

had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for
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certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP

president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to

local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of

the party.Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.

COMELEC; tampered votes.We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the subject returns

to be fatally flawed. In the absence of clearly convincing evidence, the validity of election returns

must be upheld. A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and

consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution and

only upon the most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any plausible explanation, one which is acceptable

to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice

to avoid outright nullification, which results in disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right

of suffrage. As will be discussed shortly, there is a patent lack of basis for the COMELECs findings

that the subject returns were tampered. In disregard of the principle requiring extreme caution

before rejecting election returns, the COMELEC proceeded with undue haste in concluding that the

subject returns were tampered. This is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the subject returns resulting in

the disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the records of this case. The proper procedure

in case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of the election returns is clearly spelled out in

Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening this legal provision, the COMELEC acted with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rose Marie D. Doromal vs. Hernan G.

Biron and Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010.

Disqualification; voter inclusion/exclusion proceedings.Voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the

one hand, essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from

the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show

possession of these qualifications.

On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false

representation of a material fact. The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere

innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidates qualifications for elective

office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate

attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or,

otherwise stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates

qualifications for public office.

In Velasco, the Court rejected Velascos contention that the Comelec improperly ruled on the right to

vote when it cancelled his COC. The Court stated that the Comelec merely relied on or recognized
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the RTCs final and executory decision on the matter of the right to vote in the precinct within its

territorial jurisdiction.

In the present petition, it is Panlaquis turn to proffer the novel interpretation that the RTC properly

cancelled Velascos COC when it ruled on his right to vote. The Court rejects the same.

It is not within the province of the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take

cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no

jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether

there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of ones qualifications for public office. The

finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not translate

into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise

render him ineligible. Mozart P. Panlaqui vs. Commission on Elections and Nardo M. Velasco,G.R. No.

188671, February 24, 2010.

Pre-proclamation controversy; contested returns. It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is

summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies be

promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers (BOC)

will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear

otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.

Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy, Section

20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC.

Compliance with this procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections asquickly as possible.

Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that any candidate

may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned return is

submitted for canvass; the objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing simultaneously

with the oral objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections and opposition, if any, and

summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any party adversely affected by such ruling must

immediately inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling.

After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall

suspend the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of

Appeal; the appeal shall be filed within five days. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC will

make its report to the COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.


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Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where the ERs appear to

have been tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC shall examine the other copies of the

questioned returns and, if the other copies are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, or otherwise

spurious, after having given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that the integrity of the ballot

box and of the ballots therein have been duly preserved, shall order a recount of the votes cast,

prepare a new return which shall be used by the BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the

proclamation of the winner accordingly.

Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely make his objections to the

contested ERs. Themistocles A. Sao, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 182221, February 3,

2010.

Local Government

Succession; sannggunian.Sec. 45(b) of RA 7160 provides for the rule on succession in cases of

permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. The law provides for conditions for the rule of succession

to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian

member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate

of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. Atty. Lucky M. Damasen vs.

Oscar G. Tumamao,G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010.

Public officers

Appointment; submission to Civil Service Commission. The deliberate failure of the appointing authority

(or other responsible officials) to submit respondents appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days

from its issuance did not make her appointment ineffective and incomplete.Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, [t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor

voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. Applying this to the appointment process in the civil service,

unless the appointee himself is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the

CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing

authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to the CSC. While it may be argued

that the submission of respondents appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the

conditions for the approval of respondents appointment, however, deliberately and with bad faith,

the officials responsible for the submission of respondents appointment to the CSC prevented the

fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said condition should be deemed fulfilled.

The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains valid in certain

instances despite non-compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules. Arlin B.

Obiasca vs. Jeane O. Basallote,G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010.
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RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al.versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

February 10, 2010

FACTS:Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule65 to

nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands for being

unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province

of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial Government

of Surigao delNorte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual

income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers

as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610,

The Local Government Code

, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on

1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than

250,000inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers

as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two

or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of

the province.Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a

plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative.With the

approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat

Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued that

exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to

develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations have the forceand effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law.

ISSUE:Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.

RULING: No.

The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The Constitution

requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria, must

all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461

of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion The land area requirement shall notapply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands

The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as it already

conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no

dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing

the said law, the basic law prevails.


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CITY ENGR OF BAGUIO V BANIQUED

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remediesis not an iron-clad rule.37It admits of several

exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled that the doctrine does not apply in cases (1) when the question

raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is

patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;(5) when the claim involved issmall; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the proceeding is

private land; (10) in quo warrantoproceedings; and (11) where the facts show that there was violation

of due process.38

DISTILERIA LIMTUACO V ADBOARD (Copy Post Case)

The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of the Philippines (AdBoard)

to require its clearance prior to commercial advertising and to impose sanctions on its members who

broadcast advertisements without its clearance.

AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 1974[1]

composed of several

national organizations in the advertising industry, including: Advertising Suppliers Association of the

Philippines (ASAP), Association of Accredited Advertising Agencies Philippines (4As), Cinema

Advertising Association of the Philippines (CAAP), IndependentBlocktimers Association of the Philippines

(IBA), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas(KBP), Outer Advertising Association of the Philippines

(OAAP), the Marketing & Opinion Research Society of the Philippines (MORES), Philippine Association of

National Advertisers (PANA) and the Print Media Organization (PRIMO).

Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of PANA.

In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency,

SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a

radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos).

First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e.,to command AdBoard to desist from

requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast

or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance.[6]

Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later on

amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction with

prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as CivilCase No. 04-277.

[4] The Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation

of AdBoard's registration and its dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the functions

of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Movie and Television Review and Classification

Board (MTRCB) by misrepresenting that it has the power to screen, review and approve all radio and

television advertisements. Petitioners seek the nullity ofAdBoard'sCode of Ethics for Advertising and

ACRC Manual of Procedures for Screening and Filing of Complaints andAppeals.[
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Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the

best interest of the service against AdBoard's officers.

On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must

establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person

exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person

has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no

appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[7

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the

law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions

and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the

action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts

or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their

official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer

or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for

the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[8]

The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person

exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.[9]

What is at contest here is the power and

authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and

authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The

definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group

of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individualsor corporations so acting.[10]

GOV FUA V COA(Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies)

FACTS:

o The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247

segregating the sum of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at

P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees.

o

Thereafter, Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President GMA for an authority tothe Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant such bonus.

o Petitioner wrote a letter to the President reiterating said request.

o On said letter, the President then wrote a marginal note reading, NO OBJECTION.
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o The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the Presidents

marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to its officials and

employees.

o However, a post-audit was conducted by Ms. Eufemia C. Jaugan, Audit Team Leader (ATL),

Province of Siquijor, and thereafter, she issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) Nos.2004-011 and 2004-022, respectively.

o In AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022, Ms. Jaugan questioned the legality of the payment of said

bonuses, citing Section 4.1 of Budget Circular No. 2003-7 limiting the grant of Extra Christmas

Bonus to P5,000.00, and Section 325 (a) of the Local Government Code imposing a 55%

limitation on Personal Services expenditures.

o AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster

Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, COA Region VII.

o

Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and issued Notices of Disallowance.

o Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Regional Cluster Director.

o From said denial, petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office

(COA-LAO-Local).

o However, the COA-LAO-Local issued a Decision affirming the Regional Cluster Directors Notice

of Disallowance.

o Aggrieved by the foregoing Decision of the COA-LAO-Local, petitioner filed a Petition

forCertiorari,under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING:Yes.

o By immediately filing the present petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to exhaust the

administrative remedies available to him.

o Rule VI, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA states that: The party

aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper.

o The Commission Proper, which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and

tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the audit,

would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No Objection on


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petitioners letter-request to the President is indeed authentic and tantamount to the required

approval.

o It was absolutely necessary for petitioner to allege in the petition, and adduce evidence to

prove, that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.

o Thus, since petitioner could have appealed the Decision of the Director to the Commission

Proper under the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, he is definitely not entitled to a

writ of certiorari, because there was some other speedy and adequate remedy available to him.

o Petitioner having failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision issued by

the COA-LAO-Local has become final and executory.

o Consequently, the Decision of the COA-LAO-Local can no longer be altered or modified.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Doctrines:

The thrust of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allowadministrati

ve agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within thespecialized areas of

their respective competence.

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense

for it isenough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

Facts:

Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to

complywith government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (

DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA

resolvedthat respondent is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to

reconsider however theLLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to

pay the penalties.

Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on t

o chidepetitioners petition for certiorari aspremature since the law provides for an appeal from

decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy whichshould have first beenexhausted before invoking judicial intervention.

Issue:

Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as

groundswhich exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Held:


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No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The

thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and

discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The

rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution

of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until

the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus available administrative

remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR

Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best,

speculative and presumptuous.The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied

to administrative proceedings, an opportunityto explain ones side, oran

opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process

cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given

the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

Here are selected February 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.

Constitutional Law

Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent. The trial court was correct in declaring that

respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that an employee

who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is

considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case, respondents were placed under

preventive suspension for 90 days from 23 May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After serving the period of

their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents

should have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step increment.The Board of Trustees of the

Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al.G.R. No. 170463, February 2,

2011.

Equal Protection; valid classification. Petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between

municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have

pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material

difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The

SC held that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the mad rush of

municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and the apprehension that before long the country

will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It found that the imposition of the P100 million

average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made as there

was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The

imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to

make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. The SC also found that

substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become

component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this

capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating

economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
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manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit

for cityhood up to the present. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities

of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.G.R.

No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.

Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case, the Mactan Cebu International AirportAuthority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final

decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the

government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had

been closed and abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly established by evidence that the

National Airport Corporation, MCIAAs predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given

assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in

the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held that the government acquires only

such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the

properties. This means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is

expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter ofright, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation

judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of

approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport

project. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed

public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the

government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of

the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the

payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the

purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new

purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if thelatter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it

pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation.Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al.

v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in

his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her

personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al.G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February

9, 2011.

Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on

mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the

parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of interestsearned by the amounts they received as just compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code

providing that if the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the

benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their

respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect

of nature and time.Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu

International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of


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Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of

Philip M. Suico, et al.G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.

Impeachment; narration of facts. Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts

constituting the offenses vis--visher submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. The SC

denied this as that would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes animpeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question, which the Constitution has left

to the sound discretion of the legislature. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives

Committee on Justice, et al.G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.

Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended that she was deprived of due process

since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent

ruled on the sufficiency offormof the complaints. She likewise tacked her contention on Section 3(8),

Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shallpromulgateits rules on impeachment to

effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Whilepromulgationwould seem synonymous to

publication,there is a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must thus be used in the

context in which it is generally understood, that is, to make known.What is generally spoken shall be

generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general

must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. Since the

Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be

understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine

on howto promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to

determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and

publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government howto promulgate

when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The SC observed that

it is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had theConstitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically

as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that publication is

required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment

Rules, which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Ma.

Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.G.R. No. 193459,

February 15, 2011.

Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of

one year. Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from thefilingof the first impeachment

complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days beforethe opening on July 26, 2010 of the

15thCongress. She posited that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint

may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to petitioners claim, the SC found that

the previous case of Francisco v. House of Representativeswas applicable to this case. There the SC held

that the term initiate means to file the complaintandtake initial action on it. It refers to the filing of

the impeachment complaint coupled withCongress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial

action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
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may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing

high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the

same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the

RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international

agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of

sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state

power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual

underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a

reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the

other. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, et al.G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.

International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no

difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the

contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their

powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutionalefficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the

people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory

enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreementbetween the Philippines

and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly

concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea

Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of

national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take

the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national

policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the

form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of theAgreementdoes not fall underany of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered

by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent

rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of

claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be

covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no

hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive

agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the

form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an in

administrative law and side notes(poli rview)

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