admin law cases(48 cases) (1)

8/11/2019 Admin Law Cases(48 Cases) (1)

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G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007

MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MEWAP), represented by itsNational President, DR. RAMON A. SULLA, and MEWAP DOH Central Office Chapter President, DR. GRACELA FIDELAMINA-RAMOS, and PRISCILLA CARILLO, and HERMINIO JAVIER, petitioners,vs.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, (substituting the former Executive Secretary Renato

de Villa), THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL DAYRIT and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF BUDGETAND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN,respondents.

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65475 dated

September 12, 2003 which upheld the validity of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 102, the law Redirecting the Functions

and Operations of the Department of Health. Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999

pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of

1987, and Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of

1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of

Health.

On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening

and Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive

Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and

Management (DBM) as co-chair.

The DBM, on July 8, 2000, issued the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA). On July 17,

2000, the PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 62, entitled "Implementing Executive Order No.

102, Series of 1999 Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health." M.C. No. 62 directed the

rationalization and streamlining of the said Department.

On July 24, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 136, Series of 2000, ordering the

Undersecretary, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau or Service Directors and Program Managers of the Department of

Health to direct all employees under their respective offices to accomplish and submit the Personal InformationSheet due to the approval of the Department of HealthRationalization and Streamlining Plan.

On July 28, 2000, the Secretary of Health again issued Department Circular No. 221, Series of 2000, stating that the

Department will start implementing the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan by a process of selection, placement or

matching of personnel to the approved organizational chart and the list of the approved plantilla items. The Secretary

also issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 94, Series of 2000, which set the implementing guidelines for the

restructuring process on personnel selection and placement, retirement and/or voluntary resignation. A.O. No. 94

outlined the general guidelines for the selection and placement of employees adopting the procedures and standards

set forth in R.A. No. 6656 or the "Rules on Governmental Reorganization," Civil Service Rules and Regulations,

Sections 76 to 78 of the GAA for the Year 2000, and Section 42 of E.O. No. 292.

On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, Series of 2000, viz.:

Pursuant to the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA) approved by the DBM on

8 July 2000 and Memorandum Circular No. 62 issued by the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance

(PCEG) on 17 July 2000, Implementing E.O. 102 dated 24 May 1999, the following approved Placement List of

DOH Personnel is hereby disseminated for your information and guidance.


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All personnel are hereby directed to report to their new assignments on or before 2 October 2000 pending

processing of new appointments, required clearances and other pertinent documents.

All Heads of Office/Unit in the Department of Health are hereby directed to facilitate the implementation of

E.O. 102, to include[,] among others, the transfer or movement of personnel, properties, records and

documents to appropriate office/unit and device other necessary means to minimize disruption of office

functions and delivery of health services.

Appeals, oversights, issues and concerns of personnel related to this Placement List shall be made in writing

using the Appeals Form (available at the Administrative Service) addressed to the Appeals Committee chaired

by Dr. Gerardo Bayugo. All Appeals Forms shall be submitted to the Re-Engineering Secretariat xxx not later

than 18 September 2000.

Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected

employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a complaint, docketed as Civil

Case No. 00-98793, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum No. 157, the

NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing E.O. No. 102.

On May 2, 2001, while the civil case was pending at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22, petitioners filedwith this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners sought to nullify E.O. No. 102

for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as it allegedly violates

certain provisions of E.O. No. 292 and R.A. No. 8522. The petition was referred to the Court of Appeals which

dismissed the same in its assailed Decision. Hence, this appeal where petitioners ask for a re-examination of the

pertinent pronouncements of this Court that uphold the authority of the President to reorganize a department,

bureau or office in the executive department. Petitioners raise the following issues, viz.:

1. Whether Sections 78 and 80 of the General Provision of Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the

General Appropriation[s] Act of 1998[,] empower former President Joseph E. Estrada to reorganize

structurally and functionally the Department of Health.

2. Whether Section 20, Chapter I, title i, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides legal basis in

reorganizing the Department of Health.

(A) Whether Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, has been repealed.

3. Whether the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution to effect a

reorganization of a department under the executive branch.

4. Whether there has been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of

former President Joseph E. Estrada in issuing Executive Order No. 102, Redirecting the functions and

operations of the Department of Health.

5. Whether Executive Order No. 102 is null and void.

We deny the petition.

The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and

statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987

Constitution, viz.:


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Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall

ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

In Canonizado v. Aguirre,we held that reorganization "involves the reductionof personnel, consolidationof offices,or abolitionthereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It alters the existing structure of government

offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. While the power toabolish an office is generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive

branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws, viz.:

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.This

proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is

either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was

created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are

concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office,

or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

The Presidents power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20,

Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization

measures, viz.:

SEC. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such otherpowers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are notspecifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

We explained the nature of the Presidents residual powers under this section in the case of Larin v. ExecutiveSecretary,viz.:

This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the Presidentunder the law. What law then gives himthe power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416.These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize thenational government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolishoffices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardizesalaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearlyprovides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive

issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."

So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.

The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, clearlysupport the Presidents continuing power to reorganize the executive branch, viz.:

1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In

exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government

and responsive national development, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more

efficient, effective, economical and development-oriented governmental framework:


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x x x

b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which are

necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions, services and activities;

c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from one department,

bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another;

d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;

e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;

f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of

the National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions,

and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life,

capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters;

g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this

Decree.

Petitioners argue that the residual powers of the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 refer only

to the Office of the President and not to the departments, bureaus or offices within the executive branch. They

invoke Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the same law, viz.:

Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the

policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing

authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. x x x

The interpretation of petitioners is illogically restrictive and lacks legal basis. The residual powers granted to the

President under Section 20, Title I, Book III are too broad to be construed as having a sole application to the Office ofthe President. As correctly stated by respondents, there is nothing in E.O. No. 292 which provides that the continuing

authority should apply only to the Office of the President.13If such was the intent of the law, the same should have

been expressly stated. To adopt the argument of petitioners would result to two conflicting provisions in one statute.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof

be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting

provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,

apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious

whole.14

In fact, as pointed out by respondents, the Presidents power to reorganize the executive department even finds

further basis under Sections 78 and 80 of R.A. No. 8522, viz.:

Section 78. Organizational Changes Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the

Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be

authorized in their respective organizational structure and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

Section 80. Scaling Down and Phase-out of Activities of Agencies within the Executive Branch The heads of

departments, bureaus, offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which

are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or
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abolished subject to Civil Service rules and regulations. Said activities shall be reported to the Office of the

President through the Department of Budget and Management and to the Chairman, Committee on

Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Chairman, Committee on Finance of the Senate.

Actual scaling down, phase-out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders

issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.

Petitioners contend that Section 78 refers only to changes in "organizational units" or "key positions" in any

department or agency, while Section 80 refers merely to scaling down and phasing out of "activities" within theexecutive department. They argue that neither section authorizes reorganization. Thus, the realignment of the

appropriations to implement the reorganization of the Department of Health under E.O. No. 102 is illegal.

Again, petitioners construction of the law is unduly restrictive. This Court has consistently held in Larinand Buklod ngKawanihang EIIB v. Zamorathat the corresponding pertinent provisions in the GAA in these subject cases authorizethe President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency concerned.

Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of

the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make

bureaucracy more efficient. R.A. No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of

bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is asignificant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;

(b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) whereincumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) wherethere is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform

substantially the same functions as the original offices; and (e)where the removal violates the order of separation.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the President did not commit bad faith in the questioned

reorganization, viz.:

In this particular case, there is no showing that the reorganization undertaking in the [Department of Health]

had violated this requirement, nor [are] there adequate allegations to that effect. It is only alleged that the

petitioners were directly affected by the reorganization ordered under E.O. [No.] 102. Absent is any showingthat bad faith attended the actual implementation of the said presidential issuance.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65475dated September 12, 2003 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEESUNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC., HEALTHALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION,COMMUNITY MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC.,

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG MGAMARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES,EDUARDO P. GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUATA, EDGARDO J. DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTUAND REMEGIO S. MERCADO, Petitioners,vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M.DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN,Respondents.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, promulgated by

the Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform

Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, "Redirecting

the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito

Estrada on 24 May 1999.

Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a

Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)

In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group after a

series of workshops and analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers and technical staff

possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five general areas of reform:

(1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health programs; (3)promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities

of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the

collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The said provision under

the HSRA reads:

Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government hospitals must be allowed to collect socialized user

fees so they can reduce the dependence on direct subsidies from the government. Their critical capacities like

diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities and medical staff capability must be upgraded to effectively exercise fiscal

autonomy. Such investment must be cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by public-private networks.Moreover such capacities will allow government hospitals to supplement priority public health programs.

Appropriate institutional arrangement must be introduced such as allowing them autonomy towards converting

them into government corporations without compromising their social responsibilities. As a result, government

hospitals are expected to be more competitive and responsive to health needs.

Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH, dated 5 January 2001,

entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals


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to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January 2001;" and Administrative Order No. 172

of the DOH, entitled "Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in

Government Health Facilities,"dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot

afford to pay for medicine and medical services.

Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free medicine and

free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void

for being in violation of the following constitutional provisions:

ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any

person be denied the equal protection of the law.

ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of

the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.

ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and

independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,

promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all.

ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their

physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being x x x.

ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and

promote their welfare.

ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall

strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:

x x x x

(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of

neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.

x x x x

ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, takinginto account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable

them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness

among them.


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ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall

endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost. There

shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall

endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled "Redirecting theFunctions and Operations of the Department of Health," which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and

organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being

the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result

of the devolution of basic services to local government units. The provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the

deployment of DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals read:

Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan. In view of the functional and operational redirection in

the DOH, and to effect efficiency and effectiveness in its activities, the Department shall prepare a Rationalization

and Streamlining Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis of the intended changes. The RSP shall contain the following:

a) the specific shift in policy directions, functions, programs and activities/strategies;

b) the structural and organizational shift, stating the specific functions and activities by organizational unit

and the relationship of each units;

c) the staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the existing filled and unfilled positions; and

d) the resource allocation shift, specifying the effects of the streamline set-up on the agency budgetary

allocation and indicating where possible, savings have been generated.

The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department of Budget and Management for approval before the corresponding

shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH Secretary.

Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel. The redeployment of officials and other personnel on the basis of the approved

RSP shall not result in diminution in rank and compensation of existing personnel. It shall take into account all

pertinent Civil Service laws and rules.

Section 6. Funding. The financial resources needed to implement the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan shall be

taken from funds available in the DOH, provided that the total requirements for the implementation of the revised

staffing pattern shall not exceed available funds for Personnel Services.

Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who opt to be separated from the service as a consequence of the

implementation of this Executive Order shall be entitled to the benefits under existing laws. In the case of those who

are not covered by existing laws, they shall be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one month basic salary forevery year of service or proportionate share thereof in addition to the terminal fee benefits to which he/she is

entitled under existing laws.

Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160),

which provided for the devolution to the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific

health-related functions and responsibilities.


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Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH,

should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is

void, having been issued in excess of the Presidents authority.

Moreover, petitioners averred that the implementation of the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in

accordance with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the Department of Budget and Management

(DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative order

to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.

Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P.

Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata and Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity

of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were

suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other

DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.

Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP. Certain employees allegedly suffered

diminution of compensation, while others were supposedly assigned to positions for which they were neither

qualified nor suited. In addition, new employees were purportedly hired by the DOH and appointed to positions for

which they were not qualified, despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on

costs.13 It was also averred that DOH employees were deployed or transferred even during the three-month period

before the national and local elections in May 2001, in violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known

as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers." Petitioners, however, failed to identify the DOH employees referred to

above, much less include them as parties to the petition.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners

failed to show capacity or authority to sign the certification of non-forum shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners

failed to show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal injury sustained or were in

the immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed

out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the reorganization methods were implemented in 2000; and 4)

certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus will not lie where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was

not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for

violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and

Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the

State to protect and promote the peoples right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned

provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can

only provide guidelines for legislation.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners assertion that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the

health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the

development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive Order No. 102, in

accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It also declared that the DOH did not implement

Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of discretion, as alleged by the petitioners, as the DOH

issued Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000, which created the different committees tasked with the

implementation of the RSP, only after both the DBM and Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG)

approved the RSP on 8 July 2000 and 17 July 2000, respectively.
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Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on 26 November

2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 7 March 2005.

Hence, the present petition, where the following issues are raised:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT ANY QUESTION ONTHE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY

AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ARE NOT

JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS

COMPLAINT THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE FILIPINO IS LIKEWISE NOT A

JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER

AND ABOVE THE ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE RAISED IN THE PETITION BELOW.

The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.

Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the

Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income

generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III;

Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly

resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future

legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law

can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically

declared by this Court as non self-executing.

In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as

non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x. These principles in

Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by

the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactmentof laws.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article

II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the

Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay


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down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore,

cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution --

specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-

executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara.

Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection anddue process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of

discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these

constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision

to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.

In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords

recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the

adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children

to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as

non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation24 and Tolentino v.

Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed

to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the

electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon v. National Labor

Relations Commission :

x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights

embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The

espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent

legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent

legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the

Constitution.

The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners bare allegations that it violates the general principles

expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action

to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process and the limitations

of judicial power.

Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President in excess

of his authority. They maintain that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of

legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order No. 102. This line of argument is

without basis.

This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct

the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department.29 This is also sanctioned under the

Constitution, as well as other statutes.

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control of all executive

departments, bureaus and offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the

Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
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SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy in the

Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to

reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the

following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate

offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by

abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as

transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as

transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or agencies.

In Domingo v. Zamora, this Court explained the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority under the

Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the

President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President

to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, itmust be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry

out presidential directives and policies.

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and

the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of

the Administrative Code:

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the Office of the President refer to

those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the

President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy

and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific

department. (Emphasis provided.)

Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term "agency of the government"

as follows:

Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau,

office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit

therein.

Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the Administrative

Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the President.32Indubitably, the DOH is an agency

which is under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the President.Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the President the continued

authority to reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.

The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general appropriations

laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645, the "General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year

1993," already contained a provision stating that:
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Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive Branch.The heads of departments, bureaus

and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the

delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out, or abolished, subject to civil service rules and

regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or

Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. (Emphasis provided.)

Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the

Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized intheir respective organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by this Act.

Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, "The General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999"

(Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and

organizational units in the executive department thus:

Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no

changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective

organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President didnot usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents

constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative

Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.

Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102, particularly the RSP.

However, these contentions are without merit and are insufficient to invalidate the executive order.

The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The facts show otherwise. It was only after

the DBM approved the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action on 8 July 2000, and after the

Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) issued on 17 July 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 62,

approving the RSP, that then DOH Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on 28 July 2000 Department Circular No.

275-C, Series of 2000, creating the different committees to implement the RSP.

Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative order to carry out the

streamlining, but that it failed to do so. Such objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the

DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of the President. The members of the

Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the President since they are merely his alter egos. Thus, their

acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the President,

presumptively acts of the President. Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary were clearly authorized by the

President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the

implementation of the RSP.

Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope,Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata, and Edgardo Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of

Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were suffering

from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH

employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.

In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or departments as valid, for so long as they

are pursued in good faiththat is, for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. On the other


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hand, if the reorganization is done for the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for ill-motivated political

purposes, any abolition of position would be invalid. None of these circumstances are applicable since none of the

petitioners were removed from public service, nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH that would

unquestionably result in their dismissal. The reorganization that was pursued in the present case was made in good

faith. The RSP was clearly designed to improve the efficiency of the department and to implement the provisions of

the Local Government Code on the devolution of health services to local governments. While this Court recognizes

the inconvenience suffered by public servants in their deployment to distant areas, the executive departments

finding of a need to make health services available to these areas and to make delivery of health services moreefficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is well within its

authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.

Without identifying the DOH employees concerned, much less including them as parties to the petition, petitioners

went on identifying several errors in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102. First, they alleged that

unidentified DOH employees suffered from a diminution of compensation by virtue of the provision on Salaries and

Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000, issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:

2. Any employee who was matched to a position with lower salary grade (SG) shall not suffer a reduction in salary

except where his/her current salary is higher than the maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which case

he/she shall be paid the salary corresponding to the maximum step of the SG of the new position. RATA shall no

longer be received, if employee was matched to a Non-Division Chief Position.

Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were entitled to receive

RATA at the time the petition was filed. Nor was it alleged that they suffered any diminution of compensation.

Secondly, it was claimed that certain unnamed DOH employees were matched with unidentified positions for which

they were supposedly neither qualified nor suited. New employees, again unnamed and not included as parties, were

hired by the DOH and appointed to unidentified positions for which they were purportedly not qualified, despite the

fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on costs. Lastly, unspecified DOH employees were

deployed or transferred during the three-month period before the national and local elections in May 2001, in

violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers."

Petitioners allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to pass upon. The personsinvolved are not identified, details of their appointments and transfers such as position, salary grade, and the date

they were appointed - are not given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged violations are not specified.

Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate

Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees concerned

can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any

questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative

Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The

validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at

liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or misabused, and may afford an opportunity for

abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its generalpurpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

In a number of cases, the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the "transcendental

importance" of the constitutional question justified the granting of relief. In spite of these rulings, the Court, in

Domingo v. Carague, dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to show any present substantial interest.

It demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was of transcendental

importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest. Present substantial interest, which will enable


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a party to question the validity of the law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its

enforcement. It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential

interest.

In the same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, ruled

that a citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered

some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly

traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. This case likewisestressed that the rule on constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a

partys substantive claim is without merit. Thus, a partys standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case

or a preliminary estimate thereof. After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners substantive claims, this Court finds that

the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. Nos. 142801-802 July 10, 2001

BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA, BENJAMIN KHO, BENIGNO MANGA, LULUMENDOZA, petitioners,vs.

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA, HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY ARTEMIO

TUQUERO, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents.

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioners Buklod Ng Kawaning EIIB, Cesar Posada,

Remedios Princesa, Benjamin Kho, Benigno Manga and Lulu Mendoza, for themselves and in behalf of others with

whom they share a common or general interest, seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 191 and ExecutiveOrder No. 223on the ground that they were issued by the Office of the President with grave abuse of discretion and

in violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure.

The facts are undisputed:

On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 127 establishing the Economic

Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the Ministry of Finance. The EIIBwas designated to perform the following functions:

"(a)Receive, gather and evaluate intelligence reports and information and evidence on the nature, modesand extent of illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage,

smuggling, tax evasion, and dollar-salting, investigate the same and aid in the prosecution of cases;

(b) Coordinate with external agencies in monitoring the financial and economic activities of persons orentities, whether domestic or foreign, which may adversely affect national financial interest with the goal of

regulating, controlling or preventing said activities;

(c) Provide all intelligence units of operating Bureaus or Offices under the Ministry with the generalframework and guidelines in the conduct of intelligence and investigating works;

(d) Supervise, monitor and coordinate all the intelligence and investigation operations of the operatingBureaus and Offices under the Ministry;

(e) Investigate, hear and file, upon clearance by the Minister, anti-graft and corruption cases againstpersonnel of the Ministry and its constituents units;

(f)Perform such other appropriate functions as may be assigned by the Minister or his deputies."

In a desire to achieve harmony of efforts and to prevent possible conflicts among agencies in the course of their anti-

smuggling operations, President Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 225 on March 17, 1989, providing, amongothers, that the EIIB"shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and

inland waters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs."

Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 entitled

"Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau." Motivated by the fact that "the designated

functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other existing agencies of the government" and that "there is a

need to constantly monitor the overlapping of functions" among these agencies, former President Estrada ordered


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the deactivation of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of

Investigation.

Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 196 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force

"Aduana."

Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No.

223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from theservice effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fidereorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger,

division, or consolidation of positions.

Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before this Court invoking our power of judicial

review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. They anchor their petition on the following arguments:

"A

Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 should be annulled as they are unconstitutional for being violative ofSection 2(3), Article IX-B of the Philippine Constitution and/or for having been issued with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

B.

The abolition of the EIIB is a hoax. Similarly, if Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 are considered to effect areorganization of the EIIB, such reorganization was made in bad faith.

C.

The President has no authority to abolish the EIIB."

Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive orders is: (a) a violation of their right tosecurity of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make the bureaucracy moreefficient but to give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as

that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.

Arguing in behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys the totality of theexecutive power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he has the authority to issue

Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b)the said executive orders were issued in the interest of national economy, toavoid duplicity of work and to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was not "abolished," itwas only "deactivated."

The petition is bereft of merit.

Despite the presence of some procedural flaws in the instant petition, such as, petitioners' disregard of the hierarchy

of courts and the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, we deem it necessary to address the issues. It is in the

interest of the State that questions relating to the status and existence of a public office be settled without delay. We

are not without precedent. In Dario v. Mison, weliberally decreed:

"The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the

standing of certain parties to sue, for two reasons, `[b]ecause of the demands of public interest, including


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the need for stability in the public service,'and because of the serious implications of these cases on theadministration of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants."

At first glance, it seems that the resolution of this case hinges on the question - Does the "deactivation" of EIIB

constitute "abolition" of an office? However, after coming to terms with the prevailing law and jurisprudence, we are

certain that the ultimate queries should be a) Does the President have the authority to reorganize the executivedepartment? and, b) How should the reorganization be carried out?

Surely, there exists a distinction between the words "deactivate" and "abolish." To "deactivate" means to render

inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, while to "abolish" means to do away

with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office

wholly and permanently.15Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation

where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and

abolition are both reorganization measures.

The Solicitor General only invokes the above distinctions on the mistaken assumption that the President has no

power to abolish an office.

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. Thisproceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either

created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the

Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.18

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the

President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office,19or certain laws may

grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.20 The case in point is Larin v. Executive

Secretary.21 In this case, it was argued that there is no law which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In

decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis, thus:

"Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to

reorganize the BIR.

We do not agree.

x x x x x x

Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:

'Sec. 48.Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads ofdepartments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities

which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may bescaled down, phased out or

abolished,subject to civil service rules and regulations. X x x.Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolitionofthe activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the

President.'

Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition"of offices only and doesnot cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing

is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which provides that:


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'Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. -Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the Presidentof the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be

authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act.' (italics

ours)

The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changesincluding the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.

x x x x x x

Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:

'Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other

powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not

specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.' (italic

ours)

This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him

the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416.These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize thenational government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolishoffices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardizesalaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearlyprovides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive

issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees." (Emphasis supplied)

Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order.

In the whereasclause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section

77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999 General Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in

Larin,thus;

"Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of thePhilippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall beauthorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this

Act."

We adhere to the precedentor ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect

organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support

in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and

other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respectivemandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identifyactivities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out

or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization and improved overallperformance of their respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and

productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders

issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to

sustain.


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But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive

branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an

express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the

Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achievesimplicity, economyand efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure ofthe Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to theOffice of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel,

consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. " It takes placewhen there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of

control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.26It

falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President's continuing authority to reorganize.

It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch or

agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In

this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization

is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently,

Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the

removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increasein the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) wherean office isabolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced bythose less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification ofoffices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions

as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

Petitioners claim that the deactivation of EIIB was done in bad faith because four days after its deactivation,

President Estrada created the Task ForceAduana.

We are not convinced.

An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders30shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task Force

Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve theultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB,

its creation does not entail expense to the government.

Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides that the technical,administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who are already in the public service, theybeing employees of other existing agencies. Their tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary, i.e., onlywhen the agency where they belong is called upon to assist the Task Force. Since their employment with the Taskforce is only by way of detail or assignment,they retain their employment with the existing agencies. And shouldthe need for them cease, they would be sent back to the agency concerned.

Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct control and supervisionof the President as base of the government's anti-smuggling campaign. Such a smaller base has the necessary powers1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or office and to use their respective personnel, facilities andresources; and 2)"to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG and ISAFP for assignmentto the Task Force."Obviously, the idea is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existingdepartments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole set of personneland facilities.The EIIB had proven itself burdensome for the government because it maintained separate offices inevery region in the Philippines.


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And thirdly,it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the creation of the Task Force

Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIB's expenses. Tracing from the yearly General Appropriations Act, it

appears that the allotted amount for the EIIB's general administration, support, and operations for the year 1995,

was P128,031,000;31for 1996, P182,156,000; for 1998, P219,889,000;and, for 1999, P238,743,000. Theseamountswere far above the P50,000,000allocation to the Task ForceAduana for the year 2000.

While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we find the latter to have

additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana, being composed of elements from the Presidential Security Group(PSG) and Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), has the essential power to effect searches,

seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance

of any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled

corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did not have this power. And, the

Task Force Aduana has the additional authority to conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was

not expressly granted to the EIIB.1wphi1.nt

Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil Sevice Commission, 37 we

ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute economy

and greater efficiency in its operation.

Lastly, we hold that petitioners' right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our law than

that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no

infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.38In the instructive words laid

down by this Court in Dario v. Mison,39through Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento:

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a

general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make

bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occursbecause the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.Be that as it may, if the 'abolition,' which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political

reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid 'abolition' takes and

whatever 'abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid 'abolition' as where there is merely a changeof nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for

special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.

While we cast a commiserating look upon the plight of all the EIIB employees whose lives perhaps are now torn with

uncertainties, we cannot ignore the unfortunate reality that our government is also battling the impact of a

plummeting economy. Unless the government is given the chance to recuperate by instituting economy and

efficiency in its system, the EIIB will not be the last agency to suffer the impact. We cannot frustrate valid measures

which are designed to rebuild the executive department.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 140423 July 14, 2006

JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA,petitioner,vs.

ALBERTO C. ROA,respondent.

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review is the Resolution dated July 8, 1999 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 53190, dismissing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure thereat filed by the herein petitioner from an adverse resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

The petition is casts against the following factual backdrop:

On November 27, 1996, petitioner, a dentist by profession, filed with the Pasig City Prosecution Office a complaint-

affidavit charging respondent Alberto C. Roa, likewise a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint, docketed in

said office as I.S. No. 96-5442, stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa"

written by respondent and published in the March-April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly

publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the article delved into the possibility of a father, who happened to

be an examiner in a licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the

examinations or the results thereof to enable his children to top the same.

In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is defamatory as it besmirched his honor and

reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board examinations held in May 1994.

Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate report on a matter of

both public and social concern." He averred that the article in question was not written with malice but with a sincere

desire to contribute to the improvement of the integrity of professional examinations.

After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint

in this wise:

The publication being a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, and made without malice, we

find the respondent entitled to the protection of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 of the

Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Acting on the appeal, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo

issued a Resolution (Zuo Resolution), setting aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file

an Information for libel against respondent. Accordingly, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, an Information

for libel was filed against respondent, thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517.

Adversely affected, respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On October 28, 1998, then Justice Secretary

Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuo Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the Information

earlier filed with the RTC. In compliance therewith, a "Motion to Withdraw Information" was accordingly filed incourt by the Pasig City Prosecution Office.

Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Secretary of Justice in his

Resolution of May 12, 1999.

Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 53190.


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As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Resolution dated July 8, 1999, dismissed petitioner's

petition for review. Partly says the CA in its dismissal Resolution:

The Pasig City Prosecution Office and the Department of Justice are not among the quasi-judicial agencies

included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are subject to review by the Court of

Appeals.

The Supreme Court in its Resolution En Banc dated April 8, 1997, approving the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedurein Bar Matter No. 803, did not include final orders or resolutions issued by these agencies as appealable

under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals is therefore not at liberty to supply the omissions in the Rule, that would

constitute an encroachment on the rule making power of the Supreme Court.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its subsequent Resolution of October 14, 1999,

petitioner is now with this Court on his submission that the appellate court erred:

I

XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARE NOT REVIEWABLE BY IT

UNDER RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II

XXX IN FINDING THE PETITION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 [WAS] PREMATURELY FILED.

III

XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ASSAILED IN CA G.R. SP NO.

53190 ARE NOT REVIEWABLE UNDER RULE 65 (sic) OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SINCE THESE

RESOLUTIONS WERE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS POWER OF CONTROL

AND SUPERVISION OVER PROSECUTORS.

IV

XXX IN NOT RESOLVING THE PETITION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 ON THE MERITS.

V

XXX IN NOT REVERSING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN CA G.R. SP NO.

53190 ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

a. RESPONDENT'S APPEAL FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THROUGH THE

CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, DATED JANUARY 22, 1998, WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE.

b. RESPONDENT'S ARTICLE WAS DEFAMATORY.

c. MALICE ATTENDED THE PUBLICATION OF RESPONDENT'S ARTICLE.

d. RESPONDENT'S ARTICLE WAS NOT PROTECTED BY THE MANTLE OF PRIVILEGED MATTER.


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As the Court sees it, the petition commends for its consideration the issue of whether or not a petition for review

under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of

Justice directing the prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case.

It is petitioner's thesis that Rule 43 was intended to apply to all quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial

functions. Upon this premise, petitioner submits that resolutions of the DOJ in the exercise of its quasi-judicial

functions are properly appealable to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43, adding that the quasi-judicial

bodies enumerated under said Rule are not exclusive.

Petitioner's above posture, while valid to a point, will not carry the day for him.

Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies to the CA. Section 1 thereof

provides:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax

Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial

agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission,

Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land

Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarksand Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National

Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government

Service and Insurance System, Employees' Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,

Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry

Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43, albeit any

suggestion that it does not perform quasi-judicial functions may have to be rejected. However, its absence from the

list of agencies me

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