Malaga vs. PenachosGR No. 86995 03 September 1992Cruz, J

Doctrine: Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?

HELD: Yes. The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the

state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality.

First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

De La Llana vs. AlbaG.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982FERNANDO,

FACTS:The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Blg. 169 which reads as follows:

It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon the declaration upon the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been completed), the said courts (meaning the Court of Appeals and all other lower courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office" trenches on all the constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members (Section 7, Article X of the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power of the Supreme Court "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal. " (Section 7, Id.)

ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional?

HELD: B.P. Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions."

This court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts: This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:

SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in Intervention.

Issue/s1.) The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

2.) There is undue delegation of power and authority.

3.) There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

Held: 1.) In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the

flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

2.) Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

3.) We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern.

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.

U.S. vs. Ang Tang HoG.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922Johns, J.

FACTS: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 wherein one of its salient provisions (Sec.1) authorized the Governor-General “for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the

Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor General signed E.O. 53 which fixed the price at which rice should On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against defendant Ang Tang Ho for violation of E.O. 53. It was alleged that defendant, on August 6, 1919, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of P0.80, which is a price greater than that fixed by E.O. 53. Upon said charge, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500.

Defendant interposed an appeal and assailed E.O. 53 as a result of undue delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General since Act 2868 fails to define the basis for E.O. 53 and has left it to the discretion of the Governor-General as to what would constitute an “extraordinary rise in price” in order to the issue and promulgate emergency measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act 2868 is unconstitutional due to undue delegation of legislative power.

RULING OF LOWER COURT: Convicted Ang Tang Ho for Violation of E.O. 53.

RULING OF SUPREME COURT: Act 2868 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

A law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in present, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659DOCTRINES: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

FACTS: President Ferdinand Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A amending Executive Order No. 626. Under the questioned EO. 626-A, “no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao and carabeef transported in violation of this Executive order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of National Meat Instpection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos”

The petitioner transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by police station commander for violation of E0 626-A. Petitioner sued for recovery before RTC by filing supersedeas bond. RTC sustained the confiscation and, since the carabaos could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The Court declined to rule on Constitutionality of EO for lack of authority and for it presumed validity. CA upheld the decision of trial court.

ISSUES:1. WON Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, which gives the President the power to issue decrees not for implementation of laws but in the exercise of his legislative authority.

2. WON the EO 626-A is unconstitutional

HELD:1. The challenged is denominated by executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. Under Amendment No. 6, whenever there existed grave emergency or threat thereof or whenever legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, issue decrees, orders or letters of instructions that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify such exercise, the petitioner has reason to question the validity of the EO. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President “in his judgment” a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time. The Court reserves such resolution on more appropriate occasion.

2. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law, which is to prevent indiscriminate slaughtering thereof, and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge

the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

Also, the EO authorized the seized property “to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos”. The phrase “may see fit” is extremely generous and dangerous. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. Therefore, there was indeed an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 168

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights204SCRA1991December 2, 1991

Facts:Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPTSA) undertook “mass concerted actions” because of the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances.

The teachers, through their representatives, were served with an order of Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days.

Secretary Cariño, rendered dismissal of respondents. MPSTA filed a petition against Cariño but later on dismissed by RTC.

In the meantime, respondents also filed their complaint to the CHR with regard to their suspension and replacements and alleging that they were denied of due process of law. CHR ordered Secretary Cariño to appear before the Commission to enlighten the latter on the issue. Secretary filed a motion saying that CHR lacks cause of action and has no jurisdiction over the case.

CHR ordered that respondents were denied of their due process and their civil and political rights have been violated.

Issue: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

Held: No. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be

decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA GR No. 110120 March 16, 1994

FACTS:

The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.

ISSUES:

1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan? 2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished

• As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides for another forum

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.

Rizal Empire Insurance Corp. and/or Sergio Corpus (PETITIONERS) vs National Labor Relations Commission, Teodorico L. Ruiz, as Labor Arbiter and Rogelio R Coria (RESPONDENTS)G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987

Facts: In August, 1977, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the CLAIMS DEPARTMENT and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month.

In 1980, he was transferred to the UNDERWRITING DEPARTMENT and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the FIRE DEPARTMENT as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an INSPECTOR of the Fire Division with a monthly salary P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences.

Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with backwages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, theinstant petition.

Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.

Held:Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. - Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.

SECTION 6. No extension of period. - No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner- Rizal Empire Group) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1,1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of

time. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry,

FACTS: Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of petitioner’s failure to file another complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner cannot be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional2. Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No.3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.3. Whether or not Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law

RULING OF LOWER COURT:The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so.

Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.

2. No. The true distinction is between the delegations of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.

3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not an amendment but merely supplemental to Tariff Law.

Araneta et al. v. Gatmaitan et al.

Doctrine The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made

Facts: San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region.

Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.

This move was manifested in the resolution of December 18, 1953, passed by the Municipal Mayors' League condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year.

In another resolution dated March 27, 1954, the same League of Municipal Mayor, prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein.

In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order No. 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was amended by Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954, apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines

Sur recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take effect after December 31, 1954.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries, answered the complaint alleging, that the executive orders in question were issued accordance with law; that the encouragement by the Bureau of Fisheries of the use of Otter trawls should not be construed to mean that the general welfare of the public could be disregarded

The lower Court rendered decision on February 2, 1955, the last part of which reads as follows:

The power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters, from the fact that Congress has seen fit to define under what conditions it may be done by the enactment of the sections cited, in the mind of Congress must be of transcendental significance. It is primarily within the fields of legislation not of execution: for it goes far and says who can and who can not fish in definite territorial waters. The court can not accept that Congress had intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate on this matter of national importance. To accept respondents' view would be to sanction the exercise of legislative power by executive decrees. If it is San Miguel Bay now, it may be Davao Gulf tomorrow, and so on. That may be done only by Congress. This being the conclusion, there is hardly need to go any further. Until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation. Thus said Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are declared invalid;

Issue/s (1) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay

(2) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

Ruling(1) Yes. We are of the opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters.

Now, if under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obnoxious for it carries away fish eggs and fry's which should be preserved, can the President of the Philippines exercise that same power and authority?

One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general

supervision and control of the President of the Philippines. Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department".

For the foregoing reasons We do hesitate to declare that Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law.

(2) Yes. In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land.

Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

PEOPLE v. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN DOCTRINE: An administrative agency cannot amend the act of Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

FACTS: In 1969, Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. The five accused resorted to electro fishing.

As legal background, sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Sec. 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not less than P500 nor more than P5,000 and imprisonment of not less than 6 months nor more than 5 years. It is to be noted that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters and providing for a fine of not exceeding P500 or imprisonment of not exceeding 6 months or both. Fisheries Administrative Order 84-1 amended the former by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS: The municipal court dismissed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance affirmed the dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances.

The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

CONTENTION OF THE PROSECUTION: On appeal to the Supreme Court, the prosecution, as legal basis for Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, cites sec. 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than P200, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both."

The Fisheries Law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine mollusca; (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quality of fish caught; and (6) other violations.

ISSUE: Does electro fishing fall under "other violations" of the Fisheries Law, thereby giving the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries authority to issue Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 penalizing electro fishing?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: NO. Electro fishing does not fall under "other violations." Therefore, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. Nowhere in the Fisheries Law is electro fishing specifically punished. Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of "other violations" because the penalty for electro fishing is lower than the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in sec. 76, and is not the same penalty for "other violations" of the law fixed in sec. 83 of the Fisheries Law.

Administrative agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute, otherwise, it would constitute an attempt to legislate.

Administrative regulations issued by a department head in conformity with the law have the force of law. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

In the instant case, the regulation penalizing electro fishing (Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1) is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute.

An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.

Bautista vs JuinioFacts: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."

Issue:1. Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights

2. whether the impounding of the vehicles in violation of the LOI is ultra vires

Held:1. No. the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

2. Yes. While the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.

MACEDA V. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARDG.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991ERNESTO M. MACEDA,petitioner,vs.ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX(Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELLPETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRONCORPORATION,respondents.Nature:

Petition for nullification of the EnergyRegulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated December 5and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow herein petitioner substantial cross-examination, in effect, allegedly,a denial of due process.

Facts:On August 2, 1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990.Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on November 21, 1990. ERB subsequently outlined the procedure as follows:.. it has been traditional and it is the intention of the Board to act on these applications on an industry-wide basis, whether to accept, reject, modify or whatever, the Board will do it on an industry wide basis, so, the best way to have the oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will come later, the cross-examination will come later. .Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.\

Issue:WON the EBR acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Held:Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB whichIn matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that — These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board.However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order .We dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority to grant provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, under Executive Order No.172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to itsfinal disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.

Facts:Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees."

Report recommendation: (1) private schools may increase its total school fees by not more than 15 to 20 per cent. Beyond it, it would be subject to the discretion of DECS; (2) private school may increase its school fees in excess of the ceiling provided it will not exceed P1000 for the school year in elementary and secondary levels and P50 per unit on semestral basis for collegiate level.

DECS, following the report, issued an order authorizing the 15 to 20 per cent increase on school fees.

PCF sought a reconsideration of such order. Ground: increases were too high.

DECS: issued Department Order No. 37, reducing the ceiling to 10 to 15 per cent

PCF still opposed the increase; then sent a telegram to the president urging the suspension of said D.O. (no reply)

PCF filed a petition for prohibition (SC). Grounds: unconstitutional, without any legal basis, violation of due process clause. It also argues that in support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees.

Sec. of DECS: the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary, and that the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in character

Issue: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees.

Held: YES.

Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982: Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system in accordance with declared policy.

SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. — The Minister of Education and Culture, charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function.

Legislative function: the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process.

Quasi-judicial function: prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.

When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

CIR vs CA

FACTS: On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and November 1986, its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, respectively, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. However, the request to cancel the deficiency taxes was denied.

ISSUES: WON private respondent can avail of the tax amnesty

RULING: YES. Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a simple application of its provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986,the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. It might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding the 1986revolution during which time there had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for civil Disobedience, most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be understandable then that those who ultimately took over the reigns of government following the successful revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATIONCORPORATION vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION

Facts:1. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon.

2. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. This is about Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis. No car beyond 6 yrs shall be operated as taxi.

3. Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

4. Cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981..

5. Petitioners filed petition with BOT. Petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. Petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition." Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.

Issues:

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?

B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.

(1) Equal protection of the law;(2) Substantive due process; and(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

Held:

On Procedural and Due Process(3D) Page 11. The leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

2. With regard to the contention of petitioners that fixing the ceiling at 6yrs is arbitrary and oppressive, the Court held that “As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption.

A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.”

Equal Protection Clause

3. Petitioners alleged that the Circular is being enforced only in Metro Manila and solely towards taxi industry. The Court held that the Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is

that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.

4. The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.”

5. As the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

G.R. No. L-9876US VS. PANLILIODoctrine:

The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS: In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, Pampanga; that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to betaken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them. The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD:NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful

are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. Theorders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR Citation : G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006 Ponente : TINGA, J.:

Facts :A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Issue : Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.

Held: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where

what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998

FACTS:On December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" . Petitioner Ople filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking to invalidate the issuance claiming that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue, thus unconstitutional for usurping the legislative powers of Congress

ISSUE: WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the President of legislative power properly belonging to Congress?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:NO.

The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars and general or special orders. An administrative order, like the one under which the new identification system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987 Administrative Code:

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders

The National Computerized Identification Reference System was established pursuant to the aforequoted provision precisely because its principal purpose, as expressly stated in the order, is to provide the people with "the facility to conveniently transact business" with the various government agencies providing basic services. Being the "administrative head," it is unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the government bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which the citizenry constantly transact with, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and National Statistics Office (NSO). The national computerized ID system is one such advancement. To emphasize, the new identification reference system is created to streamline the bureaucracy, cut the red tape and ultimately achieve administrative efficiency.

The project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within the ambit of the Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully carry out his administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers, quoted above.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION vs DE JESUSG.R. No. 157286 June 16, 2006

DOCTRINE: The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.

FACTS: RA 9155, otherwise known as the “Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001” became a law on August 11, 2001 in accordance with Section 27 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under the law, the office of the schools district supervisor shall have no administrative, management, control or supervisory functions over the schools and learning centers within their respective districts but shall be limited to (1) providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster; (2) curricula supervision; and (3) performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.

Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, petitioner PSDSA sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the PH National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the following administrative issues: (1) restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives and position level of Public School District Supervisors; and (2) upgrading of Salary Grade Level of Public Schools District Supervisors from alary Grade Level 19 to Salary Grade 24.

DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus thereafter issued DECS Office Order No. 1 which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9155. PSDSA filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus alleging that the act of the DepEd in removing the petitioners’ administrative supervision over elementary schools and its principals within his/her district and converting his/her administrative function to that of performing staff for the division is a gross violation of RA 9155. Furthermore, petitioners also allege that the IRR of RA 9155 expanded and included provisions which are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the subject law. They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with the existing educational laws. Ultimately, petitioners allege that by the implementation of the IRR they are stripped off of their administrative functions.

ISSUE: Whether DECS Office Order No. 1 issued by DepEd expanded RA 9155 or not.

HELD: NO. It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms to the standards prescribed by law.

Here, the assailed IRR provisions merely reiterated and implemented the related provisions of RA 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.

Administrative supervision means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.”

Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks

Doctrine: the additional electricity cost for common facilities of the apartment building used by the tenants in common is purely civil in character, (involving the conditions of lease between landlord and tenant), to be adjudged under the applicable civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of general jurisdiction and is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent board.

Facts:

Private respondents(Ruiz, Enriquez, and Moses) filed a complaint to the Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia, their landlord, of selling electricity without permit or franchise and billing them for amounts in excess of Meralco rates. Petitioner Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the regulatory board(respondent) contending that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance to their lease contract.(basically contractual in nature ang meron siya sa tenant at pinapasa lang nya yung mga bills) Respondent Board in its re-computation allowed petitioner to charge respondents only the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Power and Waterworks has jurisdiction.

Held: No.The Board of Power and Waterworks has exceeded its jurisdiction. Petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. The complaint by the tenant give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

GLOBE WIRELESS LTD., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ,G.R. No. L-27520 January 21, 1987

FACTS: Petitioner was charged of negligence by Private Respondent Arnaiz for having failed to deliver a message that the latter sent to Maria Diaz of Spain. As per complaint to the Public Service Commission (PSC), Arnaiz sent a message through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in

Dumaguete City. The same was transmitted to the head office in Manila. It was forwarded to Petitioner for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.

Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint and denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee. PSC: Issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS.

ISSUE: Whether or not Public Respondent PSC has jurisdiction, supervision and control over Petitioner.

HELD: NO.Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties.

However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public. Thus,“Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines.”

In administrative law, too basic is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.

Here, the imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the PSC over petitioner. Also, Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise and not under a certificate issued by the PSC. The PSC is empowered to impose

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959 PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION (PLA), petitioner, vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

FACTS:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office (PPO). Respondent Director issued a circular on May 27, 1957 announcing that an examination will be held to determine who will be qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the PPO. Attorneys, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical skills are qualified to take the examination. The Director, prior with the issuance of the circular, has already been holding such examinations.

PLA argued that those who has passed the bar examinations and is duly licensed by the SC to practice law and who is in good standing, is already duly qualified to practice before the PPO and that the

examination requirement, as condition precedent to practice before PPO, is in excess of the Director’s jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. Respondent argued that the prosecution of patent cases does not entirely involve the practice of law, but also includes the application of scientific and technical skills. Also, he contends that Rules of Court does not prohibit the PPO, or any other quasi-judicial body, from requiring further conditions from those who wish to practice before the PPO. He also argues that his action is in accordance with RA 165, or the Patent Law, which similar to the US Patent Law, allows a similar examination as that prescribed by him.

ISSUE/S:W/N the Director is authorized to prescribe such examinations as condition precedent to determine who are qualified to practice before the Patent Office.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: N/A

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: No. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines and to any member of the Bar in good standing may practice law before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. Although transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use of scientific and technical skills, still, all business has to be rendered in accordance of the Patent Law. Much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable. PPO exercises both judicial and quasi-judicial functions. The Director, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. He exercises judicial functions in patent applications involving questions of law as well as questions of fact.

His claim that the Philippine Patent Law, similar to the US counterpart, allows him to prescribe such requirements is untenable. Unlike the US Patent Law which authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require the show of qualifications, the Philippine Patent law is silent on that point.

Thus, lawyers may practice before the patent office since it is a practice of law and PPO being a judicial and quasi-judicial body. administrative fines in cases of violation of or failure to comply with the terms and condition of any certificate, or any orders of the PSC, inter alia. So there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the PSC to violate, neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the latter applicable to Petitioner that it had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.

GUEVARA vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings

HELD: No, Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR

Facts:Respondent National Labor Union sought reconsideration and new trial for the Supreme Court's ruling in favor of the petitioner. Respondent union alleged:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

ISSUE: Can the respondent be granted new trial to present new evidence?

RULING (No lower court ruling discussed in the actual case):

BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE MAIN ISSUE:Nature of the CIR"The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute

arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103."

On administrative due process "In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable"xxxxxx The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character."

Requirements of due process in administrative proceedings:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) "...duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded... that of having something to support it..."

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. Respondent's request for new trial was granted considering that the records of the case showed no sufficient evidence to produce a conclusion of law.

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

Facts: In 1977, PD 1069 or the Philippine Extradition Law was issued by Pres. Marcos. In 1994, RP-US Extradition Treaty was signed in Manila between Phils and USA, and said treaty was concurred by the Senate. In 1999, an extradition request of private respondent was sent by the Secretary of State of the US to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Based on the document, Mark Jimenez was being charged with Conspiracy to commit offense, Attempted tax evasion, Fraud by wire, radio or TV, False statement and Election offense. On the same day, DFA Secretary transmitted the extradition request to the DOJ Secretary for its “technical evaluation and assessment.”

Pending evaluation, private respondent Jimenez wrote a letter to the DOJ requesting to be furnished with the Extradition documents from the US. The DOJ denied the letter request on the ground of confidentiality of documents and for being premature. Note that evaluation by the department of the document is NOT a preliminary investigation nor akin to investigation of criminal cases. The purpose is merely to determine whether the procedures and requirement under the law and treaty have been complied with by the requesting State.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed before the RTC petitions for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition with application for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.

Judge Lantion of RTC Manila issued a TRO in favor of respondent. DOJ Secretary filed before the SC for immediate remedy. SC ordered RTC judge to cease and desist from enforcing the assailed order. Issue on the merits of the case was heard on oral arguments.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING ARE

INDISPENSABLE DURING THE EVALUATION STAGE OF THE EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

HELD: (*2 DECISIONS)

1. On JANUARY 2000, SC through Justice Melo ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. [NOTE THOUGH THAT there was a failure on the DFA to strictly observe the Extradition Law. Under Sec. 5 (1) of said Law, the DOJ Sec. has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers. In this case, it was the DOJ Secretary who made the extradition evaluation when it should be done by the DFA Sec. ] NUANCES. The evaluation process, just like extradition proceedings, is sui generis. It is not criminal investigation, but it is also not merely an exercise of ministerial functions. During the evaluation stage, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall :1. Make technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers b. outrightly deny the request if on its face the documents are incomplete and/o crime indicated is not extraditable and 3. Make a determination W/N the request is politically motivated Hence, this process is investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body’s quasi-judicial power.

The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of opposing party.

REASON FOR RULING IN THE AFFIRMATIVE: 1.The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are criminal. Although the law is silent on whether or not notice and hearing shall be granted to the extraditee , the extradition request pending evaluation creates an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty which is imminent in nature. Because of this possible consequence of arrest, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.

2. This case does not fall in any of the instances when right to notice & hearing may be dispensed with. The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of evaluation proceeding is that on one hand, there is yet no extradite, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause immediate incarceration.

The “accused” faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation stage itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. There is therefore blatant and manifest prejudice to the accused during the evaluation stage. Therefore, it cannot be dispensed with.

3. In case of conflict between international law and municipal law, efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them. In case of irreconcilable difference, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld. In the case at bar, although said rights are granted to extradite after the filing of the extradition petition in court by the DOJ Secretary, the law is silent as to W/N these rights are granted during the evaluation. When the law is silent, we must apply rules of fair play. A libertarian approach is thus called for.

2. In OCTOBER 2000, SC through Justice Puno REVERSED decision issued in January 2000. We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process, for 6 REASONS:

First. P.D. No. 1069[3] which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court. (Art. 6 of the Law)

Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.

Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight.[7] The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,[8] where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."

Fourth, An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.[13] His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.

Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than life."[24] The supposed threat to private respondent’s liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention. BUT THIS IS MORE IMAGINED THAN REAL.

Sixth. To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss.

Abejo vs. De la Cruz G.R. No. L-63558; May 19, 1987

Facts:Case involves a dispute between the principalstockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines, Inc (Pocket Bell) namely spouses Abejos’ and the purchaser, Telectronic Systems, Inc. (Telectronics) of their minorityshareholdings and of shares registered in the name of spouses Bragas’. With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder, holding 56% of the outstanding stocks and voting powers of the corporation on Pocket Bell. Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the corporation, Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to it’s name, and those of its nominees the total 196,000 PocketBell shares in the corporation’s transfer book cancel the surrendered certificates of stocks in its name and those of its nominees. The latter refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim pre-emptive rights over the Abejo shares and that Virginia Braga never transferred her shares her shares to Telectronics but had lost the five stock certificates corresponding those shares. This triggered off the series of intertwined actions between the protagonists, all centered on the question of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Braga’s asserts that the regular civil court has original and exclusive jurisdiction as against the SEC, while Abejos and Teletronics, as new majority share holders, claim the contrary.

Respondent Judge de la Cruz issued an order rescinding the order which dismissed the complaint of the Bragas in the RTC, thus holding that the RTC and not the SEC had jurisdiction. Respondent judge also revived the TRO previously issued restraining Telectronics’ agents or representatives from enforcing the their resolution constituting themselves as the new set of officers of Pocket Bell and from assuming control of the corporation and discharging their functions. The Abejos filed a MR, which motion was duly opposed by the Bragas, which was denied by respondent judge.

Issue: Whether or not SEC has jurisdiction

Held: The Court ruled that the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction and that the SEC correctly ruled in dismissing the Bragas' petition questioning its jurisdiction, that "the issue is not the ownership of shares but rather the non-performance by the corporate Secretary of the ministerial duty of recording transfer of shares of stocks of the corporation of which he is secretary.”

The dispute at bar, as held by the SEC, is an intra-corporate dispute that has arisen between and among the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell due to the refusal of the corporate secretary, backed up by his parents while majority shareholders, to perform his “ministerial duty” to record the transfers of the corporation’s controlling (56%) shares of stock, covered by duly endorsed certificates of stock, in favor of Telectronics as the purchaser thereof.

BERNARDO vs. ABALOS

FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong City and his son, Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998 elections. Petitioners herein interposed that respondents conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort in Quezon Province for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of the said city and who are members of the Board of Election Inspectors therein. The said affair was alleged to be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle was played all throughout and his shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr. also made an offer and a promise then to increase the allowances of the teachers. In this regard, petitioners filed a criminal complaint with the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-buying, further alleging that they conspired with their co-respondents in violating the Omnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Director of the Law Department of the COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due course without the petitioners first submitting a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC.

HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case, it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. As the petitioners then did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant petition was ruled to fail.

Industrial Enterprises vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area." IEI was later on advised that the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which was

already developing the coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC. IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating contract from MMIC to petitioner, with a written confirmation that said contract is valid and effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract from an exploration agreement to a development/production or exploitation contract in IEI's favor.

In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating contract in favor of IEI; ordered the reversion of the two coal blocks covered by the coal operating contract; ordered BED to issue its written affirmation of the coal operating contract and to expeditiously cause the conversion thereof from exploration to development in favor of IEI; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application for a coal operating contract; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application for three more coal blocks; and ordered the payment of damages and rehabilitation expenses

In reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition of the summary judgment was not proper since there were genuine issues in controversy between the parties, and more importantly, that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks

HELD: The BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board (abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked with the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program for the exploration, exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's coal resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all activities relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or through service contracts such exploitation and development, all in the interest of an effective and coordinated development of extracted resources.

If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and

extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.

GSIS vs. CSC

Facts: Salazar was employed by GSIS as a casual laborer on September 23, 1968. She became a permanent employee in the same office on February 28, 1974 with a designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide also under permanent status on December 9, 1975.Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that also on December 9, 1975, she was appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. On August 13, 1982, she was promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when on May 16, 1986, her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminus with the term of the appointing authority. Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17. The said Review Committee referred the petition both to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the Civil Service Commission. On July 22, 1987, the Civil Service Commission, issued Resolution No. 87-230 directing the reinstatement of Salazar. GSIS, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 14, 1987.On the other hand, the Board, acting on the same petition of Salazar referred to it by the Review Committee, issued an Order on March 9, 1988, finding the petition of Salazar for reinstatement, without merit and affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order which was set aside. GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Issue:Whether or not the respondent Civil Service Commission erred in not holding that it was the Merit Systems Board, not said Commission, which had appellate jurisdiction over the subject personal action of termination of services of private respondent?

Held:Sec. 8., (P.D. 1409) Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. — Decisions of the Merit Systems Board (now Merit System Protection Board) involving the removal of officers and employees from the service shall be subject to automatic review by the Civil Service Commission. The Commission shall hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission shall be subject to review on certiorari only by the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. (as amended by D.O. 135 dated February 27, 1987)

When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board

shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power.

The appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17 to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision (Resolution No. 87230) in favor of Salazar dated July 22, 1987 and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are void.

Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such jurisdiction.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte

FACTS: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on June 4,1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be

Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."

On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, et al. filed directly with the Supreme Court a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoking their right to information.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which, is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.

To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls under the exception from exhausting all administrative remedies since it only involves a question of law.

RULING OF LOWER COURT: None.

RULING OF SUPREME COURT: YES, it falls under the exception. The respondent General Manager of GSIS is ordered to allow petitioners to access the documents and records pertinent to said loans granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa. Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved.

The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question.

Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.

Mangubat v. Osmeña –judicial review

Facts:

Mangubat and Mundo, petitioners, were detectives in the Police Department of Cebu City when their services were terminated by City Mayor for lack of trust and confidence. Thereupon, the respondents were appointed to their positions and collected the corresponding compensation. Having failed to secure reinstatement, petitioners filed petitions for quo warranto and mandamus. Subsequently, Mangubat was reinstated but he was not able to collect back salaries. After trial, the court ordered the reinstatement of petitioners and payment of their back salaries. The respondents appealed and questioned the failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issues: Won the petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies

Ruling: It is now well-settled that when, from the very beginning, the action of the Mayor is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive; when there has been no semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when, manifestly, the Mayor has acted without jurisdiction, or has exceeded his jurisdiction , or has committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority, as in the case at bar, the employee adversely affected may forthwith seek the protection of the judicial department.

ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORP. V BOT & SULTAN RENT-A-CAR, INC G.R. No. L-39655 | March 21, 1975 | J. Fernando

Facts:1. Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. Arrow has in his favor a certificate of public convenience (CPN) to operate a public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck service from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa with the use of twenty (20) units.

2. Sultan filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a CPN to operate a similar service on the same line. Eight days later, without the required publication, the Board issued an Order granting it provisional permit to operate.

3. After filing an MR and for the cancellation of such provisional permit filed but without awaiting final action thereon, Arrow filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, alleging that the question involved herein is purely legal and that the issuance of the Order without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.

4. In their answer, the respondents denied the need for publication before a provisional permit can be issued, in light of Presidential Decree No. 101, which authorized respondent Board to grant provisional permits when warranted by compelling circumstances and to proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

Issue: W/N publication is necessary before provisional permits can be granted

Held:No. It is the well-settled doctrine that for a provisional permit, an ex parte hearing suffices. The decisive consideration is the existence of the public need, as shown in this case by the respondent Board. Petition for certiorari dismissed.

KBMPBM vs. Dominguez

In the early morning of October 29, 1988, Mayor Bunye accompanied by heavily armed men, allegedly thru force , violence and intimidation forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners located at the second floor of the KBS Building, purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same, by taking over and assuming the management of KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board of directors for that purpose and excluding and prohibiting the General Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful functions as such.

As claimed by the petitioners, the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere xerox copy. The so-called petition upon which the Order is based appears to be an unverified petition signed, according to Mayor Bunye, by 371 members of the KBMBPM.

Respondents challenged the personality of the petitioners, set-up the defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and assert that the Order was lawfully and validly issued under the above decree and Executive Order. G.R. No. 91927

(more on arraignment of Mayor Bunye and their rights as an accused)

ISSUE: (relevant to Admin Law)

Whether or not the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture was valid.

NO. The Order was not valid.

Petitioners have the personality to file the instant petition and ask, in effect, for their reinstatement as Section 3,Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, defining an action for mandamus, permits a person who has been excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, to file suit. Petitioners, as ousted directors of the KBMBPM, are questioning precisely the act of respondent Secretary in disbanding the board of directors; they then pray that this Court restore them to their prior stations.

As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct. And now on the validity of the assailed Order. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:

An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity to be heard. A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM's bylaws, Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected director or committee member may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly.

Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general assembly. Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.

An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day to day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,

performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them. The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the bylaws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an ongoing audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretary's power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative includes the "milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the election of new officers." Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes the takeover and ouster of incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted. Likewise, even if We grant, for the sake of argument, that said power includes the power to disband the board of directors and remove the officers of the KBMBPM, and that a hearing was not expressly required in the law, still the Order can be validly issued only after giving due process to the affected parties, herein petitioners.

Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution and extends to administrative proceedings. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations this Court, through Justice Laurel, laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, foremost of which is the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof. The need for notice and the opportunity to be heard is the heart of procedural due process, be it in either judicial or administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, a plea of a denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting in an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the aggrieved party himself as when he had the opportunity to be heard on a subsequent motion for reconsideration. This is consistent with the principle that what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of an opportunity to be heard.

In the instant case, there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM; there was, as well, not even a semblance of a hearing. The Order was based solely on an alleged petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM. There was then a clear denial of due process.

National Development Company and DOLE Philippines Inc. (PETITIONERS) vs. Wilfredo Hervilla

Facts: The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and damages filed on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a total area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in-interest of his brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former],filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent Application for the said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant,filed with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted agricultural plants. On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of Candido de Pedro. Counsel of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for theinvestigation of the said lots, to which a report was rendered and an order was issued as to the adjustment of the said title numbers.

The trial court dismissed the action for recovery, to which was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court decision and declared that the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void.. A motion for reconsideration was filed and subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the purpose of submitting original certificate of titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-in-interest by the Bureau of Lands while the case was pending. The two motions were denied. Thus this petition for review on certiorari

Issue: Whether or not the court in a deciding a case involving recovery of possession declare null and void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency of such case?

Held: In the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question(in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana,in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at bar, the petitioners possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the Director of Lands.

Defendants' possession of the lands disputed, for purposes of the free patents, has been confirmed in the administrative case. The administrative branch of the government has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed Into finality. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of possession is lost. Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners'predecessor-in-interest.

Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer interfere with such decision. The decision of the Appellate court is reversed and set aside.

Atlas Minning vs. Factoran

Facts: On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10, 1973, private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973, Atlas registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the same Mining Recorder. Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post. During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.

After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, giving respondent (Buqueron) given preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the areas covered by his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims, except the area covered thereby which is in conflict with adverse claimant's (Atlas) "Master VII Fr." Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural, the decision of the Director of Mines was set aside. On further appeal, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.

Issue:(1) Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Office of the President was time-barred;(2) Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims.

Held:(1) It is not disputed that private respondent received a copy of the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources dated November 10, 1978 on November 27, 1978 and that under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the decision of the Minister is appealable to the Office of the President within five (5) days from receipt thereof. In the case at bar, the 5-day period expired on December 2, 1978, a Saturday, private respondent filed his appeal on December 4, 1978, a Monday.

Petitioner and private respondent are in accord on the fact that at the time of the filing of the questioned appeal, Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the Office of the President pursuant to Section 29 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended.

The same law provides: Section 31. Pretermission of holiday. — Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.

Coming back to the case at bar, as the next working day after December 2,1978 was December 4, 1978 — a Monday, it is evident that private respondent's appeal was filed on time.

(2) It is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984]).

In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines' decision was supported by substantial evidence.However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said findings because of the open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues which warrant appellate review.

This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of

fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.

A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.

CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DOCTRINE: As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

FACTS: Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINENATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990, seeking this Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary restraining order. In the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.

HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.

HEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS, INC. vs. IAC

DOCTRINE: In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers, or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. (HEVR) was incorporated by the late Eufrocino Roxas and his seven children. Its articles of incorporation include, among others, the purpose of operation of Hidden Valley Springs Resort. Eufrocino Roxas was Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of HEVR. Upon his death, his son Eriberto succeeded as President.

Private respondents are the heirs of Eriberto Roxas. The latter and his family had been exclusively operating the restaurant and liquor concession at the resort under an "Agreement" executed between Eufrocino Roxas, as President of HEVR, and Eriberto Roxas, in his behalf and that of his family. Upon Eriberto's death, his son Guillermo Roxas took over all the corporate duties and assumed the authority of his father pertaining to the resort. Guillermo continued the operations of the restaurant and liquor concession incorporated under the name Hidden Valley Agri-Business and Restaurant, Inc. (HVABR).

When HEVR held a stockholders' and Board of Directors' meeting, the treasurer reported that the resort's financial difficulty was due to the fact that the biggest profit center, the restaurant therein, was not managed and operated by HEVR itself and that the concession fee paid by private respondents was not enough to pay for the interest and amortizations on the loan secured by HEVR to upgrade the restaurant and kitchen facilities. Hence, the Board passed a Resolution authorizing the President to notify HVABR of its intent to take over the operation of the restaurant, and if the latter refuses or fails to vacate the premises within 30 days, to close the resort for an indefinite period of time to prevent further losses to the corporation.

Private respondents consequently filed an action to prevent the closure of the resort and the unilateral termination by the HEVR of the concession agreement. Petitioners, in their answer, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, the declaration of the nullity of the concession agreement, and for an order requiring private respondents to vacate and surrender the restaurant premises. The RTC dismissed the complaint but the IAC granted a temporary restraining order against HEVR. Aggrieved, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court (GR No. 67195).

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) denied a previous petition by the HVABR to increase food and beverage prices at the resort restaurant, finding that HVABR was operating the restaurant and liquor facilities of the resort without the requisite MOT license.

In the meantime, HEVR entered into a contract of lease with Valley Resort Corporation, whereby the latter leased the Hidden Valley Springs Resort, including the subject restaurant premises, for a term of 10 years. Such lease was approved by the MOT. Doing business under the name and style of MJB Food and Services (MJBFS), Guillermo Roxas obtained a license from the Department of Tourism (DOT) to operate the restaurant at the Hidden Valley Springs Resort. HEVR contested the issuance of the license alleging that Guillermo Roxas was not authorized to possess and operate the restaurant. The DOT refused to reconsider the issuance of the license hence, HEVR filed the herein second petition (GR No. 78618).

Prior to the filing of the second petition, a mayor's permit to engage in the restaurant business was issued to Guillermo Roxas/MJBFS despite protests by the HEVR. Thus, HEVR filed a complaint for injunction which was dismissed by the RTC. HEVR's subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Consequently, HEVR filed a third petition (GR Nos. 78619-20) in this Court.

ISSUE: Did public respondent DOT Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and, therefore with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the issuance of restaurant license in favor MJBFS?

HELD:YES. Public respondent undeniably had knowledge prior to the issuance of the license to Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS that the subject restaurant was owned by petitioner and presently leased to Valley Resort Corporation, and that Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS' right to possess and operate the restaurant was the subject of a pending litigation. MOT records show that the department was aware of the controversy between petitioner and Guillermo Roxas, et. al., who were then doing business under the name HVABR, regarding the restaurant and liquor concession at the resort.

In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

In fine, the Court holds that it was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion on the part of public respondent to have issued, and thereafter to have refused to revoke, the restaurant license in favor of Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS knowing that: (1) the latter was not the owner of the restaurant for which the license was sought; (2) the latter's right to posses the same was being disputed by no less than the petitioner as restaurant owner; and, (3) the subject restaurant was already leased to Valley Resort Corporation pursuant to a contract of lease approved by the department.

Public respondent's action, which contravenes the acceptable standards of justice and reason, is indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Industrial Power Sales vs Sinsuat

Facts: In April of 1965 two (2) Invitations to Bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply Coordination of the Department of General Services.The first, dated April 6, 1965, called for 'eight (8) units TRUCKS, Line Construction, left-hand drive, complete and special factory built, series of 1965, brand new, for the use of the Bureau of Telecommunications pursuant to Requisition No. 18792 dated March 9, 1965." The Invitation to Bid as well as the requisition itself contained a proviso limiting the offers to foreign made products on a CIF basis, Port of Manila.

The second, dated April 29, 1965, amended the first notice on the basis of suggestions contained in letters of Industrial Power Sales, Inc. sent on April 7 and 13, 1965, which were evidently found worth considering. Those letters proposed that the invitation to include local manufacture on an FOB Manila basis. Concerning this, Acting Undersecretary of Public Works & Communications Lachica addressed a 3rd Indorsement to the Director of Supply Coordination, dated April 22, 1965. Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc. and Delta Motor Corporation, hereafter respectively referred to simply as IPSI and DELTA. Letter-Order No. B-207495 was drawn up in IPSI's favor, dated June 10, 1965 and signed by the acting Director of Supply, Conrado L. Ledda.DELTA protested the award to IPSI on the ground that the trucks offered by IPSI were not factory built, as stipulated in the specifications contained in the requisition itself and in the Invitation to Bid. the Director ruled that the bidding had been made in strict compliance with the technical specifications and requirements stated by the Bureau of Telecommunications as modified and that after due deliberation on the different bids received, the Committee on Awards, with the concurrence of the requisitioner's duly authorized representatives, had resolved to award the contract in IPSI's favor.

However, Acting Undersecretary Lachica tried to reverse himself it having been "found out that the requisition as approved by the Secretary calls for special factory built, Line Construction Trucks, and not merely utility trucks." The reply of the Acting Director of Supply dated July 27,1965 however reiterated and reaffirmed the conclusions in his Decision of June 23, 1965.Delta filed with the Office of the Secretary of General Services a letter of protest against the proposed award to IPSI. In Secretary Sinsuat's view, when Acting Director Lachica agreed to announce and advertise a supplemental or amended Invitation to Bid which would admit offers of trucks with locally manufactured utility bodies," the latter had violated a department rule 13 that—Any subsequent alteration or modification made separately or on the requisition itself by any subordinate official should bear the approval of the Department Head concerned, pursuant to Section 2048 of the Revised Administrative Code, or of the Undersecretary if so delegated.Sinsuat asserted that as there was no showing that Undersecretary Lachica had been authorized to approve any modifications of the requisition, the modification sanctioned by him in his aforesaid 3rd Indorsement of April 22, 1965 was null and voidIPSI lost no time in appealing from Secretary Sinsuat's decision to award the purchase contract to DELTA. It appealed on September 9, 1965 to the Office of the President as well as to the Office of the Auditor General. Judgment was in favor of DELTA. IPSI then filed with the Q.C. CFI on September 21, 1965, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. CFI ruled against IPSI. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the respondent Secretary had gravely abused his dicretion in granting the award of the contract to DELTA

Held: Yes. The respondent secretary ignored circumstance of estoppel as regards DELTA. For DELTA, with full knowledge of the amendment of the notice to bidders (making acceptable bids for truly with locally manufactured bodies, or FOB-Manila) made no protest at all but, on the contrary, participated in the bidding under said advertised terms, objecting thereto only after its bid had been rejected by the

Committee on Awards and the other Government offices concerned.The plea made in behalf of respondent Secretary that IPSI had gone to Court without first exhausting all administrative remedies cannot be sustained in view of the doctrine which states that: "Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review through the extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of administrative officers or agencies: first, that before said actions may be entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all the administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second, that the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative remedies, these being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."

National Development Company Vs Collector of Customs

FACTS The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on board an unmanifested cargo consisting of one television set, and respondent Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the operator of the vessel and the latter answered stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be manifested. The operator requested an investigation and hearing but respondent finding the operator’s explanation not satisfactory imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,000.00, ordering said fine to be paid within 48 hours from receipt, with a threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued if the fine will not be paid.

NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for certiorari before the CFI of Manila against the respondent. Respondent contended that petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.

ISSUE Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.

HELD The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector committed grave abuse of discretion because petitioner NDC was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set involved is not a cargo that needs to be manifested. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the administrative superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is undisputed that the respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process.