VI. Adjudicatory Powers

A. Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone

Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,

an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-

2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no

jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call

cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and

Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular

is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition

against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular

will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by

unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call

cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers

and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed

that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum

Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was

pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners

were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to

assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is

assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation

issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-

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legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon

the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules

issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the

constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the

Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a

law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,

order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the

regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which

includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action

the validity of the acts of the political departments.26 Judicialx power

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an

administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory

power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which

the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the

standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the

same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power

when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an

executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such

manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance

of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out

their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are

required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold

hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis

for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

2

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary

school. As the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the

Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned

at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its

graduating class. With the school Principal, as chairman, and the members

of the committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia

Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,

respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May

21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro

Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel,

sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by

instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of

Cotabato, committee members along with the District Supervisor and the

Academic Supervisor of the place.

Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”

"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of

teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to the real

grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere

commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by

means of certiorari.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS? It is difficult, if not

impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and

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there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in

connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. it is clear,

however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the

office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is

the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that

the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in

which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient

if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making

their decision, whatever may be their public character.

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are

administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The

exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or

administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial

duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may

be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what

the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter

in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and

undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.

Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. VS. Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA

433

Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a

"Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas

Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the

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year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and

registered with the OIC.

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel

B. Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of

gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand

letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these

demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to

terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required

90-day written notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5

of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."

Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts,

OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision

stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of

petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the

existence of such right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous

trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable

time from receipt of the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to

petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a

reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.

Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide

contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

Held: the OIC has no jurisdiction. The contentions of petitioner are well-

founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no

express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and

decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil

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company. It is of course a well-settled principle of administrative law that

unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like respondent

OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.

As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):

" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative

boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment

and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions,

but in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that

would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be

limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection

with, the performance of administrative duties which do not amount to

conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts."

B. Distinguished from judicial power

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the

Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of

Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass

concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from

the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had

time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them

they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the

protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without

disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the

granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of

Education. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the

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mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to

return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing

the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against

those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to

heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private

respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's

report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also

preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.

807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was

consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807."

Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction,

adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and

determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights

violation involving civil or political rights.

Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no

such power.

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission

the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil

and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on

complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules

of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite

for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any

investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity

from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of

documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the

truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office,

or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its

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investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its

findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes)

as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. "x x 'It may be said

generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law

is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in

controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and

undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely

the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the

merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA

162

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank

(LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees

(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining

Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April

1994, on promotion.

Held: It is to be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary

arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the

original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. The state of

our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award

or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory

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after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or

decision by the parties," while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the

Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission

by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such

decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is an express mode of

appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent

with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

What’s the ruling?

C. Distinguished from administrative function

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the

President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar

salting" activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants against

certain companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants

under the 1973 Constitution?

Held: the court ruled that PADS was not granted by law to issue a warrant

of arrest. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of

government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects

the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making

It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to

determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the

proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become

executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's

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organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential

Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant

to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and

execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the

vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign

exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of

such activities, but nothing more.

Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to

prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds.

Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force

to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in

the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG

under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was charged with the

task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of illgotten wealth or

unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate

family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the

investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may

assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent a repetition of

the same in the future.

Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary

investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without

violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law,

and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and

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corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco,

Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held: the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, like the

courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1)

sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is

indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and receivership, there

exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order,

freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest

it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured

under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations

promulgated by the PCGG.

The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may be

divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the

criminal investigation stage is the fact finding inquiring which is usually

conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence

and interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they

find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary

investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of

the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is

ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.

It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a prosecutor and

judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the

complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with

impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as

a public prosecutor.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be

promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary

investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for

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intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the

Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary

jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary

investigation and take appropriate action.

Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80

Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio

Sarenas and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right

to the use of the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes.

The claim of Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of

his father constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was

afterwards interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war,

but again reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two

Sarenas' contention is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it

appears that they made application to the Director of Public Works, only to

meet with the opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works,

with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications,

granted the two Sarenas the right, in preference to all other persons, to

use the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to

the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was

entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of Sideco and confirming

the decision of the administrative authorities, with the costs against the

plaintiff.

The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the

correctness of the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its

judgment.

Issue: WON the Director of public works has jurisdiction over the case?

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Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use

of waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies

must be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications

through the Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary

thereon is final "unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court

within. thirty days after the date of the notification of the parties of said

decision. In case of such appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the

controversy de novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive method is also provided,

somewhat akin to our cadastral system, which makes it the duty of the

Director of Public Works to make a technical examination of streams and

to prepare a list of priorities. In the performance of this work, the Director of

Public Works or any official especially authorized by him, may examine

witnesses under oath, and can issue for this purpose subpoenas and

subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the

Secretary of Commerce and Communications are then granted each

appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director

of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce and

Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the

property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of the

date of the publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)

DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF

JUDICIAL RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works,

affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, containing

as it does the technical findings of officers especially qualified in irrigation

engineering, should invariably be made a part of the judicial record

because (1) the determination of these officials would be most useful to the

courts, and (2) the exact date of the decision is of moment since it decides

whether the appeal was taken in time.

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Ocampo vs US 234 US 91

D. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No.

105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those

applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.

The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or

the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or

any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the

like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the

aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately

preceding every examination day including the examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the

sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure

examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all

others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction

with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against

respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned

resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

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Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No.

105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure

examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the

examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or

preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be

refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes

and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination

day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch.

What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of

such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel

should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers

should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners

should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be

suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent

commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all

means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate

means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

E. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-

judicial power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268

Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville

Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private

respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been

completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the

subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he

filed a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in

15

the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case was set for initial

hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and

decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The

motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending that it had

jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as

"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides

that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to

regulate the real estate trade and business.

P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the

National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement

of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction

of the agency as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real

estate trade and business and in addition to its powers

provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National

Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

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B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by

subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project

owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and

statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or

condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,

broker or salesman.

This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is

justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly

and competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

F. Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six

(6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly

been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies

and materials. Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the

Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal

because affected without formal charges having been filed or an

opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of

the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS

appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution, the Commission

ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the

SC and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a modification that it

eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome of the

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investigation and reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two

had died. The heirs of the deceased sought execution of the order from the

CSC which was granted. GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari

contending that the CSC does not have any power to execute its resolution

or judgment.

Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.

Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections

and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by

the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the

civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear

and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or

brought to it on appeal.

The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779

adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on

administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority

granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are

analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in

the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by

the Commission. In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory

provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission

the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions,

resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising

through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide

cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has

been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of

adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,

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should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of

authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless

the law otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation

of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then

pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the

binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and

purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a

condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an

impossible performance or decree a useless exercise.

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner,

Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and

prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking

further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another

respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the

National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of

Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Electoral

Commission.

Issue : WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the

election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation

of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

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Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within

which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule

of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,

every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the

performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional

Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further

constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing

protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power

to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive

powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by

necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral

Commission.

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a

Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas

trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local

match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with

the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree

plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on

entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against

importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A.

J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches

from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more

containers of matches from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary

Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural Resources and

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Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available

softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable

price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for

injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order

against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the

latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the

Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC

moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import

ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the

exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner

to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to

enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting

the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an

administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court

from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . .

. the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question

which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the

question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring

the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative

tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a

uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the

regulatory statute administered.

21

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative

boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and

capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or

essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse

of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . .

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164

Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Bañez offered to sell to petitioner

Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent

corporation. Private respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation

fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the consideration in case they

reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to

the petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying

the reservation fee, the respondent corporation changed the terms of

monthly amortization which resulted in the demand of the petitioner for the

return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the same and

petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money.

Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of

the RTC to hear the case. The same was denied and respondents

appealed to the CA who decided in their favor. Petitioner argues that

inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the parties, the

claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction

of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.

Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.

Ratio : The RTC has no jurisdiction. Under Presidential Decree No. 1344,

the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving

22

refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit

buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said

provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one

that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be

understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money. Under the

circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as

one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said powers have

since been transferred to the HLRB.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein

provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving

refund filed against project owners, developers, and dealers, among

others.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial

functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its

specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said

administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this

case the action for refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed

purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction

over the case.

Cariño vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely

the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the

merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case

No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even

23

if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings

against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,

their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More

particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the

question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by

the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted

by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those

actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and

return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of

Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations

warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the

grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts

done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly

be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of

the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary

powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the

appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

G. Classification of adjudicatory powers

2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers of

public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the

revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and awards

under;

3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or

authorization;

24

1. Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or

relax a general prohibition, or authority to relieve from

affirmative duty. The licensing power sets or assumes a

standard, while the dispensing power sanctions a deviation

from a standard;

2. Summary powers. To designate administrative power to

apply compulsion or force against person or property to

effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to

authorize such action;

3. Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having

power to determine the law upon a particular state of facts has

the right to and must consider and make proper application of

the rules of equity.

VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836

Facts :

Issue :

Ruling :

Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390

25

Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which

required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic

was surprised for she was not aware of any case filed against her. When

she appeared at the date, time and place stated in the subpoena, she was

berated by the respondent and demanded 8K from her. Said amount was

the amount of the life insurance policy of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said

subpoena was issued upon request by Generosa Sandagan who sought

the help of respondent because she could not get a share of the proceeds

of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose beneficiary was

Caamic.

Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.

Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under

Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed

to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial

of an action, or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the

Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the subpoena he

caused to be issued purports to be in a form for criminal cases pending in

his court, it was not, in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for

any other pending case in his court nor for any investigation he was

competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this Court. It was

designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative conference. That

purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of his

administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a

confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for

the latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which

was received by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in

respondent's court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's

26

court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for

respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible

compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and

absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to

his official functions and duties, accommodating the request and using his

official functions and office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick,

improper.

In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the

questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded

his full rights of redress.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104

Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair

competition in the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of

some of private respondents’ witnesses, they requested the court for a

subpoena duces tecum as regards to the books of herein petitioner.

Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it can only be

regarded as a “fishing bill” to discover evidence against herein petitioner

and that such is not applicable in a case for unfair competition. The trial

court denied the same.

Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case

for unfair competition.

Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and

damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of

27

a trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of

defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a

part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair

competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity

to account for and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which

charges as trustee with the profits acquired by the wrongful use of the

property of the cestui que trust, and defendant's profits are regarded as an

equitable measure of the compensation plaintiff should receive for the past

harm suffered by him.

in order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it

must appear. by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document

sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the

issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document

containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may

be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court may be

quashed upon motion if the issuance therof is unreasonable and

oppressive, or the relevancy of the books. documents or things does not

appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to

advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.

In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the

subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the

complaint of private respondent for unfair competition.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

28

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged

with several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3

boxes without the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its

Resolution. After appearing and showing cause why they should not be

punished for contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for

imprisonment and imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review

with the SC.

Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his

acts.

Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot

exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is

inherently judicial in nature. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged

a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the

case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated

in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and

administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power

to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in

connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission,

although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of

the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative

body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as

controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.

29

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is

essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the

enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,

consequently, in the, administration of justice.

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary

incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has

been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony.

And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of

its administrative function has been held invalid.

VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt

People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX. Power to impose penalties

Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762

Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's

Department Store situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned

and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang.

Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed

charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that

she was dismissed by them because of her membership in the National

Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said employers had been

30

questioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and

had interfered with their right to organize under the law.

The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was

dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious

disrespect to the management and her co employees so much so that

several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila

who, after investigation, filed the corresponding information’s against her

and the same are now pending trial in court.

The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller and impose

fine against the petitioner.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the

penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.

Ruling: This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It

may be contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court

of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal

cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this would be

tantamount to amending the law which is not within the province of the

judicial branch of our Government.

In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the

penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in

ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations,

notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a)

of said Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial court in so far as it

imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.

31

The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial

Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those

constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among

other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in

courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and

intention of this Act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members

and Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to

ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without

regard to technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that

"the Court shall not be bound solely by the evidence presented during the

hearing but may avail itself of all other means such as (but not limited to)

ocular inspections and questioning of well-informed persons which results

must be made a part of the record". All-this means that an accused may

be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be

convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not beyond

reasonable doubt.

CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524

X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

I. Jurisdiction

A. Definition

People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600

32

Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He

filed an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his

criminal liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an

opposition to said petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448

of the Penal Code and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature

amending said article, he concluded that the marriage of the accused with

the offended party cannot extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime

of abuse against chastity.

Issue: Whether or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of

abuse against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is

extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended party.

Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was

that the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should

extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and

rape and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as

frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and

logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must

be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes.

Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it

is only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in

every other respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore

conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of

rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, the

marriage of the accused with the offended party in the present case has

extinguished his criminal liability.

33

B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing quasi-

judicial acts

Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of

Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the

absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the

Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.

The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino

Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales.

Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to

respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,**

protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its

mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was

conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the

election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989

and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be

presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local

Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was

denied by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us,

petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null

and void.

34

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to

entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the

Federation of Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the

respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or

not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in nullifying the election?

Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction

to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.

There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules

and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.

"(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department

objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;"

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly

empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers. The

jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the

provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it

upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their

determinations."

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even

by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local

Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect

involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the

constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the

President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has

no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the

officers of the katipunan.

35

To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the

law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local

government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic

and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic

component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest

autonomy may be achieved.

I. Procedure to be followed

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A.

Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner

as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having

received the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office.

Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion

of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,

and praying, among other things, that said respondent be declared elected

member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that

the election of said position be nullified.

36

Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of

its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against

the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous

confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of

the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if

it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that

power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of

that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction

upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. If

we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said

body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut

off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which

protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be

ineffective.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei

the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests

intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction

that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular

power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the

other is also included. The incidental power to promulgate such rules

necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of

the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have

been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

37

B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30 –lourdes

C. Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337

Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of

employment of publics respondents. The arbitration’s decision is appealed

to the NLRC. Public respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of

the NLRC’s decision on the ground that the NLRC erroneously, patently

and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its

Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.

In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following

reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio

and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent

petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent

Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission

are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were

rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.

Issue: WON publics respondents’ claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due

process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules

which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just,

expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. The decision of

the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and

38

set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch,

Iligan City for further proceedings.

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by

technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to

justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to

technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules

of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem

just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not

be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties

to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order

or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary

or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further

industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this

legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by

the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed

legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial

Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural

requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before

it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements

of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision

of the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch

VI, which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48

39

dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then

Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said

respondent to his former position as policeman of the same municipality

with back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his

actual reinstatement.

Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent

Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police

Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without

stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case.

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling

short of the legal requirements of due process, because it decided the

subject administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not

taken by the Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in

error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators

shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for office

personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take

note of the proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is

merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle

that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in

order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,

speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and

defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be

present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are

heard and gven the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence.

D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

40

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738

Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of

its powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock

transfer agency (FIDELITY).

The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition

for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting

aside the decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of

the certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY

and CUALOPING.

Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both

regulatory and adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities,

the SEC may pass upon applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after

due notice and hearing), certificates of registration of corporations,

partnerships and associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners'

associations, and labor unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances;

conduct inspections; and impose fines or other penalties for violations of

the Revised Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and directives of

the SEC, such as may be warranted.

The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly

replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof

in the names of the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's

adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who have been deprived of their

certificates of stock or the persons to whom the forged certificates have

ultimately been transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to

initiate, if minded, an appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable

controversy such as can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive

jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right by a proper party

41

against another who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties that can

bring the controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its

original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who

are adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of

stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such

proceedings having initiated, would be precipitat.

The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a

P50,000 fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely

different matter. This time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC which is

involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter set aside the

fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its instant petition, can no

longer be deemed just a nominal party but a real party in interest sufficient

to pursuant appeals to this Court.

Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876

Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257

First Phil. Int’l Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259

R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826

Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493

E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction

Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675

Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704

F. Pre-trial conference; default

Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110

G. Hearing

42

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160

Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278

Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396

Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700

H. Evidence

Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505

1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557

2. Clear and convincing evidence

Black’s Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227

3. Preponderance of evidence

New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266

4. Substantial evidence

Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28

Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380

I. Decision

Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

1. Form of decision

Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273

Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616

Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

2. Publication of decisions

Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

3. Finality, promulgation and notice of decision

Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

43

Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354

Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25

Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349

Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548

4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid

Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445

Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515

5. Finality of decisions

Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987

Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7

Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607

Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666

6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata

Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812

Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497

Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963

Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429

J. Administrative appeal in contested cases

Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965

PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560

Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283

De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584

Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22

Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92

Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261

Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673

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K. Execution

Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235

II. Due process of law in administrative adjudication

A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined

Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160

Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948

B. Cardinal primary requirements of due process

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256

Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489

C. Necessity for notice and hearing

Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers’ Association vs Premiere Productions,

Inc., G.R. No. L-5621, 25 March 1953

Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437

Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447

D. Cold neutrality of a judge

Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261

E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due

process

Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34

RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420

Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103

F. Notice and hearing, when dispensed with

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1. Where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like

the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, the preventive

suspension of public servant facing administrative charges;

Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536

Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595

Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action;

where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right

to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the

person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the

property of a delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a

temporary appointee;

Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but

the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921

Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767

G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing

Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46

H. Motion for reconsideration as a cure

Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278

i. Right to counsel, not a due process requirement

Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125

III. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

A. Definition and objective

Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies

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Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220

C. Effect of doctrine

Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327

Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176

Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463

Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139

D. When doctrine does not apply

Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260

IV. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

A. Definition and purpose

Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344

Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657

Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132

B. Effect of failure to exhaust remedies

De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438

Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530

C. When applied

Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952

D. Exceptions to the doctrine

Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482

Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802

Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167

Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works

8 SCRA 179

Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794

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Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151

Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92

Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796

Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553

Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210

Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116

Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338

Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623

Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490

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