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SOMALIA OPERATIONS&Lessons Learned

DTICELECTE fmA 7.1995

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SOMALIAOPERATIONS:

," Lessons Learned

Kenneth Alard

Natkmnal D~efmee Univrsity PressFt. McNafr, Wauhingbon, DC

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A

National Defense Unio-=ty Prea Publicatoks"To increase general knowledge and Inform discussion, theIns Utute for National Strategic Studies. through its publicationarrn the NDU Press. publishes McNalr Papers: proceedings ofUnlvevsity- and Institute-sponsored symposia: books relatingto U.S. naticnal security, especially to issues of Joint. com-bined, or coalition warfare, peacekeeping operations, andnational strategy: and a variety of briefer works designed tocirculate contemporary comment and offer alternatives tocurrent policy. The Press occasionally publishes out-of-printdefense classics. historical works, and other especially timelyor clstingulshed writing on national se'-urity.

Opinions. conclusions, and recommiendations expressed orImplied within are solely those of the authors, and do notrlea_ýc represent the views of the National DefenseUtnerslty. the Department of Defense. or any other U.S.Covenment agency Clcred ior pub'Ac release: distributionunlimited,

Portions of thist book may be quoted or reprinted withoutpermission. prolded that a standard seurce credit Line isIncluded. NDU Press wvould appreclite a couiltev copy ofreprints or revlews.

tng Office 0 lnformau )512- 1800.or e Superinte dentof ments. U. entPrinting Office. Washngt . C 20402.

First printing. January 1995

S ent o umenta. Sto SSOP

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Dedlcation

T'his book Is respec~ful~y dedicated to the ftmoowres& qfMasterSeguit GcryL.Gordon mdS6agnt First Cjas.3

~. <~ 9 RundaL D. ShughaI. United St.'4e Armj uiw uwekdIled, in action on October 3. 1993 in Mogadisht4Somdio. For "onispicuous galwUmvy and intrqptdty arthe risk qf (It* above and belond the ccdl Qfd&AV uhlledefending Uteir ernbcittled. Task Fbree Rwtge comradeas.these soldiers urre posthumousLU cauwdel the Medd qf

* ~Honor on M~ij 23. 1994.

Greaier love naiCr nio masn dhlSP, [Ils,

that a man lay down his life for his Mrends.

John 15:13

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Conaten

Fam word..............................Ix

"" L TH OPE;RA1)NAL CONhI1rI .......... 3

The U.N. and Peace Operations ......... 3Jcint Doctrine .......................The Effects of the Operational

Environment ..................... 9Situations and Missions ............. 13

* IL OPE1A'IONAL LESSONS LARED .... 21planing ........... I................

Mandates and Missions ........... 22Mi•siui Analysis: Entry andExit Strategies .................. 27Multinational Conflict . ........... 31Rules of Engagement ............ 34Personnel Selection an. ! Ti-aning .... 37-Joint Planning .................. .10

Deplipywn~at.........................-3Airlift ........................Sealift ....................... 0Pre-positioned Shipping ........... 68

Administrative Requirements ........ ACas•tuct of Opexva•mn .............. 53

Command and Contrcl ............ 54Mission Execution ............... 60

: 1x

696

Civil-Military Operations ........... 64Negotiations ............ ....... 6UinteUigence .................... 72

Support ........................... 74Communications and Intermperability . 75In-Country Logistics .............. 81Medical ....................... 82M edia ......................... 83

M.l CON=IIumou ................... 87

Appendlz • Selected Bibliography ........ 97Apendix B: Humanitarian Relief

OrganJzations Active in Somalia ....... 103Appendix C: Missions and Tasks of the

UNITAF Civil-Military Operations Center(CMOC) ......................... 107

About the Author ................. 111

x.,, • • • •. . •,.• ..

Fr.eword

The American mission in Somalia prese.nted U.S.forces with a variety of difficult operationalchallenges as they tried to bring peace to a countryravaged by natural and man-made d'isasters. AfterInitial success In the summer of .992 in restoringorder and saving thousands of lives. Americansoldiers dashed with SomaU forces and werewithdrawn in the spring of 1994. In the monthsthat followed, we have studied what the Somaliacxpcrlericc can teach us about peace m !sslons andlearned how we might improve our capabilitesacross the spectrum of Joint operations.

This book represents the first tlitýe a newtool-the Joint Universal Lessons LearnedSvytem-Is heln imsed to evaluate an operation Inits totality. With it. Colonel Kenneth Allardassesses the operation from Its early stages ofhumanitarian relief through the de facto combat ofpeace enforcement. He has organized the lessonslearned for ease of reading and enlivened them withnumerous concrete and anecdotal examples.Although focused on the operational level, the

,. Insights of this study should be of Interest tostrategists and policymakers as well.

Lessons are only truly learned when weincorporate them into our planning, doctrine.tactics, and training-a process which can takesome time. The author has taken the essential firststep by Identifying and articulating the hard

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lessons of Somalia with candor and objectivity.But even as we resolve not to repeat mistakes, weshould not allow the tragic events in the latterstages of our Somalia operations to obscure themany things we did right. These too are lessons.ones to build upon as we prepare to meet furtherchallenges in the complex wozld of peace

operations.

ERVIN J. ROKKELieutentant General, U.S. Air ForcePresident. National Defense University

xli

Aeknowle ends

This study reflects In large measure the activesponsorship and encouragement of Major GeneralStephen Silvasy, Jr.. USA. Director for Operational

. .. .' "--Plans & Interoperability (J-7) of the Joint Staff.Grateful thanks are extended to him and his staff.

At National Defense University, similar thanksare due to the Director of the Institute for NationalStrategic Studies (JNSS), Dr. Hans BinnendlIk, andMajor General John Sewall. USA (Ret.) for-theirleadership and support for this project. LieutenantColonel Susan Flores. USMC. and Dr. WilliamLewis, both of INSS. provided indispensable hqp bytheir hard work thro- Shout the project as Wellasby their many helpiu' suggestions as the draftstnok shape. Dr. Ired Kilev. Director of the National

Defense University Press, and his colleague Mr.George Maerz managed all aspects of thepublication process with character!stlcprofessionalism. Mr. Don Barry, Mr. AlexContreras, Ms. Rhonda Gross, and Mr. JuanMedrano of the NDU Graphics Department broughttheir unique talents to the design of the cover andthe illustrations contained in this publication. Ms.The,'esa Chapman of the NDU Library and Mr. JimPeters of JFQ provided helpful bibliographic andtechnical support.

Special thanks are also due to the followingpeople who reviewed the draft and provided manyhelpful suggestions: Ambassador Robert Oakley;

X""i

Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston. USMC:Lieutenant General Thomas M. Montgomery. USA:Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni. USMC: MajorGeneral Fiank Libutti. USMC. Colonel Carl Farris.Lieutenant: Colonel Sam Butler and ProfessorKenneth Menkhaus of the U.S. Army PeacekeepingInstitute; Colonel F.M. Lorenz. USMC: Colonel GaryAnderson. USMC: Colonel Thomas Leney. USA:

" " • j• .• :"Colonel Robert Klliebrew. USA: and Lieutenant". I Colonel(P) Eric T. Olson. USA. Additionally. Mr. Bill

Dawson of the U.S. Central Command and Ms.Joani Schaefer of the U.S. TransportationCommand provided many useful insights into thekey roles played by their respective organizationsduring the Somalia operations.

While sincere thanks are due all these people,errors of fact and interpretation are. of course. thesole responsibility of the author.

xdir'•. " -,4: • '•,••;•'-. -.,.• .'* ,. ,

Prefcee

Mult1laterd pee opatLons ar Wi tan mpartentcomponett qf our stOI@ From trvdiftonaLpexekeepng to pame eakc~ront. ,nultgatl pow*

~ ~* ~operatons~ are sorenutm the bint uxV~ to prow--.contain, or resoLve norjfcts that could othe',4 bejfrmore costdi and demxls

The President's National Security StrategyJuly 1994

If today you are a soldier, a sailor, an airman. or amarine, then you know in some very personal waysthat the world is a changed and changing place.Far from ushering in an era of peace. our victory inthe Cold War was quickly followed by combat inOperaUonb Just Cause and Dcscrt Storm. Andeven as our Armed Forces were being reauced fromCold War lcvels. they were oeing committed to anew class of military missions, called peaceoperations, in Somalia. in parts of the formirYugoslavia. and (at this writing) in Haiti.

Peace c perations are unique because they areconducted with the increasing involvement of the

S.international cummunity. usually with mandatesfrom the United Nations and sometimes with theUnited States as the lead parner in coalitionsdrawn from a number of different nations. Thbsepartnerships can create some real challenges on allsides. bitt there are two Important advantages for

Sxv

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the United States to keep in mind. First, we clearlybenefit when other nations help shoulder theburden. Second. the voice of the internationalcommurdty is Important-just look at the impact ofworld opinion in building the diverse coalition withwhich we stood during the Gulf War. The bottomline is that our ability to build and support

-. ~ u. mt hn~atcna! ccahtl'X~ns is now an• Importm-At partof our national security strategy in the post-ColdWar world.

The significance of this strategic turning pointhas. for the last 2 years, prompted the NationalDefense University to study peace operations aspart of its mission of extensive research andteaching on national security issues: this book Isone of the products of that program. With thecooperation of the Joint Staff, a team at theNational Defense University's Institute for NationalStrategic Studies examined reports on U.S.operations in Somalia filed in the Joint UniversalLessons Learned System (JULLS). in an ellort toreikte them to Joint doctrinal principles as well asother research on this ,ubjec'.t The emphasisthroughout this effort has been to focus on themost Important lessons at the operational level.pmarily those whiclh might be encountered at thejoint task force plamning level or at theheadquarters of its major force components.Because this level is the one that ties together thestrategic and the tactical. some of those lessons arerelevant here as well. but to help bound theproblem. those insights are usually presented aseither causes ox effects.

What makes the Somalia experience important

Xv.

for U.S. Armed Forces is that it was an operationthat went through three distinct phases:

* An airlift that provided food relief andmedical supplies to a multitude of sick. starvingpeople

* An Intervention force that combinedcontinued humanitarian assistance activities "Athmilitary operations meant to provide better security

• f ,L• .' Ifor relief efforts"* A military force that provided the bulk of the

combat power for the first "peace enforcement"operation in the history of the United Nations.

In addition to underlining the complexity ofpeace operations, these three distinct" phases showthat. as the level of conflict intensified, some thingschanged more than others. The specific missionelements examined here also provide a soberingglimpse of the challenges imposed by a country inchaos, where the effects of a harsh naturalenvironment were made even more severe by clanwarlare and Lhe dbstece of govcrnmcnt.

As its title implies. this book examines certainoperational Issucs raised by our recent experiencein Somalia. especially those involving theteamwork required by Joint forces. It is an tnttkalouk at those operational issues-not acomprehensive history either of U.S. Involvement inSomalia or even of the key functional areas it"examines. It Is best described as a composite after-"action revlew-a preliminary look at the operation'smajor insights based on the best data currentlyavailable. Where relevant, these insights have beencompared to more detailed analyses of variousphases of the operation, such as those on

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UNOSOM II prepared by the Center for ArmyLessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth. KS, and theUnited States Forces Somalia ,fter Action Report(Montgomery Report) now being readied forpublication by the Army Peacekeeping Institute atthe U.S. Arny War College.

Because "lessons learned" often tend to reflectwhat went wrong rather than what went. right. itmight be possible to think that these operationswere less than successful: this is simply not thecase. Although they did not carry out the moreambitious goals of U.N.-sponsored nation-building.U.S. forces sent to Somalia dearly dtdexecute theirmissions successfully, relieing untold sufferingthrough humanitarian assistance and executingtheir miltary responsibilities with skill andprofessionalism. In fact, those skills and can-doattitudes were especially important in overcomingthe effects of many of the problems cited here.Those who too!' such initiatives and provided the..wurk-arouunds" houid be Lhe iirsL LO appreclatethe importance of learning from their experiences.

A final caveat Is that Somalia was a missionthat occurred under unique circumstances. Futureoperations under differient circumstances will likelyproduce different results. Common sense suggeststhat the lessons offered here should be balancedagainst changing mission requirements andconditions. Future missions, however, are likely tocontain enough parallels-of failed state-i and thehardships brought about by natural and man-made disasters-that the lessons learned InSomalia warrant close attention.

xvill*'.,,•-*' 4 ,' A.

NamUI. A list of relevant Natianal Defense University

publications is at appendix A. Unless otherwise noted.all direct quotations used in this handbook are takenfrcm. reporta on Somalia operations Mied in the JointUniversal Lessons Learned data base.

Id

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SOMALIA OPERATONS:rLernnu Leam"e

l. THE OPERATIONALCONTEXT

Pcxekeepung Lsn't a soale-'sJob, but onlU a 9dcn do i. 'Miltary Sociologlit Charles Moskos

The U.No uad Peeme A@pe1L IasAt the end of World War It. the United States 4

helped to found the United Nations and was one ofthe original signers of the U.N. Charter. Amongother provisions, the Charter contains twoimportant sections to help its members "malntalnInternational peace and security." Although theCharter never uses the word. Lhe generic term forthese measures Is peacelcoteng, the kinds ofobserver or truce supcrvisory missions thatoccurredafter a conflict, when combatants wantedto have the benefit of a trusted thlir p'ary to act-asa buffer. Traditionally, these misslons have beenknown as "Chapter VI actionri," because thatsection of the Charter deals with the peaceful"settlement of international disputes. However.Chapter VII contains the term pace erforcement,referring to military Intervention authorized by theU.N. Security Council- blockades. enforcement ofsanctions. forceful disarmament, and directmilitary action. These categories haven't always fit

3

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4 SOMALIA OPLRATIONS: LESSONS LOARNED

situations that seemed to go beyond peacekeepingbut stopped short of actual combat, so an informalterm. "Chapter Six-and-a-Half," emerged todescribe such activities as conflict prevention,demobilization, cantonment of weapons. andactions taken to guarantoe freedom of movementwithin a country. Mostly because of Cold War

, "': rivalries, only 13 U.N. peacekeeping operationswere approved between 1945 and 1987. With thewinding down of the Cold War, however. 13 newones (not including the peace enforcementor•'ratlon in Somalia) were approved between 1987and 1992. There Is another important figure thatwill come as no surprise to anyone who has everstepped in to break up a barracks fight-duringthis same time. more than 800 peacekeepers from43 countries have been killed while serving underthe U.N. flag.

There Is no doubt that the increasing number ofpeace operations has strained the ability of theTJnlted Nations to manage them effactively.Because it deals more with diplomacy than withcontrol of military operations. U.N. headquarters inNew York maintains a relatively small civilIan staffto oversee peacekeeping operations. Anotherindependent staff agency has traditionally handledall administrative matters, including logistics. Untilrecently, the organization also lacked an operationscenter capable of maintaining 24-hour communi-cations with these worldwide deployments. Notevery peacekeeping operation takes place underU.N. control, but those that do have no standardorganization or staff struct..re for field operations.However. they all answer to the U.N. Secretary

' .

THE OPERA.IONAL ComaW=C 5

General and may be headed either by his SpecialRepresentaUve or by a force commniander wnnm hehas selected. Because the United Nations alsolacks standard doctrine, tactics, and equipment.command and coa trol is a problem for all but smalloperations in generally peaceful environments.

Problems encountered with the U.N. structureV' . *• 'j durang our operations in Somalia (Inlcuding some

of those discussed below) contributed to aPresidential Directive in May 1994 pledging US.support for reforms in the plnmning, logistics, andcommand and control of United Nations-sponsoredpeace operations. Because these reforms will takeLime to be agreed upon and implemented. It isespecially Important to note that the Directive alsolaid down two basfc principles for the future:

9 Although the President will never relinquishconmmandof U.S. forces, he dues have the authorityto place American soldiers under the operationaLcontrol of a foreign commander when doing soserves our national Interests. The terms commandand operattonal control are defined and discussedin chapter tIr--farnacti that situation has occurredon many occasions In our military history, from theRevolutionary War to Desert Swrm..)

* The larger the peace operation, and tue-greter the likelihood of combat, the less likely it isthat the United States will agree to surrenderoperatonal control of Its forces to a U.N.commander. Participation of U.S. forces inoperations likely to involve combat should beconducted under the operational control of theUnited States, an ad hoc coalition, or a competentregional security organization such as NATO.

.,- =

6 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Joint DoetrineBecause they are often a central focus ointernational attention. peace operations have aunique ability to combine the tactical. theoperational, and the strategic levels of war. Asingle unwise tactical move by a soldier on patrol

. can Instantly change the character of an entire"operation and. when broadcast by the ever-presentmedia pool. can also affect strategic considerations.In these and other circumstances, the Jointperspective Is the beginning of wisdom, with Jointdoctrine providing the "playbook" that allows ourArmed Forces to function more cffcctively as ateam. Although American forces began theiroperations in Somalia without the benefit of astandard peacekeeping doctrine, that experiencesuggests that the followintg Joint doctrinalnubltcatlons are especially relevant for futuremissions:

* The most fundamental principles by whichwe organize and operate are outlined in Joint Pub0-2. UnVf ed Aaf'on Armed Forces (UNAAF). This

* 'key publication provides basic doctrine and policygoverningJoint operations, especially command andcontrol and the formation of Joint task forces.* Another helpful tool in Joint force plmnirng IsJoint Pub 5-00.2. Joint Task Force PManningGuidance and Procedures. Its practicaldiscussions and detailed checklists are designed toassist commanders and planners In translati.vgJoint policy and doctrine into operational declslmrom,especially on short-notice contingency operations.

* Issued during our operations in Somalia.

- 4 %9II

THE OPERATIONAL CONTEX 7

Joint Pub 3-0. Doc(Arne for Joint Operations,outlines the fundamental principles and conceptsfor joint and multinational operations and providesthe basis for unit training prior to deployment.Most importantly, it specifies the followingprinciples as guidelines for military units inoperations other than war-

S. "., jObjectv A clearly defined and attainableobjective--with a precise understanding of whatconstitutes success-Is critical when the UnitedStates is involved in operations other than war.Military commanders should also understand whatspecific conditions could result in missiontermination as well as those that yicld failure.

Unity of e. TMhe principle of unity ofcommand in war is difficult to attain in operationsother than war. In these operations, othergovernment agencies may often have the lead, with.nongovprnmental organlzalons and humanltarlanrelief organizations playing Important roles as well.Command arrangements may often be only looselydefined and many times will not involve commandauthorIt7 -as we trr- the military customarilyunderstand it. Commanders must seek anatmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives byunity of effort.

Semczy. Nothing about peace operationschanges the moral and legal responsibility ofcommanders at every level to take whatever actionsare required to protect their forces from any threat.Inherent in this responsibility is the need to becapable of a rapid transition from normaloperations to combat whenever the need arises.However. what makes this responslbility especially

8 SOMAUA OPERATONS: LESSONS IL4RNED

challenging in peace operations is the balance Ciatioust be struck with "restraint."

Nestmint. Because the restoration of peacerather than a clearly defined military victory Is thebasic objective of these operations. military forcemust be applied with great caution and foresight.The restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of

SX% "violence that characterize this environment must77" be clearly understood by each individual service

member. Rules of engagement (ROE) are standardmilitary procedures, but In peace operations, theywill often be more restrictive, detailed, andsensitive to political concerns than in war: theymay also change frequently.

P="VWWnog Peace operations may requireyears to achieve the desired effects because theunderlying causes of confrontation and conflictrarely have a clear beginning or a decisiveresolution. Although this Is a principle often tied todebates about U.S. long-term commitments, Itsoperational application is that commanders mustbalance their desire to attain objectives quicklywith - sensitivity for the long-term strategic alms

Sthat may Impose some limitations on operations.Ia - y, Legitimacy Is a function of effe tive

contrl over territory. the consent of the governed.and compliance with. certain internationalstandards.. Each of these factors governs theactions not only of governments but also ofpeacekeepers-whose presence in a countrydepends on the perception that there Is a legitimatereason for them to be there. During operationswhere a government does not exist, peacekeepersmust avoid actions that would effectively confer

TiE OPERATIONAL COmwcr 9

legitimacy on one individual or organization at theexpense of another. Because every mfl1tary movewill inevitably affect the local political situation.peacekeepers must learn how to conductoperations without appearing to take sides ininternal disputes between competing factions.

* Another joint doctrinal publication. JointPub 3-07.3. Joint Tacttcs. Techniques. ndPProceduresfor Per ekePpIng Opertern., Identifiescertain personal qualities that need to be instilledat all levels during training for peace operations.Those individual qualities are: patience. flexibility.self-discipline, professionalism. Impartiality. tactand inquisitiveness. The common factor in all thesequalities is quality Itself: the quality of the soldierIs fundamental to everything wi do--e#speclally inthe demanding environment of peace operations.

If there Is a common though unstated thread.unning through these joint doctrinal principles. Itis that diplomatic, military, and humanitarianactions must be closely integrated In any peaceoperation. When correctly planned and executed.each of these actions should reinforce the other:well-conceived humanitarian actions, for example.will win friends among the local populace in a waythat will Improve the security situation and makemilitary tasks easier. With the benefit of hindsight.It is possible to see that operations In Somalia weresuccessful when they recognized this trinity ofdiplomatic, military, and humanitarian actions--and remarkably less so when they did not.


The Effeect of the rperadonulEnvironmentThe difficulties of geography. transportation, andpolitical conditions combined to pose operatingchallenges for American forces in Somalia.

Geogaphy. As shown by figure 1. the country, .i is located on a geographical feature known as the

Horn of Africa on the northeastern coast of thatcontinent. The region's remoteness fromestablished U.S. operating facililtes-24 hours byair and several weeks by sea from the UnitedStates-was further complicated by the country'ssize, a land mass of almost 250 million squaremiles, nearly the size of New England. The terrainlooks much like the low desert regions of theAmerican southwest-dry with sparse vegetationand an annual rainfall of less than 20 inches. Thedrought that has plagued East Aflca for much ofthe last decade has been especially severe inSomalia. with food and water supplies scarze or. insome areas, nonexistent. Consequently.peacekeepers were forced to bring with them most,if not all. of what they would eat and drink.

G ofthadam. The limited. 2.600-kmnetwork of paved roads runs mostly among themain coastal cities of Mogadlshu. Merca. FJsmayo.and Berbera: however, this network had fallen intodisrepair. Interior roads are mostly unpaved, andgrading and other maintenance are haphazard.Mogadlshu has tne country's main internationalairport. although there are seven other pavedairstrips throughout the country. Cleared airstripsin the back country are the only other

• .o" '" "-

THE OPERATIONAL COwnTEX

FI(GUM1,EI Smoall

Gulf of AdenDJIEBO

U.S. and SomaMaFlelol Sin


complement to the limited air transportationnetwork. Somalia has a long coastline, but harborfacilties are either undeveloped or have fallen intodisrepair. Mogadlshu. Klsmayo, and Berbera haveonly limited cargo handling facilities. Becausewidespread civil unrest made normal maintenance.Lnd repair impossible. there was no functioningteiephone system in Somalia. The combined effects"of these factors made mobility and communication3consistent problems for peace operations-especially when measured against the need to helpfeed thousands of starving people.

The .frehter PVr FRANKIUN J. PHULJPS pugs into

Ktsnm,. dellverlng -supplies and jbod stuffs in supportof Operation Restore Hope.

Pa icaL Although drought conditions wereprttially responsible for this situation, civil waA, had

'* t

THE OPERATIONAL CONTxT 13

devastated this already threatened country. Since1988. this civil war has centered around more than14 clans and factions that make up Somali society,all of which fought for control of their own territory.Their culture stresses the idea of "me and my clanagainst all outsiders." with alliances between clansbeing only temporary conveniences. Guns andaggressiveness. including the willingness to acceptcasualties, are intrinsic parts of this culture, withwomen and children considered part of the clan'sorder of battle. Because the area was for more thana decade a focal point for Cold War rivalries. largeamounts of Individual and heavy weapons foundtheir way from government control to clanarmories. After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in1991. the political situation deteriorated, with theclans in the northern part of the country trying tosecede. With drought conditions worseningeverywhere. clan wartare and banditry gradualyspread throughout Somalia. By early 1992. theseconditions brought about a famine of Biblicalproportions: more than one-haVmfUon Somalishad perished nf 4;tqrvRtIon And at least a millionmore were threatened. Somalia had become ageographical expression rather than a country-butwhatever It was called, the scale of the humansuffering there had now captured the attention ofthe international community.

Situations and M oinsU.S. involvement In Somalia proceeded throughthree stages: Operation Prot•de ReW ahumanitarian assistance mission: Operation

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14 SOMALZA OPERATIONS: LEMONS LEARNED

Restore Hope, an operation that combinedhumanitarian assistance with limited militaryaction: and UNOSOM 11. a peace enforcementmission involving active combat and nation-building (figure 2). From the beginning of the effortto relieve the suffering in Somalia. however, there

" .. were two basic problems: moving enough food.water, and medicine into the country, andproviding security to protect the relief supplies fromtheft by bandits or confiscation by the clans andwarring factions. In April 1992. the U.N. SecurityCouncil approved Resolution 751. establishing theUnited Nations OperaUon in Somalia-UNOSOM-whose mission was to provide humanitarian aidand facilitate the end of hostilities in Somalia. The50 UNOSOM observers sent in did not make anoticeable difference in either ending hostilities or

* I securing relief supplies but in July. the UnitedNations asked or increasedi azrlifts for food.President Bush responded by ordering U.S. forcesto support Operation Provide Relief from 15 August1992A•hr•ug)j_9 December 1992.

Organized by CENTCOM. the mission of thi'soperation was to "provide military assistance insupport of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenyaand Somalia." Among its objectives:

•- . * Deploy a Humanitarian Assistance SurveyTeam (HAST) to assess relief requirements in Kenyaand Somalia

0 Activate a Joint Task Force to conduct anemergency airlift of food and supplies into Somaliaand Northern Kenya

0 Deploy (4) C-141 aircraft and (8) C-130aircraft to Mombasa and Wajir. Kenya to provide

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THE OPERATIONAL CONTKXT 15

daily relief sorties into -Somalia during daylighthours to locations which provide a permissive andsafe environment.

During the 6 months of Operation PromReLLef a daily average of 20 sorties deliveredapproxdmately 150 metric tons of supplies: in total.more than 28,000 metric tois of critically needed

.• relief supplies were brought into Somalia by this

airlift.

FI6UJR 2, ha plAi o Uaf IJ

I I CAPRNzdw

PkW Pu5W 15 Aug UNSCR# (HAST-then(UNOSOM I) 1992- 751 JTPM

9 Dcc dtd 24 Apr DG Frank1992 1992 LibuttL

USMC

AW& 2 iff 9 D=c UNSCRO LTGO Rnbert(UNITAPI 1992- 794 B. Johnston.

4 May dId 3 Dec USMC1993 199

USPOISOM 4 MaT UNSCRO MO Thomas"" ' (UNOSOM I1) 1993- 8i4 M.

31 Mar dtd 26 Mar Montpomery.1994 1993 USA

Despite the reinforccment of UNOSOMthroughout the next several months, the securitysituation grew worse. In November. a ship ladenwith relief supplies was fired upon in the harbor at

"a' •..f,

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16 SOMALA OPERATONS: LESSOIS L&ARNJED

Mogadlshu. forting its withdrawal before the badlyneeded supplies could be brought ashore. In theUnited States and elsewhere, public distress grewand, on 4 December 1992. President George Bushannounced the initiation of Operation RestoreHope. Under the terms of U.N. Resolution 794(passed the previous day), the Urited States wouldboth lead and provide military forces tomultinational coalition to be known as the UnlteaTask Force, or UNITAF. This force would bridge thegap until the sitation stabilized enough for It to beturned over to a permanent U.N. peacekeepingforce. The U.N. mandate implied two Importantmissions: to provide humanitarian assistance tothe Somali people. and to restore order in southernSomalia. Because of the implicit requirement touse force in establishing a secure environment forthe distribution of relief supplies. it is significantthat the mandate relerred to Chapter VII uf theU.N. Charter.

The CENTCOM mision statement clearlyreflected these objectives: "When directed by theNCA, USCINCCENT will conduct Joint/combinedmilitary cperatlons in Somalia to secure the majorair and sea ports. key installations and fooddistribution points, to provide open and freepassage of relief supplies, provide security forconvoys and relief organization operations. andassist UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian reliefunder U.N. auspices. Upon establishing a secureenvironment for uninterrupted relief operations.USCINCCENT terminates and transfers reliefoperations to U.N. peacekeeping forces."

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THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 17

Ot°

U.S. NOL~y Seabees from N'aud MobiLe ConstructionBattczion 1 pour conci-eteAJoors In classooms as port Qfa civic action progrcm of Opertlon Restore Hope.

During its exidstence from 9 December 1992through 4 May 1993. UN[TAF ultimately involvedmore than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations.includhiig 28, 000 Americans. It clearly succeeded Inits missions of stabilizing the security situation-especially by confiscating "technicals." the crew-served weapons mounted on trucks and otherwheeled vehicles. With better secur-ity, more reliefsupplies were distributed throughout the country.staving off the immediate threat of starvation inmany areas. However. plans for the termination ofIJNITAF and an ordetly handoff of its functions tothe permanent peacekeeping force, christenedUNOSOM 11. were. repeatedly put off. U.N.Secretary -General Boutros-Ghall urged delay until

18 SOMAI.A OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

U.S. forces could effectively disarm the bandits and, ival clan factions that continued to operatethroughout Somalia. In addition. he proposed torebuild the country's fragmented Institutions "fromthe top down"-an exercise akin to nation-building.

These disagreements delayed but did notultimately prevent the formation of UNOSOM II.officially established by Security Council Resolution814 on 26 March 1993. The Resolution wassignificant in several ways:

a The Council mandated the first ever U.N.-directed peacekeeping operation under the ChapterVII enforcement provisions of the Charter.including the requirement for UNOSOM 1I todisarm the Somali clans

• It explicitly endorsed the objective ofrehabilitating the political institutions and economyof a member state

* It called for building a secure environmentthroughout the country. including the northcrnregion that had declared its independence.These far-reaching objectives went vrell beyond themuch more limited mandate of UNITAF as well asthose of any previous U.N. operation. To Implementthem. a full U.N. peacekeeping structure war setup in Somalia. headed by retired U.S. Navy AdmiralJonathan Howe as Special Representative of theSecretary General with Turkish Lieutenant GeneralCevlk Bir as force commander of the U.N.multinational contingent.

Rather than being in charge. U.S. participationin this operation was primarily conceived in termsof logistical support. with over 3.000 personnel

ThE OPERATIONAL colnftC' 19

specifically committed to that mission.Significantly, however, the United States was alsoasked to provide a Quick Reaction Force--some1,150 soldiers from the US Army's 10th MountainDivision-that would operate under the tacticalcontrol of the Commander. U.S. Forces. Somalia.

, ,,The mission of the 4.500 American forcessupporting UNOSOM II from 4 May 1993 to 31March 1994 was as follows: "When directed,UNOSOM II Force Command conducts militaryoperations to consolidate, expand, and maintdn asecure environment for the advancement ofhumanitarian aid, economic assistance. andpolitical reconciliation in Somalia."

Mqfor Gnard. Thomna Mam ery r•ewz, back &rUu.th the U.S. Quick Rewt~on Force.

,low A~I~

20 SOMALA OPERATIONS: LESSONb LFt.RiIED

The ambitious U.N. mandate as well as thecontinuing presence of the multinationalcontingent ultimatcly threatened the Mogadlshupower base of one clan wa-iord. MohammedAideed. The crisis came into full view on 5 June1993, when 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an

.. .- , • iambush by Aldeed supporters. The United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 837. passed the nextday. called for the immediate apprehension of thoseresponsible-and quickly led to U.S. forces beingused in a highly personalized manhunt for Aldeed.After a series of clashes involving U.S. Rangers andother units, a major engagement occurred on 3October in which 18 Americans were killed and 75wounded-the bloodiest battle of any U.N.peacekeeping operation. Shortly thereafter.President Clinton announced the phasedwithdrawal of American troops that would end by31 March 1994. US. forcei largely were confinedto force protection missions from this change ofmission until the withdrawal was completed.

•'. -, . 4

3i

Il OPERATIONALLESSONS LEARNED

None of the polticci Leadership can tel me uhlt h1ion tme to acomplish. That fact. houver. does notstop them from continual•y asking me uken I uIL be

donaAn Anonymcus U.N. Commander en route

to a Peace Operation

%ach of the three distinctly different phases of ouroperations in Somali:-,- -Prot Re//e, RestoreHope, and UNOSOM li-can teach future U.S.peacekeepers some important lessons about fourareas covered in this chaper: the pianning, deploy-mcnt. 'onduct and support ,of peaeekeepingoperations.

PlaftaingThe job of the mission planner is always thankless:anticipating requirements even before a missionstatement has been formalized, orchestratingliterally thousands of details that cause anoperation to be successful or to go at all. adjustingthose details when the concept of the operationchanges, and doing all of these things under timepressures that would cause breakdowns in lessermortals. The CENTCOM planners involved in all

21

iii ,,.., o0 . ...


phases of the Somalia operations lived up to thisJob descrIpLton. In addition to adapting formerlystandard procedures to new and uncertain tasks.Perhaps they recalled the words attributed toGeneral Eisenhower. himself a former war planner:"Plans are useless, but planning Is essential."

e.>~'"IMndt.m ~~

( ,non U.N. udate ae citkal to theplnninhg d the msmdm because they shape thebasic politald guMan gSien to U.8. ixM by carNatkmal Conzmnd Anthoittm (MCA). A chumuwnate obapeo not only the uSIdm (td uAndthat we par=m but the way we carry It out (the

SSg-nd mly to the basic struuzm ofinan& the ctlon ofthe Joint Task FPrc(JTIT Is key because it mast balance the needscan wfth the 1ntt admatol Cdm alcapab1ite. Organdlmlmdal hods lnn•cluaug f n .atinag or mzrmarking a standard but adaptopackage: but the seledon ofdtenudias submidbepeA!4 by stvndar kd=& mnetdal hbo, such,b ,ds0.4 eueain, toops. terain and tineavlagabhe

Prior to establishing the airlift for Provile ReliefCENTCOM dispatched a Humanitarian AssistanceSurvey Team to Somalia. No sooner had theyarrived than the team found they had been

'• - !

OPRATIONAL LESSONS LARNED 23

reconstituted as the nucleus for the operation'sJTF. Despite the fact that both the mandate andthe mission seemed clear, the JTF soon found Itselfcoordinating a 6-month operation that eventuallydelivered 28.000 metric tons of supplies. Theirmission also came to include airlfting Pakistanipeacekeepers into the country as well. asconducting delicate negotiations with clan warlordsto assure the security of relief supplies.

The much larger scope of Restore Hope wasreflectcd in the designation of a MarineExpeditionary Force headquarters as the nucleusfor the JTF. Although this choice inescapably lenta "Marine Corps flavor" to the operation, it also lenta continuity of relationships and procedures thatwas critical in view of the larger problems faced bythe JTF. Its particular challenge whs to head amultinational coalition of 20 differentcountrics--many of them ehosen more todemonstrate broad internations.l support for theU.N. mandate than to provide complementarymilitary capabilities. Even more daunting was theneed to align these opeWtions with the activities ofas many as 49 different U.N. and humanitarianrelief agencies-none of which was obligated tofollow military directives.

Not only was unity of command a challenge inthese circumstances but there was a span ofcontrol pA ublem that offers an object lesson forfuture planners. because tCe size of the militaryunits forming the multinational contingent variedfron, platoon to brigade. t% -easonable span ofcontrol was wcrked out. with the majorparticipants contributing brigade-size units that

* ,


could be given mission-type orders (figure 3).Several smaller contingents were placed under theArmy and Air Force components. while ninecountries were placed under Marine control. asthey had responsibility for securing the Mogadishuarea. (However. n -tional sensitivities do not always"allow such Integration into a standard millitar/

" " '"hierarchy because subordination could imply aslight to national sovereignty--and certain nationalgovernments have expressly prohibited this type ofrelationship.)

Two other important span of control innovationsunder UNITAF included a Civil-Military OperationsCenter and the division of the country into nineHumanitarian Relief Sectors that allowed both thedistribution of food and the assignment of militaryareas of responsibility. The relatively crisp mandatewas also important in avoiding subsequent urgingsby U.N. officials for UNITAF to bccomc more deeplyengaged in disarming the clans: instead, thecommander limited the ('onfIscattons to thoseindividual weapons. "technicals." and arms cachesthat were a clear threat to his force.

The U.S. mission to support UNOSOM II. bycontrast, was considerably more open-ended.although this fact may not have been wellappreciated when the operation began. The basiccommand arrangements reflected the fact that theoperation was to take place under U.N. control.wltn U.S. Major General Thomas M. Montgomeryacting both as Commander. U.S. Forces Somalia(USFORSOM). and as deputy to the U.N. ForceCommander in Somalia, Lieutenant General CevikBir. The potential for conflict in this dual-hatting

•,,i*•,

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARND 25

of command relationships was clear: aa a U.S.Commander. MG Montgomery served under thecommand and control of CENTCOM. while asdeputy to General Bir, he served under theoperational control of the United Nations. Evenmore significant. however, was the fact that

, : j !General Montgomery carried out his responsibihtles* -. "through an unusual arrangement of operational

and tactical control over assigned U.S. forces.These key distinctions In levels of authority areshown in figure 4: their Implications are discussedIn pages 53-74.

Commatder. Centrd Commai4 Generd Hoar s greeWdby LtGen Johnston. comrander of Restore Hope atMogadishu Airp•t.

wowI

26 SOMAUA OPERAIIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Although General Montgomery was given only4.500 troops-many of them logistical peisonnel-his combat missions included force protection.manning an organic quick reaction force, providingfor use of off-shore augmentation to the quickreaction force, and armed aerial reconnalsance.Complicating theoe responsibilities was the factthat MG Montgomerl met the UNOSOM I1 staffforthe first time when he arrived in Somalia-and only30 percent of them had arrived by the time themission was launched. Unlike the UNITAF staff, theUSFORSOM headquartero was not built around awell-formed central nucleus but was broughttogether in some haste-composed primarily ofArmy officers individually recruited from the ArmyStaff and units worldwide.

While there may have been some expectationsthat such staff arrangements were all that wasncedcd in a situation in which thc Unitcd States rtolonger had the lea-d, foot-dragging by U.N. officialsfurther complicated the transition between UNITAFand UNOSOM II. The tntial slowness in setting upthe -UNOSOM-7-staf-Was agg-avated by itscompositton: it was formed incrementally from thevoluntary contributions of the multinationalcontingents who detailed personnel as they arrived.There certainly was an urgent need under thesecircumstances to insure a proper handoff between"the .key staffs of the incoming and outgoing U.S.components. General Johnston has pointed outthat there was approximately a 6-week overlapbetween the UNITAF and UNOSOM II staffs, thatthe incoming and outgoing staff counterparts wereco-located, and that detailed SOPs were Jointly

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED 27

FIGURE 3- UNW W mudki(bqo* cod VXW~M B

wad UU'O1WK~

UNITAF SOMALIAPMWA IN A PHAXI NV OOWAWPILOATUMIMP

LJNISOM 11 AND USFOFISOM

@"on4 may 03

DE UgN1rn00A

mm~~ L4 F

SPT CUM

28 SOMALUA OPERATTONS: LESSONS LEARNED

prepar.d to aid in the transition. These were clearlyimportant steps, but it also can be argued that thereal issues were the lack of agreement between theUnited States and the United Nations about'theconditions at the time of the transition and themilitary capabilities required to cany out theexpanded mandate of UNOSOM 11. Those issues go

"4 ... "well beyond the scope of operational command, butit is clear from subsequent events that theunderlying causes of conflict in Somalia had onlybeen postponed. Those conflicts exploded into theapen and largely defined the development of theUNOSOM II mission-a fact that can only suggestfor the future that. if such transitions cannot beavoided altogether. they should at least be Jointlydeve!oped by the Inceming and the outgoing force.

M• Ana Fntr mm Ext kvmtejeu

0 Although they are tu Sa xtintil ed bythe ssin, cutry and eit stUategie are FInpo t

plan~ncd~a~they gwum h we abouN... atto go In and umde what candIJmu wo conezpect to got out.

• One major m Mty ep styin a peaeopermtion Is t mg and

suc1s-kg them chain of emailw hift*mas towhom we an betwc m •txy aml =ft whbavo~ftg the hieiable cc at "11sim

Because it was relatively brief, the Provmide Re/lef

.1 .

OPEFA1IONAL LESSONS LJL41UM 29

FIGU3E 4s Leweb .Ialhr i.*

Combatant Command #Nontramsferable command authority(COCOWd established by law.

*Provides fulfl authority to orgroin and24~4~ employ commands and forces as the

combatant commander considersnecessary to accomplish assignedmissions.

Operat~onal Control *Transferable command authority that(OPCON) way be aeircised by -commnders at mny

echelon at or below the level ofcomnbatan~t command.*Includes authoritative directdon over allaspects of military operations and jointtraining necessary to accomtplishmissions assignd to the command.*Does not Include authoritat~e directionfor logisUcs or [DaLers ofadmnibstration. discilpine. internal

________________organization. or unit trabning

Tactical Contgot- _oCaomad, ;,uwxth- ger assigned roCrACON) attached forces or commandis oiiiilm i

capability mae available fcr tasldng.*Limited to the detailed and t'suallylocal dkir-ction aMA conbrol of iuavemntsor maneuvers necessary to accomplist-.assigned missions or tasks.

Source: Joint Pub. 1-02

30 SOMALIA OPERA.TONS: LESSONS LEAMED

airlift provided few tough entry or exit questions.beyond the obviouR ones of security for the In-country ground crews. The criterion for successwas similarly clear: providt food supplies to getpeople past the immediate threat of starvation. Theentry of UNITAF was seralpermlsslve. the only real"opposition" for a time coming from televisioncamera crews on the landing beaches. The well-understood U.N. mandate helped keep the focus onthe most Important criteria for success: bettersecurity and more food distribution. The exitstrategy was implicit In the handoff to UNOSOM II.an event that identified both a specific time frameand milestones such as the building of a staff.When these milestones were not reached, it clearlyflagged a problem: how that problem was handled.however. is another matter. Although the handoffwas not complete. U.S. forces were withdrawn on-ehedlile. While their departure certainlyrepresented a successful conclusion of the UNITAFmission (as well as a useful signal to U.N. officials).the lack of an effective transition clearlycomplicated conditions for both the entry and theexit for U.S. forces supporting UNOSOM II.

Although both UNITAF and UNOSOM wereauthorized as peace-enforcement missions underChapter VII of the U.N. Charter. the UNOSOM II

"* "mandate reflected a considerably deepercommitment of both security and humanitarianassistance. This mandate, however, was not byitself an invitation to the increasing use of U.S.forces In combat situatinns, In fact. Lhose whooriginally committed the Jnited States to a role inUNOSOM I1 believed that American forces would

-. I

oP.RATIONAL L[SSONS LutAR..r. 31

primarily play a role in logistical support to theoperation. The 1. 150 American troops constitutingthe Quick Reaction Force (QRF) were to provide arapid response only when specific threats, attacks.or other emergencies exceeded the capabilities ofother UNOSOM II forces. They were expresslybarred from spearheading routine operations.

.,.,- escorting convoys, or providing other longer termsecurity &ctions. However, there was an inadequateappreciation by planners for a potential adversarywho turned cut to be highly resourceful andcapable of adapting to the forces brought againsthim. In the aftermath of the 5 June ambush thatkilled 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. the United Statesplayed a prominent role in drafting U.N. SecurityConcil Resolution 837, which called for theapprehension of those parties responsible. Thatresolution constituted another de facto change inthc mission, because Its terms were rapidlytranslated into a manhunt for Mohammed AJdeed.Because those operations clearly outran thecapabilities of other UNOSOM II forces, there wazan immediate exparesion in the use of the QuickReation Force-now backed up by armedhelicopters from the 10th Mountain Division aswell as Air Force AC- 130 gunships. Ultimately. themanhunt for Aldeed led to the commitment of TaskForce Ranger and to the climactic battle InMogidishu on the night of 3-4 October 1993.

This deepening involvement of U.S. forces incombat operations during UNOSOM 11 has beencriticized as "mission creep." despite the fact thatthese changes in both mission and direction clearlyresulted from specific decisions reached by the


national command authorities. However. theImportant lesson for future planners that can bederived from this experience Is that the best way to ..avoid mission creep is to aislyze what the missionreally calls for: this means constantly measuringthe mission against milestones that best IndicateIts success or failure. The choice of milestones 13

" . especially important. In peace operations, thesemeasures should not normally be expressed Interms of enemy killed and wounded or Idlometersof ground taken: If they are. this is itself anindicator that the peace operation has changed inways that should call into question both themission and the mandate. In fact. the bestmeasures of success may well be those that signalreductions In the level of violence. Other Importantindicators may be expressed in terms of thenumbers of children being fed, gallons of potablewatcr bcing puripcd. or wer.pons bclng turncd In.While specific crilteria will depend upon themission, all must be capable of answering onebasic question: "How will we know when we havewon?"

* Because Swanmai s are ad hocausidg ofa the wIDUmg PlanmM must roecplus

the reduced tempo with which a coslam bAncamducts pese. rma tloom

* DMfferti national capabilities andInta•daal dAlffamwes also aftt both theplannin and the rvality of pesos ace.

ft-6

OPE1RAMIONAL LMON3 LZAR 33

Even though it was not part of a formal coalition.Jthe emergency airlift of Proed. Ru/• brought its..participants Into Immediate contact with othernations providing relief aid. as well as the addedresponsibility of transporting Pakistani

pa*-ekeepers into Somalia. This lesson Illustrates,that.like most neighborhood and communityassociations, all coalitions are voluntary. bringingwith them a mixture of strengths and limitations.friendships and rivalries. As Joint Pu.b 3-07.3notes, terms of reference must pin down the mostcritical elements relating to a country'sparticipation in a peace operation: commandrelationships. organization. logistical, responsi-bilitles. and even accow ting procedures. Thedifference was that in RNtore Hope these terms ofreference were primarily negotiated through theUnited States as the leader of the coalition, whilewith UNOSOM I1. these term were negotiated withthe Unitcd Nations.

No serious problems appear to hayv' arisenamong thie multtnat1oia-Fc-ntinzgents supportingRestore Hope, possibly as the result of a sensibledecision to have the major contributing courtriessend liaison officers to CEFNTCOM for coordinationprior to dispatching their forces to Somalia.General Johnston has also noted that the

mand arrangements outlined above achievedjui unity of command and unity of purpose.

despite the challenges of leading a large anddiverse coalition:

34 SOMAIA OPERATIONS: LZSSNS LEARNED

Our coalition partners had signed up to the rulesof engagement and the basic humanitarianrfdsslon and in every Instance sought to have a ,close bilateral arrangment with the U.S.Commander. They ... reported to me daily onactivities with periodic formal andcomprehensive briefings on progress. Unity qf

~ command can be achieved utten ewLyone slptsup to the mLsswn and to the commandrdationship. (emphasis added)

However. with the increasing intensity ofcombat during UNOSOM II. adherence to the U.N.terms of reference became more problematical.Because most multinatlonal contingents-includlngours--make it a point to stay in close touch withtheir national capitals, concerns over the policy ofhuntmig for Aldeed grew aWong with the increasedpotential for combat. The challenge of commandingd cuahlUui furce under Ihese circumstances a*n beseen in the subsequent statement of UNOSOM IICommandcr Lieutenant General Bir. who cited hislack of comm-ind authority over the sasigned forcesas the most signicant lrn4tatlon of this operation

or any other one organized under Chapter VII.Certainly the authority of futu-e U.N. forcecommanders is a topic that will be hotly debatedfor some time to come.

Another critical element for the planner is thedifference between what is planned for and whatshows up. It is a basic fact of international life thatmany of the poorer countrl.!s that have regularlypartIcipated in peace operations have done sobecause duty with the United Nations pays aportion of their military budgets. Equipment

~iS '-,S- "

OPERAIONAL LESSONS LEARN!D 35

considered standard-even basic-in mosi westernarmies is simply not present in the inventories ofmany military contingents from developing-countrlel. This fact was evident during UNOSOM Itwhen some of the contingents that had volunteeredfor a Chapter VI (peacekeeping mission arrivedlacking the minimal gear required for Chapter VII

AM'$* -. :(peace enforcement) operations. The U.N.commander thus had the dual chaienges ofproviding these contingents with the eqxupmentthey needed (often from U.S. stocks) Rs well Ps thelogistical support needed to keep that equipmentoperating. The equipment multtnaUonals do bringwith them is not likely to be interoper&LlU -o tha"identifying the- Most citical !tems thc :, ,t_4t bh "made to work together is especially Imp, ,Ltnt--communications and ammunition calibers ibeingtwo of the more obvious examples.

Lessons

• ROE are not •a•y ft *Ad dnth deankmbut also ctitical ela In t d h19 thesucaes ot Wlume oa peam opq s that •that the duahUmint d ROf Is a coam 4d

- As 'npottnt a" ttwtheY amRE are e~ivaonly to the eztmt that thuy am be umdestaod odapplied by the furmI -canhtg out a peamopmetrdm that mans h iat the ROE sulopdirct, and iumdassuffl

-we .,.

36 so0MWA OPmRATIONS: LESONO U, ARNE

ROE. common in any military operation, areespecially important in a peace operation becausethey provide the means for applying (or notapplying) deadly force in a situation in which theobjective is normally to avoid or to minimizeviolence. ROE embody two of the most importantprinciples from operations other than war-"restraint and legitimacy--because the use of forcemust be seen as supporting the ends for which theoperation was begun In the first place. The ROE ineffect for Restore Hope and UNOSOM i1 involvedthree issues: the proper use of force, theconflscaUon and disposition of weapons. and thehandling of civilians detainedi by military forces.The most critical Issue involved the use of forceand the circumstances in which It was authorized.

With admirable simplicity, the UNITAF ROElisted four basic "no's:"

V No "technicals." such as trucks carryingmounted machine guns

* No banditry*- qW roadblocks

"* No visible weapons.Because crew-served weapons--such as thetechnicals-were seen as particular threatsregardless of whether the crew demonstratedhostile intent. UNITAF commanders wereauthorized to use "all necessary force" to confiscateand demilitarize them. But what did "all necessaryforce" really mean? Did it amount to "shoot onsight?" UNITAF commander Marine UeL:.tenantGeneral Robert Johnston decided it did not anddirected commanders to challenge and approach

OPEmAfONMAL LaSsoNs I0mZ D 37

the technicals, using all necessary force if theweapons were not voluntarily surrendered. Simil•aapproaches were used in confiscaUng arm caches.These rules, combined with the demonstrat-on Ofoverwhelming force by UNITAF, resulted In fewchallenges to forcible confiscation effortg-end

* v '" •"surprisingly few acts of violence directed atainst* ~U.S. forces.

When the 20,000 U.S. soldiers of UNITAF werereplaced by the 4,500 supporting UNOSOM IJ.thesse ROE were initially left unchanged. With thechanges in mission and forces, however, violenceescalated and resulted in Fragmentary Order 39&

S' .. - 9... ,'•. ~Issued by the U.N. force commander, which stated-"Organized. armed militias. technicals, and othercrew served weapons are considered a threat toUNOSOM Forces and mr• be engiqed u/t ho ut

-..... prowocaton" (emphasis added). There is a directline of continuity between that rule and thtIncreasing involvement of U.S. forces in combatoperations. There was a noticeable difference aswell in the way U.S- forces Interpreted the ROE,stressing aggressive enforcement, while othernational contingents emphasized more graduated

* ,responses before using deadly force. Frag. Order 39continued in effect until after U.S. forces were in a

.. I I. -,-;: i force protection posture pending their withdrawalIn January 1994. after M Matine sniu keamengaged a machine gunner atop a bus. ie ROEwere again amended to exclude targets wherecoJlateral damage could not be controlled.

These experiences suggest that ROE should beapplied as the direct result of carefully consideredcommand decisions, decisions that calibrate the

"POPI

4

38 SOMALIA OPERATMONS: LESSONS LEARNED

nature of the threat with the balance that must bestruck between the often competing requirementsof restraint and the security of the force. It shouldbe clear that the Rules of Engagement must bewritten not only with the "KISS" principle (Keep ItStmple. Stupid) In mind but also with anappreciation for how they might be applied in tensesituations by warfighters rather than lawyers.Classified ROE not only detract from thoseobjectives but also make little sense In amultinational coalition with the native populationclosely observing and taking advantage of everymove. In fact. there Is an advantage to ensuringthat ROE are provided to the belligerents, who needto know and firmly understand the rules of thegame. Finally. wvhile on-sc-.ne commanders mustgenerally be free to modify ROE to reflectconditions on the ground, frequent changes in theROE should be avoided. 'ihe old military maxim."Order-Counter-order-Disorder" applies to thesevital rules as well. Keep the ROE simple and try tokeep-them-C=lSlStentt.......

A6 --andu. Selseoimasd 1aliding

Thudsebmtaand tn*mg ofpmescnd are just asozut • pece opMt s a§ WA mg

oosffe Mao w ~ -u ~b

All three phases of the Somalia operation underlinethe importance of this lesson as well as the more

• *,a.~-- -...

OPERAMONAL LESSONS LZARNED 39

fundamental point that the quality of the soldier isbasic to everything we do as a military force. Justas in other operations, success depends directly onthe patient investments in training time and effortmade during the months and years before theactual deployment order Is received. Anticipation ofsuch missions helps as well. with unit commanders

, .W .• who are able to build on those capabilities andhone the individual skills of their troops to a ftaeedge. Success in peacekeeping operations dependsdirectly upon small-unit tactical competence andthe bedrock mastery of basic military skills.

Some understanding of the differences betweenChapter VI peacekeeping requirements andChapter VII enforcement action is needed as well.In peacekeeping. Joint Pub 3-07.3 effectively sumsup the required mindset:

Peacekeeping requircs an adJustmcnt of atUtudeand approach by the individual to a set ofcircumstances different from those normallyfound on the field of battle-an adjustment tosuit-Me needw-of-peaceable Interveitom rather-than of an enforcement action.

In additicn to the individual character traitsdiscussed by that publication, the most Importantones are probably good judgment Md independent

-. action.Enforcement actions require all these things In

addition to the ability to transition rapidly to full-scale combat operations when required. MGMontgomery has noted the need for more effectivepredeployment training standards, including the

W. i'

"'AwA


in-theater ROEs. local culture, and weaponsfamiliarization. One reason for suggesting theseimprovements was provided by the Army's 43rdEngineer Battalion, a heavy construction unit thatparticipated In UNOSOM I1. The unit was given veryshort notice prior to its deployment, but to make

.m atters worse it was one of the many Army unitsA WL" * 4. : beginning the process of de-activation. Not only

were Its complements of personnel and equipmentless than expected for deployment, but herculeanefforts were required by the soldiers of thisbattalion (as well as other units) to accomplish themission.

One final point: peace operations put apremium on certain specialists who should beidentified early and placed near the front of anydeployment-possibly on the first plane. Theyinclude: trained Joint Operations Planning andExecution System (JOPES) uperatur. ctn•rad.specialists (especially those with experience in localprocurement). logisticians. lawycrs. medicalspecialists, WWMCCS operators, porttransportation organizers, public affairs officers.military police. combat engineers, psychologicaloperations specialists (PSYOPS). and civil affairsexperts. as well as special forces teams. Equallyimportant are people with specific knowledge of thelanguage and the country. Because there was a"shortage of people with a working knowledge of theSomali language, linguists were recruited bycontract both in the United States and Somalia.Although this recruitment raised some obviousquesticns of operations security, the programprovea very effective for most situations. The use of

A.

OpwRATIONAL LEsSONs LzAmN 41

Reserve Component personnel with specialqualfications for service in Somalia also workedwell-suggesting the importance of ReserveComponent integration in the planning of futurepeace operations.

Joint PimnLess"n

P lanning Ix peeze olicas is numbc thesame as planning he cmlbat OPMUM-•- e--ptthat pea" Opmatam are t"AMBY san~w wadIM:h nontm m fine tanng

STzbulawe Is a coinsmat ft Is what happomS...• whum ym have to bUaka the m asint

Opatequkts to puan an Oapmew Wfth thefliyneeded by thlom who wl soo- becanyka gt out.

* While t may have cawtan taws, the Jadtowaim Pleing andz mat SystM

(JOPES) Is the baseline syshm he all U.S.dmp -ofits, Inckuding thoss oupptn peace

The 28.000 troops deployed during Restore Hopeldearly presented the most challenging planning

problems, beginning with the longer lead times nowneeddd to establish "strategic air bridges" wltji U.S.bases and other facilities being reduced worldwide.Given the air distances between the United Statesand Somalia. overflight rights, refuelling and en-route support arrangements required additionaltime and effort to arrange. Current informatiora on

•t• ,. • -••.

4

42 SOMAIA OPERATIJNS: LESSONS LEARNED

the capacities and conditions of both air andmarine terminals inr Somalia was also lacking.Under those conditions. it seemed particularlyunfortunate that CENTCOM delayed until late Inthe deployment the arrival of so-called"transportation through-putters." Because thesesoldiers are trained to unscramble delays at such

SJ - terminals. it would make better sense In futuredeployments to have them In country sooner ratherthan later.

One of the most perceptive reports to emergefrom Restore Hope noted that the Initial stages of adeployment always place great demands upon avery limited infrastructure, but especially In a caselike Somalia. That situation was compoundedbecause, in the words of the report.

In contingencies, the tendency is for everyont toconsidcr ,hcmschvcs to bc ,I •uch grcatImportance that their presence Is required In-country first. Not everyone can or should befirst. ... Higher rank should not translate Intohigher precedence for arriving in-country.

A better approach for the future, It suggested, maybe to organize JTF headquarters in modules, eachwith its assoclat~ed logistics and communications."and to deploy them in successive stages ascapabilities are added to the force. This seems to bea reasonable approach when dealing with aparticularly austere operational environment whileallowing JTF commanders a better opportunity totailor forces and their suppc•-t to the specificsituation at hand.

OPERATIONAL LSONS LENm 43

Some of the more consistent criticisms concernthe way that Joint planning influenced the wayUNOSOM II was "stood up." Much of this processappears to have been surprisingly random, perhapsbecause this was the first time that Americanforces had been committed to a U.N.-led peace

* , ,:, 1 'enforcement operadon. However. the ultimateresult was tkaZ In Somalia MG Montgomeryconfronted a Rituation in which his command wasconstructed not as a result of a Joint blueprintcarefuhiy m-dil/ed to reflect his circumstances, butrather as the rtsult of a considerably moreconvoluted planning process. One example: the J6(communtcations) str'ff was not assigned to the JTFearl'; enough to influence communicationsplannning. and the J6 director himself did noterrive in country until 2 weeks after the activationof UNOSOM I[.

CuuasbLenily ALrong uptnvs wcrc cxprcssedabout the JOPES during &ll phases of the Somaliaoperation. Complaints included the system's lackof user-friendliness, the inflexibilliy of itsprocedures. and the difficulty of importing datafrom other sources. Most observers. however.correctly note that the system is a powerfulplanning tooi that is also the backbone of the jointoperations system. The system's advocates echothe point that JOPES takes discipline and practice.Ideally with specifically txained personnei. Clearly,you don't want to go to either war or peaceoperations without JOPES-smart operators. Evenwhen they are present, however, it Is best toremember that there !s a buIlt-in conflict betweenthe discipline needed to run that system and the

1.4~

44 SOMALA OPRMRIONS: LESSONS L•A•NED

flexibility demanded by those that JOPES andsimilar plarning systems are supposed to support.

A good example of what can go wrong with thebest of intentions was provided by ARCENT (ArmyForces, Central Command) planners just prior toRestore Hope- Those planners put great time and"thought Into the constructiGn of the Time-PhasedForce Deployment Document (TPFDD) and loadedit into the JOPES data base for implementation bysubordinate commands. Unfertunately. thesesubordinate commands had been given "writepermission" on the TPFDD and began to makechanges with a vengeance. Withln hours. wholesalechanges to unit types. personmel. eqX'.pment. anddeployment dates had been entered-largelymaking a hash of ARCENTs careful arrmngements.JOPES operators at ARCENT-now presumablyarmed- labored for weeks to make the hundredsof corrections required Lu e•sure that people.-!quipment. and lift were in proper alignment.Thercafter. the authority tc make changes wasretained by the higher command.

DeploymentPossibly because they have a Job almost asthankless as the Joint planner. those who actuallyconduct deployments of operatlonal forces like toremind us that amateurs talk aboi it strategy, whileprofessiona-s talk about logistics. Both topics cometogether In the execution of the bL slc elements ofpower projection: airltA. sealift. and pre-posltonedequipment. The major shire of the responsibilityfor deployment rests with TRANSCOM. but. as they

'. •- ,,• •• ' -

I


are also quick to point out. much of their successdepends upon other people. There should be nodoubt, however, about the success of thisdeployment to Somalia. During Restore Hope, forexample. 986 airlift missions (including bothmilitary and commercial aircraft) moved over33000 passengers and more than 32,000 short"tons of cargo to Somalia. Eleven ships-includingfive fast-sealift vessels -moved 365,000"measurement" tons of cargo to the theater as wellas 1, 192 containers of sustainment supplies. Andover 14 million gallons of fuel were delivered fromReady Reserve Force tankers to the forces ashore.

£emLut

* Although atrlft usualWy accounts for about 5"p mt of a tow dpoynt, it ha ,wy ¢smal 5pk.rcm--espedLy in pec operada=a.

* Data ham to be manage as ach as anyother aspect of the opeiston--because snmllboogkeeping cawon cause vwy hup pob*ms

Airlift is critical to a peace operation for tworeasons: In most cases it is the fastest way torespond to a crisis and, until the arrival of sealift.it is the only way to sustain the Initial deploymentsof peacekeepers. These were especially Importantconsiderations throughout the Somalia operationsbecause the Mogadishu airport was czpable ofhandling no more than two alrcr,-Jit at a time.These space limitations were a special problem

-"°

• r' k .

46 SOMALIA OPETIONS: LSSONS LEARNED

during Provide ReUgf when there was nocentralized airlift control, either for those aircraftchartered by international relief organizations oroperated by the U.S. Government. One ImportantInnovation during this phase of the operation -wasthe use of the Airborne Command. Control. and

S. K... ::Communications System (ABCCC). The use ofABCCC aircraft in a primitive operatingenvironment provided a range of criticalcapabIlities-especially communications relay andairlift coordination-that may well suggest a modelfor future operations in similar aa3.

Despite the remarkable success of the airlift.forecasting was a problem in two areas: theshipment of hazardous cargo (usually weapons andammunition) and the movement of sustainmentsupplies (food. water and other consumables).Hazardous cargo always requires diplomaticclcaranccs and becomes an cspeclaily sensitiveissue when commercial carriers are beingchartered. The movement of sustainment suppliesbecame a problem early In ProvideHopebecause ofthe lack of an interface between JOPES and theMilitary Standard Transportation & MovementProcedures (MILSTAMP) documentation-difficulties surmounted only through extcrnxvework-arounds.

Data differences also caused problems with theTime-Phased Force Deployment Documentsupporting both Restore Hope and UNOSOM 11.Because the TPFDD expresses the CINC's decisionconcerning the kinds of units sent on an operationas well as the time they will enter the deployment.it Is built around Unit Line Numbers (ULN) that

• • .•,'•- •,~~.',. • .• •

I

OPERATINAL ,sONS LzARmND 47

reflect a unit's position In the deploymentoperations order. Army units, however, organizemost of their deployment data by Unit Identity . ,Codes (UIC) and Unit Type Codes (UTC). Because - -

these codes do not match, there was great difficultyin manipulating the data and insuring that scarce

Sairlift assets were not wasted.The Inevitable Inaccuracies in TPFDD

• 'information also caused A recurrence of thepersistent problem of in-transit visibility-the"where-is-it-now?" transportation predicament thatafflicts the movement of household goods as well asthe deployment of armies. In some Instances. forexample. telephone calls, faxes. and repea ed visualchecks were needed to verify that the alrfl Id "ramp

reakity" matched the airlift requirements listed inthe automated data base. Finally, the requests forairlift support from coalition forces duringUNOSOM II iuuUncly sL unre'adlIsUc dclivcry datcsthat were themselves based more on administrativeguesswork than well -constructed requirements.

Leosse As wvth akif, data hav to be zmaapo an

much as any other aspect of the

casevy hiVprob-mSThe "oth-r 9 pacm' ofa d- .oI-nt s total

requki.to that cm by -a cad the bestoppoumity to buM a base whiMh wS sustapem qopoattms f as lansn as the umhmreue. m .theJa j~tpmspe here Ju.t

'-.

48 SOMAL[A OPRAIONS: LESSONS LZARNED

00 orMpI t as I .•h W a d at MMt

The data management problem experienced wi.th-. I. airlift was also encountered in sealift. Hazardous

cargo was not always forecasted. for example, andinaccurate entry Information as well as differencesbetween UICs and ULN's led to problems of in-transit visibility. A new data system called EASI-LINK was instituted to help correct the visibilityproblem: while It showed promise. It was notcompletely successful in overcoming the differentdata formats. The net effect of the continuingdifficulty in managing TPFDD information-including late changes. inaccurate entries, andunreliable information-made sealift planning asconsistent a problem as It had been for airlift.

Several coordination issues underlined the [actthat In logistics the Integration of joint and serviceperspectives is not always clear. One of the most

- basic problems was over command and control ofthe seaport of Mogadlshu-a crltcal concernbecause the port faclties were in such disreparthat oniy one ship could be handled at a time.There was some confusion over whether the Navy.Marine Corps. or Army was to be in charge of this"common user seaport" because the Armytransportation unit doctrinally charged with themission did not arrive until well after the first pre-poslUoned ships were waiting outside the port (apoint discussed in the next section). The Marineson at least one occasion held back some shippingin order to supply their own requirements. desplt,

. •.•,,. : •,, •,• , ..~


the fact that all sealift resources were supposed tobe centrally managed. And while components fromwithin a service routinely transferred equipmentfrom rotating to arriving units, the samearrangement did not always hold true among theservices. For example. the Army at one point in theSoperation requested lift to ship Humvees back to Its

- .~ home stations-just as the Marines Were"requesting equally daunting lift requirements toship their Humvees from the United States toSomalia.

When other l0t assets are stratid by both thephysical " ula I gfsrLaphy and thtI ,,-.wVe

Iugul"ta fr eri aectim, it is iperathe thatW Ipe ed shipping be avalable to thedeplaying h.•e when theyneed it twa. In at lemst

ze Instace durimg the emala scperatiks. ArmyPM-pltl d shipping was unalle to naet thisfamdmtinal squkt`

There Is no question that pre-positioned shippingwas a valuable asset in Soma!ia. In particular.

" * Marine Corps Maritime Preposftloned Ships (MPS)were able to offload essent:al equipment andsupplies early in the deployment, despite theausterity of the port facilities. 'The ready availabilityof this logistical support nct only reduced airliftburdens but also allowed UMITAF to adapt the MFSequipment packages to the unique requirements of

• .. ] • ,, . 4

50 SOMALIA OPERATMONS: LESSONS LEARNED

a peacekeeping operation. However. a usefullesson was also demonstrated by the problemsexperienced with three pre-positioned ships that

--caried equipment for all the services. During theinitial phases of Restore Hope. these ships wereunable to offload their cargo because of a"combination of rough seas and Inadequate portfacilil .s. Although intelligence information onMogaolsh was somewhat lacking, it was knownthat the drafts of all three vessels made Itimpossible for Lhem actually to ±nter the harbor atMogadishu: fortunately, howe-=:. all three had thecapacity to offload "in the stream." But rough seasand the delay in deploying the Army transportationspecialists required to unload the vessels forced achange In plans. One of the ships moved toKismayo, but found conditions there little better.Another went on to Mombasa. but since sealiftofficials had not contacted Kenyan auLhonUeb Luclear unloading of the hazardous cargo(ammunition) carried by the ship. it was deniedentry to the port and returned to Mogadlshu.Eventually two of the ships spent a total of 14 days

.46 In two separate port areas before finally returningto their base at Diego Garcia. They had been gonea month but never unloaded their cargo.

- - - -,What is most troubling ie future Is thatthese problems took place in an er.vironment thatwas austere but not the scene of active combatoperations. This example emphasizes as few otheraspects of the deployment the importance ofIntegrating those things that must work togethereffectively:

Timely intelligence on the port and Its

• • '\"* i

OPIERATONAL LESSONS LRARWD 51

characteristics* Current. well-Informed assessments of Its

operational capacity* Deployment of transportation specialists so

that they and their equipment arrive prior to theships

* Above all. a clear delineation of authority--- within the Joint Task Force to clarify who Is in

charge of making these things happen-end in timeto make a difference.

* ts" opmdins thdr ow uniqueadmZ trathm sawatm that, as ai w

-sec of the ap=i, it be mnwmag

One of the most persistent administrative problemsthroughout operations in Somalia was the lack ofan efficient means to track funding and other costsof the operation. especially the supplies andservices provided to coalition partners. Some ofthese requests for sunport involved strategic liftinto the country while others concerned"consumables such as water and rations. Theabsence of prior guidance and incomplete authoritycreated an administrative burden that was onlyovercome with the usual work-arounds bydedicated people. Lessening those burdens in thefuture as we operate with reduced funding willrequire tighter financial controls (including those

.•- t " * ' .. ' " I

52 SOMALIA OPERA'nONS: LESSONS LEARNED

involving reimbursement) before a peace operationbegins.

Procurement was also an issue. As had beend, the case with Desert Storm, there was an urgent

need to have contracting officers on site early-andwith authority sufficient to the monumental tasks

. , of arranging for supplies and services that oftenhad to be contracted in neighboring countries.During Provide Rel/ef a request forwarded for theuse of simplified contracting procedures during anoperational contingency was turned down on theodd grounds that bullets were not being fired atU.S. forces by a declared enemy of the UnitedStates-this despite the fact that "Imminentdanger" pay had been approved for all U.S. forcesoperating in Somalia. During UNOSOM I1. the U.N.logistical system came in for particular criticism.As one JULLS report stated:

The U.N. procurement system Is cumbersome.ineMcient. and not suited to effectively supportoperaUons in an austere cnvlronment. TheUnited Nations acquires all of its goods andservices on a reimbursable basis. Unfortunately.the reimbursement is often delayed or debated.with a final solution that may not... benefit theprovider.

Two Joint Issues that arose during Restore Hopewere finance support and personnel rotationpolicies. Although pay operations are centralized inthe Defense Finance & Accounting Service, theNavy and Marine Corps communicate thisinformation through a single system used both onshore and during operational deployments. The

OPPMRAT1ONAL LESSONS LEARNED 53

Army and Air Force lacked a comparablecommunications channel. a situation that causedsome difficulties during the early stages of theRestore Hope and also demonstrated the need forsuch essential combat support systems to bedeployable worldwide. Naturally. financialspecialists trained to function in a Joint

*.-.,environment arc the basic underpinnings of anysuch system. Most of the personnel deployedduring Nhs operation were serving in a temporary

S-duty status, a fact that led to confusion becaust ofthe wide differences in their touw lengths. Becausea uniform policy was never established by eitherCENTCOM or the JTF. replacing personnel becamea much more difficult task. Even more importa:-twas the potential morale problem inherent Inhaving people serving side-by-side who haddifferent tour lengths. -

Dunng Re.tLore Hope. much of thc Marincamphibious unit as well as most of themultinational contingent were quartered In andaround the boundaries of the MogadlshuInternatilonl Apo'rt.-Despite the fact that acomprehensive site plan had been prepared inadvance of this occupation. it quickly broke downwhen different national contingents were added tothe coalition. Because many of these countriesprovided only small units, there was no alternativeexcept to house them at the airfield. so thatencampments were soon claimed on a first-come.flrst-served basis. Apart from the inherentorganizational problems stemming from such anapproach. safety suffered as well when theencampments soon consumed all available space

-.- ,* .r.." -"-,: 4.r '-.

54 SOMALIA OPERATMONS: LESONS LEARNED

and spread toward taxiways, ramps. and activerunways. Air controllers lived in tents sandwichedbetween the edge of the runway and high-powered

I Ma-ma dwimleud tn suapport of Opefiatn Restore Hopearrtve at Mogyjtshu Mpcrt on citan alraqvL

~-~Ii~ii!


area surveillance radars. "When all other real estatUhad been claimed, an Army evacuation hospita;more than lived up to its name wher it was forcedto set up Just next to the end of the departurerunway. The result was thaL. in an alreadythreatening environment, there was needless

. :, Iexposure of the troops to a number of addltional"'. "hazards.

Cohduet of OperationsThe operations conducted in Somalia during alithree phases of the operation showed once againthe true professionalism of the American soldier.sailor. airman, and marine. !n all too manyinstances, Somalia showed as well the heroism anddedication of a force that found Itself in harm's waywhile serving in the cause of peace. The full storyof those operations and their nigniflcance at unitlevel is best left to the individual, servicecomponents. The Joint world as It affected theoperations in Somalia dealt much more with thefive areas presented here: command and control.mission execution. civil-military operations.negotiations. and intelligence.

CMMd ad CAM

• It is a basic fact a(Mt that the o~omnsM awntertnA ofa coallti nmst always takU bnt a tomtthe austin of pald lnes of authatity,ephay haI th m dnkm of the Cmlitan

volves combat.no The basic doctdna pdnpia that gmwK U.S.

'~fr*J7 ,


c in r.Iatlduulp a appmropA 6 AW I.veopmatloma-and should hav bme appled In

The major lessons on command and control that.....- emerged from our operations in Somalia are

instructive for what they reveal of problems both incoalition operations as well as in the U.S. chain ofcommand put in place during UNOSOM II. Thatmission had barely begun before full-scale fightingflared up in Mogadlshu and elsewhere in thecountryside, leading to Increased tacticalchallenges that in turn caused two major problems.Because the UNOSOM I[ headquarters was neitherorganized nor equipped to function as a battle staff.It had to undergo wrenching adjustments undergreat pressure. Even more seriously, however, thegreater potential for combat increased the concernin those countries that had contributed forces towhat they had originally seen as a huranita•iane~ffort , _ _ . ... . . .. . ....

.. . • This concern manifested itself in a pronouncedtendency for some of these national contingents toseek guidance from their respective capitals beforecarrying out even routine tactical orders. According

-.... to published reports, the commander of the Italiancontingent went so far as to open separatenegotiations with the fugitive warlord MohammedAideed-apparently with the full approval of hishome government. With American backing, theUnited Nations requested this officer's relief fromcommand for insubordination. The ItalianGovernment rerused and life went on-a useful

OPERATTONAL LESSONS LFAMR 57

demonstration of both the fundamertal existenceof parallel lines of authority and the fundamentaldifficulties cf commanding a c3alltion forme undercombat conditions.

The escalating level of violence also causedadditional command and control problema for the

.... .. . United States. As shown in figure 3. these

~ ~ ~ I a-angements were hglily unusual. The logisticalcomponents of U.S. Forces in Somalia(USFORSOM) were. OPCON (i.e.. tuder operationalcontrol as "leased" forces) to the United Nations (Inthe person of MG Montgomery) whhUe the QRF wasstill commanded and controlled (i.e.. as COCOM or"ovned" forces) by CENTCOM. MG Montgomeryexercised his authority ,ihrough an cqually unusualcombtnaticn of direct support. operaticnal control.and tactical control. These command relationshipswere unusual but reflected three fu:,.damenWalAmerican ,bjecAiveb fur UNOSOM I1. to keep U.S.forces firmly under U.S. operational control, torcducc thc visibility of U.S. combat forces in theoperation. and to eliminate any misperception thatthose forces were under the command of the UnitedNations.

With the ever-deepenLig hunt for Aideed andthe increasing involvement of the ORF in combatoperations. the decision to deploy Task ForceRanger added an additional c-mplicating factor.Because it was a strategic asset. Task Force Rangerhad its own chain of command that was headed incotmtry by Army Major General William F. Garrisonand extended directly back to CENTCOM withaoutgoing through either U.S. or U.N. channels.Although MG Montgomery did not have OPCON of

""limb1

58 SOMAUA OPZRTOOIS: LESSONS LLEARnED

this force. he maintained a dose wonklngrelationship that allowed tight coor.icrationbetween Task Force Ranger operations ana dhe

04 {QRF. Because the QRF was under the directtactical control of MG Montgomery and-because ofits caipabilities and the need to follow strictoperational securIty procedures-It was normally

"" designated as the back-up contingency forcewhenever Task Force Ranger went into action.

These same oplerational security concenrs wereapparenty at the heirt of MG Montgomery'srequest to add armor capabilities to the QRF from,U.S. sources ratner than rel)ing on those alreadyavaliJable from the coalition partners In Somalia.Although this request represented a clear signal 4that the level of violence was escalating yet again.there was rio ccmprehensive i eassessment of tilmission at the national level. Instead. MGMonLgomnery's request fur dxraor support wasrefused in a decision that has received wide publicattcntion in light of the fateful Ranger operationthat took place on the .night of 3-4 Octobea 1993.When t-e Rasigers came under mtehse hostile flii..it rapidly became clear .that the CRF lacked thecapability to rescue th-em.

MG Montgomery and his staff reacted to thatsituation by quickly organizing an extraction forceusing Malaysian and Pa istani units equipped withtanks and armored personnel carriers-much asany U.S. commander in more conventionalc!rcumstanc.s might have done in committing hIsieserves. However. the most Important lesson tc bedrawn from these events may be the usefulreminder that command and control uklimately

"" IN :' '"'"

OPERATIONAL LESS0NS LEARNED 59

£ebts upon thte ludgment of the on-scenecommander and his ability to react to theunexpected.

In the aftermath of this battle, the United Statesdecdded to send addiUonal troopl io Somalia for

i additional protection of American forces. Whilethis force was placed under U.S. command as aJT'F. figure 5 shows how an already complicatedcommand structure became still more complex. ToIllustrate (using only the b&Mc arm}yms)-the new JTF-Somalia fell under OFCON ofCENTCOM but was TACON to USFORSOM. Thepurpose of this arrangement, in theory, was toallow the JTF Commander to concentrate ontactical missions while MG Montgomery was leftfree to concentrate on his responsibilities as theDeputy U.N. commander. Although the JTF thuscontrolled all U.S. tactcal forces in Somalia neitherthe JTF nor USFORSOM controlled the Navy andMarine Corps forces, since those offshore assetswere still under the opcrational control ofCENTCOM. The JTF could not routinely task theoffshore forces for such things as drone aircraft.although they did obtain Marine and SEAL sniperteams through an informal "handshakearrangement.*

.. "- MG Montgomery has pointed out that many ofchese, odd procedures were offset by the closeworlkng relationships he enjoyed with all U.S.commanders tasked to support UNOSOM I1. andthat "Ultimately the U.S. arrangements did work."That undeniable fact is yet another tribute to thededication and professionalism of those chargedwith commanding and carrying out a dimcult

-WNW


FIGUM 5. USIVAkgri

(11M

I .,

mission. Houeuer, there should be no rnistaklngthe fact that the greatest obstacles to unity ofcommand during UNOSOM II uwre imposed by theUnited States on itself. Especallyatthe end of theoperation, these command arrangements hadeffectively created a condition that allowed no oneto set clear, unambiguous priorities in designingand executing a comprehensive force package.Instead. CENTCOM exercised long-distance controlover a number of organizationally co -equal entitiesIn a remote theater of operations. As a UNOSOMII after-action report summed matters up:

Unity of command and simplicity remain the keyprinciples to be considered when designing a JTFcommand architecture. The warfighting JTF

OPERA1ONAL L~EMONS LZARW 61

commander must retain opwratlonal cwtrol ofallforces available to him in theater aind be allowedto posture those forces as allowed under UNAAFdoctrine.

UNAAF doctrine is. of course, contained in JointPub. 0-2. which succinctly addresses the need forunity of command and simple, unambiguouscommand arrangements as a prerequisite for anymilitary operation-but particularly for thoseinvolving Joint and combined forces. The record ofUNOSOM II suggests that peace operatlons shouldnot be exempted from those standards. As apractical matter, it may also be useful to begin theplanning for such opezations with four basicquestions:

• Who £hacl iammmnd?* With what him?* By what raeans?• Tb what ends?To the extent that we are tnaible in future

* cperations to answer those questions in simpleterms. Jifficulties similar-to UNOSOM It may onceagain await us.

S-•9 mon eecuktlem k mole • u

trained and wnm a11s~.epdlyi hjoint en t h o o

* Fordble dlam-w•mt Is the 'Ibdht UnW' ofpeac oputnas wbu yonu cm8 It. m haveentered a de bcto stae at war.

__ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ _ __

62 somAuA oErA.oNTOS: LESONS I.FAED

. Rmitaint Ir an acqvind WdNL buit Its the Amqua non of peoce op•atJmi.

The "standing-up" of JTF-Somalia hi October 1993provides a useful example of the continuing pitfalls

; o, : of units entering a Joint world for which they arenot adequately pitpared. Once -again. this JTF wasformed around a nucleus--this time the Army's10th Mountain Division. Because of its tacticalorientation, no divlson-and especially not a lightinfantry tuit-has either the staff structure or thecadre of experienced personnel needed to conductJoint operations. Necessarily, staff procedures are"Army" rather than "Joint". The kinds ofcommunications and ADP equipment required toconduct Joint operations are also missing In thesedivisions. What made matters wcorse wa3 that. inspite of these anomalies, the division was given theJ17 mission and accepted the handoff for thatresponsibility in Somalia Less Lhan 2 ueeks qoterrawept _ thte u niTn o . . .

Other misconceptions included the assumptionthat thye JTF staff could be "small." or that one ofthe division's brigades could function effectively asa de facto Army component command. Andalthough the officer placed in command of the JTFwas an Army officer, Major General Carl F. Ernst,he had not previously been assigned to thedivision-a fact that made the establishment of newworking relationships another burden amongmany. The fact that the division acquitted itself wellunder these demanding circumstances owed muchnot only to Its superb personnel but also to the fact

- ''* i

OPERATIONAL LSSONS ULVAE 63

that the mission was largely confined to forceprotection for the balance of Its in-country tour.

If there was a critical difference between thespectfic tasks during the final two phases of theopi"-atlon. it was that the security andpeacekeeping functions typical of Restore Hopi(patrolling, mine clearance, heavy weaponsconfiscation) became indistinguishablefromnormalcombat operations during UNOSOM II. MGMontgomery may have said it best: "If this isn'tcombat, then I'm sure having a helluva nightmare."Unlike the well-organized nucleus of the Marineheadquarters in charge of UNITAF. the execution ofmore demanding missions during UNOSOM 11became even morm difficult because the ForceCommand headquarters was not equipped to actlike a battle staff. The initlal difficulties inmarning this headquarters were never entirelyuvercomc, with the result that key funettons--long-range supporting fires, cnmbat engineers, and airoperations-were either missing or not available 24

..hours a day. The JTF had to Improvise a JointOpera-tio'nS---entier usng-exivtlng-equlpment and-personnel, many of whom had no real expertise insome of the areas for which they were nowresponsible: joint and combined ground operations.fire support, air operations, tr-ining, andIntelligence. Equally important was the need toinstitute effective means for liaison with adjacentmultinational commands. Whi't hard work andrapid adaptation clearly helped, it Is difficult inthese stressful 3ituations to link current operationswith future operatlons--and both of these withoverall mission requlremer.ts.

64 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LMSSONS LEARNED

That need is nowhere greater than in peaceoperations. and here, too, there was a contrastbetween Restore Hope and UNOSOM II on the all-important issue of disarmament. While theirdifferent approaches to some extent reflecteddifferent missions, the UNITAF leadership wasreluctant to do more than to coufiscate thoseweapons that threatened his force and its mission.for example. "technicals" and weapons caches. Themore ambitious UNOSOM II disarmamentm!ssion--although it never became more than anincidental byproduct of the Aideed manhunt-wasa direct threat to the position of the clans withinthe local powec structure and was resistedaccordungly. The respective difficulties of executingthese two missions should consequently serve as a"bright line on the ground" in planning future peaceoperations. There is a basic conceptual differencebctwccn arms control and disarmamcnt Rcmovingor limiting the major weapons of an inferior ordefeated military forre can be thought of as a formof arms control. but to commit militaryforces tothe mission offorcibly disarming a populace is tocommi thoseforces to a combat situation that maytherqcter involve then as an activ belligerent.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley. President Bush'sSpecial Envoy to Somalia, pointed out that theapplication of force imposes special challenges forpeecekeepers who wish to avoid becoming activebelligerents. This challenge involves a mindaet thatlooks at the local populace as potential allies ratherthan likely enemies. that gives repeatedwarningsbefore the application of force against anyhostile act: that limrnts the application of force to

OPERAMONAL LESSONS LARNED 65

the minimum level required. and that constantlyseeks to engage in a dialogue rather than beingtricked Into overreaction. U.S. forces throughoutthe operations in Somalia clearly did their best tofollow that advlce before the UNOSOM II mandate

U.S. Mczlrtes cammutee a raid on~ Magcadtshu's BdktioMa*&JI -a -rajbr arm und t-undnn& OteoIw-Senough tojIU a 2.5-ton arck

made many of those points moot. Even then.American forces were under standing orders tolimit civilian casualties and collateral damage.According to General Montgomery, for example. 15-minute. 10-minute. and 5-minute warnings werenormally given before attacking any target.Although the use of AC-130 gunships. helicopterrockets, and Ranger raids over the streets ofMogadishu clearly conveyed other messages to the

.•imi

66 SOMALJA OPERATONS: ESSONS ARNED

media. some of the pret ise targetting proceduresused as well as the c( nstant search for moreaccurate, less deadly munitions representsignificant steps to adapt military power to thosesituations where the line between combat andnoncombat is difficult to draw.

.u.nMMAy .0amte-rwsons

I The r Mal peeaeIeepemIn a peace epematimare the hlamanftzian VHI V' etlma M09s)that rwlde botah a&d 2 the Feinet amd hope 1the atme.

* The HRO's can be our all., but theO aatlekt be part of a=r plazk a" -- mbekaume•W.

Although the clvii affairs officer is a familiarparticipant In many military operations, there wasno dcctrine in the collective experiences of eitherthe services or the Joint Staff to cover a situationin which a country had dec cnded into a state ofanarchy. Along the way, however there was arediscovery of the need to consader military.diplomatic. and humanitarian efforts as parts of acommon whole. Although there was no longer asingle government in Somalia. there were at least49 different international agencies. including U.N.bodies. nongovernmental organizations, and HRO's.Dealing effectively with those agencies become theprimary challenge for civil-m.litary operations inSomalia. This was in important function because

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LZARNE 67

the HRO's not only provided many of the reliefsupplies that helped fight starvation, but agenciessuch as the Red Cross and Feed the Children wereon the scene prior to the arrival of our forces andlong after their departure. Tc this basic differencein perspective should be added another: for a

"... * variety of reasons, relief agencies tend to bcsuspicious of miitary and security personnel, evenwhen they come as peacekeepers.

Women and children line upfjbir a mad at a jlbatgcenter rua bthe Irish hu'mattariwi aid group Concernin the vil~ltve of Walne Wein. Somdalt.

One thing that affected relations in Somalia wasthe pattern of accommodation that the reliefagencies had followed to ensure they could workthere effectively. This usually meant hiring localsect -rity forces-often in concert with the area's

68 SOMALIA OPERAMONS: LESSONS LEARNED

dominant clan. When peacekeeping forces arrivedto set up their own security arrangements. therewere the inevitable questions as to their authority.

iA Once these Issues were settled. it was alsonecessary to make exceptions to policy whenweapons were confiscated from those peopleemployed by the relief organizations as theirsecurity forces.

During the UNITAF phase of the operation therewas an undeniable increase In both security andthe amount of relief "upplies being distributed. Thisperiod of relative peace allowed more relief agenciesto enter the country, but It also underlined theneed to Insure closer civil-military cooperation.Sometimes these cooperauve efforts Involved smallbut Important thbigs-such as allowing HROrepresentatives to fly "space available" on militaryaircraft. More substantil efforts took place whenr,,'ary forccs during both Restore Hope andUNOSOM II worked side by side with relefagencies to dig wells, rebuild roads. repair schools.

and the like. With the need to control access tokey port areas and food distribution points. it alsobecame essential to provide photo ID cards to therelief workers. This requirement in turn meantsetting up procedures for verifying organizationaland personal bonaJfdes because, as one observersaid. "People came to view t~he ID card as bothofficial UNITAF certialcmjon of a person's role as ahumardntaran worker and also as a gun permit."FInally. some agency had to issue the cards and toregulete what privileges. If any. these ID cardswould convey.

OPERATICNAL LESSONS LEARNZD 69

A Somdi baij has taken the' Samdt fhmlzacntim forOasses one stepfia~ther by crtVng apcdr jar htnmsdfotqf a dLicarded stwuxr shme

For these and simila reasons, one of the mostImportant Initiatives of th --Somalia operation wasthe establishment of the CivUL-Milltary OperationsCenter (ClMOC). Set up In December 1992 duringthe early stages of UNAIAF. CMOC became the keycoordinating point between the task force and theHROs. Liaison officers from the majormultinational contingents. together with tWe U.S.command. used this center as a means ofcoordihating their activities-such as providingmilitary support for convoys of relief supplies andassigning pier space and port access to MogadishuHarbor for the HRO's. These practical duties alsolent themselves to the broadening of contactsbetween the military and civilan components.


Including the creation c• parallel CMOC's In each ofthe nine Humanitarian Relief Sectors. Eventually.CMOC controlled the Issue of ID cards andmaintained a data matrix showing the status offood relief supplies throughout the command's areaof operations. Equally important. however, was thefact that CMOC was able to work closely with the

f .,NX

ICE

U.S. UticksjWLd ugth mediad panruud and mwdiclnUne the aru qfMCqga*111uL to pefirm the ftrst mwdlcdCh~ acamiopm wvunInSgxnla.

Humanitarian Operations Center run by the UnitedNations-thus allowing a single focal point for allrelief agencies operat nig In-country. The staff ofCMOC was deliberately kept small in order to keepit focused on its mission of coordination andinformaUon exchange. hl.s innovation issuffiriently Important as a precedent for the future-

OPRIlioNAL LESSONS LzwjED 71

its table of organization and principal functions are

summarized In appendix C.)

'2~P ýdv AM and techniu e e. e oenml to ms•

Gmm~'6411A -co~ Awayplatkw M as s got alt i t=oah tovion

Joint Pub 3-07.3 notes that, in adeJitlon to thequalites of patience and restralit. peacekeepersmust combine

an approachable. understandig, and tactfilmanner with famess and f"m'mo, Apaftoaiinal demeanor that sawess q-d letdiplomacy and reasuing wMii achiev- more thanarogance. anger, disdain. coon. or sarcasm.PmmmeI mut be able to cope pq-ltldvel wheneach side seoks to press Its potion and thenreacts vocafly when stopped.

These qualiUes are clearly part of an attitudeadfustment from the reactions traditionallyassociated with military operations: but theeshould be no mistaking how Important thatadjustment Is during peace operations.

One perspective was offered by MGMontgomery. who noted that "consensus building'was a ziltical part of the process of developingplans and prepartng operations orders in any

~~~I *J M"s "I• .. 'a I

72 SOMAiiA OPCRATIO." LESS'OMS LEAWED

combined operation-r.otJust those involving peaceoperations. During UNOSOM 11. however. thespecific terms of reference guiding the parUcipaLAonof each multinational contingent as well as theirdifferent views of employment doctrine meant thatactions could not be taken without bread

'.- agreement. Finding those areas of consensus.building on them. and applying them to specIficoperations are inevitably complIcatedprocesse!--and ones that are noticeably diffearentform those that most military personnel are usedto. Howeý,er. MG Montgomery thought negotiatingskills important enough to rmcommend that they beaddressed at Army professional schools.

U.SAF. uu*.rs unroad J~ur frtw a C- 130 Kwculatrqft as Ow'tion ReatreP HPpe urkers bephanothe day oqf humwrwtat rdiefeff1rts to So•ncda

Malmo.

OPMRATIONAL LESSONS LZARNM 73

Another perspective comes from Army StaffSergeant Brian O'Keefe. who served outsideMogadlshu during Restore Hope and now trainssoldiers in the peacekeeping skills he learned inthat environment. An Army publication'recentlypointed out that he quickly came to realize that a

. :4, -show the flag and kick ass" approach was not goodenough. Instead tact in applying ROE andweapons-confiscation policies was essential, as wasthe use of water bottles and smiles as basicnegotiating tools. "Most of all. we learned what ittakes to conduct peacekeeping operations:negotiating skills, patience, and a whole 1'0 ofcommon sense."

The fundamental importance of maintainingthis kind of a dialogue led to a key UNITAFinnrvation: a "Combined Security Committee" thatallowed LTG Johnston and k .-y members of his staffLu meet frequently with Mohammcd Aldccd andother key clan leaders. This forum provedespecially useful in gaining and even forcingcooperation with UNITAF mandates, such asweapons cant-on-ment. As LTG Jo0ijston recount-the purpose of that dialogue:

Aldeed and All Mahdi were often unhappr withthe message we would send frm time to Ume,but for the most part (they) complied. Yco nwjndt like the chartes Mu ham to dd uith butLou v'N beme able to unove ruAr nwavms andintweUons L( you kep a contuntccmns inkope (emphasis added).

74 SOMALIA OPERATMONS: LF_9SONS LEARNED

* lt� is as vital to the nucams of apesa opmatim as It Is to MWa nam u3racdwhty.

*Aldaougk needutrus*M ofn cV mIIgf:,• .•hami~maf are esecl tubaW 2W Pom

q.. is u - a.w

It has taken the United Nations several years ofever more in.tense Involvement in complicatedoperations before it has quietly admitted somethingthat military people have always known:intelligence is the key to any operation, includingthose designed to secure the peace. While"information." Is the term of choice, operations inSomalia proved that. whatever it is called.intedigence hes a crucial role to play at the lowerend of the conflict spectrum as well as in otherplaces. A wide range of Intelligence systems wasemployed there. many of hem for the first time.Night-vision devices, ground-surveillance radars.t~cUcal air reconnaLssance. and unmanned aerialvehicles all played important roles In providingtactical intelligence and early-warning Information.The most basic intelligence In a low-intensityconflict scenario is invariably provided by humans.the best and most important HUMINT sourcealways being the soldier or marine irt the field.Patrol tactics and intelligence requirements wereadjusted to allow his eyes and ears to provide U.S.commanders with better "situation awareness."

OPERAMfONAL LESSONS LARNED 75

The major problems encountered came in twocategories. There is always an issue of how to pipeIntelligence from national sources 'own to the on-scene commander-but this was so difficult in acountry with no functioning telephone system thatall the links had to be provided by satellite. Toprovide a focal point for dissemination, CENTCOM

. •2> j •established an Intelligence Support Element (ISE)staffed solely by U.S. personnel. The ISE rapidlybecame the single most Important part of theintelligence support to UNOSOM-which raised thesecond problem. U.S. law expressly forbidsdissemination through any intelligence channelover which there is anything other thanexclusive U.S. control. In addition, there was greatconcern that sensitive U.S. intelligence sources andmethods might be compromised in the setting ofmultinational operations. For both these reasons.guidelines were developed and adhered to whichlimited the dissemination of information relating totargetting and operational security but generallypermitted the flow of timely intelligence to thecoalition.- U.S, officers serving in--the UNOSOMForce Command Staff normally acted as theconduit for information developed by the ISE insupport of specific olperations-with MGMontgomery often making the final call on itsdissemination. In all cases, however. LTG Bir asthe Fdrce Commander was kept fully apprised ofthe complete U.S. intelligence picture as It affectedhis area of operations.

If there Is a precedent for the future it U, thatpeace operations present a ntew kind of"Information war" in which the side with the best

noI


situation awareness has a great edge--and in amultinational setting there are. by definition. manysides. While intelligence has traditionaily tended tofocus on the enemy, the definition of who or whatthe enemy Is in a peace operation is not alwaysclep.r. Clearly the forces of Mohammed Aldeedbecame the main adversary that the U.S. had tocontend with in Somalia. In future operations,however, commanders may want to gear theirintelligence and other information collectionsystems-including the front -line soldier-to collectas well on those indicators signsllin the directionin which the operation is heading. The use ofCMOC to monitor the status of food dt.tributio,- inSomalia from all relief agencies is one example ofthe creative use of information to build bettersituational awareness through the use ofnontraditional mission indicators. Futureoperatfrin may suggest others.

SupportThe unprecedented nature of the operations inSomalia created a new range of problems for thecritical support services that must work effectivelyif the mission is to be successful. There was notelephcne servi.ce of any kind. and such logisticalfacilities as there were resembled those of a warzone-yet the troops had to be supported. aninfrastructure hastily constructed, and theAmerican people kept informed of what their sonsand daughters were doing in this singularlyinhospitable climate. Here again, the key factor in

- t

OPERATIONAL LFASNS LEARNED 77

adapting to these challenges was the quality of thejoint force serving in Somalia.

i al of i d a wUi dbauecm inatims amg the strat t apm a

and frda evb

that demands effeative comunicatlons

Operation Prot~de Re&tefentered an environment inwhich there were few, if any. communicationspathwiyvn between the .•trateglc and forward-operating base. The baseline communicationscapabilities they brought with them aresummarized in figure 6: such packages may wellserve as- odelsafor the future. -- 0 ....

During both Restore Hope and UNOSOM II. thecommunications support provided to U.S. forceswas generally superb. with "connectivity" helping toovercome some of the inherent difficulties ofensuring that unity of effort. If not command. was

being exercised. Part of what made this systemwork was the presence of a UaIson officer from theDefense Information Systems Agency to UNITAF atthe very start of the operation. an arrangement thatpermitted some flexibility in adjustingcommunications packages and pathways. The

~ ~.


FIGURE 6. •vif .emuukwd-ireqwh me u fed. hum aakaa .aa

* DSN (GMF Suite)- " , .I * Autodin (GMF Suite/TacUcal Comm Center)

* Intra-camp Telephone System (tactcal switchboard:phones: at least 2 STU-1I1's)e Facsimile machines (secure and nonsecurel* Secure TactIcal Satellite Radio (UHF TACSATl, Long-Range UHF Radio (MRC-138 or equivalent)- Commercial Satellite Terminal (INMARSA'F* Support Items: cables, generators• Others: handheld radios: public address systems.copiers. extra batteries, diskettes. computer paper

operation utilized both military and commercialsatellite linkages, although the availability andefficiency of the commercial INMARSAT telephoneservice were offset somewhat by the fact that 't cost$6 a minute. Another problem was that thepopularity of this system quickly outran itscapacity. Because this and other communicationpathways became crowded. even an austeresignailing environment rapidly became crowdedand required Increasing attention to the "de-confliction" of radio frequencies being used by themilitary units and HRO's.

The size of the operating area also stretched in-country communications. Infantry units commonlyoperated more than 50 miles from theirheadquarters. while transportation and engineer

OPERATIONAL LESNS LEARNED 79

units were often hundreds of miles from theirbases. Either HF or TACSAT were potentialanswers. but both the equipment and the availablenet structures were limited. The operationsprovided a number of opportunities to experimentwith tactical satellite antennaes. especdally thosethat could provide continuous communications-

... . .. .. and better force protection-for convoys operatingin remote. high-threat areas. Soldiers at all levelsrepeated the experience of Desert Storm andbrought their per3onal computers withthem-especially the newer laptop versions. Fieldexpedients flourished to protect them from blowingwind and sand--including the taping of Ziplock

SbaggIes across the opening to the disk drive in away that allowed access to the floppy disk buteffectively sealed out dust.

The most significant potential forinteroperability problems occurred between U.S.forces and the multinational contingents. DuringUNITAF. these problems were minimized by twoimportant expedients: imposing communicaUonsmanagement-discipline over the force as a wholeand assigning full-Ume IHaison officers with tacticalsatellite radios to each of the multinationalcontingents--much as had been done during theGulf War. During UNOSOM II. however, and with

-. -the U.S. no longer in charge, those practices werediscontinued. Instead. each tactical area ofresponsibility was commanded by one of themultinational contingents. whose comanders wereresponsible for ensuring that all forces under theiroperatlonal control had compatible communi-cations equipment. Because area bcundaries

-i!


roughly corresponded to national forces, thissystem worked reasonably well-as long as eachnational force stuck to its own area. Crossing overthe "seams" of national control created severeinteroperabilitv problems-a situation thatoccurred whenever one national contingent had tocross over an area boundary to reinforce another.

Some of these problems had been offset earlierby the operational communications structure setup and manned by UNITAF. Following the Marineredeployment, a backbone communicationscapability from the 1 lth Signal Brigade wasmaintained in each of the areas of operation untila U.N. structure was established In December1993. However. other communicationsresponsibilities were effectively turned over to thesignal battalion of the Army's 10th MountainDivisior There is. unfortunately. no way that adivision-level slenal battalion could be prenared toassume what amounted to a strategic(ommunicatlons mission. especially one In whichso many different communications systems werebeing used.

The internal Interoperability problems affectingaffected U.S. forces did not Involve any Grenada-like operational fiascoes: however, the ones that didoccur underline the continuing problem of aligningequipment. proc,.dures. and standards in the jointenvironment. During Restore Hope. It wasdiscovered that UNITAF .s a Marine-centeredheadquarters. used an obscure word-processingsoftware called Enable OA. while CENTCOM. likemost other military users. preferred Wordperfect. Asimilar difficulty plagued their exchanges of e-mail.


U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhauk helicoptr lands at theBeret Uen airstrip, dropping off soldiers from 2ndBrigade. 10th Moun Win Division. Fort Drum. NY. toseize the airstra as port of a combined U.S. andCanadian U.-SULL durUing (pe-pa.wn iNesLore I lope.

"11f) biLudLlon cUmphiUAtLed. althuugh It did notprevent, file transfers between the twoheadquarters: however, it illustrates the growingimportance of "offmceware" In military operationsand the problems resulting from mismatches. Inthe tactical arena. It was also discovered that theair-tasking order formats differed between the eastand west coast ships of the Marine AmphibiousReady Groups-and that the same Army andMarine single-channel tactical radios had acquiredcompatibility problems caused by differingupgradcs. Most seriously, for the first 3 weeks theNavy was offshore, the Army hospital In Mogadishu

A

82 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LZARNED

could not talk to the ships. nor were ArmyMEDEVAC helicopter pilots cleared to land onthem.

d All these and many other difficulties wereovercome by capable. problem-solving people. Themore difficult and much longer term issue Is the"stovepiping" of different data systems. During

IV'. .Restore Hope there %ere at least 10 different datasystems. most built around the requirements of',single service but handling a host of commonfunctions: intelligence. personnel. logistics. finance.etc. Each system brought Its own logistical "tail"and required its own lane on the very narrowinformation highway available to deployed forces.This is not a situation that makes sense fromeither a logistical or operational perspective. Oneafter action report summarized the problem:

Time spent trving to learn and enigneer lust the(comparatively) few systems we were associatedwith during Restore Hope could have been betterspent providing higher quality, overall service.Money spent on these circuits could have gone along way to resolving our interoperabilityproblems.

mnuCoftr.y Legl es* ta.Lesson

We have the finest theatmr-levl cembat servicesupport Inlm a I the wur: it will be eithersought after or nmdlezed In any future peaceoperaflaa.

• : ,• ." ". I _ _ _ _ _ _

OPERAMTTONAL LESSONS LEARNED 83

The "lessons learned" from the performance of thecombat service support structure in Somalia do notso much suggest the need for specific correctionsas much as they underline the importance of theU.S. contribuUon to the success of this or anyfuture peace operation. What is clear especiallyfrom the record of our support to UNOSOM I1 Isthat the management of theater-level combatservice support in an austere environment issomething In which we excel. The basic concept forUNOSOM was that support funLd%!igrs would beorganized around the U.N. Logistics SupportCommand (UNLSC)-a structure that closely anddeliberately resembled an Army Corps SupportGroup.

This command was augmented by U.S. logisticspersonnel as well as task-organized units from thesmaller IIaLiuilla cutnUngents. Although the tcrms ofreference for each member of the muitinationalcontingcnt spcciflcd the types of support theywould give and receive, the general rule was thatthe UNLSC would provide common user items(such as fuel and water) while the nationalcontingents supplied their own specific needs

(ammunition and maintenance). In practice.however, the wide variations in the equipmentbrought by the national contingents meant thatthere was a constant competition for resources.w.th the United States often making up thedifference. As the operation progressed into moreintense combat, and with correspondingly greaterlogistical demands. the presumption of self-

NE


sfficiency broke down more and more. Althoughsuch responsibilities had never been intended, thissmall logistical force eventually provided bothgeneral support and direct support to a largeportion of the coalition. The resulting demands onboth the U.N. logistics structure and its American

" underpinnings were intense-and accomplished• :'•'- ",: -• • :.only by the extraordinary efforts of U.S. logistical

personnel. As both history and precedent. there islittie question that the logistical ability the U.S.

displayed in Somalia will either be requested orcopied in all future peace operations.

In peace opezratks, especily muiltinatikWl ones,ft in essmtWl that edicall support e er l camprepured to deal with so of the wari's motdeadly and exotic diseass.

The United States has had significant experience incoping with the challenges of medical care inaustere environments. What made Somalia uniquewas that there were literally no host, countryhospital facilities to augment those that the UnitcdStates was prepared to bring. One lesson from thatexperience is that it will be useful in the future totrack medical facilities theaterwide, as well ascountrywide. As an example. !t became necessaryto arrange for the evacuation of U.S. personnel toneighboring Kenya and their treatment there.Another point is that medical intelligence is crucial

-1_______ __________ __________________________

OPCRA11ONAL LESSONS LZARN•D 85

in helping prevent exposure to Indigenous diseases.In Somalia. earthmoving equipment brought in torepair roads and other facilities releasedtuberculosis spores long dormant in the soil. Anadditional problem to be faced was that the fullrange of expertise in tropical medicine wasrequired. to help treat the medical problems not

""' ,.] ordy of the indigenous population but those of themultinational contingents as well. Although theUnited States may not be directly responsible forthese personnel. it is probably inevitable that wewill be expected to give some form of medicalsupport to future coalition partners.

LessonAn eftetwe public Ithm propa Is catkblto the success of any epraes, esp1dafl thsee

oving peace ng peeeepg.

The lessons learned from SomaLa about militaryrelations with the media suggest the importance oftwo things:

• First. there must be an efficient means ofdealing with visitors. including not only the mediabut congressional leaders and other public figures.The horror of the suffering in Somalia as well asthe role of American forces in an entirely newoperational setting were bound to attract suchattention-and did so consistently. Most publicaffairs operations in the military are well equlppedto handle such duties, but planning for their


employment in peace operations should not be leftto chance. In fact. a good rule may be to have thepublic affairs team on the first plane in country.

0 The second point is the importance ofinformation. If the mission has been well analyzed.the correct milestones chosen. and the means ofcollecting the appropriate indicators determined.

*= the leadership will have an effective degree of

situation awareness. The commander's ability tocommunicate that situational awareness to themedia (as well as the chain of command) is a realtest of leadership. How well the public informationofficer defines that situation in every publiccomment. TV appearance. or newspaper interviewwill similarly help to determine how the mission isperceived at the tactical. operational, and strategiclevels. The uncomfortable glare of the mediaspotlight is a necessary part of the consensus-building process which, as MG Montgomerypointed out. is an intrinsic part of combinedoperations in any multinational setting. As usual.this was a lesson learned the hard way:

U.S. forces in UNOSOM II had no public affairs

organization. And one of the major lessonslearned is that any U.S. force which is part of a"U.N. operation must have a first class public"affairs section In the future. After 3 October Iwas sent a 30-man Joint Information Bureau-and quality of coverage Improved enormouslythereafter.

The responsibility of sharing situationalawareness with the media is a basic and most

IN_

OPERATONAL LESSONS LZARNO 87

important function in an age where informationespecially affects those militM-y acUvitLs carriedout with the concurmnce of the iaternationalcommunity. In our system. however, the mediaspotlight serves the additional purpose of publicaccountability and highlights our special"responsibilities whencver we put the lives of

•................American troops at risk--something that is aninevitable part of any peace operation.

M. CONCLUSIONSThe dWartce bftwn gentus and stupitd is thatgenus has L1mU&

Anonymous

The basic cballenge confronting those who commitU.S. forces to peace operations is knowing how toget them in effectively when the situationwarrants-and how to get them out once theirmission has been accomplished. While recognizingthe importance of "perseverance" in operationsother than war. the real test of this principle is toensure that the United States remains able toproject its power when needed-and avoidsIndefinite commitments at the expense of Its otherresponsibilities worlawide. By itself. our operationsin Somalia did not seriously interfere with thosereponsibtlitles. but the record of our Interventioninto thatmost-infortunatecountryteaches us that--

., there must bc limits to the commitment ofAmerican military power. That experience alsosuggests the existencc of certain "bright lines" inpeace operations Indicating when those limits arebeing reached. One of them Inivoes the use ofmilitary forces in ncatlr-butkdrLgn a mission foruitch our forces should not be prmuarilyresponsible. While military power may well set the"stage for such action, the real responsibility for

89

t4


nation-building must be carried out by the civilianagencies of the government better able to specializein such long-term humantiarian efforts. Another"bright line" is any action in a peace operation thateffectively takes sides between factions engaged ininternal civil strife--clearly as much of a problemfor U.S. troops in Somali as it was for an earlier"generation of American soldiers in the DominicanRepublic and Lebanon. Such actions certainlyinclude coercive disarmament of a populace, an actthat Is qualitatively different from simplycontrolling or confiscating the arms which mayovertly threaten the peacekeeping force. Thereason: In societies where peacekeeping may beneeded, the distribution of arms reflects internalpower structures (political. cultural, ethnic or eventribal) that can be expected to fight to maintaintheir position. Ifthe dlsarmanent ofthepopulatlonbecomes un objectie. tlIeiL Lhere zdwuld be nomistaking the fact that the troops given thismission have been committcd to combat.

The uncertainties surrounding the Somaliaoperations also underline the importance ofunderstanding the strengths and limitations of theUnited Nations and other international institutions.In the case of the United Nations, this meansensuring that its mandates are precise and fullyreflect a clear understanding of a given situationand its military Implications. The importance ofthis principle cannot be understated: the Somaliaexperience shows Just how directly the changingmandates of the United Nations shaped thedifferent missions of the military forces sent there.Future American policymakers familiar with this

CONCLUSIONS 91

record wil have strong incentives to ensure thatchanges in any future U.N. mandate are fullyreconciled with the specific military capabilitiesrequired to execute them. That experience suggestsas well why the Presidential Directive ol May 1994stated that U.N. command would not be the tool ofchoice In future peace enforcement operations. The

" ' larger point here. however. Pi not whether U.S.soldiers shouid serve under U.N. control: Nosoldiers Qf any nattono&l• should be expected toserve under the U.N. comnund structure in anw1combat setting until the rejbrms calledfir by thePresident in PDD-25 have been put in plafe. At aminumum, such reforms must achieve moreeffective mean. than those demonstrated inSomalia for commanding, controlling, coordinating.and communicating with multinational forcescommitted to peace operations.

TheseJ•i}xWuiLtiwLs bhuuld not blind us. howcvcr.to the great strengths which U.N. agencies andhumanitarian rclicf organizations bring to theinternational arena. Some of the most valuablecontributons by U.S. and coalition troops InSomalia were digging the wells, grading the roads.and working side by side with many of the agencieslisted in appendix B. agencies that are the real

., peacekeepers and peacebuilders. But we shouldunderstand that their perspectives reflectpermanent commitments. while militaryperspectives are necessarily shorter. Even moreImportant is the recognition that the carefulintegration of diplomatic and military activities withhumanitarian actions not only contributes to theoverall success of the mission but also reduces the

I

92 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LFARNED

potential for casualties.The need to work effectively with coalition

partners also highlights the difficulty of exercisingunity of command in anything like the classicsense. Unaty of effort, or at least unity of purpose,is a more rcalistic goal In coalition operations--as

, , jit has been since the Peloponnesian Wars.However, there is no reason why we should settlefor anything less than unity of command over theAmerican forces that way be committed to pecceoperations or. for that matter, any other Jointoperation. The three chains of command rtrwningduring UNOSOM II underline the importance of aiesson that should be adapted from Murphy's Lawsof Conmbat: If it takes more than 10 seonds toe~xplafn the command arangements. they. probablywon't work.

The way in which command was structured by.tiL U.S. fu,-cc.- bentL Lu Sumalia iso deserves somccareful attention in the future because of thepersistent problems In organizing Joint task forces.While there is lively debate about whether theunified commands should organize "standing Jointtask forces," there' should now be little doubt thatthe organization of the headquarters for those taskforces is an issue that should no longer be left tolast-minute arrangements. More specifically, ithelps If any Joint headquarters is built around anucleus of people already accustomed to workingtogether, and it helps even more if that nucleusreflects solid expertise in joint and combinedoperationv. There should be no question thatdeveloping and broadening this expertise is afundamental requirement for the American m'ilitary

CONCLUSIONS 93

establishment. During UNOSOM II. for example.U,S. forces were also engaged in 12 other macoroperations requiring the formation of joint taskforces-operations ranging from patrolling no-flyzones over Iraq to providing flood relief in theAmerican Midwest. Far from being unusual orextraordinary events, it should be recognized that

'I the formation of Joint task forces has now become"business as usual" for the Armed Forces of theUnited States.

Another basic insight coming out of the Somaliaexperience Is that the new emphasis on peaceoperations has not rescinded the fundamentals ofmilitary operations. As always those missions mustbegin with a strategy that focuses on long-terminterests. The lack of a consistent "big picture"focus was clearly one of the things that complicatedthe transitions between the various phases of theoperauon--he relative buccess of UNITAF makingthe task of UNOSOM II more difficult. Equallyfundamcntal military tasks are those that must bedeveloped from a clear strategy: mission analysisand operations plans leading to clearly definedobjectives. While those tasks were certainlyundertaken in Somalia. the record of what we didthere also contains a clear warning for the future:Beuzre if the temptation to do too much.

Giving in to that temptation is an occupationalhazard In an institution built around can-doattitudes and the expectation of success. All themore reason, then. to insure that the analysis ofany peace operation includes the selection of thoseIndicators that can best measure missionaccomplishment. What signs, for example. would

94 SOMALIA OPERAMTONS: LESSONS LEARNED

show if the levels of violence were increasing ordecreasing? How should these things be measuredand by what part of the command? Such anunconventional approach to mission analysis mayalso help to focus on something clearly missing inSomalia-emphasizing single operations ratherthan focussing on the continuity of the mission as

.' a whole frota the overriding perspective of U.S.interests. It is this perspective that should guidethe determination of entry and exit strategies, aswell as fix our position at any moment on the L-.-!between them.

Three other Issues arise from the Somaliaexperience that may have equally lastingsignificance because they show how U.S. militarypower is adjusting to the realities of the post-ColdWar world:

0 In deployment patterns, for example. wehave long excelled at quickly moving large numbersof forces, supplies, and equipmentoverseas-prcclscly as we would have done in theevent of a NAM reinforcement. In peaceoperations, eopecially those where the majorfunction is disaster relief or humanitarian aid. wewill certainly need to be able to flne tune thosedeployments. Rather than massive airlifts, forexample. it may make more sense to put a futureJTF commander in on the ground as early aspossible and allow him to tailor the package asneeded. This will certainly mean adjusting JOPESand TPFDD procedures to allow the additionalflexibility. Conversely, it will also mean evengreater emphasis on user discipline, becauseJOPES. in particular. is the common link

CONCLUSIONS 95

among the CINC. the components, the suppoxtingcommands, and the deploying forces.

0 The second issue is the understanding of theworld at large that the professional military bringsto its preparations for operations ranging frompeacekeeping to general war. It used to be that

' . I most of this expertise was centered on the SovietUnion. Western Europe. or Korea. for obviousreasons. Now. however, the importance of morebroadly focused "area studies" has increased.despite the fact that acquiring this expertise hasnot been a traditional milestont on the path tohigher level command, ad•rancement, andpromotion. The Somalia experience underlines theimportance of knowing the country, the culture. theground. and the language as a pre-conditlon formilitary operations. with improvisations In thisinstance making notably good use of the expertisebrought by Reserve Component personnel. Anothcirecent example of the particular strengths of havinga commander schooled in a local culture was

I...provided by Generai Norman Schwarzkopf.Although his exposure to Middle Eastern culturecame primarily from his boyhood experiences in theregion, this expertise was especially valuable inleading the Gulf War coalition. Insuring as a matterof policy that the future officer corps will havesimilar strengths is an issue that must be carefullyaddressed within the military educationalestablishment.

* The third issue is one that is quicklysummed up: Peace operations such as those inSomalia show how the training and professionalismof the men and women in our Armed Forces are as

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96 SOMAUA OPERATTONS: LESSONS LEARNED

important in adapting to the requirements of new,nontraditional missions as they are in carrying outthe demands of more conventional scenarios. Forthose forces likely to be deployed as peacekeepers.supplementary training is always a good idea-forsituation-specific orientations, for familiarization

S..• with typical operational tasks, and especially forbuilding the staff competencies required by Joint ormultinational environments.

There is. however, an important senae in whichthe most basic qualification of our Armed Forces toact as peacekeepers rests upon their credibility aswarfighters. Their technical competence andphysical prowess allow our soldiers, sailors.airmen, and marines to prevail in any operationalenvironmental: but their record of going in harm's

~.I

CONCLUSIONS 97

way in the cause of peace is one that preceded ourInterventlon in Somalia and that will endure longafter the controversies surrounding it have faded.President Clinton surely bpoke for the Americanpeople when he welcomed home the 10th MountainDivision after their redeployment from Somalia InMarch 1994:

If there are any debates still to be had about ourmission in Somalia. let people have thosedebates with me. But let there be no debateabout how you carried out your misseon .... Youhave shown the world what Americans are madeof. Your nation is grateful and your President isterribly, terribly proud of you.

40

APPENDIX ASSelected BibHography

Listed below are publication leveloped by the- Joint Staff and the military s,'- ,i,.es that may assist

'" ..... . the JTF Commander tri •eitons like Somalia."where the en'.,-!ronmer )s unpredictable. theoperation falls In tle .-,.•egory of "other than war."and there may b,- ilier agencies. nations. andprivate organizatio( U 1nvolved. Publications still Indraft form are nowvetleless listed so the reader maywatch for their publication.

Joint PublcatimmJoint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 1. "Joint

Warfare of the US Armed Forces." U.S.Govcrnmcnt Printing Omce. Washington.DC. 11 November 1991.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. ,Joint Pub 0-2. "UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAA." U.S.Government -Printing Office. Washington.DC. 11 August 1994.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrinefor Joint Operations." U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office. Washington. DC. 9September 1993.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07, "JointDoctrinefor Mfiitary Operations Other ThanWar." (Draft)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07.1, "Joint

99

RWM


Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forForeign Internal Defense (FID).' U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington. DC.20 December 1993.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07.3. "JointTactics, Techniques. and Procedures forPeacekeeping Operations." U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office. Washington. DC. 29 April 1994.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07.6. "JointTactics, Techniques, ancProceduresfor ForeignHumanitarian Assistance." (Draft)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-17, Joint ThctlcsTechniques and Procedures for Thezxter ALrl4ftOperations." (Draft) Joint Chiefs of Staff. JointPub 5-00.2. "Joint Task Force PlanningGuidance'and Procedures." U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office. Washington. DC. 3 September1993.

Mum-Se"vlce PuiblewcowmAir Land Sea Application Center. "MuIL-Service

Procedures for Humanitarian AssistanceOperation&" (Draft) This publication is indevelopment as of this writing. Each servicewill adopt it into their publications system uponcompletion.

US. Army PublicationHeadquarters. Department cf the Army. Field

Manual 7-98. "Operations in Low IntensityCorUflct." U.S. Government Printing Omce,Washington. DC. 19 October 1992.

Headquarters. Department of the Army. Field

APPENDIX A 101

Manual 100-7. "Decistie Force: The Army InTheater Operations." (Final Draft)

Headquarters. Department of the Army. eldManual 100-8. "Multinational ArmyOperations." (Final Draft)

Headquarters. Department of the Army. FedManual 100-16. "Army OperationaL Support.""(Final Draft)

Headquarters. Department of the Army. FieldManual 100-23, "Peace Operations." (FinalDraft)

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Handbook forthe Soldier In Operations Other Than War(OOTW." U.S. Government Printing Office,Washington. DC. July 1994.

U.S. Navy PublieadonwHeadquarters. Department of the Navy. TACNOTE

ZZ 0050.1.94. "'Muritime InterccpttonOperations." U.S. Government Printing Office.Washington. DC. 1 July 1994.

Headquarters. Department of the Navy. TACMEMOXZ 0057.1.92. "Maritime Conduct ofNoncombatant Evacuation Operations." (Draft)U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington.DC. 30 May 1993.

Headquarters. Department of the Navy. TACMEMOXZ 0021.1.93, "Expeditionary ForcesConducting Humanitarian Assistance-" (Draft)

U. .Mmwi.ne o " I'm bmlapdoHeadquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Fleet Marine

Force Manual 1-5, "Maritime Prepositloned

z~wt

102 SOMALA OPERATMONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Shipping" U.S. Government Printing Office.Washington. DC. September 1993.

Headquarters. U.S. Marine Corps. Fleet MarineForce ManuaL 1-23. "Forcible EntryOperations" (Draft)

Headquarters. U.S. Marine Corps. Fled MarineFr.e Manual 4. "Contbat Service Support."U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington.DC. August 1993.

Headquarters. U.S. Marine Corps. OperationalHandbook 1-24. "Expedltionary ForcesConducting Humanitarian AssistanceMission&" U.S. Government Printing Office.Washington. DC. 1993.

US. Air Force PFe~eadomHeadquarters. U.S. Air Forc:e. Air Force Doctrine

Directiv 35, "Special Operatins." U.S.Government Printing Office. Washington. DC.

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Air Fbrce DoctrineDirective 3, "Militanry Operations Other ThanWc•.__•Daft ..

Headquarters. U.S. Air Force. Air Force DoctrineDirective 12, "Airspace Control in a CombatZone" (Draft)

Headquarters. U.S. Air Force. Air Force DoctrineD•rective 30, "ADrlit Operations." (Draft)

Deputy Chief of Staff. Plans and Operations:Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. JFACC Primer(Second Edition. February 1994). HQ,USAF/XOXD. Washington. DC. February 1994.

APP&NDUC A 103

Nadexal Dedoe Uniwvegy Pbed.

Although these NDU publications are not doctrinalin nature, they do contain Information that isvaluable to the operational commander.

Graham. James R.. ed. Non-Combat Rolejbr the

"U.S. Mglitary in the Post-Cold War Era. 1993.Lewis. William H., ed. Military Implicat ns Qf

United Ntions Peacekeeping Operatint& June1993.

Lewis. William H.. ed. P.aekeeping: The WayAhead? November 1993.

Lewis. William H., and Marks. Edward. DiC•eforFRyng States. January 1994.

Maurer. Martha. Coalition Command and ControL1994.

Quinn. Dennis J.. ed. Peace Support Operationsand the U.S. M(ltarj. 1994.

APPENDIX BtEumamtarim. Reule

Organizathmns Aetdve IU nomliwCRS Catholic Relief Services-Food and

clothing distributionIMC International Medical

Corps-Hospital support servicesAWO Abu Dabi Welfare

Organization-Funds for food andclothing

DCG Diakonic Care Germany-Assistance to children and orphans

CARE CARE International-General reliefservices for displaced people

ADRA Adventist Relief and DevelopmentAgrncy-Ald in local s.ehools. etc,

AMA Africa Muslims Agency-Generalwelfare support services

COSV Coordination Committee of-...- U.-gO-antzatxons for Volutary

Service-General management andsupervision services

AICF International Action Against.• - Famine-Emergency food relief

service"• I SOS Chlldrens Emergency

Services-Care and feeding forchildren

MERCY Mercy International-First aid and

105


related assistanceMSF Doctors Without Frontiers-Triage

support for illness and traumawounds

MCF Muwafaq CharityFoundation-Private Islamic groupproviding food and clothing

PSF Pharmacists Without Borders-Provides essential pharmacology

RIHS Revival Islamic HeritageSociety-Religious support services

SCR Swedish Church Relief-Generalfood and clothing aid

NORCROSS Nordic Red Cross-Provideemergency shelter and food

ICRC International Committee of the RedCross-Observer Status

FRCS Federation of the Red CrossSocicty-gcncral coordination

OXFAM Oxford Famine Relief-U.K. foodrelief organization

CWS Church World Services-Providefood and clothing

ACORD Agency for Cooperation andResearchDevlopment-Coordination ofplanning for infrastructure andinsititution building

AFSC American Friends ServiceCommittee-Emergency clothingand feeding

IARA Islamic African Relief Agency-Aidto indigent Muslims

IIRO International Islamic Relief

APPENDD B 107

Orgaz'zation-Food and clothingservices

IDRA International Development and-' Relief Agency-Coordinate relief

efforts on part of variousInternational organizations

"DAWA Munzarnai Islamic Society-Muslimrelief In form of clothing, etc.

MAUK Muslim Aid UK-Islamic suppcrt forneedy displaced persons

SCF Save the Children-U.K. and U.S.food and clothing relief aid

ACSSOM African Charity Society forMaternity and Childhood-Maternitysupport program

Unit"d Nadkm imtma ýsUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner

for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Childrens FundUNESCO_ United Nations Educational and

Scientific OrganizationUNDP United Nations Development

ProgramUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade

and DevlopmentECOSOC Economic and Social Council

- 111 't~uiu-Vflt

APP]WDIX CQMissions and lTak .f the UNfTfAFCavi.MItary Oprations Center

(`CMOC)

The CMOC was the key coordinating point forHumanitarian Relief Organizations In their dealingswith UNITAF.

1. Validation of requests for military support. Thisincluded requests within the Mogadishu area, longhaul convoy, security escorts to the interior, andrequests for support at specific sites within theUNITAF area of operations. Military support toHROs within a Humanitarian Relief Sector was

4. usually the responsibility of the local militarycommander and his CMOC.

2. Coordination of requests for military supportwithin the various military components of UNITAF.

3. Convening and hosting ad hoc mission planninggroups as an arm of the UNITAF J-3. for requestsinvolving complicated military support and/ornumerous military units and HROs.

4. Promulgating and explaining UNITAF policies to

109lieg


the humanitarian community.

5. Providing information on UNITAF operationsand the general secur4ty situation via daily securitybTrefings.

6. Administering and issuing HRO Identificationcards.

7. Validating HRO personnel requests for space-available seats on UNITAF aircraft.

8. Acting as an Interface, facilitator andcoordination agency between UNITAF elements andHROs and UNOSOM headquarters staff.

9. Chairing Mogadlshu Port Shipping Committeewhich dealt with pier space. port access and relatedis:sues important to HROs.

10. Acting as thc agcncy that rctrleved andreturned weapons confiscated from HROorganzations.

11. Responding to emergency requests forassistance from HROs in the Mogadlshu area eitherby responding directly with CMOC assets or byrequesting assistance via the UNITAF JointOperations Center (JOC).

12. Maint-Ining and operating a 24-hour watch in

the CMOC.

13. Maintaining contact with regional CMOCs.

APPVIDDCC Il

14. Supporting. as required. a six-person CivilAffairs Team.

15. Facilitating the creation of a Food LogisticsSystem for Somalia which factored in food stocks,

: . -idelivery dates, warehousing capacitles, transport"availability and road repair efforts to create a basicmatrix for food relief efforts within the UNITAF area"of operations. W.

* Rank "EWtComumand

Colonel DirectorLL Colonel Deputy Director

OpectrtnsMajor Operations/CIl Affairs

Opcratlons OfficerCaptain (2) Asst Operations OfficerMSgt OperaUons Cb!efSFC Admin ChiefS9t AMt Admin Chief

• Cpl and Below Driver/Securilty/Clerk

Major Convoy/Contol/"Transportation Officer

Captain AMt Tr7nportation OfficerSPC Air NCOCpl Driver/Security/Clerk

... t .. , . .' -. •4

ABOUT T=E AUTH@E

COL Kenneth Allard, U.S. Army. is Senior MilitaryFellow at the Institute for National StrategicStudies. National Defense University. and also

',. -• . ... serves as an Adjunct Professor in the NationalSecurity Studies Program at GeorgetownUniversity. Previously he was Special Assistant tothe Chief of Staff of the Army from 1987-1990 afterhaving worked on the 1986 DOD Reorganization(Goldwater-Nichols) Act as an Army CongressionalFellow. In addition to operational intelligenceassignments in the United States and overseas, hehas 3erved on the faculty of the Social SciencesDepartment. United States Military Academy, andas Dean of Students at the National War College.

COL Alltrd has written c..tcnsivcly oninformation warfare, the military-technicalrcvolution, and defense procurement reform. His"most recent full-length-work., Command. Controland the Common Dqfense (Yale University Press,"1990), won the 1991 National Security Book Awardand is included on the professional military readinglist recommended by the Chairman of the Joint

• -" ' Chiefs of Staff.COL Allard holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher

School of Law & Diplomacy and an MPA fromHarvard University.

* U.S. G.P.O.:1995-387-330:20002 113

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SOMALIA OPERATIONS&Lessns Learned

Composed in Brooklyn typefaceTitles set in Bodnoff

Cover design: Rhonda Gross

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