about congo

8/3/2019 About Congo

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AIIndex:AFR62/017/2002 AmnestyInternational22October2002

Contents

1. Introduction........................................................................................................12. Asquanderedheritage?......................................................................................33. MIBA..................................................................................................................54. Guardingthediamondconcessions....................................................................75. Shootingsintheconcessions............................................................................106. Rough justice....................................................................................................167. Silencingthecritics..........................................................................................178. Turningablindeye...........................................................................................199. TrainingMIBAsguards..................................................................................2010.Makinghumanrightseveryonesbusiness......................................................2211.Conclusion........................................................................................................2412.Recommendations............................................................................................26

TotheDRCgovernment..................................................................................26

TotheZimbabweangovernment......................................................................28

ToMIBA..........................................................................................................28

TotheminorityshareholdersinMIBA............................................................29

Totheinternationalcommunity.......................................................................30

13.Footnotes..........................................................................................................31

amnesty internationalDemocratic Republic of Congo Making a killing :The diamond trade in government-controlled DRC


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DRC-Makingakilling 1

AmnestyInternational22October2002 AIIndex:AFR62/017/20021

DemocraticRepublicofCongo

MakingakillingThediamondtradeingovernment-controlledDRC

Amnesty International: What do you do when someone is shot dead in yourdiamondconcessions?Diamondcompanyofficial:Nothing.1

1.IntroductionEverydaybloodisbeingspilledinthediamondfieldsoftheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC),andnobodyintheinternationalcommunityiseventalkingaboutit.Inthe capital Kinshasa, the government is able to announce, unchallenged, itscommitment to an international system aimed at breaking the links between thediamond trade and human rights violations,2while in Mbuji-Mayi, the hub of thecountrysdiamond industry, seriousabusesdirectlyconnected tothediamond trade

areoccurringonadailybasis,largelyunchecked. Dozens of people are being shot dead every year in the diamond fields ofMbuji-Mayi. Still more are being shot and wounded, often seriously. Dozens,includingmany children, arebeing heldwithout charge in appalling conditions bysecurityforceswhohavenoformalauthoritytodetainthem. Mostofthevictimsaresuspectedtobe responsibleforillegalmining in thediamondconcessions.Theshootingsoccurmainlywithintheconcessions,wheremostofthevictimshavenolegalrighttobe.Butnoneofthisdiminishestheirentitlementtotheirbasicrights,which include therightto life, therightnot tobesubjectedto

cruel,inhumananddegradingtreatmentorpunishmentandtherighttoafairtrial. In some cases,the victims may themselves be armed,or bewith an armedescort, and therefore pose a genuine threat to the safety of those guarding theconcessions.Butinthemajorityofcasesthesesuspectedillegalminersarenotarmedandtheuseoffirearmsagainstthemcannotbejustified.Shootingthemdead,insuchcircumstances,amountstoextrajudiciallyexecutingthem. 3


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2 DRC-Makingakilling


2

Despite this, toAmnesty Internationals knowledge,nota singlestate agenthas ever been prosecuted for the unlawful killing of a suspected illegal miner inMbuji-Mayi.Thosewhoguardthediamondconcessionsareacting, andarekilling,with utter impunity. The Congolese authorities refuse to acknowledge that theseabusesareeventakingplaceandtheycrackdownhardonlocaljournalistsandhumanrightsactivistswhodenouncewhatisreallyhappening. Relativesofthosewoundedorkilledinthediamondconcessionsareresignedtothefactthatthere is littlehopeofobtainingredressthroughthecourts,whichareforthemostpartsubjecteithertopoliticalinterference,ortocorruption,ortoboth.It

isoneofthemanytangibleandeverydaywaysinwhichordinaryCongolesecitizensexperiencebeingdisenfranchisedoftheirbasicrights.Italsoexemplifiesthebroaderfailings of governance in the DRC, whereby those who govern are not generallyaccountable,anddonotconsiderthemselvestobeaccountable,tothepopulationtheygovern. This lack of accountability is not only a major contributor tothe countryspoorrecordinthesphereofcivilandpoliticalrights,butisalsoakeyfactorinthefailure of successive Congolese governments to promote the countrys social andeconomicdevelopmentmoreeffectively.ThediamondsofMbuji-Mayi,togetherwiththeDRCs abundant reservesof cobalt, coltan4, copper, gold, timber, uranium and

water,5mayhaveledtothecountrybeingdescribedasageologicalscandal.Butthetruescandalisinfactapoliticalandahumanone:thisvastnaturalpotentialhasneverbeen properly exploited to thebenefit ofthe population asawhole.Unaccountablegoverning elites have instead become rich through the mismanagement ormisappropriation of the countrys national resources, while remaining apparentlyindifferenttothenegativeconsequencesthishashadforthecountrysoverallsocio-economicdevelopment.Forallthecountrysgreatpotentialwealth,in2002theDRCwas ranked in 155th place out of 173 countries in a United Nations survey ofdevelopment.6Thepriceofwealthandprivilegeforarulingelitehastoalargeextentbeentheimpoverishmentofanation.

WhilethisreportfocusesontheabusesassociatedwiththeexploitationofoneparticularnaturalresourceinonespecificplacethediamondsofMbuji-Mayithesituationdescribedthereisinmanywayscharacteristicofthesituationwhichprevailsacross theDRC.Throughoutthecountry, state institutionssuch asthe judiciary arefailingtodischargetheirdutiesadequately;alackoftransparencyandaccountabilityispromotinginstitutionalisedcorruptionandmismanagementofstateresourcesattheexpenseofsocialandeconomicdevelopment;andveryhighlevelsofhumanrights


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violations,oftenconnectedwiththeexploitationofnaturalresourcesorconflictsoverthe control of those resources, are being committed with more or less completeimpunity.

2.Asquanderedheritage?

Naturalresourcesaremorallyneutral.Assuchtheycanbeasourceofgreat

good[]ordreadfulill[]Thekeyelementisnottheresourceitself,but

howit isexploitedandAfricaprovidestellingexamplesofboth.Anorderly

miningregime,operatingwithinatransparentandpredictablelegislativeandfiscal framework,can beamajor source ofprosperity forgovernments and

people.Withoutit,mineralwealthespecially,butnotexclusivelyinitsmore

accessibleforms -willbe amagnet for the greedyandcorrupt tolinetheir

ownpocketsat the expense of the people [...]Once the rot has set in, it is

virtually unstoppable, until the entire fabric of economic and social

developmenthasbeencompletelyeroded.7

ThehistoryoftheCongosincethelate19thcenturyhasprovidedampleexamplesofhowtheunprincipledexploitationof natural resourcescangiverise tohuman rightsabuses. It has also demonstrated how corruption or themismanagement of natural

resources can undermine a countrys development and hence the enjoyment by itscitizens of their social and economic rights. Kleptocratic administrations gearedtowards the personal enrichment of a ruling elite at the expense of the generalpopulation havehad anenormouslynegative impacton thecountry and its citizensdowntheyears. Thefirst large-scaleplunderingof Congolesenatural resources began in thelate 19th centurywithBelgian colonial rule andthetrade in rubber and ivory.TheCongolesepopulationwastreatednotastherightfulownersorbeneficiariesoftheseresources,butsimplyasasourceofcheaporslavelabourfortheirexploitation.KingLeopoldIIaccruedvastpersonalwealthwithouteversettingfootonCongolesesoil.Horrendous human rights violations, including unlawful killings, torture andmutilations,wereperpetratedintheprocess. 8 With the accession to powerof PresidentMobutu Sese Sekoin 1965,therebeganasustainedperiodofinstitutionalisedcorruptionandmisappropriationofstateresources.Largeproportionsoftherevenuesfromstate-ownedcompanies,suchasthecopperandcobaltcompanyGcamines,wentnottothestatetreasurybutstraightinto


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4

the pockets of President Mobutu and his closest allies. Meanwhile, PresidentMobutus policy of Zairianisation, which was purportedly a drive to reassertauthentic African customs and values in the face of encroaching Western values,entailed the nationalisation of foreign-owned businesses and investments.Many ofthesewere then expropriated by PresidentMobutus allies, thewholeprocess thusamountingtoafurthermeansofillegitimatelyseizingwealth.Foreignaidintendedtopromote socio-economic development was also routinely misappropriated. WhilePresidentMobutubecamenotoriouslyrich,stateinstitutionswereneglectedandthecountrysinfrastructuresteadilydecayed.Justasstateofficialssuspectedofengagingincorruptionwerevirtuallyneverbroughttobook,sotheywerehardlyeverheldtoaccountformassiveviolationsofcivilandpoliticalrightscommittedduringPresident

Mobutu'srule. WiththearrivalofLaurent-DsirKabila,whoproclaimedhimselfpresidentof theDRC inMay 1997 and remained in power untilhis assassination in January2001, foreign players engaged in a renewed scramble to benefit from Congolesenatural resources.Avariety of lucrativedealswere struckwithAngolan,Namibianand Zimbabweaninterests,mostly inreturn for theirmilitarysupport in theDRCsongoingconflict.9Inareasofthecountryunderthecontrolofthearmedopposition,asimilarpatternofforeignexploitationofnaturalresourcesemerged,withRwandaandUgandabeingthemainbeneficiaries. 10

InJuly1999PresidentKabilasignedovertheexclusiverightstoexploittwoof the DRCs richest diamond concessions for a period of 25 years to a partlyZimbabwean-owned joint venture which later became known as Sengamines. Theconcessions, which comprise alluvial deposits and six kimberlite pipes, 11 werepreviously owned by MIBA, the DRCs largely state-owned diamond miningcompany. The exact terms and conditions of this arrangement remain opaque. NoofficiallegaldecreeannouncingthecreationofSengaminesanddetailingitsstatutesappears tohavebeenpublished,andthecompany isnotaffiliatedto theFdrationdesEntreprisesduCongo(FEC),CongoBusinessesFederation,whichisalsoausualCongoleselegalrequirement.Thiseffectiveprivatisationoflargelystate-ownedassetsdoesnotappeartohavebeencarriedoutaccordingtoanyinternationallyrecognised

principlesofpublic tendering and bidding,whichmight have ensured that thesalewasasbeneficialaspossibletotheCongolesestate. Instead,theSengaminesarrangementappearstobeoneofthelatestinalonglineofdealsinvolvingtheDRCsnaturalresourcestobenefitasmall,eliteminorityattheexpenseofthegeneralpopulation.Theprinciplebeneficiariesofthedeal,throughtheirshareholdings,arethoughttohaveincludedPresidentKabilahimself,anumber


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ofCongolesegovernmentministers andhigh-rankingmembers of theZimbabweanmilitary. 12 The benefit to the DRC state itself, however, is unclear. Observersinterviewed by a United Nations investigation team estimated the value of theconcessions ceded to Sengamines at several billion USdollars and considered thattheir loss was likely to irreparably weaken MIBA. 13 In addition, Sengamines isthought to enjoy the special privilege of not paying any taxes to the DRC state,therebyfurtherdeprivingthestateofrevenueswhichmighthavebeenusedtoachieverelevant development goals and promote the social and economic rights of thepopulation.14

Duringpeacetalksheldinearly2002aimedatendingtheconflictintheDRC,all parties, including the DRC government, agreed upon the need to review allcommercialcontractsconcludedsincethestartoftheconflictinAugust1998inordertoascertaintheirvalidity. 15Thiswasaresponsetowidespreadallegationsthatmany,ifnotall,ofthewarringpartieshavebeenengagedintheillegitimateexploitationoftheDRCs natural resources.A comprehensive reviewof the Sengamines contractwouldbeinkeepingwiththecommitmenttheDRCgovernmenthasexpressedinthisrespect. The basicprinciple underpinning sucha reviewshould bethatcommercialcontractsinvolvingnationalresourcesshouldcontributetotheprogressiverealisationofthepopulationssocialandeconomicrightsandnotdeprivethemofthebenefitstobe gained from their countrys natural resources. 16 Ensuring that all future suchcontracts are negotiated transparently and according to internationally recognisedtendering principles for privatisation would also afford greater guarantees that thestateanditscitizensobtainthemaximumpossiblebenefitfromsucharrangements. 17 Accountability in the commercial sphere is as crucial to promoting humanrights, includingsocialandeconomic rights,as accountability inthe politicalsphereis. Just as the DRCgovernmentmustbring an end to impunity for perpetrators ofhuman rights abuses, so it must address the endemic problems of corruption andfinancialmismanagementinordertoensurethatthecountryshugepotentialwealthisexploited as effectively as possible to the tangible benefit of the population as a

whole.

18

3.MIBATheSocitminiredeBakwanga19,knownmostcommonly by itsacronymMIBA,wasfoundedin1961andistodaytheDRCsmaindiamondminingcompany,withanofficial annual turnover in the region of $US70 million.20 Its main operations are


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6

centred in and around the government-controlled town of Mbuji-Mayi, which islocatedintheprovinceofKasaOriental,some950kmeastofthecapitalKinshasa. 80%ofMIBAssharesareownedbytheCongolesestateandtheremaining20%byanumbrellagroupcalledSIBEKA,whichconsistsoftheminingcompanyDeBeers,witha19.56%stake,andaBelgiancompanycalledUmicore,whichownstheother 80.44% of SIBEKA shares. MIBA officially describes itself as a limitedcompany21anditdoesindeedfunctionasacorporateentity.Butatthesametimeitisalsoeffectivelyastateactor,withtheDRCgovernmentexercisingdirectpoliticalandoperationalcontroloverthecompany.Theselling-offoftwokeyMIBAconcessionsto theSengamines jointventure in 1999, for example,was orchestrateddirectly by

President Kabila and it is unlikely that MIBA officials would have been in anypositiontoinfluencethisdecision,eveniftheyhadconsideredthatitwentagainstthebestinterestsofthecompany.MIBA'scurrentmanagementcommittee,includingthecompany'smanagingdirector(Prsidentdirecteurgnral,PDG),wasalsoappointedbythegovernment.Photocaption:AMIBAdiamond-processingplantinthe polygoneconcession.

Despite the loss of the two valuable concessions to Sengamines,MIBA is

thought to remain the largest single contributor to the DRC treasury. SeveralCongolese government authorities and MIBA officials interviewed by AmnestyInternationalstressedthatMIBAisakeypartofthewareffort.MIBA isalsoeasilythelargestemployerintheKasaregion,employingsome6,000workersandaround1,300securityguards.Inanefforttoaddresstheglaringdisparitybetweentherichesassociatedwith the diamond business and the poverty experienced by most of thelocal population,MIBAhasover theyearsallocatedaproportionof its revenues tocommunitywelfareprojects.ThecompanyprovidesMbuji-Mayiwithelectricityandwith clean drinking water and contributed to the establishment of Mbuji-Mayisuniversity.Ithasbuilthousing,principallyforMIBAemployees,ahospitalandsomeschools.IthasalsosetupabodycalledtheFondationMIBA,knownbytheacronym

FOMI, which has the stated aim of providing drinking water, health centres andschoolstopopulationsintheruralareassurroundingMbuji-Mayi. 22 NotwithstandingMIBAscontributionstolocaldevelopmentandtothelocaleconomy, the overall socio-economic situation in Mbuji-Mayi is somewhat bleak.BeyondMIBA,employmentopportunitiesarelimited,andevenwherepeoplemanagetosecurejobs,thewagescanbeextremelylow.Civilservantsaresometimesunpaid


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altogether.FormanypoororunemployedCongolese, the lureofMIBAsdiamondsprovestoogreattoresistandmanyhundredsopttomakeanillegallivingbytryingtosteal from the diamond concessions. In so doing, they are taking an enormouspersonalriskandmanypaytheultimateprice:dozensofillegalminersareshotdeadinMIBAsdiamondconcessionseveryyear.

4.GuardingthediamondconcessionsProtecting its concessions from theft has always been one of MIBAs biggestchallenges.Thesheernumberofpeoplewhoseektoentertheconcessions illegally,estimatedtonumberwellovera thousand every night,coupledwith theabsenceofsecureperimeterfencesandindeedacertainambiguityastotheexactboundariesoftheconcessions,23makes thetaskofguardingtheconcessionsavirtually impossibleone.Atbest,MIBAcanonly hope to limit thenumbersof illegalminerswhogainaccess.Onlyasmallproportionofthosewhodogainaccessareeverarrested. The scale of the challenge was clear during a day-time visit to a MIBAdiamond concession known as thepolygone (polygon) in October 2001. AmnestyInternational delegates observed a group of some 150 apparently illegal miners

(knownlocally ascreuseurs, ordiggers),whowere standing inthe shallowsof theRiver Lubilanji, at a pointwhere a canal flows out into the river from one of theMIBAprocessinginstallations.Mostappearedtobebetweenabout12and25yearsofageandwerecarryingbucketsandsiftingpansinordertosiftthewaterinthehopeoffindingfragmentsofdiamondintheshallowsoftheriver.InthepresenceofAmnestyInternational delegates, MIBA guards managed to arrest four of these suspectedillegal miners, using their own tops to tie their arms behind their backs beforetransporting them to a cell within the MIBA concession (see the section entitledRough Justice below). The youngest of those arrested was 14 years old.AmnestyInternational observed dozens of other suspected illegal miners throughout thepolygone concession.Thiswas inthemiddleoftheday-- fargreaternumbersenter

theconcessionsunderthecoverofdarkness.Photocaption:Suspected illegalminers,known locally ascreuseurs,sifting the bed of theRiverLubilanjifordiamonds,Mbuji-Mayi,October2001

The security arrangements which have been put in place to address the


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8

problemof illegalminersarebothcomplexandhighlyproblematic. Inthepast,thesecurity department was a comparatively well-structured service falling under theresponsibilityoftheBritmondarmofDeBeers.Butbythelate1990s,theguardingofthe concessions had ceased to operate under a single chain of command and hadbecome increasinglymilitarised, largelyasaconsequenceof thearmed conflictsof1996-1997 andof August 1998 tothepresent daywhichhavemadecontrol of theMbuji-Mayidiamondfieldsakeystrategicimperative. 24 In addition to the Congolese military, soldiers belonging to the ZimbabweDefenceForces(ZDF)havebeenchargedwithguardingtheconcessions. 25Theyareanswerabletotheirarmysuperiors,nottoMIBAofficials,andtheydonotappearto

have been integrated into any joint chain of command with their Congolesecounterparts.Itisunclearwhatlegalframework,ifany,theyareoperatingwithin.Themain contingent of Congolese guards, numbering around 1,000 in the polygoneconcession,areknownastheblondos,whotaketheirnamefromthepersonwhosetthemup.Photocaption:Suspectedillegalminersarrestedby blondos,Mbuji-Mayi,October2001Theblondos arecivilians anddonot officiallycarry firearms,although some carrycatapults,sticksandothersuchweapons.Theyreceivenoformaltraininginlawenforcement, despite being specifically charged with the task of arresting illegal

miners.Theblondosaresupervisedandregularlyaccompaniedbyofficiersdepolicejudiciaire(OPJs),JudicialPoliceOfficers,who,unlikethe blondos,docarryfirearms.NormallythestatusofOPJdenotesamemberoftheCongolesesecurityforceswithpowers of arrest, but a senior official in the Mbuji-Mayi judiciary told AmnestyInternational that the OPJs guarding the diamond concessions fall into a specialcategory of OPJs comptence restreinte (with restricted powers), who areemployed directly by MIBA and are supposedly answerable to MIBAs head ofsecurity,ratherthantopolicesuperiors.Itisunclearwhattraininginlawenforcement,ifany,theseOPJsreceive.Finally,MIBAalsousestheservicesofprivatesecurityfirms;suchcontractsarebelievedtobenegotiatedbythegovernmentratherthanbyMIBA officials, but the exact terms and conditions of these arrangements are

opaque.26 Noneofthosecurrentlyresponsibleforguardingtheconcessionsarebelievedtohavereceivedthoroughtraininginthebasicprinciplesoflawenforcement.Inanycase,thereappearstobelittleornoattemptonthepartofMIBAmanagementorthelocal stateauthoritiesto ensure thatMIBAguardsadhere to suchprinciplesor thattheyareheldtoaccountforactionswhichviolatethoseprinciples. 27


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These security arrangements are failing in another respect too -- theireffectiveness, in terms of keeping outor apprehending suspected illegal miners, isseriously compromised by widespread corruption among the very guards who aresupposedtobeprotectingtheconcessionsagainstillegalactivities.Whilesomeillegalminersentertheconcessionswithoutassistance,manyillegalminersconsideritmoreprudent,or perhaps potentiallymore lucrative,to enter into dealswiththeblondos,OPJsorsoldiers.28Guardswilloftengiveagroupofillegalminersapasswordwhichthey must use in order to be allowed to leave the concession at the end of theirclandestine shift; in October 2001 the price of a password was said to be the

equivalentofabout$7USdollars.Sometimestheminersarealsochargedperhead,and theguardsfrequently also insistupon ashareof thediamondsgathered.Giventhatonanyparticularnighttherearelikelytobeoverathousandillegalminerswithinthepolygone, it is easy to see that guardsworking in complicitywith theseminersstandtoaddsignificantly totheirofficialwages,whichareunderstoodtobearound$10aday. Illegalminershaveoftenfoundtotheircost,however,thatbeingincomplicitywithonesetofguardsdoesnotnecessarilyprotectthemfromtheattentionsofotherguardswhoarenotpartytoaparticulararrangement.Onoccasions,therehavebeenshoot-outs between different contingents of guards, who are respectively escortingillegalminersortryingtopreventthemfromstealingfromtheconcessions.Onotheroccasions,theguardswithwhomillegalminershavestruckdealswillrenegeonthosedeals,demandingalargersharethanoriginallyagreedorsimplytakingeverythingatgunpoint.Insomecases,guardshaveopenedfirewithoutwarningontheverypeopletheyhadearliertakenbribesfromandallowedintotheconcessions.Inthesevariousways,corruptionisgivingrisedirectlytosituationsinwhichindividualsarebeingputatriskofserioushumanrightsviolations.

5.Shootingsintheconcessions

Weallknowthatthey[theillegalminers]dontdoitforthesakeofdoingit.Thereisnoalternativetothat.Andwhenweseebodiesfloatingintheriver,or

survivorshidingtheirinjuriesforfearofreprisalsbytheauthorities,youjust

havethefeelingthattheseyoungpeoplearebeingkilledlikedogs.Theydont

haveanyrights.Andnoonetakesanyactiontoaddresstheissue.Everything

iscalmandlifegoeson.29

The combination of a lack of formal training for those guarding the MIBA


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10

concessions, the failureoftheMIBAmanagementor thelocalpolice authorities toinsist upon adherence by the guards to even the most basic principles of lawenforcement and widespread corruption among the guards has created an anarchicsituation in thediamondconcessions.Throughoutthe hoursofdarkness, shots ringoutfrom thediamondconcessions.A localresident toldAmnestyInternational thatone night he thought thewar had finally come toMbuji-Mayi, so intense was thegunfire.AseniorMIBAofficialadmittedtoAmnestyInternationalthathewouldnotventure into the concessions at night out of fear for his own personal safety. Theproximityofresidentialhousestotheconcessionshasevenresultedinseveralcasesoflocal residents being injured outside theconcessions bystray bullets.Forexample,NkomboKamangawashitinthelegbyastraybulletasshesleptinherbedatnight.

ShenowwalkswithalimpasaresultoftheinjuryandherfamilyisunderstoodtobeseekingcompensationfromMIBA.Thatmanyshotsare firedwithinthediamondconcessions isnotindoubt.AmnestyInternational observedhundredsofspentbullet cartridges onthegroundin justonesmallareaonthebankoftheRiverLubilanji.TheCongoleseauthoritiesandMIBAofficialsmaintainthattheshotsaremostlyfiredbyillegalminersinordertodisperseMIBAguardsand thereby gain entry tothe concessions.They furthermaintainthatthe OPJs and soldiersonduty at the concessionsonly ever use their arms in self-defence. In some cases, illegal miners are indeed armed, or are accompanied bycorruptMIBAguardsor otherstateofficialswhoarearmed.Onoccasions,thishas

ledtoshoot-outsintheconcessions.Inonesuchshoot-outon8September2002,forexample,apoliceofficercalledMuambaMukunawasshotdeadbyMIBAguardsinthepolygone concession after a heavy exchange of gunfire. He was reportedly incivilianclothingbutwasarmed,andwas reportedly accompanyinga largegroupofillegalminers.Photocaption:NkomboKamanga,hitbyastraybulletfromthe polygoneconcessionassheslept.

However, it appears that the majority of illegal miners are not armed. Forinstance, not a single one of the roughly 250 apparently illegal miners spotted byAmnestyInternationaldelegatesinthecourseoftheirthree-hourvisittothepolygoneconcessioninOctober2001appearedtobecarryingafirearm.ThehundredsofspentcartridgesAmnestyInternationalobservedonthebankoftheRiverLubilanjinotonlyappearedtomatchthetypeofriflethesoldiersintheconcessionswerecarrying,butwere also lying directly next to aMIBAguard-tower, strongly suggesting that the


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roundswereinfactfiredbyMIBAguards,notbyillegalminers.Photocaption:MukebaMuchubaPhotocaption:MulumbaTshitamba Onthebasisofalltheavailable information,includingeye-witnessaccounts,anddespiteofficialattemptstodenyortoplaydownthescaleoftheproblem,itis

clear that itis theMIBAguards, notthe illegalminers,whoare doingmostoftheshootinginthediamondconcessions.Itisalsoclearthatsuspectedillegalminersarebeingshotonadailybasis.Noprecisestatisticshavebeencompiledonthenumbersof thosewoundedorkilled,butAmnestyInternationalconservatively estimates thatseveral dozen, but possibly significantly more, are shot dead every year byMIBAguards. Many more, probably numbering several hundred a year, sustain gunshotwoundsofsomekind,whichareoftenserious. Inthemajorityofcases, theguardscannot claim legitimate self-defence, since the victims are unarmed and pose nogenuinethreattotheirsafety.TherealityisthatMIBAguardsarefrequentlyopeningfirewithoutwarningonunarmedciviliansasafirstratherthanasalastresort,therebyviolatingsomeofthemostfundamentalprinciplesoflawenforcement. 30Themajority

ofthekillingswhichresultinthesecircumstancesamounttoextrajudicialexecutions. Eighteen-year-old Mukeba Muchuba was part of a group of ten illegalminers, including his brother, who sought to gain access to thepolygone on 16September2001.MIBAguardsdiscovered theirpresenceonthe banksof theRiverLubilanjiandopenedfire.Whiletheothersinhisgroupmanagedtoescapeunharmed,Mukeba Muchuba was shot in the head by a MIBA guard. He immediately lostconsciousnessandspentthe next threeweeks in hospital.His powerof speechwasimpairedbytheinjuryhesustained. Likemostillegalminers,MukebaMuchubahadriskedgoingtothepolygonedespitebeingwellawareofthepotentialdangers.Afriendofhis, Kabongo,hadbeenkilledthereinearly2001afterhehadbeencaughtbyaMIBAguardclimbingoutofoneofthemines.TheguardreportedlyannouncedthathewasgoingtokillKabongo,whowasunarmed,andthenproceededtoshoothimdeadincoldblood.HethenaskedtwoofKabongosfriendstogooverandconfirmthathewasdead.Theguardthensaidtothem:Thatisthefatereservedforallofyou.


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12

In late August 2001 27-year-old Mulumba Tshitamba entered into anarrangementwithsomeMIBAguardstoformagroupof15peopletogoandworkinthepolygone.They worked at night near a plant calledMassif 5, where industrialwasteispumpedintoacanalandsmalldiamondscanbefoundamidthegravel.ThegroupgatheredgravelandthentookitdowntotheRiverLubilanji tosiftthroughitfordiamonds.Whiletheywerebytheriver,theguardswithwhomtheyhadmadethearrangement appeared and signalled them with a torch. Four of the miners wenttowardstheguardsandwhentheywerewithinabout50metresofthem,theguardsopenedfireontheminerswithoutwarning.MulumbaTshitambafledandhidnearapileofsandbuthewasdiscoveredandshottwiceintherightleg--oncenearthekneeandonceinthecalf.AmnestyInternationalhasnoinformationonwhathappenedto

theotherthreeminerswhohadbeenwithhim. On 29 June 2001 24-year-oldMukenyi Kalala was on the far side of theRiver Lubilanji,when he was approached by a groupof guards who suggested heformagroupofdiggerstogointothe polygone.Heorganisedagroupoftendiggersand,havingpaid10,500FC(roughly$35atthethenexchangerate)totheguards,theyenteredthepolygone.Atabout3pm,astheywereleavingthepolygone,anothergroupofguardsappearedandimmediatelyopenedfireonthem.MukenyiKalalawasshotintherightshoulder,thebulletpassingrightthroughhim,andhelostconsciousness.

He believes that eightof the other illegal miners in his group were shot dead, butAmnesty International has not been able to confirm this information or obtain thenamesofthosewhomayhavedied. While some illegal miners like Mukenyi Kalala risk going into the miningconcessions in broad daylight, themajority of illegal miners gain access under thecoverofdarkness.39-year-oldJean-AndrShambuyiandfourothersgainedillegalaccesstothepolygoneon19April2001,withoutenteringintoanyarrangementwithMIBAguards.Ataround3amatalocationintheheartofthe polygonecalledlaroutede20mtres,agroupofarmedguardssuddenlyappearedandopenedfireonthemwithoutwarning.Jean-AndrShambuyiwasshotfrombehindinthebaseoftheback,

causinghisintestinestospillout.Threeoftheotherillegalminersfledandmanagedtoescape,butthefourthpersonintheirgroupcametohisassistanceandmanagedtoensure that he was taken to hospital for treatment. Jean-Andr Shambuyi laterexpressedhisgratitudebynaming hisnext childafterthisperson,who,hebelieves,savedhislife.Hehasbeenleftwithseverescarringfromthebulletwoundandsuffersfrompainsinhislegandfrombadcirculationoftheblood.


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Photocaption:MukenyiKalala

On16October2001,thedaythatAmnestyInternationaldelegatesvisitedthevillageofLuamuela, locatedon theoutskirtsof thepolygoneonthefarsideoftheRiverLubilanji,oneofthevillagers,DibuaBrinch,wasbeingburied.Hehadbeenshotdeadon12October,reportedlybyaZimbabweansoldierwhohadcrossedtotheLuamuela sideoftheRiverLubilanjiapparentlywiththeexpresspurposeofkillinghim. Dibua Brinch left behind eight children and a pregnant wife. 31 Another

Luamuela resident, Kalala Wakala, was shot dead around 12 October, alsoreportedlybyaZimbabweansoldier.LuamuelavillagersclaimthatpeoplearebeingshotonadailybasisbyMIBAguards. During their visit to thepolygone concession in October 2001, anAmnestyInternationaldelegation,accompaniedbyseniorMIBAofficials,experiencedat first-hand the readiness ofZimbabwean soldiers to resort to firearms.Asthedelegationapproachedoneoftheexitstotheconcessionintheirvehicles,theywerestoppedatgunpoint by ZDF soldiers. A senior ZDF officer repeatedly shouted get out or Ishoot,getoutorIshootwhilebrandishingagunatthevehiclesoccupants.OneoftheAmnestyInternationaldelegateshadapistolpressedintohiscollarboneandwas

forcefullydraggedfromthevehicle.AMIBAemployeewasslappedinthefacebyaZDF soldier and photographic equipment belonging both to Amnesty InternationalandtoMIBAwastemporarilyconfiscated.TheZDFsoldiersclaimedtobeunawareoftheAmnestyInternationalvisitandappearedtobeunderthe impression thatanysuchvisitrequiredZDFauthorisation.Thedelegationwasdetainedforaroundhalfanhour, until a more senior-ranking ZDF officer arrived and apologised for what hedescribedasamisunderstanding. ThisincidentdemonstratednotonlythereadinessofZDFsoldierstobrandishfirearmsatunarmedciviliansandtouseexcessiveforce,butalsotheextenttowhichthe ZDF is acting independently of any Congolese command structures, be theycivilianormilitary.ItisremarkablethatZimbabweantroopsshouldwieldsuchpowerinaminingconcessionwithintheDRCwhich,unliketheSengaminesconcessions,isstillownedandrunbyaCongolese,largelystate-ownedcompany. Finally, in addition tothe shootings, some illegal miners are also seriouslyinjured or killed when mines collapse. There are areas in diamond concessions,including theminerouge (redmine)within thepolygone concession,where illegal


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14

minersdigholessome20to30metresdeep,lowereachotherdownbyrope,andthentunnelouthorizontallyfromthebottomoftheholesinsearchofdiamonds.AmnestyInternational witnessed a group of some 70 illegal miners engaged in this kind ofminingattheminerouge.MIBAsaysthattheyregularlybulldozeovertheseholesbutthat the illegal miners simply dig new holes. Amnesty International receiveddisturbingreports,however,thatMIBAofficialsweresometimesguiltyofbulldozingovertheholeswithoutproperlycheckingwhethertherewereminersdowntheholesatthetime.Forexample,fiveillegalminers,including MandefuTshiovoKabeya,whowasjustnineyearsoldatthetime,werereportedlyburiedaliveinApril2000.

Photocaption:Asuspectedillegalmineremergingfromamakeshiftmine-shaft,Mbuji-Mayi,October2001

6.RoughjusticeAccordingtoMIBAofficials, around10to15suspected illegalminersare arrestedeverydayatthepolygoneconcession.Therearemakeshiftcellswithinthebuildingsthatstandatthetwomainentrancestothepolygone,wheresuspectedillegalminersareinitiallydetained.AmnestyInternationaldelegatessawoneofthesecellsfromtheexterior during their visit to thepolygone -- it appeared to be around fourmetres

square in size and at least fourdetainees were being held thereat the time, all ofwhom appeared to be children.Theredid notappear to be provisions for detainingchildrenseparatelyfromadultdetainees. MIBAofficialsassertthatsuspectedillegalminersareheldinthesecellsforamaximum of one day, before being transferred to detention centres run by theProcuracy(leparquet). Inpractice,however, itappearsthatmostdetaineesarrestedbytheblondosaretransferredtoanother,unofficialdetentioncentreontheedgeoftheconcession,whichisalsorunbyMIBA. 32Thisdetentioncentrehousessixcells,whicharearound fourmetressquareinsize,coveredbyametaltrellisratherthanasolidroof. Therearenotoiletsorshowersandnofoodisprovided--detaineesrelywhollyontheirrelativestobringthemfood.Detaineeswhoareinjuredinthecourseofbeingarrestedorwhobecomeillincustodyhavenoaccesstomedicalcare. Becauseoftheabsenceoftoilets,thedetainees,whoinApril2002numberedsome 180, relieve themselves in the cells, rendering them virtually uninhabitable.Detainees therefore spend almost all of their time outdoors in a small, fenced-inenclosure which surrounds the detention centre. Their constant exposure to the


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elementsrendersthemhighlyvulnerabletodisease.Theaverageageofthedetaineesin April 2002 was around 15, but there are no provisions for detaining minorsseparatelyfromadultdetainees.33Someofthemhadbeendetainedintheseappallingconditions,whichamounttocruel,inhumananddegradingtreatment,foratleasttwoweeks. Appeals from thedetainees to betransferred to theProcuracy appear to beroutinelyignored. Relativesareabletovisitdetainees,andindeedsuchvisitsareencouragedbyMIBA guards, since relatives are informally required to pay them 100FC to gainaccess. Relatives can also pay what are called amendes transactionnelles

(compromise fines) to secure the release of detainees. These so-called fines werereportedly in the region of 5,000FC (roughly $17 at the exchange rate in October2001)--asignificantsumformanyCongolesefamilies. In the event that the requisite amendes transactionelles are not paid, somesuspected illegal miners may face trial before a military tribunal called the Courdordremilitaire(COM),MilitaryOrderCourt,whichwasestablishedin1997bythelatepresidentLaurent-DsirKabila.TheCOMdoesnotmeetinternationalstandardsforfairtrialand,accordingtoitsownstatutes,hasnojurisdictionincasesinvolvingcivilians.However, this has not stopped it from trying and imprisoning dozens ofpolitical activists, journalists, and human rights defenders in manifestly unfair andpolitically-influencedtrials.Therecanbenojustificationfortryingsuspectedillegalminers,mostofwhomareciviliansandmanyofwhomarechildren,beforeamilitarytribunal.34Iftheyaretobeputontrial,theyshouldbetriedbeforeanordinaryciviliancourtoflawandenjoytheirfulllegalrights,includingproperlegalrepresentationandtherighttoappealagainsttheirsentence.

7.Silencingthecritics TheMbuji-Mayiauthoritieshavebeenquicktoseektosilencelocalactivistswhospeakoutagainsttheabusesbeingcommittedwithinthediamondconcessions.

Crispin Kalala Mpotoyi, the owner of a local radio and television station calledRadio-TlvisionDeboutKasa, is oneofthe fewlocal journaliststo havepubliclydenounced the shootings at the diamond concessions. On 2 October 2001 he wasarrested by police and held in custody until around 10pm that evening. While theimmediatemotive forhis arrest is thought tohave beena radio program broadcastearlier that same day in which he had criticised the governor of Mbuji-Mayi, hisdenunciations of theabusesat theMIBAconcessionswere also a factor.While incustody, hewas reportedlymadeto draft and signa document, dictated tohim by


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16

policeofficers,inwhichhepledgedtoceasecoveringcertainsubjectsduringhisradioand television broadcasts. These subjects included the shootings at the MIBAconcessions. On 10 October he was rearrested and held until late the following night.Duringthistime,hewasagainquestionedabouthisradioandtelevisionbroadcasts.Followinghis release,he was ordered to report tothe Procuracy twice aweek. Inaddition, two programs, one on radio and one on television, which he had beenpresentingeveryweekwerebanned.Hewaslaterchargedwithincitationlarvolteet la haine tribale (inciting revolt and ethnic hatred), supposedlyon thebasis ofpreviousbroadcastson his radio station.The chargewasmanifestly contrived in an

attempttosilenceanoutspokencritic. Amnesty International delegates witnessed at first-hand the ongoingharassmentofCrispinKakala.AprivatemeetingbetweenAmnestyInternationalandthejournalistinOctober2001wasinterruptedbythearrivalofMbuji-Mayisheadofpolice,whoproceededtoaskaseriesofquestionsaboutthepurposeofthemeeting.ItwasthissamepoliceofficerwhohadpersonallyarrestedCrispinKalalathepreviousweek.Onthisoccasion,hewasaccompaniedbyanOPJemployedbyMIBA. Otherlocalhumanrightsactivistshavealsofoundthemselvestargetedbytheauthorities for speakingout.CharlesMfwambaMukendi, headof a local human

rightsgroupcalledtheCentresdtudesetdeformationpopulairespourlesdroitsdelhomme,(CEFOP),CentreofGrassrootsStudiesandTraininginHumanRights,haslongcampaignedagainsttheabusesattheMIBAconcessions.At6amon22October1999 he was arrested for publishing supposedly seditious documents, which wasapparentlyareferencetoareportwhichCEFOPhadreleasedonkillingsattheMIBAconcessions.Hewas transferredto thecapitalKinshasawherehewas held for ninemonthsinanunofficialsecurityservicedetentioncentrewithouteverbeingformallycharged. Amnesty International considers that he was a prisoner of conscience,arbitrarily detained because of his denunciations of human rights violations at theMIBAconcessions.Despitethepersonalrisksinvolved,CharlesMfwambaMukendicontinues towork actively as a human rights defender in Mbuji-Mayi. He is kept

undersporadicsurveillancebythesecurityservicesashegoesabouthiswork.

8.TurningablindeyeMIBAandlocaljusticeofficials,fortheirpart,consistentlyplaydownthenumberofpeople killed in the diamond concessions and deny that any of the killings aredeliberateorunlawful.AseniorMIBAofficialassertedtoAmnestyInternationalthat


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perhapsamaximumoffourpeopleayeardieintheconcessionsandthatsuchdeathstended to occur only when MIBA guards are forced to fire backwhen shot at byillegalminers.Hedismissedaspropagandareportsthatlargenumbersofminerswerebeingkilledandwoundedintheconcessionsandclaimedthat suchpropagandawasintendedtoforceMIBAtoreduceitsdeploymentofguards,therebymakingiteasierforillegalminerstogainaccesstotheconcessions. Another senior MIBA official interviewed by Amnesty International inOctober 2001 conceded that there was occasionally what he described as anaccident,inwhichillegalminerswereshot.Heclaimed toknowofonlytwosuch

accidents having occurred since the beginning of 2001. Disturbingly, he alsoconcededthatwhenillegalminerswerekilledwithinthediamondconcessions,MIBAtooknostepstoinvestigatethecircumstancesofthedeath.Inanswertoaquestiononwhat was done by MIBA in such situations, the official simply replied: Rien.(Nothing.) A senior judicial official, also interviewed in October 2001, asserted thatduring the previous two months he knew of five deaths having occurred at thepolygone concession. Inonly oneof these cases, thekilling ofan individual calledMulongo,was an investigationbythe judiciarysaid to be in progress. The officialcouldnotexplainwhynoinvestigationswereunderwayintothecircumstancesoftheotherfourdeathsorindicatewhatconcretestepshadsofarbeentakenininvestigatingMulongos death. He was also unable to give any official figures regarding otherinvestigationswhichmighthave takenplace inrecentmonths or years,or to cite asingle case inwhichaMIBA guardwasknown tohave beenbrought to justice inconnectionwiththedeathofanillegalminerwithinthediamondconcessions.Thisisnotsurprising--toAmnestyInternationalsknowledge,notasingleMIBAguardhaseverbeenputontrialforthekillingofasuspectedillegalminer,letaloneconvicted. 35

By denying that extrajudicial executions and serious gunshot injuries areoccurringwithinthediamondconcessions,andbyfailingtoproperlyinvestigatethe

fewdeathswhichareofficiallyacknowledged,theauthoritiesareensuringthattheseabusescancontinuetobecommittedwithcompleteimpunity.Suchinactionamountstoatacitendorsementandencouragementof theseabuses.Underinternational law,seniorofficialsmaybeheldaccountableforextrajudicialexecutionswhichtakeplaceundertheirjurisdiction,if itisreasonable toassumethattheyknew,or shouldhaveknown, about the risk of such executions taking place and were in a position toprevent them. 36 Given that in the course of just four days spent in Mbuji-MayiAmnestyInternationalresearcherswereabletogatherdetailedandextensiveevidence


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18

of extrajudicial executions and non-fatal shootings having occurred within thediamondconcessions,itseemsreasonabletoassumethattheMbuji-Mayiauthoritiesareinapositiontodolikewiseiftheysowished.Theirfailuretodosois,attheveryleast, a dereliction of their duties under international law to initiate properinvestigations intosuspectedcasesofunlawfulkillings.37Atworst,itisadeliberaterefusaltoactontheevidenceavailableandtopreventfurtherabuses. The patent inadequacy of the judiciarys existing investigative procedures,whichhavesofarfailedtobringasingleperpetratortojusticedespitetheexistenceofa clear pattern of abuse, points strongly to the need to establish an independentcommissionof inquiry inordertoredressthehumanrightssituationin thediamond

concessions.38

Wheresufficientevidenceemergesofhumanrightsviolationshavingbeencommitted,everynecessarystepneedstobetakentobringtheperpetratorstojustice, as well as anyone in authority who is considered complicit in thoseviolations.39

9.TrainingMIBAsguards40Dismantling Mbuji-Mayis culture of impunity is crucial to putting an end to thelawlessnesswhichcurrentlyreignsinthediamondconcessionsandthehumanrightsviolationstowhichthisgivesrise.MIBAguardsneedtoknowthattheywillbeheldaccountableforanyhumanrightsviolationswhichtheycommitinthecourseoftheirduties, as well as for any acts of corruption.41 As well as ensuring that they areproperly supervisedand thatall incidents involvingtheuseoffirearmsareproperlyinvestigated, it is essential that MIBA guards receive thorough training in lawenforcementprinciplesandtechniques.Basicprinciplesofhumanrightsandpolicingethicsshouldformthecoreofthistraining,withtheprimaryfocusbeingonavoidingtheuseofforceorfirearmswhereverpossible. 42 Thetwobasicprinciplesofinternationallawwhichgoverntheuseofforcebylawenforcementofficials43arenecessityandproportionality.Forceshouldbeusedindealingwithcriminalsuspectsonlyifothermeansproveineffective.Wheretheuseof

force is considered to be unavoidable, law enforcement officials must act withrestraintandinproportiontotheseriousnessoftheoffenceortothethreatposed,andeveryeffortshouldbemadetominimise injury.44Where injuriesdooccur,medicaltreatmentshouldbemadeavailableassoonasispossible.Theguidelinesrelatingtotheuseoffirearmsareeven stricter.Lawenforcementofficialswhoareexpectedtocarry firearms in thecourseoftheirduties should receiveadequatetraining in theiruse before being authorized to carry them.45Firearms should only be used in self-defence or in thedefenceofothersagainst the imminent threatofdeath or serious


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injury.Intentionallethalforcemayonlybeusedwhenstrictlyunavoidableinordertoprotect life.46Wherever possible, law enforcement officials are required to identifythemselvesassuch,giveaclearwarningthattheyarearmedandgiveadequatetimeforacriminalsuspecttorespondtothatwarning. ThesystemsinoperationwithintheMIBAconcessions,andthepracticeoftheMIBA guards,clearly fall far short ofallof these basic principles.Those carryingfirearmsreceivelittleornotrainingintheirproperuseforlawenforcementpurposes.Eye-witnessaccounts,includingthoseofindividualswhohavethemselvesbeenshot,consistently reportMIBAguardsopeningfirewithoutwarningand asa first resort,

without apparently giving any consideration to alternative means of apprehendingsuspectedillegalminers.Moreover,mostofthosewhoareshotareunarmedandposenoimmediatethreattothelivesoftheguardsorofothers.Theuseoffirearmsagainstthem in such circumstances is both unnecessary and wholly disproportionate.Individuals who are shot appear to be entirely reliant on other illegal miners forassistanceingettingmedicaltreatment,withMIBAguardstakingnostepstoassist.47Andtherearenoeffectivereportingmechanismsinplacetoensurethattherelevantauthoritiesarenotifiedofanyshootingsintheconcessions. 48 TheroleplayedbybothZimbabweanandCongolesesoldiersinguardingtheconcessions is a cause for particular concern. While Amnesty Internationalacknowledgestherightofthegovernmenttodeploytroopstodefendakeystrategiclocation against attacks by its armed political opponents, 49 the soldiers deployedwithinMbuji-Mayisdiamondconcessionsareinpracticeactingaslawenforcementofficials with a responsibility for protecting theconcessions against illegal civilianminers,notopposingmilitaryforces.Anymilitarytrainingwhichthesesoldiersmayhavereceivedwouldnotbeapplicabletoaciviliancontextinwhichtheyarerequiredtoapprehendcriminalsuspectswithouttheexcessiveuseofforce.Iftheyaretoactaslawenforcementofficials,thesesoldiersshouldreceivethesametrainingincivilianlawenforcementtechniquesasotherMIBAguards,theyshouldbeintegratedwithinthesame civilian chainof command50and they should beheld accountable forany

humanrightsviolationstheyaresuspectedofhavingcommitted.If theseconditionscannotbemet,AmnestyInternationalconsidersthatsoldiersshouldnotbepermittedtoplayalawenforcementrolewithinthediamondconcessions.

10.Makinghumanrightseveryonesbusiness51Although the primary responsibility for addressing the human rights violationsassociatedwithMIBAs diamond concessions lies with theDRC state authorities,


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20

MIBA itselfalsohasarole toplayinpromotingrespectforhumanrightswithin itssphereofinfluence.Consideredasastateactor,MIBAisboundbytheprovisionsofinternationalhumanrightslaw,butasabusinessentityitisalsoexpectedtomeetthesameethicalstandardsofcorporatepracticerequiredofallbusinesses.52ThisappliesequallytotheminorityshareholdersinMIBA,DeBeersandUmicore. One way in which MIBA can seek to minimisethe risk of contributing tohumanrightsviolationsistodevelopandenforceanexplicitcodeofethicalcorporatepractice, founded onbasichuman rights principles.53Thiswould complement othermeasures being taken, such as training in law enforcement forMIBA guards. DeBeershas itself developeda series ofbest practice principles forthe gem diamond

industry, part of the objective of which is to ensure that the diamond trade is notassociatedwith,orcomplicitin,abusesagainstlocalpopulations.Forexample,undertheheadingConsumerconfidence,DeBeersprinciplesstatethat:

theinjuryandhardshipsufferedbylocalpopulations(andthepotentialforit)

when conflicts arise in diamond producing areas are unacceptable, as is

seekingtoprofitfromsuchconflicts.

UndertheheadingBusinessPractices,thetextcontinues:

Wearecommittedtooperatingourbusinessesinsuchawaythatweneither

engage in,nor encourage inanymanner, the followingpractices whichareregarded as unacceptable and against the public interest and that of the

diamond industry: [...] [the] buying and trading of rough diamonds from

areaswherethiswouldencourageorsupportconflictandhumansuffering.54

Amnesty Internationalwelcomes thecommitmentto humanrightsexpressedbyDeBeersintheseprinciplesandconsidersitimportantthatbothDeBeersandUmicore,asminority shareholders inMIBA, demonstrate that they are themselvesupholdingand implementingtheseprinciples intheDRC.In1999DeBeers tookadecisiontocloseallofitsdiamondbuyingofficesintheDRCaspartofitsbroaderstatedpolicyofaddressingtheproblemofso-calledconflictdiamonds:

In October 1999, De Beers announced an embargo on the purchase of all

diamonds fromAngola [...]and thatwe would closeour buying operations

thereand inotherwestandcentralAfricancountries.Thiswasmotivatedby

concernforthesufferingofthepeopleofthesecountries,whereconflictisin

part sustainedbytheproceedsof illicitly obtaineddiamonds.DeBeersnow

has no buying offices in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo or


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Guinea.55

Under the current definitions being used by the diamond trade, the term conflictdiamondisonlyappliedtodiamondsbeingtradedbyarmedpoliticalgroups,notbynational governments. However, De Beers and Umicore should also giveconsideration to the extent to which their involvement in the largely state-rundiamond trade in the DRC is currently consistentwith their stated concern for thewelfareoflocalpopulationsandwiththeirhumanrightsobligations.Asshareholders,DeBeersandUmicoreareinauniquelyprivilegedpositiontousetheirinfluenceinapositivewaytoimproveMIBAshumanrightsrecordandtocontributetobringingan

endtotheabusesbeingcommittedinthediamondconcessions. By introducing and implementing coherent and transparent human rightspolicies, MIBA, De Beers and Umicore would be signalling their commitment tobreaking the existing link between diamond-mining operations and human rightsviolationsinMbuji-Mayi.ThesepoliciesshouldbeseennotmerelyasanadjuncttoMIBAscommercialactivitiesbutasa coreelementofitscorporatestrategy.Manycompanies have come to realise the beneficial effects which a good human rightsrecord can have on a companys image and thus its commercial performance. AsMaryRobinson, theformerUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights,haspointedout:

Twenty years ago few companies had environmental policies. Today the

environment isunquestionably amainstreambusiness issue. So it shouldbe

with human rights. Having a strong human rights policy and a sound

implementationstrategyisaboutriskmanagementandreputationassurance.

Humanrightsisabottom-lineissue.

11.ConclusionDiamonds are the inheritance of the people of Sierra Leone, Angola and

Congoandshouldbeusedtoprovidedevelopmentandprosperity[].56

TheequitableharnessingoftheDRCsvastnaturalresources,includingitsdiamonds,is essential to promoting the future prosperity of the nation and the welfare of itspeople.In thecurrent situation,inwhichlarge sectionsof thecountryareunder the


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control of armed forces opposed to the governmentof Joseph Kabila, it is clearlyimpossible foronecentral authoritytoproperlyexploit allof theseresources,whiletheenormouscostsofprosecutingawarinevitablydiminishtheresourcesavailablefordevelopment.Nevertheless,over thelongerterm,it is incumbentupontheDRCgovernment to do everythingwithin its power to ensure that the countrys naturalresources,including thediamondsofMbuji-Mayi,areexploited in suchawayastopromoteaseffectivelyaspossiblethedevelopmentofthecountryandtheprogressiverealizationofthepopulationseconomicandsocialrights. An integral partofthis process has to bebringinganend tothe decades offinancialmismanagementandoutrightcorruptionwhichhavecontributeddirectlyto

theDRCscurrentsocio-economiccrisis,aswellasbeingattherootofmajorhumanrightsabuses.TheopaquecontractsinvolvingforeignintereststhathavebeensignedinthecourseofthecurrentarmedconflictintheDRC,includingtheSengaminesdeal,aremerelythelatestinalonglineofarrangementswhichappeartohavebenefitedasmallelite tothedetrimentof thevastmajorityof thepopulation.Thereisclearly aneedtoreviewallsuchexistingcontractstodeterminetheextenttowhichtheyareconsistent with appropriate development goals and to ensure that all future suchcontracts are negotiated transparently and in accordance with internationallyrecognizedprinciplesforpublictenderingandbidding. In the more immediate term, the DRC government must take urgent and

effectivestepstobringanendtothehumanrightsviolationsbeingperpetratedinthediamond fields of Mbuji-Mayi and to bring those suspected of responsibility tojustice. The international community, from national governments to individualconsumers,alsohasanimportantroletoplayinencouragingtheDRCgovernmenttoendtheseabusesandtocleanupitsdiamondtrade.Untilnow,themainfocusoftheinternational community has been on so-called conflict diamonds traded by armedpoliticalgroups,suchastheRevolutionaryUnitedFrontinSierraLeoneorUNITAinAngola, but the situation in Mbuji-Mayi points clearly to the need to submit thecommercial activities of national governments to similar international scrutiny. Inordertobeeffectiveandconsistent,theinternationalsystemofdiamondcertificationagreedbygovernmentsthrough theKimberleyProcessneedsto takeaccountof the

fact that human rights abuses directly related to the diamond tradeare also takingplacebeyondthecontextofarmedconflictandinareasunderthecontrolofnationalgovernments. The words of a former British government minister are just asapplicabletotheDRCsofficialdiamondtradeastheyaretothecommercialactivitiesofarmedpoliticalgroups:

Youwanttomakesurethatthediamondyouareputtingonyourlovedones


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finger didnot help cut off the fingeror a hand of achild in Sierra Leone,

AngolaorCongo.57

IntheDRC,suspectedillegalminersinMbuji-MayimaynotbehavingtheirlimbsamputatedliketheciviliansofSierraLeone. 58Buttheyarebeingshotat,theyare being seriously wounded and they are being killed. While for many peoplethroughout theworlddiamondsmaybea symbolof love,forthe familiesofDibuaBrinch, KalalaWakala and of all the othermostly young menwho have lost theirlivesinthediamondfieldsofMbuji-Mayi,diamondswillforeverbeassociatedwithirreparablelossanddeath.


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12.RECOMMENDATIONS

TotheDRCgovernment

BringanendtoextrajudicialexecutionsandintentionalwoundingsintheMIBAdiamondconcessionsby:

publiclyacknowledgingandcondemningtheserioushumanrightsviolations,includingextrajudicialexecutions,whicharebeingperpetratedinthediamondconcessionsofMbuji-Mayi;

immediately establishing an independent commission of inquiry which hasadequateresources59toproperlyinvestigateallcasesofsuspectedextrajudicialexecutionsandintentionalwoundingsinthediamondconcessionswithaviewto:

o ensuring that suspected perpetrators, and those complicit in humanrightsviolations,arebroughttojusticewithoutdelayandinconformitywithinternationalstandardsforfairtrial;

o determining,andensuringthepaymentof,appropriatecompensationtovictimsortheirrelatives;

o tackling theproblem of corruption, asa contributor to human rightsabuses, and ensuring that officials suspected of corruption areimmediately suspended from their duties, pending legal proceedingsagainstthem;

o playingaroleinmonitoringtheDRCscompliancewiththespiritofthe international diamond certification system agreed through theKimberley Process, to which the DRC has signed up and whosepurposeistopreventthetradeindiamondsfromcontributingtohumanrightsabuses;

establishing proper reporting mechanisms to facilitate the work of theindependentcommission andto ensure thatallshooting incidentswithin the

concessionsareproperlydocumented;

introducingwithoutdelayadequatetrainingincivilianlawenforcementforallthose guarding the diamond concessions, including any Congolese andZimbabwean soldiers charged with guarding the concessions, and ensuringthatno-oneispermittedtoactasalawenforcementofficialintheconcessionsif they have not received this training.The training should include explicitguidelinesontheuseofforceandfirearms,aswellasfirstaidtraining,andbe


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baseduponrelevantprinciplesofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

making public the terms of all contracts entered into with private securityfirms andensuring thatany companies contracted to providesecurityat theMIBAconcessionshaveademonstrablysoundhumanrightstrackrecord;

ending the harassment, including the imprisonment, of journalists, humanrightsactivistsandothersforspeakingoutagainstthehumanrightsviolationsbeingcommittedintheMIBAconcessions;

Ensurefairtreatmentofsuspectedillegalminersby:

ensuringthatanyindividualswhoareshotorotherwiseinjuredinthediamondconcessions receive immediate medical treatment and, wherenecessary, aretransferred without delay to a medical centre where they can receiveappropriatetreatment;

takingimmediatestepstoclosedownallunofficialdetentioncentresbeingrunin theMIBA concessions and ensuring that anyone arrested on suspicionofillegalminingistransferredwithoutdelaytoanofficiallyrecogniseddetentioncentre where the detainee has access to relatives, legal assistance and anymedicalattentionwhichmightberequired;

ensuring that,whereverpossible,minors aredetainedseparately fromadultsandtheircasesarehandledwiththehighestprioritytoreducetoaminimumthetimetheyspendinpre-trialdetention;

ensuringthatifdetaineesareto bechargedwithacriminaloffence,theyarebrought promptly before a competent civilian court of law to answer thechargesagainstthem;

endingthepracticeoftryingsuspectedillegalminersandotherciviliansbeforetheCourdordremilitaire.

Promoteaccountabilityandtransparencyby:

makingpublicandreviewing,inlinewiththegovernmentscommitmentsattheInter-CongoleseDialogueheldinSouthAfricainMarchandApril2002,the terms of the contract concluded between the DRC government and theSengaminesjointventurein1999;

ensuring that all commercial contracts involving national resources arenegotiatedtransparentlyandaccordingtointernationallyrecognisedprinciplesofpublic tenderingandbidding,witha view toensuring thattheCongolesepeopleobtainthemaximumpossiblebenefitfromsuchcontracts,includingin


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26

termsofpromotingthecountrysoverallsocialandeconomicdevelopment.

TotheZimbabweangovernment

publicly acknowledge and condemn the extrajudicial executions and otherserious violations being perpetrated in the diamond concessions ofMbuji-Mayi,includingbymembersoftheZimbabweDefenceForces(ZDF);

fullycooperatewithanyinvestigationsintosuspectedextrajudicialexecutions,including theshootingsofDibuaBrinchandKalalaWakala, and intentionalwoundings in the diamond concessions and ensure that any ZDF soldierssuspected of responsibility are brought to justice in accordance withinternationalstandardsforfairtrial;

ensurethatZDFsoldiersareonlypermittedtoactaslawenforcementofficialsin the diamond concessions if they receive proper training in civilian lawenforcement,includinginprinciplesrelatingtotheuseofforceandfirearmsaswell as first aid training, and that they are integrated into a single chain ofcommandwithallother personnelactingaslawenforcementofficials in theconcessions;

makepublicthetermsofthecontractenteredintobytheDRCgovernmentandthe Sengamines joint venture in 1999, in the interests of transparency and

accountability.

ToMIBA

ensure that any MIBA employee, including blondos and officiers de policejudiciaire, who is suspected of human rights violations is immediatelysuspended from their duties, pending further investigations and any legalproceedingsagainstthem;

cooperate fullywithanycommissionof inquiry setup to investigate humanrights violationsandcorruption committedwithin thediamond concessions,including by establishing effective reporting mechanisms to ensure that allcaseswherefirearmsareusedarereportedtothecommissionofinquiry;

ensure that any individuals shot or otherwise injured in the diamondconcessions receive immediate medical treatment and, wherenecessary, aretransferred without delay to a medical centre where they can receiveappropriatetreatment;

immediately close theunofficial detention centresbeingoperatedwithin the


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MIBA concessions and ensure that when suspected illegal miners areapprehended they are immediately transferred to the jurisdiction of theappropriatestateinstitutions;

provideresources for training in law enforcementfor all personnel actingaslawenforcementofficialswiththediamondconcessions;

develop and enforce an explicit code of corporate practice, based on theprinciplesofinternationalhumanrightslaw;

makepublicthetermsofallcontractsenteredintowithprivatesecurityfirmsand establish effective screening procedures to ensure that MIBA does notemployanyoneinitsdiamondconcessionswhohascommitted,orissuspected

ofhavingcommitted,human rightsabusesin thepast,orhavedealingswithanycompanieswhichhaveapoorhumanrightstrackrecord;

enterintoaconstructivedialoguewithlocalcivilsocietyonquestionsofsocialinvestment, in keeping withMIBAs stated commitment to promoting localdevelopment,and publish periodicstudies into the social impactofMIBA'sactivities.

TotheminorityshareholdersinMIBA

takeeverysteptoensurethattheirinvolvementintheDRCsdiamondtradeisconsistent with their obligations under international law to promote andrespecthumanrightswithintheirsphereofinfluence,aswellasconformingtothespiritofthesystemofinternationaldiamondcertificationagreedthroughtheKimberleyProcess,whichaimstoensurethatthediamondtradedoesnotcontributetohumanrightsabuses;

raise their concerns with the MIBA management and the Congolese stateauthoritiesovertheextrajudicialexecutionsandotherhumanrightsviolationswhicharebeingperpetratedinthediamondconcessionsofMbuji-Mayi;

usetheirinfluencetopressMIBAtocooperatefullywithanycommissionofinquirywhichissetup,tointroducerigorouslawenforcementtrainingforallMIBAguards,andtointroduceeffectivescreeningprocedurestoensurethatMIBA does not employ anyone in its diamond concessions who hascommitted,or is suspectedofhaving committed, humanrightsabuses in thepast, or have dealingswith any companies whichhave a poor human rightstrackrecord;

contribute expertiseand experienceto theformulationandenforcementof acodeofcorporatepracticeforMIBA,basedontheprinciplesofinternational


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humanrightslaw; encourageandparticipateinaconstructivedialoguebetweenMIBAandlocal

civilsocietyonquestionsofsocialinvestmentandencourageMIBAtopublishperiodicstudiesintothesocialimpactofitsactivities.

Totheinternationalcommunity

publiclycondemntheserioushumanrightsviolations,includingextrajudicialexecutions,whicharebeingperpetratedinthediamondconcessionsofMbuji-MayiandpressuretheDRCgovernmenttotakeallnecessarystepstobringanendtotheseviolations;

lobbyfortheinternationalsystemofdiamondcertificationagreedthroughtheKimberleyProcesstobecomeaneffectivemechanismbywhichtomonitorthehumanrightsrecordofallactorsintheinternationaldiamondtrade;

the diamond industry, including Belgiums Diamond High Council (HogeRaadvoorDiamant),should takestepsto ensurethatdiamondsfromMIBAwhichenterinternationalmarketshavenotbeenminedinamannerwhichhascontributedtohumanrightsviolations;

contribute resources and expertise to ensure adequate training for lawenforcementofficialsintheDRC.


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13.Footnotes1Amnesty International interview with an official from theDRCs main diamond-miningcompany,MIBA,inOctober2001.

2 In April 2002 the DRC government signed up to an international system of diamondcertificationagreedbygovernmentsthroughtheKimberleyProcess.Thesystemisintendedto stem the international trade in conflict diamonds, which are defined by the KimberleyProcess as rough diamonds traded by armed political groups to help finance their armedopposition to recognized governments. For further information, see the official website,

www.kimberleyprocess.com3 Extrajudicial executions are unlawful and deliberate killings carried out by order of agovernmentorwithitscomplicityoracquiescence.Instrumentsofinternationalhumanrightslawwhich pertain to this issue include the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights(ICCPR),Article6ofwhichassertseveryhumanbeingsinherentrighttolife,andthePrinciples on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary andSummaryExecutions,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsin1989.

4Coltanisanabbreviationofcolombo-tantalite,anoreconsistingof two raremetalscalledcolumbium (also known as niobium) and tantalum. The latter is refined for use as acomponent inelectronic chipsand ishencepresent inawide-range ofcommonappliances,includingcellphones,playstationsandlaptopcomputers.

5ThemanywaterwaysoftheDRC,includingtheRiverCongo,offeragreatpotentialsourceof hydroelectric power, estimated at some 100,000 MW. On the African continent thispotentialisrivaledonlybyCameroon.

6 See the HumanDevelopmentReportof2002 producedbyUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), availableatUNDPs website:www.undp.org TheDRCwas ranked155th on the reports human development index, which is based on the criteria of lifeexpectancy,educationalattainmentandadjustedrealincome.

7NickyOppenheimer,DeBeersChairman,addressingtheCommonwealthBusinessForum,Johannesburg,SouthAfrica,11November1999.

8Theseviolations have been welldocumented elsewhere.See for instanceKingLeopoldsGhostbyAdamHochschild,MacMillan,1999.

9SinceAugust1998,theDRCgovernmenthasbeenatwarwithCongolesearmedgroupsinthenorthandtheeastofthecountrywhoaresupportedbyRwanda,Ugandaand,toa lesserextent,Burundi.TheDRCgovernmenthasreceivedmilitarysupportprincipallyfromAngola,NamibiaandZimbabwe.FollowingpeaceaccordssignedbytheCongolesegovernmentwithRwandaon30July2002andwithUgandaon6September2002,foreigntroopsonbothsideshavebeguntowithdrawfromtheDRC.


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30

10Humanrightsabusesassociatedwitheconomicexploitationtakingplaceinareasunderthecontrolofthe armedoppositionand their foreign backers are the subjectofa forthcoming,separateAmnestyInternationalreport.

11Diamondsaretheproductofcarbonwhichhasbeensubjectedtointenseheatandpressuredeepunderground.Theywerebroughtclosetotheearthssurfaceduringeruptionsofmoltenmagmawhichsolidifiedintorockcalledkimberlite.Millionsofyearsofrainanderosionhavefreedthediamondsclosesttotheearthssurfaceandwashedthemawayacrossthelandscapeandintothegravelofriverbedsorintotheocean.Thesesecondarydepositsarecalledalluvialdeposits.

12Sengamineswas formedby a company calledCosleg the result ofamerger of Osleg

(Operation Sovereign Legitimacy) and Comiex (Gnrale decommerce dimport/exportauCongo) incollaborationwithOryxZimcon.Thelatter isitselfa jointventurebetweentheZimbabweanDefenceForces(ZDF)andOryxNaturalResources,acompanyregisteredintheCaymanIslandswhichwasreportedly given the exclusiverights toexplore forand exploitdiamondsandothermineralsin theseconcessions foraperiodof25yearsstartingfrom16July 1999, or until the reserves are exhausted. The majority stakeholder in Comiex wasreportedlypreviouslyLaurent-DsirKabila;itisuncleartowhomhisshareholdingmayhavepassedafterhisdeath.Thecommander-in-chiefoftheZDFandthepermanentsecretaryintheZimbabweanMinistry of Defence are reportedly two of the major shareholders in Osleg.Some former Congolese government were reportedly shareholders in Cosleg. The exactshareholdingsofthesevariousplayersinSengaminesareunclear,butitappearsthatOryxisthelargestsingleshareholder,althoughnotamajorityshareholder.

13TheUNPanelofExpertsontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesandOtherFormsofWealth,mandatedbytheUNSecurityCouncil,published itsinitial report on economicexploitationintheDRCinApril2001, followedbyanAddenduminNovember2001.Thepanelisduetoproduceafurtherreportbytheendof2002.

14The impression that Sengamines is benefiting from a tax exemption is strengthened bydocumentationproducedin2000byacompanywhichatthetimewasconsideringacquiringOryxNaturalResources(seefootnote12).InasectiondetailingthecommercialstructureofOryx, the documentationreads: 'MiningoperationsdevelopedontheConcession[thesameconcessionsnowrun bySengamines]benefit from thecompleteexemption fromall import

dutiesandcorporatetaxesforaperiodofsixyearscommencingonthedevelopmentofeach

productionfacilityundertakenonaprojectbyprojectbasis. 'PresidentLaurent-DsirKabila

authoriseda similar, five-year exemptionfromtaxes fortheHewaBoraairline,whichwasalso setupin1999.PresidentKabilaandmembersofhis familywerereportedlythemajorshareholdersinHewaBora.

15The peace talks, known asthe Inter-CongoleseDialogue, were held inSunCity, SouthAfrica,betweenFebruaryandApril2002.

16The International CovenantonEconomic, Social andCulturalRights(ICESCR)and theAfricanCharteronHuman andPeoplesRights(ACHPR),tobothofwhich theDRC is a


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stateparty,bothcontainprovisionsofrelevancetothisissue:

All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth andresources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic

cooperation, based upon theprincipleofmutual benefit,and international law. Innocase

mayapeoplebedeprivedofitsownmeansofsubsistence.ICESCR,Article1(2)

EachStatePartyto thepresentCovenantundertakestotakesteps,individuallyandthroughinternationalassistanceandcooperation,especiallyeconomicandtechnical, tothe

maximumofitsavailableresources,withaviewtoachievingprogressivelythefullrealization

of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including

particularlytheadoptionoflegislativemeasures.ICESCR,Article2(1).

All peoples shall freely dispose of theirwealth and natural resources. This right

shallbeexercisedintheexclusiveinterestofthepeople.Innocaseshallapeoplebedeprived

ofit.ACHPR,Article21(1)

StatesPartiestothepresentChartershallundertaketoeliminateallformsofforeigneconomicexploitationparticularlythatpractisedbyinternationalmonopoliessoastoenable

their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources.ACHPR,Article21(5)

Inacommunication(ref:ACHPR/COMM/A044/1)of27May2002,theAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoplesRightsfoundthegovernmentofNigeriatobeinbreachofArticle21

oftheACHPRinconnectionwithoilexploitationinOgoniland.TheCommissionconcluded,inter alia, that the destructive and selfish role played by oil development in Ogoniland,closely tied with repressive tactics of the Nigerian government,and the lack ofmaterial

benefitsaccruingtothelocalpopulation,maywellbesaidtoconstituteaviolationofArticle

21.[Emphasisinboldadded.]Forfurtherinformation,see www.cesr.org

17See,forinstance,theWorldBanksprinciplesforinternationalcompetitivebidding,whichthe World Bank generally recommends as best practice for the procurement of goods orserviceswww.worldbank.org

18See, forexample,NihalJayawickrama inCorruption AViolationofHumanRights?athttp://www.transparency.org.Inthisworkingpaper,whichwaspresentedataconferenceinSofiainJune1998,hewrites:Thiscommitment[underArticle2of theICESCR]comprises

bothan"obligationofconduct"andan"obligationofresult".Theobligationofconductis"totakesteps".While thefull realization oftherelevantrightsmay beachievedprogressively,

overaperiodoftime,deliberate,concreteandtargetedstepstowardsthatgoalmustbetaken

by the government. The obligation of result is to take steps "with a view to achievingprogressively the full realizationof the rights recognized" in the covenant. The conceptof

progressive realization [of economic, social and cultural rights], while being sufficiently

flexibletoreflecttherealitiesoftherealworldandthedifficultiesinvolvedforanycountryin

ensuring the full realization of all the rights in the shortest possible time, nevertheless


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32

imposesaclearobligationtomoveasexpeditiouslyandeffectivelyaspossibletowardsthatgoal,utilizingthemaximumresourcesavailable tothatcountry.Corruptionrunscounterto

bothobligations.

19TheBakwangaMiningCompany--BakwangaistheformernameofthetownofMbuji-Mayi.

20ThiswasthefiguregivenbyaseniorMIBAofficialinterviewedbyAmnestyInternationalinOctober2001.

21Socitcongolaised'EconomieMixteparActionResponsabilitLimite.

22In an advertisement forMIBAcarried in a supplement ofJeune Afrique L'intelligentin

March2002,MIBAclaimcreditfor'l'organisationde l'enseignementmaternel,primaireetsecondaire technique de qualit qui attirent autant les parents que les lves' (theorganisationofqualitynursery,primaryandsecondaryeducationwhichattractsparentsjustas much as pupils). However, some local residents claim that insufficient funds are madeavailable to ensure the proper daily functioning of these institutions. In Mbuji-Mayi it isestimated that only13%ofgirlsattend school,whileupto600,000childrenintheMbuji-Mayibasinareestimatedtobeilliterate.

23TheRiverLubilanjiflowsthroughpartof thepolygoneconcession,afewhundredmetreswithintheofficialperimeterofthepolygone.However,theriveritselfappearstobegenerallyregardedbytheillegalminers,andindeedoftenbytheMIBAguardsthemselves,asformingoneofthedefactoboundariesoftheconcession.MinersthereforeconsiderthattheydonotputthemselvesinanillegalpositionuntiltheyhavecrossedthisriverandgenerallyMIBAguardsdonotpatrolthefarsideoftheriver,althoughtherehavebeeninstanceswhenguardshave pursued illegal miners across the river and shot at them. The boundaries of theconcessionsarefurtherblurredbythefactthatsomesmallvillagesareactuallylocatedwhollyorpartiallywithintheconcessions.Duringtheirvisittothe polygoneAmnestyInternationaldelegatessawseverallocalvillagersmakingtheirwaythroughpartsoftheconcession;somewerealsotendingtocropsthere.

24However, with the frontlines in the conflict currently some distance away from Mbuji-Mayi, the immediate threat to the security of theMIBA concessions comes not from thearmedopposition,butfromillegalcivilianminers.

25 On 13 September 2002 a ceremony was held at Mbuji-Mayis airport to mark the

supposedlyimminentwithdrawalofZimbabweantroopsfromtheDRC,followingthesigningofaccordsbetweentheDRCgovernmentandthegovernmentsofRwandaandUgandaaspartofanongoingpeaceprocess.However,attheendofSeptember2002therecontinuedtobeaZimbabweanmilitarypresenceinMbuji-Mayi.

26ASouthAfricancompanycalledIntervidisreportedlyassistingMIBAindevelopingandexpandingitselectronic surveillance systems.Anothercontract toassist in the guarding ofMIBAsconcessionshasreportedlybeensignedwithaBelgiancompany,butthenameofthecompanyisnotcurrentlyknowntoAmnestyInternational.


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27Theseprinciples of law enforcement are discussed inmore detail in thesection entitledTrainingMIBAsguardsbeginningonpage20below.

28Theseillegalforaysintotheconcessionsarenotgenerallyconductedinhaste.Illegalminerswilloftenspendseveralhoursatatimeintheconcessions,particularlyatnight,tomaximizetheirgainsasmuchaspossible.Itwouldbemoredifficultforthemtospendsomuchtimeinthe concessions without being detected, if they did not come to an arrangement with theguards. In thisway, these illegal forays can take onsomethingof the character ofofficialminingshifts.

29Interviewwithachurchofficial,October2001

30See the sectionbeginningonpage20 below entitledTrainingMIBAsguardsforafullerdiscussionofrelevantlawenforcementstandards.

31Villagersreportthatotherminershavealsobeenshot,likeDibuaBrinch,ontheLuamuelasideoftheRiverLubilanji,whichthevillagersconsidertobeoutsidetheMIBAconcessionsandwheretheyconsider theyhaveeveryright tobathe,drawwaterandengageinartisanalmining.

32In a further example of the absenceof a single chain of command atMIBA, suspectedillegal minerswho areapprehended in the concessions by soldiers rather than blondosaretaken instead to a military camp known as Lufualanga, located on the outskirts of thepolygone.AmnestyInternationalhasno informationon thenumberofdetaineesheldatthis

camporontheirconditionsofdetention.33 International standards recommend that children detained pending trial should besegregatedfromadults,exceptwherethiswouldnotbeinthebestinterestsofthechild.SeeArticle 10(2)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) andArticle 37(c) oftheConvention on theRights oftheChild (CRC).These instrumentsalsodiscouragethepre-detention trialofjuveniles andrecommend that in caseswhere juvenilesaredetained,theircasesaretobegiventhehighestpriorityandhandledasquicklyaspossibletominimizetheperiodofpre-trialdetention.

34MIBAemployeessuspectedoftheftorembezzlementhavealsobeentriedbeforetheCOM,sometimesonchargesoftreason.Theauthoritieshavesoughttojustifythechargeoftreasonon the grounds thatMIBAis a keycontributor to the war effort and thatcriminalactions

againstthecompanythereforeamounttosabotagingthewareffort.35Thelegalobligationsontheauthoritiesunderinternationallawtopreventandtoinvestigatesuspectedunlawfulkillingsandtobringperpetratorstojusticearequiteexplicit.InadditiontotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,towhichtheDRCisastateparty,otherinstrumentsofinternationallawrelevanttothiscontextincludetheUNPrinciplesontheEffective Prevention and Investigation ofExtra-legal,Arbitrary and SummaryExecutions,andtheUNBasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcementOfficials.


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34

36Superiors,officersorotherpublicofficialsmaybeheldresponsibleforactscommittedbyofficialsunder their hierarchicalauthority if theyhada reasonableopportunity toprevent

suchacts[...].Article 19,UNPrinciples ontheEffective Prevention andInvestigation ofExtra-legal,ArbitraryandSummaryExecutions

Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are heldresponsible if theyknow, orshould haveknown, that law enforcement officialsunder their

commandareresorting,orhaveresorted,totheunlawfuluseofforceandfirearms,andthey

didnottakeallmeasuresintheirpowertoprevent,suppressorreportsuchuse.Article24,UNBasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcementOfficials

37Thereshall bea thorough,prompt and impartialinvestigationofall suspected casesof

extra-legal,arbitraryandsummaryexecutions[...]Governmentsshallmaintaininvestigativeofficesandprocedurestoundertakesuchenquiries.Thepurposeoftheinvestigationshallbe

todeterminethecause,mannerandtimeofdeath,thepersonresponsible,andanypatternor

practice which may have brought about that death[...].Article 9,UN Principles on theEffectivePreventionandInvestigationofExtra-legal,ArbitraryandSummaryExecutions

38Incasesinwhichestablishedinvestigativeproceduresareinadequatebecauseoflackofexpertiseorimpartiality,becauseoftheimportanceofthematterorbecauseoftheapparent

existenceofapatternofabuse,andincaseswheretherearecomplaintsfromthefamilyofthe

victim about these inadequacies of other substantial reasons, Governments shall pursue

investigationsthroughanindependentcommissionofinquiryorsimilarprocedure.Members

of such a commission shall be chosen for their recognised impartiality, competence and

independence as individuals. In particular, they shall be independent of any institution,

agencyorpersonthatmaybethesubjectoftheinquiry[...].Article11,UNPrinciplesontheEffectivePreventionandInvestigationofExtra-legal,ArbitraryandSummaryExecutions

39 Governments shall ensure that persons identified by the investigation as havingparticipated in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions in any territoryunder theirjurisdictionarebroughttojustice[...].Article18,UNPrinciplesontheEffectivePreventionandInvestigationofExtra-legal,ArbitraryandSummaryExecutions

40Manyoftheissuesraisedinthissection,aswellasotherissuesrelatingtolawenforcement,are covered in Amnesty Internationals 10 Basic Human Rights Standards for LawEnforcement Officials (AI Index: POL 30/04/98), December 1998. Instruments ofinternationallawwhicharedirectlyrelevantinthiscontextincludetheUnitedNations(UN)

Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Principles on the EffectivePreventionandInvestigationofExtra-Legal,ArbitraryandSummaryExecutionsandtheUNBasic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Moregenerally,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,towhichtheDRCisastateparty,setoutthefundamentalhumanrightsof an individual which states are obligedtouphold.These include the right to life.On20December2000arelevantsetofguidelinescalled theVoluntaryPrinciplesonSecurityandHuman Rights was published following consultations between a coalition of non-


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governmental organisations, including Amnesty International, and the UK and USgovernmentsseewww.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm

41Asthe commentaryonArticle 7 of theCode ofConductforLawEnforcementOfficialspointsout:Thelawmustbeenforcedfullywithrespecttoanylawenforcementofficialwhocommitsanactofcorruption,asGovernmentscannotexpecttoenforcethelawamongtheir

citizensiftheycannot,orwillnot,enforcethelawagainsttheirownagentsandwithintheir

ownagencies.

42Inthetrainingoflawenforcementofficials,Governmentsandlawenforcementagenciesshall give special attention to issues of police ethics and human rights, especially in the

investigative process, toalternatives to the use of force and firearms [...] with a view tolimitingtheuseofforceandfirearms.Lawenforcementagenciesshouldreviewtheirtraining

programmesandoperationalproceduresinthelightofparticularincidents. Article20,UNBasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcementOfficials

43Thetermlawenforcementofficialsincludesallofficersofthelaw,whetherappointedorelected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention.Commentary(a)onArticle1oftheCodeofConductforLawEnforcementOfficials.AllofthoseresponsibleforguardingMIBAsconcessionsexercise thesepowersandsoshouldberegardedaslawenforcementofficials.

44Lawenforcementofficials,incarryingouttheirduty,shall,asfaraspossible,applynon-violent means before resorting to the use of forceand firearms.Theymay use forceand

firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the

intendedresult.Article4,UNBasicPrinciples onthe Use ofForce and Firearms byLawEnforcementOfficials

45Governmentsandlawenforcementagenciesshallensurethatalllawenforcementofficialsare provided with training and are tested in accordance with appropriate proficiency

standards in the use of force. Those law enforcement officialswho are required to carry

firearmsshouldbeauthorizedtodosoonlyuponcompletionofspecialtrainingintheiruse. Article 19, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law EnforcementOfficials

46Lawenforcementofficialsshallnotusefirearmsagainstpersonsexceptinself-defenceor

defenceofothersagainsttheimmediatethreatofdeathorseriousinjury[...]Inanyevent,intentional lethal use offirearmsmay onlybemadewhen strictlyunavoidable in order to

protect life. Article 9, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by LawEnforcementOfficials

47Wheneverthelawfuluseofforceandfirearmsisunavoidable,lawenforcementofficialsshall: [...]Ensure thatassistanceandmedical aid are renderedto any injured or affected

personsat the earliest possible moment;Article 5(c), UNBasic Principles on the Use ofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcementOfficials


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48Where injury or death is caused by the use offorce and firearmsby law enforcementofficials, they shall report the incident promptly to their superiors, in accordance with

principle 22. Article 6,UNBasic Principles on theUse of Force and Firearms by LawEnforcementOfficials

Governments and law enforcement agencies shall establish effectivereportingand reviewproceduresforallincidentsreferredtoinprinciples6and11(f).[...]Incasesofdeathand

seriousinjur

about congo

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