abel, the operation called verstehen

8/13/2019 Abel, The Operation Called Verstehen

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The Operation Called VerstehenAuthor(s): Theodore AbelSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Nov., 1948), pp. 211-218Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2770547 .Accessed: 15/10/2011 23:58

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THE OPERATION CALLED VERSTEHEN'

THEODORE ABEL

ABSTRACT

The postulate of Verstehen s the main argument of social theorists who assert the existence of a di-chotomy between the physical and the social sciences. An analysis of the operation of Verstehen hows thatit does not provide new knowledge and that it cannot be used as a means of verification. Lacking the funda-mental attributes of scientific method, even though it does perform some auxiliary functions in research,the fact of Verstehen cannot be used to validate the assumption of a dichotomy of the sciences.

The advocates of Verstehen efine it as asingular orm of operation which we performwhenever we attempt to explain human be-havior. The idea behind this claim is by no

means of German origin. Long before Dil-they and Weber, Vico acclaimed mathe-matics and human history as subjects aboutwhich we have a special kind of knowledge.This he attributed to the fact that the ab-stractions and fictions of mathematics arecreated by us, while history, too, is madeby men. He claimed that human beings canpossess a type of knowledge concerningthings they themselves produce which is notobtainable about the phenomena of nature.

Comte, too, implied that a special proce-dure is involved in the interpretation of hu-man behavior. He held that the methodsused in sociology embrace not only observa-tion and experiment but a further process ofverification which makes use of what hevaguely referred to as our knowledge ofhuman nature. According to him, empiri-

cal generalizations about human behaviorare not valid unless they are in accord withour knowledge of human nature. Comte wasthe first to establish what may be termed

the postulate of Verstehen or sociologicalresearch, for he asserted that no sociologicaldemonstration is complete until the conclu-sions of historical and statistical analysesare in harmony with the laws of humannature.

In the American sociological field Cooleyis the outstanding protagonist of the ideathat we understand the human and the so-cial in ways different rom those in which weunderstand the material. His theory is that

we can understand the behavior of humanbeings by being able to share their state ofmind. This ability to share other people'sminds is a special knowledge, distinct fromthe kind of perception gleaned from testsand statistics. Statistical knowledge without

emphatic knowledge is superficial andunintelligent. Between the two, Cooleyclaims, there is a difference n kind whichit would be fatuous to overlook. 2

The notion of Verstehen s included inZnaniecki's concept of the humanistic co-efficient and particularly in the role he as-cribes to vicarious experience as a sourceof sociological data. According to Znaniecki,vicarious experience enables the student ofhuman behavior to gain a specific kind ofinformation which the natural experimenter... ignores altogether. 3

I To avoid confusion, we prefer to use the Germanterm instead of its English equivalent, which is

understanding. Understanding is a general termapproximating the German Begreifen and does notconvey the specific meaning intended by the termVerstehen, which implies a particular kind of under-standing, applicable primarily to human behavior.Understanding is synonymous with comprehension,and Lundberg is perfectly right when he asserts (inFoundations of Sociology [New York: MacmillanCo., I9391, p. 5I) that understanding is the endat which all methods aim, rather than a methodin itself. In this sense understanding is the goalof all sciences. Verstehen, on the other hand, isviewed by its proponents as a method by meansof which we can explain human behavior. Thepurpose of this paper is to clarify this point and

evaluate its significance.

2H. E. Cooley, Sociological Theory and SocialResearch New York: Scribner's, I930), p. 290.

3Florian Znaniecki, The Method of Sociology

(New York: Farrar & Rinehart, I934), p. I67.2II


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2I2 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Similarly, Sorokin stresses the need forVerstehen when he insists that the causal-functional method is not applicable to theinterpretation of cultural phenomena. Hepoints out that the social sciences must em-ploy the logico-meaningful method whichenables us to perceive connections which''are much more intimately comprehensible,more readily perceived, than are causal-functional unities. 4

MacIver, too, speaks of a special methodwhich must be used whenever we study so-cial causation. He calls this process imagi-native reconstruction. He claims the causalformula of classical mechanics cannot be ap-plied to human behavior. However, the stu-dent of human behavior will find this com-pensated for by the advantage that someof the factors operative in social causationare understandable as causes; are validatedas causal by our own experience. 5

As these brief references ndicate, there isno dearth of tradition and authority behindthe idea of Verstehen.6 It is, therefore, sur-prising to find that, while many socialscientists have eloquently discoursed on the

existence of a special method in the study ofhuman behavior, none has taken the troubleto describe the nature of this method. Theyhave given it various names; they have in-sisted on its use; they have pointed to it asa special kind of operation which has no

counterpart in the physical sciences; andthey have extolled its superiority as a proc-ess of giving insight unobtainable by anyother methods. Yet the advocates of Ver-stehen have continually neglected to speci-fy how this operation of understanding sperformed-and what is singular about it.What, exactly, do we do when we say wepractice Verstehen? What significance canwe give to results achieved by Verstehen?Unless the operation is clearly defined, Ver-stehen is but a vague notion, and, withoutbeing dogmatic, we are unable to ascertainhow much validity can be attributed to theresults achieved by it.

I. THE OPERATION ILLUSTRATED

Our first task is to ascertain the formulaaccording to which the operation of Ver-stehen s performed. To do so, we had bestexamine a few illustrations of behavioranalysis. For this purpose we shall use threeexamples: the first will deal with a singlecase; the second, with a generalization; andthe third, with a statistical regularity.

Case i.-Last April I5 a freezing spellsuddenly set in, causing a temperature dropfrom 6o to 34 degrees. I saw my neighborrise from his desk by the window, walk tothe woodshed, pick up an ax, and chop somewood. I then observed him carrying thewood into the house and placing it in thefireplace. After he had lighted the wood, hesat down at his desk and resumed his dailytask of writing.

From these observations I concludedthat, while working, my neighbor began to

feel chilly and, in order to get warm, lighteda fire. This conclusion has all the earmarksof an obvious fact. Yet it is obvious onlybecause I have fitted the action of myneighbor into a sequential pattern by as-suming that the stimulus drop in tempera-ture induced the response making a fire.Since I recognize a relevant connection be-tween the response and the stimulus, I statethat I understand the behavior of my neigh-bor. I may even say that I am certain of it

( The case is obvious ), provided I notecarefully to what this certainty refers. I

4 Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics(New York: American Book Co., I937), p. 26.

5 R. M. MacIver, Social Causation (Boston:Ginn & Co., I942), p. 263.

6

The more important works dealing with Ver-stehen are K. Biihler, Die Krise der Philosophie(Jena: Fischer, 927); W. Dilthey, Ideen ueber inebeschreibende nd zergliedernde Psychologie (Leipzig:Teubner, I894); T. Erisman, Die Eigenart desGeistigen Leipzig: Quelle, 924); P. Haberlin, DerGeist und die Triebe (Berlin: Springer, I924);K. Jaspers, Allgemeine Psychopathologie (Berlin:Springer, I920); H. Rickert, Die Grenzen der natur-wissenschaftlichen Begrifsbildung (Tiibingen: Mohr,I9I3); E. Rothacker, Logik und Systematik derGeisteswissenschaften Bonn: Bouvier, I947); G.Simmel, Geschichtsphilosophie (Berlin: Duncan,I920); E. Spranger, Lebensformen Halle: Niemeyer,I924); and Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsaetzezur Wissenschaftslehre Tiibingen: Mohr, I920).


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THE OPERATION CALLED VERSTEHEN 2I3

cannot be certain that this is the correct ortrue explanation of his conduct. To be suremy explanation is correct, I need additionalinformation. I can go over to him and askhim why he lighted the fire. He may confirmmy interpretation. However, I cannot stopthere. Suppose he has another, hidden, in-tention? He may be expecting a guest andwish to show off his fireplace. Or suppose hehimself is not aware of the true motive?Perhaps he was impelled by a subconsciousmotive of wanting to burn down his houseso as to punish the fellow who harasses himabout paying off the mortgage. If so, hislighting the fire would have a symbolic func-tion. Of what, then, am I certain? I am cer-tain only that my interpretation could becorrect.

Hence, Versteken gives me the certaintythat a given interpretation of behavior is apossible one. I know that it can happen thisway, even though I cannot be certain thatsuch was the case in this instance. My inter-pretation in itself is not a hypothesis; onlyits application to the stated case is hypo-thetical.

Whence comes this certainty that Iachievethrough Verstehen? ince the case is simple,the answer is simple: I have enacted it my-self. Feeling chilled, I have gathered woodand lighted a fire; therefore, I know. Thesense of relevance is the result of personalexperience; the connection has been estab-lished by me before, so I am certain of itspossibility.

However, the answer as stated does notgive us a clear picture of the operation the

act of Verstehen nvolves. It will, therefore,be necessary to schematize the evidence andshow the steps taken to perform the opera-tion.

Two sets of observations are given in ourexample. First, there is a sequence of bodilymovement (chopping wood, lighting a fire,etc.); second, there is a thermometer readingof a near-freezing temperature. The act ofVerstehen inks these two facts into the con-clusion that the freezing weather was the

stimulus which set off the response makinga fire. An elementary examination shows

that three items of information are utilizedto reach this conclusion:i. Low temperature A) reduces he tempera-

ture of the body (B).2. Heat is produced C) by making fire (D).3. A person feeling cold (B') will seek

warmth C').

Through this interpretation the three itemsare linked together as follows:

A-B C-DB' - C'

We immediately recognize the third itemas the significant element of the interpreta-tion. The two conditions (A-B), togetherwith their known consequences (C-D), aredisparate facts. We link them into a se-quence and state that C-D is the conse-quence of A-B by translating B and Cinto feeling-states of a human organism,namely, B' and C'. Introducing these inter-vening factors enables us to apply a general-ization concerning the function of the or-ganism (behavior maxim), from which wededuce the drop in temperature as a pos-sible cause of my neighbor's behavior.

By specifying the steps which are implicitin the interpretation of our case, we havebrought out two particulars which are char-acteristic of the act of Verstehen. One is the

internalizing of observed factors in agiven situation; the other is the applicationof a behavior maxim which makes the con-nection between these factors relevant.Thus we understand a given human ac-tion if we can apply to it a generalizationbased upon personal experience. We can

apply such a rule of behavior if we are ableto internalize the facts of the situation.

These propositions require further eluci-dation, but, before we attempt this, let usconsider two other examples of behavioranalysis.

Case 2.-In one of Lundberg's articles wefind the following generalization:

Faced by the insecurity of a changing andhostile world, we seek security by creating

eternal verities in our thoughts. The more

inadequate we feel, the more we indulge n thistype of wishful thinking. Conversely, as the


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THE OPERATION CALLED VERSTEHEN 2I5

the case when we are puzzled. For example,when we were confronted with the evidencethat in army units in which promotion waseasy there was much more griping about

injustice han in those units in which veryfew were promoted, we were puzzled. Wewould expect the contrary. It is only by in-ternalizing the situation-namely, by in-troducing the intervening factor of ex-pectation -that we are able to understandthe connection. If we then assume that inunits in which promotion is easy there willbe greater expectation of promotion, we canapply the behavior maxim: The higherone's expectations, the greater one's disap-pointment if those expectations are not ful-filled. This enables us to understand heseemingly paradoxical behavior.

Another condition for making the inter-vening inner-organic equence explicit ariseswhenever we are called upon to explain thereason for asserting a connection betweenoccurrences. This is particularly so when noexperimental or statistical data are avail-able and recourse is taken to arguments insupport of an interpretation. This happens

frequently when interpretations of indi-vidual historical events are attempted, as,for example, establishing the cause of a war.Here the behavior n question can be relatedto earlier events solely on the basis that interms of assumed feeling-states such a rela-tion is a plausible one.

As has been indicated, the operation ofVerstehen nvolves three steps: (i) inter-nalizing the stimulus, (2) internalizing theresponse, and (3) applying behavior maxims.

The questions now arise as to how to goabout the process of internalizing and wherewe get our knowledge of behavior maxims.

i. Internalizing the stimulus.-To thebest of my knowledge, no one has yet speci-fied a technique by which we can objectivelyattribute certain feeling-states to personsfaced by a particular situation or event. Thearbitrary procedure we employ to internalizea stimulus consists of imagining what emo-tions may have been aroused by the impactof a given situation or event. Sometimes weare able to employ definite clues which we

have gathered while observing the impact.These may have been gestures, facial expres-sions, or exclamations or comments. Wherethere are no such clues, we note the effectproduced by an event or situation. Then weimagine how we would have been affectedby such an impact. For example, not beinga farmer, I never experienced the conse-quence of crop failure. However, observingthat its effect is a curtailment of income, Iattribute to the farmer a feeling of anxietywhich I recall having felt-or imagine Imight feel-under similar circumstances.Thus the internalizing of a stimulus dependslargely upon our ability to describe a situa-tion or event by categorizing t and evokinga personal experience which fits into thatcategory.

2. Internalizing the response.-Here, too,no specific techniques are known which per-mit a definite association between feeling-states and observed behavior. All that canagain be said is that we use our imaginationwhen we ascribe a motive to a person's be-havior-for example, fear of new commit-ments as the reason for postponing mar-

riage; or, in another instance, when we viewthe behavior as expressive of some emotion-namely, when we infer that the gripingof soldiers over promotions evokes a feelingof disappointment. We generally infer themotive of an act from the known or observedmodification it produces. If we express thisconsequence of an act in general terms, wecan utilize our personal experience withmotives or feelings we had when we our-selves acted in order to produce a similar

result.In cases where both stimulus and re-sponse are stated, imagination is facilitatedby the fact that both can be viewed as partof a complete situation. This enables us torelate to each other whatever inferences wemake about the stimulus and the response.We then select the inferences which fitone another in such a way that the given be-havior can be recognized as the solution(release of tension) of the problem (ten-sion experience) created by the impact ofthe stated event.


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3. Behavior maxims.-The generalizationswhich we call behavior maxims link twofeeling-states ogether in a uniform sequenceand imply a functional dependence betweenthem. In the cases cited it can be seen thatthe functional dependence consists of thefact that the feeling-state we ascribe to agiven human action is directed y the feeling-state we presume is evoked by an impingingsituation or event. Anxiety directs caution;a feeling of cold, the seeking of warmth; afeeling of insecurity, a desire for somethingthat will provide reassurance.

Behavior maxims are not recorded n anytextbooks on human behavior. In fact, theycan be constructed ad hoc and be acceptableto us as propositions even though they havenot been established experimentally. Therelation asserted appears to us as self-evi-dent.

This peculiarity of behavior maxims canbe accounted for only by the assumptionthat they are generalizations of direct per-sonal experience derived from introspectionand self-observation. Such personal experi-ences appear originally in the form of what

Alexander has called emotional syllo-gisms. He has this to say about them:

Our understanding of psychological con-nections is based on the tacit recognition ofcertain causal relationships which we knowfrom everyday experience and the validity ofwhich we accept as self-evident. We understandanger and aggressive behavior as a reaction toan attack; fear and guilt as results of aggressive-ness; envy as an outgrowth of the feeling ofweakness and inadequacy. Such self-evidentconnections as I hate him because he attacksme I shall call emotional syllogisms. The feel-ing of the self-evident validity of these emo-tional connections is derived from daily intro-spective experience as we witness the emotionalsequences in ourselves.... Just as the logic ofintellectual thinking is based on repeated andaccumulated experiences of relations in theexternal world, the logic of emotions is basedon the accumulated experiences of our own emo-tional reactions.8

Emotional syllogisms when stated in theform of general propositions are behaviormaxims. This explains their familiar ringand accounts for the facility with which theycan be formulated. In generalizing emotion-al syllogisms we proceed on the assumptionthat the emotions of others function simi-larly to our own.

We find, then, that in all its essentialfeatures the operation of Verstehen s basedupon the application of personal experienceto observed behavior. We understand anobserved or assumed connection if we areable to parallel either one with somethingwe know though self-observation does hap-pen. Furthermore, since the operation con-sists of the application of knowledge we al-ready possess, it cannot serve as a means ofdiscovery. At best it can only confirm whatwe already know.

III. THE OPERATION EVALUATED

From the foregoing description of theoperation of Verstehen we can draw severalinferences as to its limitations and possibili-ties. The most obvious limitation of theoperation is its dependence upon knowledgederived from personal experience. Theability to define behavior will vary with theamount and quality of the personal experi-ence and the introspective capacity of theinterpreter. It will also depend upon hisability to generalize his experiences. In somecases it may be possible to secure objectivedata on the basis of which the verificationof an interpretation can be approximated.However, owing to the relative inaccessibili-

ty of emotional experiences, most interpre-tations will remain mere expressions ofopinion, subject only to the test ofplausibility.

Regardless of the relative ability of peopleto use it, a second limitation to the use of theoperation itself lies in the fact that it is nota method of verification. This means thatwhat in the realm of scientific research weconsider a quality of crucial importance, snot an attribute of the operation of Ver-

stehen.When we say we understand a connec-

8 Franz Alexander, The Logic of Emotions and

Its Dynamic Background, International Journalof Psychoanalysis, XVI (October, Ig35), 399.


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jected. 9 He then viewed such emotionalstates as the result of a lack of psychic sup-port, such as is provided by intimate as-sociations with others. This suggested thepossibility of social cohesion being the cru-cial factor which determines the characteris-tic rate of suicide in a group. Subsequent n-vestigations established a high degree ofprobability for this inference because Durk-heim was able to show that the rate of sui-cide varies consistently in inverse ratio withthe degree of group coherence.

By reversing the procedure, we arrive athunches about possible responses to givenor expected occurrences. That is, we inter-nalize the situation by projecting it as aproblem experience and then, by means of abehavior maxim, infer the problem-solvingresponse (intention). However, to guess theparticular form the response will take re-quires information which the operation ofVerstehen does not provide. It would not,for example, be of use in trying to conjecturespecific ways and means of aggression whichmay be employed by a group in response to

a provocation by another group. The opera-tion gives us hunches, and it points outthe general character of possible factors, butit does not enable us to evaluate probabilities.

The findings with regard to the operationof Verstehen may be summarized in the fol-lowing propositions:

The operation of Verstehen s performedby analyzing a behavior situation in such away-usually in terms of general feeling-states -that it parallels some personal ex-perience of the interpreter.

Primarily the operation of Verstehen oestwo things: It relieves us of a sense of ap-prehension n connection with behavior thatis unfamiliar or unexpected and it is a sourceof hunches, which help us in the formula-tion of hypotheses.

The operation of Verstehen oes not, how-ever, add to our store of knowledge, becauseit consists of the application of knowledge al-ready validated by personal experience; nordoes it serve as a means of verification. Theprobability of a connection can be ascer-tained only by means of objective, experi-mental, and statistical tests.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY9 R. K. Merton, Sociological Theory, Ameri-

can Journal of Sociology, (May, I945), 470.

abel, the operation called verstehen

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