a2- june22 (del prado - psi)

8/10/2019 A2- June22 (Del Prado - PSI)

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Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co.G.R. No. 29462 March 7, 1929

petitioners Ignacio Del Pradorespondents Manila Electric Co.

summaryStreetcar accident; the contributory negligence of an injured party may mitigate the liability of the defendant in a case for

damages under Art. 1172

**article numbers used in the case were changed to their current provision numbers in the NCC !facts of the case

On November 18, 1925, Ignacio Del Prado attempted to board streetcar no. 74 (owned by herein respondent ManilaElectric Co.) of which Teodorico Florenciano was the motorman. The manner of Del Prados boarding was unconventional inthat he attempted to get on the streetcar just after it had departed from its previous stop. As a result of his irregular timing, thestreetcar was already in motion, though not yet in full speed. According to witness accounts Florenciano, upon seeing that apassenger was attempting to board the streetcar, reduced the speed so that Del Prado was able to grab hold onto the frontperpendicular handpost with his left hand and put his left foot upon the platform. However, before Del Prado could manageto steady himself, the motorman applied more power to the streetcar causing it to accelerate. This sudden increase in speedwas accompanied by a sudden lurch that caused Del Prado to fall off the streetcar into the pavement below where the his rightfoot was subsequently run over by the same streetcar. The foot was amputated the next day.

As defense, the motorman claimed that he was not aware of any of the foregoing events and was only made aware of theaccident after the other passengers informed him of the same. The Court did not give credit to his testimony because itseemed highly unlikely that the entire accident could have escaped his attention. Florencianos version of events becameespecially unlikely when the fact that Del Prado tried to board through the front of the streetcar where the driver was locatedwas considered.

The CFI of Manila thus deemed it proper to award P50, 000.00 for personal injuries caused by the Manila Electric Co.through the negligence of its employee. The Trial Court reduced the money awarded to Del Prado to P10, 000.00 with costs ofthe suit. Manila Electric Co. appealed this decision on the basis that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. Itpresented evidence that tended to show that due care had been used in training and instructing Florenciano.

issueWON Manila Electric Co. may avail of the defense provided by Art. 2180? NO.

ratioThe Court took this case as an opportunity to differentiate the nature of the liabilities that attached culpa aquiliana and

culpa contractual.

Liability under culpa aquiliana arises from a mere tort that does not involve the breach of a positive obligation. Undersuch liability, the employer may extinguish his liability upon proving that he exercised due/ordinary diligence to prevent thedamage caused. In the case of culpa contractual, the defense of ordinary diligence is not sufficient to dispense with anemployers liability. Another difference between the two is that in the case of the latter the Court, through Art. 1172, maymitigate the liability of the persons involved after taking the peculiar circumstances that each case presents.

Applying it to the case at bar, the Court held that the relation of a passenger to carriers for hire is that of a contractual

nature. Hence, the applicable provisions are Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 and not Art. 2180.

While Manila Electric Co. may not invoke the defense found under Art. 2180, the Court found that it would beappropriate to mitigate the liability of the former through Art. 1172. As justification for doing so, the Court stated that whilethe accident occurred due to the fault of the motorman, it could not be denied that Del Prado contributed to his misfortuneby attempting to board the streetcar while it was already in motion. Under the last clear chance doctrine, the contributorynegligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant, by the exercise ofreasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. Thecontributory negligence of the injured party, however, may mitigate the defendants liability.

The Court deemed it proper to reduce the money awarded to Del Prado to just P2, 500.00.


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Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907

petitioners M.H. Rakesrespondents The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company

summaryA black guy sustained an accident resulting from the company's failure to maintain its rails. The company's liability was

deemed to be contractual in nature, but the extent of damages was reduced due to the victim's own imprudence.

facts of the caseRakes was a negro laborer employed by the defendant company, and was at work transporting rails from a barge to the

harbor. The workers used one-hand cars to accomplish this work. The structure was as follows: the car was loaded with railsabout 560 pounds heavy that lay on sills to secure them but no side guards; men were either at the rear or the sides of the carwith two men in front hauling the car by rope. There was a point where the rail sagged and when the car passed this point itwas upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff. The plaintiff's leg was crushed and was amputated.

It was found by the trial court that the defect in the rail was reported to the foreman but he did nothing about it, and thesagging was caused by the dislodging of some of the timber due to a recent typhoon. At no time after the typhoon did thedefendant company inspect the rail.

The defense of Atlantic was that Rakes had no cause of action since liability would only spring forth from a criminalprosecution for negligence, which he should have filed against the supervisor. Secondly, there should be no damages awardedbecause of the plaintiff's own negligence.

issue/sThe pertinent issues in this case are:What is the nature of the employer's liability?What is the extent of damages to be awarded if any?

ratioAtlantic's point that Rakes should have filed a criminal suit for negligence (which would make the company's liability only

subsidiary) in order to obtain indemnity was not agreed upon by the court. The court held that it is not required that the

injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution is a condition precedent to the enforcement ofcivil rights.

Thus, the negligence of the employer would not fall under delict since no criminal action was filed. Neither is the liabilityof the employer a quasi-delict, since there are preexisting duties between the employer and the employee.The company'sliability to the employee would arise of the contract of employment. Two species of negligence may be somewhatdescribed exactly as contractual and extra-contractual. There is contractual obligation for the employer to provide safeappliances for his employee, thus it was the duty of Atlantic to ensure that the tracks were in sound condition as to preventunnecessary danger to the employee, since the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglecthis duty. Nor can the employer invoke that the accident is due to a fellow servant, since the fellow-servant rule adopted inEngland could not be adopted into Philippine jurisprudence.

On the contention that the employer should be exonerate don the basis of the employee's own negligence, Atlanticcontended that (1) he continued his work despite noticing the depression in the track and (2) he walked on the sides and noton the boards. On the first contention, the plaintiff could not have known about the depression since he was only working forless than two days. On the second contention, the Court agreed with the defendant company, since the general order was forthe workers to walk along the boards for safety despite advice by the foreman to walk along the sides.

Because of this, the question arose on whether the plaintiff is not entitled to damages. It is a rule in Americanjurisprudence that when the one seeking damages has been proven to be also negligent, then he is not entitled to recover.However, in Civil Code jurisdictions such as France, Spain and Quebec, the jurisprudence points to a rule wherein when aplaintiff is proven to have been negligent the defendant is entitled to a reduction in damages. The reason however for theAmerican rule arises from the jury system wherein the reason was not that the negligence was equal but it was difficult to


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ascertain how much damage was attributable to the plaintiff's own fault. In a civil law system, however, the courts have thecapacity to offset the litigants' responsibilities.

The Court then laid down its judgment that it deemed most consistent with the history and principles of law in thePhilippines. The test is whether or not the plaintiff's act of negligence is the primary cause of the accident. In thiscase, the plaintiff was not the cause of the accident but his negligence added to his injury. Thus he is entitled torecover damages less the sum deemed a suitable equivalent to his own imprudence.

Original award of P 5,000 reduced to P 2,500.


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Vasquez v. De BorjaG.R. No. L-48930 Date

petitioners Antonio Vasquezrespondents Francisco de Borja

summaryCorporate fiction. De Borja entered into contract with Vasquez, who was acting as agent of corporation. Obligation

unfulfilled. De Borja sued Vasquez in his personal capacity. Court held that it was proven that De Borja entered into the

contract with the corporation so Vasquez cant be held principally or subsidiarily liable.

facts of the case

On January, 1932, defendants Antonio Vasquez and Fernando Busuego jointly and severally obligated themselves to sell toFrancisco de Borja 4000 cavans of palay at P2.10 per cavan to be delivered the following month.

Vasquez and Busuego received P8400 as payment but they only delivered to de Borja 2488 cavans of palay worth P5224.80during the months of February-April 1932, and refused to deliver the remainder of the agreed amount (1512 cavans valuedat P3175.20) despite repeated demands.

Plaintiff suffered P1000 in damages, not to mention the value of 1510 empty sacks (P377.50) he gave to Vasquez andBusuego for them to fill which they did not return and the damages arising from such refusal (P150).

De Borja thus filed for an action for recovery. Vasquez denied entering into an agreement with de Borja in his ownpersonal and individual capacity and instead claimed that de Borja entered into the agreement with Natividad-Vasquez

Sabani Development Co and that Vasquez was merely the acting manager of the company.

Vasquez filed a counterclaim, alleging that he suffered damage of P1000 for the suit filed.

TC ordered Vasquez to pay de Borja P3175.20 and P377.50. CA reduced total amount to P3314.78 but in a subsequentresolution set aside judgment and ordered case to be remanded

issueWhether Francisco de Borja entered into a contract with Antonio Vasquez in the latters personal capacity or as manager ofNatividad-Vasquez Sabani Development Corporation.FDB entered into the contract with AV as manager of NVSDC, thusAV cannot be held liable on the contract principally or subsidiarily.

ratioFirst of all, the court said that the CA erred when they ordered a remand of the trial to determine if the corporation had enough

cavans of palay at the time the agreement was made because if this fact was so relevant, it should have been proven so in the trial.Moving on to the main issue, it appearing by preponderance of evidence that the party liable to the contract is the corporation

and not Vasquez, the court held that the case should have been dismissed.A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from its stockholders and

from that of its officers. The mere fact that its personality is owing to legal fiction and that it acts through its agents and officersdoes not make the latter liable on a contract duly entered into or for an act lawfully performed by them for its behalf. Such legafiction may be disregarded only when it is attempted to use it as a cloak to hide unlawful/fraudulent purposes. In the case at bar, it

was not alleged that Vasquez fraudulently benefitted by invoking legal fiction to escape personal liability. It wasnt contended as welthat Vasquez entered into the contract for the corporation in bad faith with intent to defraud de Borja.

The TC found Vasquez guilty of negligence in the performance of the contract and held him personally liable on that accountTC erred in so holding; they failed to distinguish a contractual obligation (obligation arising from a contract) from an extra-contractual obligation (obligation arising from culpa aquiliana). The fact that the corporation, acting through its agen

Vasquez, was negligent in the fulfillment of the contract did not make Vasquez principally or subsidiarily liable. It was the

corporations contract, therefore its non-fulfillment made the corporation, not the agent, liable. Corporations obligation arose fromthe contract.

Had Vasquez by his fault or negligence cause damage to de Borja, he would be liable under 1902 of the civil code, or anobligation arising from culpa aquiliana. BUT then the cause of action should have been based on culpa aquiliana and not on thecontract alleged herein. No cause of action thus arose because it was not alleged in the complaint, so TC did not have jurisdictionConsequently, it was error for the CA to remand the case.

Vasquezs claim for damages because of the suit cannot be sustained, given that he entered into the contract as the agent of thecorporation, so it does not warrant that the suit against him was tortious and malicious. In fact, it was his moral duty, as officer ofthe corporation, to have seen to it that the contractual obligation of the corporation to de Borja was met. His indignant attitudetoward defendant thus cannot be considered right and he has no legitimate cause for indignation.

Judgment of CA reversed, complaint dismissed.


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Air France v. CarrascosoG.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

petitioners Air Francerespondents Rafael Carrascoso and the Honorable Court of Appeals

doctrineLiability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.

facts of the case- Plaintiff Carrascoso bought a first class airplane ticket from Manila to Rome from Air France.- However, in his flight from Manila to Bangkok, he was forced to vacate his seat by the manager of the airline because awhite man had a better right to the first class seat. He refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager butafter being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat.- Carrascoso filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint the contract of carriage between Air France and himself.- On the other hand, Air France claims that since Carrascosos action is based on breach of contract, there must be anaverment of fraud or bad faith, upon which Carrascosos complaint is silent.

Issue/sWON Carrascoso is entitled to moral damages given that there was no averment of bad faith.YESWON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat.YES

ratio1) First, the Court made the following conclusions:

a) There was a contract to furnish Carrascoso first class seats throughout his trip.b) Said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish this seat at Bangkok.c) There was bad faith when Air France compelled Carrascoso to give up his seat, by reason of which he suffered

inconvenience, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, and social humiliation resulting in moral damages

While it is true that there was no averment of bad faith in Carrascosos complaint, this was not needed because bad faithcan be drawn from the facts and pieces of evidence established. In this case, the contract was averred only to establish therelation between the parties. The stress of the action was actually put on the acts of Air France of wrongfully expelling himfrom his seat.

This can be seen through what Carrascoso tried to prove during the trial. From the start, he intended to prove that he was

ousted by the manager of the airlines. Also, evidence of bad faith was accepted by Air France without objection. Therefore, theCourt deemed that there was sufficient basis to award moral damages.Liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. This case

shows the nuance of identifying two separate sources of obligations existing in one transaction. Here there is a contract ofcarriage between the two parties and such contract was breached by Air France when it ousted Carrascoso from his seat. Thiswrongful expulsion is independent of the breach since even without the contract, Air France would still be liable for their acts.

The Court also talked about the nature of a contract of carriage. They said these contracts are different because of therelation that an air carrier sustains with the public. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation as they have a right tobe treated by the employees with kindness, respect, courtesy, and consideration. What happened was a violation of public dutyby Air France, a case of quasi-delict, so damages are proper.

The Court also cited Art. 21 of the CC as a basis for moral damages, which states Any person who willfully causes loss orinjury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for thedamage.

2) It was clearly established that Carrascoso paid for, and received a first class ticket. If, as Air France contends, a first-class-ticket holder is not guaranteed to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is thereinconfirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have?

Other issue:Air France also contends that the CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented. >>> SC says that solong as CA's decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions, there is nothing wrong in withholding anyspecific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense. They did not ignore the other pieces of evidence, theyjust did not include them in coming up with a conclusion.


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Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. v CA and DionelaG.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986

petitioners Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc.respondents CA and Loreto Dionela

nature of petition petition for review on certiorari to annul the CAs decision

doctrineActs of the employees are acts of the employer and the latter cannot claim only subsidiary liability when the injured party filesa separate civil action for damages against him; res ipsa loquitur doctrine; contractual relation

facts of the caseA telegram was sent to Dionela through RCPI that had the words at the bottom of the original, Sa iyo walang pakinabangdumating ka diyan wala kang padala dito kahit bulbul mo. The said telegram had been sent through its facilities and wasreceived in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned the machine which automatically receivestelegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine and placed inside a sealed envelope anddelivered as is. The added words were never noticed. Dionela filed a civil case for damages against RCPI before the RTC.

Dionela:the defamatory words of the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undueembarrassment adversely affected his business but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business

as well because other people have come to know of the said defamatory words.RCPI:the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they werentaddressed to the plaintiff and therefore didn't form part of the telegram; argues that the Tagalog words arent defamatoryRTC:Libelous. No indication that the words were sent as a private joke between the operators. Applied Art. 19, 20, and 331NCC (not Art. 1161 NCC in relation to Art. 103 RPC). Theres also sufficient publication (copies of the telegram are open toview and inspection by 3 rdparties)CA:confirmed RTC. Proximate cause resulting to injury of Dionela: failure of RCPI to take steps to avoid the occurrence ofthe humiliating incident; Negligence was present: Carbon copy of the telegram was filed with others and left to hang for thepublic to see.

issue/s1. WoN RCPI should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employees YES

2. WoN the liability of RCPI s predicated on Art. 19, 20 NCC YES

ratioThe civil action for damages taken by Dionela was filed against RCPI not for subsidiary liability (aka. Not as an employer) butfor primary liability. The cause of action of Dionela was based on Art. 192and 203NCC, as well as on RCPIs breach ofcontract through negligence of its own employees. The SC points out that RCPI is a corporation engaging in the business ofreceiving and transmitting messages. Hence, every time a person transmits a message through its facilities, a contract is enteredinto. RCPI undertakes to transmit each message accurately in exchange for a fee. In this case, theres a clear breach of contractwhen libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. RCPIshouldve take measures to secure the telegram from prying eyes.

SC also points out that the acts of the employees are the acts of RCPI. The latter cannot claim only subsidiary liability for its

employees acts because that would deprive the general public of availing its services of an adequate and effective remedy.Lastly, it is a general rule that negligence must be proven. However, as negligence may be hard to substantiate, the doctrine ofRes Ipsa Loquitur may be applied by the SC with consideration of the facts or circumstances surrounding the inquiry. (Whichit did in this case). CA affirmed.

1Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may bebrought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence2Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honestyand good faith.3Art. 20.Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.


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CALALAS v. SUNGAG.R. 122039 Date May 31, 2000

petitioners VICENTE CALALASrespondents COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA

summaryQuasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. Breachof contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.

facts of the case" Eliza Sunga, college freshman majoring in PE at the Siliman University, took a jeepney owned and operated by Calalas" Because the jeepney was filled to about 24 passengers, the conductor gave a wooden stool at the back of the door at the

rear end of the vehicle to accommodate Sunga" En route to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the

rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger." Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a

result, Sunga was injured causing her to fracture her leg.o Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, certified that she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to

ambulate in crutches during said period." Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to

exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.

"

Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck." LC rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver

of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident.o This decision was based on another case which the court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for

the damage to his jeepney based on quasi-delict" CA reversed the rulingon the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi- delict,

and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code.Issue/sWON the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident rendering Calalas absolved from any liabilities? NOWON Calalas Executed utmost diligence of very cautious persons in transporting Sunga safely? NOratio1.

a.

There is no res judicata because the two cases were not identical. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salvaand his driver Verena were liable for quasi- delictfor the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand,the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage

b. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source thenegligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon thenegligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.

c. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly establishedbecause it is the basis of the action, whereas inbreach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the factthat the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.

d. Art.1756 CC provides that common carriersare presumed to have been at faultor to have acted negligently unlessthey prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provisionnecessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

e. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the

truck driver.The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actionsinvolving breach of contract.

f. Where there is a pre-existing contractual relationbetween the parties, it is the parties themselves who create theobligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.

2.a. The jeepneywas not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of

the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle which is in violation of R.A. No. 4136, asamended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

b. Calalas took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law.i. Giving her the extension seat placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.

1. the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.


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HUANG v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERSG.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012

petitioners DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANGrespondents PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. And FIRST

LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION

summaryDoctor got hit in the head by wooden plank then blames Hotel for her stupidity.

facts of the case

PETITIONERS VERSION:

June 11, 1995: Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve LHuang, for a swim at the hotels swimming pool facility. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotels swimming pool attendantinformed them that the swimming pool area was about to be closed.

They took a shower. When they came out of the bathroom, it was already pitch black. They carefully walked towards themain door leading to the hotel but, to their surprise, the door was locked.

After waiting for 10 minutes, Delia became anxious about their situation so petitioner began to walk around to look for ahouse phone. Delia followed petitioner. After some time, petitioner saw a phone behind the lifeguards counter. Whileslowly walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned out to be the folding wooden counter top,fell on petitioners head that knocked her down almost unconscious.

Delia immediately asked for help and the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the swimming pool area but ittook them at least 20 to 30 minutes to get inside. The hotel chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an ice pack andapplying some ointment on her head and demanded the services of the hotel physician.

Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. Instead of immediately providing the needed medical assistance, Dr.Dalumpines presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed by petitioner, otherwise, the hotel management will notrender her any assistance. Petitioner refused to do so.

When petitioner got home, she started to feel extraordinary dizziness accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in herstomach, which lasted until the following day. Petitioner was constrained to stay at home and suffered several sleeplessnights due to severe headaches.

She thereafter consulted several doctors:o Petitioner went to MakatiMed where she had her checkup. The MRI result clearly showed that her head was bruised.

Based also on the same MRI result, Dr. Noble (her doctor) told her that she has a very serious brain injury and gaveher medicines. Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Ofelia Adapon, also a neurologist from Makati MedicalCenter, who required her to undergo an Electroencephalogram examination (EEG) to measure the electrostatic in herbrain where it was found she has a serious condition which was already permanent.

o In September 1995, she consulted another neuro-surgeon by the name of Dr. Renato Sibayan (Dr. Sibayan) who alsotold her she has a serious brain injury. Thereafter, petitioner also started to feel losing her memory, which greatlyaffected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession. Through counsel, she sent a demand letter to respondentsseeking payment but her demanded was unheeded.

o She consulted another neuro-surgeon from Makati Medical Center by the name of Dr. Leopoldo P. Pardo, Jr. (DrPardo, Jr.) with whom she disclosed that at the age of 18 she suffered a stroke due to mitral valve disease and that shewas given treatments, which also resulted in thrombocytopenia. Dr. Pardo Jr. gave her a diagnosis that the incident inthe swimming pool resulted to more complicated injuries and as a result it affected her performance.

o Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Tenchavez for her follow-up EEG. He similarly prescribed medicine for

petitioners deep brain injury.o In 1999, petitioner consulted another neurologist at the Makati Medical Center by the name of Dr. Martesio Perez (Dr.

Perez) because of severe fleeting pains in her head, arms and legs; difficulty in concentration; and warm sensation ofthe legs, which symptoms also occurred after the 11 June 1995 incident. Upon examination, Dr. Perez observed thatpetitioner has been experiencing severe pains and she has a slight difficulty in concentration. He likewise noted thatthere was a slight spasm of petitioners neck muscle but, otherwise, there was no objective neurologic finding.

RESPONDENTS VERSION:

According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had been posted on the glass door of the hotel leading tothe swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is open only from7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m, and that the lights are kept on until 10 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel to


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do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings; and (3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmers WorldGym adjacent to the swimming pool area, which was then open until 10:00 p.m., to have a good view of the hotelsswimming pool.

Also, at around 7:40 p.m., Pearlie Benedicto-Lipana (Ms. Pearlie), the hotel staff nurse received a call from the hotetelephone operator informing her that there was a guest requiring medical assistance and she immediately, Ms. Pearlie gothold of her medical kit and hurriedly went to the hotels swimming pool area. Although petitioner looked normal as therewas no indication of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention towhich petitioner replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not need any medical attention. (though huridoid forhematoma was applied by nurse)

Dr. Dalumpines chanced upon Delia and petitioner at the hotels coffee shop and the latter reported to Dr. Dalumpinesthat her head was hit by a folding wooden counter top while she was inside the hotels swimming pool area. When askedby Dr. Dalumpines how she was, petitioner responded she is a doctor, she was fine and she was already attended to by thehotel nurse.

Having been assured that everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested petitioner to execute a handwritten certificationregarding the incident that occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to petitioner to have an X-ray test.Petitioner replied that it was not necessary. Petitioner also refused further medical attention.

Petitioner would then often call Dr. Dalumpines and have a small talk with her regarding their private lives. During one oftheir telephone conversations, petitioner requested for a certification regarding the 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotelsswimming pool area.

TC rendered decision: dismissed Petitioners complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners testimony is self-serving, thusdevoid of credibility. She failed to present any evidence to substantiate her allegation that the lights in the hotelsswimming pool area were shut off at the time of the incident. In other words, it believed respondents version of the factsand contentions. CAs affirmed TCs decision and its findings (see last page).

issue/sWON respondents actions tantamount to negligence and are therefore liable to petitioner (NO)

ratioNo such justifiable or compelling reasons exist for this Court to depart from the general rule. This Court will not

disturb the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and adequately supported by theevidence on record. Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of the lower courts are binding blablablabla (the same oldclich).

Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on account of their negligence but not on any breachof contract. Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had a change ofheart and later claimed that an implied contract existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI and that thelatter were liable for breach of their obligation to keep her safe and out of harm . This allegation was never an issuebefore the trial court. It was not the cause of action relied upon by the petitioner not until the case was before the Court ofAppeals. Presently, petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and breach of contract.

A perusal of petitioners Complaint evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict (i.enegligently putting the lights off, as well as the locking of its main door, prompting her to look for a way out leading to the fallof the folding wooden counter top on her head causing her serious brain injury).

Petitioners belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action cannot be sanctioned by the Court.Well-settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case or the cause of action on appealMatters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on appealor certiorari.

Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breachof contract (culpa contractual):

1) In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merelyincidental to the performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation.

2) In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardiansand employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selectionand supervision of employees.


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3) In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove thenegligence of the defendant, otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contractnegligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on thedefendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule ofrespondeat superior is followed.

Petitioners change of theory or cause of action from quasi-delict to breach of contract only on appeal would necessarilycause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the latter will have no more opportunity to present evidence tocontradict petitioners new argument. Second, the burden of proof will be shifted from petitioner to respondents

PHI and DTPCI. Petitioners change of theory from quasi-delict to breach of contract must be repudiated.

As petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of thefollowing requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection ofcause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, sincepetitioners case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. Theburden of proof is upon petitioner (requires only preponderance of evidence).

As found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner utterly failed to prove the allegednegligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than petitioners self-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotelsswimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a

folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was presented to substantiate the same.Even her own companion during the night of the accident inside the hotels swimming pool area was never presented tocorroborate her allegations. Moreover, petitioners aforesaid allegations were successfully rebutted by respondents PHI andDTPCI through the testimonies aforementioned.

FROM CA with regard to the decision if respondents were negligent: NO, because of the following:1) Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool areas closing time is 7:00 p.m. She, herself, admitted during her testimony

that she was well aware of the sign when she and Delia entered the pool area. Hence, knowing at the outset of thepools closing time, she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to take shower and leave the area beyond theclosing hour.

2) She admitted, through her certification, that she lifted the wooden bar countertop, which then fell on to her head. Theadmission in her certificate proves the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the night of 11June 1995. This is contrary to her assertion in the complaint and testimony that, while she was passing through thecounter door, she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object.

3) Petitioners assertion that the pool area was totally dark is not believable in that she herself admitted that she saw atelephone at the counter after searching for one. It must be noted that petitioner and Delia had walked around thepool area with ease since they were able to proceed to the glass entrance door from the shower room, and back to thecounter area where the telephone was located without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she could haveeasily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something while searching for the telephone.

The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and immediate causeof the injury of petitioner was due to her own negligence.

Even petitioners assertion of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and DTPCI in not rendering medical assistanceto her is preposterous. Her own Complaint affirmed that respondents PHI and DTPCI afforded medical assistance to her

after she met the unfortunate accident inside the hotels swimming pool facility (as mentioned in par. 14 of the Complaint). Asobserved by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI, indeed, extended medical assistance to petitioner but it waspetitioner who refused the same (i.e. it was a self-serving testimony that there was no evidence that she was not given).

With regard to petitioners contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior areapplicable in this case, this Court holds otherwise.

res ipsa: no application because she caused the wooden plank to hit her head no presumption of negligence

doctrine of respondeat superior: no application in the absence of any showing that the employees of respondents PHIand DTPCI were negligent


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SEMI-IMPORTANT:

Controlling finding of the trial courts are:

Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain injury.

Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident and the braindamage suffered by petitioner.

Thirdly, Dr. Sanchezs testimony cannot be relied upon since she testified on the findings and conclusions of personswho were never presented in court.

Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom petitioner sought forexamination or treatment were neither identified nor testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsaythey cannot be given probative value.


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Gilchrist v. CuddyG.R. No. L-9356 Feb 18, 1915

petitioners C.S. Gilchrist plaintiff-appelleerespondents E.A. Cuddy defendant

Jose Espejo and Mariano Zaldarriaga appellants

summary

Inducing one party to violate his contract with another, even if the inducer does not know the identity of the other party,makes him liable for damages.

facts of the caseThis is an appeal by the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga from a judgment of the CFI of Iloilo dismissing their cross-

complaint against the plaintiff for the alleged wrongful issuance of a mandatory and preliminary injuction.Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo. In accordance

with the terms of the contract they entered between themselves, the former leased to the letter Zigomar for exhibition inGilchrist's theater for the week beginning May 26, 1913 for P125. A few days prior to the delivery of Zigomar, Cuddy sentback Gilchrist's money, saying he had made other arrangements with his film. These arrangements were the rental of the filmZigomar to defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week.

Cuddy, being the owner of the film, willfully violated his contract with Gilchrist because the other party was offering 3

times more than Gilchrist. Gilchrist then filed for an injunction against Espejo and his partner from showing the film for theweek beginning May 26. From the facts, it seems they did know that the film would be unavailable for 6 weeks, and that theyhad knowledge that Cuddy had contracted the film. However, it appeared that Espejo and his partner did not know that it wasGilchrist who was the first party Cuddy had a contract with.

Issue/sWON Espejo and his partner are liable for inducing Cuddy to violate his contract, even if they did not know the identity ofGilchrist? YES

ratioThere was no doubt that Cuddy is liable in an action for damages for breach of contract.Espejo and his partner contend that they had the right to do what they did, since there was no valid and binding contract

between Cuddy and Gilchrist and therefore they had a right to compete for the lease of the film. The court held that this wasuntenable because Cuddy and Gilchrist did indeed have a valid and binding contract and that the right to compete does notjustify inducing Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist.

Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin said: "Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his ownenterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance orannoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absqueinjuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with."

Though there was no motive or malice for the interference other than a desire to make a profit, it does not absolve themof their liability for interfering with a contract and causing its breach. They are liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused bytheir acts.

The liability of the appellants arose from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no suchobligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages,

it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, byact or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage done.There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know theidentity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no suchknowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.

However, even if their interference is actionable, it did not entitle Gilchrist to sue out an injunction for them. Thepreliminary injunction was however, justified. This is because if he did not do so, then Espejos and his partner would haveshown the film to the public, and having seen the film, they would be satisfied and may not attempt to watch it again, so evenif Gilchrist shows the film to the public after the Espejos, he would be facing financial losses due to reduced viewership.


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So Ping Bun v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999

petitioners So Ping Bun

respondents Court of Appeals, Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. and Manuel C. Tiong

summaryGrandson So Ping Bun assumes the leasehold rights of his grandfather So Pek Giok after his death. A duty which the law

of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an

unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may pertain to a situationwhere a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the case before uspetitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprivedrespondent corporation of the latters property right.

facts of the case- 1963: Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee CChuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI)- Subjects of 4 lease contracts were premises located at Soler Street, Binondo, Manila:

# Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles.# The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the

premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.

- When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises- 1976: Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiongformed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp.- 1986: So Pek Giok died. So Ping Bun (grandson of So Pek Giok), occupied the warehouse for his own textile businessTrendsetter Marketing and religiously paid rent.- August 1, 1989: lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25% increase in renteffective September 1, 1989.

# The rent increase was later on reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees' demand.# December 1, 1990: the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase.# Enclosed in their letters were new lease contracts for signing which So Ping Bun did not answer. Still,

the lease contracts were not rescinded.- So Ping Bun refused to vacate and requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor of Trendsetter Marketing. SoPing Bun requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing.- A suit for injunction was filed- RTC: Granted annulling the four Contracts of Lease without awarding damages- CA upheld RTC

issue-WON So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contracts?YES

ratio- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded forthe damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in theprivate use and enjoyment of asset if:

# (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with,#

(b) the invasion is substantial,# (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and# (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general

negligence rules

- Elements of tort interference are:# (1) existence of a valid contract;# (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and# (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse

- So Ping Bun asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result deprived DCCSI's property right


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- Damage is NOT an essential element of tort interference- Lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable- Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts andcausing breach of existing ones.- The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's interference.

- The court ruled that: While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existingcontracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits

forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain tothe detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of thelegal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctlyconfirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketingwithout awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner'sinterference.

- WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CVNo. 38784 are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is reduced from two hundredthousand (P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to costs.


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LAGON v. CA and LAPUZG.R. No. 119107 March 18, 2005

petitioners Jose V. Lagonrespondents Hon. Court of Appeals and Menandro V. Lapuz

doctrineArticle 1314 CC provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to theother contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as interference with contractual relations. This

interference is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should resulttherefrom.

summaryElements of tortuous interference are incomplete Lagon is not liable for damages.

facts of the caseOn June 23, 1982, petitioner Lagonpurchased from the estateof Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court, two

parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent Lapuz filed a complaintfor torts and damagesagainst petitioner before RTC Sultan Kudarat.

In the complaint, Lapuz claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi MengelenGuiabar over three parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private

respondent to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by thosetenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974,the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contractwas allegedly renewed.

When Bai Tonina died, Lapuz started remitting his rent to the court appointed administrator of her estate. But when theadministrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered thatLagon, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants.

Lapuz complaint accuses Lagon of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, therebyviolating his leasehold rights over it. In his answer to the complaint, Lagon denied that he induced the heirs of Bai Toninato sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. Healso denied interfering with Lapuz leasehold rights as there was no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it;that his personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots. To refute the existence of a

lease contract, Lagon presented in court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no record of anylease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been entered into their files.Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner filed his counterclaim and prayed for the

payment of actual and moral damages. RTC and CA ruled for Lagon with award of damages.

Issue/sWON the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of Lapuz lease contract with the late BaiTonina, constituted tortuous interferencefor which petitioner should be held liable for damages.No.

ratioIn the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the elements of tortuous interference with

contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence

of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this, private respondentpresented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal.Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong andconvincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution anddelivery.

The second element requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists. While it isnot necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry,will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract. In this case, petitionerclaims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract,which the Court finds meritorious. He conducted his own personalinvestigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper andwatch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of theleasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the same.


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Lastly, (the third element) to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or musthave been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot bejustified.

The records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sellthe property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conductby persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina to sell the propertywas completely of their own volitionand that Lagon did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Lapuz himself didnot proffer any evidence to support his claim. A financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officiousinterferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.

In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that hewas unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was neverestablished.

This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is thehurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. The consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since the law affords noremedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to legal injury or wrong. Indeed, lack of malice in the conductcomplained of precludes recovery of damages.Attys fees can only be awarded when it has been stipulated upon or under the instancesprovided in Art 2208. Likewise, being in the concept of actual damages, the award for attorneys fees must have clear, factual and legalbaseswhich, in this case, do not exist.

Lagon, on the other hand, was unable to prove that he suffered loss or injury, hence, his counterclaim for actual damages must fail.Moreover, petitioners prayer for moral damages was not warranted as moral damages should result from the wrongful act of a person. Theworries and anxieties suffered by a party hailed to court litigation are not compensable.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.


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GAN v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999

petitioners Hedy Gan y Yurespondents Court of Appeals, People of the Philippines

summaryGirl driving a car, swerved to avoid a collision. Hit a guy instead. Emergency rule. Acquitted.

facts of the caseAt about 8AM, Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There is a truck and

a jeep parked on one side of the road. While Gan was driving, there was a car coming from the opposite lane, followed byanother that tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of the one in front of it and the car overtaking encroached thelane where Gan was driving.

To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit Isidoro Casino, who was crossingthe boulevard, pinning him between the Gans car and the side of the jeepney. The impact caused to hit the truck parkedahead of it.

Trial Court convicted Gan of Homicide through reckless imprudence which the CA modified the conviction toHomicide through simple imprudence. The CA holds that what Gan should have done was to step on the brakes ratherthan swerve to the right.

issue

WON Gan was negligent in terms of her decision making in responding to the situation in front of her? NO

ratioThe test of determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act wherby injury or damage results to the

person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of a person to whom negligence is attributedforesee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes theduty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.

Under the emergency rule: one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time toconsider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adoptwhat subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he findshimself is brought about by his own negligence.

The CA suggestion of stepping on the brakes would be reasonable were it not for the fact that the suggestion did nottake into account the time afforded to Gan to make the decision.


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CANTRE v. GOG.R. No. 160889 Date April 27, 2007

petitioners Dr. Milagros Cantrerespondents Sps. John and Nora Go

summaryBurnt arm from droplight during delivery. Medical negligence shown.

facts of the caseAt 1:30 am Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However, at around 3:30 a.m., Nora suffered profuse bleeding

inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery.Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure to "40" over "0." Petitioner and theassisting resident physician performed various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Noras blood pressure.Her blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a sphygmomanometer. While petitioner was massaging Norasuterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconsciousuntil she recovered. While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John noticed a fresh gaping in the inner portion ofher left arm. He was informed it was a burn. John filed a request for investigation. The medical director of the hospital, calledpetitioner and the assisting resident physician to explain what happened. Petitioner said the blood pressure cuff caused theinjury.

John brought Nora to the NBI for a physical examination wherein the medico-legal officer testified that the injury

appeared to be a burn from a droplight placed near the skin for 10 min. He dismissed the likelihood that the wound wascaused by blood pressure cuff as the wound was not around the arm but just on a side.

Skin grafting was performed on the injury wherein skin was taken from her abdomen which consequently bore a scar aswell. A year later, the wound left a 3 inch scar with a bump of around !inch high. The costs for this was shouldered by thehospital.

Aside from the permanent unsightly mark on her arm, the pain in her left arm remains. Her movements are slow andrestricted, her children cannot play with the left side of her body because it hurts with the slightest touch.

RTC awarded Go with 500,000 moral damages, 150,000 exemplary damages, 80,000 nominal damages, 50,000 attorneysfee, and 6,000 litigation expenses. CA affirmed decision except for modifying the moral damages to 200,000.

Issue/sWON the additional evidences are admissible.Yes.

WON Dr. Cantre is liable for negligence.Yes.

ratioPetitioner contends that additional documentary exhibits not testified to by any witness are inadmissible in evidence

because they deprived her of her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. Petitioner insists the droplightcould not have touched Noras body. She maintains the injury was due to the constant taking of Noras blood pressure.Petitioner also insinuates the Court of Appeals was misled by the testimony of the medico- legal officer who never saw theoriginal injury before plastic surgery was performed.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that said exhibits are admissible in evidence. We note that the questioned exhibitsconsist mostly of Noras medical records, which were produced by the hospital during trial pursuant to a subpoena ducestecum. Petitioners counsel admitted the existence of the same when they were formally offered for admission by the trialcourt. In any case, given the particular circumstances of this case, a ruling on the negligence of petitioner may be made based

on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in the absence of such additional exhibits.In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturallows the mere existence of an injury to justifya presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that thefollowing requisites concur: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someonesnegligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3.The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff (the one damaged) responsible is eliminated

For the first requirement, the gaping wound on Noras arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of deliveringa baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could not havehappened unless negligence had set in somewhere. Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the bloodpressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the"captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of hisassistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control. Third, the gaping wound on Noras left arm,


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by its very nature and considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control asshe was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributedto her own injury.

The SC affirmed CAs decision and explained that the moral damages were justly lowered because of the fact that underthe circumstances saving the patients life was the doctors elemental concern. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that this doesnot justify negligence on the part of petitioner.


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MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN BAKINGG.R. No. 156037 May 25, 2007

petitioners Mercury Drug Corporationrespondents Sebastian M. Baking

summaryProximate cause of the vehicular accident is the negligence of the saleslady in handing the respondent the sleep poten

drug. Mercury should be held liable for the negligence of its employees, and should be liable for moral and exemplary damages

for its business is imbued with public interest.

facts of the caseSebastian went to Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up to which the latter prescribed Diamicronfor his high blood sugar

and Benalize for his triglyceride. He went to Mercury Drugstore in Alabang to buy the medications but the saleslady misreadthe prescription and gave him Dormicum instead of Diamicron. The tablet sold to respondent is a potent sleeping medicineUnaware of this error, he took the medicine on three separate days, and unfortunately, on the third day, he fell asleep whiledriving which resulted to a vehicular accident. Believing that the medicine he was taking caused the accident, he went to DrSy, only to find out that he was taking the wrong tablet.

He filed a case against Mercury Drug in RTC Alabang which rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. RTCawarded him P250k as moral damages, P20k for atty's fees, and 1/2%of the cost of the suit. Petitioners appealed to CA, but itmerely affirmed decision of RTC in toto.

issue/s1. Whether the petitioner was negligent in giving him the wrong medication? YES, as it was the proximate cause of theaccident2. Whether the award of the damages were justified?YES.

ratio1. The liability of petitioner is a quasi-delict governed by Art. 2176 of the civil code. There are requisites which must concur tobe able to sustain a claim based on the provision. These are:

a. damage suffered of the plaintiffb. fault or negligence of the defendantc. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damage incurred

There is no question that the defendant suffered damages. It is obvious that the petitioner's employee was grossly negligent in

handing out the Dormicum instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that the drugstore business is imbued withpublic interest as a fatal mistake such as the issue in this case, can lead to life and death or the buying patient. The employeeshould have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the dangerinvolved and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the lawdemands.

The defense of Mercury was that the third requisite is absent because it was the negligence of Sebastian which caused theaccident. However, it was clear that without the potent effects of the drug, it was unlikely that the respondent would fall asleepwhile driving his car. Applying Art. 2180, it is clear that the employer of the negligent employee be held liable for thenegligence of his employee absent proof the exercise of due diligence of a good father of family in the selection andsupervision of its employee. In this case, Mercury Drug failed to discharge this burden, therefore making it solidarily liable forthe damages caused.

2.Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff'sphysical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, sociahumiliation, and analogous injury to those provided in Art. 2219 CC. However, the damages to be awarded must becommensurate to the loss or injury suffered. The court reduced the award of moral damages to P50K.

Exemplary damages may be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. As the business of a drugstore isimbued with public interest, award of P25K is necessary as an example for others to be extremely meticulous in the conduct ofits business.

Award for atty's fees and litigation expenses deleted for lack of basis.


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PSI v. AganaG.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007

petitioners Professional Services Inc. [PSI: owner of Medical City Hospital]respondents Natividad and Enrique Agana

summaryMissing gauzes. Dr. Ampil performed operation on Natty but left two gauzes inside Nattys body which caused the latter

to suffer more injury. Whos liable? Dr. Ampil and PSI are both liable for damages to Nattys family because of their

negligence.

facts of the caseNatividad Agana was treated in Medical City Hospital because of cancer of sigmoid as diagnosed by Dr. Miguel Ampil.

Dr. Ampil, assisted by medical staff of MCH, performed an anterior resection surgery and found out that they need to removecertain portions of her ovary as well. With Enrique Aganas (Nattys hubby) consent, Dr. Juan Fuentes performed ahysterectomy on her. Dr. Ampil took over after said surgery and closed the incision. However, the operation was flawed as theattending nurse wrote in the Record of Operation that 2 sponges (gauze) are lacking.

A couple of days after, Natty complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. They consulted with Dr. Ampil who toldthem that it was a natural consequence of the surgery. The spouses then went US to seek further treatment and after fourmonths, she was told that she was free of cancer. When they came back to the Philippines, Nattys daughter found a gauzeprotruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil was informed so he extracted the gauze and assured them that pains will soon vanish.

But the pain intensified so they went to Polymedic General Hospital where the 2nd gauze was extracted from her badlyinfected vaginal vault. Natty underwent another operation. Natty died almost 2 years after filing complaint.

Natty and Rick filed a complaint for damages against PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes with the RTC for alleged negligencefor leaving two pieces of gauze inside Nattys body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. There was also anadministrative charge against Dr. Ampil and Fuentes with PRC where Dr. Fuentes was acquitted while Dr. Ampil was notunder jurisdiction. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Aganas. CA dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes and affirmedconviction of Dr. Ampil.

Issue/s1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice NO, hes guilty2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability NO3. Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil - YES

ratio

1.

Dr. Ampils arguments that it may be the American doctors or Dr. Fuentes who left the gauzes in Nattys body arewithout basis. It is undisputed that they used gauzes during the surgery, there was note in the report about 2 lackinggauzes and such was announced to Dr. A, and that the 2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot that the surgerywas performed. An operation requiring placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until sponges are properlyremoved, and it is settled that leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has beenclosed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon.

Although there are times when due to danger to a patients life a surgeon is precluded from searching missing gauzes, it is hislegal duty to inform his patient w/in a reasonable time thereafter by advising her of what he had been compelled to do. This isso that she might seek relief from the effects of such occurrence. Dr. Ampil, however, did not inform Natty about the missinggauzes and worse, he even misled her. What was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberatewrongful act by deceiving his patient.The elements of medical negligence are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the

duty to remove all foreign objects in Nattys body before closure. When he failed, he shouldve informed Natty about it. Hebreached both duties and caused injury to Natty. The two gauzes were extracted from Nattys body and were the proximatecause of her aggravated condition.

2. Although Dr. Fuentes performed a surgery on Natty, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon and as such, he supervised DrFuentes and also checked the latters work. The control and management of the thing w/c caused the injury [res ipsaloquitur element] was in the hands of Dr. Ampil and not Dr. Fuentes.[captain of the ship doctrine]

3. PSI is liable under three grounds: respondeat superior[employer-employee relationship], agency by estoppel and doctrineof corporate negligence.a. Principle of respondeat superior(control test)


22/22

- In present time, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conductof their work w/in hospital premises. While consultants are technically not employees, the control exercisedby the hospital over the consultants is hallmark of employer-employee relationship. For the purposes ofallocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect existsbetween hospitals and their attending/visiting physicians.

b. Agency by estoppel

- This imposes liability, not as a result of the reality of a contractual relationship but rather because of theactions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or

the authority exists. The question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed theagent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the natureof the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular actin question. In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names andspecializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. FuentesIt "is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in thepublic directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence."

c. Corporate negligence

- Due to the changing structures of modern hospitals now, a lot more duties are expected from them. Amongthese are (1) the use of reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2)the selection and retention of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or supervision of all persons who

practice medicine within its walls; and (4) the formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules andpolicies that ensure quality care for its patients.As owner and operator of Medical City General Hospital, PSI was bound by its duty to providecomprehensive medical services to Natividad Agana, to exercise reasonable care to protect her from harm, tooversee or supervise all persons who practiced medicine within its walls, and to take active steps in fixing anyform of negligence committed within its premises. PSI committed a serious breach of its corporate duty whenit failed to conduct an immediate investigation into the reported missing gauzes. It is thus directly liable forsuch negligent act.

Note: 2010 resolution modified this 2007 decision only with regards the employer-employee relationship between the hospitaland the visiting doctors. In its Resolution, Court held that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle of respondeasuperior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the

negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as ahospital.1. On principle of respondeat superior: RTC and CA both ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between

the hospital and Dr. Ampil. This was also not questioned by the Aganas.2. On principle of ostensible agency: the two factors that determine apparent authority: 1) the hospital's implied

manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent; and 2) thepatients reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. Rickytestified that he chose Dr. Ampil because he was their neighbor and the latter was working in Medical City which is aprominent hospital. Also, a consent form was signed before Nattys surgery where the hospital virtually recognizedDr. Ampil as a physician of Medical City.

3. On the principle of corporate negligence: PSIs pronouncement in its MR which stated that had Natividad Aganainformed the hospital of her discomfort and pain, the hospital would have been obliged to act on itserved as anadmission that of its duties. PSI should not have waited for Dr. Ampil to tell the patient about the missing gauzes. It

should have acted. By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own standard of hospital care. It committed corporatenegligence.

a2- june22 (del prado - psi)

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