A TYPOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY PARTY SYSTEMS Paper Presented at the 20th World Congress of the

International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan,

9 — 13 July 2006

SS03.476 Global Theoretical Issues for Political Parties

Alan Siaroff

Department of Political Science

The University of Lethbridge

4401 University Drive

Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada

T1K 3M4

alan.siaroff@uleth.ca

Introduction The classic typology of party systems is that of Sartori (1976), which distinguishes amongst two party systems, moderate pluralism, polarized pluralism, and predominant-party systems. However, as Mair (2002: 93) has argued, most every party system is now one of moderate pluralism, with little remaining in the other types. Consequently, in this paper I shall outline a new typology, building on Blondel (1968) and Ware (1996), which looks both at the number of parties and their relative size. Following Ware (1996), a relevant party for this analysis will be one with at least three percent of the seats in the (lower house of the) legislature. This typology will comprise initially nine different party systems, as follows: imbalanced two-party, competitive two-party, two-and-a-half-party, moderate multiparty with one dominant party, moderate multiparty with two main parties, moderate multiparty with a relative balance amongst the parties, extreme multiparty with one dominant party, extreme multiparty with two main parties, and extreme multiparty with a relative balance amongst the parties. Each of these party systems will be defined and illustrated. This typology will then be used to classify the current party system pattern of every electoral democracy in the world that has political parties (through the end of May 2006). The consequent forms of government for such systems will also be given. It will be seen that some of these categories have very few cases, thus a revised typology of six or seven categories will be proposed. Hopefully this final typology should serve to disaggregate the now-“overcrowded” category of moderate pluralism. Earlier Classifications The initial postwar classification of party systems relied in whole or in part on quantitative (“counting”) measures of size and relative size. First there was Duverger’s (1954) distinction between two party and multiparty systems. This was made more elaborate by Blondel (1968: 184ff.), who suggested

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four categories (based more on vote shares than seat shares): two- party systems (two-party share of 90 percent or more), three-party systems — which in fact are more strictly two-and-a-half-party systems (two-party vote share between 75 and 80 percent), multiparty systems with a dominant party (dominant party obtaining about 40 percent of the votes and generally about twice as much as the second party), and multiparty systems without a dominant party. That said, Blondel (1968: 184) notes that Australia and Austria are ambiguous cases within the first, two-party, group, as sometimes a smaller third party also partakes in or at least supports a government. In my analysis, the problem here — with Rae (1971: 93) making a similar “error” — is using 90 percent as the cut-off for “two-partyness”. A cut-off of 95 percent is more definitive and will be used in what follows. Starting in the 1990s, an alternative way of examining party systems – at least those in developing countries – arose, this involving the notion of institutionalization. These analyses tended to be geographically limited to a given region, to wit Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and the Inter-American Development Bank (Payne et al. 2002) on Latin America, and Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) on Africa. However useful this may be for developing countries and indeed some developed ones in post-communist Europe (Estonia, Latvia, and Poland come to mind), it does not seem to be useful globally beyond a basic institutionalized or not distinction. In the 1990s, Ware (1996) provided a schema which returned to using quantitative measures. In examining the industrial democracies, Ware (1996: 158ff.) thus has four overall categories. First, there is a predominant party system, characterized by a continuous majority for a given party and by a divided opposition to this (p. 159). Japan from 1960 through the mid-1990s (the time of his analysis) is his sole example here. Second, there is a two-party system, characterized by (a median value of) two and only two relevant parties — with relevance being defined by having at least three percent of the

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seats. New Zealand and the United Kingdom from 1960 through the mid-1990s are (were) examples here. Next, there are party systems with from three to five inclusive relevant parties. These systems are further divided into three subtypes: two-and-a-half-party systems (that is, two larger parties usually with 80 percent or more of the seats between them, often no single party majority, and thus a smaller party holding the balance of power), systems with one large party getting at least 45 percent but not 50 percent of the seats (otherwise this would be a predominant system), and even systems. For the period up to 1990, Germany and Ireland were examples of Ware’s first subtype, Norway and Sweden of the second, and Iceland and Luxembourg of the third. Finally, there are systems with more than five relevant parties. These are further divided into two subtypes: those with two large parties (with a combined seat share of 65 percent or more) and those which are evenly balanced. Israel and Italy are his (classic) examples of the first subtype here; Finland and Switzerland of the second. Some interesting differences between these scholars arise over the issue of predominance. Whereas for Ware this presupposes a one-party seat majority, for Sartori (1976: 196) this criterion can be relaxed in those countries where single party governments are normally formed on less than the absolute majority principle (that is, in Scandinavia). At the other extreme, Blondel as noted does not ever require a majority, merely that the largest party is double the size of the next largest. There is also the issue of whether a predominant party system is a category of its own, or whether predominance is but a factor that can be combined with any type of party system. The latter view is argues by Mair (2002: 106-107 [his endnote 3]):

Although the predominant-party system constitutes a useful category, it fits rather uneasily into Sartori’s framework, since it is defined by wholly different criteria, and can by definition co-exist with every possible category of party numbers (that

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is, it can develop within a context of a two-party system, a system of limited pluralism, and a system of extreme pluralism) and, at least theoretically, with every possible spread of ideological opinion.

We shall return to this point empirically later. For now, though, it is worth noting that Sartori’s criteria here include duration — more so than for his other party systems. That is, Sartori requires four consecutive absolute majorities for single party predominance, or even just three absolute majorities (p. 199) if the system is stable and clear. Electoral Democracies, Party Politics, and Party Systems in the

World Today As of the end of May 2006 there are by my assessment 117 electoral democracies in the world, not counting Serbia and Montenegro which is in the process of dissolution. Of these 117, six island states in the Pacific Ocean – Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu – do not have political parties for cultural-traditional reasons (Anckar and Anckar 2000). This leaves 111 electoral democracies with political parties. Yet in two of these – Thailand and Venezuela – the opposition boycotted the last elections, making analyses thereof problematic. These two countries are thus excluded from what follows. Nevertheless, this still leaves 109 electoral democracies with cross-national variations in party systems. But for how long have they varied? This leads us to the “time frame problem”: for how long (how many elections) does a party system need to exist? Sartori (1976) says four continuous elections for his predominant party system. Does this mean that a pattern (predominant or otherwise) of only two or three elections is not a party system? Presumably one election does not make a party system, of course. There is indeed no accepted standard of the number of elections or time length – nor any agreement on what to call a pattern that does not last the

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required length of time (transitional ? deviating ?). The main “solution” to this problem has been to use an overall long time frame of decades and then determine the standard pattern therein for each country. Thus Blondel (1968) noted the average pattern for the period 1945 to 1966. Likewise, Ware (1996: 158ff.) measured the standard national patterns for the period 1958 to 1990. Yet both Blondel and Ware limited their analysis to the industrial democracies. Looking at a long time frame (say, 1970 or 1980 to the present) is problematic globally, since many of the current electoral democracies are rather new. Consequently, I shall thus indicate the party system pattern based on the most recent election (through the end of May 2006) for the 109 electoral democracies of analysis and then note those countries where this reflects an actual stable pattern. Again, though, the notion of how many elections for stability is debatable, and is essentially beyond the scope of this paper. The raw data for the following classifications (plus other hopefully interesting data) is given in the Appendix Table at the end, which is updated from Siaroff 2005, Table 7.3. The Initial Classification It is important to stress that the following classifications are always based on the percentage, or ratio, of seats and not votes — since it is seats which determines legislative power and (in parliamentary systems) ultimately governmental control. Brief comments are given, though, on the electoral systems of the various countries which demonstrate a given party pattern, and likewise the resulting type(s) of governments — at least for parliamentary systems — are noted (single party, coalition of one large and one small party, multiparty coalition, et cetera). Overall, the first distinction is between two-party systems, moderate multiparty systems, and extreme multiparty systems.

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Further criteria break these down into two, four, and three categories respectively. That is, in a simplified manner, we can use the number of parties with at least three percent of the seats (Ware’s criterion) to suggest three overall categories: two-party systems (P3%S of two), moderate multiparty systems (P3%S of three to five), and extreme multiparty systems (P3%S of more than five). The breakpoints here thus follow Sartori's (1976) analysis of fragmentation. However, with additional factors we are able to thus expand these categories into more precise party systems. In this analysis a party system is thus considered initially to be one of nine different types, depending on various quantitative factors. Of course, a polity may go through, or shift amongst, various party systems over time, however the main focus here is the contemporary situation. That said, certainly a party system that is the output of only one election cannot be presumed to be durable. Thus I shall distinguish between the single election party system pattern (that is, the result of the most recent election) and those countries which actually exhibit the party system (based on the past few elections, or a historical series of elections). Party system classification is determined by a combination of the following factors: (i) the number of parties with at least three percent of the seats — P3%S; (ii) the two-party seat concentration value — 2PSC, with the key breakpoints here being at 95 percent and 80 percent; (iii) the seat ratio between the first and second party — SR1:2, with the key breakpoint here being set quite high at 2.0 (reflecting Blondel’s notion of the largest party being twice the size of the second largest, although again the focus here is seats and not votes); and (iv) the seat ratio between the second and third party — SR2:3, with the breakpoint here being hypothesized at 2.5. (1) Imbalanced (lopsided) two-party systems are those with a 2PSC of at least 95 percent, and a SR1:2 of 2.0 or more (that is, double the seats of the opposition party). Usually the P3%S value will be exactly two, and can never be more than three.

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The dominant party will always have a comfortable majority of seats — above 63 percent of these, given the parameters. That said, the 2PSC of at least 95 percent criterion can be relaxed if there are but two parties yet also many independents (currently the case in Georgia and Samoa). Also, the SR1:2 can drop a bit below 2.0 if the long-term median value remains at or above this. Based on the last national election, such an imbalanced two-party pattern exists in Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Georgia, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Turkey. Of these ten countries, Botswana with the dominance of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) since 1984 is the best (indeed the only) actual ongoing example of such an imbalanced two-party system (as opposed to just an imbalanced two-party pattern). Two other historical examples of such a system were Bahamas from the 1972 through the 1987 elections inclusive (four elections) with the dominance of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), and St. Vincent and the Grenadines from the 1984 through the 1994 elections inclusive (three elections) with the dominance of the New Democratic Party (NDP). In terms of electoral systems, half — but only half — of the countries with this pattern use single member plurality (SMP). Conversely, then, such a pattern is certainly possible under other electoral systems. (2) Competitive two-party systems are those with a 2PSC of at least 95 percent, and a SR1:2 below 2.0. Usually the P3%S value will be exactly two, and can never be more than three. Given the very high 2PSC, it is almost always the case that one of the parties will have a majority of seats. However, the other party should be in “striking” distance, at least with respect to the next election. [Ideally, the two parties will win an equal number of elections over the long haul (such as in St. Lucia since universal suffrage), or at least a competitive number of elections over the long haul.]

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Based on the last national election, such a competitive two-party pattern exists in Cape Verde, Chile (in terms of electoral coalitions), Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Italy (in terms of electoral coalitions), Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States. Some clear durable examples of a competitive two-party system are Chile (in terms of the centre-left Democratic Coalition and rightist alliances), Jamaica (with the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP) as the two parties), Malta (with the Malta Labour Party (MLP) and the Nationalist Party (NP) as the two parties), and the United States (with the Democrats and the Republicans as the two parties). In terms of electoral systems, again almost half of the countries with this pattern use SMP). That said, of the multimember electoral systems in these countries the district magnitude is often small (5 in Malta) or very small (mostly 3 in Mauritius, and just 2 in Chile). (3) Moderate multiparty systems which are in fact two-and-a-half-party systems are those with a P3%S of two to five (although normally three to four), a 2PSC of between 80 and 95 percent, a SR1:2 below 2.0, and a SR2:3 of 2.5 or more (if not indeed 3.0 or more). In other words, the gap between the second and third parties is clearly greater than the gap between the first and second parties. Given these parameters, it is certainly possible that one of the two main parties will have a majority of the seats. However, such a majority is not necessarily probable – as Ball and Peters (2000: 112) state, two-and-one-half-party systems are those “in which there are two dominant parties but the larger parties rarely command an overall majority and need the support of other parties to form a government”. Based on the last national election, such a two-and-a-half-party pattern exists in Andorra, Australia, Austria, Greece, Guyana,

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Honduras, Hungary, Kenya, South Korea, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Mongolia, New Zealand, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Spain, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. Several of these countries have had a durable (longstanding) two-and-a-half-party system, such as Australia (with the Liberal Party and the Labor Party as the two main parties), Portugal (with the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Party as the two main parties), Spain (with the Popular Party and the Socialist Party as the two main parties), and the United Kingdom (with the Conservative Party and the Labour Party as the two main parties). One longstanding historical example of such a system was Germany (with the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats as the two main parties) — indeed, this was definitely Germany’s party system until its last elections. The electoral systems used in the countries with this pattern have involved a fair amount of bias in about half the cases; that is, SMP, AV (Australia), or proportional representation (PR) with small districts (Spain). Government patterns under this party system have involved single party majorities (currently in Portugal and the United Kingdom), single party minorities usually with formal or tacit support from a smaller party (currently in Spain), or a formal two-party coalition between one of the main parties and a smaller party (currently in Australia and the historical norm in Germany). (4) Moderate multiparty systems with one dominant party are those with a P3%S of three to five, and a SR1:2 of 2.0 or more. Given these parameters, it is certainly probable that the dominant party will have a majority of the seats. In any case, it will be clearly far ahead of each of the other parties. Also, over a given time period the SR1:2 can drop a bit below 2.0 if the long-term median value remains at or above this. Finally, for such a system to continue across time we must be dealing with the same party of course.

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Based on the last national election, such a moderate multiparty with one dominant party pattern exists in Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burundi, the Dominican Republic, France, Japan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Timor-Leste. Durable ongoing examples of such a party system are those of Namibia (with the dominance of the South West African People’s Organization [SWAPO]) and South Africa (with the dominance of the African National Congress [ANC]). Historical examples here of such a moderate multiparty with one dominant party system are Botswana from 1969 through 1979 inclusive of all said elections, Norway from 1949 through 1973 inclusive (with the dominance of the Labour Party), Japan from 1960 through 1993 inclusive (with the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP]), and Sweden from 1958 through 1970 inclusive and again from 1979 through arguably 1988 inclusive (with the dominance of the Social Democratic Party [SAP]). Such a pattern in Japan (again with LDP dominance) but not yet a definite system was reestablished in its last election. As for India, it moved in and out of this pattern from independence through the mid-1970s, since its P3%S ranged from two to six. Electoral systems in the countries which currently have this pattern are, surprisingly, often PR, but many majoritarian ones too (France, the SNTV system used historically in Japan). Thus this party system type can be said to arise under varying electoral systems. The definitive pattern of governance under this party system is single party rule, normally with a majority (see below). (5) Moderate multiparty systems with two main parties are those with a P3%S of three to five (although normally four to five), a SR1:2 below 2.0, and a SR2:3 of 2.5 or more. Just as in two-and-a-half-party systems, here the gap between the second and third parties is greater than the gap between the first and second parties. However, it is unlikely that either of the two main parties will have a majority of the seats.

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Based on the last national election, such a moderate multiparty system with two main parties pattern exists in Albania, Costa Rica, Croatia, Germany, Mali, and Suriname. Albania is the most longstanding and thus clear example of such a party system (with the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party as the two main parties). Indeed, in the last Albania election most parties outside of the two main ones did not bother to contest the single member constituency seats, just the national PR ones. Electoral systems here tend to be either pure proportional representation or parallel systems. Governments (in parliamentary systems) are clearly coalitions, in the current German case even involving the two main parties. (6) Moderate multiparty systems with a relative balance amongst the parties are those with a P3%S of three to five (although normally four to five), a SR1:2 below 2.0, and a SR2:3 below 2.5. There is thus not a massive gap between the first and second parties, nor between the second and third parties. Indeed, there may not even be a huge difference between the first and third parties. Based on the last national election (through May 2006), such a balanced moderate multiparty pattern exists in Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, Iceland, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Mexico, Paraguay, the Philippines, Romania, San Marino, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Ukraine. An actual moderate multiparty system with a relative balance amongst the parties has existed for quite some time in Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. Electoral systems here are normally ones of proportional representation. Likewise, governments are normally coalitions. Canada is an exception on both points (but it is also new to this pattern).

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(7) Extreme multiparty systems with one dominant party are those with a P3%S of more than five, and a SR1:2 of 2.0 or more. Given such fragmentation, it is unlikely that the dominant party will have a majority of the seats — and thus be as dominant as in category (4). As such, the dominant party here could be kept out of office; in fact, however, it tends to be in a strong position for government formation, even if this requires an executive or at least a legislative coalition. Finally, as in system (4), for party system (7) to continue across time we must be dealing with the same party. Based on the last national election, such an extreme multiparty with one dominant party pattern exists in Argentina, Benin, Ireland, Panama, and Sweden. That said, in none of these countries has such a durable party system existed for the past few elections. Rather, the key examples of this party system are historical: first and foremost Israel from 1949 through the 1961 election (or even the 1969 election) inclusive (with the dominance of the Labour Party), but also Denmark for the three elections from 1977 through 1981 inclusive (with the dominance of the Social Democrats). [Note that for Sartori (1976: 154) the Israeli Labour Party was never dominant since it was always below 40 percent of the vote.] Proportional representation electoral systems are found with this party system / pattern. With this pattern, (parliamentary) governments are indeed built around the dominant party, either heading a coalition or forming a single party minority. (8) Extreme multiparty systems with two main parties are those with a P3%S of more than five, a SR1:2 below 2.0, and a SR2:3 of 2.5 or more. Presumably, in such a system neither of the two main parties will have a majority of the seats. Based on the last national election, such a pattern exists only in India (with the BJP and Congress as the two main parties). Yet in India this is not just a pattern but a durable party

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system, existing since 1996 (that is, for four elections thus far). India uses single member plurality and has had coalitions of one of the main parties with many smaller parties. Israel from 1973 through 1996 inclusive (with Labour and Likud as the two main parties) is the best historical example of such a system, even if a couple of these elections fell short on one of the criteria. (9) Finally, extreme multiparty systems with a relative balance amongst the parties are those with a P3%S of more than five, a SR1:2 below 2.0, and a SR2:3 below 2.5. There is thus not a sizable gap between the top parties. However, since the norm here is to have a 2PSC of below 60 percent (and certainly below 65 percent), unless the top two parties combine, then at least three parties would be necessary to achieve a majority of the seats. Based on the last national election (through May 2006), such a balanced extreme multiparty pattern exists in Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Of these countries, one can note that Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands barely have party politics at all (more so independents and highly fluid parties). Of the rest, a clear extreme multiparty system with a relative balance amongst the parties exists in Belgium, Brazil, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and the Netherlands, if not indeed elsewhere. Outside of the cases in Oceania, the electoral system used in countries with this pattern is almost always party list proportional representation. Moreover, governments tend not to be just coalitions but multiparty coalitions.

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Party Systems and a Majority Government (or Not)? Of the many ways of measuring a party system, or even assessing an election, a key if not indeed the key one is whether any party actually wins or not (Siaroff 2003: 272), with “winning” normally meaning a single party majority. For the most recent election in the countries under study, we can distinguish between (single party) majority governments and hung parliaments, and indeed between earned majorities and manufactured ones. Of the ten countries currently with an imbalanced two-party system pattern, all have majority governments, and indeed all but one of these are earned majorities. Of the 13 countries currently with a competitive two-party system pattern, here as well all have majority governments, although four of these reflect manufactured majorities versus nine earned ones. The 19 countries currently with a two-and-a-half-party system pattern provide the clearest division: eight of these have majorities (three earned, five manufactured) whereas 11 have hung parliaments. This confirms my previous finding (Siaroff 2003: 272) that this category does not have a clear pattern with regard to majority governments or not. In contrast, a moderate multiparty system with one dominant party is decisively majoritarian. All 15 countries currently with this pattern have majority governments (ten earned, five manufactured). [That said, such single party majorities were not always true of the historical moderate multiparty systems with one dominant party in Scandinavia, especially Sweden.] Thus it is useful to see this category as distinctive and speaking to predominance, perhaps resulting from Ware’s (1996: 159) point that a predominant party faces — and presumably benefits from — a divided opposition. As for the remaining five categories, they are all cohesive in the opposite way: With the single country exception of Panama (category 7), none of the countries with these patterns has a single-party majority, and thus all these categories can be said to reflect hung parliaments.

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Simplifying the Typology One way to assess party systems generally may well be to focus on the seat share of the largest party — 1PSC, since this (or more precisely its inverse) has been suggested by Taagepera (1999) as a key supplemental measure. First off, Table One shows the relationships between the number of relevant parties (in Ware’s sense of having at least three percent of the seats, P3%S) and the size of the largest party (the one-party seat concentration, 1PSC). We see here that from P3%S values of 2 through 8, the mean 1PSC drops continuously. Conversely, however, it is also true that the differences between the P3%S values of 2 and 3 and also the values of 5 and 6 do not stand out, limiting the argument of having three overall categories based on P3%S (2, 3 to 5, 6 and more). TABLE ONE: 1PSC by P3%S P3%S N 1PSC: minimum maximum mean 2 25 46.9 82.4 63.2 3 20 31.6 74.2 55.8 4 20 35.0 65.3 49.8 5 14 27.5 76.4 42.3 6 10 17.4 51.3 34.2 7 13 8.0 41.3 28.9 8 3 16.7 22.1 19.3 9 3 17.7 39.4 27.0 10 1 24.2 24.2 24.2 More useful, however, is to assess 1PSC values in terms of the aforementioned nine categories, as is shown in Table Two. (Note that 1PSC is not part of any category definition.)

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TABLE TWO: 1PSC by Party System Category (Pattern Classification Based on Most Recent Election) category N 1PSC: minimum maximum mean (1) 10 66.0 82.4 73.4 (2) 13 53.3 64.0 56.8 (3) 19 41.3 59.5 50.0 (4) 15 53.9 76.4 65.4 (5) 6 36.8 45.8 42.2 (6) 16 27.5 50.0 39.1 (7) 5 37.3 51.3 43.6 (8) 1 26.7 26.7 26.7 (9) 24 8.0 41.6 26.5 We can possibly combine the first two categories and thus have a single two-party system category. Both of these categories produce only majority governments (at least in the current situations), both tend to use majoritarian electoral systems, and there have been relatively few durable examples of imbalanced two-party systems. Conversely, given the aforementioned factors the typical pattern in a two-party system is for a given election to be lopsided and thus make the entire system appear imbalanced (category 1), even though in most cases such imbalance swings back and forth every election or two. Alternatively, the category of imbalanced two-party system can be retained on its own, but then one would need to be clear on the minimum number of elections required to define this. In any case, there are certainly a sufficient number of countries with two-party systems to make it incorrect to claim that this (combined) category has undergone a “virtual emptying”, as Mair (2002: 92) does. What has occurred, indeed, is that there are now very limited examples of such a system in the industrial democracies — just the United States and (in terms of electoral alliances) Italy. However, viewed globally this is (still) a very extant system.

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We can clearly combine categories 5 and 6, since there are few patterns of category 5 and these two categories do not vary much in terms of 1PSC values — and both differ greatly here from the 1PSC values of category 4. The logical name for this new, combined category would be “moderate multiparty systems without a dominant party”. One can also note that for this new combined category the mean 2PSC value is 69.9, in contrast to the mean 2PSC value for two-and-a-half-party systems of 88.4. Even more definitely we can combine categories 8 and 9, since category 8 only contains India, and each main party there has needed to lead a broad coalition — as per category 9. The logical name for this new, combined category would seem to be “extreme multiparty systems without a dominant party”. That said, the notion of dominance in the initial category 7 does not match that in the initial category 4, since in the initial category 7 (Panama excepted) hung parliaments remain the result. Perhaps, then, what was category 4 should speak of predominance and what was category 7 just of dominance? In any case, in conclusion, the proposed simplified typology of six or seven categories should serve well to break up and separate clearly the hitherto “overcrowded” category of moderate pluralism. Conversely, almost all of the six or seven revised categories contain lots of examples of electoral democracies with the category pattern, and multiple cases of electoral democracies with such a durable party system (the ongoing category 7 admittedly less so). In other words, the global empirical reality is indeed spread out across these various categories. A Couple Additional Points This paper has made a distinction between party systems and party system patterns — with the latter indeed reflecting just the current situation (that of the most recent national

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election). Ideally one would just want to analyse party systems, or at least look for the most common system in each country over a reasonably long time frame. Perhaps this can be done by the end of this decade. By that time, one could analyse the democratic world’s party systems since, say, 1990 — a time period (by then of a couple of decades) long enough to involve several elections in almost all electoral democracies, since there have been only a small number of (16 or so) electoral democracies (and/or sovereign nations) which have arisen since 1995 and thus for which there have not been several democratic elections. Such an approach would involve taking mean scores over time for the variables P3%S, 2PSC, and 1PSC, and median scores over (the same) time for the ratios SR1:2 and SR2:3. Secondly, one issue that can be largely settled at this point is the debate over predominance and whether it occurs in combination with all numerical numbers of relevant parties. In fact, predominance really is something found largely in moderate multiparty systems, and can and should be seen primarily as a subcategory within these. References Anckar, Dag, and Carsten Anckar (2000), “Democracies Without

Parties”, Comparative Political Studies 33: 2 (March), pp. 225-247.

Ball, Alan R., and B. Guy Peters (2000), Modern Politics and

Government, 6th edition (New York and London: Chatham House).

Blondel, Jean (1968), “Party Systems and Patterns of Government

in Western Democracies”, Canadian Journal of Political Science 1: 2 (June), pp. 180-203.

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Duverger, Maurice (1954), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: John Wiley & Sons).

Kuenzi, Michelle, and Gina Lambright (2001), “Party System

Institutionalization in 30 African Countries”, Party Politics 7: 4 (July), pp. 437-468.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully (1995), “Introduction:

Party Systems in Latin America”, pp. 1-34 in Mainwaring and Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

Mair, Peter (2002), “Comparing Party Systems”, pp. 88-107 in

Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds., Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting (London: Sage).

Payne, J. Mark, et al. (2002), Democracies in Development:

Politics and Reform in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank).

Rae, Douglas W. (1971), The Political Consequences of Electoral

Laws, revised edition (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press).

Sartori, Giovanni (1976), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework

for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press). Siaroff, Alan (2003), “Two-and-a-Half-Party Systems and the

Comparative Role of the ‘Half’”, Party Politics 9: 3 (May), pp. 267-290.

Siaroff, Alan (2005), Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic

Introduction to Comparative Politics (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press).

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Taagepera, Rein (1999), “Supplementing the Effective Number of Parties”, Electoral Studies 18: 4 (December), pp. 497-504.

Ware, Alan (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford:

Oxford University Press).

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IPSA APPENDIX TABLE: DATA ON MOST RECENT ELECTION FOR ALL ELECTORAL DEMOCRACIES [through end of May 2006]

YEAR = Year of Election PFRG = Parliamentary Fragmentation ENPP = Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties P3%S = Parties With Three Percent or More of the Seats 2PSC = Two-Party Seat Concentration (combined seat percentage of the top two parties) 2PVC = Two-Party Vote Concentration (combined vote percentage of the top two parties) 1PSC = One-Party Seat Concentration (seat percentage of the top party) 1PVC = One-Party Vote Concentration (vote percentage of the top party) ED = Electoral Decisiveness (EM = earned majority, MM = manufactured majority, HP = hung parliament) SR 1 : 2 = Ratio of Seats Between the Largest Party and the Second-Largest Party SR 2 : 3 = Ratio of Seats Between the Second-Largest Party and the Third-Largest Party TVOL = Total Volatility (Vote Shares) Between the Given Election and the Previous One [Loosemore-Hanby Index] DISP = Disproportionality Between Seat Percentages and Vote Percentages (for all parties) [Loosemore-Hanby Index]

YEAR PFRG ENPP P3%S 2PSC 2PVC 1PSC 1PVC ED SR 1:2

SR 2:3

TVOL DISP

Albania 2005 0.737 3.81 5 70.0 40.0 HP 1.33 3.82 Andorra 2005 0.589 2.43 4 89.3 79.3 50.0 41.2 HP 1.27 5.50 28.8 10.0 Antigua and Barbuda 2004 0.443 1.80 3 94.1 96.9 70.6 55.2 EM 3.00 4.00 11.5 20.3 Argentina 2005 0.815 5.41 9 47.2 38.8 39.4 29.9 HP 5.00 1.11 18.5 Australia 2004 0.583 2.40 3 90.0 78.5 50.0 40.8 HP 1.25 5.00 8.2 13.6 Austria 2002 0.653 2.88 4 80.9 79.2 43.2 42.3 HP 1.14 3.63 20.9 1.9 Bahamas 2002 0.444 1.80 2 90.0 92.7 72.5 51.8 EM 4.14 7.00 16.1 23.4 Bangladesh 2001 0.484 1.94 4 85.0 81.1 64.3 41.0 MM 3.11 3.65 25.0 Barbados 2003 0.358 1.56 2 100.0 99.9 76.7 55.8 EM 3.29 ∞ 8.5 20.9 Belgium 2003 0.858 7.03 8 33.3 28.4 16.7 15.4 HP 1.00 1.04 12.8 11.1 Belize 2003 0.366 1.58 2 100.0 98.8 75.9 53.2 EM 3.14 ∞ 6.5 22.7 Benin 2003 0.791 4.79 6 55.4 37.3 HP 2.07 1.36 Bolivia 2002 0.799 4.96 7 48.5 38.8 27.7 26.9 HP 1.33 1.04 29.9 12.3 Botswana 2004 0.359 1.56 2 98.2 77.8 77.2 51.7 EM 3.67 12.00 6.6 25.5

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Brazil 2002 0.882 8.48 9 34.3 34.3 17.7 17.7 HP 1.07 1.15 15.0 0.2 Bulgaria 2005 0.792 4.80 7 56.3 50.9 34.2 31.0 HP 1.55 1.56 33.3 8.8 Burundi 2005 0.577 2.37 4 84.0 80.2 59.0 58.6 EM 2.36 2.50 6.5 Canada 2006 0.690 3.22 4 73.7 66.5 40.3 36.3 HP 1.20 2.02 8.7 13.6 Cape Verde 2006 0.513 2.05 2 97.2 95.0 56.9 52.3 EM 1.41 14.50 5.0 4.6 Chile * 2005 0.504 2.02 2 99.2 90.8 54.2 51.8 EM 1.20 54.00 6.3 8.4 Colombia 2006 0.861 7.19 8 40.5 34.8 22.1 19.0 HP 1.20 1.03 10.3 Costa Rica 2006 0.691 3.23 4 75.4 62.2 43.9 36.4 HP 1.39 3.00 22.6 15.6 Croatia 2003 0.687 3.19 5 75.7 56.5 45.8 33.9 HP 1.53 3.91 14.4 19.2 Cyprus 2006 0.744 3.90 5 64.3 61.4 32.1 31.1 HP 1.00 1.64 8.3 4.7 Czech Republic 2002 0.727 3.67 4 64.0 54.7 35.0 30.2 HP 1.21 1.41 8.6 12.5 Denmark 2005 0.795 4.89 7 56.6 54.8 29.7 29.0 HP 1.11 1.96 7.5 3.1 Dominica 2005 0.472 1.89 2 100.0 96.7 61.9 53.1 EM 1.63 ∞ 10.5 8.8 Dominican Republic 2006 0.603 2.52 3 77.5 76.1 53.9 52.4 EM 2.29 1.05 23.3 2.6 Ecuador 2002 0.866 7.46 9 40.0 24.0 HP 1.50 1.07 El Salvador 2003 0.717 3.54 5 69.0 65.8 36.9 33.8 HP 1.15 1.69 11.8 9.2 Estonia 2003 0.786 4.67 6 55.4 50.0 27.7 25.4 HP 1.00 1.47 34.1 6.6 Finland 2003 0.797 4.92 7 54.0 49.2 27.5 24.7 HP 1.04 1.33 6.1 6.3 France 2002 0.558 2.26 4 85.8 57.2 61.5 33.3 MM 2.54 4.83 23.0 28.9 Georgia 2004 0.531 2.13 2 80.0 75.3 67.2 67.6 EM 5.27 ∞ 25.1 Germany 2005 0.709 3.44 5 73.0 69.5 36.8 35.2 HP 1.02 3.64 8.0 3.9 Ghana 2004 0.523 2.10 2 96.5 55.7 EM 1.36 23.50 Greece 2004 0.543 2.19 3 94.0 86.0 55.0 45.4 MM 1.41 9.75 3.2 9.6 Grenada 2004 0.498 1.99 2 100.0 90.8 53.3 46.7 MM 1.14 ∞ 23.9 9.2 Guatemala 2003 0.784 4.64 6 57.0 45.9 31.0 25.6 HP 1.20 1.37 13.1 Guyana 2001 0.552 2.23 3 93.8 94.8 52.3 53.1 EM 1.26 13.50 2.0 Honduras 2005 0.578 2.37 4 91.4 48.4 HP 1.13 11.00 Hungary 2006 0.594 2.47 3 89.1 82.6 49.2 43.2 HP 1.23 7.70 4.1 6.5 Iceland 2003 0.731 3.71 5 66.7 64.7 34.9 33.7 HP 1.10 1.67 8.1 3.3 India 2004 0.847 6.53 6 52.1 48.9 26.7 26.7 HP 1.05 3.21 8.6 16.4 Indonesia 2004 0.859 7.07 7 43.1 40.1 23.3 21.6 HP 1.17 1.88 24.8 12.2 Ireland 2002 0.706 3.41 6 67.5 64.0 48.8 41.5 HP 2.61 1.48 6.2 10.0 Israel 2006 0.873 7.84 10 40.0 36.9 24.2 21.9 HP 1.53 1.58 40.2 6.5 Italy * 2006 0.508 2.03 2 98.7 96.5 54.1 48.3 MM 1.21 281.0 1.6 7.1 Jamaica 2002 0.491 1.97 2 100.0 99.5 56.7 52.3 EM 1.31 ∞ 8.1 4.4 Japan 2005 0.559 2.27 3 85.2 69.2 61.7 38.2 MM 2.62 3.65 8.3 23.5 Kenya 2002 0.548 2.21 3 90.0 91.5 59.5 61.0 EM 1.95 4.57 0.9 Kiribati 2003 1.000 No Parties

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Korea, South 2004 0.576 2.36 4 91.3 74.1 50.8 38.3 MM 1.26 12.10 51.3 17.9 Latvia 2002 0.801 5.04 6 50.0 42.8 26.0 23.9 HP 1.08 1.14 42.9 16.0 Lesotho 2002 0.537 2.16 4 83.1 77.3 65.3 54.9 EM 3.67 4.20 15.7 10.5 Liechtenstein 2005 0.595 2.47 3 88.0 87.0 48.0 48.7 HP 1.20 3.33 4.2 1.8 Lithuania 2004 0.837 6.13 7 45.4 43.2 27.7 28.6 HP 1.56 1.19 50.3 12.0 Luxembourg 2004 0.737 3.81 5 63.3 59.5 40.0 36.1 HP 1.71 1.40 10.4 4.5 Macedonia 2002 0.653 2.88 4 77.5 64.9 50.0 40.5 HP 1.82 2.06 27.4 14.7 Madagascar 2002 0.565 2.30 3 78.1 43.1 64.4 34.3 MM 4.68 4.40 36.8 Malawi 2004 0.809 5.24 3 57.8 31.6 HP 1.20 1.81 Mali 2002 0.689 3.21 4 78.1 41.3 HP 1.12 5.90 Malta 2003 0.497 1.99 2 100.0 99.3 53.8 51.8 EM 1.17 ∞ 0.5 2.0 Marshall Islands 2003 1.000 No Parties Mauritius 2005 0.497 1.99 3 96.8 91.4 61.3 48.8 MM 1.73 11.00 14.9 Mexico 2003 0.668 3.01 3 75.6 69.9 44.6 38.1 HP 1.44 1.61 9.7 7.5 Micronesia 2003 1.000 No Parties Moldova 2005 0.567 2.31 3 89.1 74.5 55.4 46.0 MM 1.65 3.09 8.6 16.4 Mongolia 2004 0.551 2.23 2 94.6 91.2 48.6 46.5 HP 1.06 34.00 3.9 Mozambique 2004 0.461 1.85 2 100.0 64.0 EM 1.78 ∞ Namibia 2004 0.405 1.68 5 83.3 81.9 76.4 74.7 EM 11.0 1.25 8.7 3.4 Nauru 2004 1.000 No Parties Netherlands 2003 0.789 4.74 7 57.3 55.9 29.3 28.6 HP 1.05 1.50 15.8 2.4 New Zealand 2005 0.664 2.98 5 81.0 80.2 41.3 41.1 HP 1.04 6.86 20.1 2.2 Nicaragua 2001 0.497 1.99 2 98.9 95.3 57.6 53.2 EM 1.39 38.00 12.8 4.4 Niger 2004 0.731 3.72 6 63.7 41.6 HP 1.88 1.14 Nigeria 2003 0.538 2.16 3 89.0 81.9 61.6 54.5 EM 2.24 3.06 7.1 Norway 2005 0.781 4.56 7 58.6 54.8 36.1 32.7 HP 1.61 1.65 18.8 3.9 Palau 2004 1.000 No Parties Panama 2004 0.670 3.03 6 73.1 57.0 51.3 37.8 MM 2.35 1.89 16.1 Papua New Guinea 2002 0.941 17.02 6 28.4 17.4 HP 1.58 1.50 Paraguay 2003 0.685 3.18 4 72.5 61.0 46.3 35.3 HP 1.76 2.10 37.1 11.5 Peru 2001 0.794 4.85 7 58.3 46.0 34.2 26.3 HP 1.41 1.93 24.0 13.2 Philippines 2004 0.713 3.48 4 69.3 43.9 HP 1.72 1.59 Poland 2005 0.765 4.26 6 62.6 51.1 33.7 27.0 HP 1.17 2.38 34.1 13.1 Portugal 2005 0.609 2.56 5 85.2 76.0 52.6 45.1 MM 1.61 5.36 13.1 9.2 Romania 2004 0.703 3.36 4 73.5 67.9 39.8 36.6 HP 1.18 2.33 19.4 10.1 Samoa 2006 0.505 2.02 2 87.8 67.3 EM

? 3.30 10.00

San Marino 2001 0.716 3.52 5 66.7 65.7 41.7 41.5 HP 1.67 1.25 5.8 1.1

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São Tomé and Príncipe 2002 0.614 2.59 3 85.5 79.0 43.6 39.6 HP 1.04 2.86 23.4 6.5 Senegal 2001 0.433 1.76 3 83.3 65.7 74.2 49.6 MM 8.09 1.10 43.3 25.0 Seychelles 2002 0.438 1.78 2 100.0 96.9 67.6 54.3 EM 2.09 ∞ 16.5 13.3 Sierra Leone 2002 0.392 1.65 2 98.2 89.7 74.1 69.9 EM 3.07 13.50 48.1 8.7 Slovakia 2002 0.837 6.12 7 42.7 34.6 24.0 19.5 HP 1.29 1.12 37.5 18.2 Slovenia 2004 0.787 4.69 7 59.1 51.9 33.0 29.1 HP 1.26 2.30 21.6 9.7 Solomon Islands 2006 0.975 40.32 7 16.0 13.2 8.0 6.9 HP 1.00 1.33 4.9 South Africa 2004 0.491 1.97 3 82.3 82.1 69.8 69.7 EM 5.58 1.79 8.3 0.9 Spain 2004 0.600 2.50 2 89.1 80.3 46.9 42.7 HP 1.11 14.80 10.1 9.3 Sri Lanka 2004 0.638 2.76 4 83.1 83.4 46.7 45.6 HP 1.28 3.73 5.1 St. Kitts and Nevis 2004 0.545 2.20 4 81.8 59.4 63.6 50.6 EM 3.50 2.00 1.9 24.0 St. Lucia 2001 0.291 1.41 2 100.0 90.8 82.4 54.2 EM 4.67 ∞ 5.9 28.2 St. Vincent and the Grenadines

2005 0.320 1.47 2 100.0 99.9 80.0 55.3 EM 4.00 ∞ 4.0 24.7

Suriname 2005 0.687 3.19 5 74.5 64.3 45.1 41.5 HP 1.53 2.50 35.7 11.1 Sweden 2002 0.763 4.23 7 57.0 55.0 41.3 39.8 HP 2.62 1.15 13.9 3.0 Switzerland 2003 0.800 4.99 5 53.5 49.9 27.5 26.6 HP 1.06 1.44 8.0 4.8 Taiwan 2004 0.694 3.27 4 74.7 72.9 39.6 38.0 HP 1.13 2.32 8.5 4.2 Timor-Leste 2001 0.591 2.44 4 70.5 66.1 62.5 57.4 EM 7.86 1.17 6.4 Trinidad and Tobago 2002 0.494 1.98 2 100.0 97.3 55.6 50.7 EM 1.25 ∞ 4.2 4.8 Turkey 2002 0.460 1.85 2 98.4 53.7 66.0 34.3 MM 2.04 ∞ 41.4 46.3 Tuvalu 2002 1.000 No Parties Ukraine 2006 0.707 3.41 5 70.0 54.4 41.3 32.1 HP 1.44 1.59 35.3 22.2 United Kingdom 2005 0.686 3.18 3 85.7 67.5 55.2 35.2 MM 1.81 3.18 6.4 20.8 United States 2004 0.500 2.00 2 99.8 95.8 53.3 49.3 MM 1.15 ∞ 1.5 4.0 Uruguay 2004 0.585 2.41 3 87.9 84.7 53.5 50.4 EM 1.56 3.40 25.2 3.4 Vanuatu 2004 0.893 9.36 8 36.5 19.2 HP 1.11 1.13 * calculated by electoral alliances

Note: Serbia and Montenegro excluded due to imminent dissolution; Thailand and Venezuela excluded due to opposition boycott of last election.