A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle

Philip Atkins

Published online: 27 September 2011

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new

puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not

have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to

the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s

puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is

properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s

guises are not identified with sentences.

Keywords Russellianism � Belief reports � Frege’s puzzle � Semantics �Pragmatics

Gary Ostertag (2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief

reports. He defines Russellianism broadly as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to

Russellian propositions (i.e., set-theoretic pairings of objects and properties). One

version of Russellianism, defended by Nathan Salmon (1986), holds that belief

reports which differ only in the substitution of co-referential names are identical in

semantic content and therefore identical in truth value. The immediate problem

facing this version of Russellianism is ‘‘Frege’s puzzle,’’ illustrated by the following

belief reports:

(1a) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies.

(1b) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies.

P. Atkins (&)

Philosophy Department, University of California, Santa Barbara, 5631 South Hall,

Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3090, USA

e-mail: philipatkins@umail.ucsb.edu

123

Philos Stud (2013) 163:359–365

DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9819-x

These differ only in the substitution of co-referential names, yet it seems that (1a) is

true and (1b) is false. Ostertag’s puzzle is essentially a version of Frege’s puzzle.

Ostertag’s puzzle is illustrated by the following belief reports, which have quantified

noun phrases in subject position:

(2a) Everyone who has read Middlemarch believes that George Eliot is gifted.

(2b) Everyone who has read Middlemarch believes that Mary Ann Evans is

gifted.

These, too, differ only in the substitution of co-referential names, yet it seems

possible for them to differ in truth value. Importantly, Ostertag argues that well-

known strategies for solving Frege’s puzzle cannot be extended to solve his new

puzzle. Ostertag concerns himself specifically with Salmon’s ‘‘pragmatic solution’’

to Frege’s puzzle, which appeals to pragmatic phenomena as a means of explaining

anti-Russellian intuitions. Ostertag argues that this strategy will not work to solve

his new puzzle.1

I argue that Ostertag is mistaken. Specifically, I argue that Ostertag’s puzzle can

be solved according to Salmon’s original account of belief reports, provided that

Salmon’s account is properly understood. After explaining in more detail Salmon’s

pragmatic solution to Frege’s puzzle, I explain Ostertag’s puzzle and how it can be

solved according to Salmon’s account. In addition, I draw a lesson about the proper

way of understanding Salmon’s account.

First, let’s look more closely at Salmon’s pragmatic solution to Frege’s puzzle.

According to Salmon (1a) and (1b) are true iff

Ag[Lois Lane grasps hSuperman, fliesi under g & BEL(Lois Lane, hSuperman,

fliesi, g)].

In general, belief reports of the form

A believes that S

are true iff

Ag[A grasps that S under g & BEL(A, that S, g)].

Here, ‘A’ is a simple singular term. The variable ‘g’ ranges over guises, which are

ways of grasping propositions. The precise nature of guises is unclear, and we shall

have more to say on the subject in the following; but here it need only be mentioned

that Ostertag (2009, p. 257) takes guises to be sentences, or perhaps sentences in an

internal code.2 We can understand ‘BEL(A, that S, g)’ as expressing a ternary

relation between A, the proposition expressed by ‘S’, and g, to the effect that A

assents to the proposition when grasped under g.3

1 Ostertag (2009, pp. 262–266) is willing to entertain the possibility that there is a ‘‘psychological

solution’’ to his puzzle, but he is more adamant that there is no ‘‘semantic’’ or ‘‘pragmatic’’ solution.2 I think this is a common view. See, e.g., Saul (1998, pp. 370–371) and Yagisawa (1997, p. 354). I will

reject this view in the following. It leads to problems for Salmon’s account.3 Here, ‘assents to’ means something like ‘assents mentally to’ or ‘adopts a favorable attitude toward’ or

‘approves of’ or simply ‘accepts’. See specifically Salmon (1989, pp. 245–246).

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The intuition that (1a) and (1b) differ in truth value is explained by the fact that

(1a) and (1b) are commonly used to pragmatically implicate distinct propositions.

The proposition which is pragmatically implicated using (1a) is true and the

proposition which is pragmatically implicated using (1b) is false. Because these

implicated propositions are confused with the actual semantic content of (1a) and

(1b), it is mistakenly concluded that (1a) is true while (1b) is false.4 According to

Salmon (1986, pp. 114–118), the proposition implicated using (1a) is expressed by

(1a0) BEL(Lois Lane, hSuperman, fliesi , f(Lois Lane, ‘Superman flies’)),

and the proposition implicated using (1b) is expressed by

(1b0) BEL(Lois Lane, hSuperman, fliesi, f(Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent flies’)).

More abstractly, it is Salmon’s view that belief reports of the form

A believes that S

are commonly used to implicate propositions of the form

BEL(A, that S, f(A, ‘S’)).

Here, the third relatum of BEL is the value of a function f. The function f takes any

believer x and any sentence y, then yields the way in which x grasps the proposition

expressed by y when that proposition is presented to x through y. In other words, f is

a function that takes pairs of believers and sentences onto guises.5

This is Salmon’s original pragmatic solution to Frege’s puzzle. Notice that two

distinct notions are in play. On the one hand, there is the notion of grasping a

proposition under a guise, and on the other hand, there is the notion of having a

proposition presented through a sentence. It seems to me that Ostertag collapses this

distinction by treating guises as sentences. He does not refer explicitly to the

f function, but it seems to be his understanding that the value of f is always the

sentence which appears in the ‘that’-clause of the original belief report. In that case

(1a0) expresses the same thing as

(1a00) BEL(Lois Lane, hSuperman, fliesi, ‘Superman flies’)

and (1b0) expresses the same thing as

(1b00) BEL(Lois Lane, hSuperman, fliesi, ‘Clark Kent flies’).

In effect, there is no difference between grasping a proposition under a guise and

having a proposition presented through a sentence. We shall eventually reject this

understanding of Salmon’s account, but for now it is enough that we understand

Salmon’s main point: (1a) and (1b) have the same semantic content, but they are

4 I am using the word ‘implicate’ in its broadest sense: the one that is associated broadly with whatever is

pragmatically conveyed, or suggested, or imparted. The relevantly implicated propositions may or may

not be Gricean implicatures (1989, pp. 22–40) in the strict sense. Salmon (1989, p. 253) is noncommittal.5 I want to emphasize that the third relatum of BEL is not the function f. It is the value of f, given A and

‘S’ as arguments. I refer to the function by ‘f’ and to the value of the function by ‘f(A,‘S’)’. I have

encountered some confusion on this point.

A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle 361

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commonly used to implicate distinct propositions, which speakers confuse with the

semantic content of (1a) and (1b).

Let’s turn to Ostertag’s puzzle. Suppose that everyone who has read Middle-march assents to ‘George Eliot is gifted’, but that not everyone who has read

Middlemarch assents to ‘Mary Ann Evans is gifted’. Other things being equal, it

seems that (2a) is true and that (2b) is false. According to Salmon, however, (2a)

and (2b) have the same truth conditions:

Vx[x has read Middlemarch ? Ag[x grasps hEliot, giftedi under g & BEL(x, hEliot,

giftedi, g)]].

How can Salmon explain the apparent difference in truth value between (2a) and

(2b)? It might be argued that (2a) and (2b) are used to implicate distinct

propositions, and that speakers confuse these propositions with the semantic content

of (2a) and (2b). This would be an attempt at giving a pragmatic solution to

Ostertag’s puzzle, in the same spirit as Salmon’s pragmatic solution to Frege’s

puzzle. But Ostertag (2009, p. 258) argues that Salmon’s account cannot be

extended to his new puzzle, on the grounds that Salmon cannot provide ‘‘truth-

conditionally adequate implicatures’’.

Ostertag’s argument is something as follows.6 In order for Salmon’s account to

explain the apparent difference between (2a) and (2b), the proposition supposedly

implicated using (2a) must have truth conditions which seem to be those of (2a), and

likewise the proposition supposedly implicated using (2b) must have truth

conditions which seem to be those of (2b). Otherwise there would be no explanation

for why speakers confuse the implicated propositions with the actual semantic

content of (2a) and (2b). Which proposition is supposedly implicated using (2a)?

According to Ostertag, the natural candidate is the proposition expressed by

(2a00) Vx[x has read Middlemarch ? BEL(x, hEliot, giftedi, m*)],

where m* is some particular guise. Following Ostertag, we take m* to be the

sentence ‘George Eliot is gifted’. The problem with this proposal is that (2a00)clearly entails that there is some particular way in which every reader of

Middlemarch grasps hEliot, giftedi. But, intuitively, no such claim is entailed by

(2a). In Ostertag’s words:

[(2a00)] is false if even a single reader of Middlemarch assents to the

proposition that George Eliot was intellectually gifted solely under a guise

distinct from m*—even if every other Middlemarch-reader believes that

proposition under m*. But surely this single aberration would not falsify [(2a)]

(2009, p. 258).

Thus, the proposition which is supposedly implicated using (2a) does not have truth

conditions which seem to be those of (2a). Similar considerations apply to (2b).

Thus, Salmon’s account does not adequately explain the apparent difference

6 In personal correspondence, Ostertag has endorsed the following interpretation of his argument.

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between (2a) and (2b). Thus, Salmon’s pragmatic solution to Frege’s puzzle cannot

be extended to solve Ostertag’s puzzle.7

I agree with Ostertag concerning (2a00). The problem with Ostertag’s argument is

that Salmon’s account recommends an alternative proposal. The proposal is that

(2a) is commonly used to implicate the proposition expressed by

(2a*) Vx[x has read Middlemarch ? BEL(x, hEliot, gifted i, f(x, ‘George Eliot is

gifted’))].

Here, f is the very same function mentioned above, which takes pairs of believers

and sentences onto guises. (2a*) is true iff for every reader of Middlemarch there is

some way or other in which that reader grasps hEliot, giftedi when presented

through ‘George Eliot is gifted’, and that reader assents to hEliot, giftedi when

grasped in that way. This clearly does not entail that there is exactly one way in

which every reader grasps hEliot, giftedi. There is not some particular guise m*

about which Ostertag (2009, p. 258) can complain that the above analysis ‘‘is false if

even a single reader of Middlemarch assents to the proposition that George Eliot

was intellectually gifted solely under a guise distinct from m*’’. Ostertag’s criticism

is avoided.

If (2a) is commonly used to implicate the proposition expressed by (2a*), then

(2b) is commonly used to implicate the proposition expressed by

(2b*) Vx[x has read Middlemarch ? BEL(x, hEliot, giftedi, f(x, ‘Mary Ann

Evans is gifted’))].

This is true iff for every reader of Middlemarch there is some way or other in which

that reader grasps hEliot, giftedi when presented through ‘Mary Ann Evans is

gifted’, and that reader assents to hEliot, giftedi when grasped in that way. What we

have, now, is a pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle, entirely in keeping with

Salmon’s original account of belief reports. Abstractly, the solution is simply that

belief reports of the form

Every F believes that S

are commonly used to implicate propositions of the form

7 Ostertag considers one other proposal, which is that (2a) is commonly used to implicate the proposition

expressed by

(2a0 0 0) Vx[x has read Middlemarch ? Ag[Ug & BEL(x, hEliot, giftedi, g)]],

where U is a condition on guises. What we have, now, is a Salmonian account that incorporates

elements of Schiffer’s (1992) hidden indexical theory. The above analysis is attractive in that it avoids the

consequence that every reader of Middlemarch grasps hEliot, giftedi in the same way.

Unfortunately, Ostertag (2009, pp. 258–259) argues convincingly that this proposal won’t work. Very

briefly, the reason this proposal won’t work is because the condition invoked by (2a0 0 0) must be trivially

satisfiable, or else it would appear that (2a0 0 0) expresses something stronger than (2a). But if we

understand (2a) as expressing (2a0 0 0), then we must understand (2b) as expressing

(2b0 0 0) Vx[x has read Middlemarch ? Ag[Wg & BEL(x, hEliot, giftedi, g)]],

where W is another condition on guises. But W must be trivially satisfiable, for the same reason that Umust be trivially satisfiable. But then there can be no difference in truth value between (2a0 0 0) and (2b0 0 0)!Because (2a0 0 0) is not a tenable candidate for the proposition implicated using (2a), and because it is so far

removed from Salmon’s original account, I have relegated discussion of (2a0 0 0) to this footnote.

A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle 363

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Vx[x is F ? BEL(x, that S, f(x, ‘S’))].

This does not entail that every F grasps the proposition expressed by ‘S’ in the same

way. For different values of ‘x’, there may be different values of f.This proposal avoids Ostertag’s criticism, but the proposal has to be properly

understood. In particular, we have to be prepared to distinguish between sentencesand guises. The value of f cannot simply be the sentence which appears in the ‘that’-

clause of the belief report, or else the value of f will always be ‘S’, regardless of the

value of ‘x’. In that case, we will not have avoided the consequence that every F

grasps the proposition expressed by ‘S’ in the same way.8

In sum, I think that the Russellian should reject the suggestion that grasping a

proposition under a guise is the same as having that proposition presented through a

sentence. Once the Russellian distinguishes between guises and sentences, he is able

to solve Ostertag’s puzzle. Of course, I have not given a positive account of guises.

I have only suggested what they are not. A full account is well beyond the purview

of this paper, but there is an embarrassment of possibilities. Ostertag himself, in

addition to suggesting that guises are sentences, suggests that guises are sentences in

an internal code. I take this to mean that guises are formulas of Mentalese, the

language of thought. A closely related account can be found in Braun (1998), where

it is suggested that guises are mental states, characterized in terms of their causal

relations to other mental states and behaviors. Either of these accounts would suffice

for present purposes. For what it’s worth, I personally prefer the following

suggestion: guises are not sentences, but descriptive information, associated with

sentences and analogous to Fregean senses.9 Thus, the function f takes any believer

x and any sentence y, then yields the descriptive information that x associates

with y. Again, two distinct notions are in play: grasping a proposition under a guise

(i.e., grasping a proposition via certain descriptive information) and being presented

with a proposition through a sentence. Adopting this suggestion would bring

Salmon’s account closer to the accounts of Soames (2002) and Thau (2002), who

argue that belief reports such as (1a) and (1b) have thoroughly Russellian contents

but are commonly used to communicate descriptive propositions.10

Whichever of these accounts is preferred, the important point is that Salmon has

the resources to explain Ostertag’s puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena, so long

as guises are not identified with sentences. If the Russellian resists this

identification, then he is able to solve the puzzle. Thus, Ostertag’s puzzle, while

interesting in that it seems at first to present an insurmountable difficulty for

8 Salmon (1993, pp. 87–88) and Braun (1998, p. 568) both point out that guises cannot be identified with

sentences, but for the very different reason that if guises are sentences then the theory of guises would

have no way of solving the Paderewski puzzle. For the original presentation of the Paderewski puzzle, see

Kripke (1979).9 Branquinho (1990) asks whether Salmon’s guises are Fregean senses, and he seems to answer in the

negative. But he shows only that Salmon’s guises cannot be treated as senses in such a way that Salmon’stheory of belief is reduced to Frege’s theory of belief. I agree with Branquinho on that score, but this does

not entail that guises cannot be treated as descriptive information analogous to Fregean senses. Of course,

the subject requires a lot more discussion.10 This sort of account has been labeled ‘Millian Descriptivism’. For a critique of Millian Descriptivism,

see Caplan (2007). For a defense, which I endorse, see Speaks (2010).

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Russellian theories, and useful in that it reveals the inadequacies of certain ways of

understanding Salmon’s account, is not to be feared by those who are willing to

appeal to pragmatic phenomena as a way of dealing with anti-Russellian

intuitions.11

References

Branquinho, J. (1990). Are Salmon’s ‘guises’ disguised Fregean senses? Analysis, 50, 19–24.

Braun, D. (1998). Understanding belief reports. The Philosophical Review, 107, 555–595.

Caplan, B. (2007). Millian descriptivism. Philosophical Studies, 133, 181–198.

Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kripke, S. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and use (pp. 239–283).

Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Ostertag, G. (2009). A problem for Russellian theories of belief. Philosophical Studies, 146, 249–267.

Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Salmon, N. (1989). Illogical belief. In Philosophical perspectives, 3: Philosophy of mind and action(pp. 243–285).

Salmon, N. (1993). Relative and absolute apriority. Philosophical Studies, 69, 83–100.

Saul, J. (1998). The pragmatics of attitude ascription. Philosophical Studies, 92, 363–389.

Schiffer, S. (1992). Belief ascription. The Journal of Philosophy, 89, 499–521.

Soames, S. (2002). Beyond rigidity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Speaks, J. (2010). Millian descriptivism defended. Philosophical Studies, 149, 201–208.

Thau, M. (2002). Consciousness and cognition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Yagisawa, T. (1997). Salmon trapping. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 351–370.

11 I am indebted to Ian Nance, Brian Rabern, Luke Manning, Tim Lewis, Meghan Fadel, Nathan Salmon

and Gary Ostertag.

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