a degree of faith: a case for christianity for the educated skeptic

8/16/2019 A Degree of Faith: A Case for Christianity for the Educated Skeptic

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A DEGREE OF FAITH

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A DEGREE OF FAITH

A C ASE FOR CHRISTIANITY FOR THE EDUCATED

SKEPTIC

JOEL M ABRY


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Copyright© 2014 by Joel P. Mabry

All rights reserved. This book or any portion thereof may not be reproduced or used in any

manner whatsoever without the express written permission of the publisher except for the use of

brief quotations in a book review.

www.logicalapologetics.com

http://www.logicalapologetics.com/http://www.logicalapologetics.com/http://www.logicalapologetics.com/


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To my wife, without whom this book (and podcast) would not have been possible


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Table of Contents

Preface 6

Acknowledgements 8

Introduction 9

Part I: Worldview and Epistemology 18

1. Epistemology 19

2. Postmodernism 33

3. Naturalism 42

Part II: The Existence of God 57

4. The Kalam Cosmological Argument 61

5. The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument 69

6. The Ontological Argument 76

7. The Argument from Fine-Tuning 82

8. The Poetical Arguments 92

9. The Argument from Religious Experience 97

10. The Argument from Innate Concepts 105

11. The Argument from Morality 112

Part III: History & Christianity 120

12. Can Miracles Happen? 121

13. Textual Criticism and Higher Criticism 134

14. Did Jesus Claim to be God? 145

15. Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? 157

Part IV: The Problem of Evil (and Suffering) 165

16. The Problem of Evil (and Suffering) 166

Appendix A: How to Keep Faith in College 184

Appendix B: Resources 191


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Preface

At the age of nineteen I exited the lecture hall one morning convinced that I had no soul. The

lecture touched on the mind/body problem and ended with the conclusion, for me at least, that

we were not souls but merely complex arrangements of neurons. This was jarring for me

because I couldn’t equate that view of humanity with a final judgment at the end of time asdescribed in the bible. How could God judge us for our actions if our very personalities can be

altered by, say, electrical shocks?

I did not, though, go to my room and burn my bible. On the contrary, I delved deeper into the

problem, somehow having the wisdom to go further than the usual college skeptic to doubt even

my doubts. I didn’t have much time for research, and I wouldn’t have known where to go even if

I did. So I googled it.

According to Wikipedia, there were a few notable philosophers that were not materialists. One

of these, Richard Swinburne, was an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Oxford. Upon seeing

this, I thought that if an Oxford professor can be a dualist, then I can continue to be one until I

can investigate the matter myself.

It was not until a couple years later that I was in the library looking around aimlessly and

stumbled upon the name of that Oxford professor and his book The Evolution of the Soul .

Despite the sophisticated argumentation and prodigious footnotes and appendices, I devoured

the book. That started a cascade of reading on the mind/body problem along with other alleged

problems of Christian belief.

During these college years, a few people close to me had either lost their faith or were

seriously doubting it. This compelled me to dig deeper in my research and address theirparticular concerns.

Then, before I knew it, I graduated from college, moved to another city, got married, and

started working. My first job involved data-entry or, more accurately, data-extraction. I sat in a

cubicle eight hours a day and worked my way down a spreadsheet of 27,000 names. For each

name, I found it in the database, wrote the information onto a physical sheet of paper, placed

that paper in a certain stack depending on whether this or that criterion was met, marked the

name off my spreadsheet, and moved to the next name, ad nauseum. And although I was 97%

sure that what I was doing added no value to the company but was only a solution devised by a

boss due to an IT-related misunderstanding, I continued to show up each day and do my job

while listening to eight hours of audio material through my headphones. I listened to a panoply

of podcasts, sermons, interviews, and lectures.

I was consuming so much information each day that I needed an outlet to organize my

thoughts and synthesize my half-baked ideas. The podcast (www.logicalapologetics.com)

became that outlet.

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And while audio is a great tool for propagation, I find books to be much more effective at

organizing complex ideas, and they are much easier to skim and find particular interesting

passages. This book is an attempt to do that.

I have taken much of the material from the podcast, cleaned it up, added new material, and

organized it into one coherent and concise argument for Christianity.

As for goals for the book, I have three. First, I hope to provide a resource for others who are

doubting or know someone who is doubting. Second, I hope this book, like Richard Swinburne’s

book, shows that there are intelligent people out there that hold dissenting views, and that the

Christian doesn’t have to be alone. Third, I hope this book works some small part in setting the

record straight and redeeming Christianity’s popular image from unwarranted disparagement

and ridicule because of perceived anti-intellectualism.

Whether I achieve these goals or not is for the reader to decide. I only ask for an open mind.


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Acknowledgments

This project of mine would have died in the first episodes of the podcast if it were not for the

early encouragement and interest of those family and friends closest to me. I thank each of

them.

A special thanks goes to Will Webb for figuring out how to start a podcast, sharing that

knowledge with me, and giving me my first microphone. Without such help, I doubt this would

have ever gotten off the ground.

Most of all, I thank Casey for graciously telling me to work on my podcast when anyone else

would have told me to get a job. I couldn’t ask for a better friend, confidant, and wife.


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Introduction: Faith

Faith or Reason. Conservative or Liberal. Good or Evil. These are three dichotomies that most

people never question. In their view, you either have faith or you have reason. You are

conservative or liberal. You are good or bad. You cannot be both.

Is that the case? Can reality truly be divided so neatly into pat categories? As a preliminary

test, let’s focus first on the last one: good or evil. And since the difference between the two has

never seemed more obvious or more important than in World War II, we will use that conflict to

question whether good and evil can be so sharply divided.

At first, everything appears to separate neatly into one or the other category. On the side of

the Axis powers we have Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. All three are known

for their opportunistic aggression, horrific war-crimes, and oppressive rule. Sounds evil enough.

On the side of the Allies we have the United States fighting for democracy and freedom, the

U.K. fighting for national survival, and... Stalin’s Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union wasn’t brought into this conflict with a clear slate. It had teamed with Nazi

Germany in attacking Poland unprovoked until Germany broke the pact and attacked the Soviet

Union as well. The Soviet Union was also led by Josef Stalin, a man that killed twenty million of

his own subjects in peacetime. During the war, the Soviet Union performed war atrocities of

their own such as the Katyn massacre in which 20,000 Polish officers were secretly executed in

the forest. Furthermore, we now know that after the war, the Soviet Union held half of Europe

under a regime as oppressive as the one that had just collapsed in Berlin.

These facts significantly muddy what, at first, seemed an obvious dichotomy. Were the Alliesgood or evil? Also keep in mind that most of the Allied war power came from the Soviet Union,

as Michael Bess explains:

The overwhelming bulk of the killing of Nazis was not done by the citizen soldiers at all,

but rather by the soldiers of the Red Army: the ratio is about four German soldiers killed

by the Russians for every one killed by the British and Americans.... The Russian people

had shown a heroism and self-sacrifice in this war that boggled the mind; but they were

led by a government whose catalogue of crimes was extraordinarily heinous, even by

the standards of the twentieth century. We won World War II partly through our own

courage and self-sacrifice, and partly through the hammerblows struck by our extremely

powerful, and extremely nasty, ally.1

That’s not the only problem with viewing the Allies as wholly good guys. There are also the

questions that arise from the dropping of two atom bombs on Japan as well as the carpet-

bombing of civilian populations by the United States and United Kingdom. The firebombing of

1 Michael Bess, Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II (New York: Vintage Books, 2008),

167-168.


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Dresden alone killed at least 60,000 noncombatants, and in the first seven months of 1945,

200,000 civilians died in the bombings of sixty-six Japanese cities.2

Now these choices, i.e. teaming with Stalin and firebombing civilian populations, may have

been necessary to prevent a greater evil. Or not. But either way, this demonstrates how a

complicated reality can be incorrectly simplified as an either/or dichotomy. After examining theevidence, can you honestly say that any contender in World War II was either good or bad

instead of some of both?

Likewise, can you say that you must live either by faith or by reason? Are these two categories

as clear-cut and antagonistic as the media portrays them? Or are they, like the good and evil,

often intermixed?

I argue in this book, and specifically in this introduction, that faith and reason are not

antagonistic but are collaborative. Furthermore, the two work together not only in the lives of

Christians, but also in the lives or non-Christians. We all live by both faith and reason.

Tripartite Faith

This fact, that everyone relies on both faith and reason, can be demonstrated once we further

define faith. And since faith is so difficult to define, I have taken the position of Charles

Spurgeon who divides it into parts: “It is made up of three things—knowledge, belief, and trust.” 3

The first part of faith is knowledge, specifically indirect knowledge. Your own direct

experiences and what you can reason from logic itself are not a part of faith, e.g. seeing your

cat on the floor, feeling your own headache, figuring through mental math that 15 + 15 = 30. But

nearly everything else is a part of faith.

That the earth is round, that the universe is expanding, that your parents are your parents, that

George Washington existed – these are all matters of indirect knowledge, and thus matters of

faith. You did not see these things happen. You only know them on the authority of others; you

know them by faith. In fact, you know most things by faith.

But just because you know these propositions – that the universe is expanding, that your

parents are your parents, etc. – does not mean that you believe them which is the second

portion of faith. Knowing the proposition is different from attaching a truth value to the

proposition. I know the proposition “LBJ was the nation’s greatest president” but I don’t

necessarily believe it, that is, I don’t necessarily regard the proposition as true. And in order to

believe something, you must first have knowledge of the proposition. A child can’t believe in the

Holocaust unless he has heard of the Holocaust. So first there is knowledge, then there is belief.

2 Michael Bess, Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II , 98-99.

3Charles Spurgeon, All of Grace: An Earnest Word with Those Seeking Salvation by the Lord Jesus

Christ , chapter 8, accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.spurgeon.org/all_of_g.htm .

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These first two portions of faith are widespread. Most of what we believe is on faith: all of

history, most of science (the experiments you didn’t personally partake in), and too much of our

financial system. We heard of these things from authorities, and we chose to believe or not

believe based on the authority.

What then, is the difference between the faith of a Christian and the faith of a non-Christian?There are two main differences.

First, Christians believe one additional proposition to be true: Jesus rose from the dead. This

belief is not based on “blind faith,” or unsubstantiated faith. On the contrary, this is believed with

the same faith that the non-Christian believes in Caesar’s assassination or the early death of

Alexander the Great. These are historical questions that are believed because of the authority of

the witnesses whom we encounter in the form of ancient texts.4

Second, Christians have the third part of faith: trust. This portion is what is known as saving

faith. It means trusting the person of Jesus for your personal salvation. Spurgeon explains it

beautifully:

Now, true faith, in its very essence rests in this—a leaning upon Christ. It will not save

me to know that Christ is a Saviour; but it will save me to trust him to be my Saviour. I

shall not be delivered from the wrath to come by believing that his atonement is

sufficient, but I shall be saved by making that atonement my trust, my refuge, and my all.

The pith, the essence of faith lies in this—a casting one-self on the promise.... To use an

old and hackneyed illustration: suppose a fire in the upper room of a house, and the

people gathered in the street. A child is in the upper story: how is he to escape? He

cannot leap down—that were to be dashed to pieces. A strong man comes beneath, and

cries, "Drop into my arms." It is a part of faith to know that the man is there; it is anotherpart of faith to believe that the man is strong; but the essence of faith lies in the dropping

down into the man's arms. That is the proof of faith, and the real pith and essence of it.

So, sinner, thou art to know that Christ died for sin; thou art also to understand that

Christ is able to save, and thou art to believe that; but thou art not saved, unless in

addition to that, thou puttest thy trust in him to be thy Saviour, and to be thine for ever.5

So what is faith not ? Faith is not forcing yourself to believe something despite the evidence.

On the contrary, it is forcing yourself to act on the evidence despite your feelings. C.S. Lewis

illustrates this finely:

My reason is is perfectly convinced by good evidence that anaesthetics do not smother

me and that properly trained surgeons do not start operating until I am unconscious. But

that does not alter the fact that when they have me down on the table and clap their

horrible mask over my face, a mere childish panic begins inside me. I start thinking I am

4 For the reliability of the witnesses, cf. chapter 13.

5 Charles Spurgeon, “Faith,” accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.spurgeon.org/sermons/0107.htm.

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going to choke, and I am afraid they will start cutting me up before I am properly under.

In other words, I lose my faith in anaesthetics. It is not reason that is taking away my

faith: on the contrary, my faith is based on reason. It is my imagination and emotions.

The battle is between faith and reason on one side and emotion and imagination on the

other.6

As you can see, it is often our emotions that keep us from the truth. This book seeks to

present the truth of Christianity to the reader’s mind, and asks that the reader keep an open

heart.

Models of Unbelief

If you seek to understand anything, it never hurts to better understand yourself. Below I have

categorized what I see to be the most common personality profiles of unbelief. I do not mean to

stereotype; this is merely an exercise in introspection. Look at these types and ask yourself,

“With which do I most identify?” And, hopefully, once you have identified your type, you will be

able to notice your own biases. It is not bad to have biases. Everyone has biases, but we should

be aware of what they are. Mine is the Apologist which is the Christian corollary to the

Enlightened.

Let me say again, please don’t be offended. These are only personality profiles.

1. The Rebel

The defining feature of the Rebel is that he refuses to place his trust in Jesus even though he is

more or less convinced of the truth of Christianity.

Examples include:

● Binx Bolling from Walker Percy’s novel The Moviegoer who states: “The proofs of God’s

existence may have been true for all I know, but it didn’t make the slightest difference. If

God himself appeared to me, it would have changed nothing. In fact, I have only to hear

the word God and a curtain comes down in my head.”7

● Hazel Motes from Flannery O’Connor’s novel Wise Blood : “‘Do you think I believe in

Jesus?’ he said, leaning toward her and speaking almost as if he were breathless. ‘Well I

wouldn’t even if He existed. Even if He was on this train.’”8

● The demons from James 2:19 (ESV): “You believe that God is one; you do well. Even

the demons believe—and shudder!”

6 C.S. Lewis, The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics (New York: HarperOne, 2002), 116-117.

7 Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 145.

8 Flannery O’Connor, Wise Blood (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990), 10.


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If you evangelize to them... they may get angry.

When it comes to Truth... they think, “It doesn’t matter what the truth is, I’ll never believe.”

Christian Corollary: the Fundamentalist who thinks, “Science could show every part of thebible to be false, and I’d still believe.”

How to approach them: Show the ultimate emptiness of whatever they currently place their

trust in, e.g. career success, sexual freedom, social activism, etc.

2. The Post-Christian

The Post-Christian is just not interested in Christianity. He probably has a worldview that

seems to work well enough for him already and thus shows zero interest in Christianity. You

might as well try and convert him into an ancient pagan. He is entirely apathetic when it comesto this topic.9

Examples include:

● Meursault from Albert Camus’ novel The Stranger : “I said that I didn’t believe in God. He

wanted to know if I was sure and I said that I didn’t see any reason to ask myself that

question: it seemed unimportant.... In any case, I may not have been sure about what

really did interest me, but I was absolutely sure about what didn’t. And it just so

happened that what he was talking about didn’t interest me.”10

● Ira Glass, who said: “I find that I don't seem to have a choice over whether or not Ibelieve in God. I simply find that I do not. And trying to force myself to believe, it would

be like trying to convince yourself that you're in love with somebody who you're not in

love with.”11

If you evangelize to them... they won’t argue with you. They will probably just politely refuse

because they aren’t interested.

When it comes to Truth... they agree that the Truth matters. But they aren’t looking for the

truth because what they have seems to work just fine.

Christian Corollary: Cultural Christians who think, “Why would I not believe in God? I’ve

always believed.”

9 Christian belief is not a “live” option for the Post-Christian, cf. chapter 1.

10 Albert Camus, The Stranger, trans. Matthew Ward (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 116.

11 Ira Glass, “Faith” This American Life, December 20, 2001, WBEZ Chicago, accessed December 8,

2014, http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/202/transcript .

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How to approach them: Inspire wonder and show how mysterious reality truly is.

3. The Enlightened

The Enlightened views himself as too smart for Christianity. Whereas the Post-Christiandoesn’t have any arguments, the Enlightened man knows all the arguments against Christianity.

He delights in using these arguments to show intellectual superiority to Christians.

Examples include:

● Thomas Jefferson

● Bart Ehrman

● Most of the new atheists

If you evangelize to them... they will debate you. You can argue philosophical and historical

points with the Enlightened.

When it comes to Truth... they desire it and spend much time searching for it.

Christian Corollary: The Apologist

How to approach them: Show the superior arguments for Christianity. Remind them that

humans do not have the minds of gods.

4. The Post-Modern

The Post-Modern believes in Jesus, but also believes in every other religion because all truth ispart of the greater truth that truth is relative. He tends to chose his own philosophy from portions

of many different religions and based on his core values of tolerance, anti-conflict, and love.

Examples include:

● John Lennon

● Pi from Yann Martel’s Life of Pi .

If you evangelize to them... they will just agree with you because all truth is relative. Why

argue when we are called to love one another?

When it comes to Truth... they don’t believe in objective Truth. All truth is relative. There is

something of truth in everything.

Christian Corollary: The Liberal Christian who seems to use religion only as a vehicle for

deeper beliefs in tolerance and acceptance.

How to approach them: Show the deep beauty and visceral reasons for Christianity.


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Each personality profile can also be described by which of the three portions of faith it has.

Remember that faith is composed of knowledge, belief, and trust.

Knowledge of

Doctrines

Belief Trust

The Rebel Yes Yes No

The Post-Christian Yes or Partial No No

The Enlightened Yes No No

The Post-Modern Yes, BUT w/ hereticalextras

Yes, BUT in wrongdoctrine as well

Yes, BUT notexclusive trust

As you can see, each personality profile requires a different starting point.

The Rebel already knows and believes, and therefore it would be useless to tell him doctrines

or try to convince him of their truth. Instead you must show the futility of trusting in anything

other than Jesus.

The Post-Christian needs to be shown the genuine doctrines of Christianity and how strange

they are first. The wonder of it all must be shown in order to give them new eyes.

The Enlightened needs to have his arguments defeated or at least subdued first.

The Post-Modern needs to be first disabused of several notions, such as the relativity of truth.

Short Outline

This book builds a case for Christianity from the ground up. It is designed to show the existence

of a benevolent creator God and that this same God became the man Jesus who was crucified

and rose again on the third day. Each section of the book builds upon the former sections.

However, don’t stop reading if you get stuck. Just jump ahead and there should be small

summaries of past information where necessary.

Part I argues that the only workable worldview is one that allows for the supernatural. In this

part I delve into questions of epistemology that become quite mind-bending.

Part II argues for the existence of a creator God. This part is valuable for all theists and all

members of an Abrahamic religion (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). This part is mostly

philosophical with small portions of scientific arguments.


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Part III argues for Christianity in particular. This part uses historical arguments to show that

Jesus was who he said he was and that he died and rose again.

This book does not discuss a few topics that, despite their importance, are not necessary for

the argument this book makes. Some of these topics that are beyond the scope of this book

include: Darwinism, inerrancy, and accusations that Paul’s letters are pseudepigraphical (similaraccusations against the Gospels, on the other hand, are discussed).

Finally, I have put some questions in the text to allow the reader to self-evaluate and make the

book more interactive. I lifted this idea from Walker Percy’s Lost in the Cosmos. I hope you’ll

make use of them.


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Bibliography

Bess, Michael. Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II. New York: Vintage Books, 2008.

Camus, Albert. The Stranger. Translated by Matthew Ward. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.

Glass, Ira. “Faith.” This American Life. December 20, 2001, WBEZ Chicago.http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/202/transcript .

Lewis, C.S. The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics. New York: HarperOne, 2002.

O’Connor, Flannery. Wise Blood. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990.

Percy, Walker. The Moviegoer. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.

Spurgeon, Charles. All of Grace: An Earnest Word with Those Seeking Salvation by the Lord Jesus

Christ. Chapter 8. http://www.spurgeon.org/all_of_g.htm .

Spurgeon, Charles. “Faith.” http://www.spurgeon.org/sermons/0107.htm.

http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/202/transcripthttp://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/202/transcripthttp://www.spurgeon.org/all_of_g.htmhttp://www.spurgeon.org/all_of_g.htmhttp://www.spurgeon.org/all_of_g.htmhttp://www.spurgeon.org/sermons/0107.htmhttp://www.spurgeon.org/sermons/0107.htmhttp://www.spurgeon.org/sermons/0107.htmhttp://www.spurgeon.org/sermons/0107.htmhttp://www.spurgeon.org/all_of_g.htmhttp://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/202/transcript


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Part I: Worldview and Epistemology


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Chapter 1: Epistemology

or

Is everyone but me a mindless zombie?

He stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon nothing.

— Job 26:7 (KJV)

Thought Experiment: Imagine that you are dreaming. Then, down from the sky, descends a

radiant person holding a shiny smooth tablet. This effulgent being claims to have the Answer to

all of life’s mysteries on the tablet. However, before you can receive the Answer, the brilliant

person must test whether or not you have a belief-system capable of supporting the Answer.

The dazzling being starts the exam by gauging your reaction to the following statements:

1. The earth was created roughly ten thousand years ago by an act of divine power.

2. Humans and chimpanzees evolved from a common ancestor that lived 5 to 8 millionyears ago.

3. It is wrong to murder.

4. Water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit.

5. If A and B, then C. Yes, A and B. Therefore, C.

6. 2 + 2 = 4.

7. Jesus of Nazareth was crucified circa AD 30.

8. Jesus of Nazareth rose from the dead on the third day after his crucifixion.

9. George Washington was the first President of the USA.

10. I have a self, or soul, that is continuous despite the fact that my body is composed of

different atoms now than ten years ago.

11. I have free will, and therefore, am, to some degree, responsible for my decisions andactions.

12. All truth is relative.

13. The world outside of my mind is not an illusion.

14. Other people have minds.

15. God exists.

16. My memories are genuine.

Question: Look at the statements you believe. Why do you believe them?

❏Because you’ve seen it (or heard/felt/tasted/smelled it)?

❏ Because it is directly obvious to your mind.

❏ Because that’s what people say and you’ve never had any reason to doubt it.

❏ Because it’s given to you on good authority.

❏ Because it is derived from other ideas that you deem trustworthy.

❏ Because society could not function if it were not true.

❏ Because the statement is a necessary precondition for any knowledge to be possible.

❏ Because you couldn’t interact with others and find meaning in relationships if it were not


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true.

(CHECK ONE OR MORE)

Question: Look at the statements you don’t believe. Why don’t you believe them?

❏ Because there is no evidence for it.❏ Because it would identify you with a group with which you would rather not associate.

❏ Because the evidence is against it.

❏ Because it clashes with your other more deeply held beliefs.

❏ Because, if it were true, then you would have to make life changes.

❏ Because it is the product of pre-Enlightenment superstition.

❏ Because it is the product of post-modern “thinking.”

❏ Because you’ve never thought about it.

(CHECK ONE OR MORE)

Why do we believe what we believe?

The question sounds simple enough, but try to answer it while imagining a petulant child next

to you. Every time you give an answer, this child will screech a high-pitched “WHYYYY?”

Answer that , and again the child will ask, “WHYYY?” Repeat ad nauseum.

Eventually, you will get to something foundational, something so basic and vital to your belief-

structure that you have never questioned it before. And then the child, once again, annoyingly

asks why you believe that. At this point, you have unwittingly become embroiled in the

philosophic debate over epistemology, or how we can know anything. And then you realize, to

your surprise, that the petulant child has been speaking with a French accent, has luxurious

black hair and a soul-patch, and is none other than René Descartes, the great 17th

centuryphilosopher.

Now, before I address your French friend, let’s look at the epistemological abyss into which

he’s so helpfully lowered you. By the end of the questioning, you probably had come to a couple

of dead-end beliefs at which you could go no further, a position known as Classical

Foundationalism.

Classical Foundationalism

Classical Foundationalism is the epistemological position that all our beliefs should be based on

either logic or direct observation. Think of these two as the firm stone foundation on which your

whole belief-structure is built. Why do you believe that 2 + 2 = 4? Because of logic. Why do you

believe that this book exists? Because you see it. And any other belief you have must be based

on logic, the senses, or derived from those two.


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Therefore, Classical Foundationalism’s answer to the question posed at the beginning of this

chapter — “Why do we believe what we believe?”— is this: We believe because of the evidence

of logic and our senses.

But is this answer sufficient?

Problems with Classical Foundationalism

The first problem with Classical Foundationalism is that it is self-referentially incoherent . In other

words, Classical Foundationalism fails its own test. It contradicts itself. It is neither (1) proven by

logic nor (2) proven by the senses. In other words, you could sit outside in the woods for all

eternity and never once will you see Classical Foundationalism come crashing through the

bushes. And never once will you reach it through the mere manipulation of thought itself.

The second problem with Classical Foundationalism is that even if you could prove it by logic

or the senses, that might not be enough. For how do we know we can trust logic or the senses?

Logic’s Weak Link: A Critique of Rationalism

This brings us promptly back to René Descartes.

Descartes is most famous for his skeptical method in which he doubted everything in search of

a completely stable foundation on which to base his philosophy. He describes it thus:

I thought . . . that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to

which I could suppose the least ground for doubt…. Accordingly, seeing that our

senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing reallysuch as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning…. I,

convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the

reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered

that the very same thoughts which we experience when awake may also be experienced

when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all

the objects that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth

than the illusions of my dreams.1 (my emphasis)

Descartes points to the fact that people sometimes make logical mistakes as evidence that

logic is not trustworthy enough as a foundation of knowledge. However, I wouldn’t go that far.The existence of occasional mistakes in DNA replication doesn’t mean that the process isn’t

reliable on the whole for transferring genetic material.

1 René Descartes, Discourse on Method (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909), accessed December 2,

2014, http://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.html .

http://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.htmlhttp://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.htmlhttp://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.htmlhttp://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.html


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On the other hand, if there was a systemic problem, one that casts aspersion on the reliability

of the logical process as a whole, instead of specific instances of mistakes, then logic might not

be so reliable after all. Is there such a fundamental flaw in logic?

I was introduced to this problem in a short piece entitled “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”

written by Lewis Carroll.2

The scene opens with swift-footed Achilles having overtaken thetortoise in a foot-race,3 and Achilles is sitting on the tortoise’s shell. The tortoise, though, poses

a question that even mythology’s fastest man won’t be able to catch before it falls into the vortex

of an infinite regress. The tortoise starts with a simple logical argument. The two premises are

labeled A and B, and the conclusion is labeled Z.

A: Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other.

B: Two sides of this triangle are equal to the same thing.

Therefore, Z: the two sides of this triangle are equal to each other.

The tortoise states this argument and asks Achilles if he agrees. And Achilles, like many of us,

finds the truth of this argument to be immediately apparent. He says that, yes, Z follows logically

from A and B. But the tortoise disagrees with that statement.

Now, the tortoise doesn’t doubt that A and B are true, but he does doubt the hypothetical

proposition— let’s call it C— which says that “if A and B, then Z.” So they write that down in a

notebook.

Now they have:

A: Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other.

B: Two sides of this triangle are equal to the same thing.

C: If A and B are true, then Z is true.Therefore, Z: the two sides of this triangle are equal to each other.

Achilles says to the tortoise that he must accept that! But the tortoise asks, “Why?”

“Because,” says Achilles, “it follows logically from them. If A and B and C are true, Z

must be true. You can’t dispute that , I imagine?”

2

Lewis Carroll, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles” Mind 4, No. 14 (1895): 278-280, accessedDecember 2, 2014, http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html . 3By his choice of setting and characters, Lewis is referencing one of the paradoxes of Zeno, a rationalist

pre-Socratic philosopher. Zeno claimed that given a race between Achilles and a tortoise in which thetortoise is given a head start, Achilles will never be able to catch the tortoise. For, in the time it takes Achilles to move forward, the tortoise will invariably have moved forward. And when Achilles movesforward more, the tortoise will still move forward more, ad infinitum. Thus, says Zeno, Achilles can nevercatch the tortoise, and all movement is an illusion. The flaw in Zeno’s argument, though, is that hepresupposes that Achilles and the tortoise move at the same rate even though he presumably pickedthose two characters because one is fast and the other slow.

http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.htmlhttp://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.htmlhttp://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.htmlhttp://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html


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“If A and B and C are true, Z must be true,” the Tortoise thoughtfully repeated. “That’s

another Hypothetical, isn’t it?”4

So then they add another proposition, what the tortoise just said, and they call it D: “If A and B

and C are true, Z must be true.”

So they write that one down. But again, the tortoise refuses to accept that the premises

necessitate the conclusion unless there is another premise which says so. And this continues

on and on and on with Achilles writing down endless propositions in the notebook forever.

Now what is this story supposed to show? Well, there have been many debates about that.

But what I learned from it is the unprovability of logic. It shows that logic’s attempts to prove

itself just fall into an infinite regress. The truth of logic may be immediately apparent to us, but

that is its only authority. Logic cannot prove itself, nor can anything else prove it.

To be clear, I am not saying that the fundamental laws of logic contradict themselves. But I amsaying that the basics of logic are unprovable and unproven. In other words, even logic, on

which we base nearly all our beliefs, is not absolutely proven. And given that fact, should we

rely on it as heavily as we do?

Perception’s Problems: A Critique of Empiricism

Since logic is unproven and unprovable, let’s test empiricism, the other pillar of Classical

Foundationalism. Empiricism means relying on sense-experience such as sight, hearing, smell,

taste, and/or touch as the path to knowledge.

First, let’s look back at that same Descartes quote:

I thought . . . that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to

which I could suppose the least ground for doubt…. Accordingly, seeing that our

senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing

really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning…. I,

convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I

had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very

same thoughts which we experience when awake may also be experienced when

we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all

the objects that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no moretruth than the illusions of my dreams.5 (my emphasis)

Have you ever wondered if your life were just a dream? Or if you were actually just a brain in a

vat that’s being electrically stimulated to have experiences like a person in the Matrix? These

4 Carroll, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” 5 Descartes, Discourse on Method.


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are the doubts to which Descartes is referring. Sure, we see this or that, but how do we know

that these things really exist? Descartes understood that just because these images and

sensations are in our minds, it doesn’t necessarily follow that they actually exist outside of our

minds, especially given the possibility that we are dreaming, being deceived by some evil

demon, or having our brains electrically stimulated by our machine overlords. If it is even

possible that we are being deceived about our sensations, then empiricism is no more proventhan logic.

Second, even supposing that our perceptions correspond to a reality outside of our minds,

empiricism still has a problem providing us with knowledge. This problem is called the problem

of induction.

Induction means observing several instances of a phenomenon and then making a general

rule about how it all works. For example, if every time you drop an apple it falls to the floor, then

you can induce that all apples naturally fall to the floor. Then through other experiences, you

notice that everything falls to the floor. From these many particular experiences, you induce a

law of gravity that says everything falls to the floor unless otherwise supported.

The problem of induction, then, can be illustrated as a dialogue between an empiricist and a

skeptic:

SKEPTIC: Why do you think that if I drop this apple it will fall to the ground?

EMPIRICIST: Because we have done millions of trials and apples always fall to the

ground when we let go of them.

SKEPTIC: So we are assuming that the future will be like the past? In the past, the applefell to the ground, so in the future it also will?

EMPIRICIST: Yes, that’s what we are doing. We are inducing laws of nature by finding

patterns in our past observations.

SKEPTIC: Okay, we are finding rules derived from past observations. But how do you

know that the future will be like the past?

EMPIRICIST: I know because induction has always worked in the past.

SKEPTIC: Yes, but how do you know that the future will be like the past?

EMPIRICIST: Because the future has always been like the past. Therefore, I induce a

general law that the future works like the past.

SKEPTIC: Hold on, aren’t you using induction to prove that induction is reliable? Isn’t

that a circular argument? You only believe this apple will fall because it always has in the


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past. But you only believe that the future will be like the past because it always has been

like the past.

Do you see what happened there? The empiricist can only induce things because the future is

like the past, but he only knows the future is like the past because the future has always been

like the past, and he only knows that , i.e. that the future has always been like the past, becausethe future has always been like the past, and so on and so on ad infinitum.

Here we find that empiricism is in the same boat as logic, that is, in the boat forever swirling

into an infinite Charybdis of self-justification, never to reach the bottom.

Parable: A man lived with his young son at the top of a tower that pierced the clouds. One day,

his son came to him trembling and asked, “Father, we live above the clouds. How is it that we

have not fallen through the floor to our doom?” So his father brought him a piece of sturdy

material and said, “Our tower is made of this material which is too sturdy to fail us.” The child

was satisfied and went away glad.

The next day, the child returned to his father and asked with a quivering voice, “Father, we live

above the clouds. How is it that our tower has not been blown over by the wind, dooming us?”

So his father brought him to the architect that designed their tower. And the architect said to the

child, “Be not afraid. I designed this building to withstand any possible wind by anchoring it with

beams deep underground.” At this answer the child was satisfied and went away glad.

A few days later, the child ran to his father with tears in his eyes and said, “Father, we live

above the clouds. How is it that our tower has not fallen through the earth, dooming us?” So the

father took him to the ground outside and said, “Jump up and down. Feel how sturdy the earth

is. Nothing can shake it. Nothing can fall through it.” At this, the child was satisfied and went

away glad.

Meanwhile, the Earth soars through space at 67,000 miles per hour, a spinning speck of dust

in a vast galaxy of fire and debris.

Reductio ad Absurdum

So far, not only have I shown that Classical Foundationalism contradicts itself (since it isn’t itself

derived from logic or empiricism), I have also shown that logic and induction cannot be proven

without infinite regress.

Now, I will list some propositions that I think true and necessary, and yet Classical

Foundationalism denies. From this, we can conclude that Classical Foundationalism is

insufficient as an epistemological basis, and we’ll need to find something else.

G.K. Chesterton lists some of these necessary truths in his essay “Philosophy for the

Schoolroom” and notes that these propositions are accepted by all sane people and yet are


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unproven and unprovable: 6

1. Every sane man believes that the world around him and the people in it are real, and not

his own delusion or dream. No man starts burning London in the belief that his servant

will soon wake him for breakfast. But that I, at any given moment, am not in a dream, is

unproved and unprovable. That anything exists except myself is unproved andunprovable.

2. All sane men believe that this world not only exists, but matters. Every man believes

there is a sort of obligation on us to interest ourselves in this vision or panorama of life.

He would think a man wrong who said, “I did not ask for this farce and it bores me. I am

aware that an old lady is being murdered down-stairs, but I am going to sleep.” That

there is any such duty to improve the things we did not make is a thing unproved and

unprovable.

3. All sane men believe that there is such a thing as a self, or ego, which is continuous.

There is no inch of my brain matter the same as it was ten years ago. But if I have saved

a man in battle ten years ago, I am proud; if I have run away, I am ashamed. That there

is such a paramount “I” is unproved and unprovable. But it is more than unproved and

unprovable; it is definitely disputed by many metaphysicians.

4. Lastly, most sane men believe, and all sane men in practice assume, that they have a

power of choice and responsibility for action.

In summary, Chesterton says these propositions are unproven and unprovable: 1) that the

world exists, and other minds exist; (2) that events matter, and we have moral obligations; (3)

that there is continuity of personhood/identity; and (4) that we have free will. Additionally, we

can add logic and induction to this list, making six necessary and unprovable foundational

beliefs.

So now the question is this: Given that none of these important beliefs are supported by

evidence, what do we believe in the absence of evidence?

Belief in the Absence of Evidence: Three Models

I would not want to jettison a single one of these unprovable propositions, but Classical

Foundationalism would have you reject all of them, or at least the four that Chesterton mentions.

In the absence of evidence, Classical Foundationalism abides by W.K. Clifford’s maxim: “It is

wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”7

And while this may seem prudent at first, remember that this is setting the burden of proof very

high— so high, in fact, that many of our most important beliefs don’t qualify!

6 G.K. Chesterton, “Philosophy for the Schoolroom” Daily News, June 22, 1907, accessed December 2,

2014, http://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/ . 7 W.K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief” Contemporary Review , 1877, accessed December 2, 2014,

http://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.html .

http://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/http://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/http://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/http://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.htmlhttp://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.htmlhttp://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.htmlhttp://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/


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The downside to such a position is aptly explained by William James in his lecture, “The Will to

Believe”:

Believe truth! Shun error!— these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by

choosing between them we may end up by coloring differently our whole intellectual life.

We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error assecondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more

imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford, in the instructive passage which I have

quoted, exhorts us to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in

suspense forever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of

believing lies. You, on the other hand, may think that the risk of being in error is a very

small matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to be

duped many times in your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of

guessing true. I myself find it impossible to go with Clifford. 8

If we, likewise, find it impossible to go with Clifford, then what are our options?

One option is Reformed Epistemology which holds that our beliefs are justified, or have

warrant, if they are (1) produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties that (2) were

designed to attain truth (3) in an environment for which they were designed. If those three

conditions are met, then a belief is properly basic, that is, it doesn’t need logical or empirical

support.9

For example, you have warrant for believing that you truly resemble your reflection in the

mirror because (1) you are awake and not under the influence of hallucinogens, (2) your eyes

were designed (by God, presumably) to accurately convey visual information to your brain, and

(3) the mirror is not a trick-mirror or a life size photo.

The consequences of Reformed Epistemology are profound. Under this model, you can

provide warrant for logic and induction, belief in other minds, belief in morality, belief in the

continuity of personhood, and belief in free will. Furthermore, a belief in the existence of God

can be warranted without logical or empirical evidence so long as the individual has the sensus

divinitatis, or an ingrained belief in the divine.

Whereas Classical Foundationalism says to reject beliefs until you have reason to accept

them, Reformed Epistemology says to accept beliefs until you have reason to reject them,

provided that you have an inner conviction about such beliefs. This is a much more naturalmodus operandi and produces better results. To be clear, I’ll repeat that Reformed

Epistemology does not uncritically accept all beliefs, it just believes them until it has a reason

not to, and only those beliefs held by inner conviction such as a sensus divinitatis or the

attestation of the Holy Spirit or some such mechanism. Such a method is expressed by C.S.

8 William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans,

Green, and Co., 1912), Kindle edition. 9 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).


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Pierce: “A person may, it is true, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that

case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian

maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.” 10

A second alternative to Classical Foundationalism, or really an addendum to it, is expressed

by William James:

The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but

must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that

cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such

circumstances, “Do not decide, but leave the question open,” is itself a passional

decision— just like deciding yes or no— and is attended with the same risk of losing the

truth.11

The meaning of this quote is not immediately apparent unless you are familiar with what

James means by a “genuine” option. But first you must understand the three characteristics of

an option. An option is either (1) live or dead, (2) fixed or open, and (3) momentous or trivial.

An option is live if there is a real possibility of you choosing to believe or not believe. For

example, choosing whether or not to believe in God, for many of us, is a live option. On the

other hand, an option is dead if one of the choices is practically unbelievable. For example, it is

impossible for me to believe in the Flying Spaghetti Monster or the Great Pumpkin. Even if I

tried to believe, my other beliefs and general worldview would not let me. Such beliefs are so

ridiculous to me that they are not even possible beliefs. Thus, the option to believe or not

believe in the Great Pumpkin is a dead option.

An option is fixed if deciding not to choose is tantamount to choosing. Examples of fixedoptions include: golfing or not golfing, believing or not believing that a plane is safe for travel,

and placing or not placing one’s trust in Jesus for personal salvation. An option is open, on the

other hand, if there are other choices, such as the choice to not choose. For example, the option

between believing that the U.S. will win the most gold medals at the Olympics or that Germany

will win the most gold medals is open because you could pick a third option by saying that

Russia will win the most gold medals. You could even refuse to choose between the U.S. and

Germany. Refusing to choose in a fixed option, though, such as trusting or not trusting an

airplane to be safe, is tantamount to choosing. If you decide not to ride the plane because you

can’t decide, then you have practically chosen that it is not safe.

Lastly, an option is momentous or trivial. It is momentous if it is of great importance and trivial

if it is not. For example, your choice of religion is momentous because it affects you drastically

on every level of your life and possibly in the next life. On the other hand, your choice of

10 C.S. Pierce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868):

140-157, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html . 11

James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.htmlhttp://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.htmlhttp://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.htmlhttp://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html


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hypotheses in a science experiment designed to test the effects of methane on clown fish is

trivial because you could delay judgment indefinitely without affecting your life.

A genuine option, then, is one that is live, fixed, and momentous. And now that we know the

basic vocabulary, we can better understand James’ thesis: In the case of a genuine option that

cannot be decided through evidence, we not only may, but must choose what to believe.

I prefer James’ addendum to Classical Foundationalism more than Reformed Epistemology

because it provides clearer criteria for when to believe something in the absence of evidence.

Reformed Epistemology is often criticized because of all the ridiculous propositions that it could

justify. According to Reformed Epistemology, its critics assert, someone could believe

something as silly as the Great Pumpkin without any proof. However, that is not strictly true

because they would need a sensus pumpkinitus that provides an inner conviction that the Great

Pumpkin exists. If such a sensus pumpkinitus exists, then that person would be justified in

believing in it, according to Reformed Epistemology. But is that such a flaw, especially in view of

the many flaws of Classical Foundationalism? How many people do you know that have aninner conviction that the Great Pumpkin exists?

In this way, the sensus divinitatis or its equivalent acts in a similar way to James’ requirement

that a choice be a live option. James’ criteria, though, seems clearer and less liable to

misinterpretation and confusion. According to James, if the Great Pumpkin is a live option for

you (and both fixed and momentous), then you are justified in choosing to believe in it. But for

the rest of us who find such a belief ridiculous, we are justified in not believing it without positive

evidence.

The complement, though, is that if the Great Pumpkin, or God, for that matter, is a live option

for you, then you must choose. The option is live, the choice is momentous, and the option isfixed. Remaining agnostic is tantamount to not believing:

We see, first, that religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to gain,

even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good. Secondly,

religion is a forced option, so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by

remaining 29eighbor29 and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error

in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we

positively chose to disbelieve. It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain

woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel

after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married some one else? Scepticism, then, is

not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of

truth than chance of error — that is your faith-vetoer’s exact position. He is actively

playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious

hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. To

preach 29eighbor29m to us as a duty until “sufficient evidence” for religion be found, is

tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to


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yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may

be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion

laying down its law.12

Thought Experiment: Imagine you are in a prison cell and hooked up to several electrodes.

There is only one window in the cell, and through it you see someone hooked up to electrodesas you are. On the wall of your cell are two buttons. The first button unlocks the door and frees

you, but condemns the person in the other room to a severe electric shock every hour for the

next ten years. The second button frees the other person but condemns you to a severe electric

shock every hour for the next ten years. And as long as you don’t push any button, both of you

receive a severe electric shock every hour. What do you do?

❏ You reason that there is no such thing as morality, and therefore it’s not wrong for you to

free yourself at the cost of another’s suffering. Push the first button.

❏ You reason that while you are certain of your own capacity for pain, you aren’t sure that

the person in the other room has a mental life similar to yours with the capacity to feel

pain, feel pleasure, desire freedom, etc. Now that you think of it, you don’t have any

proof at all that the person is anything more than a life-like robot without a

consciousness, and it would be silly for you to believe something without any proof.

Push the first button.

❏ You think that perhaps you are dreaming. If that is the case, then the person in the other

room isn’t real. Push the first button.

❏ What is ten years of electric shocks compared to a reward in heaven? Push the second

button.

❏ You refuse to push either button and take an electric shock every hour as you

contemplate the nature of live, fixed, and momentous choices.

(CHECK ONE)

Summary

Although we tout logic and induction as the prime means of attaining knowledge, relying wholly

on them is dangerous. For one, neither logic nor induction can be proven. Second, the

epistemological position of Classical Foundationalism which emphasizes logic and induction is

self-contradictory. Third, Classical Foundationalism exhorts us not to believe many necessary

and fundamental beliefs such as the belief in other minds, the belief in an external reality, the

belief that memory is generally true, the belief in morality, the belief in the continuity of

personhood, etc.

Because of these problems, a different epistemology should be chosen, either Reformed

Epistemology or William James’ addendum to Classical Foundationalism. Under this new

epistemology, the aforesaid integral beliefs can be maintained. Furthermore, a belief in God is

one of the integral beliefs that is justified outside of evidence. It is also, for most readers, a belief

12 William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.


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that requires a choice because to not choose in such a situation is, itself, a choice against belief.

Evaluation

Rate this chapter ’s argument from 1 to 7.

1. “I am sure this argument is wrong.”

2. “I think this argument is wrong, but I have minor reservations.”

3. “I think this argument is wrong but with some reservations.”

4. “I am equally convinced by both sides of this argument.”

5. “I think this argument is right, but with some reservations.”

6. “I think this argument is right, but I have minor reservations.”

7. “I am sure this argument is right.”


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Chesterton, G.K. “Philosophy for the Schoolroom.” Daily News, June 22, 1907.http://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/ .

Clifford, W.K. “The Ethics of Belief.” Contemporary Review , 1877.http://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.html .

Descartes, René. Discourse on Method. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909.http://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.html .

James, William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York:Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912. Kindle edition.

Pierce, C.S. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2(1868): 140-157. http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html .

Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.htmlhttp://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.htmlhttp://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/http://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/http://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.htmlhttp://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.htmlhttp://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.htmlhttp://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.htmlhttp://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.htmlhttp://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.htmlhttp://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.htmlhttp://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.htmlhttp://www.bartleby.com/34/1/4.htmlhttp://people.uwec.edu/beachea/clifford.htmlhttp://www.chesterton.org/philosophy-for-the-schoolroom/http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html


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Chapter 2: Postmodernism

or

Will someone stop those blind men from harassing that elephant?

Question: How would you describe human history?

❏ The story of humanity is one of progress and growth. Man began as a primitive life-form,

nothing more than an animal. Life was difficult, nasty, brutish, and short: women were

oppressed and died in childbirth, men worked long hours in the fields doing body-

breaking manual labor, life-spans were short, feces was ubiquitous, disease was

rampant, war and subsequent rape and death were constant, rulers viciously subjugated

their citizens, and most people were ignorant and superstitious. But then came science.

Through science and technology, we have drastically increased our lifespans,

exponentially increased our food production, eliminated most disease, given everyone

an equal voice in government, accelerated commerce, created marvels of

communication and transportation, propagated learning and literacy, and freed man fromthe brutal enslavement of ignorance and superstition. Mankind will continue to prosper

as technology advances.

❏ The story of humanity is a depressing, morbid tale of disappointment, cruelty, and death.

Man began as an animal and continues to be an animal. He enslaves, rapes, kills, and

plunders his fellow man. With every advance in technology has only come an advance in

man’s ability to do these deplorable acts. In fact, beneficial technology, for the most part,

is merely an accidental by-product of the search for ways to better kill each other. First

we hit each other with hard, sharp objects, then we propelled little pieces of metal at

each other with the help of explosive powder, now we send robots flying through the air

to rain fire and death on all below. We are now equipped with enough explosives to

make our whole planet uninhabitable. And while there are periods of ostensibleprogress, every advance in prosperity and comfort only comes through exploitation of

others. The West lives at ease because it colonized and exploited the rest of the world

and continues to do so through financial institutions. Most of the rest of the world,

though, continues to live a dirty, miserable existence that proves the idea of modern

progress is nothing more than an oppressive lie.

(CHECK ONE OR MORE)

In the last chapter, we questioned how we could know anything. But we never questioned

whether there was anything to know. We assumed that there was a Truth: we just didn’t know

how to get to it. In other words, we started with modern presuppositions. In this chapter, though,we will question these assumptions by examining postmodernism which, as the name suggests,

is a reaction to modernism.

Understanding Postmodernism as a Reaction to Modernism

There are at least two ways to approach postmodernism. First, you could approach it in the way

it was developed, as a reaction against modernism.


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Below are some examples of modern thought contrasted with postmodern thought that I’ve

paraphrased and supplemented from an Encyclopaedia Britannica article:1

Modernism Postmodernism

There is an objective reality that isindependent of observation.

All reality is merely a social construct.

The statements of historians and scientists,in principle, are either true or false. That eventhough we’ll never know if Herodotus wastelling the truth, there were events in the pastthat actually happened and are trueregardless of whether we can find or expressthem.

There is no such thing as Truth.

Humanity, as a result of science andenlightenment, is becoming smarter, moreprosperous, more humane, and history is astory of progress.

Our technological achievements are not

progress. If anything, our technologies are a

regress. Technology only enables us to better

torture and kill and oppress as demonstrated

in the horrific conflict of WWII and the

hundreds of smaller conflicts since then.

Logic applies universally. Logic is a social construct with nometaphysical authority.

There is a thing called human nature thatwe have in common with even ancientpeoples and can learn about through thestudy of the Greek and Roman Classics.

Human nature is entirely determined by thesocial environment, and therefore, there areno human nature insights that can be derivedfrom reading about cultures as distant as theGreeks or Romans.

Language reflects reality. Words only have meaning in relation toother words, and these words only havemeaning in relation to the intellectual andcultural values of the readers, and, therefore,even if there were Truth, there would be noway to express it.

Understanding Postmodernism through its Definition

1 Brian Duignan, “Postmodernism and Relativism” Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v.

"postmodernism", accessed December 02, 2014,http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1077292/postmodernism/282559/Postmodernism-and-relativism.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1077292/postmodernism/282559/Postmodernism-and-relativismhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1077292/postmodernism/282559/Postmodernism-and-relativismhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1077292/postmodernism/282559/Postmodernism-and-relativismhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1077292/postmodernism/282559/Postmodernism-and-relativismhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1077292/postmodernism/282559/Postmodernism-and-relativism


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The second way to approach postmodernism is to define it. So what definition of postmodernism

do its adherents give? None. Postmodernists refuse to define postmodernism. They say it can’t

be defined. They rail against the very idea of defining something because that presupposes

Truth.

Fortunately, I’m not completely postmodern, and therefore I have no compunction aboutdefining things. And since its adherents won’t supply a definition, we will use the one given by

the aforementioned article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Postmodernism is:

a late 20th-century movement characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or

relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of

ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.2 (my

emphasis)

That’s a huge definition. And it probably doesn’t even cover much of what is described as

postmodern. But let’s use it to get a better picture of this philosophy and some of its pro’s and

con’s.

Skepticism, Subjectivism, Relativism and Self-Defeating Statements in General

The first part of our definition of postmodernism is skepticism. Now, postmodern skepticism is

different from some other branches of skepticism. But basically, skeptics say that we can never

know truth. And I think postmodernists would agree with that. But they would also add that there

is no such thing as Truth. This means that postmodern skepticism is self-referentially absurd, or

self-defeating. Because the claim “there is no truth” is itself a truth. You’ll see this happen again

and again with postmodernism.

The second part of our definition of postmodernism is subjectivism. Subjectivism is the idea

that all knowledge and truth is subjective. In other words, what is true for you is not true for me,

therefore there is no objective Truth, only subjective truths. This, also, is self-defeating because

the claim “all truth is subjective” would itself have to be subjective and thus not binding on all

truths.

To be fair, though, there is some merit to postmodernism ’s emphasis on the role of the reader

in interpretation. It rightly points out that every reader comes to a text with a different framework

and set of background knowledge. Therefore, each text could mean something slightly different

to each reader, and perfect communication is impossible. But nobody has ever claimed to have

perfect communication. Postmodernism makes its mistake by taking the same data to mean that

all communication is impossible due to the subjective role of the reader in interpretation. There

is no need to besmirch all communication just because perfect communication is impossible.

The third part of the definition of postmodernism is relativism. Relativism is the idea that all

2 Brian Duignan. “Postmodernism and Relativism.”


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truth is relative to cultural context. Of course, this, too, is self-defeating because the claim “all

truth is relative” claims to be culturally independent and absolute while simultaneously holding

that all truth is relative to cultural context.

Question: Does Truth exist?

❏ As some Roman once said, “What is Truth?” There is no such thing as Truth with acapital t. There are only truths. What is true for you may not be true for me. In fact, any

capital t Truth is no more than a power play designed to exploit others.

❏ Truth exists, and one day we will find it through continual application of the scientific

method. We just haven’t gotten there yet.

❏ The Truth is out there, man, it’s like a great cosmic principle that guides all our actions

and says, “Go for it, dude. Spread the love.” But it’s also, like, inside of you too. You just

have to reach in and harness it. You are the Truth, man.

❏ Truth is a person, the second person of the Trinity.

❏ What do I care? I’ll leave that question for the philosophers.

(CHECK ONE)

In short, the first three aspects of postmodernism—skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism—

are all self-defeating. In other words, if these tenets of postmodernism are true then they are

also false. And for something to be both true and false simultaneously is a contradiction which

violates the most basic law of logic: the law of noncontradiction. For example, if the claim “This

statement is false” is true, then it is also false, which is a contradiction. In the same boat are the

statements “There is no truth,” “All truth is subjective,” and “All truth is relative.”

To be clear, this differs from being a circular argument. In the last chapter, I demonstrated that

both logic and induction are circular —that is, they rely on themselves to prove themselves. But

a contradiction, a self-defeating statement, is the opposite. If it relies on itself, it collapses.

For a person who believes in logic, it is much worse to believe in a statement that is self-

defeating than merely self-proving. However, if you are a postmodernist, then it, theoretically

shouldn’t bother you that the tenets of postmodernism are logically self -defeating. Because

logic, to a postmodernist, is just a social construct with no metaphysical backing. In that sense,

postmodernism is anti-intellectual and illogical despite its large adherence among the highly

educated.

Postmodernism in Academia

Why is it that postmodernism is heavily concentrated among intellectuals, especially those inthe humanities and literature departments? Perhaps it is because postmodernism relies soheavily on arguments about language.

Berkeley philosopher John Searle, however, in his article “The Case for a Traditional LiberalEducation” gives a different explanation. He says postmodernism took hold in literaturedepartments because “during the 1960’s a fairly sizable number of leftist intellectuals became


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convinced that the best arena of social change was culture, that high culture in general anduniversity departments of literature in particular could become important weapons in thestruggle to overcome racism, imperialism, et cetera. We are now witnessing some of theconsequences of this migration.”3

If John Searle is correct, then there has always been a conscious political motive forteaching postmodernism in literature departments, and it is not taught merely for academicpurposes such as literary criticism.

Political Cynicism

The last part of the definition of postmodernism is political cynicism. At heart, postmodernism is

a reaction to colonialism, exploitation, and oppression.The desire for justice seems to be the

motive of postmodernism, and I admire that. As with most cynical perspectives, this one too

masks a more compassionate interior. So at the very least, I must admit that postmodernism

usually has its heart in the right place.

But regardless of its motive, does postmodernism accurately describe reality with its cynical

view? Is postmodernism correct in criticizing modernism’s optimism?

I side with postmodernism in this case. For me, today’s problems are too large and

complicated for us to be as optimistic about our future as the modernists. The modernist

believes that science and technology will transform our world into a utopia. All we need is more

science. Postmodernism, on the other hand, rightly points out the silliness of the modernist ’s

childlike faith in science. Has the modern Man seen the newsreels of WWII, the pictures of the

near-starved Holocaust survivors, or heard accounts of the Allied firebombing of Germany and

Japan? These examples and the almost unlimited number of similar events all prove thatgreater technology does not necessarily lead to greater happiness. The modern man makes the

simple mistake of equating greater knowledge with greater love and compassion. The latter are

what we need for a utopian society, not more knowledge.

But the postmodernist hardly does more than critique modernism. At best, the postmodernist

merely proposes progressive political reforms as if the systems of oppression are the sole

problem. Whereas modernism views the problem as a lack of knowledge to be remedied by

more science and technology, postmodernism views the problem as systems of oppression to

be remedied by progressive political reforms. But both views ignore the underlying problem: the

nature of humanity. Postmodernism does not wonder how and why systems of oppression were

formed in the first place.

Christianity, at this point, must step in where postmodernism left off and complete the picture.

According to Christianity, humanity is a fallen race with a sin nature that manifests itself in war,

enslavement, systems of oppression and exploitation, etc. The problem is not so much

3 John Searle, “The Case for a Traditional Liberal Education,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education,

no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 91-98.


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impersonal institutions as it is us. Humanity is the problem. And more science doesn’t remedy

that, and neither does more tolerance and postmodern theory. Humans only function properly

when they are in the proper relationship with their Creator.

Truth Claims as Power Plays

Postmodernists would never accept the Christian answer, mainly, due to the fact that it is an

answer. An answer presupposes that there is a truth. And postmodernism knows that any truth

claim is a power play. The reasoning goes like this: if I have the truth, then I have something

you don’t have. And that makes me special. You might could say that I am more important than

you since I have the truth. This gives me a cognitive excuse for alienating you, oppressing you,

killing you. Therefore, every religion or philosophy, as a source of truth, has the seed of

oppression built into it. Any Truth or dogma, by its very nature, causes separation, alienation,

and oppression, if only between those who know the Truth and those who do not.

Postmodernism attempts to obviate these unfortunate side effects by denying that Truth exists.

If there is no right answer, if there is no dogma, then there can be nothing to fight about.

The Parable of the Three Blind Men, the Elephant, and the Omniscient Narrator

If the postmodernist solution, that there is no Truth, seems difficult to grasp at first, then the

postmodernist will probably explain it with a simple illustration: There were three blind men

wandering around and they came upon this elephant. And the first man touched the elephant’s

ear and said, “Ah, the elephant is soft and flat like a blanket.” And the second man touched the

elephant’s leg and said, “No, the elephant is thick and hard like a tree trunk.” And the third man

touched the elephant’s nose and said, “You are both wrong. The elephant is muscular and

bendy like a snake.”

And then the postmodernist storyteller sighs and says with a patronizing smile, “This is what

religions and dogmas are like! Christianity sees one aspect of God, Islam sees another,

Buddhism another, etc. But they are all just incomplete pictures of the same thing! Therefore, all

dogmas are equally true!”

This story and the moral it espouses, that there is no objective Truth, seems reasonable,

tolerant, and uncontroversial at first. But there is one major flaw in the story—the narrator. The

narrator can only describe the three blind men and their humor

a degree of faith: a case for christianity for the educated skeptic

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