80647568 the african union and nigeria

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UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES

CAVE HILL CAMPUS

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

TOPIC: Interrelationship between the African Union and Nigeria

NAME: Sandra Ochieng’-Springer

DATE: December 6, 2011



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The African Union (AU) is drawing near to its tenth anniversary in 2012. It was

created in July 2002 to succeed its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity

(OAU) which was founded in 1963 (Hanson 2011). It was created during what Lloyd

terms the third wave of regionalism in which there was a spur in regional

agreements worldwide (2002). According to Tieku, the AU is an intergovernmental

organization that was designed to achieve three broad goals. First, it is intended to

bring together the plethora of sub regional institutions in Africa in order to pursue

continent-wide co-operation and integration amongst African states. Second, it aims

at creating the conditions for African states to engage in social, economic and

political relations in a way that will make war between them unlikely. Third, it

attempts to design an institutional framework for African states to participate more

effectively in the international market and in international organisations on trade,

finance and debt among other things (2004).

The above three aims of the AU are based on liberalist, realist and institutionalist

perspectives. Institutions are sought as solutions for states to pursue their interests

in an anarchic environment. Institutions within the AU such as the Pan African

Parliament, the African Investment Bank, the African Court of Justice, the AU Peace

and Security Council and the African Commission have been assigned a leading

role. This is tied into functionalism as prescribed by Mitrany who saw a proliferation

of flexible task oriented international organisations as the means to address the

priorities dictated by human need (In Rosamond 2000). According to Okumu, the AU

was therefore established as a functional organization with separate functional

institutions that would deal with specific agenda such as peace and security and

good governance (2009). The Preamble of its Constitutive Act acknowledges one

such issue that requires functional attention and is assigned to the AU Peace and



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Security Council, “the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment

to the socio-economic development of the continent and the need to promote

peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our

development and integration agenda.”1 However this functionalism is rendered

futile because of the continued emphasis on statist logic leading to domination by

the most powerful states. The intergovernmentalism within the AU has meant that

states as key actors (such as Nigeria, South Africa and Libya) seek to use their

power to contest for their interests. This renders the regional integration project and

functional institutions created ineffective especially because of the antagonisms

generated by the emphasis on statehood and territory. Anderson supports this

argument by claiming that, regional unions are constructed in a manner analogous

to the process of nation building, but they lack the natural cohesiveness of nations

(1991), to focus on statehood is therefore recidivist and an affront to the regional

integration process. Having functionalist organisations which answer to individual

states and have no power in themselves to act in the interest of members is

considered backward by proponents of neofunctionalism such as Haas, Lindberg

and Schmitter (In Rosamond 2000). They view neofunctionalism as a form of

enhanced cooperation through common institutions where institutions take on a

greater role and have more authority in order to make significant contributions

within the regional arrangement.

The realist reasoning behind the creation of the regional organization brings to the

fore the relations of politics among nations and not within nations takes priority.

This relates to the second aim of the regional organisation and is confirmed by

Mitrany who attests that, if nations are economically and socially dependent and

1 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Preamble,http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm



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their national well-being depends upon the maintenance of peace, then war is

unlikely (1976). Liberalism’s concentration on the abolition of state imposed

limitations on movement between countries of goods and services and the retreat

of state intervention resonates within the establishment of the AU, this was in order

to keep up with the deepening of globalisation and the proliferation of open

regionalism. On the one hand therefore, the AU is a statist regional project while on

the other hand it embraces liberal aspects. This is in keeping with Michael O’Neill’s

argument that the process of integration is ‘endemically syncretic’, that is it is

driven by coexistence yet contradictory logics such as economic globalisation on

the one hand and the urge to retain the primacy of national governance on the

other (1996). The members have to find a way to adapt to a mixture of perspectives

which creates space for both the state and the region which will enhance their

viability. Notwithstanding the current problems facing the European Union (EU), this

mixture has been achieved through the adoption of a hybrid system of

supranationalism and intergovernmentalism where in certain areas decisions are

made through negotiation between member states while in others, it is made

through supranational institutions. While not making a case for the replication of the

EU regional integration process because every region is unique in its own right and

countries have their fair share of national baggage, it is important to highlight that

the institutions are by and large accepted by the citizens as representative of their

needs. By way of comparison, this critical process of acceptance of regional

institutions is lacking within the AU.

Among the motivators of a renewal of the African integration process reflected in its

third aim is globalisation and its ensuing realities in the post 1990s period.

Globalisation involves the growing integration of economies, markets and societies



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around the world. Okumu concurs and states that “the formation of the Union was

to provide Africa with a platform and voice to survive and benefit from the wave of

globalization” (2009: 93). The Constitutive Act also affirms that the Union was in

response to “the multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in

the light of social, economic and political changes taking place in the world.”2 This

global integration has had implications for different countries’ (especially

developing) socioeconomic and political policies. According to Jayasuriya (2005)

among these implications are that integrated global markets have limited

governments policy discretion as emphasis is placed on the dominance of market

forces, the consequent open policies and the retreat of state intervention within the

economy, all neoliberal initiatives. This, coupled by the fact that there are

symmetrical relationships within the world system means that states have been

forced to seek mechanisms for minimizing threats to policy space and remain active

members of world system in spite of these advances. Mechanisms such as

regionalism have been adopted to deal with these realities in order to avoid

marginalization (Ochieng’ 2010).

Marginalisation also takes place within the regional groupings as powerful nations

seek to assert their influence. Within the AU, financing is one way to determine

which country wields power and which ones are marginalized. Membership

contributions are based on a formula that allows 5 countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya,

Nigeria and South Africa) to contribute 75 percent of these funds (Okumu 2009).

Greater contributions automatically mean greater say. Nigeria, due of its large

financial contribution because of ‘petro dollars’ and its role of ‘big brother’

continent-wide, is a key actor whose interests were crucial to the organization’s

2 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Preamble,http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm



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creation. Tieku argues that the election in 1999 of Olesugun Obasanjo and Thabo

Mbeki as presidents of Nigeria and South Africa respectively triggered the AU

process (2004). These leaders sought to reform the OAU to suit their foreign policy

interests. In the case of Nigeria, Obasanjo’s focus was on the reform of the conduct

of governance and the reposition of the OAU at the center of Africa’s developmental

issues. For him, issues of security, stability, co-operation and development were

paramount. This was against a background of domestic political pressures and

Nigeria’s geopolitical and leading role in West Africa.

Nigeria’s influence in the AU cannot be understood in isolation, it is therefore critical

to evaluate its strategic and geopolitical importance in West Africa and in Africa in

general. Nigeria is a mega state in the African context, its estimated population of

155, 215, 273 attest to this, every one in five African is Nigerian (IMF 2009). The

country is also the leading exporter of oil in Africa and the eighth largest oil

producer in the world. Nigeria is a prominent member of and hegemon in the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which is in the Customs

Union stage of economic integration (Osaghae 1998). It has assumed a natural

leadership role since independence in 1960 embraced by both the democratically

elected leaders and military leadership. It has been a willing actor and arbitrar

between rebels and governments, having a large army; it has contributed a

significant amount of troops for AU and UN peacekeeping missions in different

countries including Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia and Angola (Falola and

Heaton 2008). It also contributes significantly towards organisations that promote

West African cooperation in ways that the other countries are not able to; in

addition, the country organizes and funds programs to send doctors, teachers,

lawyers and other professionals to other countries (Eleazu 1988). Nigeria is



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therefore able to command such influence because of its power and capability

economically, militarily and in terms of human resource.

Ambe-Uva and Adegboyega argue that “it has become an axiomatic truth that the

foreign policy of a country is to a large extent determined by its domestic structure

and factors. There are various constituent elements in the political system - the

government, political parties, pressure groups, civil society, public opinion, leader’s

personality and the press-operating within the democratic process provided by the

Constitution that exert direct or indirect pressure in shaping a country’s foreign

policy” (2007: 45). In Nigeria’s case it was public opinion and the leader’s

personality that was a major factor in shaping foreign policy.

From inception, Olesugun Obasanjo who was elected in 1999, for two terms, was an

internationalist; his focus was therefore on courting foreign investment and

reforming the OAU. It is against this background of Obasanjo’s internationalist

nature and public opinion that he sought to assert Nigeria’s influence within the AU.

Obasanjo’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) government came to power at a time

when domestic opposition to Nigeria’s peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra

Leone was at its zenith. Falola and Heaton state that, revelation during the

campaign that Nigeria was spending $1 Million a day on peace keeping missions in

Sierra Leone provoked so much displeasure with the public that a drastic reduction

in Nigeria’s involvement in Sierra Leone had become imperative for the new

government (2008). This was against a backdrop of economic hardship for the

average citizen in Nigeria. Obasanjo, being aware of the importance of Nigeria’s

vanguard role in West Africa and at the continental level was not prepared to

abandon this position. He therefore sought to craft a new foreign policy towards

Africa that would spread the costs of peacekeeping among the other relatively well



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endowed countries and a sharing of the burden of resolving conflicts in Africa. Tieku

claims that, the reform package that Obasanjo presented was crafted as an

integration and co-operation package encompassing issues of security, good

governance and development (2004). Although Nigeria has been a willing leader in

West Africa, under both military and civilian rule, since 1999 when they had a

democratically elected government, they have used this as leverage to intervene

further into the other West African and continental countries to promote democracy

and good governance.

Nigeria’s leading role as the promoter of democracy on the continent is paradoxical

because of Nigeria’s governance record. Nigeria is a nascent federal democracy

having gone through many discontinuities with recurrent military interruptions in its

political process. The country has been ruled by the military for 30 years and it has

been under civilian rule or 21 years.3 During the periods of civilian rule, the country

was governed under new or amended constitutions with ‘democratically’ elected

civilian government. However, corruption has rendered the democratic process less

effective because control of the federal and state governments translates to access

to government funds, politicians therefore have shown in the past willingness to go

to extremes to win elections and stay in power, to lose office means to be cut out of

the system of patronage. Falola and Heaton state that Obasanjo declared that

ending corruption was one of the main tasks of his administration. One of the anti-

corruption institutions he created was the Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC) to investigate instances of corruption among public officials and

initially the EFCC was able to recover over $5 billion in stolen funds and prosecute

offenders. Obasanjo however failed to reduce corruption in the country and used

3 See Appendix 1 for chart on Political continuity and discontinuity in Nigeria



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the anti-corruption institutions that he set up to prosecute his political opponents,

weaken them in election years and to cripple opposition parties (2008).

This can be considered to be what Sodaro terms the paradox of democracy where

institutions can be subverted or manipulated in ways that contradict its basic

principles even when the rules and procedures are being followed (2004). Further,

Obasanjo stepped down in disgrace after trying to modify the constitution and

prolong his tenure by vying for a third term. Nigerian politics can be classified under

what Haynes refers to as façade or minimal democracy in which rulers have few

genuine pretensions to democracy; regular but controlled elections; and alliances

between the political rulers and the military (In Hinds 2001: 6). Obasanjo himself

was a military head of state between 1976-79. It therefore has a kind of democratic

form with minimum trappings of democracy but little democratic substance. Despite

these shortcomings in its democratic process, Nigeria has been able to convince the

AU to accommodate its interests. This is because of the power that it wields that

allows it to remain influential. Nigeria was also able to convince the AU to include a

resolution and management of domestic conflict in its agenda by virtue of the fact

that the continent has a record of pervasive human rights violations and threats to

human security. This trend continues to manifest, Okumu attests to this and makes

the point that “the AU, after five years of existence, has little to show in terms of

democratic consolidation and promotion of a culture of human rights, human

security and good governance” (2009: 101).

In terms of Obasanjo’s goal of courting foreign investment, South Africa’s interests

within the AU come to bear. Thabo Mbeki like Obasanjo adopted a neo-liberal

strategy designed to make South Africa a destination for foreign investment and a

competitive global trading state. However, the location of South Africa in a



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continent whose international image as a protector of rights including property

rights, is tainted, the immediate challenge that the government of the day faced in

its attempt to pursue these twin objectives was finding the appropriate means to

improve the image of Africa. It accomplished this through its foreign policy

indicating the promotion of democracy and human rights as the core of its policy.

Mbeki placed this neo-liberal agenda within a broader transformationalist agenda

and reintroduced ‘African Renaissance’ to serve as the conceptual framework for

the new approach. He set about reforming the OAU, played a vital role in the

creation of the AU and influenced the AU to take a number of pro-democracy

decisions (Tieku 2004). South Africa’s interests in this case were compatible with

Nigeria’s and with each other’s support, they were able to wield a lot of influence

within the AU as two of the most powerful states on the continent. Their agendas

were both neoliberal embracing the twin pillars of free trade and democracy. This

interplay of states within the AU places emphasis on its intergovernmental nature in

which sovereignty is preserved and the state takes a central role in bargaining, with

powerful states reaping the spoils because of their capacity and influence.

Rosamond posits that the emphasis on governance in this instance focuses on zero-

sum notions associated with sovereignty and a politics of absolutes (2000).

Okumu argues rightfully that, although the Preamble of the Constitutive Act

envisions the AU as an organization that would create “solidarity and cohesion

among (African) peoples,” as well as a “united and strong Africa” composed of

“governments and all segments of civil society,” this Pan-Africanist ideal has not

been widely embraced on the continent” (2009: 106). There is no Africanist ethos

that brings the people on the continent together as one. This is compounded by the

fact that individual countries are themselves intensely divided along ethnic,



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linguistic, regional and religious lines. Nigeria for example consists of over 200

ethno-linguistic groups, the country is also split mainly between two religions;

Muslims and Christians with 50% of the Sunni Muslims heavily concentrated in the

North while Christians make up 40% of the population and the other 10% consists of

indigenous religions (Falola and Heaton 2008).

Based on the above factors and given the colonial historical background which

entailed alteration of political landscapes through the amalgamation of previously

independent nations, the national question is a nagging problem for most African

states which struggle with developing a meaningful national identity that

supersedes the divisions. Unless a culture is created that can accommodate and

embrace shared values (political and social) at a national level, a similar task at a

continental level will prove to be futile. Okumu is of the opinion that “currently, the

continent is bereft of Pan Africanist ideas, aspirations and ambitions similar to those

that guided Nkrumah and Nyerere to spearhead the African liberation struggle and

implant the seed of the ‘African Personality’ “(2009: 106). Sodaro argues that the

success of a democracy is dependent upon the attitudes and behaviours of the

political elite (2004). This same argument can be applied in this instance, political

elite in the different countries should be willing to be the driving forces behind a Pan

Africanist spirit and create an environment for such an awareness to develop to an

extent that the project is people driven and not politicize the differences among the

people.

If we consider Machiavelli’s (1984) view of political culture and conduct of election

and Mostesquieu’s (1989) conditions for democracy, we may raise a brow against

Nigeria’s quest for free and fair elections. Machiavelli believed that to have a sound

political culture, the actual conduct of politics and the “moral habits” of citizens



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must coincide with the norms of behaviour prescribed by state’s constitution

(1984).

The 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria provides such condition.

Embedded in it are: Its universal suffrage, representative government through

competitive political party system, a presidential form of government based on the

principles of separation of powers and checks and balances amongst other

democratic values. All stable and successful democracies depend on these (Otonna

2011).4

At the AU level, mechanisms such as the AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and

Governance and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) establishing

norms at the continental level have been created. The Charter speaks consistently

to the support, nurture, promotion and consolidation of good governance, political

pluralism, tolerance, consensus and a culture of democracy and peace (African

Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 2007).

But it is not enough to have these features in the constitution or in charters.

Montesquieu provides a link between the constitution and value system. Looking at

a democratic society, he concluded that its main features may not lie in any neat

institutional arrangement but in the spirit or intention behind them, not in the laws

but in the spirit of the laws. The political culture of many of African countries has

been left wanting in terms of consolidation of certain values and mores. Nigeria tops

the list of countries that whose democratic processes do not reflect the spirit behind

the laws instituted. The country remains marred by violence, rigging, intolerance of

opposition, falsification of popular vote and authoritarian democracy, all of which

4 The Tide. 2011. Nigeria’s Political Culture and Elections. December 05



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according to Otonna, have led to alienation in the political arena (The Tide,

December 05 2011)5.

The effects on the political culture in Nigeria has been a cross road between

parochial and subjective cultures. Parochial to the extent that citizens are

indistinctly aware of the existence of federal government, their existence seemingly

unaffected by national decisions and subject to the extent that they see themselves

not as participants in the political process but as subjects of the government (Hague

et al 1998). At the AU level, the political culture is parochial where citizens are far

removed from its politics and maintain a passive relationship to the AU. They do not

get to vote on any AU decisions therefore they have no real influence on AU politics.

Apathetic national political cultures have been translated onto the regional level on

the AU which has been referred to as a ‘dictators club and is also trying to shake off

the title of ‘talk shop’ (Tieku 2004 and Okumu 2009). These sentiments by average

citizens are warranted because since the AU was formed in 2001, it has very little to

show. Okumu contends that the regional organization still faces daunting challenges

including the seemingly intractable conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC), Niger Delta region in Nigeria, Darfur and Somalia, agile militia and rebel

movements in Uganda, DRC, Sudan, Central Africa Republic, flawed elections in

Kenya and Angola, acute democratic deficits in Zimbabwe, military take overs in

Central Africa Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, Guinea and Twice in

Mauritania, recurrent territorial disputes, xenophobic violence coupled with abject

poverty, famine and malnutrition (2009). This reinforces the point that principles

and institutions can be rendered ineffective by lack of political will and corruption

which are antithetical to good governance.

5 The Tide. 2011. Nigeria’s Political Culture and Elections. December 05.



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In order to meet its integration agenda, the AU requires substantial financial

resources. Okumu states that the AU has an annual budget of $130 million. The

financing is derived mainly from membership contributions, private sector and

foreign donors. Five of the most powerful and well-endowed countries on the

continent (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) contribute 75 percent of

these funds. Since its inception, the AU has operated on a deficit as there is the

malpractice of non-payment of dues and the accumulation of huge arrears was

inherited from the OAU. This has led to a profound overreliance on external support

in implementing its programs related to peace and security agenda (2009: 106). He

further posits that, “without this support, the AU peace and security agenda would

not have been operational” (Ibid). The downside to this is that donors are the ones

who have drawn roadmaps for setting up key institutions and determined which

aspects of the agenda are to be implemented. Conditionalities and commitments of

aid often reflect the character of the donor which means a change in the character

and outlook of AU policy making as it adapts to reflect the requirements of the

donors.

Nigeria’s economy is largely dependent on oil revenues. The fact that oil revenues

accrue mainly from foreign-owned multinational corporations has led to the

establishment of the “rentier state” in Nigeria – a state in which the government is

dependent solely upon “rents” paid to it by non-Nigerian clients (Falola and Heaton

2008). Due to this, the Nigerian government has had little incentive to rule in the

best interest of its citizens, since its poor and money derive not from the population

but from foreign oil companies that pay the government for the privilege of drilling

on Nigerian territory. This latter point relating to Nigeria’s government disincentive

to rule in the interests of its citizens can be juxtaposed to the regional setting.



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Because of overdependence on foreign aid to build capacity and find solutions to

African problems, there are missed opportunities for self-sustainability as solutions

are dictated by outsiders who may not understand continental issues nor represent

or be responsive to the needs of the continent’s populations. Further, given the

global financial crisis, support from the West will definitely decrease and this will

have a critical negative impact on the AU’s undertakings.

Tieku argues that the clash of interests and ideas of key actors and how they are

accommodated within the AU is important in understanding the dynamics of the AU.

His work analyses the interests of three key players within the AU; Nigeria, South

Africa and Libya and how they have sought to use their influence to reform the

organization in line with their foreign policies. Although some of the interests of

Nigeria and South Africa were compatible, there was a clash between these two

countries interests and Libya’s interests. Unlike Libya which was unsuccessful in its

quest for a federalist United States of Africa which most members viewed as too

radical; Nigeria and South Africa were able to lobby successfully for their interests

within the AU with each other’s support (2004). This clash of interests within the AU

is significant in this era because of the emergence of the Arab Spring that has led to

the death of Qaddafi. This leaves a large power vacuum within the AU and an

opportunity for Nigeria to increase its clout and position in the post Qaddafi era. As

a major oil producer and the most populous country in Africa, its ‘big brother’ role

could expand. Personality politics also needs to be highlighted in this instance

because Qaddafi was a charismatic head strong figure head within the AU who was

a force to reckon with backed by Libyan petrodollars. Obasanjo represented a

similar personality within Nigeria and the AU. However, since Obasanjo’s departure

from power in Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan has been elected president. Mr. Jonathan



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is not considered the charismatic tenacious type leader but is docile and might not

be able to take advantage of the power vacuum and Qaddafi’s absence within the

AU. However, Nigeria through its own political and financial clout within the Union

and through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – of which

Jonathan is currently chairman - could still loom larger and push its goals of

increased stability in West Africa and beyond through cost sharing.

The AU has to find a way to remain a viable regional institution in a globalized world

system. Most countries in the world are making such attempts at a regional and in

the multilateral fora as well at an increasing rate. The success of these attempts,

determine the policy makers from the policy takers of the globalisation process. The

AU remains an incoherent and disorganized institution plagued by handicaps

ranging from the lack of a real African ethos to pervasive human rights violations

and threats to human security to severe scarcity of resources for governments to

provide for their own citizens leading to limited funding for such a mammoth

organization to overdependence on external aid to weak democratic institutions and

institutional capacities, it is therefore a policy taker. All these factors have

contributed to its ineffectiveness and unresponsive to the needs of the continental

population. However, it is incumbent upon Africans to create a new situation on the

continent; there is no choice but to continue to treat the Union with unrelenting

resolve. In order for this to happen, focus cannot be placed fully on the state.

Accommodation of local forces and non-state actors into the development agenda is

imperative. Sole focus on intergovernmentalism has meant that mainly the key

actors have been accommodated into the integration process because of their

influence and capability. The AU is an organization made up of 53 nations; all

cannot be major players within the Union because they are differently endowed but



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they have to be accommodated into it and the Union has be made to work for them

as well. Further, intergovernmentalism has meant that the AU is state driven rather

than people driven. A regional integration project cannot work if people feel distant

from it, remain largely untouched by its activities and are uninvolved in its work

which is the situation that obtains within the continent both at regional and the

national levels.

The changes that have taken place in North Africa where citizens have demanded a

new leadership and change from dictatorships to a new kind of government are

instructive of the wave and kind of activism that is possible from civil society and

other non-state actors. This might be an avenue that can be explored where the

promotion of the Union takes a bottom up approach as in South East Asia where this

kind of alternative regionalism is pursued and the non-government actors are made

partners of integration processes. There has to be creativity in the approach to

regional integration, there are lessons to be learnt from the EU model but total

replication as is currently done might not work because of the different realities

presented by the different regions. A blend of different perspectives of regionalism

can be adapted, the main aim being to make the process work for the people, in

turn for the states involved as they deal with the inevitable globalized international

arena; a new regionalist approach. These prescriptions in order to work entail the

work of individual nations and the community of nations. The old adage ‘charity

begins at home’ comes to bear, individual countries cannot pursue and champion

democracy, economic growth and peace and security, three core areas stated in the

aims of the AU while at the national level they are plagued by repressive

governance systems, economic decline and insecurity. This scenario classically

represented by Nigeria and its involvement in the AU.



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Within this same trail of thought, Marks et al speak of a multi level governance

approach in which there is an existence of overlapping competencies among

multiple levels of government and the interaction of political actors across those

levels. In addition to avoid the exclusivity of the state as the only link between

domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining, other non political actors can

be included in this process as well. This according to them avoids the traps of state-

centricism and the treatment of a region integration project as only operating from

the headquarters (1996). Christiansen concurs and adds that multi levels of

government approach offers a horizontally as well as vertically asymmetrical

negotiating system (In Ougaard and Higgott 2002). This approach is worth

exploring.

Although there is much debate on the high politics of the AU involving matters such

as defense, funding and foreign policy, much of what goes on within the regional

organisation is about day to day technical, regulatory policy making, in other words,

low politics. Rosamond is rightfully of the view that there needs to be more

conceptualisation and analysis of low politics which is the operational arm of any

regional arrangement (2000). One cannot work without the other, both low and high

politics issues need to be tabled on the agenda and resolved if the AU is to be a

thriving institution. There is much to be done within the AU and national African

polities in order to make them viable institutions and players in an increasingly

interconnected world, however, there is no question that the Union is extremely

necessary and effort must be made at the sub-national, national and regional levels

to make it work.



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21

Appendix 1

NIGERIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES, 1960-PRESENT

DATES NAMES TITLE ETHNICITY

Cause of departure

1960-Jan. 1966 Tafawa

Balewa

Prime Minister Hausa-Fulani

(North)

Coup (killed)

1963-Jan. 1966 NnamdiAzikiwe

President[appointed]

Ibo (East) Coup(Removed)

Jan-July 1966 Agusi Ironsi Military Head of State

Ibo (East) Coup (Killed)

July 1966-1975 Yakubu

Gowon

Military Head of

State

Tiv (Middle

Belt/North)

Coup

(Removed)1975-1976 Murtala

MuhammedMilitary Head of State

Hausa-Fulani(North)

Coup (Killed)

1976-1979 OlesugunObasanjo

Military Head of State

Yoruba (SouthWest)

Handed powerto civilian govt

1979-1983 Shehu

Shagari

President Hausa-Fulani

(North)

Coup

(Removed)



22

1983-1985 MuhammedBuhari


Hausa-Fulani(North)

Coup(Removed)

1985-1993 IbrahimBabangida


Gwari (North) Forced out of office

June-1993 MoshoodAbiola

President Yoruba(Southwest)

Did not begintenure

Aug-Nov 1993 ErnestShonekan

Interim Head of State[appointed]“Military/Civillian”

Yoruba(Southwest)

Forced out of office

Nov 1993-1998 Sani Abacha Head,ProvisionalRuling Council“Military”

Kanuri (North) Died in office

1998-1999 AbdulsalamiAlhajiAbubakar

Head,ProvisionalRuling Council“Military”

Gwari (North) Handed powerto civilian govt

1999-2007 OlesugunObasanjo

President,FederalRepublic of Nigeria

Yoruba (SouthWest)

Peaceful handover of powerafter elections

2007-2010 UmaruMusa Yar’Adua

President,FederalRepublic of Nigeria

Hausa-Fulani(North)

Died in office

2011-Present Goodluck Jonathan

President,Federal

Republic of Nigeria

Ijaw (SouthSouth)

Source: Falola, Toyin and Mathew Heaton. 2008. A history of Nigeria. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

80647568 the african union and nigeria

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