5. the un security council

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5. The UN Security Council

Primary Responsibility Under UN CharterUnder article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council hasprimary responsibility for maintenance of international peaceand security and the authority to act on behalf of allmembers of the UN.

Chapters VI of the UN Charter

Chapter VI deals with peaceful settlement of disputes,providing a wide range of techniques to investigate disputesand help parties achieve resolution without using force.



Security Council’s Authority

(1) Identify aggressors and commit all UN members totake enforcement measures such as economicsanctions,

(2) to provide military forces for joint action

Chapter VII

Prior to 1990, all UN Peacekeeping forces were authorizedunder Chapter VI. In cold War era UNSC used its enforcementpowers only on two occasions (Korea and Congo).

(http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/3/541.full.pdf)

One dramatic change since the Cold War’s end is theSecurity Council’s increased use of Chapter VII, including itsprovisions for economic sanctions and military enforcementaction.



Size of the UNSC

The Security Council was kept small in order to facilitatemore efficient (i.e. swifter) decision-making in dealing withthreats to international peace and security.

Membership

UNSC has both permanent (P5) and non-permanent (10)members.

P5, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia andChina are the key to Security Council’s decision-makingsince each has veto power.

The non-permanent members (10) are elected for two-yearterms and participate fully in the Council’s work.

At least four non-permanent members must vote in favour ofresolution for it to pass.



No Country may serve successive terms as a non-permanentmember.

Five of the non-permanent seats go to Africa and Asia, two

each to Latin America and Western Europe and one toEastern Europe.

The designation of permanent members reflected thedistribution of military power in 1945.

Criticism

The desire to ensure UN’s ability to respond quickly anddecisively to any aggression is not fulfilled.

UN could not undertake an enforcement action either against

its strongest members or their concurrence.

The current Council composition, however, is clearly an

anachronism and discussion of “equitable represention” is a

major reform issue.

Any state, including non-UN members has right to bring

issues before the Security Council.

There is no guarantee of action.



The Secretary-General can also bring the matter to the

attention of the Security Council’s attention to address

problems before they become crisis.

Non-members may attend formal meetings and address theCouncil upon request when they have an interest in a

particular issue (have a dog in the fight).

Veto Power

The Soviet Union used its veto power frequently during the

Cold War, not only to block action on many peace and

security issues but also to block admission of western-

supported new member and nominees for Secretary General.

The United States did not exercise their veto until the 1970s

reflecting its early dominance and many friends.

US has infrequently used the veto since the 1990.

Early precedent exists of abstentions not to be counted as

vetoes.

Abstention means registering disagreement, but not blockingaction.



Breakthrough for the UNSC

In the late 1980s, the Security Council’s activity, power and

prestige increased again following major shifts in Soviet

foreign policy. There was a quick succession of

breakthroughs in regional conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq

War, Afghanistan, Central America, Namibia and Cambodia.

New Trends - Consensus Building

The Security Council also began to conduct more informal,

private consultations and to reach more decisions by

consensus than by formal voting.

Security Council’s presidents now play an active role in

facilitating discussions and consensus building, determining

when the members are ready to reach a decision.

The President also confers regularly with the Secretary-

General, with relevant states, and other actors not

represented on the Council.

The presidency rotates monthly between the 15 members.



In addition, P-5 informally consults, a practice that has

enhanced their close cooperation, but also fuelled

perceptions of Great-Power collusion.

History of Enforcement

Since 1987, the Security Council has taken action on more

armed conflicts, made more decisions under Chapter VII of

the UN Charter authorized more peacekeeping operations

and imposed more types of sanctions in more situations than

ever before.

In 1991, US led coalition forces liberated Kuwait under UNflag. This was undoubtedly UN’s finest hour.

The confrontation with Iraq in 1990 marked a high point in

Security Council’s functioning. The strength of agreement

among both the P-5 and the non-permanent members of the

Council at that time was extra-ordinary.



Yet, the UN was unable to “make war” itself and had to stand

aside while the US and allied forces took the lead without

formally reporting to the Security Council as the authorizing

organ.Even though the Council resumed its lead role with the

ceasefire and punitive sanctions imposed on Iraq, the

questions raised about its ability to fulfill the mandate of

maintaining peace and security would return repeatedly

throughout the 1990s.

1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared hisfamous Report titled Agenda for Peace [A/47/277 - S/24111

17 June 1992] triggering a debate about what UN can do andwhat it cannot do in dealing with threats to peace.

In the aftermath of debacle in Somalia where US operatedindependent of UNPK effort, US stopped paying its

commitment to UN making it clear how important US fundingis to keep the UN going.



It authorized NATO bombing Bosnian Serb forces in Bosnia

in 1995.



It has authorized UN administered protectorates in Kosovo

an in East Timor.

The decision by US and NATO in 1999 to undertake bombingof Serbia (in former Yugoslavia) without explicit authorization



from UNSC and in the face of Russian and Chineseopposition showed that p-5 was deeply divided.

Yet the Security Council assumed a major role in Kosovo

with the end of NATO bombing.

It took the unprecedented step of creating War Crimes

Tribunal to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide in

Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.



It expanded definition of threats to peace to include terrorism

following the September 2001, attacks on the Word TradeCentre and the Pentagon.



The gulf between UNSC and the General Assembly widenedin 2001-2002 in during the Secretary-Generalship of Kofi

Annan.

At special sessions in 2000 and 2001, the Council identified

HIV/AIDS epidemic and the multi-faceted crisis in Africa as

security threat.

Conflict Resolution

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought beforeit, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the partiesto try to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the

Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It mayappoint special representatives or request the Secretary-Generalto do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for apeaceful settlement.



When a dispute leads to fighting, the Council's first concern is tobring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, theCouncil has issued cease-fire directives which have beeninstrumental in preventing wider hostilities.

It also sends United Nations peace-keeping forces to help reducetensions in troubled areas, keep opposing forces apart and createconditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economicsanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action.

A Member State against which preventive or enforcement actionhas been taken by the Security Council may be suspended fromthe exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by theGeneral Assembly on the recommendation of the SecurityCouncil. A Member State which has persistently violated theprinciples of the Charter may be expelled from the United Nationsby the Assembly on the Council's recommendation.

A State which is a Member of the United Nations but not of theSecurity Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions

when the Council considers that that country's interests areaffected. Both Members of the United Nations and non-members,if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council,are invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council'sdiscussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation by anon-member State.



CONCLUSION

The UN Charter gives the Security Council enormous formalpower but does not give it direct control over the means to

use that power.

The Security Council has no standing armies. It dependsupon the voluntary cooperation of states willing to contributeto peacekeeping missions, to enforce sanctions, to pay theirdues, and to support enforcement actions either under UNcommand or by a coalition of the willing.

However, it can be said that, despite these problems

demanding major reforms of the organization, UN doesrepresent the twenty-first century and not the post-1945world.

ASSIGNMENT

SAFE HAVENS OF BOSNIA: 1995

READ THE CASE STUDY:

The Return of History:Bosnia and the Hour of Europe

INTERNET SEARCH:

Agenda for Peace – Boutros Boutros Ghali - 1992



CASE STUDY

The Return of History:

Bosnia and the Hour of Europe

Christopher Myer, Getting Our Way, Chapter 9

The Serb Siege of Sarajevo – April 1992

The siege of Sarajevo, was an episode of such notoriety in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia

that one must go back to WW II to find a parallel in European history. Not since then had a

professional army conducted a campaign of unrelenting violence against the inhabitants of a

European city so as to reduced them to a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in

constant fear of death. In the period covered in (Milosevic) indictment, there was no where safefor a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in a hospital, from deliberate attack.

Serbian Atrocities

Elsewhere in Bosnia, Serbian forces made rapid gains, within months occupying 70 percent of

the country. The mainly Muslim inhabitants of Eastern Bosnia were driven out or killed.

Refugees poured into Croatia, bringing with them tales of mass killings, the burning of villages

and mass rape.

The UN estimated that just a month into the conflict, 520,000 people, a twelfth of the population,

had been displaced from their homes. Aid convoys destined to help these people were blocked byground troops. It was a vast humanitarian disaster that would only get worse. Something had to

be done.

World Reaction to Atrocities

In 1992 Margaret Thatcher told the world:

Serbia will not listen unless forced to listen… waiting until the conflict burns itself out

will not only be dishonourable but also very costly: refugees, terrorism, Balkan wars

drawing in other countries, and worse. The inaction of the West made it an accomplice to

slaughter.

UN PROFOR Deployment

In June 1992, the UN Peace-keeping force, UNPROFOR deployed to Bosnia. It had been created

the previous September during the Serb-Croat War.



It had no peace-making authority. Besides the protection of humanitarian convoys and refugees,

its main task was to hold and protect Sarajevo’s airport. A couple of months later the British

government decided to contribute a battalion of 1,800 men. After France, Britain became

UNPROFOR’s largest contributor.

The London Conference

A weak after the decision to send in British troops, a joint EC-UN conference was convened in

London, hosted by the British Prime Minister, John Major, and the UN Secretary General,

Boutros Boutros Ghali. The conference brought together 30 nations, including representatives of

the Yugoslav Republic. The aim was to halt the violence, alleviate a mounting humanitarian

crisis, and put in place a framework within which a final peace could be negotiated.

There was particular concern that, as winter approached, over a million refugees could die of

exposure and starvation.

Tough Conclusions

Major opened the conference with words:

The people who we represent have been appalled by the destruction, the killing, the

maiming – the sheer cruelty which has disfigured Yugoslavia. We all seek a just peace.

The London conference reached tough conclusions. The warring parties were ordered to halt

ethnic cleansing and agree to peace talks in Geneva – or face harsh consequences: if the y do not

comply the Security Council will be invited to apply stringent sanctions leading to their total

isolation

UN Retribution

The promised UN retribution was nowhere to be seen: no stringent sanctions, no total isolation.

Above all, there was no use of force to stop the fighting and the atrocities, and the threat had not

even been made in the London communique.

This set a disastrous precedent. It led Milosevic and Tudjman, the Croat leader, to believe for

over three years that they could face down the international community.

Cart Blanche

The aftermath of the London conference as good as gave the Serbs and Croats carte blanche in

their ethnic cleansing. It was hardly surprising that four successive peace plans subsequently

foundered. Neither the Serbs nor the Croats had any incentive to submit to the Mediators’ plans,

when they thought that, without fear of retribution, they could acquire more territory by force of

arms.



The cycle of violence was reversed only when the gap between tough talking and weak action

became intolerable. This happened with the sorry tale of the safe havens.

Safe Havens

Six of these had been created by Security Council in 1993. They included Serbrenica. The idea

was that there should be areas where Bosnian refugees could find sanctuary from the violence.

Their integrity would be guaranteed by UNPROFOR.

The initiative was flawed from the Start. The commander of UN forces requested some 30,000

troops for the task of protecting the safe havens; he got around 7,500 instead.

Air Strikes – Dual Key Arrangement

The Security Council had provided for air strikes, should the havens come under attack. But the

strikes had to be authorized by a UN/NATO ‘dual key’ – a clumsy arrangement which

guaranteed impossibly slow responses, if any at all.



The havens became places where Bosnian forces rested before combat. This prejudiced their

integrity in Serb eyes and invited attack.

UNPROFOR found itself stranded once again in an ill-defined no-man’s land between peace-

keeping and peace-making.

The result was predictable. The safe haven of Serbrenica came under Serb attack in July 1995.

the few hundred lightly armed Dutch troops of UNPROFOR could do nothing to protect the

thousands of refugees.

In one of the most notorious incidents of the whole conflict almost 8,000 men and boys were

massacred by General Mladic and his Bosnian Serb Army.

It required an atrocity of this scale finally to lead to decisive action. It was taken by an informal

club of Great Powers, called the Contact Group – US, UK, France, Germany and Russia.

NATO Bombing Attacks –

August 1995

All five were on the UN Security Council….

The group seized the reins of Bosnian policy from inside UN and NATO. The Contact Group,

led by America, is just like the Great Power Directorate that ran the Congress of Vienna and kept

multilateral diplomacy on leash.

Bosnian Serbs came under heavy NATO bombing attacks, while the Croats comprehensively

defeated the Croatian Serbs in a lightening campaign [in August 1995].

Dayton Accord - 21 November 1995

Wheeling and dealing, not entirely trusted by anyone…. Holbrooke delivered where the

Europeans had failed. After 21 days of negotiations… last minute renegotiation of borders –

Izetbegovic of Bosnia, Tudjman of Croatia and Milosevic of Serbia were finally brought to

initial a deal. It was solemnly signed a month later in Paris.

By the time the Balkan bulldozer went into action, the Americans were ready to use force. That

was the watershed…. Further air strikes, 25,000 US troops on ground to enforce a deal.

Criticism

Under UNPROFOR, the obligations of the force had been unlimited – protect civilians, assist aid

deliveries, secure safe zones and so on – but its authority was very limited.

[Milosevic said]: it was your… high technology that defeated us. It was a lesson Milosevic had

to learn in Kosovo in 1999 all over again.



The Bosnia crisis…. did not present a stark choice between ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ diplomacy.

Nor was Dayton agreement a triumph after four long years.

Lessons

Serbs and Croats paid with their lives for the complexity, as the international community, by trialand error, worked out what it should do.

Nobody had a dog in the Balkan fight.

When societies fall out, however violently, only then they can bring the crisis to a permanent

resolution.

We have simply postponed the inevitable day of reckoning. We do not know whether the

republics and communities of old Yugoslavia are capable of peaceful coexistence, once foreign

forces leave their soil.

If Milosevic and Mladic had been confronted by the full force of the United States and NATO in

1991, instead of 1995, over 100,000 lives would have been saved. It required violence, atrocity

and instability to seize the world’s attention.

…Rwanda, the Congo, Darfur or Zimbabwe are no less harrowing. But nations pick and choose.

They always will. The decisive factor is the national interest.

These things… will happen again and we won’t always be able to intervene.

Politicians and diplomats ignore history at their peril. Sitting on his cloud, Winston Churchill

shouts down in frustration to our commanders in Afghanistan and diplomats in Pakistan: Readmy 1998 Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War. It’s all in there!

George Canning is shaking his head in despair.

…our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and then

with a commanding force.

5. the un security council

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