46282842 trigger bruce 1974 the archaeology of goverment

8/6/2019 46282842 Trigger Bruce 1974 the Archaeology of Goverment

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The archaeology of governmentBruceTrigger

IntroductionIn recent years archaeologists have exhibited an increasing interest in processual studiesthat attempt to explain the development of complex societies. In these studies the ex-planation of changes in political organization is of major importance. They have alsoshown a less explicit but long-standing interest in the political behaviour of earlycivilizations that seems to reflect the historians' traditional interest in political events.In spite of this, little attention has been paid to the interpretation of political organiza-tion as an archaeological problem. Most archaeologists would probably agree thatpolitical organization, like other aspects of social behaviour, falls into ChristopherHawkes' (I954) middle range of amenability to archaeological study; generally moredifficult to interpret than technological processes or subsistence economy, but lessdifficult than religious beliefs. Indeed, the difficulties assumed to be inherent in studyingall types of social processes have long resulted in archaeology being characterized asprimarily concerned with studying the material adaptation of societies to their environ-ment; although few archaeologists would now sustain the notion that social organizationand beliefs can be explained as simple epiphenomena produced by the economic sub-structure. In fact, a survey of the literature indicates that political organization is now ofmore interest to archaeologists than traditional views of the profession might suggest.There appear to be many assumptions concerning how hypotheses about politicalorganization can be validated archaeologically; what is needed is for these assumptionsto be made explicit and adequately tested. The development of reliable techniques forusing archaeological data to test assumptions about political development is of im-portance, since the complex causality of most social institutions makes it possible toadvance alternative explanations for particular processes without being able to establishwhich of these explanations is superior to another.

The political subsystemThe political may be viewed as one of the subsystems making up the total socio-culturalsystem, which ideally is the object of archaeological study. In general terms, the politicalsystem is concerned with broad processes that regulate the functioning of societies.


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96 Bruce TriggerThese processes relate to: (i) foreign relations (2) defence from external attack (3) main-taining internal order, validating and maintaining patterns of authority, and regulatingthe competition for power, and (4) organizing complex activities relating to the welfareof the society as a whole (Balandier 1972; Lloyd I965: 72). These activities are some-times described as attributes of the state (Renfrew I972: 363), but in one form or anotherapply to the simplest as well as the most complex societies. In common with mostsocial anthropologists, I reject the idea that political activities are a feature only ofcomplex societies. The real difference between simple and complex societies is insteadthe degreeto which politicalactivities areprofessionalizedand institutionally-differentiatedfrom the general kin-based patterns of social interaction that characterize smaller-scale societies. It is this institutionalization of political activities that Sears (I968: 134)refers to when he cites 'specialized sub-organization' as being a characteristic of thestate. It is also generally agreed that the complexity of social institutions tends tovary with the demographic scale (but not necessarily with the population density) ofthe social unit and with the complexity of other institutions. In spite of the evidentinterrelatedness of all elements of the social system, political phenomena can bedifferentiated from aspects of social organization such as residence, family, descent andinheritance on the one hand and from law and other aspects of belief and values on theother.

Inferring political organizationIn recent years, archaeologists have scored some successes in inferring residence patternsfrom archaeological data. These successes, however, have encouraged the realizationthat residence patterns and descent systems are not necessarily the same and someanthropologists have questioned the appropriateness of archaeological data for studyingthe latter spheres (Aberle I968). There is probably little hope of using archaeologicaldata to study any significant problems related to interpersonal competition for power,which is an important element in the ethnological study of political behaviour. Evendynastic marriage patterns, which may be important for understanding the politicalinterdependence of states, may not be amenable to study for the majority of prehistoricstates. In spite of this, the elements that are present in the archaeological record appearto permit the delineation of many of the basic elements of political organization, suchas the hierarchical organization of decision-making and the military system.The strong points of archaeological data for the interpretation of socio-politicalbehaviour currently lie in their ability to provide information concerning community sizeand distribution of population, division of labour, relative distribution of goods andservices and the symbolic representation of status differences. Throughout the rest ofthis paper, I will attempt to survey how these data may improve an understanding ofpolitical organization. I am deliberately restricting this survey to the type of problemsencountered in dealing with societies for which documentary evidence is not available.In doing so, I am fully aware that many of the most important archaeological studiesrelated to ancient political systems have been based on a combination of archaeological


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The archaeologyof government 97and historical data and agree that it would be the greatest folly to reject written sourcesof information when they are available. In the long run, the information gathered fromthe study of such societies may provide much of the understanding needed to interpretsocieties for which such information is not available. Nevertheless, the intrinsic interestof societies for which written records exist has diverted attention from the study ofthe correlations between political organization and material culture that are neededto interpret archaeological cultures that lack written documentation.It may be accepted as a general rule that because of the complexity of social pheno-mena the results gained from any one line of investigation may be deceiving. Thissuggests the need to study a problem along as many lines as possible and to cross-checkthe results of these studies for their coherence. Five basic types of approaches may bedistinguished, as follows:I Demographic. Recent studies of the effect of population on other aspects of humanbehaviour offer the hope that significant inferences can be based solely on knowledgeof the size and distribution of population. The potential of such inferences for archaeo-logical studies clearly cannot be exaggerated. The interest of anthropologists in suchproblems derives in part from K. Oberg's (I955) paper in which he argued that numericalincrease and concentration of population were the principal factors influencing thedevelopment of social structure among indigenous peoples of Central and SouthAmerica. Later, when establishing the World Ethnographic Sample, G. P. Murdock(i957) made gross size of population his only variable for distinguishing his politicaltypes: Autonomous Local Community (1,5oo or less); Minimal State (I,5o00-0,000);Little State (Io,ooo-Ioo,ooo); States (more than Ioo,ooo). Recent work suggests regu-larities which, if sustained, will permit significant deductions to be based solely ondemographic criteria.Some of these regularities relate to community or group size. Naroll (1956: 690), forexample, has collected data that suggest where maximum gatherings do not exceed afew hundred people no authoritative officials are needed but where such gatheringsexceed 500 they are necessary. In the initial instance, the authority seems to take theform of a council of chiefs recognizing a paramount headman as their spokesman. Wherelocal groups exceed i,ooo people (my own work would suggest 1,500) officials must inaddition be able to exercise police functions. It may be significant that the maximumsize for Murdock's autonomous local community is also about this level, since thiswould be the point at which if a stable community were to increase in size and holdtogether it would have to transform itself from a village into a small city state.Multi-community groupings require less political integration since, especially if thetechnology remains relatively simple, local groups can manage most of their own affairs.Tribal governments are largely concerned with suppressing internal blood feuds andregulating relations with other groups. Because of this, larger numbers of people maycome together as members of a single political entity without developing a state than canremain together in a similar condition in a single community. Kroeber (I955: 309) hasobserved that in many parts of North America, Indian tribes tended to break apart ifthey exceeded 500 members. The same appears to hold true for New Guinea at thepresent time (Forge 1972). This upper limit seems to apply in cases where, for various


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98 Bruce Triggerreasons, clans or small local groupings cling to their autonomy and rankings of headmenfail to develop. Where councils of headmen do develop, the upper limit is many timeshigher.Baker and Sanders (1972: I63) suggest that simple tribes have a maximum populationof 5,000 to 6,ooo; while chiefdoms normally number io,ooo to I2,ooo and societies fourtimes as large can exist for only a short time before splitting or developing into a state.It is clear, however, that even if this observation is valid very serious problems are en-countered in using it to interpret the archaeological record. For example, archaeologi-cally the seventeenth-century Huron Indians of eastern Canada appear as a culturallyhomogeneous cluster of settlements with a population of about 20,000 people, hencethey would be interpreted as a chiefdom. Historically, we know that the Huron were aconfederacy made up of four tribes, each approaching Baker and Sanders' maximum of5,000 to 6,ooo. Chiefs were ranked up to the level of the confederacy council but powerwas validated by the ability of a clan leader to distribute goods and in no way by coercivepressure (Trigger 1969). Clan autonomy and individual rights were consistently prizedabove any other political ideals and no one has suggested that the Huron or Iroquoisconfederacies constitute examples of chiefdoms. We have already noted that centraliza-tion can emerge among political units of 6,ooo people or less, as evidenced by small citystates. Finally, it may be observed that population density does not appear to predictpolitical organization, since groups like the Chimbu number 400 per square mile yetlack social stratification or ranking (Flannery 1972: 406). Nor, as the contrast betweenthe Yoruba and Ibo illustrates, does population density serve alone as a factor necessarilypromoting the development of urbanism and in this way shape political systems (BascomI955: 452).While theoretical sophistication has not yet reached the point where demographicdata can serve as more than a very general predictor of the nature of political systems,the intrinsic value of the approach suggests that further research along these lines maybe highly rewarding.2 Cultural. The idea that political units normally ought to equate with cultural ones isderived from G. Kossinna's and V. G. Childe's general proposition that an archaeologicalculture is the expression of a single people. This notion was further strengthened by thepolitical dogma that the state is the logical expression of a common nationality. Recentlythis idea has been applied more or less self-consciously to the interpretation of archaeo-logical data from the south-eastern United States and Peru. While Sears (i968) admitsthe possibility of multi-ethnic states, he assumes that most Mississippian polities in thesouth-eastern United States grew by expanding and replacing local populations.Identifying a prehistoric state in this area requires defining an ethnic group usingarchaeological criteria, determining its extent, and finding evidence of its politicalorganization by locating the ceremonial centres or hierarchy of such centres whichserved to govern and co-ordinate it. In Peru, the unification of several coastal valleysinto single stylistic units is taken, along with other evidence, as indicative of the develop-ment of direct political control (Earle 1972).In spite of this, historical evidence clearly indicates that in some instances patterns ofmaterial culture greatly exceed the boundaries of any one government, as may be


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The archaeologyof government 99observed in the city state systems of ancient Mesopotamia, Greece or Mesoamerica.Conversely, a single state may incorporate groups possessing diverse cultural patterns.This is normally the case with empires but may also occur when peoples speakingdiverse languages or with different economies live in close proximity. In the case ofmature states, spreading by replacement is probably rare, since it is in the interestsof rulers to increase their wealth by increasing the number of their subjects regardless ofthe latter's cultural background. Another feature of imperial states that should beamenable to archaeological study is the forced resettlement of conquered populations forpolitical reasons, particularly when, as in Peru, these are largely rural populations thatretain their native culture in a new setting.In societies where at least some goods, such as pottery, are mass-produced, the wide-scale distribution of these items provides evidence of trading zones and associated linesof communication. Yet, as W. Y. Adams (I970) has pointed out, these trading zonesmay not correspond in any specific way with ethnic groups or political borders, sincetrade flows across such boundaries as often as it does not. Among tribal societies, wherepottery is manufactured by women for household use, a greater homogeneity of potterystyles may result not only from political alliances and intermarriagebut also from war-fare and the capture of women by both sides. Hence many different lines of evidencemay have to be explored before the significance of variations in pottery styles may beunderstood.

In complex societies the material culture associated with high status groups mayprovide the best clue to the political structure of an area, since sharing a common stylemay serve as a badge of political identity. Particularly in areas of diversity in villageculture, an elite culture may serve as evidence of political unity.On the other hand, the high, and indeed the low, status cultures of whole city statesystems may share a common style in spite of political diversity. An intrusive elite mayadopt the material culture of an areathey have conquered, so that only their language orother archaeologically elusive features provide certain evidence of their presence. Thisis particularly likely to be the case where the older culture is recognized as being superiorto that of the newcomers. Examples are provided by the Kassites or the Amorites inMesopotamia and the Mycenaean rulers in Crete. It is clear that, like other criteria,cultural ones are rarely useful alone; however, they may be more informative whenused in combination with other criteria.3 Societal. In the long run, the increasing wealth and the increasingly unequal distribu-tion of wealth that is observed in the archaeological records in many parts of the worldmay lead to conflict and thus must correlate with the development of political systemsto protect these arrangements (Lloyd i965: 78); however, at certain levels, a movementin this direction is not equivalent to the development of the state. Status correlates inmany, but not all, cases with the ability of certain individuals or groups to appropriate adisproportionate share of society's wealth for their own use, but there is no inevitablecorrelationbetween status and property. In band societies, status is derived mainly frominitiatives that contribute to the common welfare of the group and is imperilled byattempts to retain an unequal share of material possessions, hence in these societiesstatus consists mainly of intangibles that are not apparent in the archaeological record.


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ioo Bruce TriggerIn more complex societies, the relative wealth of clan groups or of age and sex divisionswithin such groups may be apparent from differential distributions of material posses-sions, but this does not reveal how such differentials were socially regulated and super-naturally justified. Even slavery may be associated with stateless societies in whichprestige must be validated by gift giving. This is exemplified by the Indian tribes of thewest coast of Canada among whom prisoners of war were set to work for the economicbenefit of their captors and were sometimes slain as part of displays involving theconspicuous consumption of wealth.Elaborate goods in limited numbers of children's graves may indicate a society inwhich high status was assigned at birth to members of particular clans or families(Flannery 1972: 403), but this reveals nothing about the political basis of such power.Moreover, as P. J. Ucko (1969) has forcefully admonished us, grave goods do notnecessarily correlate with wealth (or status) in life; therefore, alternative explanationsof such graves, such as that they result from ritual sacrifice,ought at least to be considered.Such an alternative was seriously entertained with respect to the Early Dynastic 'deathpits' excavated at Ur of the Chaldees. Only the subsequent discovery of one text appar-ently alluding to retainer sacrifice in connection with Mesopotamian royal burials hastipped scholarly opinion in favour of them being royal graves (Kramer 1963: I29-30).Inferences about political organization must be based on a broad pattern of access togoods and services as preserved in the archaeological record. Only at the point where itcan be demonstrated that the privileges of the elite are based on wresting significantsurpluses from the society at large for their own use can the existence of a state con-fidently be posited. Such conclusions cannot be based simply on demonstrating thatthere was a centralized redistributive system in the society. It requires proof of markedasymmetry in the system, with the elite appropriating much more than they put into it.The development of this type of a redistributive system is an evolutionary processand for transitional societies it may not be possible to determine whether or not a statewas present; however, some classes of evidence that definitely suggest the existence of astate are the following: (i) building programmes of a labour-intensive nature that arespecifically designed to affirmthe personal glory of high-status individuals or to displaythe power of the state. Such projects include the construction of graves, palaces andtemples. Some of these constructions, such as large tumuli over royal graves, may re-quire relatively little technical skill but the manpower required makes the resultingstructure a symbol of royal authority. It is argued, however, that purely in terms oforganization, monumental construction could have been done without the coerciveforces of the state (Kaplan i963; Erasmus I965). In this respect, Colin Renfrew's dis-tinction between group-oriented and individualizing chiefdoms (or might the latterbetter be called states?) may be conceptually useful. In the first, monumental worksare of a community nature; in the latter they display the power and eminence of rulersto their subjects (Renfrew I973); (2) the emergence of full-time specialists to serve theneeds of the elite and the state apparatuswhich they control. In general, these specialistsfall into four classes: artisans, bureaucrats, soldiers and retainers. Workers of this sortare enabled to specialize to a much greater degree than full-time specialists whoseservices are available to the society as a whole and who first appear at an earlier stage ofsocial development. The appearance of 'master specialists' is correlated with the


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The archaeologyof government Ioidevelopment of new sources of patronage, namely, rulers who can cover the high overheadneeded to support them. Their presence leads to the creation of an elite culture or whatRobert Redfield has called a 'Great Tradition', which is distinct from the 'Little Tradi-tion' of the peasantry. Archaeologically, the presence of a Great Tradition can bemeasured by the refinement of technology and the appearance of sophisticated andcoherent art styles as exhibited in the palaces, temples, tombs and goods that are manu-factured for the elite. In pre-industrial societies such goods are shared to a very limiteddegree, if at all, by the lower classes, except in the form of cheap and clumsy imitations.The distribution of workers or of variant local styles may reveal much about the degreeof centralization of patronage and power in a particular political system; (3) large-scalehuman sacrifice in connection with high status burials. Such retainer sacrifice, which isessentially different from the killing of prisoners of war or enslaved prisoners of war insimpler societies, was common to many ancient states in both the Old and New World.It must be remembered, however, that the state is a precondition for the developmentof civilization (if defined as associated with a Great Tradition) and for this reason manysimpler states may go undetected using these cultural criteria (Trigger I968: 53-4).4. Geographical.All complex societies produce a wide range of special purpose struc-tures: palaces, temples, storehouses, military camps, meeting places, and administrativebuildings. Some of these structures clearly relate to political activities and the study ofthem and their distribution may reveal something about the political organization. Careis needed, however, to determine correctly the functions of such buildings, which arenot always clear from a study of their location, lay-out and contents. Some of the prob-lems involved in determining the functions of buildings are exemplified by the recentdebate whether the 'Official Palace' at Tell el Amarna was a palace, temple or combina-tion of both (Uphill 1970; Assmann 1972). At least part of the latter controversy seemsto stem from the difficulty of applying modern (or medieval) concepts about the functionof buildings to ancient ones. Likewise, in dealing with tribal societies, it is of less im-portance to correlate the largest house in a village with a village headman than it is todetermine whether the house reflects his greater affluence or was made large to serve asa communal meeting place for the whole village.

Archaeologists recently have begun to use locational theory to determitle hierarchiesof settlement types and to attempt to explain their distribution. Normally this analysisinvolves determining different levels of service functions. Even at a simple tribal levelcentrally-located, fortified towns may provide protection for neighbouring smallvillages. Such an arrangement represents a reasonable compromise between a need forprotection and the desire of horticulturalists to live as near as possible to their fields.David Clarke (I972) has applied locational analysis to Iron Age settlements and hillfortsin England, interpreting different sizes as different order centres. Even in those caseswhere economic factors may be the primary determinants of settlement size, their sizemay correspond in a general way with their position in an administrative hierarchy; ifso, this can be confirmed by the further correlation of specific types of high statusresidences or official buildings with sites of a particular rank. Where centres of politicaladministration do not correspond with centres of population and economic activity,as in some feudal societies, this should easily become apparent. Multiple or itinerant


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102 Bruce Trigger

capitals, for example, may represent the efforts of a central government to overcomeproblems of communication and internal disunity (Balandier 1972: 137-8).Political factors play an important role in influencing the size and location of settle-ments, although at the tribal level these seem mainly to be correlated with military con-siderations. Where warfare is endemic among closely neighbouring groups, as in NewGuinea, protection may be achieved by kinsmen living in small dispersed hamlets, notall of which can be attacked at one time. Elsewhere, dispersed farming or herding groupsmay share a common fort to which everyone can retire in times of danger. For the mostpart, however, communities depend on increased size for protection or locate themselvesin easily defensible locations, as far removed as possible from sources of danger (DoxiadisI968: I4I, I43). Military matters can be studied further by investigating weapons andthe effects of warfare on the movement of populations and on patterns of culturegenerally.Elsewhere I have argued that craft specialization will tend to produce a hexagonaldistribution of cities of approximately equal importance, each having perhaps 5,000 to50,000 inhabitants (Trigger 1972). Cities of this size also appear to correspond with theideal type of a city state system; however, where cities are established as the capitals oflarge states they are subsidized as administrative and cult centres and become larger andmuch more opulent than they would have done otherwise. This expansion of cities asthey gain hegemony within a city state system can easily be documented for ancientMesopotamia (Ur, Babylon), Classical Greece (Athens), and highland Mesoamerica(Tenochtitlan) and a similar phenomenon may explain the relatively large size of Tikalamong the classic Maya centres. Supercities, with populations of ioo,ooo or more, suchas Rome and Ch'ang-an, achieved and maintained their huge size as centres of vastempires and a similar explanation probably holds for all pre-industrial cities of thisorder. Within these large-scale states it is often possible to distinguish not only a capital,but secondary and tertiary administrative centres corresponding to regional and smallerdivisions. In Egypt, where little archaeological information is available concerninghabitation sites, a hierarchy of tomb types seems roughly to parallel the administrativehierarchy. The tendency of provincial officials to locate their tombs in their admini-strative centres rather than in the royal necropolis has been found to serve as a usefulmeasure of the relative degree of centralization or decentralization at different periods.Even without written records, no archaeologist could doubt the political unification ofEgypt at the time when the largest pyramids were constructed.In some instances, political unification may be attested by the extent of state projectssuch as irrigation or transportation systems. While the degree to which small-scaleirrigation systems can operate on a consensual basis is a matter of controversy, it seemsfairly clear that the integrated multi-valley systems of coastal Peru or the large water-control systems of the Old World presuppose the existence of a central authority to planand maintain such projects. These projects may be combined with important trans-portation systems, such as the Grand Canal joining the Huang Ho and Yangtze riversin China. In many large states special road networks were constructed for admini-strative and military purposes. These road systems tend to be co-extensive with thestate and in the case of the Roman and Inca empires, where they have been relativelywell studied, they would serve to reveal the extent of these empires even without written


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The archaeologyof government I03records. Particularly with the growth of aerial reconnaissance, this type of evidence hasproved increasingly amenable to study (Deuel 1973).Where rival city states exist in close proximity to one another it is not unusual foreach urban centre to be fortified. On the other hand, administrative centres are oftenfortified within large states so they may serve as control centres for the central govern-ment and places where the elite can live in relative security. This was the case withtraditional Chinese cities (ch'eng) (Fei 1953: 95). By contrast, the lack of fortificationsaround Roman cities in the early centuries of the Christian era was a measure not onlyof security against external attack, but also of the control that the Roman administrationwas able to exercise over the surrounding countryside.Frontiers between states may be demarcated in a variety of ways that can be studiedarchaeologically. Sometimes formal boundary markers may be recovered; in othercases states may be separated as a matter of policy by no-man's-lands. Work done byParsons (I97i) and Dumond (1972) suggests that during the Classic period in highlandMexico Teotihuacan and Cholula were separated by a broad, sparsely-settled zonewhich may have functioned as a no-man's-land. Elsewhere elaborate border defencesmay separate one state from another or protect settled areas against the incursion ofbarbarian tribesmen living beyond the borders of the state. Examples are the elaboratedefences that the Egyptians built along their southern frontier in the Middle Kingdom,the Great Wall in China and the Roman limes, which vary from a single fortified linealong the northern frontiers to broad defensive belts in Syria and North Africa (Deuel1973: 93-I20). Even without written records, a study of forts and border defences wouldenable archaeologists to trace the frontiers and history of expansion of the RomanEmpire. That such fortifications are not only a feature of large states is shown by Offa'sDyke, the linear earthwork between Wales and Anglo-Saxon Mercia. Analogous forti-fications appear to have demarcated the borders of coastal states in Peru (Deuel I973:222-6).5 Iconographic. The art of some cultures, such as China and India (including theIndus Valley civilization), appears to be singularly poor in information about politicalsubjects. In other cultures, artistic representations of rulers and their activities abound.These representations are often highly formalized and based on a limited repertoire ofthemes. The relative size and positioning of figures, the elaborateness of costumes, andparticular iconic symbols (crowns, parasols etc.) may denote the rank of those beingdepicted. Without writing, such representations may be difficult to interpret, as wit-nessed by the long uncertainty as to whether Maya rulers were priests or secular rulers.It is possible, however, that even without written explanations, a detailed contextualanalysis will reveal the fundamental significance of differences in the attributes associatedwith these figures.Certain features that recur in this 'iconography of power' in widely separated earlycivilizations are of special interest since they appear to be parallel responses to similarcircumstances among historically unrelated groups. Among the most obvious themesare the following: (i) the relative size of figures and elaborateness of costumes tend tocorrelate positively with their political importance; (2) defeated enemies are shownsimply dressed or naked in the presence of their elaborately-costumed conquerors


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104 Bruce Trigger(examples from Egypt, Mesopotamia, Maya, Mochica culture); (3) a king is often por-trayed dominating a supine enemy (Egypt, Maya, Aztec). Similarities of this sort suggestthat the iconography of early civilizations can be a source of insight not only into thepolitical structure of these societies but into their political psychology as well.

ConclusionA broad range of data concerning political systems is embedded in the archaeologicalrecord. The present survey only touches the surface of this subject but suggests thatcareful attention to this area will further an understanding of archaeological cultures forwhich written records are lacking and for testing more general theories of culturalevolution. For the present, few conclusions can be based on only one line of inference;instead they must be based on the convergence of different lines of investigation.4.x. I973 Departmentof AnthropologyMcGill University

ReferencesFor a brief but thoroughand systematicreview of the historyand concepts underlyingstudiesof politicalanthropology, ee Balandier1972.Aberle,D. F. I968. Commentsby David F. Aberle. New Perspectivesn Archeology,pp. 353-9(eds S. R. and L. R. Binford). Chicago:Aldine Publishing Company.Adams,W. Y. 1970. The evolutionof ChristianNubian pottery.KunstundGeschichteNubiensin ChristlicherZeit, pp. 111-28 (ed. E. Dinkler). Recklinghausen:Verlag Bongers.Assmann, J. I972. Palast oder Tempel? Ueberlegungenzur Architektur und Topographicevon Amarna.Journalof Near EasternStudies.31:143-55.Baker,P. T. and Sanders,W. T. I972. Demographicstudies in anthropology.Annual Reviewof Anthropology,, pp. I51-78 (ed. B. J. Siegel). Palo Alto: AnnualReviews, Inc.Balandier,G. 1972. PoliticalAnthropology.Harmondsworth,Middlesex: Penguin Books.Bascom,W. I955. Urbanizationamongthe Yoruba. American ournalof Sociology.6o:446-54.Clarke,D. L. 1972. A provisionalmodel of an Iron Age society and its settlement system.Models in Archaeology, pp. 801-69 (ed. D. L. Clarke). London: Methuen.Deuel, L. 1973.Flightsinto Yesterday.Harmondsworth,Middlesex:Penguin Books.Doxiadis, C. A. I968. Ekistics:an introduction o the scienceof humansettlements.London:Hutchinson.Dumond, D. E. 1972. Demographic aspects of the Classicperiod in Puebla-Tlaxcala.South-western ournalof Anthropology.8:101-30.Earle, T. K. I972. Lurin Valley, Peru: early Intermediateperiod settlement development.AmericanAntiquity.37:467-77.


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The archaeologyof government 105Erasmus,C. J. I965. Monument building: some field experiments. Southwestern ournal ofAnthropology. 21:277-301.Fei, H.-T. I953. China'sGentry.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress.Flannery, K. V. 1972. The culturalevolution of civilizations. Annual Reviewof EcologyandSystematics. II, 399-426. Palo Alto: AnnualReviews, Inc.Forge, A. 1972. Normative factors in the settlement size of neolithiccultivators.Man, Settle-mentand Urbanism, p. 363-376 (edsP. J. Ucko, R. TringhamandG. W. Dimbleby).London:Duckworth.Hawkes, C. 1954. Archaeological heory and method: some suggestionsfrom the Old World.AmericanAnthropologist. 6:155-68.Kaplan, D. I963. Men, monuments, and political systems. Southwesternournal of Anthro-pology. 19:397-4I0.Kramer,S. N. I963. TheSumerians.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress.Kroeber,A. L. 1955.Natureof the land-holdinggroup.Ethnohistory.:303-14.Lloyd,P. C. 1965.The politicalstructureof Africankingdoms:an exploratorymodel. PoliticalSystemsand the Distributionof Power, A.S.A. Monographs 2:63-II2. London: TavistockPublications.Murdock,G. P. 1957. World ethnographicsample. AmericanAnthropologist. 9:664-87.Naroll, R. I956. A preliminary index of social development. American Anthropologist.58:687-715.Oberg, K. 1955. Types of social structureamong the lowland tribes of South and CentralAmerica.AmericanAnthropologist.7:472-87.Parsons,J. R. I971. PrehistoricSettlementPatterns n the TexcocoRegion,Mexico.Ann Arbor:Memoirs of the Museum of Anthropology,University of Michigan,no. 3.Renfrew,C. 1972. TheEmergencef Civilisation.London: Methuen.Renfrew, C. 1973. Wessex as a social question. Antiquity. 47:221-5.Sears,W. I968. The state and settlementpatterns n the New World. SettlementArchaeology,pp. 134-53 (ed. K. C. Chang).Palo Alto: NationalPress.Trigger, B. G. 1968. BeyondHistory.New York: Holt, Rinehart,and Winston.Trigger,B. G. I969. The Huron:Farmers f theNorth.New York:Holt, Rinehart,and Winston.Trigger, B. G. 1972. Determinants of urbangrowth in pre-industrialsocieties. Man, Settle-mentand Urbanism, p. 575-99 (eds P. J. Ucko, R. Tringhamand G. W. Dimbleby). London:Duckworth.Ucko, P. J. I969. Ethnographyand archaeological nterpretationof funeraryremains. WorldArchaeology. :262-80.Uphill, E. P. I970. The Per Aten at Amarna.Journalof Near EasternStudies.29:15 -66.


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1o6 Bruce Trigger

AbstractTrigger,B. G.The archaeology of governmentA broadrangeof dataconcerning political systems is embeddedin the archaeological ecord.The present survey is general in nature but suggests that demographic,cultural, societal,geographicaland iconographic approaches,especially when employed in combination, willfurther an understandingof the political organizationof text-free archaeologicalsocieties.This in turnoughtto facilitatethe use of archaeologicaldata for testing more general theoriesof cultural evolution.

46282842 trigger bruce 1974 the archaeology of goverment

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