41760 federal register /vol. 62, no. 148/friday, august 1, … · airlines (laa) office in...

41760 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 107 and 139

[Docket No. 28979; Notice No. 97-13]

RIN 2120–AD–46

Airport Security

AGENCY: Federal AviationAdministration (FAA), DOT.ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This notice proposes toamend the existing airport securityrules. It would revise certainapplicability provisions, definitions,and terms; reorganize these rules intosubparts containing relatedrequirements; and incorporate somerequirements already implemented inairport security programs. Thisproposed revision also wouldincorporate certain new measures thatwould provide for better security.Specifically, this proposal would moreclearly define the areas of the airport inwhich security interests are the mostcritical and where security measuresshould be the most stringent. It wouldmodify access control requirements byallowing secondary access media,modify escort procedures forindividuals without access authority,and expand the requirement for anidentification system to include achallenge system. Further, it wouldclarify the following: trainingrequirements for airport securitypersonnel; the role of the airportsecurity coordinator; procedures forairport operators to comply with FederalAviation Administration securitydirectives; procedures for responding toand evaluating threats; and the need toreview and test security contingencyplans. The intent of this proposal is toenhance security for the travelingpublic, air carriers, and personsemployed by or conducting business atpublic airports by increasing awarenessof and compliance with civil aviationsecurity measures.DATES: Comments must be submitted onor before December 1, 1997.ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposedrulemaking should be mailed ordelivered, in triplicate, to: FederalAviation Administration, Office of theChief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket(AGC–10), Room 915–G, Docket No.28979, 800 Independence Ave., SW.,Washington, DC 20591. Comments mayalso be sent electronically to thefollowing internet address: 9–NPRM–[email protected]. Comments may be

examined in Room 915–G between 8:30a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, exceptFederal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Office of Civil Aviation Security Policyand Planning, Civil Aviation SecurityDivision (ACP–100), Penny Anderson,Federal Aviation Administration, 800Independence Ave. SW., Washington,DC 20591; telephone (202) 267–3418.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited toparticipate in this rulemaking bysubmitting such written data, views, orarguments as they may desire.Comments relating to theenvironmental, energy, federalism, oreconomic impact that might result fromadopting the proposals in this documentare also invited. Substantive commentsshould be accompanied by costestimates. Comments should identifythe regulatory docket or notice numberand should be submitted in triplicate tothe Rules Docket (see ADDRESSES). Allcomments received, as well as a reportsummarizing each substantive publiccontact with FAA personnel on thisrulemaking, will be filed in the docket.The docket is available for publicinspection before and after the commentclosing date. All comments received onor before the closing date will beconsidered by the Administrator beforetaking action on this proposedrulemaking. Late-filed comments will beconsidered to the extent practicable.The proposals contained in thisdocument may be changed in light ofcomments received. Comments receivedon this proposal will be available, bothbefore and after the closing date forcomments in the Rules Dockets forexamination by interested persons.However, the Assistant Administratorfor Civil Aviation Security hasdetermined that the airport securityprograms required by part 107 containsensitive security information. As such,the availability of informationpertaining to airport security programsis governed by 14 CFR Part 191(Withholding Security Information fromDisclosure under the Air TransportationSecurity Act of 1974).

Comments wishing the FAA toacknowledge receipt of their commentmust include a self-addressed, stampedpostcard on which the followingstatement is made: ‘‘Comments toDocket No. 28979.’’ The postcard will bedate-stamped and mailed to thecommenter.

Availability of NPRM

Any person may obtain a copy of thisNPRM by submitting a request to theFederal Aviation Administration, Officeof Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800Independence Ave., SW., Washington,DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267–9677.Communications must identify thenotice number of this NPRM.

An electronic copy of this documentmay be downloaded using a modem andsuitable communications software fromthe FAA regulations section of theFedworld electronic bulletin boardservice (telephone: 703–321–3339) orthe Office of the Federal Register’selectronic bulletin board service(telephone: 202–512–1661). Internetusers may reach the FAA’s webpage athttp://www.faa.gov or the Office of theFederal Register’s webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/suldocs foraccess to recently published rulemakingdocuments. Persons interested in beingplaced on the mailing list for futureNPRM’s should request from the aboveoffice a copy of Advisory Circular No.11–2A, Notice of Proposed RulemakingDistribution System, which describesthe application procedure.

Background

This proposed rule was written beforethe tragic crash of TWA 800 on July 17,1996. That accident raised concernsabout the safety and security of civilaviation, leading the President to createthe White House Commission onAviation Safety and Security, headed bythe Vice President. The Commissionissued an initial report on September 9,1996, with 20 specific recommendationsfor improving security. On February 12,1997, the Commission issued its FinalReport with 57 recommendations, 31 ofwhich deal with improving security fortravelers. In addition, the FederalAviation Reauthorization Act of 1996(Pub. L. 104–264) was signed onOctober 9, 1996, and directs the FAA toamend rules to upgrade civil aviationsecurity.

The FAA is working to respond to therecommendations of the Commissionand to carry out the legislation, and hasissued several proposals. On March 11,1997, an Advance Notice of ProposedRulemaking on the certification ofscreening companies was issued (62 FR12724, March 17, 1997), and on March14, 1997, the FAA issued a Notice ofProposed Rulemaking on employmenthistory; verification and criminalrecords checks (62 FR 13262, March 19,1997).

The rules proposed in this noticewere not written in response to theCommission or the Reauthorization Act.

41761Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

1 Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1996, U.S.Department of Transportation, Federal AviationAdministration Office of Civil Aviation Security.

However, this notice, which proposes toupdate the overall regulatory structurefor airport and air carrier security, is theresult of a multi-year effort involvingthe FAA, airports and air carriers, andthe Aviation Security AdvisoryCommittee. The extensive proposedrevisions are considered to be consistentwith the intentions of the mandates,contain proposals that industry hasidentified as necessary or appropriate,and outline a new organization for theregulations that would assist indeveloping future changes to the rules.For these reasons, the FAA is publishingthis proposed rule for comment. TheFAA anticipates that any final rulebased on this proposal will incorporateresponses to these mandates.

Terrorist IncidentsIn response to a rise of hijacking

incidents, and to ensure the security ofairports serving scheduled air carriers,the Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) issued 14 Code of FederalRegulations (CFR) part 107 on March 18,1972. The rule required each airportoperator to implement prescribedsecurity measures by developing andobserving an airport-specific securityprogram. Part 107 has been amended onseveral occasions, but the rule has neverundergone a comprehensive update.

Since the inception of part 107, theprimary threat to civil aviation hasexpanded beyond hijacking to bombingof aircraft and murderous attacks withinairports. The following incidents areindicative of this evolution.

• December 27, 1985: Simultaneousattacks at two European airports againstthe general public in open terminalareas. At least 13 people were killed andapproximately 80 wounded at Rome’sLeonardo da Vinci International Airport;4 persons were killed andapproximately 45 wounded at Vienna’sSchwechat International Airport.

• September 5, 1986: Terrorist assaulton Pan American (Pan Am) Flight 73.Four terrorists assaulted Flight 73 inKarachi, Pakistan as the aircraft waitedto take off. The four terrorists weredressed similarly to airport securitypersonnel and drove a van resemblingan airport security vehicle alongside theaircraft. The terrorists stormed theaircraft and after 17 hours ornegotiations, the aircraft’s auxiliarypower unit failed. Anticipating an attackby security forces, the terrorists openedfire on the massed passengers, killing 22persons and injuring 125 others beforesecurity forces could intervene.

• September 14, 1986: The bombingof an international terminal building. Adevice detonated in a trash can locatedin front of the international terminal

building of the Kimpo InternationalAirport, Seoul, South Korea. Fivepersons were killed and 29 wereinjured.

• November 11, 1987: Explosivesdetonated in a passenger terminal.Explosives in baggage detonated,possibly prematurely, in the passengerterminal of the Beirut InternationalAirport, Beirut, Lebanon. Six personswere killed and 73 were injured. Noperson(s) claimed responsibility;however, the person carrying the bagwas killed.

• December 21, 1988: The bombing ofPan Am Flight 103. All 243 passengersand 16 crew on board, plus 11 personson the ground at Lockerbie, Scotland,were killed. Subsequent inspection ofthe reconstructed aircraft determinedthat a device consisting of plasticexplosives inside a tape cassette playerwas responsible for the destruction ofFlight 103. The device had beenconcealed in checked luggage.Individuals working for the Governmentof Libya are responsible for thebombing. One conspirator was theformer manager of the Libyan ArabAirlines (LAA) office in Valletta, Maltaand retained full access to the airport.Using this access privilege and otherknowledge gained as representatives ofLAA, the conspirators bypassed securitychecks at Valletta’s Luqa Airport andinserted the suitcase containing thebomb into baggage of an Air Malta flightto Frankfurt.

• August 26, 1992: Explosive deviceplaced in an international terminal. A20-pound explosive device was placedin the international terminal in theHouari Boumedienne InternationalAirport, Algiers, Algeria. Twelvepersons were killed and 126 wereinjured. Members of the IslamicSalvation Front were arrested. Theirintent was to disrupt foreigninvolvement in Algeria.

• November 3, 1994: Armedindividuals seized the airport. Armedmilitant Muslim activist seized theSaidu Sharif Airport in Pakistan’sNorthwest Frontier Province andbarricaded the runway. Pakistaniparamilitary forces attacked several dayslater. Five persons were killed and atleast 17 were injured.

• December 24, 1994: Hijacking andpossible intention to destroy Air Franceflight 8969. While on the ground atHouari Boumedienne InternationalAirport, Algeria, Air France Flight 8969was commandeered by four terroristsarmed with automatic weapons, handgrenades, and explosives. The fourgunmen wore what appeared to be AirAlgerie uniforms and displayed airportidentification. The hijackers killed three

people. French counterterrorism forcesstormed the aircraft at MarignaneAirport in Marseille, France; all fourhijackers were killed. Explosive werefound on the aircraft, leading tospeculation that the hijackers intendedto blow up the aircraft over Paris.

• July 22, 1996: A bomb detonated ina public area of a terminal building. Sixpersons were killed and an estimated 60others were injured when a bombexploded in the concourse outside ofthe departure/arrival lounges at theLahore International Airport, Lahore,Pakistan. The device, containingapproximately 3 kilograms ofexplosives, reportedly had been left ina briefcase and placed beneath a benchnear the domestic lounge. The explosionoccurred moments before the departureof PIA flight 715 for Karachi. There wereno immediate claims for the bombing.

Fifty-nine attacks have been recordedat airports throughout the world duringthe past 5 years. These attacks haveincluded 24 bombings; 15 attemptedbombings; and 20 shootings, shellings(such as mortar attacks), arsons, andsimilar incidents. At least 41 personshave been killed and more than 250injured in attacks at airports between1992 and 1996.1

Terrorism has been, for the most part,a phenomenon afflicting U.S. interestsoverseas, and the threat to U.S. civilaviation is assessed to be higher abroadthan it is domestically. The World TradeCenter bombing in February 1993,however, indicates that terrorism is alsoa very real threat in the United States,and may be on the rise.

Ramzi Ahmed Yousef has beenconvicted for the bombing ofPhilippines Airline flight 434(December 11, 1994) and for conspiringto bomb U.S.-flag aircraft. Authoritiesbelieve that Yousef and his co-conspirators acted on their ownvolition, in opposition to U.S. foreignpolicy in the Middle East, and that theywere assisted by local radicalsympathizers in the Philippines and theUnited States. The conspiracies areindicative of an emerging trend interrorism, characterized by terroristelements operating without traditionalorganizational structure or statesponsorship.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) characterizes such terrorists asseeking a ‘‘common political, social,economic, or personal objective whichtranscends nation-state boundaries.’’The U.S. Department of State,commenting on global terrorism trends


2 For further analysis of the terrorist threat, pleaserefer to the following public documents: Terrorismin the United States: 1994, U.S. Department ofJustice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995, U.S.Department of State, April 1996.

3 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996, U.S.Department of State, April 1997.

4 President’s Commission on Aviation Securityand Terrorism, Report to the President, May 15,1990.

5 DOT Office of Inspector General, Audit ofAirport Security, Federal Aviation Administration,Report No. RP–FA–3–105, September 20, 1993.

6 United States General Accounting Office, Reportto Congressional Committees, Aviation Security:Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic andInternational Changes, January 1994.

notes that ‘‘terrorism by extremistindividuals or groups claiming to act forreligious motives’’ continue to dominateinternational terrorism.2

The number of international terroristattacks against U.S. interests fellbetween 1995 and 1996, althoughincidents involving American targetsstill represented more than 24%of thetotal attacks worldwide in 1996.Domestically, the FBI asserts that theU.S. is not immune to internationalterrorism, describing the terrorist threatas ‘‘real and potentially lethal.’’ TheFAA views these developments as causefor concern.3

In addition, individual acts of revengeor criminality must be considered sincethe consequences of such acts can bejust as deadly. Following are threeexamples:

• December 7, 1987: Destruction ofPacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Flight1771. Flight 1771 crashed when arecently terminated airline employeeboarded the Los Angeles San Franciscoflight with a handgun, shot onepassenger (his former supervisor), theflightcrew, flight attendant, andpresumably himself. As a result, all 38passengers and five crew on board werekilled. The fired employee retained hisairline identification after his dismissaland used to bypass the passengerscreening checkpoint.

• August 14, 1990: Gunman gainedunauthorized access at WashingtonNational Airport. A man armed with a.38 caliber revolver entered the OgdenAllied Services garage at Washington,DC’s National Airport, and held severalemployees at gunpoint. He was a formeremployee at Ogden and had voluntarilyleft his job. He commandeered a fueltruck, forced an Ogden employee todrive onto the air operations area andfired several shots at a second Ogdenfuel truck, wounding two persons. Hewas in possession of 30 to 40 rounds ofammunition when he was arrested. Amolotov cocktail was recovered from thecommandeered fuel truck, and severalothers were found in the gunman’svehicle.

• May 7, 1995: Gunman exchangedfire with police at Minneapolis/St. PaulInternational Airport. A man armedwith a 7.62 mm Norinco SK5 assaultrifle attempted to enter a secured areathrough a door in the baggage claimarea. Unable to gain access, the gunman

fired several rounds, shattering panes ofplate glass, and then proceeded throughthe terminal firing his weapon. Thegunman then exited the terminal to apublic driveway, changed fire withresponding police officers and was shotthree times before being apprehended.Three persons were injured by flyingdebris, but non seriously. The weaponused appeared to have been altered tofire automatically and the gunman wasin possess of 90 rounds of ammunition.The gunman never gained access to thesterile or secured areas of the airport.

• October 13, 1995: A low-levelexplosive device destroyed anautomated facility serving La GuardiaInternational Airport. The facility, aLow Level Windshear Alert System(LLWAS), is locate din a remote areanear Flushing Airport, formerly ageneral aviation field. The LLWAS ishoused in a metal box on a utility poleand is surrounded by a perimeter fencethat was cut to gain entry. Even throughthe LLWAS was not fully functional forseveral days, air traffic to La Guardiawas not jeopardized. An arrest wasmade in this matter. Despite an anti-government leaflet found at the scene,no connection was found between theperson arrested and right-wing terroristorganizations.

Response to Terrorist Incidents

The incidents discussed above haveled to concerted efforts to strengthenaviation security around the world andparticularly security at U.S. airports.The FAA responded by issuingemergency amendments to airportsecurity programs, using part 107authority.

The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103resulted in numerous changes to civilaviation security. The PresidentialCommission on Aviation Security andTerrorism was critical of the domesticU.S. civil aviation security system forfailing to provide the proper level ofprotection for the traveling public andurged major reforms. Specifically, thecommission recommended that the‘‘FAA initiate immediately the planningand analysis necessary to phaseadditional security measures into thedomestic system over time.4 TheCommission’s report prompted theAviation Security Improvement Act of1990 (Public Law 101–604), enactedNovember 16, 1990.

The new law mandated many changesto airport and air carrier securityprograms, as well as Federal staffing andreporting procedures. Several

rulemakings were initiated to imposehiring standards for air crew andsecurity personnel, and trainingstandards and criminal history checksfor certain airport and air carrierpersonnel. The act also required theFAA to coordinate with the FBI toassess the domestic air transport system,develop security guidelines for airportdesign and construction, and expandthe security technology research anddevelopment program.

The proposed revisions to part 107also respond to two other Federalreports. In September 1993, the Office ofthe Inspector General (IG) of the U.S.Department of Transportation issued areport critical of certain aspects of theFAA’s oversight of airport securitysystems.5 In January 1994, the GeneralAccounting Office (GAO) issued a reportsuggesting further actions the FAAcould take to improve civil aviationsecurity.6

The IG report found significantdeficiencies in the effectiveness ofaccess control and challenge proceduresat five U.S. airports. The reportrecommended that airport and aircarrier implementation of proceduresfor access control and challenge bestrengthened, stressing that the FAAmust take steps to increase airport andair carrier employees’ awareness andresponsibility for those procedures.

In January of 1994, the FAAresponded to the report by meeting withrepresentatives of airports, air carriersand other airport tenants, and employeegroups/unions to discuss the IG’sfindings and to emphasize the need forimproved employee security awareness.Simultaneously, the FAA began focusedinspections at U.S. airports with thehighest volume and most complexsecurity operations. Slated to continueon a routine basis, these specialinspections targeted the securitymeasures that the IG found to be auniversal weakness—access control andchallenge procedures.

The response has been an industry-wide commitment to address theidentified weaknesses and improvecompliance. In particular, many airportsand air carriers have improved theirtraining programs and institutedprograms to provide individualincentives for compliance andescalating disciplinary action forinstances of non-compliance.Compliance at airports which have


instituted such programs has improvedmarkedly. The FAA proposes toimplement similar measures at otherpart 107 airports by clarifying andmodifying access control, identificationdisplay, and challenge requirements.

Separately, the GAO issued a reportentitled ‘‘Aviation Security—AdditionalActions Needed to Meet Domestic andInternational Challenges,’’ in responseto a Congressional inquiry on FAA’sefforts to implement the AviationSecurity Improvement Act of 1990. GAOfound that the FAA has taken importantsteps in response to the act and citedadditional actions that should be takento enhance the FAA’s security programsand initiatives. These actions include—(1) pilot-testing new procedures beforeimplementation, (2) strengtheninghuman factors research and itsapplication, (3) making systematicanalytical use of information that theFAA collects during air carrier andairport security inspections, and (4)providing airport security coordinatorswith security clearances, so that theycan be given classified informationregarding threats to civil aviation.

Similar to the IG report, the GAOreport highlighted the need for the FAAto increase industry employees’ overallawareness of security measures. Thereport concluded that the FA mustrefine security training and proceduresto increase personnel sensitivity tosecurity requirements. The FAA agreesthat complacency must be combated,and as previously noted, considersimproved employee training andincreased accountability to be anessential part of the solution.

Specific responses to issues raised inthe IG and GAO reports are discussedbelow in the ‘‘Section by SectionAnalysis.’’

The Role of the Aviation SecurityAdvisory Committee

The Department of Transportationand the FAA are convinced that theaviation industry and general publicshould have input into the developmentof future aviation security measures andissues. On April 3, 1989, the Secretaryof Transportation announced theformation of a national aviation securityadvisory committee under the provisionof the Federal Advisory Committee Act(Title 5 U.S. Code, Appendix II).

The Aviation Security AdvisoryCommittee (ASAC) was formed toexamine all areas of civil aviationsecurity and to ensure a higher degreeof safety for the traveling public byrecommending improvement of aviationsecurity equipment and procedures. TheASAC is chaired by the FAA’s AssistantAdministrator for Civil Aviation

Security and makes recommendations tothe FAA Administrator. Committeemembership represents a balance ofFederal government, aviation industry,and consumer advocacy groups,including:1. Air Courier Conference of America2. Air Line Pilots Association

International3. Air Transport Association of America4. Aircraft Owners and Pilots

Association5. Airport Law Enforcement Agencies

Network6. Airports Council International, Inc.7. Allied Pilots Association8. American Association of Airport

Executives9. Association of Flight Attendants10. Aviation Consumer Action Project11. Aviation Security Contractors

Association12. Cargo Airline Association13. Families of Pan Am 103 Lockerbie14. International Airline Passengers

Association15. National Air Carrier Association,

Inc.16. National Air Transportation

Association17. Regional Airline Association18. U.S. Department of Defense (Policy

Board on Federal Aviation)19. U.S. Department of Justice (Federal

Bureau of Investigation)20. U.S. Department of State21. U.S. Department of Transportation

(Office of Intelligence and Securityand Federal Aviation AdministrationTechnical Center)

22. U.S. Department of the Treasury(Customs Service, Immigration andNaturalization Service, and SecretService)

23. U.S. Postal Service24. Victims of PanAm Flight 103

All ASAC meetings are open to thepublic and are announced in theFederal Register. Meetings are typicallyheld three times a year. Members of thepublic are permitted to attend andappear before the committee, subject toreasonable limitations of space andtime.

The FAA invited the ASAC tocomment on the underlying issues andpotential solutions associated with therevision of parts 107 and 108. InDecember 1993, the FAA sought theASAC’s input on a ‘‘discussion paper’’that presented a broad scope of securityissues and concerns. A copy of thispaper is filed in the FAA public docketfor this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking(NPRM).

To address the issues raised in thediscussion paper, the ASAC formed twosubcommittees to develop

recommendations on airport and aircarrier security issues, respectively, andprovided the FAA formalrecommendations on March 15, 1994.Individual ASAC members alsoprovided comments on issues whentheir respective organizations differedfrom the position taken by thecommittee. The views of the ASAC andof individual committee members werethen forwarded to the FAA with anoverall recommendation that securityregulations should remain flexible andcontain only general securityperformance standards. Specificrecommendations are addressedindividually in the ‘‘Section-by-SectionAnalysis.’’

Discussion of the Proposed RuleThis proposed revision of part 107

would comprehensively update airportsecurity regulations to more efficientlyand effectively address terrorist andother criminal threats to civil aviation.This proposed action would incorporateboth procedures currently in airportsecurity programs and new securityprocedures, in a manner that is intendedto allow regulated entities andindividuals to understand theirresponsibilities more readily. When afinal rule has been adopted, the FAAwill update relevant advisory circularsand prepare a standard airport securityprogram that will contain specificsecurity measures that are consideredsensitive under part 191 and thereforecannot be included in the proposedrevision. Lastly, the proposed revisionwould incorporate certain newmeasures that would provide for bettersecurity. For example, the proposedrevisions make individuals directlyaccountable to the FAA for violatingcertain regulations and would requireairports to include in their securityprograms specific disciplinary actionand penalties to be taken withemployees or tenants that do notcomply with security requirements.Through these changes, the FAA hopesto create a more effective mixture ofindividual and corporate responsibilityfor complying with security regulations,particularly those relating to accesscontrols and challenge procedures.

Air carrier security programs requiredby part 108 also have been amendedextensively since 1985. The FAAproposes to revise part 108, whichgoverns aircraft operator security,concurrently with this part. Therulemakings will proceed in tandem. Allreferences to proposed part 108 in thispreamble are intended to refer to theconcurrently proposed revision of part108. Further, this proposal wouldmodify the airport emergency plan


required under 14 CFR part 139, thecertification and operations rules forland airports, to indicate that theevaluation of threats would be handledunder airport security programs.

The proposed revisions of part 107and part 108 represent a comprehensiveapproach toward upgrading the securityrequirements of the civil aviationsystem. The intent of these proposedrevisions is to foster consistency andstandardization throughout the nationalcivil aviation security program. Wherepossible, the revisions of part 107 andpart 108 propose nearly identicallanguage to enhance, clarify, or proposesecurity measures for implementationby both airport operators and aircarriers.

Changes to definitions in proposed§ 107.3 and § 108.3 are intended topromote a common understandingwithin the aviation community whenused in these respective regulations.Moreover, the proposed definitions forboth parts 107 and 108 take into accountthe need to clarify the division ofresponsibility between air carriers andairport operators for the implementationof aviation security measures.

Proposed § 107.7 and § 108.5 wouldclarify the authority of theAdministrator to conduct inspections ortests to determine air carrier compliancewith 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, and theregulations, and the airport operator’sand air carrier’s obligation to provideFAA Special Agents the necessaryaccess and identification medium toconduct inspections.

Both proposals include language, inproposed § 107.9 and § 108.7, thatwould prohibit persons from knowinglymaking false statements or entries onsecurity-related documentation.Proposed § 107.11 and § 108.9 containlanguage that would prohibit personsfrom interfering with or compromisingrequired security methods orprocedures. Further, new languageproposed in § 107.103(a) and § 108.103would require the inclusion of asecurity compliance program within anairport operator’s and air carrier’ssecurity program.

Proposed § 107.105 and § 108.105reflect similar procedural language forthe approval and amendment of securityprograms. Proposed § 107.209 and§ 108.223 would require the airportoperators and air carriers to establishaccountability standards foridentification media.

Finally, language is proposed in bothnotices to expand training requirementsto include personnel performingsecurity-related duties (proposed§ 107.211 and § 108.227), to incorporatesimilar sections for the implementation

of contingency plans (proposed§ 107.301 and § 108.307), and to requirecompliance with Security Directives(proposed § 107.303 and § 108.305).

Section-by-Section Analysis

In this notice, the FAA proposes torevise existing §§ 107.1 through 107.31.The FAA further proposes to addseveral new sections, some of whichaddress the security responsibilities ofpersons and the requirements forpersonnel identification systems.Individual airport security programswhich implement the requirements ofpart 107 would be subject to revision asa consequence of this rulemaking (seethe section below entitled‘‘Implementation Schedule’’).

Historically, part 107 has beenamended in increments with eachamendment being added to theregulation at the end of the part. TheFAA proposes to reorganize theregulation into specific subpartsidentified by subject matter. To do sowould require a change in the currentnumbering scheme. For example, allsections that specify security programcontent and approval process would belisted in proposed subpart B, entitled‘‘Security Program.’’ All sections whichdescribe the operational aspects ofsystems or procedures required in theapproved security program would belisted in proposed subpart C,‘‘Operations,’’ and so on.

This arrangement of the sections bysubpart is intended to make part 107‘‘user friendly’’ by allowing the readerto locate a particular section easily andto identify all requirements relevant toa specific subject readily. Arranging theregulation by subparts also would allowthe FAA to keep similar sectionstogether rather than to add serially tothe body of the regulation.

Throughout the proposed rule,references are made to 49 U.S.C.Subtitle VII. This statute is therecodification of FAA’s authority toprescribe aviation security regulationspreviously found in the FederalAviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. App.1301 et seq.

Subpart A—General

Section 107.1 Applicability

This notice proposes to extend theapplicability of existing § 107.1. Thisproposal would extend the applicabilityto employees, contractors, and otherindividuals who have significantsecurity responsibilities at an airportand whose actions could diminish theeffectiveness of those systems, methods,or procedures required by this part, byacts such as subverting an access control

system, divulging security-sensitiveinformation, or falsifying records.

Further, the FAA proposes to extendairport security requirements beyondairports serving scheduled passengeroperations. Instead, the proposedrequirements would apply to an airportregularly serving any air carrier requiredto have a security program under parts108 and 129. This is not intended,however, to imply that an airport whichonly serves an occasional single aircarrier flight is necessarily required toimplement an airport security program.Title 49 U.S.C. 44903 specifies that theFAA shall impose certain securityrequirements on airports ‘‘regularlyserving’’ air carrier operations.

This notice also proposes to moveexisting § 107.1(a)(3), which applies therequirements of this part to personsentering a sterile area, to part 108. Thischange would consolidate most securityrequirements applicable to the sterilearea in part 108, since the responsibilityfor ensuring the integrity of the sterilearea rests mainly with air carriers.

Part 107 currently refers to the‘‘Director of Civil Aviation Security’’ asthe official who oversees civil aviationsecurity operations and approves airportsecurity programs. Under internal FAAreorganization, the current title of thisposition is Associate Administrator forCivil Aviation Security; however, 49U.S.C. 44932 refers to this official as theAssistant Administrator for CivilAviation Security. Therefore, paragraph(b) of this section would use the title‘‘Assistant Administrator for CivilAviation Security.’’ The FAA intends toresolve this inconsistency beforeissuance of the final rule. In addition,paragraph (b) would clarify that theDeputy Assistant Administrator for CivilAviation Security, or any individualformally designated could act in thecapacity of the Assistant Administratorand the duties of this position could befurther delegated.

Section 107.3 DefinitionsThis proposed section would replace

existing § 107.3, Security program. Theprovisions of existing § 107.3 would beincorporated under proposed Subpart B,Airport Security Program. Thisproposed section also would revise thedefinitions contained under current§ 107.1, Applicability and definitions.The introductory text of this proposedsection would make the definitions inproposed part 108 apply to this part.

The term ‘‘air operations area’’ inexisting § 107.1 would be replaced bythe term ‘‘restricted operations area’’and its definition modified. Thedefinition ‘‘exclusive area’’ in existing§ 107.1 would be revised and grouped


with a newly defined ‘‘exclusive areaagreement.’’ This new definition wouldensure clarity of standards pertaining tosecurity agreements between theairports and air carriers or foreign aircarriers, and expand the applicability ofexclusive area agreements to include notonly air carrier leaseloads butindividual access points as well. Thedefinitions ‘‘escort’’ and ‘‘sterile area’’would remain essentially unchangedfrom existing § 107.1 The definition‘‘escort’’ would be revised to includereference to the proposed criticalsecurity area and restricted operationsarea; the definition ‘‘sterile area’’ wouldbe revised to clarify the responsibility toconduct inspections of persons andproperty.

The following definitions would beadded: Airport security program,Airport tenant, Airport tenant securityprogram, Assistant Administrator,Critical security area, Exclusive areaagreement, Restricted operations area,and Unescorted access authority.

The definitions ‘‘airport tenant’’ and‘‘airport tenant security program’’ wouldbe added to this section to clarifyproposed § 107.113 and to eliminateconfusion between airport tenantsecurity programs (which do not applyto air carriers and foreign air carriersthat have security programs) andexclusive area agreements (which onlyapply to air carriers and foreign aircarriers that have security programs).

This notice proposes two newsecurity area definitions. The definitionof ‘‘critical security area’’ is introducedfor the purposes of proposed § 107.201,Security of the Critical Security Area.The term ‘‘critical security area’’ wouldbe added to replace the term ‘‘securedarea’’ found in existing § 107.14. Thedefinition ‘‘restricted operations area’’would be added to replace the term ‘‘airoperations area’’ found in existing§§ 107.1 and 107.13. This definitionwould be added for the purposes ofproposed § 107.203, Security of theRestricted Operations Area. (See belowfor further discussion of these particularsections).

The description of the intendedparameters of ‘‘critical security area’’and ‘‘restricted operations areas’’ wouldbe purposely limited. Due to thedifferent physical layouts and tenantactivities, it is impossible to define withspecificity in this proposed rule theboundaries of the proposed criticalsecurity area and restricted operationsarea. As such, the proposed definitionsgive only general descriptions forcritical security area and a restrictedoperations area.

The term ‘‘unescorted accessauthority’’ would be defined in this

section to support access andidentification requirements of the newlyproposed critical security area andrestricted operations area. It would beincluded to ensure a clear distinctionbetween individuals that are authorizedaccess and those who are not.

Section 107.5 Airport SecurityCoordinator

Under this proposal, existing § 107.5entitled ‘‘Approval of security program’’would be incorporated into proposed$107.105 entitled ‘‘Approval andamendments,’’ under proposed SubpartB, Airport Security Program. Existing§ 107.29 entitled ‘‘Airport SecurityCoordinator’’ would be revised andrenumbered as new § 107.5 under newSubpart A, General.

As part of the employment standardsrulemaking [56 FR 41412; August 20,1991] adopted in response to theAviation Security Improvement Act, theFAA Administrator requires airportoperators to designate an official at eachairport as the airport securitycoordinator (ASC), to serve as the pointof contact with the FAA on securitymatters and to provide oversight to theairport’s security system. The ASCserves as the counterpart of the aircarrier’s ground security coordinatorrequired under part 108.

To promote standardization, thisproposed section would further definethe functions and responsibilities of theASC, including the designation ofalternate ASCs. Specifically, the ASCwould be responsible for immediatelyinitiating corrective action for eachinstance of noncompliance and forreviewing all security-related functionsfor compliance and effectiveness. Theproposal also would clarify that anindividual serving as an ASC mayperform other duties in addition tothose required by the FAA, and neednot serve full-time as the ASC.

Existing language specifies that theASC is the airport operator’s primaryFAA contact, charged with reviewing allsecurity-related functions forcompliance with this part and theairport security program. Nevertheless,the ASAC commented that the FAA hasnot applied this requirement as written,as the ASC is not treated as the FAA’sprimary contact. Proposed language isintended to clarify the relationshipbetween the FAA and the ASC.

The FAA also proposes to requiretraining for the ASC every 2 years. Thistraining is intended to ensure that ASCsand their alternates remain updated onboth airport and air carrier securityregulatory and operationalrequirements. The ASAC opposedinclusion in the rule of any ASC

training requirements as well as adescription of the ASC’s job duties andresponsibilities. The committee didnote, however, that, if training isrequired, credit should be given for theASC’s previous experience.

The FAA therefore requests commentson methods airport operators would useto meet this training requirement. Forexample, should the FAA require insecurity programs specific training as itdoes for air carrier ground securitycoordinators? Should the training beperformed once or should it berecurrent? Should the FAA developspecific guidance or a curriculum forsuch a training program? How shouldexperience be factored into the trainingrequirement? Should existing ASCs be‘‘grandfathered’’ under the trainingrequirement?

The FAA also proposes moving to thissection certain provisions of existing§ 107.31 recently effective [60 FR 51854;October 3, 1995] regarding the ASCresponsibility to review and controlresults of access investigations and toserve as the contact for individualsappealing their results. This change isintended to ensure that all ASCresponsibilities are located in the samesection of the rule.

Section 107.7 Inspection AuthorityUnder this proposal, existing § 107.7

entitled ‘‘Changed conditions affectingsecurity’’ would be moved to proposedSubpart, B § 107.107. Existing § 107.27entitled ‘‘Evidence of compliance’’would be given a new title, ‘‘Inspectionauthority,’’ and revised and renumberedas new § 107.7 under new Subpart A,General. This proposed section wouldcombine the evidence of compliancerequirements of existing § 107.27 withthe FAA’s statutory authority to conductinspections, investigations, and tests.

Paragraph (a) proposes to state theAdministrator’s authority to conductinspections and investigations necessaryto determine compliance with part 107and the security program. The authorityfor the FAA to conduct inspectionsnecessary to gauge compliance withFederally-mandated securityrequirements has, on occasion, beenchallenged by airport operators. Thenew language would resolve anymisunderstanding regarding the FAA’sauthority to conduct such inspectionsunder 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII.

Proposed paragraph (b) would restatethe language of existing § 107.27.Proposed paragraph (c) would clarifythe airport operator’s obligation toprovide FAA Special Agents thenecessary access and identificationmedia to conduct inspections. Thisproposed requirement would not be


extended in the rule to any FAAemployee other than Special Agents.Special Agents are those FAAemployees who are authorized toconduct inspections of airport and aircarrier security operations and whomust possess and present valid FAA-issued credentials. There are someinspections and investigations that aSpecial Agent can accomplish only withunescorted access to the critical securityarea and restricted operations area, andit is essential that they be able toaccomplish these tasks. The FAA willprovide criteria for ascertaining thevalidity of Special Agents’ credentials innon-regulatory guidance materials.

The inclusion of paragraph (c) isintended to facilitate FAA SpecialAgents conducting inspections,investigations, tests, and other dutieswithout being hampered. It is notintended to allow FAA Special Agentsto have access to the entire airport, onlyto those portions necessary to conducttheir duties. Nor is the FAA proposingto require airport operators to giveaccess and identification media to allFAA inspectors. However, as mentionedin the discussion of § 107.209 (d) below,airports may be required to accept FAAform 8000–39 as a valid identificationmedia.

Section 107.9 FalsificationUnder this proposal, existing § 107.9

entitled ‘‘Amendment of securityprogram by airport operator’’ would bemoved to proposed Subpart B under§ 107.105 and retitled ‘‘Approval andamendments.’’ Proposed § 107.9 wouldbe new, retitled ‘‘Falsification,’’ andwould be included under proposedSubpart A, General. This section is thesame as the current § 107.2 adopted onNovember 17, 1996 (61 FR 64242(December 3, 1996).

Section 107.11 SecurityResponsibilities of Persons

Under this proposal, existing § 107.11entitled ‘‘Amendment of securityprogram by FAA’’ would be moved toproposed Subpart B under § 107.105‘‘Approval and amendments.’’ Proposed§ 107.11, retitled ‘‘Securityresponsibilities of persons,’’ would beincluded under Subpart A, General, andwould be completely new.

The FAA believes that thecontribution of individuals to thesuccess of the civil aviation systemcannot be overestimated and that theregulations must address theresponsibility of individuals who workwithin the security system. Therefore,the FAA is proposing to prohibitpersons from tampering, compromising,or modifying any security system, or

carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon,explosive, or destructive substance intosterile areas, critical security areas, orrestricted operations areas. Although theairport operator is primarily responsiblefor carrying out statutory and regulatorysecurity responsibilities under this part,the FAA believes that it is critical thatpersons employed directly by theairport operator understand theimportance of their responsibilities toensure that security measures within thecivil aviation system are properlyimplemented. It is also important thatother persons who may have an impacton aviation security understand theirresponsibilities.

This section proposes specificrequirements to make personsaccountable for complying withregulatory prohibitions againstinterfering with or compromisingsecurity methods or procedures requiredunder this part. Moreover, by includingthese prohibitions in the regulation, thisproposed section would permit the useof civil penalty action as a means to gaincompliance under this part by personswho are employed by the airportoperator and other persons not underthe direct authority of the airportoperator (such as trespassers).

While there are some instances inwhich enforcement action againstpersons may be taken by the FAA, inmany cases enforcement action wouldnot be appropriate or necessary. TheFAA intends, in proposed § 107.103, torequire the airport operator to include inits security program procedures toensure that persons with unescortedaccess to critical security areas orrestricted operations areas will complywith the requirements of this section.Many airports already have suchprograms in place and have establishedpenalties, such as monetary fines andrevocation of access authorization. Theairport operator would remain theprimary party responsible for violations,including those committed by theiremployees and contractors. However, inappropriate cases, persons who fail tocomply would be subject to FAAenforcement action, such as a civilpenalty of up to $1,000 per violation ofthese rules.

The term ‘‘person,’’ used throughoutthis new section and the proposed rule,is used as defined in 14 CFR Part 1,under § 1.1, General Definitions, whichdefines person to mean an individual,firm, partnership, corporation,company, association, joint-stockassociation, or governmental entity, andincludes a trustee, receiver, assignee, orsimilar representative of any of them.

Proposed paragraph (a) of this newsection would prohibit tampering or

interfering with an airport’s securitysystem, including circumventing accesscontrol systems and misusingidentification media. This proposedparagraph is intended to provide adeterrent which, in turn, would promotethe effectiveness of the security controlmeasures required by this part.

For instance, many airports haveinvested in personnel identificationsystems as a means of satisfying therequirement to control movement underexisting § 107.13 (proposed § 107.203).This proposal would require the use ofpersonnel identification systems in bothcritical security areas and restrictedoperations areas and would set forthminimum standards for personnelidentification systems. Establishingsanctions for not complying withpersonnel identification media displayrequirements would significantlypromote the effectiveness of personnelidentification systems.

Further, this section would prohibitpersons from compromising, orrendering less effective, any systemimplemented in response to the variousrequirements of this part. Thisprohibition includes similar languagefound in existing § 107.25(f) thatprohibits the use of an airport-approvedidentification by any person unless it isissued to that person. However, theproposed language would expand theprohibition to encompass any type ofintentional misuse, such as tampering,compromise, or modification, ofsecurity systems or the unauthorizedcircumvention of these systems. Suchacts would include writing on walls ordoors combination lock numbers thatprovide access to critical security areasor restricted operations areas,temporarily or permanently disablingelectronic access systems, and loaningof access or identification media whichwould provide access to, or movementwithin, security-sensitive areas of anairport without authorization.

Under part 108, the responsibilityrests with the air carrier for ensuringthat unauthorized items which may beharmful to civil aviation or to thetraveling public do not get into thesterile area. The FAA, accordingly,believes that the current prohibitionfound in existing § 107.21(a) against theintroduction of a deadly or dangerousweapon, explosive, or incendiary intosterile areas is more appropriatelylocated in part 108. The FAA proposestransferring the existing prohibitionfound in § 107.21(a) to proposed part108.

The risk to the traveling publicpresented by the presence of a deadly ordangerous weapon, explosive, orincendiary, or destructive substance


should not be underestimated.Paragraph (b) of this section, asproposed, has been drafted to prohibitthe unauthorized possession of suchweapons or other dangerous items insterile areas, critical security areas, andrestricted operations areas. The currentrules refer to the carriage of ‘‘explosive,incendiary, or deadly or dangerousweapons’’ in various places, includingexisting § 107.21 and § 108.9. Thestatute, however, refers to searchingpersons and property for the presence ofa ‘‘dangerous weapon, explosive, orother destructive substance.’’ (See 49U.S.C. 44902) In order to make moreclear what items the air carriers searchfor and what items are controlled invarious areas secured for the purposesof part 107, the FAA proposes to referthroughout the revised part to ‘‘deadlyor dangerous weapon, explosive,incendiary, or other destructivesubstance.’’ This change is proposed inparagraph (b) of this section as well asproposed § 107.101(a)(1),§ 107.219(c)(1), and § 107.219(c)(4)(ii).The FAA also will provide guidance ondestructive substances.

This section is also intended toprohibit persons from conductingunauthorized ‘‘tests’’ of airport securitysystems by compromising orcircumventing any element of thesystem. However, proposed paragraph(c), would allow for individualsauthorized by the Federal government,airport operator, and air carrier toconduct tests and inspections ofsecurity systems.

Provisions regarding the carriage offirearms by law enforcement officersand other authorized personnel found inexisting § 107.21(b) would be includedin proposed paragraph (d). Paragraph (d)proposes that provisions of this sectionthat apply to firearms and weaponswould not be applicable to lawenforcement personnel, Federal AirMarshals, and certain individualsauthorized in an airport securityprogram to carry a weapon. Thisparagraph would further exemptpersons properly transporting declaredfirearms under proposed § 108.213 orhazardous materials under 49 CFR part175 from firearms and weaponsprohibitions. Proposed paragraph (d)(7)also would exclude from theseprohibitions weapons and firearmslegally carried aboard non-air-carrieraircraft, such as general aviation pilotsoperating personal aircraft andtransporting firearms in compliancewith state and local laws.

The concept of requiring persons to beresponsible for complying with securitymeasures was generally supported bythe ASAC, particularly the airport

operator representatives. Two ASACmembers, the Air Line PilotsAssociation and the National AirTransport Association, however,expressed reservations about thefeasibility of enforcing such arequirement and suggested that securityresources could be better usedelsewhere to achieve the same results.By promoting awareness of securityresponsibilities, this proposal alsowould address the concerns raised bythe DOT Inspector General aboutemployee awareness of, and compliancewith, access control and challengeprocedures. Further, this proposedsection parallels efforts to require thatpersons be accountable for their actionsrelated to the dissemination of sensitivesecurity information [Sensitive SecurityInformation, final rule published 62 FR13736, March 21, 1997].

Other federal regulations and statutesmay also contain applicable securityand safety responsibilities of persons,including the following: proposed§ 107.207, Access investigation;proposed § 108.201 Screening ofpersons and property and acceptance ofcargo; proposed § 108.213 of this part,Carriage of weapons; Part 191 of thischapter, Protection of Sensitive SecurityInformation; 49 CFR part 175,Transportation of hazardous materials;49 U.S.C. 46302, regarding falseinformation involving aircraft piracy,interference with flight crew members,carrying a weapon, and other criminallaws; and 49 U.S.C. 46303, regardingcarriage of a weapon.

Subpart B—Airport Security Program

Section 107.101 Requirements

While part 107 is a public documentand sets forth broad airport securityrequirements, the security-sensitivedetails of how an airport meets theserequirements are contained separatelyin the airport’s FAA-approved, non-public security program. The FAAintends to continue to use this methodand proposes a new security programrequirements section, § 107.101. Thisproposed section would be includedunder proposed Subpart B which wouldincorporate all sections relating toairport security programs. Theprovisions of existing § 107.3(a) wouldbe stated in this proposed section. TheFAA believes that this minor changewill help the reader comprehend theoverall purpose and format of an airportsecurity program.

This new section would incorporatesimilar provisions of the existingregulation that require the airportsecurity program to be in writing, andthat a copy be kept at the airport

operations office. The program’sobjective has been modified to includeprotection against the introduction of adeadly or dangerous weapon, explosive,incendiary, or other destructivesubstances onto aircraft. Also, thereference to the Director of CivilAviation Security would be updated toAssistant Administrator and reference topart 191 prohibitions on the distributionand disclosure of sensitive securityinformation would be included.

The FAA is developing a StandardAirport Security Program (SASP) to aidairport operators in developing andrevising their security programs.Drafting of the model program is beingcoordinated with the revision of part107 and it is scheduled to be availableshortly after the publication of the finalrule of part 107. Additionally, the FAAis revising security advisory circulars toensure that they reflect any changes topart 107 resulting from this rulemaking;the circulars are intended to be availablereferences for the development andrevision of airport security programs.

Section 107.103 Content

This proposed section would be newand would be added to proposedSubpart B, Airport Security Program. Itwould describe the required content ofairport security programs. Basically, itwould revise the provisions of existing§ 107.3.

Existing § 107.3 defines the type of aircarrier operation that requires a specificairport security program. Currently, thetype of security program an airportoperator must implement is expressedin terms of the type of aircraftoperations. The proposed revisionwould express the applicability in termsof aircraft operations regulated underproposed § 108.101. Proposed § 108.101,Security program: Adoption andImplementation, requires each aircarrier to adopt and carry out a securityprogram as it applies to the type ofoperations conducted. This change isintended to promote consistency andinterdependency between parts 107 and108.

The FAA designs security regulationsto provide varying levels of protectionbased upon the size, type, andfrequency of aircraft operations.Security provisions, therefore, are moredemanding at airports where air carriersutilize large transport airplanes with 60seats or more, and have scheduleddepartures and arrivals. The numberand nature of crimes against civilaviation since 1972 validates theconnection between the requirement foran airport security program and the typeof aircraft serving a given airport.


Experience shows that airport servedonly by smaller aircraft need not complywith all requirements appropriate forairports served by larger aircraft. Thisapproach currently allows smallerairports to implement security measuresin a more economical manner. The FAAbelieves that this has provided anacceptable level of security at suchfacilities and proposes to continue thisapproach to airport operator securityprograms.

The proposed rule continues tospecify three different security programsvarying in complexity, but the proposedpart 108 would modify the type ofpassenger operations that woulddetermine the program required. Themost comprehensive security programwould continue to be applicable toairports serviced by scheduledpassenger operations with aircraft ofmore than 60 seats.

The type of passenger operations thattrigger the two remaining types ofairport security programs have beenexpanded somewhat, as the result ofproposed changes to part 108, to ensurecomplete protection of the sterile areaand to ensure security of all passengers,even those enplaned by private chartersand on helicopters (discussed below).

As proposed, airports that servescheduled passenger or public charterpassenger operations with aircrafthaving a passenger seating configurationof more than 60 seats would continue tohave in their security programdescriptions of the following:

1. Areas to be secured and thoseadjacent to the airport that would affectsecurity;

2. Procedures to control access toareas to be secured;

3. Exclusive areas and the procedureseach air carrier must use to notify theairport operator when that air carriercannot adequately control access;

4. Law enforcement support andtraining;

5. System for maintaining records;and

6. Alternate security procedures to beused in emergencies and other unusualconditions.

Proposed § 107.103(a) also would addnew requirements to require suchairports to include in their securityprogram a description of the following:

1. Airport security coordinator’sduties, means of contact, training andidentification;

2. Security compliance program;3. Critical security area boundaries,

activities, entities and signs, as well asprocedures, facilities, and equipmentused to perform the control functions;

4. Restricted operations areaboundaries, activities, entities and signs,

as well as procedures, facilities, andequipment used to perform the controlfunctions;

5. Sterile area boundaries andprocedures, facilities and equipmentused to control access, other than thepassenger screening checkpoint;

6. Personnel background checkprocedures;

7. Personnel and vehicleidentification systems;

8. Escort and challenge procedures;9. Employee and tenant training

programs;10. Schedule for submitting records;11. Procedures, facilities, and

equipment supporting air carrierpassenger screening operations,including law enforcement support;

12. Procedures, facilities, andequipment supporting the contingencyplan;

13. Procedures for handling SecurityDirectives, Information Circulars, andclassified information, as appropriate;

14. Procedures for public advisories;15. Incident management procedures;

and16. Each airport tenant security

agreement, including a description ofthe area and procedures, facilities, andequipment used to perform the controlfunctions, and methods by which theairport operator will monitor and auditthe tenant.

A second level of standards,contained in proposed § 107.103(b),would be required for airport operatorsserving air carrier operations describedin proposed § 108.101 (a)(2) and (a)(3)and existing § 129.25 (b)(2) and (b)(3).Existing § 107.3(g) requires an airportoperator to have a security program ifserved by scheduled passenger or publiccharter operations where passengers areenplaned from, or deplaned into, asterile area. Proposed § 107.103(b)would still require an airport servingthese type of air carrier operations tohave an airport security program but, byreferencing proposed § 108.101 (a)(2)and (a)(3), these operations would beexpanded to also cover public charteroperations using aircraft with less than61 seats and any private charteroperations when passengers areenplaned from, or deplaned into, asterile area.

For such airports, the minimum lawenforcement standards would remainessentially the same; however,requirements for an airport securitycoordinator, as well as theestablishment of contingency plans andincident response procedures, areproposed. As these additions typicallyare procedural in nature, the FAAbelieves that the inclusion of suchrequirements would not unduly burden

airports with such limited operations.Instead, this enhancement wouldpromote better compliance andemergency preparedness by ensuringbetter coordination and disseminationof security-related information, andresponse to threats to civil aviation.

Specifically, this notice proposes thatan airport operator serving air carrieroperations specified in proposed§ 108.101 (a)(2) and (a)(3) and existing§ 129.25 (b)(2) and (b)(3) wouldcontinue to have in their securityprogram the descriptions of lawenforcement support and training, thedescriptions of a system for maintainingrecords, and also the identity and meansto contact the airport securitycoordinator.

Proposed § 107.103(b) also wouldrequire such airports to include in theirsecurity program a description of thefollowing:

1. Airport security coordinator dutiesand training;

2. Schedule for submitting records;3. Procedures, facilities, and

equipment supporting the contingencyplan;


5. Procedures for public advisories;and

6. Incident management procedures.The third and final level in proposed

§ 107.103(c) is intended for airportsserved by air carriers required to havea security program under proposed§ 108.101(a)(4) and existing§ 129.25(b)(4). Similar to existing§ 107.3(f), an airport security programwould be required if the airport isserved by air carriers that havescheduled passenger operations in anaircraft with a passenger seatingconfiguration of more than 30 but lessthan 61 seats. Proposed § 108.101(a)(4),however, would expand theapplicability to public charteroperations as well as private charteroperations using aircraft with more than30 seats and any type of internationaloperation using an aircraft of less than61 seats to and from the United States.Such air carriers would not be requiredto implement all security measures at alltimes. They would implement portionsof their security program only whendirected by the Administrator to do so.

Similar to the second level of airportsecurity program requirements, the FAAproposes to expand programrequirements for this third category ofairports to include establishingprocedures for incident response andpublic advisories. Again, the FAA viewsthese additions as procedural and notunduly burdensome, and believes they


would promote a higher level ofemergency preparedness.

Specifically, this notice proposes thatan airport operator serving air carrieroperations specified in proposed§ 108.101(a)(4) and existing§ 129.25(b)(4) would continue to have intheir security program the descriptionsof law enforcement support availability

and training, the descriptions of asystem for maintaining records, and alsothe identity and means to contact theairport security coordinator. Proposed§ 107.103(c) also would require suchairports to include in their securityprogram a description of the following:

1. Airport security coordinator dutiesand training;

2. A schedule for submitting records;


4. Procedures for public advisories;5. Incident management procedures.The following chart compares security

program requirements between airportsserved by different levels of air carrieroperations:

Proposed requirement

Airport served by

Scheduledoperationsand public

charter > 60seats

Other schd.operationsand public/

privatecharter re-quired toscreen

Any oper-ations notrequired toscreen < 61

seats

Airport Security Coordinator (proposed § 107.5) ..................................................................................... X X XSecurity Compliance Program (proposed § 107.103(a)(2)) ..................................................................... XAlternate Security Procedures (proposed § 107.103(a)(19)) ................................................................... XCritical Security Area (proposed § 107.201) ............................................................................................ XRestricted Operations Area (proposed § 107.203) .................................................................................. XAccess Controls (proposed § 107.203(b)(1) and § 107.205) ................................................................... XSigns (proposed § 107.201(b)(7) and § 107.203(b)(7)) ............................................................................ XPersonnel Background Check Procedures (proposed § 107.203(b)(2) and § 107.207) .......................... XPersonnel/Vehicle Identification Systems (proposed § 107.209) ............................................................. XEscort Procedures (proposed § 107.205(d)) ............................................................................................ XChallenge Procedures (proposed § 107.209(f)) ....................................................................................... XTraining Programs (proposed § 107.211) ................................................................................................ XLaw Enforcement (proposed § 107.213, § 107.215 and § 107.217) ........................................................ X X XRecords (proposed § 107.219) ................................................................................................................. X X XContingency Plan (proposed § 107.301) .................................................................................................. X XSecurity Directives/Information Circulars (proposed § 107.303) .............................................................. X X XPublic Advisories (proposed § 107.305) ................................................................................................... X X XIncident Management and Notification Procedures (proposed § 107.307) .............................................. X X X

Section 107.105 Approval andAmendments

To facilitate the amendment process,this notice proposes that existing§§ 107.5, 107.9, and 107.11 be combinedinto a single section, proposed§ 107.105, and revised to make theprocess consistent in both parts 107 and108. Several changes are proposed to theamendment process itself. Proposed§ 108.105 prescribes the same approvaland amendment procedures.

Throughout this new proposedsection, any references to the ‘‘Directorof Civil Aviation Security’’ are replacedwith ‘‘Assistant Administrator.’’ Petitiondeadlines also have been included forairport operators. Specifically,paragraph (a)(2) proposes that airportoperators submit to the Administrator apetition for reconsideration within 30days after receiving the notice tomodify. Paragraphs (d) and (e) ofexisting § 107.5 have been combinedinto proposed § 107.105(a)(3) whichprovide for the Administrator to disposeof any petition within 30 days ofreceipt. The FAA also specifies, inparagraph (a)(2), that the filing of apetition stays the notice to modify

pending a decision by theAdministrator. Such timeframes areintended to promote timely and efficientaction by both the airport operator andthe FAA.

Paragraph (b) of this new sectionwould prescribe procedures for anairport operator to request anamendment to its airport securityprogram now covered under existing§ 107.9. Currently § 107.9 states that anairport operator requesting approval of aproposed amendment to its programmust submit the request 30 days priorto the effective date of the amendment.The FAA proposes to increase thenumber of days prior to the effectivedate that the airport must submit itsproposed amendment from 30 to 45days. The proposed rule also notes thatthe amendment process may take longerthan 45 days if the proposedamendment is modified or denied.These languages changes are intended toallow extra time for discussion with theFAA and assist airport operators inplanning for program changes.

Existing § 107.9 also states that theFAA will respond to an amendmentproposed by the airport operator within15 days. The proposal extends this time

period to provide the FAA with a morerealistic period in which to conduct acomprehensive review of the proposedamendment to an airport securityprogram. Under this proposal, the FAAwould have 30 days after receipt forapproval or denial of the proposedamendment.

In proposed paragraph (b)(4) of thisnew section, the FAA proposes tomodify existing § 107.9(d) to limit thetime that an airport operator maypetition the Administrator to reconsiderthe denial to 30 days. Similar toproposed paragraph (a), thisrequirement is intended to ensure thatthe airport operator takes prompt actionon a petition and permits adequate timeto exchange relevant information andsupport documentation.

Retention of the FAA’s existingprocedures to amend an airport securityprogram is proposed in paragraphs (c)and (d). Two significant changes,however, are being proposed to theexisting procedures of § 107.11: (1) Anew requirement for airport operators tosubmit petitions for reconsideration nolater than 15 days before the effectivedate of the amendment, and (2) aclarification that a petition for


reconsideration stays the effective dateof the amendment. These changes alsoare proposed to ensure a timely andefficient exchange of information.

The ASAC recommended that anyamendment issued by the FAA to anairport security program include anexpiration date. The committee wasconcerned that the FAA may use theamendment process to circumvent therulemaking process and suggested thatthe FAA be required to initiate a formalrulemaking if it wished the provisionsof the amendment to continue after theexpiration date.

When there is information that cannotbe discussed in a public forum,amendment of the security programprovides a means to impose andimplement a new requirement. The FAAdoes not believe it would be in the bestinterest of the traveling public to requirea rulemaking for every amendment to anairport security program, but willestablish internal procedures toperiodically review amendments toensure that their inclusion in thesecurity program, rather than part 107,is appropriate.

Section 107.107 Changed ConditionsAffecting Security

This proposed section would be newand would include changed conditionsthat currently require the airportoperator to take corrective action underexisting § 107.7. It would expand thescope of the requirement to encompassall the elements of the security program.The FAA believes that every element ofa security program plays an essentialpart in the overall integrity of anairport’s security system. Therefore, theFAA intends to expand those conditionsthat must be reported to ensure that anychanges that may impact security willbe reported to the FAA and addressedas soon as possible.

The proposed rule language reflectsthe need for the airport operator toreport any changes in the physicallayout of the airport terminal area thatmay have an impact on the checkpointscreening operation for which an aircarrier is responsible. Similarly, thissection proposes to require the airportoperator to report any changes in aircarrier and foreign air carrier aircraftoperations that could lead to aregulatory requirement, such as achange to an air carrier’s level ofservice, aircraft, or leasehold.

The proposal, like the existingregulation, would establish proceduresfor the airport operator to follow whena changed condition occurs. Currently,it is necessary for the airport operator tofollow routine amendment proceduresset forth in § 107.9 (proposed § 107.107)

when specific elements of the airportsecurity program change. Theseprocedures would be augmented underthis proposal to require the airportoperator to initially notify the FAAwithin 2 hours, or within an approvedtimeframe, of the discovery of anychanged condition that could affect howan airport complies with regulatoryrequirements. The availability ofelectronic communication, overnightdelivery services, and local FAA fieldoffices would seemingly provide themeans for the airport operator to readilycommunicate changes to the FAA.While the proposed language providesflexibility in notification time,comments are requested, however, onthe feasibility of a 2-hour notificationrequirement.

This proposed section would requirethe airport operator during this initialnotification to obtain verbal approval ofany interim measures to be taken tomaintain adequate security. As iscurrently the case, this proposed sectionwould still allow the FAA to issue anemergency security programamendment under proposed§ 107.105(d) if an agreement onadequate interim measures cannot bereached. However, new languageprovides relief in responding to short-term changes.

After this initial notification,paragraphs (c) and (d) propose that theairport operator follow certainprocedures to amend its securityprogram to reflect the change. Forchanged conditions under 60 days’duration, paragraph (c) proposes thatthe airport operator be relieved from theamendment process required underproposed § 107.105 and only berequired to provide written notificationwithin 72 hours for FAA approval.Recognizing that many changedconditions affecting security can bereadily resolved in less time than itwould take to complete the formalamendment process, the FAA intendsthis change to provide some relief inreporting to the FAA any short-term ortemporary changes while ensuring thatthe FAA retains oversight of temporaryor short-term changed conditions tosecurity.

Proposed paragraph (d) of this sectionwould provide procedures for thedisposition of changed conditionsanticipated to be over 60 days induration. These procedures arecurrently used for all instances of achanged condition affecting security.

Section 107.109 Alternative Means ofCompliance

This proposed section is new. Itwould be added to provide relief in

certain unique circumstances from thefull requirements of an airport securityprogram.

Specifically, it would provide relieffor small airports located incommunities that are only served byseasonal air carrier or foreign air carriertraffic (such as ski resorts), remotelylocated, subject to extremeenvironmental conditions, or havelimited facilities and few employees.Often these airports serve aircraft largerthan 60 seats for only a portion of theyear, or on an infrequent but regularbasis (e.g. one operation per day, threeoperations per week, winter operationsonly). However, under the definition ofproposed § 107.103(a), such airportswould be required to have acomprehensive security program. Thissection would permit the FAA toapprove airport operators of suchairports to use alternative means tocomply with the requirements of therule

While air carrier or foreign air carrieroperations with aircraft having morethan 60 seats necessitate more complexsecurity measures, the FAA recognizesthat requiring such airports toimplement security measures at thesame level of intensity as larger airportswould not always be necessary toachieve the required level of security.Currently, the Assistant Administratorcan allow for flexibility in applyingsecurity measures at such airports, andthe FAA proposes to incorporate thisprocess in proposed part 107. Topetition for relief from part 107requirements, larger airport operatorswould still have to use the exemptionprocess under existing § 11.25, Petitionsfor rule making or exemptions.

Section 107.111 Exclusive AreaAgreements

The FAA proposes a new sectiondevoted to exclusive area agreements.Existing part 107 includes exclusivearea agreements as a provision of§ 107.3(b)(3) and (b)(5) and § 107.13,Security of air operations area. Asexclusive area agreements are a part ofan airport operator’s security programand detail part 107 responsibilitiesassumed by air carriers, the FAAbelieves that the requirements forexclusive areas should be more closelytied to the airport security program andaddressed in a separate section.

Paragraph (a) proposes expanding theexisting exclusive area responsibilitiesfor air carriers and foreign air carriers toinclude individual access points (e.g.,doors). The security responsibilities forthese points may be assumed by a part108 air carrier or part 129 foreign aircarrier based on an agreement with the


airport operator. This section alsoproposes updating the terminology ofthe areas in which exclusive areaagreements are applied from the airoperations area to the proposed criticalsecurity areas and restricted operationsareas.

In 1992, the FAA initiated a testprogram to allow several all-cargocarriers to enter into exclusive areaagreements with airports by which theyassumed the responsibility for control ofaccess to and movement within theirleaseholds. The requirements of part108 do not apply to all-cargo carriers.The test program has been successfuland the FAA proposes to allow all-cargocarriers which have voluntarilyimplemented security programs underpart 108 enter into exclusive areaagreements with airport operators.

Section 107.113 Aiport TenantSecurity Programs

This new section proposes to permitthe use of airport tenant securityprograms that allow airport tenantsother than air carriers or foreign aircarriers to assume some of an airportoperator’s security responsibilities, asspecified in 49 U.S.C. 44903(c)(2).

While statutory language does notrequire the FAA to approve airporttenant security programs, the FAAbelieves the judicious use of suchprograms would result in bettercompliance by more directly involvingairport tenants in the implementation ofsecurity measures. The FAA isconcerned, however, that under anairport tenant security agreement,security violations and the associatedmonetary penalties could be viewed asa justifiable cost of doing business. Inorder to counter that possibility, theproposal would require the airporttenant security program to specify notonly the enforcement steps, but also thepoint at which the airport tenantsecurity program would be terminated ifthe tenant continued to violate it.

While similar in concept to the aircarrier exclusive area agreement, theairport tenant security program languagewould differ in an important matter—the tenant would be responsible to theairport operator rather than directly tothe FAA. The airport operator wouldfunction much as the FAA does byperforming compliance andenforcement functions. The tenantsecurity program would have to specifythe measures by which the tenant wouldcontrol access and meet other part 107requirements on its leasehold. Thesemeasures would have to be agreed uponby the FAA, the airport operator, andthe airport tenant, and specified in a

written agreement within the securityprogram.

Statutory language requires a securityprogram of an airport tenant to includethe methods the airports operator willuse to monitor and audit the tenant’scompliance, the enforcementprocedures used in cases of non-compliance, and a provision requiringthe tenant to pay financial penalties tothe airport operator if the tenant fails tocarry out its security responsibilities.This last provision would require theprogram to include the dollar amount offines and other penalty action for eachtype of violation.

An airport operator complying withall measures for security compliancewith a tenant security program, asoutlined in its airport security program,may not be found in violation by theFAA for security violations occurring onthe tenant’s leased area. However, thissection should not be misconstrued asdiminishing to any degree therequirements reflected in the airportsecurity program or the airportoperator’s regulatory responsibilities.Paragraph (d) also would specify thatthe FAA may terminate an airporttenant security program at any time ifthe tenant fails to provide an acceptablelevel of security.

The FAA requests comments fromairport operators and airport tenants notregulated under part 108 who would beaffected by this proposed section.Specifically, any recommendations forprocedures or policy that the FAAshould issue regarding implementationof this section are welcomed.

Subpart C—Operations

Section 107.201 Security of theCritical Security Area

This proposed new section wouldprovide a more simplified approach todesignating areas to be controlled forsecurity purposes. As proposed, therewould then only be two types ofprotected areas, and security measureswould be prescribed separately for each.The specific requirements of thesemeasures would be found in subsequentsections of the proposed rule.

Existing part 107 requires the airportoperator to designate a portion of theairport where security measures areapplied to protect areas used for‘‘landing, taking off, or surfacemaneuvering of airplanes.’’ This area iscalled the air operations area (AOA) andexisting § 107.13 prescribes standardsfor controlling access and movement ofpersons and vehicles within it. Thespecifics of how an airport operatormeets these standards are detailed in itsairport security program.

The current regulation also requiresairports served by larger air carrieraircraft to use stringent access andidentification controls within certainportions of the AOA. One of theseportions, the secured area, was createdwith existing § 107.14, Access controlsystem. Section 107.14 requires theimplementation of complex accesscontrol measures in certain portions ofthe AOA where air carriers operate. TheFAA also required airport operators 2.5years later to implement additionalidentification display and trainingprocedures to provide even moreprotection to air carrier aircraft within aportion of the AOA. Designated as theSecurity Identification Display Area(SIDA), this portion of the AOAoverlaps or is identical to the securedarea.

The interrelated nature of the AOA,the secured area, and the SIDA hascreated considerable confusion in theaviation community. The secured areahas frequently been misinterpreted tomean all areas of the airport controlledfor security purposes. The extent of itsapplication has been regularly disputed,and it is often considered to beindependent of the AOA. Likewise, thescope of the AOA has become unclear,and the term is used within the industryand the FAA for other purposes. Forexample, Advisory Circular 150/5370–10A, Standards for SpecifyingConstruction of Airports, uses the termAOA for safety and constructionpurposes. Also, the identificationrequirements of the secured area.

The ASAC expressed dissatisfactionwith the terms being used to describeexisting security areas andrecommended that current terms andrequirements be regrouped into twoareas only: the Restricted OperationsArea (ROA) and the Secured OperationsArea (SOA). As proposed by the ASAC,the SOA would essentially replace thesecured area and the SIDA, and the ROAwould replace the air operations area.

The FAA believes that the terms‘‘SOA’’ and ‘‘ROA’’ are too similar andcould be inadvertently interchanged,resulting in further confusion andmisunderstanding. Instead, toaccomplish the same purpose, the FAAproposes, the terms ‘‘critical securityarea’’ as the area with the highest levelof security. This area would beapproximately that of the currentsecured area. The term ROA wouldapply approximately to areas nowtermed ‘‘AOA’’. The FAA also proposesto require the continuous display ofairport-issued or airport-approvedidentification media in all areas to besecured. This change would applycurrent SIDA requirements to all critical


security areas and restricted operationsareas, thus eliminating the need for aseparate display area.

A tightly controlled identificationsystem can be used in tandem withaccess control measures that may notnecessarily meet all of the performancestandards of proposed § 107.205(a), suchas group access, to achieve anacceptable level of security. Byrequiring identification media to bedisplayed in both the critical securityarea and the restricted operations area,identification media would be used as ameans to comply with the requirementto control movement to and from suchareas. The FAA continues to viewidentification systems as one of the mosteffective means to control movement inany portion of a critical security area orrestricted operations area.

Proposed § 107.201 would require theairport operator to establish a criticalsecurity area and implement certainsecurity measures in this area. Theproposed critical security areaessentially would replace the securedarea that originated with existing§ 107.14. Consistent with existing FAApolicy, only the most critical securitysensitive portions of an airport wouldneed to be designated as critical securityareas. Generally, those portions of theairport are the nonplubic areas wherepassenger and baggage operations areconducted. Adjacent areas to passengerand baggage operations also may beincluded in the critical security area ifsuch areas cannot be separated bysecurity measures such as time anddistance or a physical barrier. The intentis to more clearly describe the areas ofthe airport in which security interestsare the most critical, and securitymeasures should be appliedaccordingly.

The following table illustrates thedifferences in security requirementsbetween the proposed critical securityarea and the proposed restrictedoperations area:

Requirements

Criticalsecu-

rityarea

Re-strictedoper-ationsarea

Complex Access Controls XBaseline Access Controls XEscort Procedures ............ X XPersonnel and Vehicle

Identification System ..... X XContinuous Display of

Identification .................. X XChallenge Program ........... X XEmployment History Ver-

ification .......................... X XCriminal Records Check ... XSecurity Training ............... XSecurity Briefing ................ X

Requirements

Criticalsecu-

rityarea

Re-strictedoper-ationsarea

Signs ................................. X X

The FAA proposes that airportoperators be required to use accesscontrols in the critical security area thatmeet the current requirements of§ 107.14 (proposed § 107.205(a)).Airport operators and air carriers haveinvested considerable resourcesimplementing the access controlrequirements of existing § 107.14, andthe FAA believes this investment hasresulted in greater protection of theareas that provide access to air carrieraircraft. While operational difficultieshave been encountered with the use ofthese controls, the FAA will continue tosupport their use and work with airportoperators to address operationalconcerns, such as efficient control ofgroup access (see the discussion belowof proposed § 107.205, Access controlsystems).

The FAA also proposes to continue torequire identification in the criticalsecurity area, but to further simplifyregulatory requirements, training andidentification requirements would nolonger be linked together as currentlyprescribed in § 107.25. Instead, thisnotice proposes to separaterequirements for training and foridentification systems that the airportoperator must implement in criticalsecurity areas and restricted operationsarea. Proposed § 107.201 wouldestablish the requirement for anidentification system that incorporatesthe standards of proposed § 107.209,including the implementation of achallenge program.

Identification systems are already inuse at most airports covered by thissection of the proposal, and the FAAcontends that such systems areessential. Further, the inclusion ofaccess control and identificationrequirements also permits the UnitedStates to meet its obligations under theConvention on International CivilAviation to comply with InternationalCivil Aviation Organization (CAO)Standards. ICAO’s Annex 17 to theconvention establishes internationalsecurity standards and recommendedpractices. Standard 4.4.1 of Annex 17requires member states to establishprocedures and identification systems toprevent unauthorized access by personsand vehicles to security areas of anairport.

Under this section, individuals withunescorted access to the critical security

area would continue to be required tosubmit to a personnel background checkas required under existing § 107.31 andreceive training consistent with thatcurrently required in § 107.25. FBIcriminal history checks are required forthose applying for access to the criticalsecurity area if designated ‘‘triggers’’ areraised during an employment historyreview and verification. The standardsfor access investigation are contained inproposed § 107.207.

Proposed § 107.201(b)(6) wouldrequire the airport operator to trainindividuals in a manner prescribed inproposed § 107.211 prior to authorizingsuch individuals unescorted access tothe critical security area. The trainingrequirement outlined in proposed§ 107.211 is consistent with theunderlying principle that the criticalsecurity area is the focus of the airportoperator’s security measures. Therefore,proposed training requirements wouldbe more involved for the criticalsecurity area than for the restrictedoperations area.

This section also proposes toincorporate signage concepts from FAAAdvisory Circular 107–1 (May 19, 1972).This advisory circular recommends thatairport operators appropriately postsigns warning of the entry restrictions tocertain areas at the airport and anypenalties associated with unauthorizedentry. Proposed paragraph (b)(7) of thissection would make this a requirement.Rather than establish specific signdimension or wording, the proposal setsa broad standard for signs, recognizingthe different physical and operationalcharacteristics of individual airports.

The FAA proposes that the airportoperator be permitted 2 years toimplement the revised signrequirements. This would allow theairport operator time to coordinate signmodifications with other changesproposed in this section, such asidentification systems and training. (Seethe proposed Implementation Schedulebelow.)

Section 107.203 Security of theRestricted Operations Area

As discussed in the analysis of thecritical security area, the FAA proposesin this new section to require thedesignation of a restricted operationsarea and to specify measures that mustbe implemented in it.

The restricted operations area conceptis based on the current AOArequirements, but the area to beprotected would be further explained.Although impossible to fully define forall airports, in general, restrictedoperations areas would be those areaswhere air carriers and foreign air


carriers subject to parts 108 and 129take off, land, taxi, park, and otherwisemaneuver their aircraft (other than thecritical security area), and adjacent areasthat cannot be separated by othersecurity measures. This would permitexcluding some areas not used by suchair carriers and foreign air carriers. Itwould require including some areasadjacent to runways and taxiways thatcannot be separated by secondarycontrols.

Security measures similar in conceptto the those of the critical security areahave been proposed for the restrictedoperations area to strengthen the overallairport security system, but with lesscomplex standards for access control,training, and employment backgroundchecks commensurate with the lessvulnerable operations within therestricted operations area.

Similar to the differences between theaccess control requirements of existing§§ 107.13 and 107.14, the means used tocontrol access to and movement in therestricted operations area can differfrom the standards to be employed inthe proposed critical security area. TheFAA proposes that airport operators berequired to use access controls in therestricted operations area that meet thecurrent requirements of § 107.13(proposed § 107.205(b)). However,unlike existing § 107.13, this sectionproposes additional accountabilityprocedures (see the discussion belowunder proposed § 107.205, Accesscontrol systems).

As in the critical security area, thissection proposes that airport operatorsuse an identification system to controlmovement that meets the standardsprescribed in proposed § 107.209.

The expansion of identificationrequirements is not supported by theASAC. The committee urged the FAA tolimit identification requirements to thesecured area (proposed critical securityarea), leaving the airport operator thediscretion to use an identificationsystem in other areas. The FAAacknowledges the need for airportoperators to have the latitude to addresslocal circumstances but believes that, ifairport identification systems can bebolstered, more pressing operationalconcerns raised by the implementationof access control systems can beaddressed with greater effectiveness.The more stringent identificationmeasures proposed here permit the FAAto propose permitting group access andsecondary access media standards underproposed § 107.205.

The FAA proposes to require that theairport operator implement the sameescort and challenge procedures used inthe proposed critical security area;

however, access investigation woulddiffer. This section proposes to requireexisting employment historyverification standards currently used inthe AOA. This section also proposesrequirements for signs similar to thoseof the critical security area.

Section 107.205 Access ControlSystems

The FAA proposes in this section tospecify the requirements for accesscontrol systems that are required inproposed § 107.201 and, in some cases,proposed § 107.203. The performancestandards of existing § 107.14 areincluded in proposed paragraph (a) withmodifications, and new procedures areproposed to address operational issuesthat have come about since theimplementation of existing § 107.14.

Specifically, the existing performancestandard requiring a system to limitaccess by time and date has beenmodified to emphasize that thisstandard is for contingency purposesonly. During a recent review ofcontingency plans (see the discussionbelow under proposed § 107.303,Contingency plans), airport operatorsand air carriers expressed concern aboutthe burden placed on airport operatorsto meet this performance standard. TheASAC concurred and suggested that therule clarify that this performancestandard be used for contingencypurposes only.

Both airport operators and air carriershave urged the FAA to developtechnical specifications for accesscontrols. This recommendation also wassupported by GAO. The FAA agrees thatthere is a need for technical standardsand is supporting current efforts todevelop them, but does not consider therevised regulation as the proper venueto issue technical standards. (See thediscussion below entitled ‘‘UniversalAccess System.’’)

Existing paragraph (b) would bereplaced by access requirements for therestricted operations area. While theserequirements are similar to existing§ 107.13, the FAA proposes additionalaccountability procedures. Currently,§ 107.13 only requires the airportoperator to use procedures to detect andrespond to penetration of the AOA anddoes not specify any other performanceor technical standards that such accesscontrols must meet. To ensure bettercontrol of access media, proposedaccountability procedures wouldinclude regular audits of issued accessmedia, and measures to ensure thataccess controls are locally controlledand cannot be used to gain access to therestricted operations area of otherairports.

Paragraph (c) is proposed to addressconcerns raised by the ASAC on theissuance of temporary access media toindividuals who are not in possession oftheir original access media. A typicalexample of this is an airport or aircarrier employee who shows up forwork without her/his approved accessmedium and cannot practicably beescorted throughout her/his assignedshift. The existing regulatory languagedoes not address this situation, but suchtemporary access media generally havebeen prohibited by local FAA guidance.This paragraph proposes to allow theairport operator to issue a second accessmedium to an individual as long asaccess authorization is verified, andother specific standards are met.

Paragraph (d) proposes that theairport operator establish andimplement escort procedures forindividuals without access authority.Many airport operators already havesome type of escort procedure in placebased on FAA policy guidance, but suchprocedures are applied inconsistently.To ensure a more consistent applicationof these procedures, the FAA believesescorting standards should beincorporated into the rule.

This proposed section also addressesthe issue of individual validation andgroup access. FAA airport inspectionsthat were prompted by the IG auditrevealed that, despite best efforts, thereare certain instances where individualvalidation of access authority hasbecome operationally unfeasible.Performance standards require an accesscontrol system that validates anindividual’s access authorization;however, unauthorized group access,commonly known as ‘‘piggybacking,’’often occurs. In such an instance, anindividual with assumed authorizedaccess passes through an access pointwithout being subject to any controlmeasures that validate authorization forthat individual’s access. As a result, theFAA is reviewing alternative accessmeasures to accommodate groupvalidation of individual accessauthorization. The FAA is currentlyconducting field tests of possiblesolutions.

To support this effort, the FAA isproposing paragraph (e) to allow airportoperators to address the issue of groupaccess. The present performancestandards do not allow for group access,but this new language would allow theFAA to work with each airport operatorto resolve the issue locally.

Comments regarding the practicalityof group access are requested. Anyrecommendations on methods currentlyused for access of more than oneauthorized individual in a vehicle or


more than a single individual at anaccess point would be helpful. Forexample, local procedures have beendeveloped by some airports that allowfor access validation of all persons in avehicle without requiring eachpassenger in the vehicle to validate her/his access authorization by individuallyusing the medium (e.g., by ‘‘swiping’’ amagnetic card).

Proposed paragraph (f) would addressaccess control points that lead fromnon-public areas, other than criticalsecurity areas, to the sterile area. Suchnon-public areas would include aircarrier offices and storage areas. In someairports, a sterile area can be accessedvia points other than the passenger-screening checkpoint. While currentpolicy partially addresses access to thesecured area from the sterile area, verylittle guidance exists for access to thesterile areas other than the passengerscreening requirements of part 108. Thisrule would clarify that an individualcould not be escorted from, for instance,a critical security area, into a sterile areaand bypass the screening requirementsof part 108.

Paragraph (g) of this section proposesto incorporate the current provisions foralternative access system. Based on fieldexperience, alternatives would addressthe use of the passenger-screeningcheckpoints as an acceptable accesscontrol measure used in combinationwith other control measures. Further,this paragraph intends to permitalternatives for access controls measureson portions of the ramp where aircraftpark or maneuver that lack physicalbarriers, such as doors or walls, onwhich to install traditional accesscontrols. The SASP will also provideairport operators more guidance onacceptable alternatives to addressunique physical or operationalcircumstances.

Special Discussion on Universal AccessSystem (USA)

The implementation of existing§ 107.14, Access Control Systems,resulted in many different airport accesscontrol systems nationwide. Suchvariances created access problems forair carrier air crews, whose dutiesrequire that they regularly travel tomany different airports. Typically, aircrews must either obtain separate accessmedia at every airport to which they flyor be escorted through access controlpoints. The aviation industry madeseveral attempts to remedy thissituation; however, due primarily tofinancial constraints, was unable toresolve the problem.

Eventually, pilot groups and aircarriers turned to the ASAC for

assistance. The ASAC responded byorganizing a working group to research,develop, and test standards, and devisean implementation plan for a nationalaccess control system that would permittransient air crewmembers to carry asingle access control medium whichwill work at each airline’s. An air carrieror airport operator could implementsuch a system at either a select numberof access points or incorporate it into itsentire access control system.

In October 1993, Congressappropriated $2 million dollars fordevelopment and testing of UniversalAccess System (UAS) standards. TheFAA and the ASAC’s UAS WorkingGroup (UASWG) have used these fundsto develop preliminary standards andfunctional requirements, and to fieldtest prototype installations. During thisprocess, the ASAC also expressedinterest in developing standards for allaccess control systems. The committeedecided to use the services of (RTCA,Inc.), another federal advisorycommittee, to organize this effort,building on research and standardsdeveloped by the UAS Working Group.At the request of the industry, the FAAserved as a co-chair of this TACA group,which has since completed its work andcompiled its recommendations intoRTCA document #D0230. Once UASstandards are finalized, Appendix E ofthis document will be updated toinclude specific UAS standards. Thesetests were conducted in cooperationwith volunteer air carriers and airports,including Northwest Airlines and DeltaAir Lines; the Detroit Metro WayneCounty Airport, and MiamiInternational Airport. Testing has beencompleted and a final test report isunder review. Next, the preliminarystandards will be revised and the UASworking group will addressimplementation issues.

Since these UAS access points will beheld to § 107.14, there is no immediateneed to modify part 107 or part 108 toaccommodate anticipated use of theUAS. Procedural changes which resultfrom a UAS installation will be handledby amendment to the Air CarrierStandard Security Program (ACSSP) orairport security programs (ASP),asappropriate.

Section 107.207 Employment History,Verification, and Criminal HistoryRecords Checks

The White House Commission onAviation Safety and Securityrecommended, and the Federal AviationReauthorization Act of 1996 required,that the FAA adopt rules to provide forexpanded background checks andcriminal history records checks of

persons with responsibilities forscreening passengers and property. OnMarch 14, 1997, the FAA issued aNotice of Proposed Rulemaking torespond to these mandates (62 FR13262, March 19, 1997). The commentsreceived in response to that notice willbe considered in developing a final rule.However, while that notice refers tounescorted access to the SIDA, underthis proposal the term SIDA would nolonger be used. It is proposed insteadthat the rule would refer to unescortedaccess to critical security areas. Underthis proposal, existing § 107.31 wouldbe moved to proposed Subpart C,Operations, under new § 107.207.

Section 107.209 Identification SystemsUnder this proposed new section, an

identification system would be requiredfor both the critical security area and therestricted operations area. The FAAwould add this section to regulatestandards governing the issuance,display, and accountability ofidentification systems to promote theireffectiveness. This proposed sectionwould also comply with ICAO’s Annex17, Standard 4.4.1 that requires memberstates to establish identification systemsto prevent unauthorized access bypersons and vehicles to security areas ofan airport.

While most airports currently useidentification systems of some type tosatisfy the movement controlrequirements of existing § 107.13, therehas never been a regulatory requirementto have such a system. Many of thestandards and criteria in this proposal,however, have long been included inmany airport security programs and, asa result of an 1987 program amendment,national standards for such systemswere established. Thus, any systemcurrently in place most likely wouldrequire little, if any, alteration to be incompliance with the rule as proposed.Even proposed standards for auditingand vehicle identification not found inthe 1987 amendment codify commonindustry practice.

In addition, the FAA is proposing thatthe standards would become effective 2years after a final rule is adopted,providing airport operators with time tomake necessary changes so that theirsystems would meet regulatoryrequirements.

The ASAC requested that airportoperators be afforded 5 years to phase inany identification changes required bythe revised rule; however, thecommittee did not provide any financialor operational data to support thisposition. As the implementation ofproposed identification requirements isdependent on the implementation of


other security measures in this proposal,the FAA recognizes that it will takesome time to make all the proposedchanges. Even so, the FAA sees benefitsto bolstering airport identificationsystems and considers 5 years to beimpractical for implementation of theproposed identification requirements.Two years has been proposed based ondata collected for the economic analysisfor this rulemaking. The FAA requestscomments on this schedule, includinginformation regarding operational andcost impacts (see the proposedImplementation Schedule below).

In proposed § 107.209(b), standardsare proposed for personnelidentification media. Under thisproposal, the media must conveyaccurate information about theindividual, bear an expiration date, bereadily identifiable for challengepurposes, and indicate the individual’sauthorization for access and movement.These specifications are similar to thosecontained in FAA policy and establishbroad parameters rather than specificsizes, colors, or actual wording thatmust appear on the media. The airportsecurity program would state how theindividual airport would meet thesestandards. This would permitconsiderable flexibility to the airportsand accommodate technologicaladvances.

This new section also proposes thatan airport operator’s identificationsystem include procedures toincorporate identification displayrequirements of existing § 107.25 and tominimize the number of unaccountableidentification media. Accountabilityrequirements are intended to ensure theintegrity of the system by specifying anaudit at least once a year and mediarevalidation or reissuance procedureswhen there is no accountability for acertain percentage of identificationmedia. Procedures are also proposedthat would require airport operators toretrieve expired identification mediaand safeguard unissued identificationmedia stock and supplies. Thesestandards would apply to personnel andvehicle identification systemsseparately.

The ASAC commented that an auditevery 2 years is sufficient andrecommended that any requirements foraudits not be specified in the revisedregulation but included in an airport’ssecurity program. While it has been theFAA’s policy to require an audit every2 years, many airport operators haveresisted, claiming that the regulation didnot require them to do so. The FAAproposes to resolve anymisunderstandings about the need toaudit identification systems by

including the requirement in theregulation.

The FAA views identification systemsas one of the most effective means tocontrol movement in any portion of theproposed critical security area or theproposed restricted operations area. Assuch, the proposal also intends toincrease the frequency of the audit toonce a year to ensure the integrity of anairport’s identification system. Manyairport operators already haveautomated identification systems thatconduct audits on an on-going or dailybasis. The proposed annual auditreflects this advance in technologywhile allowing leeway for lesssophisticated identification systems.The inclusion of the phrase ‘‘and asnecessary’’ with the 1-year requirementis intended to ensure that anidentification system is auditedwhenever the integrity of a system is inquestion.

Initially, the FAA consideredrequiring an airport operator torevalidate its system if 5 percent ofidentification media wereunaccountable. This would codifyinternal FAA guidance onunaccountable identification mediawhich has been incorporated into mostairport security programs. Many airportoperators, however, have complainedthat the 5 percent requirement requiresrevalidation or reissuance of media toofrequently and does not account for theoperational reality that employees willlose or misplace identification. TheASAC also expressed similar concernsthat this percentage is too low andrecommended that the percentage beincreased to 10 percent. Thisrecommendation was not supported byany financial or operational data.

Recognizing the serious economicimplications associated withrevalidation or reissuance ofidentification media, the FAA hasresearched accountability percentagesand found such percentages to rangefrom 2 percent to 10 percent, dependingon whether the identification system isused in a military, civilian, orcommercial application, and the layoutof the facility. As there appears to be noclear consensus as to the appropriatepercentage level for use at airports, theFAA requests comments on whatcriteria should be the basis foraccountability percentages and whatthese percentage should be. Commentsshould be supported by financial andoperational data and the impact on theintegrity of the identification system.

It is anticipated that initialaccountability criteria and percentageswill have to be tested over an extendedperiod of time and amended as

appropriate. To facilitate this process,the FAA proposed that guidance onaccountability criteria and percentagesbe included in the SASP to permit theFAA to be more responsive tooperational needs and technologicalchanges. Thus, the revised rule onlyproposes that the airport operatorrevalidate its systems or reissue badgeswhen a certain accountabilitypercentage identified in the airportsecurity program is reached.

As proposed, revalidation andreissuance percentage would be basedon issued identification media. Theterm issued would apply to anyidentification medium currentlyassigned to an individual or vehicle.Returned media should be consideredaccountable when an individual orvehicle no longer has access andmovement authorization.

Additionally, the same standards areproposed for vehicle systems asproposed for the personnelidentification system. The FAA isconcerned, however, that thesestandards may not permit the use ofexisting vehicle identification systemsbased on specific vehicle markings orpaint schemes. If such systemsincorporate accountability procedures,airport operators may be allowed to usepainting or marking schemes to meet thevehicle identification requirements ofthis proposed section.Recommendations are requested onstandards that will accommodate suchvehicle identification but still providefor accountability and integrity of thesystem.

At ASAC’s suggestion, the FAA alsoproposes in § 107.209(c) to permit theuse of the identification program forvehicles used under part 139, if thatsystem also meets the requirements ofthis proposed section.

Paragraph (d) proposes that airportoperators would be required to issuetemporary identification media topersons whose duties are expected to betemporary, such as contractors. Tominimize the number of accountableand valid identification media, the FAAproposes that such individuals shouldhave their identification media validonly for the time needed to performtheir temporary duties.

The FAA further proposes in thissection to allow an airport operator toapprove the identification media ofother entities which meet the standardsof this regulation. Inclusion of thispractice would codify an acceptablepractice used by many airports. Themost common example is an air carrierissuing identification media to itsemployees that in turn are acceptable tothe airport operator for movement and


access authority. The FAA also issuesidentification badges to certain FAAAviation Safety Inspectors (ASI’s) toreplace locally issued airportidentification media when ASI’s areconducting inspections outside theirassigned geographical area. Such FAA-issued identification is known as FAAForm 8000–39 and guidance on theacceptance of this identification will beprovided in the SASP.

Paragraph (f) proposes to require anairport operator to develop a challengeprogram. Airport operators currentlyestablish their own challengeprocedures to meet the requirements ofexisting § 107.25(e)(2), but in thisparagraph the FAA proposes to expandthese requirements in order to ensurestandardized challenge proceduresbetween airports, and within the criticalsecurity areas and restricted operationsareas. The FAA believes consistentchallenge procedures will simplify thechallenge process for employees, andthereby promote better compliance withidentification media display andchallenge requirements. The particularsof the challenge program, however,would remain detailed in the approvedairport security program. Even thoughthe ASAC did not support standardizedchallenge procedures, the FAA believesthat the lack of standardization hasresulted in inconsistent challengeprocedures among employees at a givenairport, as well as employees whoperform their duties at different airports.As a result, the effectiveness of afundamental element of the airportsecurity program is being undermined.

Section 107.211 TrainingThis proposed section would remove

the training requirements from existing§ 107.25 currently titled ‘‘Airportidentification media’’ and place theminto this new section which would bedevoted solely to security trainingrequirements. The change is intended toemphasize the need for individuals withsecurity responsibilities to be properlytrained so that they will be betterprepared to fulfill their security dutiesand responsibilities.

The underlying principle of thisproposed section is that individualswho have access to those areas whereair carriers conduct passengerenplaning/deplaning operations wouldhave more critical securityresponsibilities than individuals whoseaccess is limited to peripheral areas ofan airport. Accordingly, the FAAproposes a two-tiered training programthat would provide security training forindividuals with critical security areaaccess authorization and securityinformation to individuals with

restricted operations area accessauthority. Thus, the training would beappropriate for the scope of theindividual’s access and movementprivileges.

Under this section, the FAA proposesthat persons with critical securityresponsibilities should be subject notonly to the proposed requirements butalso to the training curriculum currentlyrequired under existing § 107.25. Thisenhanced curriculum would promoteconsistent national implementation ofsecurity measures. As proposed,security training would includeinstruction on the identification system,challenge and escort procedures,restrictions on divulging sensitivesecurity information, falsification ofrecords, and other securityresponsibilities under proposed§ 107.11.

All individuals who have unescortedaccess to, and movement privilegeswithin, the proposed restrictedoperations area would be provided withinformation commensurate with theirsecurity responsibilities under thisproposal. Security training for thoseindividuals with access to the restrictedoperations area would be generally thesame as that for the proposed criticalsecurity area; however, security trainingof the restricted operations area couldbe accomplished in a less formalmanner and could be provided througha simple videotape presentation, printedmaterial, or verbal presentation.

In addition, this proposed sectionwould direct the airport operator toensure that persons performing securityfunctions for the airport are briefed ontheir responsibilities under theproposed rule, the airport securityprogram, and any other pertinentsecurity information.

This proposed section also wouldspecify requirements for maintainingdocumentation of training and thedeadline for implementing a revisedtraining syllabus.

Section 107.213 Law EnforcementSupport

Under this proposal, existing § 107.15entitled ‘‘Law enforcement support’’would be renumbered to proposed§ 107.213 and revised. Several changesare proposed for the law enforcementsupport requirements of existing§ 107.15. Under existing § 107.15,airport operators must provide lawenforcement to support its securityprogram; to support the passenger-screening system required by proposedpart 108 and existing part 129; and torespond to an incident at the request ofan air carrier or a foreign air carrier.

As stated in the discussion ofproposed § 107.3, Definitions, above, theterm ‘‘law enforcement officers’’ hasbeen replaced by the term ‘‘lawenforcement personnel.’’ Existing part107 uses the term ‘‘law enforcementofficer’’ to describe State or local lawenforcement and private securitypersonnel, resulting in confusion aboutthe use of private security personnel tosupport the airport security programand passenger screening functions. Thisconfusion may be the result of the lawenforcement community using the term‘‘law enforcement officer’’ solely todescribe qualified Federal, State, orlocal municipality law enforcementofficers. Yet, 49 U.S.C. 44903(c) allowsfor the use of Federal, State, or local lawenforcement officers as well as privatesecurity personnel to support airportand air carrier security programs.

To avoid any furthermisunderstandings, the FAA proposesto use the term ‘‘law enforcementpersonnel’’ throughout revised part 107to generically describe both lawenforcement officers and privatesecurity personnel meeting therequirements of part 107. This wouldnot change the requirements for the typeof law enforcement personnel an airportoperator can employ.

Existing § 107.15(a) has been modifiedto specify the qualifications of lawenforcement support required underproposed § 107.103(a) and (b). However,the most substantial change made to thisproposed section would be thedistinction between the use ofuniformed and ‘‘plainclothes’’ lawenforcement personnel.

Currently, § 107.17(a)(2) requires lawenforcement support to be identifiableby uniform. Proposed § 107.213(a)would state that an airport operatorneed only provide uniformed lawenforcement personnel in support of thepassenger-screening system requiredunder proposed part 108 and existingpart 129. This change was suggested bythe ASAC which recommended thatairport operators be permitted theleeway to use ‘‘plainclothes’’ lawenforcement personnel. The FAApartially concurs with thisrecommendation and believes that theairport operator, in most cases, is bestsuited to determine the local need foruniformed and ‘‘plainclothes’’ officers.

This modification would allow lawenforcement personnel to operatecovertly in situations the airportoperator deems appropriate, such asinvesting theft in the baggage make-upareas, while requiring a readilyidentifiable law enforcement presence atthe passenger-screening checkpoint. Thepassenger-screening checkpoint


presents a unique situation whereindividuals subjected to securitymeasures may become uncooperative,and suspect bags and individuals mustbe successfully segregated in highlycongested, often restricted, areas of theairport terminal. The FAA believes thatpassenger-screening efforts would bebetter supported by a prompt responseby uniformed law enforcementpersonnel who are readily identified ashaving the authority to take charge ofthe situation.

Paragraph (b) also would be modifiedto clarify its applicability to the airportsecurity program required underproposed § 107.103(c).

Section 107.215 Law EnforcementPersonnel

Under this proposal, existing § 107.17entitled ‘‘Law enforcement officers’’would be renumbered to proposed§ 107.215, retitled ‘‘Law enforcementpersonnel,’’ and revised.

The minimum standards for lawenforcement support at an airportessentially would be unchanged. Asdiscussed in proposed § 107.213 above,the requirement for law enforcementpersonnel to be in uniform would bemodified. To reflect this proposedchange, proposed § 107.215(a)(2) wouldbe amended to delete the uniformrequirement.

Currently, § 107.17(c) requires thatlaw enforcement officers meet thetraining standards, if any, prescribed byeither the State or local jurisdiction forofficers performing comparablefunctions. Proposed paragraph (c)would update training requirements forState and local law enforcement officersto reflect the fact that all States have lawenforcement training programs. Thisparagraph also would specify thatprivate security personnel used to meetthe requirements of part 107 must betrained in a manner acceptable to theAdministrator if the State and localjurisdiction does not prescribe trainingstandards for such personnel.

Section 107.217 Supplementing LawEnforcement Personnel

Under this proposal, existing § 107.19entitled ‘‘Use of Federal lawenforcement officers,’’ would berenumbered to proposed § 107.217,retitled ‘‘Supplementing lawenforcement personnel,’’ and revised.Proposed § 107.217 would give theAdministrator greater flexibility inresponding to requests to supplementlocal law enforcement personnel. Thisrevised section still would set forth thesame procedures for an airport operatorto request Federal assistance insupplementing local law enforcement,

but would incorporate statutorylanguage that would provide forsupplemental support from anypersonnel employed by the Federalgovernment.

Section 107.219 RecordsUnder this proposal, existing § 107.23,

entitled ‘‘Records,’’ would berenumbered to proposed § 107.219 andrevised. Proposed § 107.219 wouldincorporate new recordkeepingrequirements found throughout theproposed rule and would ensure thatthe FAA has access to such records.This new section would require that lawenforcement actions taken in support ofpassenger-screening activities or theairport security program be recorded,maintained, and submitted to the FAA.Such records would be necessary tomeasure the effectiveness of the civilaviation security program and tosupport FAA compliance programs.

Paragraph (a) proposed that the FAAhave access to any record requiredunder the proposed rule and wouldrequire the submission of records to theFAA pursuant to a schedule approvedin the airport’s security program.Requiring the airport operator toprovide the FAA with a report of lawenforcement responses on a regular andpredictable basis would prove a moretimely and efficient means ofdisseminating this information to theFAA. The manner in which records aresubmitted to the FAA, and at whatfrequency, would be determined foreach airport to accommodate local lawenforcement reporting and FAAinvestigation procedures.

A slight modification is proposed forrecords resulting from law enforcementactivity. In proposed paragraph (b)(1) ofthis section, the word ‘‘action’’ wouldbe changed to ‘‘response.’’ A lawenforcement ‘‘action’’ routinely hasbeen confused with ‘‘police action’’which, within the law enforcementcommunity, suggests some type ofdetention/arrest or other action relatedto alleged unlawful activity. In thecontext of the civil aviation securityprogram, it was intended that a responseby a law enforcement entity to any civilaviation security incident needs to berecorded. That response may or may notresult from a violation of local law.

Proposed paragraph (b)(2) of thissection would extend the period of timeduring which records must bemaintained to a more practical 180 days.Oftentimes, the current 90-dayrequirement is insufficient forinvestigation and enforcement purposes.Proposed paragraph (c) would beexpanded to require records to reflectmore specific information about

individuals who are detained orarrested, which would aid the FAA andthe FBI in the investigation of suchincidents.

The addition of proposed paragraph(d) of this section would require theairport operator to make and maintainfor 180 days records of any correctiveaction taken against persons who fail tocomply with proposed falsification andsecurity responsibilities sections(proposed §§ 107.9 and 107.11). A newparagraph (e) is also proposed to requirethe airport operator to maintain anyadditional records that may be neededto support the airport security program,and highlight additional recordkeepingrequirements found throughout theproposed rule.

Subpart D—Contingency Measures

Section 107.301 Contingency Plan

Contingency plans are an existing partof airport and air carrier securityprograms. They contain securitymeasures that can be immediately andflexibly applied to counter threats thatarise quickly. To ensure the integrity ofthe national civil aviation securitysystem, the security-sensitive details ofthe contingency plan cannot beincluded in a public regulation, butproposed new § 108.307 would includein the proposed rule a 1987 securityprogram amendment (amended in 1994)requiring airport operators and aircarriers to have and implement a plan.

The application of contingencymeasures in response to the Persian GulfWar provided valuable lessons oncontingency planning and the FAA usedthis information to make changes to aircarrier and airport security programs.Recently, the FAA and the air carriersthoroughly reviewed these plans toincorporate changes and ‘‘lessonslearned’’ from response to the elevatedthreat during the Persian Gulf War. Themethod for implementation of these wasmodified to allow for a greater degree offlexibility, and new test procedures alsowere adopted. The ASAC endorsed thefinal product of this effort andsupported the codification ofcontingency plan requirements for thisproposed revision of part 108.

This proposed new section wouldrequire air carriers to implement FAA-issued contingency measures containedin their security programs whendirected by the Assistant Administratorfor Civil Aviation Security. It alsoproposes that airport operators and aircarriers test these contingency plans toensure that all parties involved areaware of their responsibilities and thatinformation contained in the plan iscurrent.


Section 107.303 Security Directivesand Information Circulars

This proposed section would be new.It would correspond to proposed§ 108.305 and would impose the samerequirements upon the airport operatorto respond as necessary to SecurityDirectives which may apply to airports.

These proposed measures also reflectmodification made to the existingSecurity Directive process in proposedpart 108. Existing part 108 provides thatthe air carrier shall specify, not laterthan 72 hours after delivery of aSecurity Directive, the method by whichthe measures in the Security Directive‘‘have been implemented,’’ unless theSecurity Directive provides a differenttime. This appears to assume that,within 72 hours after receipt of theSecurity Directive, procedures have, infact, been implemented. However, if theSecurity Directive does not requireimplementation within 72 hours, it isnot clear from the existing rule whenthe implementation methods must beprovided to the FAA. The proposed rulewould make clear that, unless theSecurity Directive provides otherwise,within 72 hours after receipt of theSecurity Directive, the airport operatoror air carrier would provide to the FAAthe implementation methods that areeither in effect or will be in effect whenthe Security Directive is implemented.In response, the FAA would eitherapprove the airport operators proposedalternative or notify the airport operatorto modify the alternative measures tocomply with the requirements of theSecurity Directive within 48 hours afterreceiving proposed alternativemeasures.

In July 1989, the FAA issued a finalrule [54 FR 28982, July 10, 1989] thatrequired the use of Security Directivesand Information Circulars as the meansto disseminate information to aircarriers concerning security threats andappropriate measures to beimplemented. The FAA usesInformation Circulars for thenotification of general informationregarding threats to civil aviationsecurity, and Security Directives tonotify of specific, credible threatinformation and measures to be taken.

The FAA did not similarly amendpart 107 as it was thought at the timethat most credible threats were directedat U.S. air carriers, and the threat todomestic airports was relatively low.

The FAA now believes that theconcerns of the airport community andthe President’s Commission on AviationSecurity and Terrorism regarding thecoordination of security threat

information need to be addressed in thisrevision of part 107.

Airport operators have repeatedly toldthe FAA that they are not privy tosecurity information in the samemanner as air carriers and, as such, theyare often at a disadvantage inresponding to a higher level of threat.Comments received from the ASACechoed this concern. The ASACrecommended that airport operatorsreceive Security Directives andInformation Circulars; however, thecommittee stipulated that the FAAshould only issue these documents toairport operators on an informationbasis only, with no requirement toimplement specified measures. In itsassessment of the aviation securitysystem, the President’s Commission onAviation Security and Terrorism alsostressed the need to have bettercoordination and communication ofsecurity information among the FAA,airport operators, and air carriers.

In proposing this requirement, theFAA has not overlooked ASAC’sconcerns, however; as Security Directivemeasures directed at airports areanticipated to be site specific andappropriate for the threat level, the FAAviews the benefit of the proposedrequirements as a necessary precautionthat will not unduly burden airportoperators. Further, the FAA in the pasthas issued emergency amendments toairport security programs to respond toan increased threat. Such emergencymeasures often may be more efficientlyhandled by use of Security Directives.

This section also proposes to permitthe airport security coordinator to applyfor a security clearance through the FAAin order to receive classifiedinformation related to national security.Such clearances for airport securityofficials were recommended by theFederal Bureau of Investigation in a1992 report, and more recently, by theGAO in the aforementioned audit ofFAA’s compliance with the AviationSecurity Improvement Act of 1990. TheFAA carefully considered theimplications of granting suchclearances, particularly the risk ofunauthorized release of sensitiveinformation, and subsequently endorsedthe issuance of security clearances, on avoluntary basis, to select airportpersonnel at 74 of the largest andbusiest U.S. airports. As of May 1995,101 clearances had been granted toairport security personnel. The resultsof this voluntary program have beenpositive and the FAA believes thedissemination and coordination ofsecurity sensitive information amongairport security personnel has beenenhanced. As such, the FAA proposes to

formalize this program in part 107 andpermit airport security at all airportsregulated under part 107 to apply for asecurity clearance.

Section 107.305 Public AdvisoriesThis proposed new section would be

added to incorporate new statutorylanguage and the 1986 airport securityprogram amendment.

In August 1986, the FAA amendedairport security programs to requireairport operators to notify the public ofineffective security measures at foreignairports. This amendment was issued bythe Administrator under the provisionsof § 107.11(f) in response to Pub. L. 99–83; 99 Stat. 222–227, Title V—International Terrorism and ForeignAirport Security, Section 552(a), TravelAdvisory and Suspension of ForeignAssistance. This legislation requiresairport operators to immediately postand prominently display the identify ofany foreign airport that the Secretary ofTransportation determines is failing tomaintain and administer effectivesecurity measures. The provisions forpublic notification established in Pub.L. 99–83 have been included in 49U.S.C. 44907.

Airport representatives on the ASACcommented that this public notificationrequirement was ineffective, nothingthat such postings are typically ignoredby the traveling public. They suggestedthat only air carriers be required tonotify passengers of such airports.Congress has determined, however, thatsuch postings are important to alert thetraveling public. The FAA encouragescomments and recommendations onhow such postings of notifications couldbe more effectively displayed.

Section 107.307 Incident ManagementThis new section would be added to

require the airport operator to establishprocedures to evaluate and respond tothreats of sabotage, aircraft piracy, andother unlawful interference to civilaviation operations. Existing part 107lacks a requirement for airport operatorsto respond to threats of such criminalactivity. Instead, part 139, Certificationand Operations: Land Airports ServingCertain Air Carriers, requires airportoperators to be prepared to respond toan actual incident of sabotage, hijack,and other emergencies by developingand testing an airport emergency planunder § 139.325. These emergencyprocedures are typically incorporated inthe airport security program verbatim.

Proposed paragraph (b) wouldspecifically provide that evaluation of athreat would be under the securityprogram. However, any event coveredby the part 139 airport emergency plan,


such as an actual hijacking, would behandled as specified in the airportemergency plan.

The procedures to evaluate threatsmay include sensitive securityinformation and, as such, should remainin the airport security program to limitits distribution. The FAA believes thatemergency response procedures to suchincidents, however, should remain inthe part 139 airport emergency plan. Anexpedited response to emergencysituations is critical, and responseprocedures to any emergency should belimited to one document to minimizedelays and confusion.

To promote coordination betweenparts 107 and 139, the FAA is alsoproposing to amend § 139.325 to ensurethat emergency response procedures tohijack and sabotage incidents containedin the airport emergency plan areconsistent with the approved airportsecurity program. Proposed § 107.307(d)would support this coordination byrequiring the airport operator to reviewannually threat and incident responseprocedures. Such a review is intendedsimply to ensure threat responseprocedures and contacts are stillaccurate and should not be interpretedas a requirement for a full-scaleexercise. The FAA anticipates that sucha review could readily be incorporatedinto the annual review of the airport’semergency plan required under§ 139.325(c)(4).

In the event that an airport requiredto have an airport security programunder part 107 is not required to havean airport emergency plan under part139, paragraph (c) proposes to requiresuch facilities to develop emergencyresponse procedures in addition tothreat evaluation procedures. Thisproposed section is intended to ensuresuch airport operators are prepared torespond to actual incidents of criminalactivity and is not intended to requireminimum standards for aircraft rescueand firefighting or emergencyequipment.

Implementation ScheduleThe FAA will include in the final rule

an implementation schedule for thetransition from the existingrequirements to those adopted in thefinal rule. The revisions to part 107 havebeen extensive, and the FAA recognizesthat airport operators will have to makeextensive changes to security measuresand airport security programs. The FAAproposes to make new part 107 effective120 days after the publication of thefinal rule, unless otherwise noted in therule. Several sections of the proposedrule, including identification, signs andtraining requirements would permit

extra time to phase out old securitymeasures and references and introducenew ones. It is anticipated that thistransition schedule will be based onairport size and possibly limited tocertain requirements that necessitate alonger time period to implement. TheFAA is requesting comments on thisproposed schedule andrecommendations on a feasibleimplementation schedule andmethodologies to facilitate a smoothtransition.

Harmonization With International CivilAviation Organization and JointAviation Requirements

In keeping with U.S. obligationsunder the Convention on InternationalCivil Aviation, it is the FAA’s policy tocomply with International CivilAviation Organization (ICAO) Standardsand Recommended Practices (SARP) tothe maximum extent practicable. Asdiscussed above in the analysis of§§ 107.201, 107.209, and 107.221, theFAA has determined that, whereapplicable, it has complied with ICAOSARPs in developing this proposal.

ICAO has required strengthened andintensified security programs inresponse to terrorist attacks. Due to theincreased severity of criminal actsagainst civil aviation, the ICAO Councilconvened on an accelerated scheduleand, on December 19, 1985, adoptedAmendment 6 to Annex 17 to theConvention on International CivilAviation, entitle ‘‘Standards andRecommended Practices—Security—Safeguarding International CivilAviation against Acts of UnlawfulInterference.’’ Eleven new specificationswere introduced into the Annex andnineteen specifications were adopted asstandards. Domestic airport securityprograms were amended accordingly. InSeptember 1989, the ICAO Counciladopted Amendment 7 to Annex 17which allows it to implement standardsand recommended practices at anaccelerated pace. In December 1992, theICAO Council adopted Amendment 8 toAnnex 17 which introduced newprovisions for the following: screeningchecked baggage and controlling cargo,variations to procedures relating tosecurity programs, pre-flight checks ofinternational aircraft, and measures forincorporating security into airportdesigns.

The Joint Aviation Authorities, anassociated body of the European CivilAviation Conference, develop JointAviation Requirements (JAR) in aircraftdesign, manufacture, maintenance, andoperations for adoption by participatingmember civil aviation. The JAR do notaddress aviation security.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Proposed §§ 107.5, 107.101, 107.103,107.105, 107.107, 107.111, 107.113,107.210, 107.203, 107.207, 107.209,107.211, 107.215, 107.217, 107.219contain information collectionrequirements. As required by thePaperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44U.S.C. 3507 (d)), the FAA has submitteda copy of these proposed sections to theOffice of Management and Budget(OMB) for its review.

The information to be collected isneeded to allow the FAA to complywith Congressional reportingrequirements and to verify compliancewith statutory requirements under 49U.S.C. Subtitle VII to protect personsand property in air transportationagainst acts of criminal violence.

The collection of information requiredunder this proposal has been in effectfor several years, and reporting andrecordkeeping requirements haveremained generally consistent. Whilemany of the proposed part 107 programamendment and law enforcement recordrequirements remain virtuallyunchanged, some additionalinformation collections would berequired. For all of the reportingelements in the collections ofinformation contained in this proposal,the annual reporting burden isestimated to be 15,630 hours. For all ofthe recordkeeping elements in thecollections of information contained inthis proposal, total initial annualrecordkeeping is estimated to be753,658 hours and annualrecordkeeping burden is estimated to be388,735 hours.

It is estimated that this proposal willaffect 460 part 107 regulated airportsannually.

Organizations and individualsdesiring to submit comments on theinformation collection requirementshould direct them to the Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs,OMB, Room 1235, New Executive OfficeBuilding, Washington, DC 20503;Attention: Desk Officer for FederalAviation Administration. Thesecomments should reflect whether theproposed collection is necessary;whether the agency’s estimate of theburden is accurate; how the quality,utility, and clarity of the information tobe collected can be enhanced; and howthe burden of the collection can beminimized. A copy of the commentsalso should be submitted to the FAARules Docket.

Economic Summary

The FAA has determined that thisproposed rule is not a ‘‘significant


rulemaking action,’’ as defined byExecutive Order 12866 (RegulatoryPlanning and Review). The anticipatedcosts and benefits associated with thisproposed rule are summarized below.(A detailed discussion of costs andbenefits is contained in the fullevaluation in the docket for thisproposed rule.)

The FAA is responsible forpromulgating regulations to provide asafe and secure civil air transportationsystem. Consistent with its statutoryresponsibilities, the FAA has adoptedFederal Aviation Regulations (FAR’s)dealing with aviation security. Theserules include FAR part 107 coveringairport security and FAR parts 108, 109,and 129 regulating the security practicesand procedures of affected air carriers.These regulations provide specificmeasures and guidelines to prevent airpiracy and other criminal acts. At thetime that these rules were promulgated,the primary focus of civil aviationsecurity was the prevention ofindividual acts of air piracy.

Over the last decade, terrorist andcriminal actions against civil aviationhave resulted in the continued tragicloss of life and property. This hasresulted in the FAA promulgatingseveral emergency rulemaking actions.The FAA has also combatted theseterrorist and criminal incidents byimposing specific requirements onairports by amending their individualsecurity programs.

The proposed regulation is an attemptto comprehensively updated airportsecurity regulations. Such acomprehensive review is necessary toaddress changes to the structure of civilaviation security as well as to analyzethe effect of emergency rulemaking onthe entire security program. Thus, theFAA is proposing to amend the existingairport security rules to incorporate inthe rules certain requirements that hadbeen part of the airports’ securityprograms. (In a parallel rulemakingeffort, the FAA is also proposing toamend the existing air carrier securityrules, which are contained in part 108.)

The FAA is proposing to revise thecurrent §§ 107.1 through 107.31 and addnew sections, some of which addressthe security responsibilities ofindividuals. Historically, part 107 hasbeen amended in increments with eachamendment added to the regulation innear chronological order. The FAAproposes to reorganize the regulationbased on subparts organized by subjectmatter. Arranging the regulation bysubparts allows the FAA to keepoperationally similar sections together.This proposed rule groups the sectioninto four subparts—Subpart A—General

(§§ 107.1 to 107.11), Subpart B—Airportsecurity program (§§ 107.101 to107.113), Subpart C—Operations(§§ 107.201 to 107.219), and SubpartD—Contingency Measures (§§ 107.301to 107.307).

Currently, there are 460 airports in theU.S. aviation system that have anAirport Security Program (ASP)approved by the FAA; the contents ofthis program, its approval, and theamendment process are key componentsof part 107. All airport securityprograms cover many of the samerequirements and concerns. However,due to the different physical layouts andsecurity requirements of each airport,each airport’s security program willhave some unique features.Accordingly, it is important to note thatthere is not a single airport securityprogram, but, instead, many programsthat have many common elements.

Many of the proposed changes to part107 simply change definitions or makeminor word changes. These changeswould not result in any incrementalcosts and will not be covered in thissummary. Nine proposed sectionswould increase costs, and threeproposed sections would result in costsavings. In this analysis, the FAAestimated costs for a 10-year period,from 1996 through 2005. As required byOMB, the present value of this coststream was calculated using a discountfactor of 7 percent. All costs in thisanalysis are in 1994 dollars.

Proposed § 107.5, entitled ‘‘AirportSecurity Coordinator’’ (formerly§ 107.29), would increase theresponsibilities of the Airport SecurityCoordinator (ASC). Under this proposedrule, the ASC, or in certain cases, theairport operators or their designees,must review materials and securityfunctions for effectiveness andcompliance and take corrective actionimmediately for each instance of non-compliance with this part andimmediately notify the FAA of theinstances and any corrective measurestaken. The ASC must also be trained inaccordance with the FAA-approvedsecurity program every two years. Theestimated cost resulting from thesechanges total $7.5 million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.11, entitled ‘‘SecurityResponsibilities of Persons’’ wouldprohibit persons from tampering,compromising, or modifying anysecurity systems, or carrying a deadly ordangerous weapon, explosive,incendiary, or destructive substancesinto sterile areas, critical security areas,or restricted operations areas. Proposed§ 107.103 would have the FAA requirethe airport operator to include in itssecurity program procedures to ensure

that persons with unescorted access tocritical security areas and restrictedoperations areas comply with therequirements of proposed § 107.11; thecost of this requirement is assigned toproposed § 107.11 as this section is thebasis for the compliance program. Thecost to implement such a complianceprogram would include initialcompliance program and annualadministration of this program.However, part of the complianceprogram is the challenge procedurewhich is covered in proposed§ 107.209(f). Thus, the net totalcompliance costs of $2.7 million,discounted, do not include the costs ofsetting up and administering a challengeprogram.

Proposed § 107.103, entitled‘‘Content’’ (amending the current§ 107.3) would expand the requirementsfor the Airport Security Programs(ASP’s) to include descriptions ofincidence response and notificationprocedures, controlled notificationsigns, and the increased responsibilitiesof the Airport Security Coordinators.The estimated administrative costswould be approximately $49,200,discounted.

Proposed § 107.107, entitled‘‘Changed conditions affecting security’’(amending the current § 107.7) wouldinvolve notification costs. All airportsare required to alert the FAA to certainchanges in airport security. Thisproposal would increase the number ofairport security changes that the FAAneeds to be aware of; require eachairport operator to notify the FAAwithin two hours of discovery of thesechanges and explain the interimmeasures being taken to deal with them;and relieve airports of having to modifytheir ASP for a changed securitycondition under 60 days. This proposedrevision would save an estimated $5.1million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.201, entitled ‘‘Securityof the critical security area’’ (amendingthe current § 107.14) would replace thesecured area portion which is subject tothe current § 107.14. Only the mostcritical security sensitive portions of theairport would need to be designated ascritical security areas, such as thoseareas where passenger and baggageoperations are conducted and adjacentareas that are not separated by securitycontrols or physical barriers. The intentis to better define the areas of the airportin which the security interest is themost critical and where securitymeasures should be the most complex.This would entail a number ofadditional costs including rebadgingand training all employees with accessto the proposed critical security area,


requiring those airports without apersonnel or vehicle identificationsystem to establish one, and changingwarning notices and signs for this area.This proposed revision would cost anestimated $129.7 million, discounted.

The proposed § 107.203, entitled‘‘Security of the restricted operationsarea’’ (amending the current § 107.13),would establish ‘‘restricted operationsareas.’’ In this area, which would besimilar on the current AOA, the meansused to control access and movementwould not need to be held to the samestandards as the means proposed tocontrol access and movement in thecritical security area. However, theproposed regulation on restrictedoperations areas would still entail anumber of additional costs includingrebadging and providing information toall employees with access to therestricted operations area and changingwarning notices and signs for this area.This proposed revision would cost anestimated $12.7 million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.205, entitled ‘‘Accesscontrol systems’’ (amending the current§ 107.14), would embellish the existingperformance standards for accesscontrols by allowing the issuance of asecond access medium to individuals.The secondary access media programwould give airport operators an optionin addition to using either existingairport escort programs or denyingemployees access without their originalcards, both of which can be very costly.An airport operator opting to use asecondary access media would incuradditional costs, including developmentcosts, annual computer time, cardmanufacturing costs, and card storagecosts. A few airports currently escort allemployees who do not have their accesscards. Most others deny entry toemployees without access cards. Theyare either sent home to retrieve the cardor not allowed to work for the day, sothat employee’s supervisor would needto reassign employees and/or obtainemployees from labor pools which existto insure against employee ‘‘no shows’’.In addition, this proposed sectionwould require airports to ensure that alldoors leading from nonpublic areas,other than the critical security area, tothe sterile area meet the access controlrequirements of this proposed section.The total net cost savings would be $4.7million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.209, entitled‘‘Identification systems’’ (amending thecurrent § 107.25), would require airportsto implement an ID system if they don’thave one, and require ID systems tomeet certain standards. Such standardswould require airports to audit theiridentification (ID) systems once a year

and revalidate their ID systems when apercentage, specified in each airport’sASP, of the currently issuedidentification media becomeunaccountable for both personnel andvehicle systems. Airports that do nothave personnel or vehicle identificationsystems would have to install a systemand incur administrative costs. Inaddition, it would require airportoperators to have temporary personneland vehicle IDs for people withoutunescorted access authority. In addition,this proposed section would requireairport operators to implement achallenge program in the ‘‘criticalsecurity’’ and ‘‘restricted operations’’areas. The purpose of the challengeprogram is to improve each airportoperator’s ability to limit unauthorizedincursions in the secured area. Theproposed rule would require all airportsto codify their present challengeprograms; airports without such aprogram would also incuradministrative costs. The total costs ofthis proposed section would be $7.5million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.215, entitled ‘‘Lawenforcement personnel’’ (amending thecurrent § 107.17), would allow for theuse of plainclothes officers in support ofthe airport security program. This is avoluntary program, but the use ofplainclothes officers could result insavings. The airport operator couldbetter utilize officers and realize savingsin labor costs. The analysis assumes that5.5 percent of airports would use thisoption, yielding cost savings of $19.5million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.219, entitled‘‘Records’’ (amending the current§ 107.23), would require that records bemaintained pursuant to a schedule inthe ASP and increase the time an airportmust maintain records from 90 days to180 days. Airports would still berequired to report all deadly weaponactivity, arrests, and threats against civilaviation, but the proposed sectionwould also require the airport operatorto maintain records of corrective actionsimposed on persons in support of thesecurity compliance program. Theadditional recordkeeping andmaintenance costs would total $9.4million, discounted.

The proposed § 107.303, entitled‘‘Security Directives and InformationCirculars’’ would develop standardizedprocedures that airport operators mustfollow upon receiving such documentsissued by FAA. The administrative timecost required to process and respond tothese documents is estimated at adiscounted $78,100.

The proposed § 107.3037, entitled‘‘Incident management,’’ would require

that airports incorporate certainprocedures into their ASP’s forresponding to threats of sabotage,aircraft piracy, and other unlawful actsagainst civil aviation. This sectionwould also require that airportoperation to coordinate theseprocedures with emergency responseprocedures required in FAR part 139;the costs of incorporating these threatresponse procedures into part 107 andthe review that would be necessary areestimated to be approximately $1.3million, discounted.

The 10-year cost of this proposed rulewould be $174.5 million (present value,$142.1 million).

The FAA requests comments on themost cost-effective ways to implementthese proposals. Many of theseproposals are performance standardsand do not provide many detailedrequirements as to how they would orwould be implemented. Thus, theregulated parties may have severaloptions as to how to comply. The FAA,in preparing this analysis, chose what itconsidered to be a reasonable approachin analyzing and costing out eachproposed section, and recognizes thatthere may be more efficient ways toimplement each section. The FAArequests that comments be as detailed aspossible and cite or include supportingdocumentation.

The FAA points out that, inestimating the costs of the rule, theprojected costs may well be in excess ofthe actual costs of complying with afinal rule. Some of the projected costsare significant in terms of the totalprojected costs of the rule. For example,the designation of ‘‘critical securedareas’’ has total projected costs thatcould be as high as $129.7 million,compared with total projected costs of$142.1 million, discounted, over 10years. In terms of implementation, theFAA expects that airport operatorswould find ways of meeting theobjectives of the rule in ways that maysignificantly reduce costs.

FAR Part 107 contributes to a securecivil air transportation system byproviding specific regulations to preventcriminal acts or air piracy. The benefitsof the proposed part 107 rules would bea strengthening of airport security. Thecurrent airport security systems, inwhich security is maintained through anintricate set of interlockingrequirements, are effective and haveprevented terrorist and criminal acts.The proposed changes would simplyadd to this effectiveness. In a parallelrulemaking effort, the FAA is alsoproposing to amend the existing aircarrier security rules, which arecontained in part 108.


7 The five rules are :

• Access to Secured Areas at Airports (1988).• Security Directives (1989).• Explosives Detection Systems (1989).• X-Ray Systems (1990).• Employment Standards (1990).

The high degree of dependencebetween parts 107 and 108 and amongthe proposed amendments does notpermit the separation of the benefits ofthese proposed amendments from theprevious rules. It would be extremelydifficult to determine to what extent anaverted terrorist incident could becredited to either airport operatorsecurity or to air carrier security.Accordingly, the benefits from theproposed rules for parts 107 (airportoperators) and 108 (air carriers) havebeen combined in this benefit-costanalysis.

The benefits of this rulemaking wouldbe the prevention of specific criminaland terrorist incidents, primarilyexplosions, hijackings, and sabotage.The FAA examined the number ofcriminal and terrorist incidents from1985 to 1994 to compute the overallbenefits. In order to provide the publicand government officials with abenchmark comparison of the expectedsafety benefits of rulemaking actionsover an extended period of time withestimated costs in dollars, the FAAcurrently uses a value of $2.7 millionand $518,000 to statistically represent ahuman fatality and a major injuryavoided, respectively.

The FAA has calculated benefitsbased on the types of criminal andterrorist incidents that parts 107 and108 are designed to combat. A Poissonprobability distribution was used toassist in estimating the potentialbenefits of these proposed rules. ThePoisson distribution is particularlyuseful in describing discrete randomvariables having a low probability ofoccurrence. Applying this distributionto the actual number of historicalincidents results in projectedprobabilistic estimates of potentialfuture incidents.

The FAA developed the Poissonprobability distribution model based onthe historical record while assumingthat the past level of threat carries intothe future. This model was used toestimate the potential number of futurecriminal and terrorist incidents that mayoccur in the absence of aviation securityrulemaking actions. What resulted wereprobability estimations of experiencingsuch incidents on board U.S. air carriersover the next 10 years. Given theuncertainties of predicting futurecriminal and terrorist incidents, theFAA is taking a conservative approachand using the historical record ofincidents as representatives of the truemean of occurrences for incidents,which sums to $1.871 billion (presentvalue, $1.334 billion).

The agency recognizes that potentialbenefits could change as the result of

the changing dynamics of aviationsecurity. While the benefits estimate isvalid based on those incidents cited inthe historical record, this baseline couldchange upon the assessment of anincreased credible security threat(s). Ifsuch information warrants some form ofregulatory initiatives, then the historicalbaseline would be augmented to includethose threats. Subsequently, the pool ofpotential safety benefits could increaseand be applied to any future rulemakingactions related to such threats.

Since 1987, the FAA has initiatedrulemaking and promulgated fivesecurity-related rules 7 that haveamended both parts 107 (airportoperators) and 108 (air carriers). Theserules also added to the effectiveness ofboth parts in that they were designed toaddress certain aspects of the totalsecurity system to help preventadditional criminal and terroristsactivities. These rules comprise aportion of the costs of combating thecriminal and terrorist incidents that theexisting parts 107 and 108 are trying toprevent. Accordingly, these costs can becompared with the benefits ofpreventing such incidents. To put theproposed changes to parts 107 and 108into context, the costs of these pastrulemakings will be added to the costsof the proposed changes to parts 107and 108; the benefits will also becontrasted against the costs of all theserulemakings.

In reviewing the five security-relatedrules, the costs were updated from theirrespective base-year dollars to 1994dollars using the implicit price deflatorfor Gross Domestic Product. The presentvalue of the costs and benefits wasrecalculated using the current discountrate of 7 percent. The FAA hasdeveloped new data that has improvedcomponents of past analyses. Theestimated update discounted costs total$498 million.

The FAA has developed three cost-benefit comparisons. Comparingbenefits of $1.871 billion, which arebased on the historical record ofincidents, to the combined estimatedcosts of the proposed amendments toparts 107 and 108, $217.4 million,suggests that expected benefits exceedestimated costs.

Using the Poisson distribution, theFAA estimated the probability ofoccurrence of potential benefits. Fromthis information, the agency has been

able to determine the probability ofobtaining occurrences where potentialbenefits would exceed costs. Each of thecriminal and terrorists incidents,explosions, hijackings, and sabotage,has a range of expected occurrences(based on the current assumed level ofthreat) with an associated probability foreach discrete number of events. TheFAA calculated the probability andassociated benefits of each possiblecombination of occurrences. The resultsof this analysis indicate that theprobability exceeds 95% that obtainingcombinations of occurrences where thebenefits of avoiding any of thesecombinations of occurrences willexceed the estimated costs of theseproposed rules.

When the estimated cost of these twoproposed rules are added to the cost ofthe five security rules ($727 million,undiscounted) already issued, thecombined cost is $944 million,undiscounted. The probability ofobtaining a combination of occurrencesyielding benefits equal to or greater than$944 million is over 68%. The FAA,therefore, has determined that thebenefits of these two proposed rulesexceed their costs, even when the costsof these two rules are added to the costof the previously issued rules.

International Trade Impact StatementIn accordance with the Office of

Management and Budget memorandumdated March 1983, federal agenciesengaged in rulemaking activities arerequired to assess the effects ofregulatory changes on internationaltrade. This proposed rule would affectall airport owners that have an FAA-approved security program in accordwith part 107. Unlike domestic aircarriers that compete with foreign aircarriers, domestic airports are not incompetition with foreign airports. Forthis reason, a trade impact assessmentwould not be applicable.

Initial Regulatory FlexibilityDetermination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980(RFA) was enacted by Congress toensure that small entities are notunnecessarily burdened by governmentregulations. The RFA requires agenciesto review rules that may have a‘‘significant economic impact on asubstantial number of small entities.’’

The FAA’s criterion for a ‘‘substantialnumber’’ is a number that is not lessthan 11 and that is more than one thirdof the small entities subject to the rule.The FAA’s small entity size standardscriterion define a small airport as oneowned by a county, city, town or otherjurisdiction having a population of


8 A primary airport is one which enplanes 10,000or more passengers annually (as per 49 U.S.C.47102 (11)).

49,999 or less. If two or more towns,cities, or counties operate an airportjointly, the population size of each aretotaled to determine whether thatairport is a small entity. The thresholdannualized cost levels in December1983 dollars is $5,400 for airports;adjusting to 1994 values, this thresholdcost becomes $7,800.

The FAA examined all primaryairports 8 to determine the number ofairports classified as small entities.After reviewing population data, theFAA determined that 108 of the primarynon-military airports are owned byjurisdictions with populations less than50,000.

Some airports are already incompliance with portions of theproposed rule and the total costsestimated in the regulatory evaluationwere adjusted accordingly. However,this regulatory flexibility determination,in looking for the maximum cost thatcould be incurred by a small entityairport, assumed that the typical airportwas not in compliance. Annually, theproposed part 107 would cost theaverage Type A (<2) airport no morethan $28,299, save the typical Type Bairport $3,327, and cost the typical TypeC airport no more than $2,869.

The cost of the proposed part 107 toTypes B and C are less than thethreshold figure of $7,800, but the costsof Type A (<2) airports exceed thisthreshold. As noted above, there are 21Type A (<2) airports in the 108 airportsthat qualify as small entities. At 19% ofthe number of small entities, this is lessthan the definition of a ‘‘substantialnumber’’. Therefore, the FAA finds thatthis proposed rule would not have asignificant impact on a substantialnumber of small entities.

Unfunded Mandates Reform ActTitle II of the Unfunded Mandates

Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted asPub. L. 104–4 on March 22, 1995,requires each Federal agency, to theextent permitted by law, to prepare awritten assessment of the effects of anyFederal mandate in a proposed or finalagency rule that may result in theexpenditure by State, local, and tribalgovernments, in the aggregate, or by theprivate sector, of $100 million or more(adjusted annually for inflation) in anyone year. Section 204(a) of the Act, 2U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federalagency to develop an effective processto permit timely input by electedofficers (or their designees) of State,local, and tribal governments on a

proposed ‘‘significant intergovernmentalmandate.’’ A ‘‘significantintergovernmental mandate’’ under theAct is any provision in a Federal agencyregulation that will impose anenforceable duty upon State, local, andtribal governments, in the aggregate, of$100 million (adjusted annually forinflation) in any one year. Section 203of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, whichsupplements section 204(a), providesthat before establishing any regulatoryrequirements that might significantly oruniquely affect small governments, theagency shall have developed a plan that,among other things, provides for noticeto potentially affected smallgovernments, if any, and for ameaningful and timely opportunity toprovide input in the development ofregulatory proposals. This proposed ruledoes not contain any Federalintergovernmental mandates or privatesector mandates.

Federalism Implications

The regulations proposed herein willnot have substantial direct effects on thestates, on the relationship between thenational government and the states, oron the distribution of power andresponsibilities among the variouslevels of government. Therefore, inaccordance with Executive Order 12612,it is determined that this proposedregulation will not have sufficientfederalism implications to warrant thepreparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed in thepreamble, and based on the findings inthe Initial Regulatory FlexibilityDetermination and the InternationalTrade Impact Analysis, the FAA hasdetermined that this proposedregulation is significant under ExecutiveOrder 12866. In addition, it is certifiedthat this proposal, if adopted, will nothave a significant economic impact,positive or negative, on a substantialnumber of small entities under thecriteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.This proposal is considered significantunder DOT Regulatory Policies andProcedures (44 FR 11034; February 26,1979).

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 107

Airports, Arms and munitions, Lawenforcement officers, Reporting andrecordkeeping requirements, Securitymeasures.

14 CFR Part 139

Air carriers, Airports, Aviation safety.

The Proposed AmendmentIn consideration of the foregoing, the

Federal Aviation Administrationproposes to amend parts 107 and 139 of14 CFR as follows:

1. Part 107 is revised to read asfollows:

PART 107—AIRPORT SECURITY

Sec.

Subpart A—General

107.1 Applicability.107.3 Definitions.107.5 Airport security coordinator.107.7 Inspection authority.107.9 Falsification.107.11 Security responsibilities of persons.


107.101 General requirements.107.103 Content.107.015 Approval and amendments.107.107 Changed conditions affecting

security.107.109 Alternate means of compliance.107.111 Exclusive area agreements.107.113 Airport tenant security programs.


107.201 Security of the critical securityarea.

107.203 Security of the restrictedoperations area.

107.205 Access control systems.107.207 Employment history, verification,

and criminal history records checks.107.209 Identification systems.107.211 Training.107.213 Law enforcement support.107.215 Law enforcement personnel.107.217 Supplementing law enforcement

personnel.107.219 Records.


107.301 Contingency plan.107.303 Security directives and information

circulars.107.305 Public advisories.107.307 Incident management.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113,40119, 44701–44702, 44706, 44901–44905,44907, 44913–44914, 44932, 44935–44936,46105.

Subpart A—General

§ 107.1 Applicability.(a) This part describes aviation

security rules governing:(1) The operation of each airport

regularly serving an air carrier requiredto have a security program under part108 of this chapter.

(2) The operation of each airportregularly serving a foreign air carrierrequired to have a security programunder § 129.25 of this chapter.

(3) Each person who is in, or entering,a critical security area, restrictedoperations area, or sterile area describedin this part and part 108 of this chapter.


(4) Each person who files anapplication or makes entries into anyrecord or report that is kept, made, orused to show compliance under thispart, or to exercise any privileges underthis part.

(b) Except as provided in § 107.105 ofthis part, the authority of theAdministrator under this part is alsoexercised by the AssistantAdministrator of Civil Aviation Securityand the Deputy Assistant Administratorfor Civil Aviation Security, and anyindividual formally designated to act intheir capacity. The authority of theAssistant Administrator, includingmatters under § 107.105 of this part,may be further delegated.

§ 107.3 Definitions.Terms defined in part 108 of this

chapter apply to this part. For purposesof this part, part 108 of this chapter, andsecurity programs under these parts, thefollowing definitions also apply:

Airport operator means a person whooperates an airport serving an air carrieror a foreign air carrier required to havea security program under part 108 or§ 129.25 of this chapter.

Airport security program means anairport operator’s security programrequired under § 107.101 of this partand approved by the Administrator.

Air tenant means any person, otherthan an air carrier or foreign air carrierthat has a security program under part108 or § 129.25 of this chapter, that hasan agreement with the airport operatorto conduct business on airport property.

Airport tenant security programmeans the agreement between theairport operator and an airport tenantthat specifies the measures by which thetenant will perform security functionsunder § 107.113 of this part.

Assistant Administrator means theFAA Assistant Administrator for CivilAviation Security as described in 49U.S.C. 44932.

Critical security area means a portionof an airport specified in the airportsecurity program in which securitymeasures specified in this part arecarried out. In general, this area iswhere air carriers and foreign aircarriers enplane and deplanepassengers, and sort and load baggage,and any adjacent areas that are notseparated by security controls orphysical barriers.

Escort means to accompany orsupervise an individual who does nothave unescorted access authority to acritical security area or a restrictedoperations area, in a manner sufficientto take action should the individualengage in activities other than those forwhich the escorted access is granted.

Exclusive area means any portion ofa critical security area or restrictedoperations area, including individualaccess points, for which an air carrier orforeign air carrier that has a securityprogram under part 108 or § 129.25 ofthis chapter has assumed responsibilityunder § 107.111 of this part.

Exclusive area agreement means anagreement between the airport operatorand an individual air carrier or foreignair carrier that has a security programunder part 108 or § 129.25 of thischapter that permits such an air carrieror foreign air carrier to assumeresponsibility for specified securitymeasures in accordance with § 107.111of this part.

Restricted operations area means aportion of an airport specified in theairport security program in whichsecurity measures specified in this partare carried out. In general, this area iswhere air carrier and foreign air carrieraircraft take off, land, taxi, park, andotherwise maneuver (other than criticalsecurity areas), and any adjacent areasthat are not separated by securitycontrols or physical barriers.

Unescorted access authority meansthe authority granted to individuals byan airport operator, air carrier, foreignair carrier, or airport tenant authorizedunder this part, or parts 108 or 129 ofthis chapter, to gain access to, and bewithout an escort in, critical securityareas and restricted operations areas.

§ 107.5 Airport security coordinator.

(a) Each airport operator shalldesignate an Airport SecurityCoordinator (ASC), and any alternateASC as necessary, in the airport securityprogram to serve as the airportoperator’s primary and immediatecontact for security-related activitiesand communications with the FAA.Any individual designated as an ASCmay perform other work duties inaddition to those described in paragraph(b) of this section.

(b) The ASC, or alternate ASC, shall—(1) Serve as the airport operator’s

primary and immediate contact forsecurity-related activities andcommunications with the FAA;

(2) Be available to the FAA on a 24-hour basis;

(3) Review with sufficient frequencyall security-related functions to ensurethat all are effective and in compliancewith this part, including the airportsecurity program, airport tenantactivities, and applicable securitydirectives;

(4) Immediately initiate correctiveaction for any instance of non-compliance with this part, the airport

security program, and applicablesecurity directives;

(5) Review and control the results ofaccess investigations required under§ 107.207 of this part;

(6) Serve as the contact to receivenotification from individuals applyingfor unescorted access of their intent toseek correction of their criminal historyrecord with the FBI; and

(7) Perform any other duties deemednecessary by the Administrator as setforth in the airport security program orin a Security Directive.

(c) Effective [insert 180 days afterpublication of the final rule in theFederal Register], each airport operatorshall ensure and document that theindividual designated as the ASC, andeach designated alternate ASC, has beentrained within the preceding 24calendar months to carry out theresponsibilities described in paragraph(b) of this section, as specified in theairport security program. The airportoperator shall maintain ASC trainingdocumentation in its principaloperations office until 180 days after thetermination of each individual servingas an ASC.

(D) With respect to training requiredunder this section, whenever a personcompletes recurrent training in thecalendar month before or the calendarmonth after the calendar month inwhich that training is required, thatperson is considered to have completedthe training in the calendar month inwhich it was required.

§ 107.7 Inspection authority.

(a) Each airport operator shall allowthe Administrator, including FAASpecial Agents, at any time or place, tomake any inspections or tests todetermine compliance of the airportoperator, air carrier, foreign air carrier,and other airport tentants with—

(1) The airport security program;(2) This part;(3) 49 CFR part 175, which relates to

the carriage of hazardous materials byaircraft; and

(4) 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, as amended.(b) At the request of the

Administrator, each airport operatorshall provide evidence of compliancewith this part and its airport securityprogram.

(c) On request of any FAA SpecialAgent, and presentation of valid FAA-issued credentials, each airport operatorshall issue to that agent access andidentification media to provide thespecial agent with unescorted access to,and movement within, critical securityareas and restricted operations areas.


§ 107.9 Falsification.

No person may make, or cause to bemade, any of the following:

(a) Any fraudulent or intentionallyfalse statement in any application forany security program, access medium,or identification medium, or anyamendment thereto, under this part.

(b) Any fraudulent or intentionallyfalse entry in any record or report thatis kept, made, or used to showcompliance with this part, or exerciseany privileges under this part.

(c) Any reproduction or alteration, forfraudulent purpose, of any report,record, security program, accessmedium, or identification mediumissued under this part.

§ 107.11 Security responsibilities ofpersons.

(a) No person may:(1) Tamper or interfere with,

compromise, modify, attempt tocircumvent, or cause a person to tamperor interfere with, compromise, modify,or circumvent, any security system,method, or procedure implementedunder this part.

(2) Enter, or be present within, acritical security area or restrictedoperations area without complying withthe systems, methods, or proceduresbeing applied to control access to, orpresence in such areas.

(3) Use, allow to be used, or cause tobe use, any airport-approved accessmedium or identification medium thatauthorizes the access or presence ofpersons and vehicles in critical securityareas or restricted operations areas inany other manner than that for which itwas issued by the appropriate authorityunder this part, part 108, or part 129 ofthis chapter.

(b) Except as provided in 49 U.S.C.subtile VII, and paragraphs (c) and (d)of this section, no individual may haveany deadly or dangerous weapon,explosive, incendiary, or otherdestructive substance on or about theindividual’s person or accessibleproperty when entering, or within acritical security area or restrictedoperations area of an airport governedby this part, or a sterile area governedunder § 108.201 of this chapter.

(c) The provisions of this section withregard to paragraphs (a) and (b) of thissection do not to apply to personsauthorized by the Federal Government,airport operator, air carrier, or foreignair carrier to conduct inspections forcompliance with this part, part 108, orpart 129 of this chapter, or 49 U.S.C.subtitle VII, while they are conductingan inspection.

(d) The provisions of this section withrespect to firearms and weapons do notapply to the following:

(1) Law enforcement personnelrequired to carry a firearm or otherweapon while in the performance oftheir duties at the airport.

(2) Persons authorized to carry afirearm under § 108.213, § 108.215, or§ 129.27 of this chapter.

(3) Persons authorized to carry afirearm in a sterile area, critical securityarea, or restricted operations area underthis part, an approved airport securityprogram, an approved air carriersecurity program, or security programused in accordance with § 129.25 of thischapter.

(4) Properly declared firearms inchecked baggage for transport under§ 108.213 of this chapter.

(5) Transportation of hazardousmaterials under 49 CFR part 175.

(6) Federal Air Marshals.(7) Aircraft operators not subject to

part 108 or part 129 of this chaptercarrying firearms in accordance withstate and local law.


§ 107.101 General requirements.

(a) No person may operate an airportsubject to this part unless it adopts andcarries out an airport security programthat—

(1) Provides for the safety and securityof persons and property on an aircraftoperating in air transportation orintrastate air transportation against anact of criminal violence, aircraft piracy,and the introduction of deadly ordangerous weapon, explosive,incendiary, or other destructivesubstance onto an aircraft;

(2) Is in writing and is signed by theairport operator or any person to whomthe airport operator has delegatedauthority in this matter;

(3) Includes the items listed in§ 107.103 of this part;

(4) Is organized in the same sequenceas § 107.103 of this part to the extentpracticable; and

(5) Has been approved by theAdministrator.

(b) The airport operator shall maintainone complete copy of the securityprogram in its principal operationsoffice, and make it available forinspection upon the request of theAdministrator.

(c) Each airport operator shall—(1) Restrict the distribution,

disclosure, and availability of sensitivesecurity information, as defined in part191 of this chapter, to persons with aneed to know, and

(2) Refer all requests for sensitivesecurity information by other persons tothe Administrator.

§ 107.103 Content.(a) Except as otherwise approved by

the Administrator, each airport regularlyserving an air carrier, required toconduct screening under § 108.101(a)(1)or § 129.25(b)(1) of this chapter, shallinclude in the security program adescription of the following—

(1) Name, means of contract, duties,and training requirements of the airportsecurity coordinator, and designatedalternates, required under § 107.5 of thispart.

(2) Security compliance program thatspecifies procedures the airport operatorwill implement to ensure persons withauthorized unescorted access to criticalsecurity areas and restricted operationsareas comply with § 107.9 and § 107.11(a) and (b) of this part, includingrevocation of unescorted accessauthority of persons that fail to complywith security requirements.

(3) Critical security areas, including—(i) Dimensions and a map detailing

boundaries and pertinent features;(ii) Each activity or entity on, or

adjacent to, a critical security area thataffects security;

(iii) Procedures, facilities, andequipment used to perform the accesscontrol functions required under§ 107.201(b)(1) of this part; and

(iv) Notification signs required under§ 107.201(b)(7) of this part.

(4) Restricted operations areas,including—

(i) Dimensions and a map detailingboundaries, and pertinent features;

(ii) Each activity or entity on, oradjacent to, a restricted operations areathat affects security;

(iii) Procedures, facilities, andequipment used to perform the accesscontrol functions required under§ 107.203(b)(1) of this part, and

(iv) Notification signs required under§ 107.203(b)(7) of this part.

(5) Sterile areas, including—(i) Dimensions and a map detailing

boundaries and pertinent features;(ii) Activities and tenants located

within the sterile area;(iii) Access controls to be used when

the passenger-screening checkpoint isnon-operational and the entityresponsible for that access control; and

(iv) Procedures, facilities, andequipment used to control access asspecified in § 107.205 of this part.

(6) Access investigation proceduresused to comply with § 107.207 of thispart.

(7) Personnel and vehicleidentification systems as described in§ 107.209 of this part.


(8) Escort procedures in accordancewith § 107.205(d) of this part.

(9) Challenge procedures inaccordance with § 107.209(f) of thispart.

(10) Training programs requiredunder § 107.211 and § 107.215 of thispart.

(11) Law enforcement support used tocomply with § 107.213(a) of this part.

(12) System for maintaining recordsand schedule for reporting records, asdescribed in § 107.219 of this part.

(13) Procedures, facilities, andequipment used to support air carrier orforeign air carrier screening functions of§ 108.211 of this chapter.

(14) Procedures, facilities, andequipment incorporated in thecontingency plan required under§ 107.301 of this part.

(15) Procedures for the distribution,storage, and disposal of SecurityDirectives, Information Circulars, and,as appropriate, classified information, asspecified in § 107.303 of this part.

(16) Procedures for public advisoriesas specified in § 107.305 of this part.

(17) Incident management proceduresused to comply with § 107.307 of thispart.

(18) Alternate security procedures, ifany, that the airport operator intends touse in the event of natural disasters andother emergencies or unusualconditions.

(19) Each exclusive area requiredunder § 107.111 of this part.

(20) Each airport tenant securityprogram as specified in § 107.113 of thispart.

(b) Except as otherwise approved bythe Administrator, each airport regularlyserving an air carrier or foreign aircarrier required to conduct screeningunder § 108.101(a)(2) or (a)(2) or (a)(3),and § 129.25(b)(2) or (b)(3) of thischapter shall include in the securityprogram a description of the following—

(1) Name, means of contact, duties,and training requirements of the airportsecurity coordinator, and designatedalternates, as required under § 107.5 ofthis part;

(2) Law enforcement support used tocomply with § 107.213(a) of this part;

(3) Training program for lawenforcement personnel required under§ 107.215 of this part;

(4) System for maintaining recordsand schedule for reporting records, asdescribed in § 107.219 of this part;

(5) Procedures, facilities, andequipment incorporated in thecontingency plan required under§ 107.301 of this part;

(6) Procedures for the distribution,storage, and disposal of SecurityDirectives, Information Circulars, and,

as appropriate, classified information, asspecified in § 107.303 of this part;

(7) Procedures for public advisories asspecified in § 107.305 of this part; and


(c) Except as otherwise approved bythe Administrator, each airport regularlyserving an air carrier or foreign aircarrier required to have a securityprogram under § 108.101(a)(4) or§ 129.25(b)(4) of this chapter, shallinclude in the security program adescription of the following—

(1) Name, means of contact, duties,and training requirements of the airportsecurity coordinator, and designatedalternates, required under § 107.5 of thispart;

(2) Law enforcement support used tocomply with § 107.213(b) of this part;

(3) Training programs for lawenforcement personnel required under§ 107.215 of this part;

(4) System for maintaining recordsand schedule for reporting records, asdescribed in § 107.219 of this part;

(5) Procedures for the distribution,storage, and disposal of SecurityDirectives, Information Circulars, and,as appropriate, classified information asspecified in § 107.303 of this part;

(6) Procedures for public advisories asspecified in § 107.305 of this part; and


(d) The airport operator may complywith paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of thissection by including in the securityprogram, as an appendix, any documentthat contains the information requiredby paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). Such anappendix shall be referenced in thecorresponding section(s) of the securityprogram.

§ 107.105 Approval and amendments.(a) Approval of security program.

Unless otherwise authorized by theAssistant Administrator, each airportoperator required to have an airportsecurity program under this part shallsubmit its proposed airport securityprogram to the Assistant Administratorfor approval at least 90 days before anyair carrier or foreign air carrier, requiredto have a security program under§ 108.101 or § 129.25 of this chapter, isexpected to begin operations. Suchrequests shall be processed as follows:

(1) Within 30 days after receiving theproposed airport security program, theAssistant Administrator will eitherapprove the program or give the airportoperator written notice to modify theprogram to comply with the applicablerequirements of this part.

(2) Within 30 days of receiving anotice to modify, the airport operatormay either submit a modified securityprogram to the Assistant Administratorfor approval, or petition theAdministrator to reconsider the noticeto modify. A petition for reconsiderationmust be filed with the AssistantAdministrator. Except in the case of anemergency requiring immediate actionin the interest of safety, the filing of thepetition stays the notice pending adecision by the Administrator.

(3) Upon receipt of a petition forreconsideration, the AssistantAdministrator either amends orwithdraws the notice, or transmits thepetition, together with any pertinentinformation, to the Administrator forreconsideration. The Administratordisposes of the petition within 30 daysof receipt by either directing theAssistant Administrator to withdraw oramend the notice to modify, or byaffirming the notice to modify.

(b) Amendment Requested by anAirport Operator. Except as provided in§ 107.107(c) of this part, an airportoperator may submit a request to theAssistant Administrator to amend itsairport security program, as follows:

(1) The application must be filed withthe Assistant Administrator at least 45days before the date it proposes for theamendment to become effective, unlessa shorter period is allowed by theAssistant Administrator. However, inaccordance with the procedures in thisparagraph, it may take longer than 45days for a final decision by theAdministrator.

(2) Within 30 days after receiving aproposed amendment, the AssistantAdministrator, in writing, eitherapproves or denies the request toamend.

(3) An amendment to an airportsecurity program may be approved if theAssistant Administrator determines thatsafety and the public interest will allowit, and the proposed amendmentprovides the level of security requiredunder this part.

(4) Within 30 days after receiving adenial, the airport operator may petitionthe Administrator to reconsider thedenial.

(5) Upon receipt of a petition forreconsideration, the AssistantAdministrator either approves therequest to amend or transmits thepetition, together with any pertinentinformation, to the Administrator forreconsideration. The Administratordisposes of the petition within 30 daysof receipt by either directing theAssistant Administrator to approve theamendment or affirm the denial.


(c) Amendment by the FAA. If safetyand the public interest require anamendment, the AssistantAdministrator may amend an airportsecurity program as follows:

(1) The Assistant Administrator sendsto the airport operator a notice, inwriting, of the proposed amendment,fixing a period of not less than 30 dayswithin which the airport operator maysubmit written information, views, andarguments on the amendment.

(2) After considering all relevantmaterial, the Assistant Administratornotifies the airport operator of anyamendment adopted or rescinds thenotice. If the amendment is adopted, itbecomes effective not less than 30 daysafter the airport operator receives thenotice of amendment, unless the airportoperator petitions the Administrator toreconsider no later than 15 days beforethe effective date of the amendment.The airport operator shall send thepetition for reconsideration to theAssistant Administrator. A timelypetition for reconsideration stays theeffective date of the amendment.

(3) Upon receipt of a petition forreconsideration, the AssistantAdministrator either amends orwithdraws the notice, or transmits thepetition, together with any pertinentinformation to the Administrator forreconsideration. The Administratordisposes of the petition within 30 daysof receipt by either directing theAssistant Administrator to withdraw oramend the amendment, or by affirmingthe amendment.

(d) Emergency Amendments.Notwithstanding paragraphs (a), (b), and(c) of this section, if the AssistantAdministrator finds that there is anemergency requiring immediate actionwith respect to safety in airtransportation or in air commerce thatmakes procedures in this sectioncontrary to the public interest, theAssistant Administrator may issue anamendment, effective without stay, onthe date the airport operator receivesnotice of it. In such a case, the AssistantAdministrator shall incorporate in thenotice a brief statement of the reasonsand findings for the amendment to beadopted. The airport may file a petitionfor reconsideration under paragraph (c)of this section, however, this does notstay the effectiveness of the emergencyamendment.

§ 107.107 Changed conditions affectingsecurity.

(a) After approval of the airportsecurity program, each airport operatorshall notify the Administrator whenchanges have occurred to the—

(1) Procedures, methods, system,facilities, training, equipment, areadescriptions, staffing, or any otherdescription or requirement prescribedby the airport security program;

(2) Nature of air carrier or foreign aircarrier operations, including changes tolevel of service, aircraft, and leasehold;or

(3) Layout or physical structure of anyarea under the control of the airportoperator, air carrier, or foreign air carrierused to support the screening, access, ormovement control functions requiredunder parts 107, 108, or 129 of thischapter.

(b) Whenever a changed conditiondescribed in paragraph (a) of thissection occurs, each airport operatorshall notify the Administrator within 2hours, or within the time specified in itssecurity program, of discovery of thechanged condition and each interimmeasure being taken to maintainadequate security until an appropriateamendment to the security program isapproved. Each interim measure(s) mustbe acceptable to the Administrator.

(c) For changed conditions under 60days duration, each airport operatorshall forward the information requiredin paragraph (b) of this section inwriting to the Administrator within 72hours of the original notification of thechange condition(s). The Administratorwill notify the airport operator of thedisposition of the notification inwriting. If approved by theAdministrator, this written notificationwill become a part of the airportsecurity program for the duration of thechanged condition(s).

(d) For changed conditions over 60days duration, each airport operatorshall forward the information requiredin paragraph (b) of this section in theform of a proposed amendment to theairport operator’s security program, asrequired under § 0107.105 of this part.The request for an amendment shall bemade within 30 days of the discovery ofthe changed condition(s). TheAdministrator will respond to therequest in accordance with § 107.105 ofthis part.

§ 107.109 Alternate means of compliance.If the safety and security of the

airport, and air carrier passengers andoperations, are not diminished, theAdministrator may approve an airportsecurity program that permits the use ofalternate means of compliance with therequirements of this part. Such anamendment may be considered for anairport operator of an airport that isserved seasonally or infrequently by anair carrier or foreign air carrier requiredto conduct screening under

§ 108.101(a)(1) or § 129.25(b)(1) of thischapter.

§ 107.111 Exclusive area agreements.

(a) The Administrator may approve anamendment to an airport securityprogram in accordance with this sectionthat permits an air carrier or foreign aircarrier that has an approved securityprogram under part 108 or part 129 toassume responsibility for specifiedsecurity measures for all or portions ofthe critical security areas or restrictedoperations areas. The assumption ofresponsibility must be exclusive to oneair carrier or foreign air carrier, andshared responsibility among air carriersor foreign air carriers is not permitted.

(b) An exclusive area agreement shallbe in writing and maintained in theairport security program. Thisagreement shall contain descriptions ofthe following:

(1) Dimensions, boundaries, andpertinent features of each area, orindividual access points, over which theair carrier or foreign air carrier willexercise exclusive securityresponsibility.

(2) Procedures and a description ofthe facilities and equipment used toperform the control functions describedin § 107.201 or § 107.203 of this part, asappropriate.

(3) Procedures by which the air carrieror foreign air carrier will immediatelynotify the airport operator and providefor alternative security measures whenthe procedures, facilities, andequipment required by the agreementare not adequate to perform the controlfunctions in accordance with § 107.201or § 107.203 of this part, as appropriate.

(4) Methods by which the airportoperator will monitor and audit the aircarrier’s or foreign air carrier’scompliance with the exclusive areaagreement.

(5) Circumstances under which theairport operator will terminate theexclusive area agreement for cause andresume responsibility for securitymeasures covered by the exclusive areaagreement.

§ 107.113 Airport tenant securityprograms.

(a) The Administrator may approve anairport tenant security program thatpermits an airport tenant having accessto a critical security area or restrictedoperations area to accept responsibilityfor all or part of the specified securitymeasures of §§ 107.201 or 107.203 ofthis part within the tenant’s leased areasor areas designated for the tenant’sexclusive use under an agreement withthe airport operator. This airport tenant


security program shall be included inthe airport security program.

(b) The airport tenant securityprogram shall include the following:

(1) Dimensions, boundaries, andpertinent features of each area coveredby the airport tenant security program.

(2) Measures by which the tenant willcarry out within its designated areas thesecurity requirements imposed by theAdministrator on the airport operator.

(3) Methods by which the airportoperator will monitor and audit thetenant’s compliance with the securityrequirements.

(4) Terms of the agreement, includingmonetary and other penalties, to whichthe tenant may be subject if it fails tocarry out any security requirements itagreed to perform.

(5) Circumstances under which theairport operator will terminate theairport tenant security program forcause.

(c) The airport operator may not befound to be in violation of a requirementof this part in any case in which theairport operator demonstrates that:

(1) The tenant, or an employee,permittee, or invitee of the tenant, isresponsible for such violation; and

(2) The airport operator has compliedwith all measures in its airport securityprogram to ensure the tenant hascomplied with the airport tenantsecurity program.

(d) The Administrator may amend orterminate an airport tenant securityprogram in accordance with § 107.105 ofthis part.


§ 107.201 Security of the critical securityarea.

(a) Each airport operator required tohave an airport security program under§ 107.103(a) of this part shall establishat least one critical security area anddescribe each critical security area in itssecurity program.

(b) Each airport operator required toestablish a critical security area shall dothe following:

(1) Prevent the entry of unauthorizedindividuals and ground vehicles byestablishing and carrying out a system,method, or procedure for controllingaccess to critical security areas of theairport in accordance with § 107.205 ofthis part.

(2) Establish and carry out a personneland vehicle identification systemdescribed under § 107.209 of this part tocontrol the presence and movement ofpersons and ground vehicles within thecritical security area.

(3) Establish and use escortprocedures in accordance with§ 107.205(d) of this part.

(4) Establish and use challengeprocedures required under § 107.209(f)of this part.

(5) Subject each individual to apersonnel background check asdescribed in § 107.207 of this part beforeauthorizing unescorted access to acritical security area.

(6) Train each individual beforegranting unescorted access to the criticalsecurity area, as required in § 107.211(b)of this part.

(7) Post signs at critical security areaaccess points and on the perimeter thatprovide warning of the prohibitionagainst unauthorized access. Suchwarning signs shall be posted by eachairport operator not later than 2 yearsafter [the effective date of this rule].

§ 107.203 Security of the restrictedoperations area.

(a) For those portions of the airportwhere air carrier and foreign air carrieraircraft take off, land, taxi, park andotherwise maneuver but are notdelineated as a critical security area,each airport operator required to havean airport security program under§ 107.103(a) of this part shall establishand describe in its security program arestricted operations area.

(b) Each airport operator required toestablish a restricted operations areashall do the following:

(1) Use a system, method, orprocedure for controlling access torestricted operations areas of the airportin accordance with § 107.205(b) of thispart.

(2) Subject each individual to a 5-yearemployment history verification beforeauthorizing unescorted access to therestricted operations area.

(3) Establish and use a personnel andvehicle identification system describedunder § 107.209 of this part to controlthe presence and movement ofindividuals and ground vehicles withinthe restricted operations area.

(4) Establish and use escortprocedures in accordance with§ 107.205(d) of this part.

(5) Establish and use challengeprocedures required under § 107.209(f)of this part.

(6) Provide security information asdescribed in § 107.211(c) of this part toeach individual with unescorted accessto the restricted operations area.

(7) Post signs on restricted operationsarea access points and perimeters thatprovide warning of the prohibitionagainst unauthorized access. Signs shallbe implemented by each airportoperator not later than 2 years after [theeffective date of this rule].

§ 107.205 Access control systems.(a) Critical Security Area. Except as

provided in paragraph (g) of thissection, the system, method, orprocedure for controlling access to thecritical security area required under§ 107.201(b)(1) of this part shall—

(1) Ensure that only those individualsauthorized to have unescorted access tothe critical security area are able toobtain that access;

(2) Ensure that an individual isimmediately denied access to a criticalsecurity area when that person’sauthority for that area is withdrawn;

(3) Provide a means to differentiatebetween individuals authorized to haveaccess to an entire critical security areaan individuals authorized access to onlya particular portion of a critical securityarea; and

(4) Be capable of limiting anindividual’s access to a critical area bytime and date, as specified in the airportcontingency plan required under§ 107.301 of this part.

(b) Restricted Operations Area. Exceptas provided in paragraphs (c) and (e) ofthis section, the system, method, orprocedure for controlling access to therestricted operations area requiredunder § 107.203(b)(1) of this part shall—

(1) Prevent the entry of unauthorizedindividuals and ground vehicles;

(2) Provide for detection of andresponse to each unauthorized presencein or access or attempted access to, therestricted operations area by anindividual whose entry is notauthorized in accordance with theairport security program;

(3) Be locally controlled; and(4) Incorporate accountability

procedures to maintain the integrity ofthat system, method, or procedure.

(c) Secondary access media. Anairport operator may issue a secondaccess medium to individualsauthorized access to critical securityareas and restricted operations areas, ifthe airport operator follows methodsand procedures in the airport securityprogram that—

(1) Verify the access authorization ofthe individuals granted unescortedaccess to critical security areas andrestricted operations areas but are not inpossession of their original accessmedium;

(2) Limit time of access with secondaccess medium;

(3) Retrieve the second accessmedium when expired; and

(4) Deactivate or invalidatetemporarily the original access mediumuntil the time that the individualreturns the second access medium.

(d) Escorting. Each airport operatorshall establish and implement


procedures for escorting individualswho do not have unescorted accessauthority to a critical security area or arestricted operations area that—

(1) Ensure that only individuals withunescorted access authority arepermitted to escort;

(2) Ensure that the escortedindividuals are continuouslyaccompanied or supervised in a mannersufficient to take action should escortedindividuals engage in activities otherthan those for which escorted accesswas granted;

(3) Identify what action is to be takenby the escort, or other authorizedindividual, should individuals underescort engage in activities other thanthose for which access was granted;

(4) Prescribe law enforcement supportof escort activities; and

(5) Ensure that individuals escorted toa sterile area without being screenedunder § 108.201 of this chapter remainunder escort in accordance with thissection, or submit to screening pursuantto § 108.201 of this part.

(3) Group validation. An airportoperator may submit for approval by theAdministrator procedures in its airportsecurity program for group validationwithout each individual validatingaccess authority at individual accesspoints.

(f) Sterile areas. With the exception ofaccess points leading from a criticalsecurity area, each airport operator shallensure that all points that provideaccess to the sterile area from nonpublicareas meet the requirements of thissection.

(g) Alternative systems. TheAdministrator may approve anamendment to an airport securityprogram that provides an alternativesystem, method, or procedure thatprovides an overall level of securityequal to that which would be providedby the system, method, or proceduredescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) ofthis section.

§ 107.207 Employment history,verification, and criminal history recordschecks—[Reserved]

[Note: The is a separate rulemaking actionthat will result in new text for this section.To avoid confusion, the section is notrepeated here. See the preamble for furtherexplanation.]

§ 107.209 Identification systems.

(a) Personnel identification system.The personnel identification systemunder §§ 107.201(b)(2) or 107.203(b)(3)of this part shall include the following:

(1) Personnel identification mediathat—

(i) Convey accurate identification ofthe individual to whom theidentification medium is issued;

(ii) Indicate clearly the scope of theindividual’s access and movementprivileges;

(iii) Indicate clearly an expirationdate; and

(iv) Are of sufficient size andappearance as to be readily observablefor challenge purposes.

(2) Procedures to ensure that eachindividual continuously displays theidentification medium issued to thatindividual.

(3) Procedures to ensureaccountability through the following—

(i) Retrieving expired identificationmedia;

(ii) Reporting lost or stolenidentification media;

(iii) Securing unissued identificationmedia stock and supplies;

(iv) Auditing the system at aminimum of once a year or sooner asnecessary to ensure the integrity andaccountability of all identificationmedia;

(v) As specified in the airport securityprogram, revalidate the identificationsystem or reissue identification media ifa portion of all issued identificationmedia become unaccounted for,including identification media that iscombined with access media; and

(vi) Ensure that only oneidentification medium is issued to anindividual at a time. A replacementidentification medium may only beissued if an individual declares inwriting that the medium has been lostor stolen.

(b) Vehicle identification system. Theidentification system required under§ 107.201(b)(2) and § 107.203(b)(3) ofthis part shall include the following:

(1) Vehicle identification media that—(i) Indicate clearly the scope of the

vehicle’s access and movement;(ii) Indicate clearly an expiration date;

and(iii) Are of sufficient size and

appearance as to be readily visible whenaffixed to the vehicle.

(2) Procedures to ensureaccountability through—

(i) Retrieving expired vehicleidentification media;

(ii) Reporting lost or stolen vehiclemedia;

(iii) Securing unissued vehicleidentification media stock and supplies;

(iv) Auditing the system at aminimum of once a year or sooner asnecessary to ensure accountability of allvehicle identification media;

(v) As specified in the airport securityprogram, revalidate, or reissue vehicleidentification media, if a portion of all

issued vehicle identification mediabecome unaccounted for; and

(vi) Ensure that only oneidentification medium is issued to avehicle at a time. A replacementidentification medium may only beissued if the owner of the vehicle, ordesignee, declares in writing that themedium has been lost or stolen.

(c) Part 139, Ground vehicle system. Ifapproved by the Administrator, avehicle access control and operationssystem may be used to meet therequirements of both § 139.329, GroundVehicles and this section.

(d) Temporary identification media.Each airport operator shall issuepersonnel and vehicle identificationmedia to persons whose duties areexpected to be temporary. Temporaryidentification media system shallinclude procedures and methods to—

(1) Retrieve temporary identificationmedia;

(2) Authorize the use of a temporarymedia for a limited time only; and

(3) Ensure that temporary media aredistinct and clearly display anexpiration date.

(e) Airport-approved identificationmedia. The Administrator may approvethe use of identification media meetingthe criteria of this section that are issuedby entities other than the airportoperator, as described in the airportsecurity program.

(f) Challenge program. Each airportoperator shall establish and carry out achallenge program that requires eachindividual authorized unescorted accessto critical security areas and restrictedoperations areas to ascertain theauthority of any individual notdisplaying an authorized identificationmedia to be present in such areas. Achallenge program shall includeprocedures to verbally challenge orreport individuals not visibly displayingauthorized identification media that—

(1) Apply uniformly in both criticalsecurity areas and restricted operationsareas, including exclusive areas;

(2) Identify how to challenge directlyor report individuals not visiblydisplaying authorized identificationmedium, including procedures to notifythe appropriate authority; and

(3) Prescribe law enforcement supportof challenge procedures, includingresponse to reports of individuals notdisplaying authorized identification.

(g) Effective date. The identificationsystems described in this section shallbe implemented by each airportoperator not later than 2 years after [theeffective date of this rule].

§ 107.211 Training.(a) Each airport operator shall ensure

that individuals performing security-


related functions for the airport operatorare briefed on the provisions of thispart, applicable Security Directives andInformation Circulars promulgatedpursuant to § 107.303 of this part, andthe airport security program, to theextent that such individuals need toknow in order to perform their duties.

(b) An airport operator may notauthorize any individual unescortedaccess to the critical security area unlessthat individual has successfullycompleted training in accordance withthe FAA-approved curriculum specifiedin the security program. Thiscurriculum must detail the methods ofinstruction and include at least thefollowing topics—

(1) Control, use, and display ofairport-approved access andidentification media;

(2) Escort and challenge procedures,and the law enforcement support forthese procedures;

(3) Security responsibilities asspecified in § 107.9 and § 107.11 (a) and(b) of this part; and

(4) Any other topics specified in theairport security program.

(c) An airport operator may notauthorize any individual unescortedaccess to a restricted operations areaunless that individual has beenprovided, and so acknowledges inwriting, information in accordance withthe airport security program,including—

(1) Control, use, and display ofairport-approved access andidentification media;

(2) Escort and challenge proceduresand the law enforcement support forthese procedures;

(3) Security responsibilities asspecified in § 107.9 and § 107.11 (a) and(b) of this part; and

(4) Any other topics specified in theairport security program.

(d) Each airport operator shallmaintain a record of all training givento each individual under this sectionand written acknowledgment requiredunder paragraph (c) of this section, for180 days after the termination of thatperson’s unescorted access authority.

(e) Training described in this sectionshall be implemented by each airportoperator not later than 2 years after[insert the effective date of this rule].

§ 107.213 Law enforcement support.(a) In accordance with § 107.215 of

this part, each airport operator requiredto have an airport security programunder § 107.103 (a) and (b) of this partshall provide:

(1) Law enforcement personnel in thenumber and manner adequate tosupport its security program.

(2) Uniformed law enforcementpersonnel in the number and manneradequate to support each passenger-screening system required under§ 108.201 or § 129.25 of this chapter.

(b) Each airport required to have anairport security program under§ 107.103(c) of this part shall ensurethat:

(1) Law enforcement personnel areavailable and committed to respond toan incident at the request of an aircarrier or foreign air carrier that has asecurity program under part 108 or§ 129.25 of this chapter.

(2) The procedures by which torequest law enforcement support areprovided to each air carrier or foreignair carrier that has a security programunder part 108 or § 129.25 of thischapter.

§ 107.215 Law enforcement personnel.(a) Each airport operator shall ensure

that law enforcement personnel used tomeet the requirements of § 107.213 ofthis part, meet the followingqualifications while on duty at theairport—

(1) Have arrest authority described inparagraph (b) of this section;

(2) Are identifiable by appropriateindicia of authority;

(3) Are armed and firearm andauthorized to use it; and

(4) Have completed a trainingprogram that meets the requirements ofparagraphs (c) and (d) of this section.

(b) Each airport operator shall ensurethat law enforcement personnel used tomeet the requirements of § 107.213 ofthis part have the authority to arrest,with or without a warrant, while onduty at the airport for the followingviolations of the criminal laws of theState and local jurisdictions in whichthe airport is located—

(1) A crime committed in the presenceof the law enforcement personnel; and

(2) A felony, when the lawenforcement personnel has reason tobelieve that the suspect has committedit.

(c) The training program required byparagraph (a)(4) of this section shall—

(1) In the case of Law EnforcementOfficers, meet the training standardsprescribed by either the State or localjurisdiction in which the airport islocated for law enforcement personnelperforming comparable functions.

(2) In the case of private LawEnforcement Personnel, be trained in amanner acceptable to the Administrator,if the State and local jurisdictions inwhich the airport is located do notprescribe training standards for privatesecurity personnel who meet thestandards in paragraph (a) of thissection.

(3) Include training in—(i) The use of firearms;(ii) The courteous and efficient

treatment of persons subject toinspection, detention, search, arrest, andother aviation security activities;

(iii) The responsibilities of lawenforcement personnel under the airportsecurity program; and

(iv) Any other subject theAdministrator determines is necessary.

(d) Each airport operator shalldocument the training program requiredby paragraph (a)(4) of this section and—

(1) Maintain documentation oftraining in its principal operations officeuntil 180 days after the departure orremoval of each law enforcementpersonnel from service at the airport;and

(2) Make training documentationavailable for inspection upon therequest of the Administrator.

§ 107.217 Supplementing law enforcementpersonnel.

(a) When the Administrator decides,after being notified by an airportoperator as prescribed in this section,that not enough qualified State, local,and private law enforcement personnelare available to carry out therequirements of § 107.213 of this part,the Administrator may authorize theairport operator to use, on areimbursable basis, personnel employedby the Administrator, or by anotherdepartment, agency, or instrumentalityof the Government with the consent ofthe head of the department, agency, orinstrumentality, to supplement State,local, and private law enforcementpersonnel.

(b) Each request for the use of Federalpersonnel must be submitted to theAdministrator and include the followinginformation:

(1) The number of passengersenplaned at the airport during thepreceding calendar year and the currentcalendar year a of the date of therequest.

(2) The anticipated risk of criminalviolence, sabotage, aircraft piracy, andother unlawful interference to civilaviation operations.

(3) A copy of that portion of theairport security program whichdescribes the law enforcement supportnecessary to comply with § 107.213 ofthis part.

(4) The availability of lawenforcement personnel who meet therequirements of § 107.215 of this part,including a description of the airportoperator’s efforts to obtain lawenforcement support from State, local,and private agencies and the responsesof those agencies.


(5) The airport operator’s estimate ofthe number of Federal personnel neededto supplement available lawenforcement personnel and the periodof time for which they are needed.

(6) A statement acknowledgingresponsibility for providingreimbursement for the cost of providingFederal personnel.

(7) Any other information theAdministrator considers necessary.

(c) In response to a request submittedin accordance with this section, theAdministrator may authorize, on areimbursable basis, the use of personnelemployed by a Federal agency, with theconsent of the head of that agency.

§ 107.219 Records.(a) All records required to be

maintained under this part shall befurnished to the Administrator pursuantto the schedule included in the airportsecurity program.

(b) Each airport operator shall ensurethat—

(1) A record is made of each lawenforcement response taken infurtherance of this part; and

(2) The record is maintained for aminimum of 180 days.

(c) Data developed in response toparagraph (b) of this section mustinclude at least the following:

(1) The number and type of deadly ordangerous weapon, explosive,incendiary, or other destructivesubstance discovered during anypassenger-screening process, and themethod of detection of each;

(2) The number of acts and attemptedacts of aircraft piracy.

(3) The number of bomb threatsreceived, real and simulated bombsfound, and actual detonations on theairport.

(4) The number of detentions andarrests, including—

(i) Name, address, and the immediatedisposition of each individual detainedor arrested;

(ii) Type of deadly or dangerousweapon, explosive, incendiary, or otherdestructive substance confiscated, asappropriate; and

(iii) Identification of the air carriers orforeign air carriers on which theindividual detained or arrested was, orwas scheduled to be, a passenger, orwhich screened that individual, asappropriate.

(d) Each airport operator required tohave an airport security program under§ 107.103 (a) of this part shall make, andmaintain for 180 days, records ofcorrective action imposed on personsthat fail to comply with § 107.9 and§ 107.9 and § 107.11 (a) and (b) of thispart.

(e) Each airport operator shall makeand maintain any additional recordsrequired by the Administrator, this part,and the airport security program,including, but not limited to, thefollowing recordkeeping requirementsof this part:

(1) § 107.5, Airport securitycoordinator.

(2) 107.207, Employment verification.(3) § 107.211, Training.(4) § 107.215, Law enforcement

personnel.


§ 107.301 Contingency plan.Each airport operator required to have

a security program under § 107.103(a)and (b) of this part shall adopt acontingency plan and shall:

(a) Implement its contingency planwhen directed by the Administrator.

(b) Conduct reviews and exercises ofits contingency plan with all air carriersand foreign air carriers and all personshaving responsibilities under the plan toensure that all parties involved knowtheir responsibilities and that allinformation contained in the plan iscurrent.

§ 107.303 Security directives andinformation circulars.

(a) When a threat against civilaviation becomes known, the AssistantAdministrator may issue an informationcircular to notify airport operators of thegeneral situation or a Security Directivesetting forth mandatorycountermeasures to an assessed threat.

(b) Each airport operator required tohave an airport security program shallcomply with each Security Directiveissued to the airport operator by theAdministrator, within the timeprescribed in the Security Directive forcompliance.

(c) Each airport operator that receivesa Security Directive shall—

(1) Immediately upon receipt from theFAA, or within the time prescribed inthe Security Directive, verballyacknowledge receipt of the SecurityDirective to the FAA, followed bywritten acknowledgment of receiptwithin 24 hours;

(2) Not later than 72 hours afterdelivery by the FAA, or within the timeprescribed in the Security Directive,specify the method by which themeasures in the Security Directive havebeen implemented (or will beimplemented, if the Security Directive isnot yet effective) by providing the FAAa copy of the written measures andimplementation procedures; and

(3) Ensure that information regardingthe Security Directive and measures

implemented in response to the SecurityDirective are distributed to specifiedpersonnel, as prescribed in the SecurityDirective, and to other personnel withan operational need to know.

(d) In the event that the airportoperator is unable to implementparagraph (b)(2) of this section, theairport operator shall submit, within 72hours after receipt of the SecurityDirective, proposed alternativemeasures and the basis for submittingthe alternative measures to theAdministrator for approval. Within 48hours after receiving the airportoperator’s proposed alternativemeasures, the Administrator eitherapproves the proposed alternativecountermeasures or notifies the airportoperator to modify the alternativecountermeasures to comply with therequirements of the Security Directive.The airport operator shall implementany alternative measures approved bythe Administrator within 72 hours ofreceipt of notification of theAdministrator’s determination.

(e) Each airport operator that receivesa Security Directive or InformationCircular and each person who receivesinformation from a Security Directive orInformation Circular shall:

(1) Restrict the availability of theSecurity Directive or InformationCircular, and information contained ineither document, to those persons withan operational need to know.

(2) Refuse to release the SecurityDirective or Information Circular, andinformation contained in eitherdocument, to persons other than thosewho have an operational need-to-knowwithout the prior written consent of theAdministrator.

(f) The airport security coordinator, oran individual designated by the airportoperator, may receive classifiedinformation related to national securityif the airport security coordinator, ordesignee, has applied to theAdministrator and received theappropriate security clearances.

§ 107.305 Public advisories.When advised by the Administrator,

each airport operator shall prominentlydisplay and maintain in public areasinformation concerning foreign airportsthat, in the judgment of the Secretary ofTransportation, do not maintain andadminister effective security measures.Such information shall be posted in themanner and for the timeframe specifiedin the airport security program.

§ 107.307 Incident management.(a) As described in the airport security

program, each airport operator shallestablish procedures to evaluate the


appropriate response to threats ofsabotage, aircraft piracy, and otherunlawful interference to civil aviationoperations, including bomb threats.

(b) Immediately upon receipt of athreat of any of the incidents describedin paragraph (a), each airport operatorshall—

(1) evaluate the threat in accordancewith its airport security program;

(2) Initiate appropriate action asspecified in the Airport Emergency Planunder § 139.325 of this chapter; and

(3) Immediately notify theAdministrator of acts, or suspected acts,of unlawful interference to civil aviationoperations, including specific bombthreats to aircraft and airport facilities.

(c) Airport operators required to havean airport security program under§ 107.103(c) of this part but not subjectto part 139 of this chapter, Certificationand Operations: Land Airports ServingCertain Air Carriers, shall develop

emergency response procedures toincidents of threats identified inparagraph (a).

(d) To ensure that all parties knowtheir responsibilities and that allprocedures are current, at least onceevery 12 calendar months each airportoperator shall review the proceduresrequired in paragraphs (a) and (b) withall persons having responsibilities forsuch procedures.

PART 139—CERTIFICATION ANDOPERATIONS: LAND AIRPORTSSERVING CERTAIN AIR CARRIERS

2. The authority citation for part 139continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–44706, 44709, 44719.

3. Section 139.325 is amended byredesignating paragraph (h) as newparagraph (j) and adding newparagraphs (h) and (i) to read as follows:

§ 139.325 Airport emergency plan.

* * * * *(h) Each airport subject to part 107,

Airport Security, shall ensure thatinstructions for response to paragraphs(b)(2) and (b)(6) of this section in theairport emergency plan are consistentwith its approved airport securityprogram.

(i) FAA Advisory Circulars in the 150Series contain standards and proceduresfor the development of an airportemergency plan which are acceptable tothe Administrator.* * * * *

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 21,1997.

Anthony Fainberg,Director, Office of Civil Aviation SecurityPolicy and Planning.[FR Doc. 97–19698 Filed 7–31–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

41760 federal register /vol. 62, no. 148/friday, august 1, … · airlines (laa) office in...

Documents