2nd set of property cases

7/23/2019 2nd set of Property Cases

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/2nd-set-of-property-cases 1/36

G.R. No. 81015 July 4, 1991

CRESENCIO VIRAY and BENJAMIN D. DE ASIS, petitioners,vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and RUSTICO VICTOR, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p

It is about a written lease agreement that the case at bar turns. The lease concerns residentialpremises identified as Apartment A at 1836 Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Said lease wasexecuted on April 1, 1981 by the owner of the place, Benjamin de Asis, and Rustico Victor, aslessee. 1 The agreement included stipulations (a) fixing the term of the lease and (b) governingthe lessors right of repossession, viz .:

(a. Term of Lease)

2. The term of this lease shall be for a period of three (3) months and shall beimpliedly renewable from month to month under the same terms and conditions,unless revised by the parties in writing with previous notice to each other of at leastfifteen (15) days.

(b. Repossession by Lessor)

7. Upon failure of the Lessee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of thislease, as well as such other terms and conditions which may be imposed by theLessor prior to and/or upon renewal of this lease agreement as provided in par. 2above, then the Lessor shall have the right, upon five (5) days written notice to theLessee or in his absence, upon written notice posted at the entrance of thepremises leased, to enter and take possession of the said premises holding in histrust and custody and such possessions and belongings of the Lessee found

therein after an inventory of the same in the presence of a witness, all these actsbeing hereby agreed to by the Lessee as tantamount to his voluntary vacation ofthe leased premises without the necessity of suit in court.

A duplicate original of the contract was given to the lessee, Rustico Victor.

Sometime in October, 1983, Victor and his wife left for Ontario, Canada and did not return to thePhilippines until February, 1985. They left the apartment in the care of their son, Ramon.

Believing that the Victor spouses had abandoned the apartment — they having been away formore than a year, and the place being occupied by Ramon Victor, an unauthorized stranger — De Asis brought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court in December, 1984 to evict the latter. But as

aforestated, the spouses returned in February, 1985, and on their representation that they did notmean to give up the apartment, the case was dismissed on joint motion of the parties dated March12, 1985. 2

It seems, however, that Rustico Victor did not re-occupy the apartment but continued to leave itin the care of his son, Ramon. Later, in the second week of October 1985, Ramon himself left forCanada. He asked his brother, Roldan, to look after the place. But Roldan Victor did not actuallymove into the apartment; all he did was to install a padlock at the main door, visit the place oncea week, and sleep there occasionally. 3

When De Asis learned of this state of affairs sometime in December, 1985, he went to the placeto see for himself if it was true. He saw there was nobody in the apartment, but he could not get

inside because it was locked. De Asis then caused the cutting off of the electrical and waterservice connections and, on the following day, posted at the main door of the apartment a noticeof termination of the lease, on the ground of abandonment and failure to pay rentals in accordancewith the contract. He could not serve the notice of termination directly on the lessee since he didnot know where the latter was.

In the first week of January, 1986, De Asis returned to the apartment and noted that thetermination notice he had posted at the door was no longer there. He posted another notice, thistime announcing that he would repossess the place after five (5) days in order to secure it fromfire, repair it to preserve its value, and inventory such of the lessee's things as were inside whichmight thereafter be claimed at his residence in Quezon City. 4



De Asis also wrote on January 2, 1986 to the local barangay captain requesting his presence atthe premises on January 5, 1986 at which time he intended to open and repossess the apartment.On January 5, 1986, as announced, and in the presence of the barangay authorities, De Asis hadthe door of the apartment opened by a carpenter, and hauled to his residence the things foundinside after making an inventory of them. Thereafter, he made repairs on the apartment at a costof P13,108.00, and then leased it to Cresencio C. Viray. 5

Not long afterwards an action of forcible entry was instituted in the Metropolitan Trial Court againstDe Asis and his new lessee, Viray, by Roldan Victor in behalf and in the name of his father,Rustico. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 11635-CV and resulted in a judgmentrendered on December 29, 1986 "against the defendants . . De Asis (owner-lessor) and Sgt. C.Viray (present occupant) ordering the said defendants to restore plaintiff to the possession andenjoyment of the leased premises at No. 1836-A Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and to pay thecosts of this suit." 6 The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled that Rustico Victor could not be deemed tohave abandoned the premises, and even if he had, the apartment could not be repossessedwithout Judicial action, the stipulation authorizing the lessor to do so being void as "against publicpolicy and existing precedents."

De Asis and Viray appealed to the Regional Trial Court, without success. That Court rendered

judgment on June 15, 1987, affirming that of the Metropolitan Trial Court. 7 It adopted "byreference the findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . in the Decision appealed from;" declaredthe findings to be "in strict accord with the evidence presented and the conclusions . . . soobviously correct that a detailed discussion would serve no useful purpose;" and directed "thecourt of origin to issue a writ of possession immediately in favor of the plaintiff and family, and toissue an order directing the immediate return of the personal belongings of plaintiff taken bydefendant Benjamin De Asis inside the apartment in question that were hauled and/or transportedto his residence in Quezon City on April 15, 1987."

De Asis and Viray then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Their appeal met the same fate. By judgment promulgated on November 27, 1987 by the Fifteenth Division, 8 their petition for reviewwas dismissed and the Regional Trial Court's decision affirmed.

It is to overturn these three adverse verdicts that De Asis and Viray are now before this Court.They ask this Court to rule favorably to them on two questions of law, viz .: (a) whether or not theposting in the premises, in the first week of December, 1985, of notice of termination of the leasehad legally caused its cessation or extinguishment as of December 31, 1985; and (b) whether ornot De Asis had "the legal and contractual right to repossess the premises" without andindependently of prior judicial authority. 9

The Court gave the petition due course by Resolution dated June 28, 1989 and required theparties to submit memoranda. The petitioners submitted their memorandum on August 23, 1989.No memorandum was filed by or in behalf of Rustico Victor within the time appointed.

It is indisputable that the parties' written agreement created a lease on a month-to-month basis.Such a lease, therefore, must be construed, by established doctrine, 10 as providing a definiteperiod and as terminable by notice at the end of any given month.

It appears undisputed, too, that the lessor had posted a notice of termination of the lease at thedoorway of the leased apartment and that notice had subsequently been noted and removed bythe lessee's representative. The giving of notice of termination in this manner is explicitlyauthorized by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides that a demandby a landlord for payment of rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate thepremises may inter alia be made "by posting such notice on the premises if no persons be foundthereon."

The lease having thus been licitly terminated, the lessee, Rustico Victor and his sons becameobliged to surrender the leased apartment to the lessor. They did not. They stayed away from theplace and did not show up during the repossession undertaken by the lessor, announced inadvance through the posting of another notice on the door of the apartment.

What the Victors eventually did was to bring a forcible entry suit against De Asis on the theorythat the stipulation in the lease contract authorizing repossession by the lessor without courtaction was void as contrary to public policy, and De Asis had perpetrated the legally proscribedact of taking the law into his own hands.



The stipulation referred to does by its terms empower the lessor to repossess the apartmentextrajudicially. It states that— 11

7. Upon failure of the Lessee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of thislease, as well as such other terms and conditions which may be imposed by theLessor prior to and/or upon renewal of this lease agreement as provided in par. 2above, then the Lessor shall have the right, upon five (5) days written notice to the

Lessee or in his absence, upon written notice posted at the entrance of thepremises leased, to enter and take possession of the said premises holding in histrust and custody and such possessions and belongings of the Lessee foundtherein after an inventory of the same in the presence of a witness, all these actsbeing hereby agreed to by the Lessee as tantamount to his voluntary vacation ofthe leased premises without the necessity of suit in court .

It is noteworthy that in an earlier case decided in 1975, Consing v . Jamandre, 12 this Courtsustained the validity of a substantially Identical condition in a written lease agreement, whichread as follows: 13

9. That in case of the failure on the part of the SUB-LESSEE to comply with any of

the terms and conditions thereof, the SUB-LESSEE hereby gives an authority tothe SUB-LESSOR or to any of his authorized representatives to take possessionof the leased premises, including all its improvements thereon withoutcompensation to the SUB-LESSEE and without necessity of resorting to any courtaction but in which case the SUB-LESSEE shall be duly advised in writing of herfailure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract by way of reminderbefore the takeover.

This Court ruled that the stipulation "is in the nature of a resolutory condition, for upon the exerciseby the Sub-lessor of his right to take possession of the leased property, the contract is deemedterminated;" and that such a contractual provision "is not illegal, there being nothing in the lawprescribing such kind of agreement. 14

Similarly, there is considerable authority in American law upholding the validity of stipulations ofthis nature. 15

Although the authorities are not in entire accord, the better view seems to be, evenin jurisdictions adopting the view that the landlord cannot forcibly eject a tenantwho wrongfully holds without incurring civil liability, that nevertheless, where alease provides that if the tenants holds over after the expiration of his term, thelandlord may enter and take possession of the premises, using all necessary forceto obtain the actual possession thereof, and that such entry should not be regardedas a trespass, be sued for as such, or in any wise be considered unlawful, thelandlord may forcibly expel the tenant upon the termination of the tenancy, usingno more force than is necessary, and will not be liable to the tenant therefor, sucha condition in a lease being valid .

. . . although there is contrary authority, the rule supported by a substantial numberof cases is that despite the effect of forcible entry and detainer statutes, where alease expressly gives a landlord a right to use such reasonable force as isnecessary in making re-entry and dispossessing a tenant, when the landlordbecomes entitled to possession because of the termination of the term, thelandlord can use force in making re-entry and dispossessing the tenant.

Be this as it may, since the lessor (De Asis) had licitly and efficaciously terminated the month-to-

month lease by notice, and had therefore acquired an affirmative right of action to judicially ejectthe lessee after giving notice to vacate, the existence of such an affirmative right of actionconstitutes a valid defense against, and is fatal to any action by the tenant who has been oustedotherwise than judicially to recover possession. So has this Court had occasion to rule, withunassailable logic, it might be added. In Apundar v . Andrin, 16 this Court said:

In Medel v. Militante (41 Phil. 526), we held that when the tenant denies hislandlord's title this gives rise to a right of action on the part of the landlord to recoverimmediate possession of the denied premises; and it follows as a necessarycorollary from this proposition that if the landlord acquires possession peacefully,as in this case, by the mere act of reentry, the tenant cannot maintain an action toput the landlord out. The existence of an affirmative right of action on the part of



the landlord to oust the tenant is fatal to the maintenance of any action by thetenant. Otherwise, the absurd result would follow that a tenant ousted under thecircumstances here revealed would be restored to possession only himself to beimmediately put out in a possessory action instituted by the landlord. To preventcircuity of action, therefore, we must recognize the affirmative right of action on thepart of the landlord as a complete and efficacious defense to the maintenance ofan action by the tenant.Circuitus est evitandus; et boni prejudices est lites dirimere,

ne lis ex lite oriatur .

Another consideration based upon an Idea familiar to jurisprudence is equallydecisive. This is found in one of the implications of the familiar maxim, Ubi jus ibiremedium, the converse of which is of course equally true, namely: Nullum

jus nullum remedium. Applying this idea to the case before us, it is manifest thatinasmuch as the plaintiffs right of possession has been destroyed, the remedy isalso necessarily taken away. Even under the language of the statute itself (Sec.80, Code of Civ. Proc.), the action of unlawful detainer does not lie unless theproperty is unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff, which imports an actual presentright of possession in him.

Upon the view that the Court thus takes of the facts, the petition for review on certiorari must beaccorded merit and relief correspondingly granted to the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of November 27, 1987 in CA-G.R. SP No.12280, subject of the appeal, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and another renderedDISMISSING Civil Case No. 115635-CV of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 6).Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.

Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.

Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,

Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of theRegister of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCTNo. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of theRegister of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by thePresident of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.

On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizingpetitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained DevelopmentPermit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development.Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons,petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless,



petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portionsoccupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal TrialCourt of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,

Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they haveoccupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of

P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Officeof the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan,San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the neededright of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter,petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forciblyremoving and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2)bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means offorce, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing andthreatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdingsin violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1

On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible

entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained thedismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986,said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Courtand the Regional Trial Court. 4

The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the propertyat the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commencean action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner movedto reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September26, 1986. 6

Hence, this recourse.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitionerwhen it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file itsanswer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case againstpetitioner. 7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process toexist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issuespresented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals.

Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additionalpleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion forreconsideration negates any violation of due process.

Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subjectproperty, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case againstpetitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and neverdetermines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, privaterespondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Josewere ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable

possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing treestwelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title itpresented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possessionraised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the titleto the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possessioneven against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he hasin his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until heis lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accionreivindicatoria. 10



Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drasticaction of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrineof self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailingbecause the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threateneddispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, theowner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 ofthe Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or

intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has anaction or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competentcourt, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 146082. July 30, 2004]MELCHOR CUSTODIO, petitio ner, vs. ROSENDO F. CORRADO, respondent .D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J .:

For review on certiorari is the Decision dated July 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inCA-G.R. SP No. 45764, and its Resolution[2] dated November 13, 2000 denying the motion forreconsideration. The CA affirmed the Decision[3] dated September 9, 1997 of the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9, in RTC Appeal Case No. 3301, which reversed theDecision[4] dated August 19, 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas,dismissing respondent Rosendo F. Corrados Complaint for Recovery of Possession andOwnership with Injunction and Damages, in Civil Case No. 120.

The facts and antecedent proceedings, as culled from records, are as follows:

On July 12, 1993, respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment[5] case againstpetitioner Melchor Custodio with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No.116. It was dismissed by the MTC on March 15, 1994 on the grounds that (1) it had no jurisdictionas the complaint is a possessory suit, (2) there was no barangay conciliation, and (3) the plaintifffailed to prove his case by preponderance of evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC of Balayan,Batangas affirmed the appealed decision docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099.[6]

On January 2, 1995, respondent filed with the same MTC another complaint for recovery ofpossession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 120,[7] and which is thecore case subject of the present petition.

The Complaint avers that respondent Rosendo F. Corrado (then plaintiff) is the registeredowner of a residential lot in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, Batangas covered by TCT No. T-21342.He claims that more than a year prior to the institution of the complaint, petitioner MelchorCustodio (then defendant), under a dubious claim of tenancy relationship with respondents father,Crisanto Corrado and without his knowledge and consent, demolished his old residential houseon the said lot and constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where petitioner and his family nowreside.

In his Answer ,[8] petitioner Melchor Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold tenant

of Crisanto Corrado since 1961 up to the present. He further claimed that respondents fatherconsented to the construction of the bungalow thirty (30) years ago when the subject lot was stillowned by respondents father and before it was transferred to respondent. As affirmativedefenses, he alleged inter alia that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action; (b) therequired barangay conciliation under P.D. 1508[9] was not complied with; and (c) the presentcomplaint is now barred on the ground of res judicata and is violative of the rule on forumshopping.

The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference:

1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21342 covering the lot in question is in the name ofplaintiff Rosendo Corrado;

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/146082.htm#_ftn2
































2. That the defendant has never been a tenant of the plaintiff;

3. That the construction of the two-bedroom bungalow structure on the subject premises waswithout the consent of the plaintiff;

4. That the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 which involved the same parties was by reason ofalleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508;

5. That subject property is located in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, and not in Barangay Gulod,Calatagan;

6. That no Barangay Certification is attached to the instant complaint pursuant to PresidentialDecree No. 1508;

7. That the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court was appealed before the Regional Trial Courtwhich was docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099.[10]

After trial, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, the dispositive portion of

which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint withoutpronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The MTC initially resolved several issues and ruled inter alia that: (a) It has jurisdiction overthe complaint which is an accion publiciana case although denominated as recovery ofpossession and ownership; (b) Prior compliance with barangay conciliation is not requiredbecause the parties reside in non-adjoining barangays of different municipalities with respondentresiding inBarangay Binubusan, Municipality of Lian, Batangas, and petitioner residing

in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan and the complaint included a prayer for preliminary injunction andTRO; and (c) The filing of the present Civil Case No. 120 does not constitute forum shopping andthe judgment in the previous ejectment case in Civil Case No. 116 will not amount to res judicata inthe present case because there was no judgment on the merits in Civil Case No. 116. The MTCnoted that there was no adjudication as to the rights of the parties, particularly the determinationof their possessory rights in Civil Case No. 116 as its dismissal was anchored on respondentsnon-compliance with the required barangay conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 and on respondentsfailure to allege the particular date of deprivation of possession required for the court to determinewhether the case was filed within the one (1) year period.

However, the MTC finds that the petitioners continued stay on respondents property hasfactual and legal basis since evidence on record, such as milling tickets, convincingly show thatpetitioner has been a tenant of respondents father, Crisanto Corrado, cultivating the latters three(3)-hectare sugarcane land, including the subject lot, since 1961. It did not give credence torespondents claim of ignorance to the tenancy relationship between petitioner and his father sincethe latest milling tickets showed that petitioner continued working on the subject lot even after itwas transferred to respondents name.

Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC, which set aside and reversed the MTCdecision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision ofthe lower court dated August 12, 1996 and a new one entered declaring the plaintiff as the trueand absolute owner of the residential lot in question; ordering the defendant to deliver thepossession thereof to the plaintiff and to vacate the same, with costs against the defendant-

appellee.

SO ORDERED.[12]

In reversing the MTC, the RTC found merit in respondents allegation that petitioner cannotclaim any right to possess respondents lot on the premise that he is an alleged tenant ofrespondents father. The RTC found it unacceptable for the MTC to rule that respondent is boundby the action of his father in allowing petitioner to construct a house on the subject lot and occupythe same. The RTC stressed that the parties had stipulated during the pre-trial that the subject lotis registered under the name of respondent and that petitioner is not a tenant ofrespondent.Further, respondent acquired the said lot in 1970 not from his father but from the















government, which was the registered owner since 1909. Thus, respondents father neveracquired any right over the said land, hence, he has no right to transmit or alienate the land toanyone. The RTC further stated that petitioners alleged possession, if any, would have been onlyby tolerance by the government and he would have acted promptly at the time respondentpurchased the lot if he truly believed that he had the legal right over the lot. Finally, the RTCclarified that contrary to the MTCs ruling, the case is not merely an accion publiciana, where onlyphysical possession is involved, but one of accion reinvindicatoria because respondent claimed

recovery of full possession as an absolute owner. The RTC concluded that since respondent isthe absolute owner of the property, the MTC cannot bar him from recovering possession basedon spurious authority granted by a third party who is not an owner.

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCdecision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the RTC decision dated September 9, 1997 in RTC Appeal CaseNo. 3301.

SO ORDERED.[13]

The CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable because there is no identity ofcauses of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed that the former is an ejectmentsuit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the date of deprivation of possessionwhile the latter is for recovery of possession, and not ejectment. It also brushed aside the allegedtenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent, noting that the milling tickets were issuedfor respondents father as the planter and petitioner as the tenant, but without any evidenceshowing that they referred to the subject lot and without any indication that petitioner was gettinghis share from the subject lot.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for our resolution:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THATCIVIL CASE NO. 116 AND CIVIL CASE NO. 120 HAVE TWO (2) SEPARATE CAUSES OF

ACTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHAT DETERMINES THE NATURE OR CAUSE OFTHE ACTION IS NOT THE CAPTION OF THE COMPLAINT BUT THE MATERIAL

ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOTTAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT FOR RES JUDICATA TO APPLY,

SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION WILL SUFFICE.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS AMPLY ESTABLISHED BY APREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPONDENT ANDHIS FATHER, CRISANTO CORRADO.[14]

In our view, the relevant issues for our resolution are: (a) whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable in this case; and (b) whether the alleged tenancy relationship betweenpetitioner with respondent and the latters father was established by preponderance of evidence.

On the first issue, petitioner insists that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this casesince the material allegations in the complaints of Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120 would clearlyreveal an identity of cause of action. Citing jurisprudence, it argued that what should control indetermining the cause of action are the averments in both complaints seeking recovery ofpossession of the subject lot with the ultimate goal of dispossessing and ejecting petitioner fromthe property and restoring it to respondent and not the different captions of the two complaints. Heargued further that the application of the principle of res judicata only requires substantial and notabsolute identity of causes of action. For his part, respondent countered that while there may beidentity of parties and subject matter, the causes of action are not identical in Civil Case Nos. 116and 120 as the former is one for ejectment to recover material possession while the latter is onefor recovery of possession and ownership of the subject land.











We find petitioners contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is inapplicablebecause Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits and its cause of actionis different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession and ownership.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites mustconcur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having

jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)

there must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subjectmatter, and (c) identity of cause of action.[15]

In the present case, the judgment in Civil Case No. 116 was not on the merits. A judgmenton the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when there is determinationwhich party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formalor merely technical point, or by default and without trial.[16] Thus, a judgment on the merits is onewherein there is an unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties withrespect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case.[17] In this case, the MTCsdismissal of Civil Case No. 116 was anchored on its lack of jurisdiction and lack of proof of thedate of demand without determining and resolving who has the right of possession betweenpetitioner and respondent. Verily, the case was not resolved on the merits but was dismissed ontechnical points. A judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction cannot operate as res

judicata on the merits.[18]

There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. We agreewith the findings of the CA which we find no reason to set aside, to wit:

In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit and for failure ofplaintiff-private respondent to state the date when he was deprived of his possession, the courtheld that it did not entitle him to file an ejectment suit against herein defendant-petitioner. In CivilCase No. 120, the cause of action is for recovery of possession and not ejectment. These aretwo separate causes of action and therefore the principle of res judicata does not apply to thepresent case.[19]

Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of actionfrom an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as Civil Case No. 120, and the judgmentof the former shall not bar the filing of another case for recovery of possession as an element ofownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue thanpossession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes abar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.[20] Incidentally, weagree with the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is not an accion publiciana but moreof an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the respondents allegation in the complaint that he isthe registered owner of the subject lot and that the petitioner had constructed a bungalow thereonand had been continuously occupying the same since then.

The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery ofpossession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our jurisprudence. What really

distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) andfrom a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the questionof possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal ) together with forcible entryare the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of realproperty. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action torecover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownershipwhich includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recoverpossession.[21]

Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the circumstanceobtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence. In Vda. de Villanueva v. Courtof Appeals,[22] we held that a judgment in a case for forcible entry which involved only the issue

of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership will not bar an action betweenthe same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit torecover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identityof causes of action between the two.

Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him andrespondents father was amply supported by evidence. It must be stressed that this is a factualissue requiring re-evaluation and examination of the probative value of evidences presentedwhich is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, this issue had already beensquarely resolved by the Court of Appeals and we find no impelling reason to set itaside. According to the Court of Appeals, the milling tickets only showed that they were issued toCrisanto Corrado but did not show whether such tickets referred to the same lot in question. In






















http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/feb2001/117971.htm


















petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before itfrom the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law. For a question to be one of law,it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by thelitigants. The findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court, whichis not a trier of facts.[23]

At any rate, the issue of tenancy relationship had already been settled during the pre-trial stage

where the parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of respondent and thatpetitioner was never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and respondent are bound by such stipulationswhich are deemed settled and need not be proven during the trial. Pre-trial is a procedural deviceintended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties. It thus paves the way for a lesscluttered trial and resolution of the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite thetrial, or totally dispense with it. Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal precept that the parties arebound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-trial.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision dated July28, 2000 and Resolution dated November 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.45764 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908

NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,vs.HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.

T. Icasiano, for appellant.R. Salinas, for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez, FernandoMarcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, residentsof the town of Bulacan, province of the same name, filed a written complaint against HiginoMeneses, alleging that they each owned and possessed farm lands, situated in the places knownas Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that the defendant is the owner of afish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the

River Taliptip on the other; that from time immemorial, and consequently for more than twentyyears before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutoryeasement permitting the flow of water over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the saidplaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water collected upon their landsand in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip River. From that year however,the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and bymeans of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through said placeinto the Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damagedby the stagnant waters, there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan; that theirplantation were destroyed, causing the loss and damages to the extent of about P1,000, whichloss and damage will continue if the obstructions to the flow of the water are allowed to remain,preventing its passage through said land and injuring the rice plantations of the plaintiffs. They

therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring that the said tract ofland in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of water from the propertyof the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the defendantbe ordered to remove and destroy the obstructions that impede the passage of the waters throughParaanan, and that in future, and forever, he abstain from closing in any manner the aforesaidtract of land; that, upon judgment being entered, the said injunction be declared to be final andthat the defendant be sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs inthe proceedings; that they be granted any other and further equitable or proper remedy inaccordance with the facts alleged and proven.

In view of the demurrer interposed by the plaintiffs to the answer of the defendant, the latter, onthe 29th of August, 1904, filed an amended answer, denying each and everyone of the allegations











of the complaint, and alleged that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of thelands described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that he, togetherwith his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were statedby him, and which he and his brothers had inherited from their deceased mother.

Apolinara de Leon; that the same had been surveyed by a land surveyor in September, 1881, healso denied that he had occupied or converted any land in the barrio of Bambang into a fishpond;

therefore, and to sentence the plaintiffs to pay the costs and corresponding damages.

Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th of March, 1907,entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in their favor, andsentenced the defendant to remove the dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on theside of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove anddestroy the obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the strip of land in Paraanan; toabstain in future, and forever, from obstructing or closing in any manner the course of the watersthrough the said strip of land. The request that the defendant be sentenced to pay an indemnitywas denied, and no ruling was made as to costs.

The defendant excepted to the above judgment and furthermore asked for a new trial which was

denied and also excepted to, and, upon approval of the bill of exceptions, the question wassubmitted to this court.

Notwithstanding the defendant's denial in his amended answer, it appears to have been clearlyproven in this case that the lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as well as thesmall adjoining lake, named Calalaran, are located in places relatively higher than the sitio calledParaanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant are situated, and which border on theTaliptip River; that during the rainy season the rain water which falls on he land of the plaintiffs,and which flows toward the small Calalaran Lake at flood time, has no outlet to the Taliptip Riverother than through the low land of Paraanan: that the border line between Calalaran and Paraananthere has existed from time immemorial a dam, constructed by the community for the purpose ofpreventing the salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran,passing through the lowlands of Paraanan; but when rainfall was abundant, one of the residentswas designated in his turn by the lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the sluice gate in orderto let out the water that flooded the rice fields, through the land of Paraanan to the above-mentioned river, that since 1901, the defendant constructed another dam along the boundary ofthis fishpond in Paraanan, thereby impeding the outlet of the waters that flood the fields ofCalalaran, to the serious detriment of the growing crops.

According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one estate forthe benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which theeasement is established is called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servientestate.

The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and givingpassage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easementwas not constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, andthe law had imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in the altitude of thelands in the barrio Bambang.

Article 552 of the Civil code provides:

Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of mandescend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.

Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this easement, northe one of the higher estate works increasing the burden.

Article 563 of the said code reads also:

The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to which thissection refers shall be governed by the special law relating thereto in everything notprovided for in this code.

The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating ofnatural easements relating to waters, provides:



Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow naturally, withoutthe work of man, from the higher lands together with the stone or earth which they carrywith them.

Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or prevent such aneasement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of thehigher lands belonging to different owners; neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend

the easement.

According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant, Meneses, had no right toconstruct the works, nor the dam which blocks the passage, through his lands and the outlet tothe Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so,to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which protectsand guarantees the respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the fields inCalalaran and Paraanan.

It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by means ofwalls, ditches fences or any other device, but his right is limited by the easement imposed uponhis estate.

The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and maintain afish pond within his own land, but he was always under the strict and necessary obligation torespect the statutory easement of waters charged upon his property, and had no right to closethe passage and outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake ofCalalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estatesby obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging tothe plaintiffs.

It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other owners of high lands in Calalaran,in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, to haveanother made by the defendant at the border of Paraanan adjoining the said river, for the purposeof preventing the salt waters of the Taliptip River flooding, at high tide, not only the lowlands inParaanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake, since the plaintiffs can not preventthe defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water; but the defendant couldnever be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands to the Taliptip River duringthe heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, therebyimpairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates.

For the above reasons, and accepting the findings of the court below in the judgment appealedfrom in so far as they agree with the terms of this decision, we must and do hereby declare thatthe defendant, Higino Meneses, as the owner of the servient estate, is obliged to give passage toand allow the flow of the waters descending from the Calalaran Lake and from the land of theplaintiffs through his lands in Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip River; and he is herebyordered to remove any obstacle that may obstruct the free passage of the waters whenever theremay be either a small or large volume of running water through his lands in the sitio of Paraananfor their discharge into the Taliptip River; and in future to abstain from impeding, in any manner,the flow of the waters coming from the higher lands. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, inso far as it agrees with decision, and reversed in other respects, with the costs of this instanceagainst the appellants. So ordered.

SPS. DOLORES MIRANDA PROVOST and JEAN PROVOSTVs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. VICTOR RAMOS and FE A. RAMOS,

QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition seeks the annulment of the Decision [1] dated February 13, 2003 of the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57008 and its Resolution[2] dated August 27, 2003, denying themotion for reconsideration. The appellate court reversed the Decision[3] dated December 10,1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.573, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated February 19, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)of Mambajao, Camiguin in Civil Case No. 212.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/G.R.%20No.%20160406.htm#_ftn1















Private respondents, spouses Victor and Fe Ramos, are the owners of a parcel of land surveyed

as Lot No. 12542, Case 15, Cad. 473 situated in Putingbalas, Tupsan Grande,[5]Mambajao,

Camiguin. The spouses lot was donated to them by Nicolasa Yap Vda. de Abao on October 24,

1994. Adjacent to the lot is a parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 12543, C-15, Cad. 473 owned

by petitioner Dolores Miranda Provost. She bought it from Rosario Abanil.

Sometime in May 1992, the Provosts constructed a fence separating the two lots. In 1994, the

Ramoses, believing that the Provosts encroached on a portion of their lot, demanded the return

of the encroached area but the latter refused. The Ramoses thus had a relocation survey and the

relocation survey showed that the fence was indeed on their land.

The Provost spouses disagreed, arguing that the cadastral survey plan used had been

disapproved by the DENR Regional Office for being defective and was replaced with a correction

survey of Barangay Tupsan, Mambajao. Under the correction survey, Lot No. 12542 with an area

of 4,402 square meters was surveyed as Lot No. 13436, Cad 473, Module 2, but with a reduced

area of 3,845 square meters, and Lot No. 12543 with an area of 1,774 square meters as Lot No.

12769, Cad 473, Module 2 with an increased area of 2,634 square meters. Upon request of

petitioners Provosts, another relocation survey was done using the approved cadastral survey

plan. This relocation survey showed that the fence was within petitioners property.

On December 26, 1994, the Ramos spouses filed a complaint for recovery of ownership

and possession with damages and with prayer for preliminary injunction before the MTC.They

alleged that the Provosts encroached on 314 square meters of their lot. The MTC dismissed the

complaint and held that the Ramoses failed to prove their ownership and possession of the

disputed area. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the claim by

the Ramoses over the property sought to be recovered was based on a disapproved survey plan.

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC

decision and ordered the Provosts to vacate the area, remove the fence, and pay damages, to

wit:

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition isGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 28, Mambajao, Camiguin in Civil Case No. 573 entitled, SpousesVictor Ramos, et al. vs. Jean Provost, et al. is reversed and set aside and in lieuthereof, another one is entered:

(a) ordering respondents to vacate and surrender theencroached area of 314 square meters to the petitioners and toremove their fence;

(b) to pay petitioners the following amounts:

(1) the amount of P6,355.82 as actual damages;(2) the amount of P500.00 per annum as reasonable rentals

of the encroached area;(3) the amount of P35,500.00 as attorneys fees

plus P1,500.00 as traveling expenses every hearing;(4) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;(5) the amount of P500.00 as litigation expenses and to pay

the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]










Hence, this petition for certiorari where petitioners argue:

1. That respondent Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of private respondents outside of the issue raisedin the decisions of both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.

2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in insisting on the technical descriptionof the erroneous and disapproved survey of private respondents land as the basisfor its findings that petitioners had encroached the land of respondents.

3. That the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in merely denying in a cavalier mannerpetitioners Motion for Reconsideration as mere refutation of its own findings,without stating the legal basis for the denial in direct violation of the provisions ofthe second paragraph, of Section 14, of the 19[8]7 Constitution of the Philippines,that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of the court shall be refuseddue course or denied without stating the legal basis [therefor].

4. That there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedyin the ordinary course of law open to petitioners, except this petition for certiorariunder Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[7]

At the outset, we note that this case involves an error of judgment and not of

jurisdiction. Thus, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not

proper.Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant petition as one proper for review

under Rule 45.

Simply, the main issue in this case is whether petitioners (Provosts) encroached on the property

of private respondents (Ramos spouses).

Private respondents anchor their claim on the deed of donation and an old survey plan, while

petitioners base theirs on the deed of absolute sale and the corrected survey plan.

Petitioners aver that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it held that they

encroached upon the Ramoses property since the frontage (points 7, 8 and 9) in the old survey

plan of the Ramoses property was the same frontage in the new survey plan and the fence was

constructed at point 8 of the cadastral plan. They argue that the points of the frontage of

respondents property in the old and new survey plan are similar but with different technical

descriptions on measurements and bearings, thus the location of the frontage in the two surveys

cannot be identical. More so, under the approved survey plan, the fence was constructed at point

9, which is point 4 of their lot and clearly within their property.They posit that the Court of Appealsdid not bother to check the technical descriptions and instead relied on the testimony of the

engineer who conducted the relocation survey using the technical description on the disapproved

survey plan. They maintain that private respondents were unable to establish the identity of their

property, since they relied on a disapproved survey plan. Moreover, the contested area was

previously occupied by Asterio Aboc, a tenant of Rosario Abanil.







Private respondents, on their part, state that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in

continuous and open possession as owners, as evidenced by the tax declarations and that

petitioners did not deny points 7, 8 and 9 of respondents property. They insist that the Provosts

encroached on their land as the fence was constructed at point 8.

The Court of Appeals in reversing the RTC decision reasoned that the petitioners had no right to

move the common boundary such that the area of the adjoining lot was reduced to 3,552 square

meters. It further held that they could not validly claim ownership over the area of 2,327 square

meters since they bought only 1,774 square meters, and that the correction survey plan was under

protest as it would prejudice private respondents.[8]

We stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership

or accion reivindicatoria.[9] Section 8, Rule 40[10] of the Rules on Civil Procedure nonetheless

allows the RTC to decide the case brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without

jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide the case on the merits. In the instant case, the

MTC of Mambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of jurisdiction but since

it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of the MTC.

Now, on the main issue, we sustain the decision of the RTC.

Significantly, the parties do not deny that a correction survey was made in Barangay Tupsan; that

the survey plan was approved on February 16, 1994; and that the area of the private respondents

property under the corrected survey plan was reduced to 3,845 square meters, while that of

petitioners was increased to 2,634 square meters.

In an action to recover under Article 434 [11] of the Civil Code, the claimant must (1) establish the

identity of the property sought to be recovered and (2) rely on the strength of his title and not on

the weakness of defendants claim. It is also settled rule that what defines a piece of land is not

the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in the description but the boundaries

therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits .[12]

In this case, we find that private respondents failed to identify the property they seek to

recover. They relied on the old survey plan, the technical descriptions of which did not indicate

the accurate measurements and limits of their property. The technical descriptions under the old

cadastral survey plan cannot be the basis to delineate the boundaries of the lots or determine

their respective areas for the obvious reason that it was not approved. In fact, a relocation survey

plan[13] of Lot No. 12542, attached to the complaint as Annex B and presented in evidence by the

petitioners as Exhibit 1, reveals that the area of the lot is still subject to verification and final

computation.

Moreover, private respondents failed to prove open, continuous and adverse possession of the

disputed area. That their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of owners
























since World War II based on the early tax declarations, is insufficient to delineate

boundaries.[14] Also, they admitted that Asterio Aboc is the tenant of Rosario Abanil.[15] They

merely claimed that a portion of the land where Abocs house was once built, is part of their

property. Such claim without further proof of title does not suffice to define the boundaries of the

adjoining lots. It thus appears clearly that the contested area was part of Abanils lot sold to

petitioner Dolores Provost.

As held in Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals,[16] when the records do not show that

the land subject of the action for recovery has been exactly determined, such action cannot

prosper, inasmuch as respondents ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear

satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.

Considering that there is already an existing correct and approved cadastral survey plan

of Barangay Tupsan, and absent any showing that the same is erroneous, that plan should be

the basis to delineate the boundaries.

Additionally, however we find the RTCs award of actual damages for P10,000; attorneys fees

for P10,000; and litigation expenses for P5,000, without legal and factual basis; hence, the awards

must be deleted.

An award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is proper when the court deems it just

and equitable that attorneys fees and litigation expenses should be recovered, and when the civil

action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and evident bad

faith. The award of attorneys fees as damages is the exception rather than the rule. It is not to be

given to the defendant every time the latter prevails. The right to litigate is of great consequence

that a penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it mistakenly unless, of course

such party acted in bad faith. In this case, we could not award attorneys fees and expenses of

litigation in the absence of showing of gross and evident bad faith in filing the action.[17]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2003 of the Court of

Appeals and its Resolution dated August 27, 2003 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The

Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch

28 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages, litigation

expenses and attorneys fees are deleted.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, peti t ioner, vs . GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by hisAttorney-in-Fact, CHRISTIAN DE JESUS, respondent .

D E C I S I O N



















VITUG, J .:

Petitioner Philippine National Bank disputes the decision handed down by the Court of Appeals promulgated on 23 March 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001, entitled Generoso De Jesus,represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Christian De Jesus, versus Philippine National Bank. Theassailed decision has affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, ofMamburao, Occidental Mindoro, declaring respondent Generoso de Jesus as being the true and

lawful owner of the 124-square-meter portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. T-17197 and ordering petitioner bank to vacate the premises, to deliver possessionthereof to respondent, and to remove the improvement thereon.

It would appear that on 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner beforethe Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, withdamages, over the questioned property. In his complaint, respondent stated that he had acquireda parcel of land situated in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square meterscovered by TCT No. T-17197, and that on 26 March 1993, he had caused a verification survey ofthe property and discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon by abuilding of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of demand sent byrespondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.

Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in1981 from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and toremedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which then also belongedto Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to haveaccepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent ofpetitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.

The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the rightful ownerof the disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and ordering petitioner to surrenderpossession of the property to respondent and to cause, at its expense, the removal of anyimprovement thereon.

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, sustained the trial court but it ordered to be deleted theaward to respondent of attorneys fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages, and litigationexpenses.

Petitioner went to this Court, via a petition for review, after the appellate court had denied thebanks motion for reconsideration, here now contending that -

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN ADJUDGING PNB A BUILDERIN BAD FAITH OVER THE ENCROACHED PROPERTY IN QUESTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN NOT APPLYING IN FAVOR OFPNB THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE RULING INTECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

108894, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 7.[1]

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have both rejected the idea that petitionercan be considered a builder in good faith. In the context that such term is used in particularreference to Article 448, et seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not beingthe owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of anydefect in his title or mode of acquisition.

The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in goodfaith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment

of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted topay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder orplanter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of thebuilding or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does notchoose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree uponthe terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what isbuilt, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faithmay demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/sep2003/149295.htm#_ftn1






replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted orsowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower theproper rent.

A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the landowner to make achoice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builderto pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with

the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other wayaround.[2] Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, ispreclusive. He much choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building toinstead remove it from the land.[3] In order, however, that the builder can invoke that accruingbenefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, heshould be able to prove good faith on his part.

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaningor statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence ofmalice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. Anindividuals personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusivelybe determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from

knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry.[4]

The essence of goodfaith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absenceof intention to overreach another .[5] Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he isnot aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it .[6]

Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should be evident enoughthat petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good faith. Evidently, petitioner was quiteaware, and indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a partof the building sold to it stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it.

Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has inactuality been part of the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers toa piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some

works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is thebuilder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwisefor, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land,the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. [7]

In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article 448 of the CivilCode. The Court commiserates with petitioner in its present predicament; upon the other hand,respondent, too, is entitled to his rights under the law, particularly after having long been deprivedof the enjoyment of his property. Nevertheless, the Court expresses hope that the parties will stillbe able to come up with an arrangement that can be mutually suitable and acceptable to them.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985

FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,vs.AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:

This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo to the then Court of

Appeals, which the latter certified to this instance as involving pure questions of law

Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under TransferCertificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas,Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant,owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.

Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof hadencroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, After theencroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972,his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from hisencroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973 against DUMLAO in the



























Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil Case No 1, Said complaint was later amendedto include DEPRA as a party plain. plaintiff.

After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on September 29, 1973, the dispositive portionof which reads:

Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs, aslessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an area ofthirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month,payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month therent is due; and the lease shall commence on the day that this decision shall havebecome final.

From the foregoing judgment, neither party appeal so that, ff it were a valid judgment, it wouldhave ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals sothat DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court.

On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the thenCourt of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial Court), involving the very same 34 square meters,which was the bone of contention in the Municipal Court. DUMLAO, in his Answer, admitted theencroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit is barred by res judicata by virtue ofthe Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become final and executory.

After the case had been set for pre-trial, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for Judgment basedon the Stipulation of Facts attached thereto. Premised thereon, the Trial Court on October 31,1974, issued the assailed Order, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the thirty four (34) square meterssubject of this litigation is part and parcel of Lot 685 of the Cadastral Survey of

Dumangas of which the plaintiff is owner as evidenced by Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 3087 and such plaintiff is entitled to possess the same.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the Decisionof the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issueof possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real property, mayonly be rendered by Courts of First Instance.

Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the Municipal Court, we hold thesame to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of possessiononly (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1 The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when itimposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is notfavored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongsto Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec.19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). 3 Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, itsDecision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Quetingof Title. Besides, even if the Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due todifference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was the deprivation ofpossession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership.Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer

case "shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land. "4

Conceded in the Stipulation of Facts between the parties is that DUMLAO was a builder in goodfaith. Thus,

8. That the subject matter in the unlawful detainer case, Civil Case No. 1, beforethe Municipal Court of Dumangas, Iloilo involves the same subject matter in thepresent case, the Thirty-four (34) square meters portion of land and built thereonin good faith is a portion of defendant's kitchen and has been in the possession ofthe defendant since 1952 continuously up to the present; ... (Emphasis ours)



Consistent with the principle that our Court system, like any other, must be a dispute resolvingmechanism, we accord legal effect to the agreement of the parties, within the context of theirmutual concession and stipulation. They have, thereby, chosen a legal formula to resolve theirdispute to appeal ply to DUMLAO the rights of a "builder in good faith" and to DEPRA those of a"landowner in good faith" as prescribed in Article 448. Hence, we shall refrain from furtherexamining whether the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridicalpositions respectively defined by law, for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor

in good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448.

In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith,

shall have the right

to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of theindemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or

to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one whosowed, the proper rent.

However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value isconsiderably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall payreasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate thebuilding or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms ofthe lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof(Paragraphing supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching partof DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He

cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part ofhis land, 5 as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not bindingbecause it was made in a void proceeding.

However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of FirstInstance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession,"without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchenremoved. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his encroachedland, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his willingnessto pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is

entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building,under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand,has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building orto sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents heredid refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner ofthe building to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to suchremotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other party fails to payfor the same (italics ours).

We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to

sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to beexecuted and is. furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453(now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608[1946]).

A word anent the philosophy behind Article 448 of the Civil rode.

The original provision was found in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code; which provided:

ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted ingood faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing orplanting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in Articles 453 and 454, or to



oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one whosowed, the proper rent.

As will be seen, the Article favors the owner of the land, by giving him one of the two optionsmentioned in the Article. Some commentators have questioned the preference in favor of theowner of the land, but Manresa's opinion is that the Article is just and fair.

. . . es justa la facultad que el codigo da al dueno del suelo en el articulo 361, enel caso de edificacion o plantacion? Algunos comentaristas la conceptuan injusta,y como un extraordinario privilegio en favor de la propiedad territorial. Entiendenque impone el Codigo una pena al poseedor de buena fe y como advierte uno delos comentaristas aludidos 'no se ve claro el por que de tal pena . . . al obligar alque obro de buena fe a quedarse con el edificio o plantacion, previo el pago delterreno que ocupa, porque si bien es verdad que cuando edifico o planto demostrocon este hecho, que queria para si el edificio o plantio tambien lo es que el queedifico o planto de buena fe lo hizo en la erronea inteligencia de creerse duenodel terreno Posible es que, de saber lo contrario, y de tener noticia de que habiaque comprar y pagar el terreno, no se hubiera decidido a plantar ni a edificar. Laley obligandole a hacerlo fuerza su voluntad, y la fuerza por un hecho inocente de

que no debe ser responsable'. Asi podra suceder pero la realidad es que con esehecho voluntario, aunque sea inocente, se ha enriquecido torticeramente conperjuicio de otro a quien es justo indemnizarle,

En nuestra opinion, el Codigo ha resuelto el conflicto de la manera mas justa yequitativa y respetando en lo possible el principio que para la accesion seestablece en el art. 358. 7

Our own Code Commission must have taken account of the objections to Article 361 of theSpanish Civil Code. Hence, the Commission provided a modification thereof, and Article 448 ofour Code has been made to provide:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or plantedin good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing orplanting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or tooblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one whosowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buythe land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In suchcase, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose toappropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agreeupon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix theterms thereof.

Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his options.

The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:

Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rightsarises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of theimprovements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of theimpracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a

just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvementsafter payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay forthe land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who isauthorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the

principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico,G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs. Ibanez [S.C.]52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050). 8

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby orderedremanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448and 546 of the Civil Code, as follows:

1. The trial Court shall determine

a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;



b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen;

c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters mayhave acquired by reason thereof, and

d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of thekitchen built thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional, TrialCourt shall render judgment, as follows:

a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which toexercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriatethe kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount of tile expensesspent by DUMLAO f or the building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plusvalue") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reasonthereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area. The amounts to berespectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in accordance with the option thusexercised by written notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by theobligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering theamount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;

b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to obligeDUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because,as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is considerably more than that ofthe kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and tothe Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land. Inthat event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such noticeof rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Courtformal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement isreached by the parties, the trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after thetermination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of thelease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be lessthan Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable within the first five (5) days of eachcalendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2)years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of timesince 1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixedshall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease.DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the kitchen.Upon expiration of the two-year period, or upon default by DUMLAO in thepayment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, DEPRA shall be entitled toterminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and to have the kitchen removedby DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall betendered by DUMLAO to the Court for payment to DEPRA, and such tender shallconstitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixedby the Court.

c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten Pesos(P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA'sland for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied the subjectarea, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the precedingparagraph;

d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Precision shall be inextendible,and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due tothe obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order ofexecution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliancewith such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.

No costs,

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995

PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTOQUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamedQuisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato,

Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING,SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) andHEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma.Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. GalileoBrion, respondents.

G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995

CESAR ALMENDRAL, petitioner,vs.EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.

G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995

EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING(Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDOQUISUMBING, (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, allsurnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad,Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCOQUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamedQuisumbing),petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO MENESES and BRAULIO C.DARUM,respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07049 affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984 of the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 474-83-C which declared as null andvoid the original certificates of title and free patents issued to Pablito Meneses over lots found bythe court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca

Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.

I

On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna, issuedto Pablito Meneses Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268covering Lot 1585 with an area of 417 square meters, and Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808 andOriginal Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515 square meters. Both lotsare located in Los Baños, Laguna.

Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver andTransfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" forand "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses (Rollo, p. 45). After the execution

of said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvementsthereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes.In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda.He had been occupying the land since 1956.

On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as September6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued OriginalCertificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baños,Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land wasregistered on August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of



Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato,Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing.

In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then Court of First Instance ofBiñan, Laguna to recover possession over a portion of the property from Dominga Villamor andLorenzo Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. B-350. On January 3, 1966, the case was decidedin favor of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Quisumbings' right

over the property.

In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over anadditional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by thenatural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its Decision of September 28, 1978, the Courtof First Instance of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings' title thereto which, after it was dulysurveyed, was identified as Psu-208327. The additional area was divided into two lots in thesurvey plan approved by the Director of Lands on November 16, 1964. In ordering theconfirmation and registration of title on favor of the Quisumbings, the land registration court said:

. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the property was bolstered by theunappealed decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 of this Court

when the properties applied for were classified as accretions made by the watersof the Laguna Lake. . . . (G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).

On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before the Court of First Instanceof Laguna, Branch VI, Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum andCesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. Theyalleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baños, using his brother Pablito as a "tooland dummy," illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and,confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtainedfree patents and original certificates of title to the land.

On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by theMeneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners ofthe riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. In so holding, the trialcourt relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350, and quotedthe following portions of the appellate court's decision:

Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic ) 859 square meters of land underTCT No. 25978 of the Laguna Land Registry, the northwest boundary of which isthe Laguna de Bay.

It is ascertained that the northwest portion of Quisumbing's lot is bounded by theLaguna de Bay. The nature of the Laguna de Bay has long been settled in the case

of Government of the Philippines v. Colegio de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when itheld that:

Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depression of the earth;it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks and springs,and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According tothe definition first quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.

Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the authorities cited by theappellants referring to seashore would not apply. The provision of the law onwaters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. Andaccordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks,streams, rivers andlakes by accessions or sediments from thewaters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of the property is bounded byLaguna de Bay, which is a lake, even if the area where Lanuza's house andVillamor's house for that matter is located is not included within the title, it mustnecessarily be an accretion upon appellees' land by accessions or sediments fromthe waters thereof which should belong to the owner of the adjacent land. Theauthorities cited by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions by water ofthe sea under Title I. Lakewaters being terrestrial waters, their ownership is



governed by Title II of the Law of Waters. As held in the Colegio de San Jose case,the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of sea waterare not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes which are governed bydifferent provisions. As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation isnecessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law doesnot require the same (Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.No. L-17652, June 30, 1962 citing Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City

of Manila, 10 Phil. 567 and 3 Manresa, C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp.80-84).

The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been procuredthrough fraud, deceit and bad faith, citing the following facts as bases for its conclusion: (1) TheDeed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly executed by Silverio Bautista in favor of PablitoMeneses was a simulated contract for lack of consideration; (2) The said instrument was swornto before Mayor Lorenzo Meneses who had no authority to notarize deeds of conveyances; (3)

Although the lots subject of the deed of conveyance were placed in his brother's name, MayorMeneses actually exercised rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendraladmitted having anomalously prepared the documents to support the free patent applications ofPablito Meneses and, having personally filled up the blank forms, signed them in the absence of

the persons concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession from 1979 to 1980despite orders from the Director of Lands to produce and surrender the same; (6) District LandOfficer Braulio Darum approved the free patent applications and issued the questioned titleswithout the required cadastral survey duly approved by the Director of Lands and despite thependency of LRC Case No. B-327 involving the contested lots; (7) Darum represented the Bureauof Lands in LRC Case No. B-327 without authority from the Director of Lands and after he hadwithdrawn his appearance in said case, persisted in filing a motion to set aside the order for theissuance of a decree in favor of the Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refusedto produce the missing original records of the free patent applications and their supportingdocuments; and (9) When Darum was not yet an oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he admittedin his letter to the Land Registration Commission that the contested lots are portions of the landbeing claimed by the Quisumbings contrary to his later representation in the joint answer to the

petition that the subject lots are not portions of Lots 1 and 2, Psu-208327 owned by theQuisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito Meneses' Original Certificate of TitleNo. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"), covering Lot No. 1585, consisting of417 square meters and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No.12808 (Exh. "H"), covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515 square meters, bothlocated at Los Baños, Laguna, as accretion lands forming parts of a biggeraccretion land owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment (Exh. "A"),rendered by the Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna, in LRC Case No. B-327,

which bigger accretion land is directly adjacent to or at the back of plaintiffs' riparianland, and consequently, declaring as null and void and cancelled OriginalCertificate of Title No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original Certificate ofTitle No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808;

2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his Deputy at Calamba,Laguna, to make the corresponding entries of cancellation in his Registry of theabove mentioned Original Certificate of Titles/Free Patents;

3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito Meneses and all personsacting in their behalves to vacate the subject lands and surrender the possessionthereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and

4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sums of:

a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month from January, 1977, untilthe subject property is completely vacated, as actual andcompensatory damages;

b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;

c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;



d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and

e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial courtgranted in its Order of September 7, 1984 subject to the posting by the Quisumbings of a bond inthe amount of P500,000.00. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for the reconsideration of said

order.

The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Pablito Meneses,Silverio Bautista, Pablo Silva, Virgilio Cruz and Cesar Almendral for violation of paragraphs (e)and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring in the approval and grant of the freepatents over portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned by the heirs of Ciriaca Arguelles Vda.de Quisumbing. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendantsguilty as charged. The case was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987, the judgment ofconviction was affirmed (Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 [1987]).

Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 07049 tothe Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1987, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be withoutmerit and affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.

The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of the appellate court'sdecision but it was denied in the Resolution of February 23, 1988 which in pertinent part stated:

However, for humanitarian considerations, and considering the appeal of thedefendants-appellants for a reduction of the moral and exemplary damages, Wefavor the reduction of the moral damages from P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and theexemplary damages from P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other respects, We findno justification for modifying the dispositive portion of the decision of the lowercourt (G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).

Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari , which was docketedas G.R. No. 82220. Cesar Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for a 45-day extensionwithin which to file a petition for review on certiorari . After this Court had granted them a 30-dayextension, Almendral still failed to file any petition. The Quisumbings also filed a petition for reviewon certiorari , docketed as G.R. No. 83059, solely on the issue of the propriety of the reduction ofthe amount of damages in the Court of Appeals' Resolution of February 23, 1988. Upon motionof petitioners in G.R. No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the Resolution of August1, 1988.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised before the Court of Appeals,contending in the main: (1) that the lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the

public domain; (2) that no conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuanceof the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3) that the Deed of Waiver and Transfer ofRights was founded on a valid consideration.

As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion lands, petitioners relied onthe Decision of the Court of Appeals in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga, CA-G.R. No. 55390-R, October 23, 1980, holding that the property involved therein was part of the natural bed of theLaguna de Bay and therefore what had to be determined was whether said property was coveredby water when the lake was at its highest depth.

Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual issues which have beenthoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings

of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court (Coca-ColaBottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 533 [1994]) and they carry even moreweight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court (Binalay v. Manalo,195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The jurisdiction of this Court is thus limited to reviewing errors of lawunless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the recordor that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion (BA FinanceCorporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 566 [1941]). We find no such showing in this case.

Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil CaseNo. B-350 has a bearing in the resolution of this case for while the lots occupied by Villamor andLanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to thesame accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.



In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327 ordering theconfirmation and registration of title in favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters ofaccretion land is binding on petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by the Courtof Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world, moreso because it became final and executory upon the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose anappeal.

Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore land known as Lots 190 and 1585are part of Laguna de Bay" and therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the sameas accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of the decision in Republic v. Courtof Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although the case deals with the registration of areclaimed land along the Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:

Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject to the samegravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, thisphenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. Thus, thealternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, couldhardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observedfour to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which

bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in thewater level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period(four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the land iscompletely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" ofLaguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bedor basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. TheBrief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshoreland, to wit:

. . . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water andleft dry by the flux and reflux of the tides.

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marksand that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the landin question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bayfrom different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to"flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within themeaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought tobe registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshoreland as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and thereforecapable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves thathe has a registerable title (at pp. 538-539).

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires theconcurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual andimperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) thatthe land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). Whilethe trial court mainly relied on the findings in Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in controversyare accretion lands and it has not determined on its own the presence of said requisites, it is toolate now for petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to claim otherwise. Consequently, the lands held to beaccretion lands could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the landsin controversy (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of indefeasibility of title should favorthem as the one-year period provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. They also urgedthat, having been granted by the state, their title is superior to that of the Quisumbings. We hold,however, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of the free patents and titles of PablitoMeneses, said assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People,153 SCRA 303 (1987) which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.

Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059 (questioning the reduction ofthe damages awarded to the Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of February23, 1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court(Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]). While it is the appellate court's duty to review



the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The Courtof Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are palpablyor scandalously and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 226SCRA 423 [1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]).

There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of Appeals of the damages awardedby the trial court. Its action was premise merely on "humanitarian considerations" and the plea of

the defendants-appellants. We may agree with the Court of Appeals in reducing the award afterscrutinizing its factual findings only if such findings are diametrically opposed to that of the trialcourt (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is, the Court of Appealsaffirmed point by point the factual findings if the lower court upon which the award of damageshad been based.

We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court. RespondentBraulio C. Darum in G.R. No. 83059 must also be solidarily liable for said damages in his capacityas a public officer. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacityfor acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protectedby the mantle of immunity for official actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42, 227 SCRA 271[1993]).

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 83059 isGRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED while itsResolution of February 23, 1988 insofar as it reduces the amount of damages awarded to theQuisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 and respondentBraulio Darum in G.R. No. 83059.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996]

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, peti t ioners,vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEORABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO,ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/orprivate capacities, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHTS OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO IMMOVABLEPROPERTY; ARTICLE 457; REQUISITES.- In the case of Meneses vs. CA, this Court heldthat accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires theconcurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual andimperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3)that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the seacoast).These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners oflands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from theeffects of the current of waters.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.- Where the accretion was formed bythe dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek

and the Cagayan River bounding petitioner's land, it cannot be claimed that the accumulationwas gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of thecreek and the river. In Hilario vs. City of Manila, this Court held that the word current indicatesthe participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and lowtide. Not having met the first and second requirements of the rules of alluvion, petitionerscannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT DEPOSIT IS DUE TO THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER,MANDATORY.- In Republic vs. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the depositshould be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art.457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvionmust be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco vs. Director of Lands, et al., where



the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river borderingsaid land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it wasdeemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the case at bar,the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley LumberCo. consequent to its sawmill operations.

4. ID.; PUBLIC LANDS; FINDINGS AS SUCH BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS,

RESPECTED.- The mere filing of the Miscellaneous Sales Application constituted anadmission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of a SurveyPlan wherein said land was described as an orchard. Furthermore, the Bureau of Landsclassified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust inthe Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspectionconducted by the Bureau of Lands. This Court has often enough held that findings ofadministrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confinedto specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Again, when saidfactual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the partiesand not reviewable by this Court.

5. ID.; PUBLIC LAND LAW; JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC LANDS.- Having determined thatthe subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same inaccordance with the Public Land Law. Under Sections 3 and 4 thereof, the Director of Landshas jurisdiction, authority and control over public lands. Here respondent Palad as Directorof Lands, is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, dispositionand management of the lands of the public domain. He may issue decisions and orders ashe may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact. Inthe case of Calibo vs. Ballesteros, this Court held that where, in the disposition of publiclands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearlyacts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of

judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXHAUSTED IN CASE AT

BAR.- The administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could not haveintended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. Thedecision being appealed from was the decision of respondent Hilario who was the RegionalDirector of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Directorof Lands." It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of theBureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of theBureau of Lands. In any case, respondent Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretaryof the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge"of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion forreconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on saidmotion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the caseof Hamoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this Court held that the

Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside theorders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public landsunder the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of

Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond thebounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Manolo L. Tagarda, Sr. for petitioners. Arturo R. Legaspi for private respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J .:

Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge thedecision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by theRegional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for annulment of theverification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding aparcel of public land.

The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrativeremedies before having recourse to the courts.



The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan deOro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creekand along the banks of the Cagayan river.

Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subjectlots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a

result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Courtof Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against private respondents, whichdecision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.

The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the samebecame final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment beforethe Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the same. AntonioNazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filedanother case for certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunctionwith the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. Thedecision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected fromportions of the subject lots they occupied.

Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the surveyplan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion areabeing claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant,however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.

In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera,respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a reportto the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent toLot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that privaterespondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications.

Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilariorendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno

by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if qualified, may filepublic land applications covering their respective portions.

Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau ofLands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered himto vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvementsthey have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possessionthereof.

Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitionersDesamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC,Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and

recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondentIgnacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondentPalad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whichresulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing thecomplaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of thesurvey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by theMetropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as thepreparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shallbe conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.[1]

Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by

Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had been actedupon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau ofLands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources, the present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine ofexhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there was no showing of oppressivenessin the manner in which the orders were issued and executed.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assign the following errors:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jun1996/98045.HTM#_edn1






I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY ANDCAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTWHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THEMATTER;

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY ANDCAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT

DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THEEXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.,DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION OFPUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAUOF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT FOR

ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.

The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not thesubject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretionto his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:

"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they graduallyreceive from the effects of the current of the waters."

In the case of Meneses v. CA,[2] this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring propertyunder Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that thedeposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the actionof the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent tothe banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in acase, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion graduallyreceived from the effects of the current of waters.

For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by thedumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the

Cagayan River bounding their land.[3]

It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation ofsuch boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from theaction of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v.City of Manila,[4] this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body ofwater in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not havingmet the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of ariparian owner.

In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped fromdenying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Landswhen the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571.[5] Themere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was publicland, having been the subject of Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No.

36302, Cad-237) which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's MiscellaneousSales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by AntonioNazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation report torespondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular inspection that said land actually covers adry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The investigation reportalso states that except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole areais fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential housesmade of light materials, including those of private respondents which were erected by themselvessometime in the early part of 1978.[6]

Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which wasformed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with

the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands.[7]

This Court has often enough held thatfindings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction isconfined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.[8] Again,when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on theparties and not reviewable by this Court.[9]

It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made orartificial. In Republic v. CA,[10] this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be dueto the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the CivilCode all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be theexclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al.,[11] where the land was notformed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also











































the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-madeaccretion and, as such, part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by theSun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.[12] Even if this Court were to takeinto consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late AntonioNazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the

Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land,[13]

the same would still be part of thepublic domain.

Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as wellas the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have Jurisdiction over thesame in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners'complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the Court of Appealsaffirmed.

However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have beenexhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of respondentHilario who was the Regional Director of The Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and

by authority of the Director of Lands."[14]

It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of theRegional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to anOfficer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.

In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of theDepartment of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of theBureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration byaffirming or adopting respondent's Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as anUndersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretaryof Agriculture and Natural Resources,[15] This Court held that the Undersecretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director ofLands with respect to questions involving public lands under the administration and control of theBureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot therefore,

be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 ofCommonwealth Act No. 141.[16]

As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being anartificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and controlover the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141) whichstates, thus:

"Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officercharged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who shall actunder his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of thesurvey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition andmanagement of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall beconclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."

In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or capriciousnessin the execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Courtfinds otherwise since said decision was based on the conclusive finding that the subject land waspublic land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands actedwithin his rights when he issued the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecitedprovisions.

Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate thesubject land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect forpetitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to privaterespondents Salasalans and Rayabas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over thesubject land. The execution order merely directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from thesubject land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before they were ejectedfrom it.Based on the finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actuallyoccupying the subject land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Landsand in the exercise of this administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject landon the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants thereof.























While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied bythem, they nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales

Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact directedto do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely implements respondent Hilario'sorder. It should be noted that petitioners' own application still has to be given due course.[17]

As Director of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any

form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.[18]

He mayissue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are basedon the findings of fact.

In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros,[19] this Court held that where, in the disposition of publiclands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly actswithin his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, butnot an act or grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari . Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse ofdiscretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3788 December 21, 1907

PEDRO P. ROXAS, petitioner-appellee,vs.JULIA TUASON, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI, AND ALEJANDRO ANDCONSOLACION AGUIRRE,

TORRES, J.:

On February 19, 1906, attorneys Rosado, Sanz & Opisso, on behalf of Pedro P. Roxas, appliedfor the registration of the estate owned by the said Roxas, known as the Hacienda de San PedroMacati , in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act; said hacienda wasacquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the will of his late father, Jose Bonifacio Roxas, yUbaldo. The property consists of four different parcels of land, irregular shape, designated on theaccompanying plan under the letters "A", "B", "C", and "D", containing a total area of 1,761hectares 51 ares and 5 centares, equivalent to 17,615,105 square meters, and according to thelast assessment for the purpose of taxation assessed at P415,221.34, of which P59,904corresponded to the portion of said hacienda included within the limits of the city of Manila andP256,769 corresponded to that portion situated in the Province of Rozal. The building constructedof strong materials, called the "Casa-Quinta" or "Casa de Ingenieros," belonging also to saidRoxas, is erected within parcel "C," occupying, together with its appurtenances, an area of 8,430

square meters, and was assessed at P98,557.34. It does not appear that said hacienda ismortgaged nor that any person has any right to or any interest therein; and it is almost whollyoccupied at the present time, under lease, by about 429 tenants whose names, residences, andpostal addresses, as well as the residence of the owner of the property and of his attorney in fact,are stated in the application.

In his writing of April 24 the petitioner requested the summoning of the persons therein named,and stated in addition that the total area of the hacienda is 17,613,595.91 square meters, asspecified in the corrections made to the technical description.

In another writing dated July 24, 1906, amending his former application, the petitioner gives thepostal address and names of several occupants of the property; and by other amendments to his

original petition dated August 30 and September 25, 1906, rectifications are made in theboundaries of the hacienda, the last of which represents a decrease of 1,446.70 square meters,or 14 ares and 46.70 centares which must be deducted from the original description.

The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means ofsubpoenas and notices published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason, appeared andby a document dated September 10, 1906, set forth her opposition to the registration andauthentication of the title of the petitioner, Roxas, as regards the parcel marked "C," for the reasonthat two old monuments which had separated their respective properties had been pulled downand new ones erected without her consent, and in her opinion the latter included a considerableportion of the land owned by her, as may be seen on page 122, part IV, of the record.















The municipality of San Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested registration, allegingthat the land occupied by the municipal building and the public school had been in the possessionof the town from time immemorial, and that all the land occupied by roads, highways, lanes, andpublic landing places belonged to the public domain and should be excluded from registration infavor of the petitioner.

Under date of the 18th of September, 1906, the attorney for Alejandro Aguirre and Consolacion

Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for registration alleging that the two parcels of landowned by them had been improperly included within the bounds of said hacienda in the parcelmarked "C," the second said parcels, which is the only subject of the respective bill of exceptionsand appeal interposed by them, consists of a building lot situated in Calle San Pedro, oppositethe first parcel of land, which was the subject of another bill of exceptions and appeal by thepetitioner; said second parcels measures 10 meters and 87 centimeters on its front and rear, and9 meters and 20 centimeters along each of its sides, its boundaries being stated.

Evidence consisting of both oral testimony and documents, which appear in the record, havingbeen adduced by both parties in the suit, the judge, after a notation of default having been enteredagainst all the respondents, rendered his decision on the 17th of October, 1906, overruling theopposition made by Julia Tuason, by the municipality of San Pedro Macati, and by Alejandro and

Consolacion Aguirre as to the second parcel, and ordered the registration of the Hacienda of SanPedro Macati in favor of Pedro Roxas, the petitioner herein, excluding the parcel of land with afrontage of 23 Spanish yards and a depth of 24 Spanish yards occupied by the municipal building,which the government has the right to use without the payment of rent therefor, so long as thesame is occupied by the said building or by another in substitution thereof and used for the publicgood and for official purposes. The respondents, Julia Tuason, the municipality of San PedroMacati, and Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre, excepted to said judgment and moved for a newtrial on the ground that the same was contrary to law and to the weight of the evidence; saidmotion was overruled, the respondents again excepting. The respective bills of exceptions havingbeen presented, the same were forwarded in the ordinary manner.

The only subject of controversy between the petitioner, owner of the Hacienda of San Pedro

Macati, and the respondent Julia Tuason is the question of the boundary line, between theirrespective contiguous premises.

The representative of the petitioner affirms that the real boundary of the hacienda on the side thatadjoins the land of Tuason was and still is a creek or sapa separating both properties, and that informer years said creek was wider that at the present time.

The respondent, however, maintains that the boundary between the sitio called Suavoy, formerlyan island of that name, and the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati is determined by straight linesdrawn between some old monuments distant a few yards from the bank of the said creek.

The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed bymonuments belonging to her or that the creek which divides the sitio or Island of Suavoy from theland of the said hacienda is included within the respondent's land, since in the bill of sale executedby the procurador general of the Augustinian friars on March 28, 1893, to Julia Tuason, nomention is made of monuments erected thereon nor of any creek existing in the large tract of landpurchased by her, except that the land is situated in the barrio of Suavoy and that it is boundedon two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.

Nor does the record show that there was more land on the side of the hacienda, forming part ofthe barrio or sitio of Suavoy, not included in the tract acquired by Tuason from the AugustinianFathers, and that said creek traversed said barrio from one end to the other, or the respondent'sland, in order to affirm on good grounds that her land extended to the opposite bank of theaforesaid creek.

From the fact that the land of Julia Tuason was bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of SanPedro Macati it does not follow that the strip of a few meters in width on the bank of the creekabove referred to belonged to her, there being no evidence in support thereof, and if her statementwere true, she would have applied for a survey and demarcation of her property in accordancewith the area of the same stated in her title deed; and if she did not do so it must be because sherenounces its verification in this manner or for some other reason.

Further than this, it is impossible to draw the above conclusion, inasmuch as the strip of land,irregular in shape, running parallel to the creek and forming a portion of its bank, has always upto the present time been occupied by tenants of said hacienda as being an integral portion thereof,



even at the time when the land now owned by Julia Tuason belonged to the Augustinian Fathers,the original owners thereof.

It is so affirmed by Rafael Rivera, the collector of rents of the hacienda, and by two tenants thereof,Tomas Medina and Santos Tenorio; the two last named were lessees for about thirty years andtwenty-seven years, respectively, of certain portions of the hacienda with their respective part ofsaid strip, as a prolongation and integral part of the lands of the hacienda, and they were never

molested or interfered with by the Augustinian Fathers or their tenants, nor later by Julia Tuason,who later acquired the adjoining land on the other side of the creek, or by her tenants; these latterwhen cultivating the land did not cross the creek, it being recognized as the boundary line betweenboth properties; that in 1871 the said creek was wider than at present, having then a width ofabout 4 Spanish yards, small bancas plying on it around the Island of Suavoy,. and some of themonuments of the hacienda were 4 meters distant from the bank, others 2 meters, and some 1meter; that the witness Santos Tenorio was present at an interview held between an Augustinianpriest named Martinez, in charge of the land at the time, and the owner of the hacienda, BonifacioRoxas, in connection with the boundary line of the two adjoining estates, and after someexplanations the said creek was settled as the limit in spite of the fact that the old monumentswere already in existence at some distance from the bank in the direction of the hacienda; andthat in 1882, when the first-named witness, Rafael Rivera, took charge of his office of collector,

the owner of the hacienda pointed out to him the said creek as the limit of his property, everybodyasserting that Suavoy was at that time an island, although two of the witnesses of the respondentstated that said creek was only a canal.

The proven fact that said creek was wider in 1871, when it had a width of about 4 Spanish yards,is the best explanation as to why some of the monuments of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macatiare now at some distance from the bank of the same, and no legal reason whatever exists whythe slow increase which has taken place on the hacienda's side should be considered asbelonging to the respondent, inasmuch as the latter does not own the bed of the creek andbecause it may be assumed that the slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both propertiesequally since the respondent has not been able to show or prove that her land has been therebyreduced.

Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession to real propertyreads: lawphil.net

The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currentsbelong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.

The provision in this article is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on account of theaccretion, has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the hacienda inasmuch as it hasincreased all along the bank of the creek, the gradual effect of the currents; and even though thelaw does not require an express act of possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate,it is certain that the owner of the hacienda has possessed it for more than thirty years through histenants, who have been cultivating their respective parcels of land together with thecorresponding portion of the said strip down to the bank of said creek.

For these considerations the question of the situation of the old monuments and the placing ofnew ones in the intervening space is of no importance, inasmuch as it has already been shownthat the respondent has no title to the accretion which by spontaneous increase formed the stripof land between the creek and the monuments, and no proof is offered in the record that the landof Julia Tuason reached the other side of the creek toward the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.

In conclusion: The result of the evidence, as stated in the judgment appealed from, does notmaintain the claim of the respondent; on the contrary, it has been shown in a convincing mannerthat the present natural limit of both properties is the aforesaid creek; therefore, the oppositionfiled by Julia Tuason is untenable.

As to the opposition filed by the municipality to the registration applied for, the judgment appealedfrom is held to be in accordance with the law and the merits of the case because, as is therein setforth, the petitioner, Pedro Roxas, is the owner of the building lots and portions of land to whichthe said opposition refers; the municipality of San Pedro Macati has only the usufruct of the plotoccupied by the municipal building as long as the same or any other building of a public andofficial nature is erected thereon; the municipality can not dispose of it as a property of its ownbecause, according to the documents offered in evidence by the petitioner, the SpanishGovernment had recognized the dominion of the petitioner's predecessor over the land occupiedby said municipal building and by the town cemetery, and the grant made by the owner was ever



understood to be only of the usufruct thereof so long as used for public purposes, the same beingreturnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such purpose.

In connection with the land occupied by the public school of said town, no opposition based onordinary or on extraordinary prescription may be made by the municipality because the plot wasgranted only for the purpose of erecting thereon a public school, and the possession thereof, onthe part of the municipality, was simply usufructuary, the government of the Province of Manila

having recognized the title thereto which pertained to the petitioner, owner of the said hacienda,whereof the said plot forms a part; moreover, the possession thereof by the municipality has beenbut for a few years only. The school building having been destroyed, the land was abandonedmany years ago, and for this reason prescription can not be invoked because the possessionthereof was interrupted and ceased many years since; in view thereof, the decision of the lowercourt respecting the petition of the municipality is held to be in accordance with the law and themerits of the case.

The attorney for Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre excepted to the decision of the 17th ofOctober, 1906, whereby their claim to the second parcel of land, as stated in their petition, wasdismissed; their bill of exceptions, entered in the general register under No 3788, was dulyforwarded, but notwithstanding the fact that the time prescribed has been exceeded, the

appellants have not filed their brief nor notified the appellee regarding the same; therefore, thelatter by a petition dated June 26, 1907, requested that their appeal be considered as having beenabandoned; this request is held to be well based and in accordance with the law.

Therefore, by virtue of the considerations above set forth, it is our opinion that the judgmentappealed from should be affirmed as regards the respondents who have appealed, Julia Tuasonand the municipality of San Pedro Macati; the appeal of Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre ishereby declared to be abandoned, each of the appellants to pay their respective share of thecosts. So ordered.

2nd set of property cases

Documents