2nd set consti cases

8/10/2019 2nd Set Consti Cases

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Brigido R. Simon, Jr., et al. vs. Commission On Human Rights, et al.

EN BANC, DECISION, Vitug, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is again placed into focus in

this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to

prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled Fermo, etal. vs. Quimpo, et al.

The case all started when a Demolition Notice, dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the

petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council

under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and

members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a

grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.

1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that

their stalls should be removed to give way to the Peoples Park.

Later, the group filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the chairman to send a letter to

Simon to stop the demolition of the private respondents stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.

The CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls and shant ies at North

EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission and ordering said petitio ners

to appear before the CHR.

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHRs own

ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private

respondents stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the

disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase

light housing materials and food under the Commissions supervision and again directed the petitioners to desist

from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and

arrest. 6

A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHRs jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among

other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of

Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor

dwellers in Metro-Manila;


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xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the

demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this

Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North

Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain

business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a

permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss

set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case

to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commissions

authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,

and that the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage

in business. 9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt

charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the

ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10

In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition

of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the order to desist, and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of

them.

On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to

dismiss, in this wise:


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Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed

by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The

motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13

The CHR opined that it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tigerlimited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the

power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines .

. . . It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to ones right to development, to life and t o dignity. All these brazenly

and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of

women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and

traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Mans inhumanity to

man.

In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the business rights of the private respondents whose stalls were

demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Courts resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public

respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its

Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who

had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20

issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well,

the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21


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The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and

political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in

accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as

well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged

whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of

human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to

victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other

evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the

members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not

heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then

Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is only the first of the enumerated powers

and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment, but that resemblance can in no way be

synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:


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. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-

judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,

receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and politicalrights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or

even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a

controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence

and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those

factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and

definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the

Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, itsis, to determine the extent of CHRs investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase human rights is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a

few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the

Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is

(w)hat do you understand by human rights? The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have

given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts ofthe world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or

Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of

religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to

elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and

social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . .

Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.

26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. 27


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So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the

Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his

political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights

advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the

right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights

that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and

political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished

this right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other

violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the

commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under

the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which

cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments

regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This

particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps,

at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined

as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?


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MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts

of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human

rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past

regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a

matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with

human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee,

so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of

political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of

disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed

Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the

concept and jurisdictional area of the term human rights. I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference

was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later

on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.


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If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other

convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of

which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified

in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link ourconcept of human rights to general terms like convention, rather than specify the rights contained in the

convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of

amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and

political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of

the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need

arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to

marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be

envisioned initially by this provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to

fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations.

So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of

individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the

concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an

international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.


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(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are

not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property,

marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights

appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general

sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable

searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32

Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the

establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of

petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegatesenvisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights

violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the (1) protection of rights of political detainees,

(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)

salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious. While the enumeration has not

likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,

significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making

a conclusive delineation of the CHRs scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,

instead, that Congress may provide for other cases of violat ions of human rights that should fall within the

authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation. 35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores

and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be

developed into a Peoples Park. More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this

Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be

likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that

cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards

hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that

the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the

compartment of human rights violations involving civil and political rights intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to adopt its operational guidelines and rules of

procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the

CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power to cite or hold any person in direct or

indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided


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for in the Rules of Court. That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to

violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial

powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate

with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in

pursuing its investigative work. The order to desist (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instancebefore us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not

possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through

Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid servic es to the

underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer

jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the

Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never

derived by implication.

Evidently, the preventive measures and legal aid services mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and

judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf

of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the

writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the judge of any court in which the action is

pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of

preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation

or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to

any appropriate agency of government. 37

The challenge on the CHRs disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors

affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on

the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate

administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and

academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is

merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act

about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said

Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been

intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39


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WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby

prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for

contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, peti tioner, vs.HON. RALPH C. LANTION,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.

JIMENEZ,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MELO, J.:

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast andoverwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression andtyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him intimes of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basicdue process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.The buglesounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamentalwrit.

The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of ForeignAffairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of privaterespondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were theGrand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the UnitedStates with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud theUnited States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty5 years on eachcount);

B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts;Maximum Penalty5 years on each count);

C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts;Maximum Penalty5 years on each count);

D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts;Maximum Penalty5 years on each count);

E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penaltyless than one year).


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(p. 14, Rollo.)

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating andauthorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant toSection 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the

"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents insupport thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of somedocuments in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some othermatters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requestingcopies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as alldocuments and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time tocomment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.

Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held inabeyance in the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of,or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copyof the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.

In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letterdated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999),denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extraditionrequest and supporting documents from the United States Government,pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of theextradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions ofthe extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the ExtraditionTreaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates thedocumentary requirements and establishes the procedures under whichthe documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence.Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in

Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.

Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not apreliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation ofcriminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures andrequirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with


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by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights ofthe accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the personsought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the

petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will notpose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate saiddocuments

2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grandjury information and documents obtained through grand jury processcovered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The UnitedStates had to secure orders from the concerned District Courtsauthorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury informationto Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose

of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the saidinformation is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In thisparticular extradition request the United States Government requestedthe Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of thesubject information. This Departments denial of your request is

consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty whichprovides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests ofthe United States in any proceedings arising out of a request forextradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is thecounsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedingsin connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the ViennaConvention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that"[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must beperformed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal lawenforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender ofaccused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed withthe Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against theSecretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the NationalBureau of Investigation, for mandamus(to compel herein petitioner to furnish privaterespondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him anopportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to


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evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari(to set aside hereinpetitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from

considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; andto enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI fromperforming any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the UnitedStates), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and awrit of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafterraffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presidedover by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, whoappeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file amemorandum, but the same was denied.

On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day,disposing:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: theSecretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director ofthe National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representativesto maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the actscomplained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection withthe request of the United States Government for the extradition of the

petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trialcourt; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of thepetitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days fromservice on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 ofthe 1997 Rules of Court.

The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminaryinjunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set onAugust 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. The respondents are,

likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to theissuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)

Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:


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PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OFJURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONAMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION INISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERBECAUSE:

I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROMCOMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF,I. E., TO DESISTFROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THEOFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS ANDFROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITYTO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST,THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE

PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITIONWAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE ANADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;

II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROMPERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITIONTREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI ANDPROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY ANDSUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND

IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHTIN ESSETHAT NEEDSPROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFERANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.

(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Alsoissued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO)providing:


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NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until furtherorders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, youragents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place orstead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing theassailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in CivilCase No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice,Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.

(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, asdirected, filed their respective memoranda.

From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues arepatent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of bothparties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During theevaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to thetwo basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer wouldnecessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues ofwhich are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolutionwould call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24,1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of theextradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that

private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluationstage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of thelegal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-USExtradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is thereany conflict between private respondentsbasic due process rights and the provisionsof the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly intothe substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters whichconcern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the

filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 bythe trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-USExtradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered intoforce the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as thePhilippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of


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an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal offoreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him inconnection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of apenalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state orgovernment." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves acharged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:

The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to theSecretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrestissued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, orsome other instruments having equivalent legal force;

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars asto the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known,the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission ofthese acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and thedesignation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of therequest; and

4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary ofForeign Affairs, pertinently provides:

. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that therequest fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treatyor convention, he shall forward the request together with the related

documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designateand authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the taskof evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is theSecretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?


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In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, theexecutive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:

1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identityand probable location of the person sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;

3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of theoffense for which extradition is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for theoffense;

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the

prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;

6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 orparagraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.

(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provideprobable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committedthere;

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competentauthority; and

9. A copy of the charging document.

(Paragraph 3, ibid.)

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that theaccompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the

principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in theRequesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall notbe granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the


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request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is notpunishable under non-military penal legislation."

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition requestand its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, heshall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate andauthorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5,P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with theproper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take theextradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition forextradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective

extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest andtemporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1],Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceedingis criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the

Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature ofthe proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides thatthe attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,represent the latter throughout the proceedings.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting theextradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of aprima

faciecase, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to theCourt of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in

the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition isextraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditionsmentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also


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determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a politicalone (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the followingquery presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the

evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of theSecretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all thesupporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is thelatter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure theirsufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether ornot the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense whichis not punishable under non-military penal legislation.Ipso facto, as expresslyprovided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justicehas the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.

However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that therewas failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it istrue that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs onJune 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justicereceived the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairsdischarging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanyingdocuments. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of ForeignAffairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for whichreason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates themagnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly itsresponsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determinethe completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether theycomply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-USExtradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although theDepartment of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, theDepartment also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition(tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private

respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and thesupporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonableperiod of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of theopposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending thefiling of private respondent's opposition to the request.

The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority,one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of


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Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestationthat it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message thatif it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent toparticipate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that theDepartment of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request andsupporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the requestand its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice,eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all byhimself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFASecretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritativedetermination?

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class

by itself. It issui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous tosay that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executiveauthority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness andsufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its faceand on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable;and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, orthat the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penallegislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3,RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as aninvestigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in theexercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluationof evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,AdministrativeLaw: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citingMorgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is oneof the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it toexercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).

This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, andinvestigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p.27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit.,p.64).

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rule-


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making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable toprosecution.

InRuperto v. Torres(100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion torule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It

does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the factsand making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determiningwhether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merelyinvestigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority toadjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the onlypurpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the factsand circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a finalpronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion andjudgment.

The above description inRupertoapplies to an administrative body authorized toevaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to therights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Itsonly power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of thelaw and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determinewhether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The

bodys power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition

can be filed in court.

It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluationprocedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion thewheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation ofliberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at twostages:First,the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending thesubmission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case ofurgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person soughtpending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US ExtraditionTreaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is

submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions onlymean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospectiveextraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph[5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no requestis submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight


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from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditeeduring the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential DecreeNo. 1069).

Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as

during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a veryimminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process isakin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, theconsequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment setsoff or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of aprospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminallaw enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakesof the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion tomake available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certainconstitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions.Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there arerights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlierstage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135;Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S.478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

InPascual v. Board of Medical Examiners(28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that theright against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitutionwhich is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrativeproceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrativeinvestigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which couldresult in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citingthe earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan(6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that therevocation of ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation

than forfeiture of property.

Cabal vs. Kapunan(supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealthagainst a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-GraftLaw. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture ofproperty, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and suchforfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case ofAlmeda, Sr.vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laiddown the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceedingis under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be includedin the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in


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form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to becriminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceedingdoes not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, theproceeding is civil in nature.

The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of onesproperty or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us,involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchyof constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoysprecedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, thetime spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person toeventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal orpenal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to apreliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same resultthe arrestand imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluationstage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in thefiling of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and tothe deprivation of his liberty.

Petitioners reliance onWright vs. Court of Appeals(235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminallegislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wrightis not authorityfor petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary

investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wrightwas in reference to theapplicability of the prohibition against an ex post factolaw. It had nothing to do withthe denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.

As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceedingenforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devisedin the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good,which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to bedue process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with dueprocess requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.

The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppressionand punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, bothStates accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.

The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not onlyworded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are


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alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with whichthe provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, theirdynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modernproblem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet theexigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process areinterpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law thecapacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid theconfines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of thedue process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion inthe course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S.78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inherein the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two componentssubstantive due process whichrequires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person tohis life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the twobasic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by animpartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearingpervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedingsas well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individualsare entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and uponnotice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refutethe position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due

process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, theaffidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavitsand other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, therespondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the

complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, suchas:

1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like thesummary abatement of a nuisanceper se(Article 704, Civil Code), the preventivesuspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local


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Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theatersshowing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to publichealth and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminalprosecution;

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondentis not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time withoutprejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of theproperty of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise themhad not been claimed.

Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does theevaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described

situations mentioned above?

Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which arequite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S.Government.

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extraditionwhich is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2),and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, thegovernor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding

state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberalconstruction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftlyas possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime(31AAm Jur2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, therequisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements orjurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers,such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the timethe offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with thecommission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding statebefore some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S.406-407). The extradition documents arethen filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers anddocuments prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrumentcharging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavitmade before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charginginstrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to conferjurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the extradition(35 C.J.S.408-410). A statutory provision requir ing duplicate copies of the


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indictment, information, aff idavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other

instruments accompanying the demand or requisit ions be furnished and deli vered

to the fugiti ve or hi s attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one

has been held to be a right mandatory on demand(Ibid., p. 410, citingEx parteMoore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d853).

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentationto the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for thereturn of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer havingauthority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31AAm Jur2d 815).

In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter

dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department ofJustice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which arebasically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-USExtradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. Inurgent cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made directlyby the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition istransmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to

the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares adeclaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in fullforce and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legalrepresentation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditableoffenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated inaccordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequentextradition hearing.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of theprospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized tohold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request(Ibid.)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditableto the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction overthe defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is beingsought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is


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We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achievelegitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance inconstitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher

values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Billof Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that theywere designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry fromthe overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterizepraiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, thanmediocre ones.

(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine

Government that no rightthat of libertysecured not only by the Billsof Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well,is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.)

In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where therights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means.

It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary thatthe means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution.Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is noquestion that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgentpublic need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse thebypassing of an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a

person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitutionis a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who woulddeny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,

Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool ofcriminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender ofaccused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless,accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however,not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not


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mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in"ordered liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At thatpoint, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may

not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in theabsence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) sinceafter a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal andstatutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of therequested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretaryof Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law andthe treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filingof the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements willnot vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notableefforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since iteven informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, andthose that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits thatconsultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in hisDepartment and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous natureof the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time dueto its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitatesimmediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?

Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness ofadministrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right tonotice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarityand deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet noextraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determinationwhich, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. Thegrant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threatof arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during theevaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treatyand the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.

Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot bedispensed with and shelved aside.


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Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewiseinvokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of publicconcern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to

documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, ordecisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policydevelopment, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations asmay be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of thePhilippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2)the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general rightguaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred.These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"(Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and relyon the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alonecan protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).

Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request datedJuly 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since thematters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the otherhand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested withpublic interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes materialwhen a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes theright to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directlyaffected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.

The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter ofpublic concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which thepublic may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simplybecause such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. CivilService Commission,150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is thepeople and any citizen has "standing".

When the individual himself is involved in official government action because saidaction has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind ofdeprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public


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concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation againsthim.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within

the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of thePhilippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records,and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to officialgovernment action from the U. S. Government. No official action from our countryhas yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreignrelations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes thisconstitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of publicconcern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the

balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary forthe proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no officialgovernmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence theinvocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extraditionhearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our governmentby then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instantcontroversy: Would private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during theevaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of thePhilippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is inthe affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clausein the Constitution?

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass uponthe constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor theExtradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of thegrant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreignrelations.

The rule ofpacta sunt servanda,one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims ofinternational law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein ingood faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is alsocompelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]hePhilippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generallyaccepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to


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the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with allnations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part ofthe law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rulesapplicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed.,p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or localcourts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict betweena rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the localstate. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to bothsince it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for thegenerally accepted principles of international law in observance of the IncorporationClause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz,Philippine Political Law,1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and achoice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts(Ichong vs. Hernandez,101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova,9 SCRA 230[1963];In re: Garcia,2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organsof municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga &Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law ofthe land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national ormunicipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied inmost countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with,but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lexposterior derogat prioritakes effecta treaty may repeal a statute and a statute mayrepeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such asthe Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if theyare in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal ornational law?En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pittedagainst each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, asimplemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights

of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From theprocedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during thejudicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearingare clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law issilent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifeststhis silence.


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Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, hedescribes the evaluation procedure as an "ex partetechnical assessment" of thesufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. Anapplication of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not goagainst the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Lawprecludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, Americanjurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstateextradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may evenrequest for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state,and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right(35 C.J.S.410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government toprevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecysurrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. Theconfidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that