They cede the political the surveillance state controls the public sphere Robins & Webster, 99 (Kevin Robins, Frank Webster professor at the University of Glasgow, Head of the Department of Sociology at City University London Times of the Technoculture: From the Information Society to the Virtual Life Psychology Press, 1999, https://books.google.com/books?id=6EHkovx-xzcC&source=gbs_navlinks_s) //GYIn the name of security, state surveillance has become a pandemic, and even normative, feature of modern society. In the process, it has extended from intelligence activities to routine policing activities. This has been encouraged particularly by the expanding police use of computer facilities, which has promoted new forms of proactive and pre-emptive policing. As it becomes possible to maintain a broad data base that can be inexpensively screened, it becomes prudent to consider everyone a possible suspect initially. Such developments can be seen, in Foucaldian terms, as part of an irreversible continuing historical process of more intensive and extensive social control. As a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Kenneth Newman, has expressed it, it would be better if we stopped talking about crime prevention and lifted the whole thing to a higher level of generality represented by the words social control. However, what is particularly significant is that these surveillance and control strategies are modeled on the military paradigm. In their computerization strategies, the police are moving to a more military style of operation. Thus the policing strategy of targeting and surveillance, which undertakes surveillance activities in order to target individuals, groups, locations or areas of special interest, is military in origin. It was developed by Sir Kenneth Newman out of his experiences as Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the late 1970s, where the British army had set up, under the direction of the leading counter-insurgency theorist Frank Kitson, just such a system for the collection and analysis of masses of intelligence information. Rather than being some extraordinary and exceptional state of affairs, the military paradigm of surveillance technologies interlinked with command and control systems that are insistently hidden from the public eye, has become a generalized model for control and policing strategies.Agambens obviously not being literal --- hes not even claiming our experiences are on par with nazi victims Van Munster, 5/28/2014 Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and teaches security studies at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark (Rens, The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule, Danish Institute for International Studies, p. 144)//roetlinSupra fn. 4, at p. 181, passim , Agambens outspoken statement that the concentration camp is the political paradigm of the West does not purport that life today faces the same horrors that inhabitants of concentration camps had to confront.

They cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violenceKappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

You should be an informed citizen, not the government they shut down critical thinking and deliberationSteele, 10 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas (Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml) [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak truth to power? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectuals primary purpose should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a research program that could be employed by students of world politics, as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the full truth from the powerful, Foucault states, we must avoid a trap into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do. This is not a question in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts refused us, an analysis of the situation we arent allowed to make. Theres the trap. (2001: 453) 27 This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical research program of our own, will also become imbued with authority and used for mechanisms of control, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, instead, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a friend who plays the role of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. What the President needs, then, is an intellectual father-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of the brittleness of power, of its arrogance and blindness [ignorance], of its limits and pitfalls; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to listen to that voice and tremble. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make that big of a difference are missing the point. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to tell the story of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both historys events and context. The intellectuals of America, Morgenthau wrote, can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the tact, rules, and seduction that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, humanly speaking, no more is required, and no more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation ([1964] 2006: 233).

Their deliberative model is both violent and ends any democratic discussion that they want to create Stuhr 2007 (john, Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Department Chair, pragmatism with ressentiment, http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/USC/PD12.html, LB)Deliberative democratic theory holds out the hope that a people, or peoples, if you like, can talk and reason together well enough to work out their differences and arrive at policy directions that would be amenable to all involved. This hope is not shared by all. It is shared readily by many analytic philosophers (those analysts who are willing, anyway, to dally with values), since analytic philosophers generally accept that there is an objective and shared world that can be accessed and evaluated with language. However, it is not generally shared or accepted by continental philosophers who harbor a long suspicion, heralded by the masters of suspicion (Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud), that all is rarely what it seems to be, that history is made behind the backs of men, that power is too often wielded out of ressentiment rather than strength, and that what we say may be largely influenced by what we are unwilling and unable to acknowledge. As a result, there is no easy fit between continental philosophy and most deliberative democratic theory. Those who have been willing to venture there, such as Jrgen Habermas, share more of the analytic frame of mind than they do of the continental, even though they are heirs of Marx and to a certain extent Freud. But they, at least Habermas, are no heirs of Nietzsche and his account of ressentiment. There is something about the Nietzschean suspicion of power, reason, and truth that makes for a tortuous view of deliberative democratic theory and its cousins (e.g., Rawlss late work on international theory and the laws of peoples). That Nietzsche is suspicious of democracy for upholding the common mentality and meager aspirations of the herd is the least of the problem. The greater problem, again, is that in a Nietzschean view what we say, and what we say is reasonable -- our very postulation of reason and truth -- is often a will to power gone astray out of weak and malignant motivations steeped in ressentiment. In their explorations into democracy, post-Nietzscheans are more likely to turn to an agonistic view of politics, what Chantal Mouffe and others call radical democracy, brought on by Schmitt, rather than by any kind of deliberative hope. Radical democrats think that any kind of consensus achieved through talking is the end of democracy, not the beginning of it. One might even say that the continental lefts antipathy to deliberative theory is its own longstanding ressentiment at the linguistic turn in political theory and practice and at the resurgence of democratic ideals that aim toward consensus rather than valuing supposedly irreconcilable differences. The odd, often missing, figure in all this is Dewey, and the odd, also often missing, philosophy more largely is pragmatism. The most mainstream of analytic philosophers of deliberation will never mention John Dewey, though Deweys entire body of work lends itself to this kind of collective learning and working out through communication what we as a people want to be. The more interesting philosophers of deliberative democratic theory will turn to Dewey often. And as for pragmatism at large, one should recall Habermass reliance on Mead for his notion of individuation and how one begins to converse with others in the first place. In light of this background, in my contribution to this panel, I will trace the resources that deliberative theory has found in pragmatism, and I will inquire into why and how it is that pragmatism avoids the continental lefts ressentiment toward any hope in deliberative talk. But in the main, the central question I will address is this: Should pragmatism hold out hope in deliberation when the Nietscheans may well be right that ressentiment clouds and dogs all deliberative encounters and all political arrangements? Given that the Deweyans and pragmatists more broadly dont share the faith of most analytical philosophers in the objective reality of the world, or at least of a world given ready-made and waiting prior to human interpretation, the Deweyans share the continentals suspicion of language as a mere tool for accessing the real. How far does this resemblance continue, and how does this resemblance augur for a non-analytic philosophy of deliberative democracy. Have Dewey and other pragmatists simply finessed the problem of ressentiments power to skew deliberative talk? Or are there resources in pragmatism that actually help a deliberating people acknowledge and work through ressentiment and its causes and consequences, in some kind of marriage of Freudian working through and pragmatic problem solving? If pragmatism has been too nave in its hope in the winged words of conversation and their ability for a people to find new direction, might it still have resources to work through the question properly? In the final sections of my presentation, I develop positive responses to these pressing questions for pragmatic theory and democratic practice.

Switch-side debate causes uncertainty and indecisionthis undermines political participationMUTZ 2006 (Diana C. Mutz is Samuel A. Stouffer Professor of Political Science and Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, where she serves as Director of the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics at the Annenberg Public Policy Center, Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy, ebook)***We do not support the gendered language in this card***There are at least two potential social psychological mechanisms that might explain why cross-cutting exposure discourages participation. First, political inaction could be induced by the ambivalence that crosscutting exposure is likely to engender within an individual. If citizens are embedded in networks that do not reinforce their viewpoints, but instead tend to supply them with political information that challenges their views, then cross-cutting exposure could make people uncertain of their own positions with respect to issues or candidates and therefore less likely to take political action as a result. In this case it is an internal (i.e., intrapersonal) conflict that drives the effect. The chain of events leading to suppressed participation would be one in which crosscutting exposure leads to ambivalent attitudes, which, in turn, reduce political participation because these individuals do not have views that are sufficiently definite or strong to motivate them to political action.No character has been criticized more for inaction that results from ambivalence than Hamlet, prince of Denmark. Laurence Oliviers Hamlet is described simply as The Prince who could not make up his mind.35 Readers of Shakespeares famous play have long criticized Hamlet for indecisiveness and they frequently cite that quality as the cause of his ultimate downfall. His failure to kill Claudius when he had the chance resulted in a tragic series of events that ultimately led to his own death, as well as his mothers. And yet, could one not also argue that his extensive weighing of the pros and cons was entirely appropriate under the circumstances?Hamlet is painfully self-aware, as are many of Shakespeares characters. His [Their] motives may be noble, but his [their] constant questioning of himself [themselves] is not practical, and he experiences a paralyzing ambivalence as a result. His slow, plodding, deliberative decision-making process produces ambivalence and leads him to act with wings as swift as meditation, which is to say, not swiftly at all. Although Hamlet might be the poster child for the deliberative process, the price he pays for it is enormous.In todays popular parlance, the very kind of deliberation that theorists advocate one that involves careful, time-consuming weighing of pros and cons, and exposure to a multitude of different viewpoints is popularly chided as the antithesis of action. As H. Ross Perot put it, I come from an environment where, if you see a snake, you kill it. He contrasts this with the more deliberative style of corporations such as General Motors (GM): At GM, if you see a snake, the first thing you do is go hire a consultant on snakes. Then you get a committee on snakes, and then you discuss it for a couple of years. The likely course of action is nothing. You figure the snake hasnt bitten anybody yet, so you just let him crawl around on the factory floor.36

Psychoanalysis cant explain international relations --- the move from the clinic to the macro-sphere is too great --- obviously not everyone shares the exact same fantasies and theres no mechanism to actualize changeBoucher 2010 --- literary and psychoanalytic studies at Deakin University (Geoff M., Zizek and Politics: A Critical Introduction, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_hmrBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%C5%BDi%C5%BEek+and+Politics:+An+Introduction&ots=3uqgdGUwxC&sig=MNP7oMG7JXgWMj49yz2DHRTs6BI#v=onepage&q&f=false)//trepkaCan we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remark- able that, for all the criticisms of Zizek's political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra-extremism of Zizek's political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate - which has perhaps caused the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacan's notion of travers- ing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people's sub- jective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands' volun- tary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a support- ing moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully-fledged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option ((7), Zizek's option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose 'traversal of the fantasy' is immediately identical with his transformation of the socio-political system or Other. I-Ience, according to Zizek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psy- choanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Zi2ek's resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objec- tive) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject-object, whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Zizek's decisive political-theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1) The substantive problem is to equate any political change worth the name with the total change of the subject-object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equat- ing politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embrac- ing dictatorial govermnent, as Zizek now frankly avows (IDLC 412-19). We have seen that the ultra-political form of Zizek's criti- cism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is sufficiently radical for him - even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Zizek's model of politics proper is modelled on a pre-critical analogy with the total transformation of a subiect's entire subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be? We have seen that Zizek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people. The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime's 'inherent transgressions': at once subjects' habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime's myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete 'traversal' - in Hegel's terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation - of all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of of entire new subjectobjects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the first iekian political subject was Schellings divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (IDLC 153; OB 1448). But can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all in one world- creating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not for iek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?

Their alternative is the reason why psychoanalysis is bad the negative attempts to put us on the couch, interpreting our fantasies for us until we dont know what we want anymore the rule of psychoanalysis is regardless of what you say, you mean something else this paradox makes politics impossible. Deleuze 2004(Gilles, thinker, Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, pg. 274-280 [Originally published in Italian. "Relazione di Gilles Deleuze" and discussions in Armando Verdiglione, ed., Psicanalisi e Politica; Atti del Comvegno di studi tenuto a Milano l'8-9 Maggio 1973. Milan: Feltrinelli, 19-3, pp. 7-11, 17-21, 37-40, 44-45, 169-172. Abridged and edited.])I would like to present five propositions on psychoanalysis. The first is this: psychoanalysis today presents a political danger all of its own that is different from the implicit dangers of the old psychiatric hospital. The latter constitutes a place of localized captivity; psychoanalysis, on the other hand, works in the open air. The psychoanalyst has in a sense the same position that Marx accorded to the merchant in feudal society: working in the open pores of society, not only in private offices, but also in schools, institutions, departmentalism, etc. This function puts us in a unique position with respect to the psychoanalytic project. We recognize that psychoanalysis tells us a great deal about the unconscious; but, in a certain way, it does so only to reduce the unconscious, to destroy it, to repulse it, to imagine it as a sort of parasite on consciousness. For psychoanalysis, it is fair to say there are always too many desires. The Freudian conception of the child as polymorphous pervert shows that there are always too many desires. In our view, however, there are never enough desires. We do not, by one method or another, wish to reduce the unconscious: we prefer to produce it: there is no unconscious that is already there; the unconscious must be produced politically, socially, and historically. The question is: in what place, in what circumstances, in the shadow of what events, can the unconscious be produced. Producing the unconscious means very precisely the production of desire in a historical social milieu or the appearance of statements and expressions of a new kind. My second proposition is that psychoanalysis is a complete machine, designed in advance to prevent people from talking, therefore from producing statements that suit them and the groups with which they have certain affinities. As soon as one begins analysis, one has the impression of talking. But one talks in vain; the entire psychoanalytical machine exists to suppress the conditions of a real expression. Whatever one says is taken into a sort of tourniquet, an interpretive machine; the patient will never be able to get to what he really has to say. Desire or delirium (which are in a deep sense the same thing), desire-delirium is by its nature a libidinal investment of an entire historical milieu, of an entire social environment. What makes one delirious are classes, peoples, races, masses, mobs. Psychoanalysis, possessed of a pre-existing code, superintends a sort of destruction. This code consists of Oedipus, castration, the family romance; the most secret content of delirium, i.e. this divergence from the social and historical milieu, will be destroyed so that no delirious statement, corresponding to an overflow in the unconscious, will be able to get through the analytical machine. We say that the schizophrenic has to deal not with family, nor with his par- ents, but with peoples, populations, and tribes. We say that the unconscious is not a matter of generations or family genealogy, but rather of world population, and that the psychoanalytical machine destroys all this. I will cite just two examples: the celebrated example of president Schreber whose delirium is entirely about races, history, and wars. Freud doesn't realize this and reduces the patient's delirium exclusively to his relationship with his father. Another example is the Wolfman: when the Wolfman dreams of six or seven wolves, which is by definition a pack, i.e. a certain kind of group, Freud immediately reduces this multiplicity by bringing everything back to a single wolf who is necessarily the Father. The entire collective libidinal expression manifested in the delirium of the Wolfman will be unable to make, let alone conceive of the statements that are for him the most meaningful. My third proposition is that psychoanalysis works in this way because of its automatic interpretation machine. This interpretation machine can be described in the following way: whatever you say, you mean something different. We can't say enough about the damage these machines cause. When someone explains to me that what I say means something other than what I say, a split in the ego as subject is produced. This split is well known: what I say refers to me as the subject of an utterance or statement, what I mean refers to me as an expressing subject. This split is conjured by psychoanalysis as the basis for castration and prevents all production of statements. For example, in certain schools for problem children, dealing with character or even psychopathology, the child, in his work or play activities, is placed in a relationship with his educator, and in this context the child is understood as the subject of an utterance or statement; in his psychotherapy, he is put into a relationship with the analyst or the therapist, and there he is understood as an expressing subject. Whatever he does in the group in terms of his work and his play will be compared to a superior authority, that of the psychotherapist who alone will have the job of interpreting, such that the child himself is split; he cannot will acceptance for any statement about what really matters to him in his relationship or in his group. He will feel like he's talking, but he will not be able to say a single word about what's most essential to him. Indeed, what produces statements in each one of us is not ego as subject, it's something entirely different: multiplicities, masses and mobs, peoples and tribes, collective arrangements; they cross through us, they are within us, and they seem unfamiliar because they are part of our unconscious. The challenge for a real psychoanalysis, an anti-psychoanalytical analysis, is to discover these collective arrangements of expression, these collective networks, these peoples who are in us and who make us speak, and who are the source of our statements. This is the sense in which we set a whole held of experimentation, of personal or group experimentation, against the interpretive activities of psychoanalysis. My fourth proposition, to be quick, is that psychoanalysis implies a fairly peculiar power structure. The recent book by Castel, Le Psychanalysme, demonstrates this point very well. The power structure occurs in the contract, a formidable liberal bourgeois institution. It leads to "transference" and culminates in the analyst's silence. And the analyst's silence is the greatest and the worst of interpretations. Psychoanalysis uses a small number of collective statements, which are those of capitalism itself regarding castration, loss, and family, and it tries to get this small number of collective statements specific to capitalism to enter into the individual statements of the patients themselves. We claim that one should do just the opposite, that is, start with the real individual statements, give people conditions, including the material conditions, for the production of their individual statements, in order to discover the real collective arrangements that produce them.

Psychoanalysis enables modern governmentalityMilchman and Rosenberg 2 (Milchman is a professor at the department of PoliSci @ Queens College in New York and Rosenberg is an Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Queens College, A Foucauldian Analysis of Psychoanalysis: A Discipline that Disciplines, http://www.academyanalyticarts.org/milchman-foucauldian-analysis, wcp)For Foucault, the very genesis of the discipline of psychoanalysis is itself linked to historical changes in the exercise of power-relations, and in particular to the emergence of governmentality. According to the later Foucault, modern power-relations cannot be grasped on the basis of political theory's traditional model of power-law-sovereignty-repression. This juridical model of power, which still dominates political theory, and sees power as emanating from a sovereign, from the top down, ignores the fact that power today also comes from below. As Leslie Paul Thiele has argued in his explication of Foucault's contribution to a theory of power: "Power forms an omnipresent web of relations, and the individuals who support this web are as much the producers and transmitters of power as they are its objects." In place of the juridical model of power, Foucault argues that modern power-relations are instantiated through what he designates as "governmentality." For Foucault: The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. `Government' did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. .... To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. For Foucault, then, the operations of the modern state are not restricted to interdiction or repression in the political sense, but have expanded to incorporate the practices of governmentality. Government, in the Foucauldian sense, depends on the knowledge generated by the human sciences, by the disciplines, in particular psychoanalysis; indeed, the state claims that it governs on the basis of that knowledge. Here, the central role of the human sciences in the operation of the developing disciplinary society, and its techniques for the control and management of its citizens becomes especially clear. Moreover, governmentality, and the technologies for the control of individuals, are by no means limited to the state. Indeed, according to Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, modern, liberal societies do not leave the regulation of conduct solely or even primarily to the operations of the state and its bureaucracies: "Liberal government identifies a domain outside 'politics,' and seeks to manage it without destroying its existence and its autonomy." This is accomplished through the activities of a host of institutions and agents not formally part of the state apparatus, including psychoanalytic facilities and analysts. As Nikolas Rose has pointed out, psychoanalysis, like "All the sciences which have the prefix `psy-' or `psycho-' have their roots in this shift in the relationship between social power and the human body, in which regulatory systems have sought to codify, calculate, supervise, and maximize the level of functioning of individuals. The `psy sciences' were born within a project of government of the human soul and the construction of the person as a manageable subject." As a manifestation of governmentality and its power-relations, psychoanalysis is implicated in the control of the individual. For Foucault, psychoanalysis is a discipline that "disciplines," that helps to create politically and economically socialized, useful, cooperative, and -- as one of the hallmarks of bio-power -- docile individuals. Indeed, according to John Forrester, for Foucault, psychoanalysis is "the purest version of the social practices that exercise domination in and through discourse, whose power lies in words, whose words can never by anything other than instruments of power." Of course, the aim of the analyst is not control, but the "mental health" of the individual and the "betterment" of society. Nonetheless, the result of the psychoanalytic management-oriented conception of the subject is an individual who is susceptible to techno-medical control. Moreover, as Nikolas Rose has suggested, the power-knowledge obtained by psychoanalysis (and indeed all of the psy sciences) and its technologies for the control of the individual: fed back into social life at a number of levels. Individuals could be classified and distributed to particular social locations in the light of them -- in schools, jobs, ranks in the army, types of reformatory institutions, and so forth. Further, in consequence, new means emerged for the codification and analysis of the consequences of organizing classrooms, barracks, prisons, production lines, the family, and social life itself....Hence, the psy knowleges could feed back into more general economic and social programs, throwing up new problems and opportunities for attempts to maximize the use of the human resources of the nation and to increase its levels of personal health and well-being. Whatever its impact or health and welfare, this power-knowledge enhanced the degree of control to which the person was subject, and made it possible to effectively discipline the individual. Indeed, the existence of our developing disciplinary society is inconceivable without the psy sciences, and the power-relations which they consolidate. The discipline and control of the individual to which psychoanalysis made its signal contribution, was linked to its conception of, and commitment to, normalization. Foucault signalled the increasing role of normality and normalization in the functioning of the developing disciplinary society in Discipline and Punish: "The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the `social worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements." For Foucault, discipline and normalization were inseparable components of the emergence of the human sciences, and their technologies. Indeed, he asserted that "a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life." Psychoanalysis did not break with this complex. Indeed, according to Foucault, "Freud was well aware of all this. He was aware of the superior strength of his position on the matter of normalization." Indeed, psychoanalysis was thoroughly implicated in the societal process in which the norm increasingly supplanted the law, in which the West was "becoming a society which is essentially defined by the norm." For Foucault: "The norm becomes the criterion for evaluating individuals. As it truly becomes a society of the norm, medicine, par excellence the science of the normal and the pathological, assumes the status of a royal science." Lest one conclude that Foucault is not referring to psychoanalysis here, he is quick to point out that "psychoanalysis, not only in the United States, but also in France, functions massively as a medical practice: even if it is not always practiced by doctors, it certainly functions as therapy, as a medical type of intervention. From this point of view, it is very much a part of this network of medical 'control' which is being established all over." Deviation from the norm, in the establishment of which psychoanalysis played a signal role, the anomaly, became the object of the technologies and therapeutic techniques of the psy sciences, psychoanalysis among them. The theological conception of evil had given way to the psychoanalytic conception of deviance, in the combat against which the analyst was now enlisted to play a leading role. As Hubert Dreyfus has claimed, "Freudian theory thus reinforces the collective practices that allow norms based on alleged sciences of human nature to permeate every aspect of our lives." These practices then become a lynchpin of the developing disciplinary society and its techniques for managing people.

Psychoanalysis is not verifiable continual contradictions and no base criteria Tuck, 2014, B.S. from University of Michigan, (Andrew, Why Did American Psychiatry Abandon Psychoanalysis?, http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/107788/antuck.pdf?sequence=1)To say that psychoanalysis has grown stagnant as a scientific field may at first seem a sweeping and completely unwarranted claim. After all, in terms of producing new branches of thought, psychoanalytic theory has undoubtedly proven an expansive and fruitful domain; to argue that psychoanalytic progress suddenly stopped after Freud would require answering to object relations theory, ego psychology, self psychology, and Lacanian psychoanalysis, to name but a few. Furthermore, rather than dying with Freud in 1939, psychoanalysis produced these subfields through a variety of different thinkersthe role of Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Heinz Kohut, and Jacques Lacan in their respective theories above seem to demonstrate that psychoanalysis was not a one-man show after all. In fact, it was during the decades immediately following Freuds death that dynamic psychiatry was at the peak of its influence in the United States. 11,12 Given the proliferation of new models and theories of psychoanalytic thought under an equally diverse group of psychoanalysts, on what grounds could the argument that psychoanalysis failed to produce visible and useful knowledge possibly possess any merit? The answer is in the question: it was precisely the sheer amount and diversity of psychoanalytic subfields that delegitimized psychoanalysis as a whole: the presence of such diversity of opinion within the same field undermined the authority of any one subfield. Rather than adding to a collective fund of psychoanalytic knowledge, each of these different subfields took a different approach to psychoanalytic theory and practice. Former American Psychiatric Association president Alan Stone said: Today, at least in my opinion, and I am not entirely alone in thinking this, neither Anna Freud's Ego Psychology nor Melanie Klein's Object Relations Theory seem like systematic advances on Freud's ideas. Rather they seem like divergent schools of thought, no closer to Freud than Karen Horney who rebelled against Freudian orthodoxy. 13 The frequent emergence of these competing divergent schools of thought and their dissenting followers, then, made any developments in psychoanalysis seem to other scientists less like legitimate scientific discoveries and more like competing hypotheses. In contrast with more established fields like biology, innovations in psychoanalysis often seemed to contradict earlier psychoanalytic ideas as well as one another, frequently forming branches and sub-branches without regard to maintaining any sort of continuity or internal consistency in psychoanalysis as a whole. 14,15 In fact, many of these developments were reactionary in nature, responding to other trends in psychoanalysis rather than to new clinical data. This is the case of Heinz Kohuts development of self psychology, which was a reaction against the subfields of ego psychology and classical drive theory. The revival of American interest in the work of Melanie Klein in the second half of the twentieth century has also been described as a reaction against ego psychology. 16 Furthermore, never did one of these new theories thoroughly abrogate and replace a previous one in the way that, for example, Einsteins theory of general relativity transformed Newtonian physics. This is not to say that a new idea in psychoanalysis would not have been met with resistance upon its introduction; however, it soon proved that psychoanalysis on the whole lacked the tools that other disciplines had to debunk or prove new theories. By what criteria could psychoanalysts reject or accept a new hypothesis? In physics, a new model was expected to be compatible with currently available data, as well as able to make predictions to be confirmed by observation17; similarly, a new pharmaceutical drug was expected to prove itself by beating a control in a double-blind trial. But such criteria, even if psychoanalysts wanted to use them, were not as conveniently applied to unconscious phenomena proposed by psychoanalysis. Even the gathering of data from clinical psychotherapy was typically unable to resolve the conflict between two competing subfields; problematically, any clinical data that could potentially prove the efficacy of one psychoanalytic school could be interpreted to support others as well. 18 In an article for Psychoanalytic Psychology, psychologist Robert Holt, even as he argued for the validity of psychoanalysis as a testable scientific theory,19 admitted the difficulty of producing data that could settle disputes between psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic theories, let alone between schools within psychoanalysis: