TWe meet

A) Oversight leads to material curtailment—that’s Healey.

B) Counter Interpretation: Curtailment includes reducing NSA discretion over surveillance—Freedom Act proves

Hafetz 6-7, Jonathan Hafetz is associate professor of law at Seton Hall University School of Law. He is the author of "Habeas Corpus after 9/11: Confronting America’s New Global Detention System." He recently served as counsel to the New York City Bar Association in a friend-of-the-court brief challenging bulk collection of telephony metadata, Opinion: With new NSA rules, a shift in balance between security and privacy, http://www.northjersey.com/opinion/opinion-guest-writers/a-turning-point-1.1350790 MWimsatt

LAST WEEK, the Senate approved the House version of the USA Freedom Act, ending a political standoff and paving the

way for the act’s passage. The vote marks the first time Congress has curtailed , rather than expanded,

government surveillance power since 9/11. But it remains to be seen whether the act is an isolated victory for privacy or the first step in a larger process of surveillance reform. The USA Freedom Act principally addresses the surveillance program that provides for the government’s collection and storage of Americans’ phone records. Under that program, the government has been collecting the metadata — including the number a person dials, and the time, date and length of those communications — of every call made in the United States. It can then search the database by querying it with specific telephone numbers. While the program does not allow the government to listen to the actual content of those calls, advances in technology now enable the government to learn a great deal about a person’s private life simply from metadata. This program operated under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, which Congress initially enacted after 9/11 and subsequently amended. Section 215 authorized government to collect business records that are "relevant to an authorized investigation." The government relied on this provision to engage in the dragnet collection of phone records on the theory that those records might one day be relevant to an actual investigation. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a special court created in 1978 to handle national security surveillance requests, sanctioned this collection in secret rulings, none of which was made public. Snowden exposes secrecy But in June 2013, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden pierced the veil of secrecy by revealing a vast network of government surveillance programs, including bulk metadata collection under Section 215. Snowden’s revelations ignited a national debate over civil liberties and security, setting the stage for the recent battle over surveillance reform in Congress. The Section 215 program had been scheduled to expire on June 1. Without Snowden’s revelations, Congress would almost certainly have reauthorized this Patriot Act provision, as it had done seven times in the past. But those revelations altered the landscape and reinvigorated privacy concerns that had long lain dormant. Other developments increased the momentum for reform. In 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the independent watchdog agency within the executive branch, concluded that the Section 215 program lacked an adequate legal basis and found that the program had made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation, despite infringing the privacy of millions of Americans. And just last month, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals became the second court to declare the Section 215 program illegal, ruling that Congress had not authorized the bulk collection of telephony metadata. The appeals court, moreover, rejected the argument that Congress had approved the program in prior reauthorizations, explaining that "Congress cannot reasonably be said to have ratified a program of which many members of Congress — and all members of the public — were not aware." Modifications The USA Freedom Act does not end the Section 215 program so much as modify it. Phone records will still be collected, but they will remain in the hands of the private telecommunication companies, which typically store them for 18 months. The government can still access those records, although it must first obtain an order from the FISC, thus establishing a layer of judicial review that had originally been absent. Additionally, the USA Freedom Act gives FISC judges authority to appoint a special advocate to present the civil liberties argument in certain cases. Until now, those judges had heard only the government’s side, thus skewing decisions in its favor. The FISC will also be required to make public any major rulings. Previously, its decisions remained hidden from the public, including the court’s rulings approving the bulk metadata collection program under Section 215, thus contributing to the creation of secret law. These measures together have the potential to increase the fairness and transparency of the surveillance court, although they

should have been made stronger. The special advocate provision, for example, should have mandated the participation of an outside attorney to present opposing arguments anytime the

government sought a new authority or advanced a new interpretation of current authority, rather than leaving this

participation to the discretion of the FISC . Majority backed limitations More significant than any

particular change is the fact of reform itself. Despite the fear-mongering that surrounded the debate in Congress — including

false claims by intelligence officials that the nation would be less safe without the Section 215 program — a majority in both houses held firm in demanding that the president’s surveillance authority be limited. After continually titling the scales in favor of security since 9/11, Congress finally sought to include protections for civil liberties in the balance. It is nevertheless crucial to recognize the limits of

the USA Freedom Act. The act does not end the bulk collection and storage of Americans’

phone records , but instead alters the manner in which those records will be stored

and accessed .

Our definition is best for debate- it is the most real-world example: the USA Freedom act is a major real-world example of curtailment that follows the same method as our aff

Our definitions are the most precise and based in the topic lit it’s tied to field context and is most predictable.

Hurts your groundA) Allows negative state actions, kills link ground for Ks and DA, and

skirts solvency questions. Elimination destroys mechanism debates.

B) We increase negative ground, they can PIC out of specific agencies which checks any delimitation we cause

They over limit – taking away core affs like judicial review, warrant requirement, and congressional oversight.

A) Process counterplans can enforce any negative action or cuts aff and ensures things like executive flex force the aff onto the negatives DA ground. That makes being aff impossible

B) Handcuffs the aff to the status quo—freedom act cuts solve restrictions. Oversight is the only way to ensure those changes

C) Aff’s would always lose to circumvention without oversight because they are always hollow mandates

Default to reasonabilityA) No bright line for limits—default to a proximately topical aff and

don’t penalize us unless its egregious B) Competing Interpretations provides an incentive for the neg to

avoid clash and case-specific research– they’ll just manufacture a contrived interpretation that excludes the plan.

Case

Solvency 1. FCC oversight still solves Haley 14 outlines multiple reasons:

a. It’s unique technical expertise is essential to meaningful review—that revitalizes the NSA mission—their turns ignore FCC’s track-record keeping sensitive information under wraps

b. FCC has proven to check NSA stepping out of bounds and ensures proper handling of data.

c. Oversight solves: meaningful review revitalizes effectiveness towards communication means FCC is key

2. Your evidence is not indicative of how FCC is the oversight board – instead of the executive office of the president.

3. Even if circumvention is true, we still solve:a. The Europe impact is predicated in large part by their perception of the

US. If they simply think that we’re doing good things, we solve the impact.

b. The plan restores confidence, which is key to solving terror. 4. Codifying FCC authority ensures effective and transparent oversight—

only Congress can do thisHealey 14, J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University Law School, May 2015; B.A. magna cum laude, in Political Science, concentration in Public Policy and Administration, minor Law and Public Policy, Northeastern University, A Tale of Two Agencies: Exploring Oversight of the National Security Administration by the Federal Communications Commission, December 2014, Lexis, MWimsattIV. How the FCC Should Address the NSA Surveillance: Implementing the Solution

Congress is equipped to enact legislation codifying FCC oversight of the NSA by virtue of both current law and the PCLOB's recommendations. First, the Telecommunications Act can serve as the basis for the FCC to take action to further develop its protection of consumers on the Internet, Moreover, there has been some movement in Congress calling on the FCC to take action regarding the NSA phone database , indicating the

possibility of the FCC taking up an oversight role. n116 Further, Congress gave the FCC broad investigation, regulatory, and enforcement powers, as well as the privacy-focused directive of implementing Consumer Propriety Network Information protection. n117 Additionally, the first PCLOB Report calls for extensive changes in the NSA and FISA Court regime while the second report calls expressly for industry input and expertise: the FCC could facilitate some of the suggested changes through its subject matter expertise . Even as the FCC is set up to facilitate the PCLOB recommendations,

Congress needs to codify the legal authority for the FCC to do this specifically .

Granting express legal authority is key , as organic statutes of agencies determine

what a given agency can and cannot do . Congressional authorization would be a logical outgrowth of both the FCC's regulatory interests and current legal recommendations regarding NSA oversight. B. Congress should amend the organic statutes of the FCC and NSA and encourage participation in the FISA Court . The lack of oversight of NSA data collection practices will continue to be problematic moving forward, as national security is an ongoing concern and technology is a large part of life

in a modern society. There is need for effective and transparent oversight of the NSA's data collection. As such, Congress should act by amending the organic statutes of both

the NSA and the FCC to provide the FCC with oversight authority over the NSA , and by allowing the FCC to participate as amicus curiae with the FISA Court. [*112] 1. Congress should amend the NSA organic statute to provide for collection of data by the

FCC. The NSA needs transparent and easily understood oversight . While it should

not have to disclose national security information , the agency should be required to disclose basic statistics, such as how much information it is gathering, similar to

Recommendation 9 in the second PCLOB Report. n118 This would at least illustrate to

the public , via the FCC , that the NSA is targeting its surveillance at legitimate threats to national security - rather than performing blanket surveillance of all Internet users. Further, these reforms would comport with the PCLOB's enumerated Recommendations. n119 As of now, "lawmakers and the public do not have even a rough estimate of how many communications of U.S. persons are acquired under section 702." n120 Because the NSA is required to target foreign communications in order for its surveillance to be lawful, n121 an annual snapshot showing the volume of its surveillance will help foster some degree of transparency, n122 helping assure

citizens that their privacy is not being intruded upon, without hampering legitimate

national security efforts . n123 This expanded role for the FCC in relation to the NSA

should be codified by Congress . First, Congress should amend the NSA's organic

statute to require the agency to comply with FCC requests for data. Additionally, while the FCC does not have the security clearance to review the substance of the surveillance, such clearance is not necessary on an agency-wide basis. Instead, Congress should require the NSA to provide targeting statistics that could be reasonably disclosed, or at least preliminary statistics that could focus the FCC's inquiry. This new

legislation is all that is necessary to facilitate oversight on the NSA side , as the FCC

will require most of the congressional authorization . [*113] 2. The FCC's organic statute should be amended to allow the FCC authority over NSA data collection and participation in the FISA Court. To enact a solution based on FCC oversight of NSA data

collection, Congress should pass legislation allowing the FCC to collect information

from the NSA , and to allow the FCC to submit its findings about this data to congressional oversight committees as well as the FISA Court. While novel, this

solution is in keeping with the PCLOB recommendations, particularly the recommendation emphasizing the need for the NSA to publicly disclose the scope of its surveillance. n124 Moreover, it is not uncommon for agencies to have oversight authority over other agencies. n125 Thus, this type of inter-agency accountability could be codified to provide the FCC with oversight authority over NSA data collection .

Terror Infiltration is possible and likely – ISIS camps 8 miles from the US border proveWashington Times 4/17/15 (“Islamic State operating in Mexico just 8 miles from US border: report,” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/14/islamic-state-operating-in-mexico-just-8-miles-fro/>)

The Islamic State terror group is operating a camp in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua, just eight miles from the U.S. border, Judicial Watch reported Tuesday. Citing sources that include a “Mexican Army field grade officer and a Mexican Federal Police Inspector,” the conservative watchdog group reported that the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, is organizing only a few miles from El Paso, Texas, in the Anapra neighborhood of Juárez and in Puerto Palomas. Judicial Watch sources said that “coyotes” working for the notorious Juarez Cartel are smuggling Islamic State terrorists across the U.S. border between the New Mexico cities of Santa Teresa and Sunland Park, as well as “through the porous border between Ac ala and Fort Hancock, Texas.” “These specific areas were targeted for exploitation by ISIS because of their understaffed municipal and county police forces, and the relative safe-havens the areas provide for the unchecked large-scale drug smuggling that was already ongoing,” Judicial Watch reported. Mexican intelligence sources say the Islamic State intends to exploit the railways and airport facilities in the vicinity of Santa Teresa, New Mexico. “The sources also say that ISIS has ‘spotters’ located in the East Potrillo Mountains of New Mexico (largely managed by the Bureau of Land Management) to assist with terrorist border crossing operations,” Judicial Watch reported. “ISIS is conducting reconnaissance of regional universities; the White Sands Missile Range; government facilities in Alamogordo, NM; Ft. Bliss; and the electrical power facilities near Anapra and Chaparral, NM.” Mexican authorities, however, disputed the Judicial Watch findings.

PTX 1. Congress will veto the deal – Bipartisan view that it’s weak

Peterson, Wall Street Journal Congressional reporter, 7/2/15

[Kristina, 7/2/15, Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Lawmakers Stiffen Stance Against Iran Nuclear Deal”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-lawmakers-stiffen-stance-against-iran-nuclear-deal-1435875608, Accessed July 3 2015, A.H]

WASHINGTON—Delays and unresolved disputes in international nuclear negotiations with Iran have hardened criticism from U.S. lawmakers, pointing to a growing likelihood that the GOP- controlled Congress will try to undercut a final deal this summer. Republicans , who initially reacted to the talks with skepticism, have expressed deepening doubts this week that Obama administration officials will be able to reach an accord with Iran that lawmakers can support. “At the end of the day, they got the bomb in North Korea because we in Congress were not forceful enough” during the Clinton administration, said House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R., Calif.), who said lawmakers would insist key demands are met in any final deal with Iran. “If we don’t push back, this will end up in the same set of circumstances.” Senior Iranian and American diplomats have been in discussions for nearly two years on a deal aimed at blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons in exchange for easing international sanctions. Congress in May passed legislation preventing President Barack Obama from waiving sanctions on Iran while lawmakers review the final deal and potentially vote on a resolution to approve or disapprove it. Mr. Obama will be able to implement any final deal with Iran, so long as a veto- proof majority doesn’t oppose it . As negotiations stretched past their official June 30 deadline this week, top GOP leaders, including Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) and House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.) urged the White House to walk away from the talks in a bid to extract a better deal from Iran. The White House “seems intent on muddling toward an unacceptable deal with Iran,” Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) wrote in a Politico op-ed this week, warning the administration that Congress is prepared to defend the public, even if that means “working against a bad agreement that threatens our country and our allies.” Republicans and some Democrats have said their support for any final deal with Iran will hinge on whether Iran agrees to submit to “anywhere, anytime” inspections, including at military sites, to ensure it can’t cover up nuclear activity. Many are concerned about what kind of nuclear capabilities Iran will have a decade into the deal . Lawmakers also have emphasized that sanctions must be lifted gradually, rather than rolled back immediately, to keep pressure on Iran to comply with the deal. “We don’t want to see a terrorist state flush with cash after sanctions are lifted,” Mr. Royce said. Under the legislation passed in May, Congress will have to decide whether to pass a resolution approving or disapproving the deal. Either measure would need 60 votes to clear procedural hurdles in the Senate. One option GOP leaders are considering is introducing a resolution of approval, under the assumption that it wouldn’t get enough votes to pass. That could convey the lackluster congressional support more effectively than a resolution of disapproval that passes Congress but is vetoed by Mr. Obama, a House GOP aide said. Mr. Obama said this week that he was committed to making sure a deal prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. “There are those in Congress and elsewhere who have been skeptical of a diplomatic approach from the beginning, but we would hope that

all members of Congress will weigh any final deal on its merits,” National Security Council spokesman Ned Price said on Thursday. “If we can get to an agreement here, it will be one that we can defend to the public, to the Congress, and to the world.” Critics of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy said they were not expecting to see the administration seize a better deal in the final stretch and some said they were prepared to repudiate it. “Another week of negotiations at this point is just another week for further U.S. concessions,” Sen. Marco Rubio , a Florida Republican running for president , said in a statement. If Mr. Obama “chooses to conclude a deal that ensures that Iran will be a nuclear threshold state , I am confident that a majority of both houses of Congress will join me in opposing it , which will lay the foundation for our next president to undo this disaster.” The May legislation gives lawmakers 30 days to review any final deal if one is struck before July 9. If an accord comes after that date, the period would lengthen to 60 days, during which Mr. Obama wouldn’t be able to roll back sanctions. Democrats who have lodged their own reservations about the negotiations with Iran cautioned that spurning a deal could have negative consequences, including accelerating Iranian work on developing nuclear weapons. “The ramifications potentially could be quite alarming and Congress will have that on its hands,” said Rep. Gerald Connolly (D., Va.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “A renunciation of the agreement even if it doesn’t have the force of law could persuade the Iranians that the West negotiated in bad faith” and could “strengthen the hand of the hardliners in Tehran,” he said. But Democrats also noted that Republicans’ increasingly caustic comments about the emerging deal were a form of political posturing meant to emphasize their distance from Mr. Obama’s foreign policy. “I’ve never believed the Republicans were going to look at this agreement without an anti-Obama lens,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (D., Conn.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

2. [No link] Obama won’t spend PC on FCC dealsJudis 14 (John, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, “Obama’s FCC Isn’t Really Doing Anything about Net Neutrality”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/21/obama-s-fcc-isn-t-really-doing-anything-about-net-neutrality)

President Barack Obama understands that. So did former Federal Communications Commission (FCC) chairman Julius Genachowski and so, perhaps,

does Tom Wheeler, his successor. But Obama’s FCC had done precious little to enforce net neutrality. This week, Wheeler introduced an outline of new regulations on net neutrality. They are profoundly inadequate, and, in any case, will probably

be thrown out in court just as Genachowski’s were. Wheeler could do something, but he and Obama appear unwilling to spend any political capital by taking a stance that is strongly opposed by Comcast, Verizon, and other companies with powerful lobbies in Washington. A little background is in order.

3. [No link] The President empirically stays out of FCC regulatory issuesPatch 8 (John, Freedom Campaign.org, “Fairness Doctrine and the Obama Transition”, http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2008/12/03/fairness-doctrine-and-the-

obama-transition/)

Not long ago, several Congressional Democrats called for a return to the Fairness Doctrine.¶ "It’s time to reinstitute the Fairness Doctrine," said Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) in a 2007 interview with The Hill. "I have this old-fashioned attitude that when Americans hear both sides of the story, they’re in a better position to make a decision."¶ The issue

melted into obscurity before the election with the financial crisis and other issues sucking up most of the political oxygen Obama isn’t likely to waste political capital on Fairness Doctrine legislation in the foreseeable future. The battle is likely to be in the FCC and, potentially, the courts.

4. [Link turn] Wheeler’s clout solves the link – influence with telecom companies and Democratic Party key

Queally 13 (Jon, staff @ Common Dreams, “Obama Picks One of Telecom's Most Powerful Industry Lobbyists to Head FCC”, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/05/01/obama-picks-one-telecoms-most-powerful-industry-lobbyists-head-fcc)

The president's pick, Tom Wheeler, has served as both an informal adviser and key fundraiser for Obama and was for many years the head of two powerful industry associations .¶ As the Los Angeles Times reports:¶ From 1979 to 1984, Wheeler headed the National Cable Television Assn., since renamed the National Cable and Telecommunications Assn. After eight years helping to create technology companies, Wheeler took over as head of the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Assn. in 1992, leaving in 2005 to join Core Capital Partners.¶ Wheeler has been a longtime Obama supporter, raising $200,000 to $500,000 for the 2008 campaign and more than $500,000 for the 2012 campaign, according to Obama campaign disclosures.¶ If confirmed by the Senate, Wheeler would succeed outgoing Chairman Julius Genachowski, who is scheduled to end his tenure in the coming weeks.¶ Craig Aaron, president of the media reform

group Free Press, was quick to question the troublesome choice of someone with such deep ties to the telecom industry, big finance, and the elite political machine of the Democratic Party.¶ "The Federal Communications Commission needs a strong leader — someone who will use this powerful position to stand up to industry giants and protect the public interest," said Aaron. "On paper, Tom Wheeler does not appear to be that person."¶ Free Press was not alone in its caution.¶ “I am skeptical that the former chief lobbyist of the wireless and cable industries will be capable of holding his former clients accountable for their ongoing shortcomings,” said Sascha Meinrath, who heads the Open Technology Institute at the New America Foundation which advocates for net neutrality, better public access and other democratic media initiatives.¶ Tim Winter, president of the Parents Television Council, speaking with the Los Angeles Times also questioned the Obama's choice, saying it would be "hard to know whether Mr. Wheeler will be truly focused on serving the interests of the American people," given his strong industry ties. ¶ As reporting at Reuters mentions, an opinion piece by Wheeler in 2011 hinted that "he favored a controversial and ultimately shelved merger deal between AT&T and T-Mobile, sparking speculation that he may be open to more consolidation in the wireless industry."¶ Putting such statements in context for what's ahead at the FCC, the Washington Post reports:¶ As chairman, Wheeler may also have to weigh in on the fast-changing television landscape, where traditional business models of cable and broadcast networks are being shaken up by online video providers.¶ Several mergers will also come before the FCC chairman for consideration, including a bidding war between Japan’s SoftBank and Dish Network over the nation’s third-largest wireless provider, Sprint.¶ And later this year, the federal appeals court will rule on arguments made by Verizon Wireless and MetroPCS that the FCC doesn’t have the ability to regulate broadband Internet providers.¶ The agency has been under attack by phone giants who have argued that the FCC should not strap new rules to the fast-growing broadband market. But consumer groups have demanded more oversight of Internet service providers

to prevent rising cable and wireless bills and a troubling lack of competition.¶ Acknowledging that Wheeler's choice was roundly endorsed in the elite circles of Washington , Aaron said his group would continue to press the FCC regardless of Wheeler's

nomination and likely confirmation.

5. [Link turn] Business lobbies have massive influence in CongressSasso, National Journal Technology Correspondent, ’14

[Brendan, October 17 2014, National Journal, “The FBI Wants More Access to Your iPhone. Congress is Standing in the Way”, http://www.nationaljournal.com/reporters/bio/212, accessed 7/2/15, GE]

Silicon Valley and the nation's law enforcement community are in an arms race. Tech companies like Apple and Google want to make the data customers carry on their smartphones and computers more secure, safe from the prying eyes of spies and identity thieves alike. But law-enforcement officials—from the FBI to local police—see those same devices as treasure troves of evidence that they could be using

to stop crimes and catch criminals. As the tech giants get better at encryption, however, law-enforcement agencies are turning to Congress for help, asking lawmakers to make it mandatory for the tech companies to make their devices more accessible. FBI Director James Comey made that case personally on Thursday, saying at the Brookings Institution that police need new legislation to help them catch criminals who are using encryption to hide incriminating evidence. Law-enforcement agencies are accustomed to getting what they want from the federal government

—from new legal authority to the type of military-grade material recently on display in Ferguson, Mo. But following the broad and unflattering attention placed on government surveillance by Edward Snowden's leaks, few on Capitol Hill are demonstrating any appetite for further peeling back privacy protections. "I'd be surprised if more than a handful of members would support the idea of backdooring Americans' personal property," Sen. Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat and vocal privacy advocate, said. An aide to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy said the senator is open to reviewing the FBI's proposal, but that right now, he's focused on passing his own bill that would rein in

government spying. And a House Democratic aide said that staffers have been in touch with the FBI on the issue but that Congress is

unlikely to force technology companies to build backdoors into their networks and devices anytime soon. "I think the combination of business and civil-liberty concerns would have made this proposal difficult to adopt even before the Snowden disclosures, " the aide said. "In the middle of a surveillance-reform fight, it's just that much more complicated." The FBI director warned Thursday that encryption technologies are allowing criminals to become "beyond the law." Even with a court order, police are unable to access information that is critical to solving crimes, he said. "The FBI has a sworn duty to keep every American safe from crime and terrorism, and technology has become the tool of choice for some very dangerous people," Comey said in a speech at Brookings. "Unfortunately, the law hasn't kept pace with technology, and this disconnect has created a significant public-safety problem." The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, a 1994 law known as CALEA, forces telephone companies to build surveillance technologies into their networks to allow law enforcement to install wiretaps. But the law hasn't been updated and doesn't cover new devices and online forms of communication. Apple and Google recently announced that their new phones will feature default encryption that will make it impossible to unlock the devices for police. "Are we so mistrustful of government—and of law enforcement—that we are willing to let bad guys walk away ... willing to leave victims in search of justice?" Comey asked. He urged Congress to update CALEA to "create a level playing field" so that

companies like Google and Apple have to provide police the same access to information that telephone providers like AT&T do. But the plan will face fierce resistance from tech companies and privacy advocates. They warn that any backdoor for law enforcement could also be exploited by hackers. Greg Nojeim, a senior counsel with the Center for Democracy and Technology, said he doubts Congress will enact legislation to make U.S. products less secure. "Who in Europe is going to buy these newly compromised cell phones if Congress insists that they be made with backdoors for U.S. law enforcement?" Nojeim asked. "It's probably one of the worst job killers a member of Congress could propose." A large majority of House members have already gone on the record opposing backdoor access to Americans' information. In June, the House voted 293-123 to adopt an amendment to a defense appropriations bill to cut off funds for National Security Agency projects that build vulnerabilities into security products. Ed Black, the president of the Computer & Communications Industry Association, a lobbying group that represents Google, Facebook, Yahoo, and others, said securing customer information is a core function of technology companies. The new encryption features are more than just marketing gimmicks, he said. "It's not like a new color on [the customer's] phone," he said. "It's something that they think is essential to protecting their freedom, their lives, and their privacy." In his speech Thursday, Comey said he understands the need of businesses to compete overseas and that his goal isn't to "stifle innovation or undermine U.S. companies." "But we have to find a way to help these companies understand what we need, why we need it, and how they can help, while still protecting privacy rights and providing network security and innovation," he said. "We need our private-sector partners to take a step back, to pause, and to consider changing course."

6. [Thumper] Net neutrality is in Congress now – Thumps the DADavis 6-17 (Wendy, staff @ MediaPost’s Daily Online policy blog, “House Panel Votes To Prevent Net Neutrality Enforcement”, http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/252240/house-panel-votes-to-prevent-net-neutrality-enforc.html)

Forging ahead with a plan to nix the net neutrality rules, lawmakers on the House Appropriations Committee voted 30-20 today to approve a budget bill that prohibits the Federal Communications Commission from enforcing the open Internet regulations.¶ The measure, which surfaced in a subcommittee last week, would block enforcement until after the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has decided whether the rules are legitimate. Last week, that court rejected a request by AT&T, CenturyLink and trade associations to stay the rules, but hasn't yet decided whether the FCC was authorized to issue the regulations.

7. Bottom of the docket – The plan is placed at the bottom of the legislative docket so it doesn’t drain political capital – this would be normal means

8. Winners WinKuttner, American Prospect co-founder, 11

(Robert, co-founder and current co-editor of The American Prospect, co-founder and director of the Economic Policy Institute, and Demos research and policy center Distinguished Senior

Fellow; 5/10/11, The American Prospect, “Barack Obama’s Theory of Power,” http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack_obamas_theory_of_power, Accessed 7/3/15, AEG)

Obama's critics contend that his prolonged fantasy of bipartisanship, his failure to lay the blame for the depressed economy squarely on the Republicans, and his reluctance to use his bully pulpit to tell a coherent story, particularly about jobs, needlessly weakened the Democrats and led to avoidable losses in the 2010 midterm. More fundamentally, under Obama government has lost credibility as a necessary force for economic recovery and fairness, undermining the Democrats' core appeal to voters. At the very least, Obama failed to drive the agenda or exploit the full possibilities of presidential leadership in a crisis. In the formulation of the political historian James MacGregor Burns, Obama ran and inspired voters as a "transformational" figure but governed as a "transactional" one. Notwithstanding a vow to profoundly change Washington, Obama took the Washington power constellation as a given. Despite an economic emergency, he moved neither Congress nor public opinion very much and only seldom used his oratorical gifts. "He is so damned smart and confident that he thinks he just has to explain things to the American people once," says former House Appropriations Chair David Obey. "He doesn't appreciate that you have to reinforce a message 50 times." Obama's reticence, his reluctance to lay blame, make sharp partisan distinctions, or practice a politics of class, reflects the interplay of his personality and his tacit theory of power -- one that emphasizes building bridges to opponents, defying ideological categories, shying away from the kind of mass mobilization that swept him into office, and practicing a kind of Zen detachment. At moments in American history, that conception of the presidency has suited the times. This doesn't seem to be one of those moments. Yet in the third year of his presidency, there are signs of a learning curve. It may be that Obama is playing his own elegant brand of rope-a-dope, biding his time, letting the Republicans lead with their chins, waiting for just the right moment to dramatize their extremism and exploit their schisms -- then demonstrating a toughness that has largely eluded him until now and reshaping the political center as a more progressive one. The hope of a new, more combative Obama was kindled by portions of his April 13 speech at George Washington University, which showed an Obama that we've seldom seen during his presidency. "The man America elected president has re-emerged," exulted The New York Times' lead editorial. Obama departed from his usual reluctance to be partisan, explicitly criticizing the self-annihilating Republican designs so usefully spelled out in Rep. Paul Ryan's proposed 10-year budget. The president resorted to a formulation he seldom uses -- the injustices of class: "The top 1 percent saw their income rise by an average of more than a quarter of a million dollars each. That's who needs to pay less taxes?" Obama said. "They want to give people like me a $200,000 tax cut that's paid for by asking 33 seniors each to pay $6,000 more in health costs. That's not right. And it's not going to happen as long as I'm president." At last, Obama shifted the mind-numbing debate from the scale of the budget and its deficits to its content and political meaning. He did what his progressive critics have long advocated, drawing a clear, bright, partisan line and pledging to defend Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security . But the budgetary details of the speech showed an Obama who was still the transactional leader of the Burns paradigm. Obama devoted most of the speech to his own plans for cutting the deficit. Jobs and recovery were hardly mentioned. Most of the proposed deficit reductions came from cuts to programs rather than from tax increases. And Obama was far too generous with the word, we. As in: But after

Democrats and Republicans committed to fiscal discipline during the 1990s, we lost our way in the decade that followed. We increased spending dramatically for two wars and an expensive prescription-drug program -- but wedidn't pay for any of this new spending. Instead, we made the problem worse with trillions of dollars in unpaid-for tax cuts. [Emphasis added.] As Tonto said to the Lone Ranger, What do you mean, we? This fiscal deterioration, of course, was the Republicans' handiwork. Why not point that out? Obama seemed to come to his partisanship reluctantly, almost apologetically . At one point in the speech, having just flayed the Republicans for their sheer extremism, he added, "I'm eager to hear other ideas from all ends of the political spectrum." He further mixed his own message by declaring, "We will all need to make sacrifices." Indeed, the main ideological themes of the speech had been undermined by Obama's earlier compromises. The left pole that Obama defined in the budget debate had already been moved to the right by his yearlong emphasis on deficit reduction; his prior concessions in the December 2010 tax deal, which failed to restore higher tax rates on the rich; and the 2011 budget deal, which cut $38 billion in programs. If the bipartisan Gang of Six, spawn of Obama's own Bowles-Simpson commission, does reach agreement, it will only add pressure to alter Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid for the worse -- thus fatally blurring Obama's bright line. Was Obama's speech -- the most resolutely political, partisan, progressive, and effective in recent memory -- a turning point or a one-off? Is Obama now revising his theory and practice of presidential power? As the political scientist Richard Neustadt observed in his classic work, Presidential Power, a book that had great influence on President John F. Kennedy, the essence of a president's power is "the power to persuade." Because our divided constitutional system does not allow the president to lead by commanding, presidents amass power by making strategic choices about when to use the latent authority of the presidency to move public and elite opinion and then use that added prestige as clout to move Congress. In one of Neustadt's classic case studies, Harry Truman, a president widely considered a lame duck, nonetheless persuaded the broad public and a Republican Congress in 1947-1948 that the Marshall Plan was a worthy idea. As Neustadt and Burns both observed, though an American chief executive is weak by constitutional design, a president possesses several points of leverage . He can play an effective outside game, motivating and shaping public sentiment, making clear the differences between his values and those of his opposition, and using popular support to box in his opponents and move them in his direction. He can complement the outside bully pulpit with a nimble inside game, uniting his legislative party, bestowing or withholding benefits on opposition legislators, forcing them to take awkward votes, and using the veto. He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices. Done well, all of this signals leadership that often moves the public agenda. The most effective presidents have worked all these levers. Think of Franklin Roosevelt, or Ronald Reagan, or Lyndon B. Johnson during the era of the War on Poverty and the civil-rights crusade. But except in the endgame of the battle for health care and his recent turnabout in defending Medicare, Obama has been relatively disengaged on all of these fronts. He left the details of his signature legislation and attendant bargaining to his staff. Says a senior Democrat who speaks frequently to Obama, "He is just not someone who enjoys what most of presidential politics entails." Reviewing Obama's relatively short career, a few core principles emerge in which he deeply believes. These have remained constants. Building Bridges. Obama, famously, is convinced both by his life journey and his prior experience in politics that he can persuade

almost any adversary to find areas of common ground. "Much of Obama's self-confidence," wrote David Remnick in his biography of Obama, The Bridge, "resided in his belief that he could walk into a room, with any sort of people, and forge a relationship and even persuade those people of the rightness of his position." From the Harvard Law Review, to the Illinois Senate, to the Iowa precinct caucuses, Obama's political life before his presidency only strengthened that conviction. Obama has a deep certitude that the voters, especially political independents, are sick of partisan division and want a leader who will rise above it to solve practical problems. In service of that goal, he has bent over backward to praise his opposition rather than attack it, frequently offering concessions in advance. Mostly, he has pursued common ground by giving ground. The experience of his first two years, when Republicans wanted nothing so much as to destroy him, did not shake Obama from these strategic beliefs. "He doesn't have a fighter's instinct, but he is in the middle of a hugely consequential fight," says a veteran Senate Democrat. "They will keep pushing him as long as he keeps backing up." His drawing of bright lines in the April 13 speech was very much the exception. Defying Categories. This core political instinct interacts with, and is reinforced by, Obama's personal reticence and determination not to be the angry black man. From his first entry into electoral politics, he defined himself as a different sort of African American and a different sort of liberal. Even though his voting record as a U.S. senator was one of the most progressive, as president he has almost gone out of his way to distance himself from the liberal base. In an interview with The New York Times' Peter Baker on the eve of the 2010 elections, Obama expressed regrets for looking too much like "the same old tax-and-spend liberal Democrat." Courting Elites, Wary of Mass Mobilization. Obama and his campaign staff brilliantly enlisted an army of volunteers who thought of themselves as a movement built on the values of sweeping change and the tactics of community organizing. Obama repeatedly vowed that he would use these engaged citizens to press Congress to enact health reform and other urgent priorities. But once elected, Obama's political staff quickly downgraded Obama for America into Organizing for America, a denatured arm of the Democratic National Committee -- out of concern that an independent movement might be more of a pressure group than an amen chorus. While he has maintained a close -- and politically damaging -- alliance with Wall Street (and lately, under Chief of Staff Bill Daley's tutelage, has reached out to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), Obama has been detached from the one recent popular rising that could help him win lost ground in the crucial states of the Midwest -- the backlash against union busting and draconian budget cuts by Midwestern Republican governors and legislators. Though the line attributed to FDR speaking to supporters -- "Now, make me do it" -- is probably apocryphal, Roosevelt did make good use of popular groups to his left, as did Lyndon Johnson in his complex alliance with Martin Luther King. Obama and his political staff are distinctly uncomfortable with independent mobilizations making him do anything. At a time when progressive movements lack the energy of the 1930s or 1960s, the president has not chosen to help animate them. Zen Leadership. The adjectives widely used to describe Obama are words like diffident, detached, aloof, professorial. Obama practices restraint to a fault. As a policy expert and intellectual, he is hands-on when it comes to White House deliberation but mostly hands-off with Congress. As Burns demonstrated, power is enhanced in the course of its exercise. But Obama, despite his eloquence and capacity to motivate, seems to believe that power should be conserved and presidential leadership reserved for emergencies. He waited long and disabling months before becoming personally

engaged in the health-reform battle. This left the details obscure, voters anxious, and Democrats at the August 2009 town meetings playing the role of pinata. By the time the bill finally passed, the victory was politically Pyrrhic. An exasperated David Obey told me, "Obama sat and let Jubilation T. Cornpone tie up Max Baucus for all those months. Hell, Chuck Grassley made it clear to me that he'd never vote for the thing." Obama and his team never embraced such strategies as forcing Republicans (and conservative Democrats) to take awkward votes or using the veto to define clear and principled differences. David Axelrod told me that the White House considered it futile and self-defeating to bring up measures in the Senate that couldn't win. This stance, the opposite of Harry Truman's, has infuriated Obama's allies in the House. During the last session, important progressive legislation on jobs and energy independence passed the House but was never even brought to a vote in the Senate. In one emblematic episode in December 2009, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi pulled out all the stops to get the House to narrowly pass a $154 billion public-investment, jobs, and unemployment-extension bill. The White House, however, rebuffed Pelosi's entreaties to urge Majority Leader Harry Reid to bring the measure to a vote in the Senate. At the time, Obama's aides were convinced that job growth was around the corner, had already moved on to deficit reduction as the theme of the 2010 State of the Union address, and were laying plans for "Recovery Summer," a conceit that entirely backfired. Except on such rare occasions at late stages of the health debate, it was not Obama's style to call in wavering Democrats to give them an LBJ-style treatment -- or to call them in at all, even to discuss major pending policy decisions. A number of senior Democrats were livid that they were kept in the dark about the April 13 budget speech, which had evidently been months in preparation. They first heard about it when David Plouffe, the White House political director, made the rounds of the Sunday talk shows, three days before the speech. "You've heard of the 'great man' theory," says Robert Borosage, who co-directs the progressive Campaign for America's Future. "They believe in the 'great speech' theory." Obama's stirring speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention established the novice as presidential timber. During the campaign, his superb address on race, a subject he dearly wanted to avoid, saved his candidacy from being destroyed by the controversy over the Rev. Jeremiah Wright. But as president, much of the time Obama has been AWOL rather than a defining presence driving the debate . His great speeches, like April's budget address, often come late in the game, after concessions have been made and damage done. Obama seems to relish demonstrating that he can score the occasional touchdown run starting from his own end zone. But politics, like football, is a game of cumulative scoring. If you keep giving ground, the clock eventually runs ou t. Hands off, above the fray, turning the other cheek, representing decency and common purpose, conserving rather than wielding power, uncomfortable with popular movements he doesn't control -- by some alchemy, this style of leadership is expected to produce the voter approval that puts polite pressure on the other party to join the quest for consensus. Reciprocity and compromise then result in effective government and popular adulation. This has been Obama's operating theory of power. For the most part, it hasn't worked.

9. Fiat shields the link – We should assume that the plan passes instantly without the legislative process so we can have better debates about the effects of the plan not the process.

10. Iran wouldn’t use nukes-their main concern is having power, not bringing about their own destruction

Pincus, Washington Post reporter on intelligence, defense, and foreign policy, 12

[Walter, 3/19/12, Washington Post, “How bad would Iran be with the bomb?”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/walter-pincus, Accessed July 2 2015, A.H]

However, within the intelli-gence community and among its retirees there are some ex-perienced analysts who believe that Iran’s leaders with nuclear weapons wouldn’t be much different than they are today, with their first concern being holding on to power, not using a weapon to wipe out Israel and thereby bring about their own destruction . That approach has been sensibly argued by Paul Pillar, a former senior CIA intelligence analyst and a national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005. He was deeply involved back then when internal doubts about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction programs were low-keyed by CIA leaders and ignored by the George W. Bush White House. “ An Iran with a bomb would not be anywhere near as dangerous as most people assume, and a war to try to stop it from acquiring one would be less successful and far more costly than most people imagine ,” Pillar writes in the current issue of Washington Monthly. Pillar, who teaches at Georgetown University, points out that despite all the “belli-cosity and political rhetoric” about the issue, the idea of an Iran with the bomb “has been subjected to precious little careful analysis.” Conventional wisdom is that Tehran’s leaders would become more dangerous to their neighbors and the United States, Pillar states. He cites the repeated stereotyping that Iran’s rulers are “religious fanatics who value martyrdom more than life, cannot be counted on to act rationally and, therefore, cannot be deterred.” Pillar notes that the past 30 years have proved that although they promote martyrdom to defend the homeland, “ they have never given any indication of wanting to become martyrs themselves .” Pillar says that since the 1979 revolution against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Islamic Republic of Iran has conducted a “cautious” policy toward the world. He acknowledges targeted assassinations in the 1980s and 1990s of exiled dissidents, but avoids mentioning Tehran’s anti-Americanism, its threats to Israel and its support of Hamas and Hezbollah, groups the United States and Israel consider terrorist organizations. He also fails to mention Iran’s military aid to dissident forces in Iraq.

11. If Iran violates the deal, Russia and China would block snapback sanctions – no enforcement

Fabien, The Hill White House correspondent, 6/29/15

[Jordan, 6/29/15, “White House confident final Iran nuclear deal is in reach”, http://thehill.com/policy/international/246475-white-house-confident-final-iran-nuclear-deal-is-in-reach, Accessed July 2 2015, A.H]

Those concerns were heightened when Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said last week he would not allow inspections of military sites allegedly involved with the country’s nuclear program. He also demanded the U.S. and its negotiating partners — the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and China — lift all sanctions immediately after the deal is

reached . A senior U.S. official said Monday that negotiators offered language that would allow the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog, to inspect all sites in Iran suspected of nuclear activity, including military installations. But not all of Iran’s military facilities may be open to inspectors. “We have worked out a process that we believe will ensure that the IAEA has the access it needs,” the administration official told reporters in Vienna. “The entry point isn't, we must be able to get into every military site, because the United States of America wouldn't allow anybody to get into every military site, so that's not appropriate.” Iran’s negotiating partners have demanded that sanctions relief be gradually implemented as inspectors verify Tehran is abiding by the terms of the agreement . The U.S. also wants sanctions to be able to be “snapped back” if Iran violates the deal . But opponents worry sanctions won’t be easily snapped back. There’s some internal tension among the negotiating partners over reimposing economic penalties. Russia and China, who are veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council, are eager to do business with Tehran. Even if Iran is found to violate the deal, it could be difficult to get all countries to agree to bring back sanctions . “There is an inherent asymmetry in the deal between an Iranian nuclear program that expands over time and Western economic leverage that diminishes over time,” Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation of Defense of Democracies, told The Hill. “The problem is, it will be like a slow motion train wreck,” he added. “It won’t be obvious the train is crashing.”

Executive PowerNon-UQ—freedom act proves no spillover and applications already require council. Vladeck 14 (Stephen, Pf of Law American U., “Judge Bates (Unintentionally) Makes the Case for FISC Reform”, http://justsecurity.org/13816/judge-bates-fisc-reform/)

First, on the informational point, Judge Bates offers no evidence in support of his claim that allowing a security cleared outside amicus to participate before the FISA Court will somehow affect the government’s duty of candor to the tribunal, or otherwise disrupt the (apparently quite congenial) relationship between the FISC and the relevant government stakeholders . Indeed, Congress has already provided for security cleared private counsel to participate in FISA Court proceedings in the contexts of applications under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and section 702 of FISA (as amended by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008). Does Judge

Bates object to those provisions, as well? If not, why would a security cleared special advocate be any different in this regard than a security cleared private lawyer for the recipient of a section 215 production order or section 702 directive? Judge Bates doesn’t say, nor does he offer any examples in which security cleared private counsel who have had access to classified information have unlawfully disclosed such information. Why would FISA proceedings be any different in this regard from, say, the Guantánamo habeas litigation? And insofar as the concern stems from

reliance upon unclassified summaries, how is the Senate bill any different from the well-established rules under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)?

Link turn—streamline information to find 4th gen threats faster – aff is a prerequisite, information before action – that’s 1ac Gross evidence

No link—Exigent circumstances check the DASeamon 8 – Professor, University of Idaho College of Law (Richard, “Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits”, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Spring 2008, http://www.hastingsconlawquarterly.org/archives/V35/I3/seamon.pdf)//DBI

The hypothetical surveillance order described above, covering all cell phone calls to and from the doomed Flight 93, falls not only within the intrinsic limits of the President's powers under Article II but also within the extrinsic limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Ordinarily, the Fourth Amendment requires the government to get a warrant before electronically intercepting phone calls or reading their mail (presumably including their e-mail). 146 In addition, the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a particularized showing that the monitoring of each phone user is likely to reveal evidence of crime. 147 The traditional Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and an individualized showing of probable cause for a search do not, however, apply to our

Flight 93 scenario. The exigent circumstances doctrine of Fourth Amendment law justifies immediate , warrantless surveillance of all cell phone users on board the flight.148 Moreover, although the exigent circumstances

doctrine normally requires a particularized showing of probable cause of criminal activity, 149 that showing is unnecessary when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement ," make the probable cause requirement impracticable. 50 The Flight 93 scenario thus illustrates the linkage between the President's congressionally irreducible, intrinsic power under Article II to respond to genuine national security emergencies and

extrinsic limits on that power imposed by the Fourth Amendment. In a "genuine emergency," the President can take immediate action reasonably necessary to protect national security - even if the action violates statutory restrictions-and, if the President's action entails a search or seizure (as does

Presidentially authorized electronic surveillance ), exigent circumstances in the "special needs" context of national security will often excuse ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements . In short, the President's power reasonably to respond to a genuine national security emergency not only is irreducible by Congress but also satisfies the Fourth Amendment-even if the response entails warrantless, suspicionless searches and seizures-as long as that response is reasonably justified by the emergency. 51

Executive is slow and Congress is fast Diehl and Ginsburg 6 (Paul, Henning Larson Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Tom, Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, "Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo", Michigan Journal of International Law, Summer, 27, Page 7-8, NKF)

Given the advantages of deliberation and our constitutional tradition of checks and balances, Nzelibe and

Yoo must provide convincing evidence of the advantages of their proposed system of executive centrality. The authors examine the relative institutional competencies of Congress and the president and conclude that the president is better situated to be the center of a war-making system for three main reasons: the president can act quickly, has better access to information, and is more accountable to the public. We take each of their three arguments in turn. A. Speed One reason ex

ante congressional involvement may be suboptimal is that it may clash with the need to act quickly in some international crises.17 Nzelibe and Yoo assert that the president is better situated in this regard, and they imply that ex ante congressional involvement could hinder or delay “good” wars. They share certain assumptions with proponents of congressional ex ante approval, such as John Hart Ely, who argue that

deliberation can also prevent or delay “bad” wars.18 Recent events, however, belie the claim that Congress plays a role in delay ing war and thus call into question the assumptions on both sides of this debate. For example,

Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force within a week of the September 11 attacks, yet several weeks passed before large numbers of troops were actually deployed in

Afghanistan. The delay in launching the invasion of Iraq was due not to any congressional opposition or

authorization process, but rather resulted from the President’s explicit choice to seek United Nations Security Council approval after obtaining congressional support. Recent experience thus demonstrates that unilateral presidential initiatives need not proceed in a speedy fashion, and that congressional approval ex ante may not delay essential hostilities.

Congressional deterrence is key to stopping conflict and policy failureDueck 10 (Colin, Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, "Regaining a Realistic Foreign Policy,”http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/43426, NKF)

Fifth, think of diplomacy as simply one tool in America’s foreign policy toolkit, to be used in coordination with other instruments. In itself, diplomacy is neither good nor bad. Diplomacy or negotiations alone cannot transform hostile

regimes, and it is useless in the absence of material power. At the same time, conservative realists recognize that there is nothing inherently objectionable about using tough negotiations in concert with other policy instruments to pressure hostile regimes . Indeed, to avoid negotiations altogether would be to surrender a

form of power that America possesses. The key under such circumstances is to bargain from strength, and to secure worthwhile concessions in exchange for whatever is given. Sixth, recognize that deterrence and

containment are not entirely outmoded as strategic options in the 21st century. Certainly, suicide bombers cannot be deterred. But the governing elites of Tehran and Pyongyang , however despicable, hope for survival and

not for death. The distinction is crucial. It is the reason why deterrence can still work in relation to existing rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. The U.S. can exhaust, contain, and wear down these regimes. They will

break down before the United States does. Seventh, with regard to military intervention, the U.S. should be much more careful than it has been over the past 20 years about intervening abroad, and at the same time much

more capable, overwhelming, and relentless when it chooses to do so. From Somalia to Iraq, the pattern must be broken of initially inadequate interventions in peripheral locations of questionable centrality to U.S. security. Picking fights in unpromising locations only encourages the impression of weakness when these fights go badly. Once American forces are committed, however, there can hardly be anything more important than winning the wars the U.S. is actually fighting. This means, among other things, building on the

dramatic improvements in recent years in American capacities when it comes to counter-insurgency. If the United States is going to intervene militarily abroad, it must be adequately prepared for the constabulary and reconstruction duties that inevitably follow, or it will only invite humiliation .

Executive Post Counterplan 1. Permutation do both – the CP removes FISA courts which makes the aff a dead letter

because there are no more courts – means there is literally no chance of the politics Disad

2. Solvency deficita. Can’t solve terrorism – Healy evidence is ULTRA specific to how only FCC

oversight can solve via having the technical expertise to know where to isolate data and communication channels and being able to gather and link data efficiently – their evidence is ONLY specific to citizens civil liberties.

b. They don't solve for NSA secrecy from the public and executive branch – means no exclusive NB to the CP

3. Also the Status quo solved the internal links to their alt cause claims – the USA Freedom Act creates “amicus curiaes” which removed the ability of the FISC courts to

cheat the system and forces them to have attorneys for their targets – that’s basic legal knowledge.

4. Links to the DAa. Ex Flex

And the counterplan links to the net benefit- Obama and the Department of Justice hate Article 3 courts- restricts their authority Breglio, Yale Law graduate, ‘3

[Nola, 9-24-13, Yale Law Journal, “Leaving FISA Behind: the Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance”, pg. 208, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/432_82yj9cqx.pdf, accessed 7-7-15, JF]

But such a course of action would doubtless bring a firestorm of protest from the executive branch. The President would contest the imposition of strict judicial supervision over foreign intelligence surveillance, pointing to the Keith decision, along with his constitutionally designated role as Commander in Chief155 and the longstanding tradition of deference to the Executive in the realm of foreign affairs and

national security.156 The Department of Justice would argue that submitting foreign intelligence surveillance to Article III courts would hamstring its investigators in the very area where they need more flexibility, and defeat the purpose of the USA PATRIOT Act amendments. It is thus highly unlikely that legislators would support a proposal to increase the bureaucratic requirements in this context.

Additionally, this option presupposes the legitimacy of Title III itself. As discussed above, some would argue that surveillance should be removed from the judicial context entirely—at least until the target has contested it and transformed the issue into an adversary proceeding. These practical and constitutional considerations counsel against a return to Title III.

b. Politics = [same link argument as theirs I guess spin something]

5. Perm Do the The Aff : and all combination of the planks .

6. Perm The United States federal government should require that the Federal Communications Commission curtail the National Security Agency’s requests for warrants for domestic surveillance in the FISA court through oversight. The FCC will provide adversarial testimony and present data regarding the adverse impacts of surveillance requests by the NSA to the FISA court and afterword’s shift the action then transfer action towards acting towards the title 3 courts .