24793919 neopatriarchy islam and female labour force participation

8/8/2019 24793919 Neopatriarchy Islam and Female Labour Force Participation

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Neopatriarchy, Islam and Female Labour Force Participation: A Reconsidera-

tion

byElhum Haghighat, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Lehman College,City University of New York, USA

Abstract

This article reconsiders the cross-national determinants of female labour force par -

ticipation in Islamic settings. It explores a neopatriarchal perspective using indica-

tors of the role of the government and the political role of women. The study shows

that government plays a significant role in determining female employment. Islamic

ideology as a cultural variable also contributes significantly to the model. Thus, the

results indicate that Islamic ideologyper se is not the only factor determining fe-

male labour force participation; the political atmosphere and economic develop-

ment also contribute.

In mainstream sociology, Muslim countries have usually been classified as

outliers on gender relations and demographic factors. These countries generally

have lower-than-average levels of female labour force participation (FLFP) and

higher-than-average levels of fertility and mortality relative to non-Muslim nations

at the same level of economic development (Weeks, 1988). For example, in 1995,

female employment in Islamic countries was 21.7% while other Muslim andnon-Muslim developing countries, it was 38.1% (World Bank World Tables, 1999).

The popular press and much of the academic liter ature in terpret Is lam as the

secluder and excluder of women which, in turn, inhibits womens integration

into the formal labour force. What is missing from the analysis is the role of the state

in those so cieties as the main employer and in vestor. In many Is lamic so cieties, the

patriarchal system has never been weak ened but rather mod ernised into a sys tem re-

ferred to in this study as the neopatriachal state (Moghadam, 1992; Sharabi, 1988).

Neopatriarchy will be de fined in this article as tradi tional pa triar chy, es pe cially em-bedded in religion, which gets appropriated by the state to reinforce its rule. In the

following section the meaning of each of these factors and how they affect female

employment opportunities is explored.

Oil as the Winning Ticket for the Global Lot tery

The oil boom of the 1970s brought overnight success to some of the Muslim Middle

Eastern na tions; it was like drawing the win ning global lottery ticket: from being

among the poorest countries in the world, the Gulf states found themselves among

the wealthiest (Hijab, 1988:117). The economic boom had a major impact not only

International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 84


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on the oil rich countries, but on the global economy as well. One major change in

the global economy was the flow of labour to these countries. The oil boom also en-

abled an import-substitution development strategy which tends to be capital-inten-sive rather than labour intensive and is, therefore, less conducive to female labour

(Moghadam, 1992). Most importantly, the oil money created a handful of rich gov-

ernments, which be came the ultimate economic power as well as the ma jor em-

ployer in these nations.

Modernisation, Socio-cultural and Neopatriachal Perspectives

Before the path-breaking work of Boserup in 1970, it was widely assumed that

womens status generally, and womens share of the labour force particularly, were

inevitably enhanced through the normal process of socioeconomic development(Clark, et al., 1991:47). The modernisation perspective explained FLFP as a conse-

quence of changes in the societys occupational structure and increased educational

opportunities, which often are accompanied by reduced fertility and household re-

sponsibilities (Collver and Langlois, 1962; Wilensky, 1968). A more detailed study

of differ ent patterns of FLFP in Western societies sug gests that fe male employ ment

declines in the early stages of economic development due to a progressive reduction

of womens employment in traditional sectors such as agriculture and petty trade

(Anker and Hein, 1986). This reduction is not initially compensated for by new op-

portunities for women to work in service and white-collar occupations. Thus, his-torical investigation of the Western world indicates the withdrawal of women from

productive work as early modernisation proceeded (Oakley, 1974; Ryan, 1975;

Tilly and Scott, 1978). Therefore, the development process creates many changes in

a so ciety, particularly in the struc ture of its labour force.

While a modernisation perspective points to an ultimate increase in FLFP

and womens benefit from this process, scholars such as Youssef (1970), Boserup

(1970), and Caldwell (1982) criticised the modernisation perspective and devel-

oped a socio-cultural perspec tive. This per spec tive states that socio-cultural fac torsconstrain female employment, regardless of economic development. These con-

straints emerge from patterns of social organisation, especially the family and kin-

ship patterns (Collver and Langlois, 1962). Youssef (1974), for example, links the

low proportion of women in modern sectors (for example in clerical jobs) to cul-

tural norms of the separation of men and women in Islamic societies that emphasise

restriction and limited interaction of women with strange men. Papanek (1973)

analyses seclusion of women in Muslim and Hindu societies in terms of separate

worlds and the symbolic shelter of women who are seen as vulnerable to the out-

side world and in need of protection by the male members of their family. Clark,

Volume 25 Number 10/11 2005 85


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Ramsbey and Adler (1991) explain regional differences in womens share of the la-

bour force by Islamic ideology of seclusion of women and the traditional support

for a patriarchal system.

In general, the socio-cultural perspective perceives the kinship structure of

non-Muslim countries as more adaptable to an increased demand for female labour

force participation that may accompany economic development. The literature also

perceives Muslim women as passive and submissive due to the Islamic patriarchal

structure (Altorki, 1986; Moghadam, 1988; Walter, 1981).

While a socio-cultural perspective emphasises how the kinship and cultural

structure of the so ciety constrains fe male em ploy ment, a newly devel oped

neopatriachal per spective emphasises the in stitutional struc ture as well as the kin-ship and cultural structure of the society. Sharabi (1988), the pioneer theorist devel-

oping this perspective, concentrates on Muslim Arab nations although his theory

could be applied to all so cieties with neopatriachal characteristics. To Sharabi

neopatriarchy is the product of the interaction between modernity and patriarchy

(tradition) in the context of dependent capitalism. A neopatriachal society experi-

ences structural changes under a politically and economically dependent system

without breaking its patriarchal culture. These societies, therefore, do not experi-

ence the same demographic changes as would be ex pected of a so ciety approaching

mod ernisation. Slow or no reduction in fertility, mor tality, and lit tle or no major

sectoral changes in FLFP are some of the demographic imbal ances that might be

observed in those societies.

Sharabi shows that the state in Arab countries be came the cen tral con trol-

ling force in society, not just by virtue of their monopoly of coercion but also by

their vastly increased economic power as owner of the basic industries, source of all

major investments, only international borrower, and provider of all essential ser-

vicesthe state be came within a few years the largest em ployer in society

(Sharabi, p.60). Sharabi concludes that this strategy became financially possiblemainly due to the sudden accumulation of oil revenues and other investment strate-

gies. In this study I refine, expand and empirically test Sharabis neopatriachal per-

spective. I define neopatriarchy as traditional pa triar chy, which is intertwined with

religion and is appropriated by the state to reinforce its rule.

Historical studies of the transition of Western societies from feudalism to

capitalism shows patriarchy being replaced by a new system of gender inequality

and therefore traditionalism being re placed by modernism (Lerner, 1986). In

neopatriachal societies however, patriarchy is not weakened but rather modernised.



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Therefore, patriarchal values are embedded in the kinship and cultural system and

are not eliminated despite the replacement of the traditional means of production

with industrialisation.Studies such as Obermeyer (1992) for instance focus on the politics of fertil-

ity, mor tal ity, and FLFP in Arab Muslim nations. She dis misses the dominant ideol -

ogy in the literature that Islam is the inhibiting force oppressing women and focuses

her attention on the political context of demography in Muslim nations rather than

on Islam ex clusively. She states:

The ambivalence of any Arab/Muslim leaders toward female emancipation

stems from their need to ad dress two conflict ing demands in their societ ies: pros-

perity, which means modernisation; and identity, which is partly rooted in tradi-tion. The satisfac tion of both de mands makes it necessary to define a na tional

identity in relation to two sources that are often at odds: the Islamic tradition and

the WestThe traditional bases of identity present themselves as the safest

choice, and religion is used selec tively to cope with po litical ex igen cies and to

legitimate the power of individual leaders (p.52).

Moghadam (1992) ap plies the neopatriachal framework to issues such as the

womens movement and the legal and political status of women in Muslim societ-

ies. She emphasises on the po litical/legal status of women in those societies and

womens traditional roles being constantly emphasised in the political arena as sym-bols of tra ditional ism, Islamisation of the state, and reaction to the in ter ference of

Western politics. She states:

Neopatriachal state prac tices build upon and rein force par ticular nor mative

views of women and the family, of ten but not exclu sively through the law. In

partic ular, laws, which ren der minors and de pend ents of men, re flect and per pet-

uate a modernised form of patriar chy. In some cases, the fo cus on women is an

at tempt to de flect atten tion from eco nomic failure (p.14).

Hijab (1988) also challenges the mainstream view that Islam is the main sup-pressor of womens status and points to the role of the state rather than religion.

Hijab studies countries such as Tunisia and Iraq and shows the role of the govern-

ment in changing social attitudes toward womens employment when their labour is

in demand. For example, Iraqs need for manpower was so pressing that the govern-

ment made special efforts to change social attitudes toward womens involvement

in the public sector through media and elite channels (Hijab, 1988). Hijab gives the

example of a pharmaceutical plant north of Baghdad where female workers had to

be brought in from Baghdad and housed in dormitories because the plant was not

able to hire women from the nearby village since local women were not allowed by



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their male family members to work in the factory. The villag ers were resentful to -

ward the new plant. Sometimes the buses transporting women from Baghdad were

attached. Gradually, women from the village began to seek work in the factorythemselves, first being chaperoned by their male relatives and finally going to work

on their own.

Hijab also cites the example of Tunisia where the government had been eager

to integrate women into the modern labour force up until the unemployment of men

became a serious problem. She states that the male un employ ment prob lem be came

so serious that the state could not afford to consider the needs of both men and

women. The government was clearly happy to adopt the traditional view that men

were the breadwinners and had to be planned for accordingly, and that women were

the economic responsibility of their menfolks (Hijab, p.81).

To sum up, in neopatriachal so ci eties of the Muslim Middle East, the state

became the ultimate power and the main owner of industries. In a handful of these

countries, their government had the means to do this because of the enormous reve-

nue from oil. When womens labour in the modern sector is in demand, the govern-

ment responds to the need by integrating women into the la bour force. Islamic

ideology as a conservative factor to suppress womens equal access to the modern

sectors is manipulated when the society is facing a high rate of male unemployment.

Gender issues had been addressed in those countries very superficially be-

cause womens labour force participation had never been seriously in demand. Due

to high fertility rates, political and economic failures, governments face high rates

of unemployment and a disproportionately young population in search of jobs. In

these circumstances Islamic ideology is used to keep women out of the labour force

and give men priority.

Research Design

All countries of the world, developed and developing, are included in the samplewhere date are avail able for 1980. After deletion of cases for which data were miss-

ing, the sample size is 135 countries. Previous cross-national studies examine a sim-

ilar or lower number of cases than this study. For example, Clark, et als (1991) total

reported cases are 135, Pampel and Tanaka (1986) examine 140 and Marshal (1985)

examines 60 cases (see the Appendix for list of countries).

Principle Concepts

Female economic activities: female employment activity is the sole dependent vari -

able in the study. This variable is measured as the fe male share of the labour force



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for 1980. This measure is preferred over the female labour force participation rate

(per 100 adult women), since it entails consideration of female labour activity in re-

lation to male activity and thus minimises the error introduced by countries varyingdefinitions of labour force participation. The female share of the labour force ranges

from 5% (United Arab Emirates) to 50% (Mozambique) for 1980. The source for

this measure is the World Bank Social Indicators of Development (1993).

The limitations of the fe male share of the labour force measure are well re-

cognised. Statistical discrimination against women (Hijab, 1988) is a serious

problem with female employment statistics. This is evident in 1) defining work as

labour for wages which excludes housework and child care, and 2) national cen-

suses which exclude unpaid family work such as farm work and petty trade (Ankerand Hein, 1986; Hijab, 1988; Nuss, 1989). Hijab uses Egyptian data as an example:

na tional sta tistics in Egypt in 1970 re ported that only 3.6 per cent of the agri-

cultural labour force was women. A sample of ru ral house hold wives through out

the coun try revealed that half of wives ploughed and lev eled the land in lower

Egypt, and be tween 55 and 70 per cent par ticipated in agricul tural activities, and

about 75 per cent en gaged in milk ing and poul try ac tivities (UN, 1984a, p.41)

(p.73).

Hijab concludes that with all the discrepancies in data collection in the Arab world,

female labour force participation is still lower in Arab countries than other parts of

the world.

Islam

Islamisation is measured by the per cent of the population that is Muslim

(%MUSLIM). The source for this measure (Weeks, 1988) does not report specific

dates for these data. Since the data are reported in a 1988 publication, per cent Mus-

lim population for different countries probably reflects the late 1970s and early

1980s data. Countries with less than .6% Muslim in this population are reported ascountries with zero Muslim population. The range of this variable, therefore, varies

from 0 to 100%, with clustering at each end of the distribution.2

Oil Revenue

Oil revenue (OILGDP) is calculated from data on crude petroleum production in

thousand metric tons in 1981 from the United Nations 1982Energy Statistics Year -

book. Countries with missing values for oil production were not oil producing coun-

tries, so missing values are replaced with zero. Converting to an approximate dollar

value of $34 per barrel in 1981 (Middle East and North Africa, 1995) and dividing



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by Gross Domestic Product (Energy Statistics Yearbook, 1982) standardises oil pro-

duction.

Economic Development

Gross National Produce (GNP) per ca pita or energy consumption per capita

(ECPC) has measured economic development in earlier studies. Energy consump-

tion per capita is often regarded as pref erable to GNP per ca pita be cause GNP per

capita is more sensitive to fluctuations in currency exchange and inflation rates

(Marshal, 1985:221). Both ECPC and GNP per capita were tested in this study. The

correlation between these two measures is 0.85, and they were found to have similar

effects. ECPC measured as kilogram of coal equivalents is reported in this ar ticle.

This variable is log transformed because of its skewed distribution (LECPC). A sec-

ond variable, the logged value squared is also included, in order to test for

curvilinearity (LECPC2). The source of the data is the World Bank Social Indica-

tors of Development(1993).

Role of the State

The concept of neopatriarchy is a complex, multidimensional concept. Different as-

pects of state structure are measured here to capture differ ent dimensions of the

neopatriachal state. First, patri archal family structure is reflected in the To tal Fertil-ity Rate (TFR). The assumption is that the higher the TFR, the more patriar chal the

family structure is in society. Second, the role of the government in religion mea-

sures the institu tional ties between religion and the state. Third, the political role of

women in government ministries measures the access of women to policy making.

The last two measures are compos ites of subscales.

For the measure of the role of government in religion, two measures are

used to indicate the importance of religion in the stage. A) Freedom for Religion,

a code developed by Barrett (1982) and Humana (1986) and reported by Sullivan(1991) classifies governments into three categories:

1. Atheistic government; the government formally promotes disap proval of

religion.

2. Secular government; the government promotes neither ap proval nor

disapproval of religion.

3. Religious government; the government identifies itself with a particular

religion or religion in general.



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Muslim countries are found in all three categories, including the atheistic

government code. On the other hand, European countries such as the United King-

dom, West Germany, Norway and Italy are coded into the religious governmentcategory. Whenever a government supports religion, whether the Christian Church

of England or the Islamic Shariat of Iran, that country gets a religious coding.

Of religious governments, 46 are in predominantly Christian countries and

26 are Islamic coun tries. While a higher percentage of Islamic coun tries have reli-

gious governments than do Christian countries, the association is not as strong as

some might expect. In predominantly Christian countries, 55% have religious gov-

ernments, while the percentage for predominately Islamic countries is 68%.

A second code, status of organised religion, ranks countries from 1 to 5,where 5 indicates the heavy influence of religion on the government and society in

general and 1 indicates a large effort of the government at discouraging religion.

The rank is as follows:

1. Government hostile to religion; keeps organised religion under strict

governmental control.

2. General government disapproval of religion.

3. Strictly secular government; neither harassment of nor subsidies for religiousactivities.

4. Government supports or subsidises some religious activities.

5. Government-sponsored official religions.

Combining the two scales cre ates an overall po litical/religion index (POL-REL

INDEX). The inter-correlation for these two variables is 0.61.

Political Role of Women

In Neopatriarchal societies, womens low political status contributes to a variety of

institutional and family structures, which may discourage female labour force par-

ticipation. Five different measures of the political role of women are included:

1. Per cent of parliamentary seats occupied by women.

2. Per cent of women in executive offices, economic, political and legal affairs.

The offices include the president or Prime Minister, and decision-makers in

the ministries of finance, trade, industry and agriculture (economic); foreign

affairs, interior and defence (political); and law and justice (legal). Decision



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makers are defined as ministers, deputy ministers, secretaries, and deputysecretaries.

3. Per cent of women in social affairs ministries. This includes decision-makers

in the ministries of health, education, housing and welfare.

4. Per cent of women in all ministries. The percent of women decision-makers in

all ministries (4) is a broader measure, which includes women in categories 2

and 3.

5. Per cent of women in ministerial level occupations: unlike (4), this measure

includes only top-level ministries.

All the measures are re ported in the Worlds Women 1970-1990: Trends and Statis-tics (1991). Factor analysis of the five variables shows high loading for all variables

on the first principle components. An index referred to as political role of women

(WOMEN-POL INDEX) is created from the mean of the five subscales.

Fertility Behaviour

Finally, womens reproductive behaviour is measured by the Total Fertility Rate

(TFR), which is a summation of age specific fer tility rates. Islamic countries have

high TFRs so this may lower womens la bour force participation. On the other

hand, the TFRs may be high because of the lower rate of participation. Because ofthis poten tial endogeneity, fer tility is in cluded only as a fi nal step in the anal ysis.

Data for this measure are from the 1993 World Bank World Tables.

Results

Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for all variables. The correlation

matrix is presented in Table 2. Female share of the la bour force is cor related most

strongly with %MUSLIM, but also with oil production, the political role of re ligion,

and the political role of women. TFR also has a significant but not strong correla-

tion with female share of the labour force. %MUSLIM is neg atively cor related withthe po litical role of women and positively corre lated with the political role of re li-

gion, as expected from the discussion of the neopatriachal state in many Muslim so-

cieties.

Table 3 presents a stepwise multiple regression of the womens share of the

la bour force. %MUSLIM is entered in step 1. The standardized co efficient is

0.507 indicating that Muslim countries tend to have a much lower female share of

the labour force. The equation estimates that in countries with no Muslim popula-

tion, about 36% of the labour force is expected to be female while in countries with



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12/22


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13/22

100% Muslim, on average only about 19% of the labour force is expected to be fe-

male. About a quarter of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by

%MUSLIM alone.

Model 2 controls for oil production. The standardised coefficient for oil pro-

duction is 0.253, which shows that countries that produce more oil tend to have a

lower female share of the labour force. The effect of %MUSLIM is reduced some-

what from 0.507 to 0.414 to some of the total correlation of %MUSLIM with fe-

male share of the la bour force is due to oils disproportionate role in Muslim

countries. The value of R-square increases from 26% to 31%.

In model 3, development is added to the equation and the explained variance

increases from 31% to 39%. Development variable shows its usual U-shapedcurvilinear effect; the logged value of development is negative while the value of

the squared log is positive. In the early stages of economic development, female

share of the labour force declines, and then rises in later stages. The inflexion point,

where the female share is predicted to be low est, oc curs at a develop ment level of

6.75 (-12.374/(-2.*.916)). Countries such as Albania with log of ECPC of 6.96, Al-

geria (6.63), Cuba (6.93), and Egypt (96.12) show values close to this inflexion

point.

The correlation between %MUSLIM and log of ECPC is low (r=.15) indicat-ing that Muslim countries are not necessarily low or high in development. Here in

step 3, in fact, the coefficient for %MUSLIM increases slightly from 4.14 to -.480.

In step 4, the two neopatriarchy variables, the Po litical Role of Religion In -

dex and Political Role of Women Index are added. The coefficients for both indices

are in the expected directions. Countries with more women in political power tend

to have a higher female share of the labour force while religious governments sup-

press female employ ment activities. The R-square increases from 39 to 52% indi-

cating that about 13% of the variance is uniquely explained by these variables.When the two state neopatriarchy variables are controlled, the effect of

%MUSLIM declines from -.480 to -.361. About a quarter of the Muslim effect is

explained by these two neopatriarchy variables. Therefore, part of the reason why a

low female share of the labour force is observed in Muslim countries is because

they tend to have very different political systems.

In step 5, TFR is added to the equation. The standardised coefficient for TFR

is -.144 and not significant. TFR does not show any direct impact on the female

share of the labour force. The standardised coefficient for %MUSLIM slightly de-



14/22

creases from -.361 to -.322. It appears that Muslim countries do not have a lower fe-

male share of the labour force because of high fertility; politics are more important.

Interaction Effects with %MUSLIM

It was assumed the relation ship between the female share of the la bour force and

any given independent variable in the study is the same across all values of the re-

maining independent variables. This assumption, however, needs to be examined

closely. For example, the oil production effect on the female share of the labour

force might not be the same for Muslim countries as it is for non-Muslim countries.

To test this, %MUSLIM is multiplied with each in de pend ent vari able in order to ex-

amine the impact of whether our main independent variable, %MUSLIM, has a dif-

ferent effect on the fe male share of the la bour force at differ ent levels of each of the

independent variables.

Table 4 shows the interaction effects of %MUSLIM with four independent

vari ables. First, all interaction terms were added to gether and then they were en -

tered sep arately into the equation in or der to check if collinearity distorts the esti-

mates. The results show the same conclusions either way and there is no evidence

that the estimates are dis torted due to the collinearity.

The estimated coeffi cient for the interaction effect of oil revenue is not sig -nificant indicating the same im pact of oil wealth on Muslim coun tries as on

non-Muslim countries. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for interaction effect of

the Political Role of Religion Index is about zero (-0.011), which indicates that the

impact of this variable is the same in Mus lim coun tries as it is in non-Muslim coun -

tries.

The estimated coefficient for the Political Role of Women Index is also about

zero (0.008), which indicates that the im pact of this variable is the same in

non-Mus lim coun tries as it is in Mus lim coun tries. It appears that the neopatriarchyvariables are equally valid for non-Muslim countries as for Muslim countries.

To sum up, the theory originally developed for Muslim countries applies as

well to non-Muslim countries. However, this does not mean that non-Muslim coun-

tries, e.g. Christian countries, with a state re ligion have as low a fe male share of the

labour force rate as Muslim coun tries with state re ligions (there is still a main ef-

fect of %MUSLIM). The differences between non-Muslim countries with or with-

out state re ligions are about the same as the differ ence be tween Mus lim countries

with or without a state religion.



15/22


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16/22

The one interaction effect that is statistically significant is the interaction of

%MUSLIM with devel opment, but this interac tion is compli cated since the devel -

opment effect is curvilinear. Therefore the impact of development for 0% Muslimcountries is compared with 100% Muslim countries.

As graph 1 indicates, development does not have the same effect on Muslim

countries. Among 0% Muslim countries there is a U-shaped relationship between

the female share of the labour force and economic development while the normal

U-shape does not apply to Muslim countries and therefore is not the same for Mus-

lim countries. What this indicates is that %MUSLIM does not have much of a rela-

tionship to development.

In Muslim countries, the impact of development on the female share of the

labour force due to neopatriachal state is much more uncertain than in non-Muslim

countries. Therefore, from Figure 1 we can conclude that first, the development ef-

fect is stronger for non-Muslim countries than it is for Muslim countries due to rea-

sons such as the oil wealth and monopoly of economic and political power in the



17/22

hands of government and the existence of the patriarchal system. Second,

%MUSLIM effect is strongest among poor and rich countries and weakest among

middle-of-the-range countries (the gap between 0% and 100% Muslim curve). Inother words, %MUSLIM effect is different in coun tries with different levels of de -

velopment.

Discussion

This cross-sectional study of developing and developed countries has explored the

low female share of the labour force in Muslim nations. The emphasis of the litera-

ture on the culture of Islam as the primary suppressor of female share of the labour

force in Muslim countries was challenged; political factors and the existence of oil

wealth were hypothesised to play major roles in determining female employment inthose coun tries. Sev eral an alysts have identified the neopatriachal state as espe-

cially important in keeping women out of the labour force. The political role of reli-

gion and the political role of women measured the core of neopatriachal

perspective.

The results confirm the significant negative impact of %MUSLIM on female

share of the labour force; about a quarter of the variance in the dependent variable

was explained by %MUSLIM alone. The results show marginal empirical support

for the hypothesis that oil wealth helps explain the low female share of the labourforce in Mus lim coun tries. The %MUSLIM coeffi cient decreases only slightly

when the model is controlled for oil revenue, indicating that oil revenue is not the

main reason for low female labour force participation in Muslim countries.

However, the neopatriachal variables do play a more significant role in ex-

plaining the female share of the labour force; about a quarter of the Muslim effect

was lost when the model controlled for the political role of religion and the political

role of women. Therefore, part of the reason why a low female share of the labour

force is observed in Muslim countries is not only due to sociocultural factors but

also because these coun tries tend to have very differ ent po litical systems. Neverthe-less, most of the effect of %MUSLIM on female share of the la bour forces re mains

after controls for state structure.

To explain this remaining effect, Islamisation of the state and its effect on fe-

male labour force participation could be further studied. Neopatriachal ideology

embedded in the state as through specific family policies for instance, could be used

to examine the discouragement of womens employment activities. Case studies of

countries could give a better insight into these policies. Muslim countries such as

Saudi Arabia (highly neopatriachal, Islamic, oil producing) vs. Malaysia (not so



18/22

neopatriachal, Islamic, low level of oil production) could be used as case studies.

The study should shed more light on the female share of the labour force analysis if

it is further expanded to a time series analysis of different points in time, e.g. 1970,1980, 1990 time periods to examine changes in female employment activities in dif-

ferent points in time.

In conclusion, this study explains some pieces of the puzzle but there are still

other pieces missing that need to be explored. The contribution of this study how-

ever is that it challenges the mainstream liter atures emphasis on the culture of Is lam

as the sole suppressor of female share of the labour force in Muslim countries. It

brings out an important point, that examining female employment activities require

a more complicated and multidimensional analysis than what is offered in the litera-

ture.

Endnotes

1. Direct all correspondence to: Elhum Haghighat, Department of Sociology and

Social Work, Lehman College-City University of New York, 250 Bedford Park

Boulevard West, Bronx, NY 10468, U.S.A. [email protected]

This work was partially funded by a 2001 George N. Shuster Fellowship Award,

Lehman College, City University of New York.

2. The range of Muslim population varies considerably among countries clusteringat the two ends of the distribution.

Muslim population No. of coun tries

75-100% 28

50-74% 6

25-49% 7

.6-24% 44

0 50135

Volume 25 Number 10/11 2005 101
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


19/22

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Ap pendix - List of Coun tries In cluded in the Sample (n=135)

Afghanistan

AlbaniaAlgeria

Angola

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

Benin

BoliviaBotswana

Brazil

Bulgaria

Burkino Faso

Burundi

Canada

Cape verde

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Columbia

Comoros

Congo

Costa Rica

Cote dIvoire

Cuba

Cyprus

CzechoslovakiaDenmar

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Equatorial Guinea

Ethiopia

Fiji

Finland

FranceHaiti

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Ireland

IsraelItaly

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kenya

Korea, Democratic Republic (North)

Korea, Republic of (South)

Kuwait

Laos

Lebanon

Liberia

Libya

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

MauritiusMexico

Mongolia

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Nepal

Netherlands (The)

Nicaragua

Niger

NigeriaPhilippines (The)

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Rwanda

Saudi Ara bia

Senegal

Sierra Leone

SingaporeSomalia

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Suriname

Swaziland

Sweden

Switzerland

Syria

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

United Arab Emirates

United KingdomUnited States

Uruguay

Venezuela

Vietnam

Yemen Republic (North)

Yugoslavia

Zaire

Zambia

Zimbabwe



22/22

Gabon

Gambia

Germany, West

Ghana

Greece

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

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