2019 patently-o patent law journal9 jasper l. tran, software patents: a one-year review of alice v....

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AliceatFive1

byJasperL.Tran&J.SeanBenevento2

Abstract.ThispaperupdatesthestatisticsonthefiveyearsafterAlicev.CLSBankanddiscusses19FederalCircuitcases(includingtheirexemplarypatentclaims)that found eligibility uponAlice challenges. TheAlice invalidation rate at theFederalCircuitanddistrictcourtshasloweredovertime,averagingcumulatively56.2%atitsnear-five-yearmark.

Introduction..............................................................................................................................26Opinions.......................................................................................................................................331) DDRHoldings,LLCv.Hotels.com(Dec.5,2014)................................................332) Enfish,LLCv.MicrosoftCorp.(May12,2016)....................................................363) BascomGlobalInternetServicesv.AT&TMobilityLLC(June27,2016)384) RapidLitigationManagementLtd.v.CellzDirect,Inc.(July5,2016)........415) McRO,Inc.v.BandaiNamcoGamesAmericaInc.(Sept.13,2016)............446) Amdocs(Israel)Ltd.v.OpenetTelecom,Inc.(Nov.1,2016)........................477) ThalesVisionixInc.v.UnitedStates(Mar.8,2017)..........................................508) VisualMemoryLLCv.NVIDIACorp.(Aug.15,2017).......................................539) Finjan,Inc.v.BlueCoatSystems,Inc.(Jan.10,2018)......................................5610) CoreWirelessLicensingS.A.R.L.v.LGElectronics,Inc.(Jan.25,2018)...5811) AatrixSoftwarev.GreenShadesSoftware(Feb.14,2018)...........................6012) VandaPharms.Inc.v.West-WardPharms.Int’Ltd.(Apr.13,2018)........6313) DataEngineTechnologiesLLCv.GoogleLLC(Oct.9,2018).........................6514) AncoraTechnologies,Inc.v.HTCAmerica,Inc.(Nov.16,2018).................7015) NaturalAlternativesInt’lv.CreativeCompounds,LLC(Mar.15,2019)..7216) SRIInt’l,Inc.v.CiscoSystems(Mar.20,2019,modifiedJuly12,2019)..7717) EndoPharms.Inc.v.TevaPharms.USA,Inc.(Mar.28,2019)......................8018) UnilocUSA,Inc.vADP,LLC(May24,2019).........................................................8319) CellspinSoft,Inc.v.Fitbit,Inc.(June25,2019)...................................................87Conclusion..................................................................................................................................92

1CiteasJasperL.Tran&J.SeanBenevento,AliceatFive,2019PATENTLY-OPATENTLAWJOURNAL25(2019).2ManythankstoDavidB.Cochran,JasonRantanen,andMatthewJ.Silveirafortheirthoughtful feedback. Opinions herein are personal, and do not necessarily reflectthose of Jones Day (and its former/current clients). All errors of omission andcommissionaretheauthors’own.Theyreceivednospecificfundingforthisresearch.

2019PATENTLY-OPATENTLAWJOURNAL

Tran&Benevento AliceatFive 2019 Patently-O Patent L.J.10

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Introduction

AliceCorp.v.CLSBankInt’l3(commonlyknownas“Alice”)isnostrangertoIPreadersandneedslittleintroduction.Briefly,theSupremeCourtfiveyearsagodecidedAlice and raised the patentability standard for (mostly) computer-implemented inventionsunder35U.S.C. §101,4 such that implementinganabstract idea on a computer is insufficient to transform that idea intopatentable subject matter.5 At the time, a Supreme Court justice evenconsideredAlice a “minor case” in following its prior §101 framework setforthinMayoCollaborativeServs.v.PrometheusLabs.,Inc.6twoyearsearlier.7

3573U.S.208(2014).4Certaincategoriesareenumeratedaspatentable in35U.S.C.§101: “process[es],machine[s], manufacture[s], [and] composition[s] of matter.” However, there areseveral exceptions “implicit” in § 101: patents cannot be obtained for “[l]aws ofnature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.PrometheusLabs.,Inc.,566U.S.66,70(2012)(quotingDiamondv.Diehr,450U.S.175,185(1981)).5Alice,573U.S.at218–21.6566U.S.66(2012).7JasperL.Tran,TwoYearsAfterAlicev.CLSBank,98J.PAT.&TRADEMARKOFF.SOC’Y354,357(2016);seealsoHon.TimothyB.Dyk,ThoughtsontheRelationshipBetweentheSupremeCourtandtheFederalCircuit,16CHI.-KENTJ.INTELL.PROP.67,74(2016)(“BeforetheSupremeCourt’sdecisionsinBilski,Mayo,Myriad,andAlice,challengestopatentabilitybasedon35U.S.C.§101wererare.Thosechallengesnowconsumeasignificantportionof our [Federal Circuit] docket.”). In fact, thedecadeprecedingMayoonlysawahandfulofdistrictcourtcasesthatinvalidatedpatentsunder§101.SeeClimaxMolybdenumCo.v.Molychem,LLC,No.02-cv-311,2007WL3256698(D.Colo.Nov.1,2007);PerfectWebTechs.,Inc.v.Infousa,Inc.,89U.S.P.Q.2d2001(S.D.Fla.2008),aff’donotherground,587F.3d1324(Fed.Cir.2009);CyberSourceCorp.v.RetailDecisions,Inc.,620F.Supp.2d1068(N.D.Cal.2009),aff’d,654F.3d1366(Fed.Cir.2011);DealerTrack,Inc.v.Huber,657F.Supp.2d1152(C.D.Cal.2009),aff’dinpart,vacatedinpart,rev’dinpart,674F.3d1315(Fed.Cir.2012);FortProps.,Inc.v.Am.MasterLeaseLLC,609F.Supp.2d1052(C.D.Cal.2009),aff’d,671F.3d1317(Fed.Cir.2012);BancorpServs.,L.L.C.v.SunLifeAssuranceCo.ofCan.,771F.Supp.2d1054(E.D.Mo.2011),aff’d,687F.3d1266(Fed.Cir.2012);GloryLicensingLLCv.Toys“R”Us,Inc.,2011WL1870591(D.N.J.May16,2011);VSTechs.,LLCv.Twitter,Inc.,2012WL1481508(E.D.Va.Apr.27,2012);CLSBankInt'lv.AliceCorp.Pty.Ltd.,768F.Supp.2d221(D.D.C.2011),aff’d,717F.3d1269(Fed.Cir.2013)(enbanc),aff’d134S.Ct.2347(2014);Ass’nforMolecularPathologyv.USPTO,702F.Supp.2d181(S.D.N.Y.2010),aff’dinpart,rev’dinpart,689F.3d1303(Fed.Cir.2012),aff’dinpart,rev’d in part, Ass’n forMolecular Pathology v.Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569U.S. 576(2013); King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)(findingfourclaimsineligible),aff’donothergrounds,vacatedinpart,616F.3d1267


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But the reality has been the opposite – Alice has been a major force inpatentabilitydeterminationsunder§101.

Forexample,inthefirstmonthandahalffollowingAlice’srelease,830patentapplications were withdrawn from the USPTO.8 At Alice’s one-yearanniversary(June19,2015),lowercourts(namelydistrictcourts,thePatentTrial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), and the Federal Circuit) appliedAlice toinvalidateorrejectsoftware-basedpatentclaimsatanaverage invalidationrateof82.9%:69.7%atthedistrictcourtsand94.1%attheFederalCircuit.9AtAlice’stwo-yearmark(June19,2016),thenumberswereslightlylower,atanaveragecumulativeinvalidationrateof78.2%:66.5%atthedistrictcourtsand92.3%at theFederalCircuit.10Near the five-yearmark(asofMarch1,2019), the cumulative numbers, as shown in TABLE 1,11 were even lower(though still the majority); the average cumulative invalidation rate was56.2%: 53.7% at the district courts and 76.3% at the Federal Circuit.12

(Fed.Cir.2010)(reversing§101invaliditydetermination).8 Tristan Gray-Le Coz & Charles Duan, Apply It to the USPTO: Review of theImplementationofAlicev.CLSBankinPatentExamination,2014PATENTLY-OPAT.L.J.1,3(2014).9JasperL.Tran,SoftwarePatents:AOne-YearReviewofAlicev.CLSBank,97J.PAT.&TRADEMARKOFF. SOC’Y 532, 545 (2015). Among other things, thisOne-Year ReviewarticlediscussesAlice’sproceduralpostureindetail.10Tran,TwoYears,supranote7,at370.11Thedata,calculatedbythenumberofcases,coverssoftware/technologypatents(astheunsurprisingmajority)andbiotechnology/lifesciencepatents,butexcludesAlicechallengesforcoveredbusinessmethod(CBM)review.Forthelistofcasesandtheir brief summary, see https://bit.ly/2LPIE8F. If calculated by the number ofpatentsinvalidatedatthedistrictcourtsandtheFederalCircuitbetweenJuly2014andApril2019,theinvalidationrateis65.4%,or615patentsinvalidatedoutof1292patentstotal.SeeRobertRSachsetal.,BenevolentDespotorTyrant?AlicevCLSBankFiveYearson,IAM(May23,2019),https://www.iam-media.com/benevolent-despot-or-tyrant-alice-v-cls-bank-five-years.12Asapointofreference,theinvalidationrateforpatentschallengedunderAliceinthe last year and a half has dropped to approximately 44%, since Berkheimer(February2018).MatthewBultman,HappyBirthday!WhatWeKnowAsAliceTurns5,LAW360 (June 19, 2019),https://www.law360.com/articles/1169278?scroll=1&latest=1?copied=1. Putdifferently, the observable trend is that the invalidation rate has been decreasingsinceAlice’s issuance, such that the invalidationratewashigher incasescloser toAlice’srelease.AlsoworthnotingisthattheinvalidationratedoesnotfollowanormalGaussiandistribution,butisratherleft-skewed(ornegativeskewness,withhigherinvalidationrateontherightofthex-axis).Whiletheaverage,asinallstatistics,doesnot tellmuchabout thedistributionof each individualdatapoint, it doesprovide


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Specifically, the district courts found ineligibility in 338 out of 629 AlicechallengesandtheFederalCircuitin58outof76.Courts(includingthePTAB)have invalidated more than 970 patents, and more than 60,000 patentapplications have been abandoned before the USPTO following § 101rejections.13

Table1 Ineligible Eligible PrematuretoDetermine Total

DistrictCourt338cases

53.7%

181cases

28.8%

110cases

17.5%

629cases

FederalCircuit58cases

76.3%

16cases

21.1%

2cases

2.63%

76cases

Total396cases

56.2%

197cases

27.9%

112cases

15.9%

705cases

Thereasoningforsuchahighinvalidationrateissimple:Alicesetforthatwo-step test todeterminewhetherachallengedpatentorpatentapplication issubjectmatter eligible, and themajorityof patents andpatent applicationshavenotbeenabletomeet this test.14Atstepone,courtsask“whethertheclaimsatissuearedirectedtooneofthosepatent-ineligibleconcepts”(lawsofnature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas). 15 Patent-eligible claimsunder this step are specific and clearly indicate the improvement over theprior art.16 Eligible system claims tend to improve the functioning of thecomputer system itself,17 while eligible method claims focus on a specific

someperspectiveonthewholegroup.13Sachs,supranote11.14AliceCorp.v.CLSBankInt’l,573U.S.208,217–18(2014).15Alice,573U.S.at217.16See,e.g.,VisualMemoryLLCv.NVIDIACorp.,867F.3d1253,1258(Fed.Cir.2017)(notingthat“keyquestion”inEnfishsteponewaswhether“focusoftheclaims[is]...onthespecificassertedimprovement”(citingEnfish,LLCv.MicrosoftCorp.,822F.3d1327,1335–36(Fed.Cir.2016))).17See,e.g.,Enfish,822F.3dat1335(holdingthatsteponerequiresdeciding“whethertheclaimsaredirectedtoan improvement tocomputer functionalityversusbeingdirectedtoanabstractidea”).


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process and how that process is “new and useful.”18 The specification canprovide helpful evidence to support eligibility, if it identifies particularimprovementsoverthepriorart.19

Iftheclaimsaredirectedto“oneof[the]patent-ineligibleconcepts,”suchasanabstract idea,thenthecourtsproceedtosteptwotodeterminewhether“theelementsofeachclaimbothindividuallyand‘asanorderedcombination’”disclosean“inventiveconcept.”20Ifaninventiveconceptispresent,thentheclaimsarepatent-eligible.21TheFederalCircuitexplainedsteptwoinBascomthat “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.”22 Additionally, theFederal Circuit clarified in Berkheimer and Aatrix that “whether a claimelement or combination of elements would have been well-understood,routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field at aparticularpointintimeisaquestionoffact.”23Thetestappears,inpractice,tobehighlysubjective24andmanyjudgeshavebeenconfusedastohowtoapplythe Alice test.25 For example, the Federal Circuit’s recent 7-5 denial of

18CellzDirect,827F.3dat1048(findingthat“theclaimsaredirectedtoanewandusefulmethod”(emphasisadded)).19See,e.g.,VisualMemory,867F.3dat1259,1260(Thespecification“discussestheadvantagesofferedbythetechnologicalimprovement.”).20Alice,573U.S.at217–18(quotingMayoCollaborativeServs.v.PrometheusLabs.,Inc.,566U.S.66,72,78–80(2012)).21Alice,573U.S.at217–18.Incontrast,“[i]tiswellsettled,though,thatautomatingconventional activities using generic technology does not amount to an inventiveconcept.”LendingTree,LLCv.Zillow,Inc.,656F.App’x991,996(Fed.Cir.2016).See,e.g.,id.(findingclaimsforinternet-basedloanapplicationsineligible);InreSalwan,681F.App’x938,941(Fed.Cir.2017)(findingclaimsforelectronicmedicalrecordmanagementineligible);FairWarningIP,LLCv.IatricSys.,Inc.,839F.3d1089,1094(Fed.Cir.2016)(findingclaimsfordetectingfraudulentaccessofmedicalinformationineligible);Tranxition,Inc.v.Lenovo(UnitedStates)Inc.,664F.App’x968,972(Fed.Cir. 2016) (finding claims for automated migration of computer configurationinformation ineligible); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364(Fed.Cir.2015)(findingclaimsforautomatedpriceoptimizationineligible).22BascomGlob.InternetServs.,Inc.v.AT&TMobilityLLC,827F.3d1341,1350(Fed.Cir.2016).Bascomisdiscussedinmoredetailinfraascase#3.23Berkheimerv.HPInc.,881F.3d1360,1368(Fed.Cir.2018);AatrixSoftware,Inc.v.GreenShadesSoftware,Inc.,882F.3d1121,1128(Fed.Cir.2018).Aatrixisdiscussedinmoredetailinfraascase#11.24See,e.g.,Sachs,supranote11(“Alicetestisafancy‘IknowitwhenIseeit’shorthandforjudgestousetodecidewhetherpatentclaimshaveso-called‘inventivemerit.’”).25FortestimoniesonsuchconfusionbycurrentandformerFederalCircuitjudgesas


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rehearingenbancinAthenaDiagnostics,Inc.v.MayoCollaborativeServs.,LLCincludeseightseparateopinions.26AlleightopinionscallforSupremeCourt27orCongressionalintervention(e.g.,thecurrentproposed§101bill).28

wellasformerUSPTOCommissioners,amongothers,seeDavidO.Taylor,ConfusingPatentEligibility,84TENN.L.REV.157,240–44(2016).Cf.JasperL.Tran,AbstractingAboutAbstract Idea, 102 IOWAL.REV.ONLINE60 (2016) (jokingabout theongoingconfusion inapplying “abstract idea”underAlice). Interestingly,withenoughdatapointspost-Alice,artificialintelligence(machinelearning)hasbeenutilized(toassisthumans) to predictwhich claimswould be rejected under theAlice test. See BenDugan,MechanizingAlice:AutomatingtheSubjectMatterEligibilityTestofAlicev.CLSBank,2018U.ILL.J.L.TECH.&POL’Y33.26No.2017-2508,2019WL2847219(Fed.Cir.July3,2019);seealsoDennisCrouch,AthenaLosesonEligiblity –Although12FederalCircuit JudgesAgree thatAthena’sClaims Should Be Eligible, PATENTLYO (July 3, 2019),https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/07/eligiblity-although-eligible.html(succinctlysummarizingtheeightopinions).27See,e.g.,Va.InnovationScis.Inc.v.Amazon.com,Inc.,227F.Supp.3d582,592n.3(E.D.Va.2017)(TheFederalCircuit“casesinwhichpatentswereupheldasdirectedtopatent-eligiblesubjectmatterareoftenthemostinstructivebecausetheyhelpsettheboundariesof§101invaliditydeterminations.”),aff’dsubnom.,Va. InnovationScis., Inc.v.HTCCorp.,718F.App’x988(Fed.Cir.2018).SinceAlice, theSupremeCourt has denied more than 40 certiorari petitions on § 101 grounds. See, e.g.,Bultman,supranote12.28Seealso,e.g.,Berkheimerv.HPInc.,890F.3d1369,1374(Fed.Cir.2018)(Lourie,J., joined by Newman, J., concurring) (per curiam) (“I believe the law needsclarificationbyhigherauthority,perhapsbyCongress,toworkitswayoutofwhatsomanyintheinnovationfieldconsiderare§101problems.”);accordAatrixSoftware,Inc.v.GreenShadesSoftware,Inc.,890F.3d1354,1360(Fed.Cir.2018)(Lourie,J.,joinedbyNewman,J.,concurring)(percuriam);IntervalLicensingLLCv.AOL,Inc.,896F.3d1335, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Plager, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part) (“go[ing] on record as joining [his] colleagueswho have recently expressedsimilar views about the current state of our patent eligibility jurisprudence,[includingJudgesLourieandNewmaninBerkheimer,aswellas]JudgeRichardLinn’sconcurring and dissenting in Smart Systems Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Trans-tAuthority,[873F.3d1364,1376(Fed.Cir.2017)that]critiquedatlengththe‘abstractideas’idea”);KristenOsenga,InstitutionalDesignforInnovation:ARadicalProposalfor Addressing § 101 Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1191(2019)(“Thedoctrineofpatent-eligiblesubjectmatterisamess,anditisweakeningpatentrightsinthiscountry.Nearlyeveryone,fromthebartothebenchandfromacademiatoindustry,hascalledforreform.”).Infact,Congressisalreadyconsideringa patent eligibility reform bill. Seehttps://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/E8ED2188-DC15-4876-8F51-A03CF4A63E26.Consequently,commentatorshavespeculatedwhether2019wouldbeAlice’slastbirthday.Evenifthatturnsouttobetrue(inafewyears,oritmaynot),


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WhiletheFederalCircuithasheardmorethaneighty§101casesinthefiveyearssinceAlice,19casesstoodoutfromthecrowd:thosethatappliedtheAlicetwo-steptestandactuallyfoundeligibilityinlightofAlice.29BecausetheFederalCircuit’spatentcasesarebindingonthelowercourts(districtcourtsandthePTAB),these19FederalCircuitcaseshavebeenelevatedtoastatuswhere they operate as a protective shield for patent owners. Because thechallengedpatents’claims in thesecaseshavesurvived theAlice test, theseclaimshavebecomeexemplarysuchthatmanyotherchallengedpatentclaimswant to analogize to, in hopes of being similarly shielded from the Alicescythe.30GivenAlice’ssubjectivetest,patentlitigatorswhorepresentallegedinfringersmayalsobenefitbyunderstandingthefactsoftheseFederalCircuitopinionsthatfoundeligibilitytobetterpreparetheircases.Tothatend,thispaper showcases these 19 exemplary cases to illuminate what claims theFederalCircuithas consideredpatent eligible inapplyingAlice.31Each case

thispaperwouldstillprovidehistoricalvalueandperspectiveonhowtheFederalCircuithasdevelopedits§101positivejurisprudencepost-Alice.29Foranongoingtallyofpost-AliceFederalCircuitcases,notincludingaffirmancesissued without an opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36, seehttps://www.bitlaw.com/patent/section-101-cases.html.30See,e.g.,Amdocs(Israel)Ltd.v.OpenetTelecom,Inc.,841F.3d1288(Fed.Cir.2016)(analogizing the representative claim at issue to those in DDR Holdings, LLC v.Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2014) andBascomGlob. InternetServs.,Inc.v.AT&TMobilityLLC,827F.3d1341(Fed.Cir.2016)(stating“Claim1issimilartotheclaimsinDDRHoldingsandBASCOM”).These19casestogetherhaveformedtheFederalCircuit’spositive jurisprudenceon§101inthefiveyearspost-Alice. In contrast, the Federal Circuit cases that found no patent-eligible subjectmatterinthefiveyearspost-Alice–thoughlessbutstillnonethelessinformative–belongtotheFederalCircuit’snegativejurisprudenceon§101.31AsthefatherofthePatentActof1952putit,“thenameofthegameistheclaim.”CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Linn &O’Malley,J.,dissenting)(quotingHon.GilesSutherlandRich,ExtentofProtectionandInterpretationofClaims:AmericanPerspectives,21INT’LREV.INDUS.PROP.&COPYRIGHTL.497,499(1990));seealsoPhillipsv.AWHCorp.,415F.3d1303,1312(Fed.Cir.2005)(enbanc)(“Itisabedrockprincipleofpatentlawthattheclaimsofapatentdefinetheinventiontowhichthepatenteeisentitledtherighttoexclude.”).


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discussion32 includes a claim chart illustrating the representative claims atissueforeaseofcomparisontootherclaimsofinterest.33

32Tobeabsolutelyclear,thecasesummary,includingespeciallythediscussionoftheinventions,ismeantforastrictlyfactualconstruction,andshouldnotbeattributedasopinionsof theauthors’employer (and its former/currentclients).That is, anystatementsthatlack“plaintiffalleged”or“accordingtothecourt”shouldbeconstruedasthoughtheyalreadyhavesuchaqualifier.33TheFederalCircuitdidnotspecificallyfindarepresentativeclaimineverycase.Inthecaseswithnoexplicitfinding,thecasediscussionhighlightstheclaimorclaimswhichtheFederalCircuitfocuseditsanalysison.


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Opinions

DDRHoldings,LLCv.Hotels.com(Dec.5,2014)34

RepresentativeClaim19ofU.S.PatentNo.7,818,39935[19] Asystemuseful inanoutsourceproviderservingwebpages

offeringcommercialopportunities,thesystemcomprising:[19(a)] acomputerstorecontainingdata,foreachofapluralityoffirst

web pages, defining a plurality of visually perceptibleelements,whichvisuallyperceptibleelementscorrespondtothepluralityoffirstwebpages;

[19(a)(i)] wherein each of the first web pages belongs to one of apluralityofwebpageowners;

[19(a)(ii)] whereineachofthefirstwebpagesdisplaysatleastoneactivelink associated with a commerce object associated with abuying opportunity of a selected one of a plurality ofmerchants;and

[19(a)(iii)] whereintheselectedmerchant,theout-sourceprovider,andtheownerofthefirstwebpagedisplayingtheassociatedlinkareeachthirdpartieswithrespecttoeachother;

[19(b)] acomputerserverattheoutsourceprovider,whichcomputerserveriscoupledtothecomputerstoreandprogrammedto:

[19(b)(i)] receive from the web browser of a computer user a signalindicatingactivationofoneofthelinksdisplayedbyoneofthefirstwebpages

[19(b)(ii)] automatically identifyas thesourcepagetheoneof the firstwebpagesonwhichthelinkhasbeenactivated;

[19(b)(iii)] inresponsetoidentificationofthesourcepage,automaticallyretrievethestoreddatacorrespondingtothesourcepage;and

[19(b)(iv)] usingthedataretrieved,automaticallygenerateandtransmitto the web browser a second web page that displays: (A)informationassociatedwith thecommerceobjectassociatedwiththelinkthathasbeenactivated,and(B)thepluralityofvisually perceptible elements visually corresponding to thesourcepage.

In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, the Federal Circuit considered theeligibility of a patent “directed to systems and methods of generating a

34773F.3d1245(Fed.Cir.2014).35Seeid.at1249–50.Claim19isrepresentativeofclaims1,3,and19.Seeid.at1249–50,1255.


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compositewebpagethatcombinescertainvisualelementsofa‘host’websitewithcontentofathird-partymerchant.”36Priortothispatent,whenavisitorclickedonanadvertisementforathird-partymerchant,thelinkwoulddirecttrafficaway fromthe“host”websiteand to the third-party’swebsite.37Thepatent at issue preventsmerchants from takingweb traffic away from thehost.38Whenavisitor clicksa linkon thehost’swebsite (e.g., a third-partyadvertisement),thepatentedsystemcreatesacombinedpagewhich“retainsthehostwebsite’s‘lookandfeel’”whilesimultaneously“display[ing]productinformationfromthethird-partymerchant.”39

TheFederalCircuitheldthepatentatissue“clear[ed]the§101hurdle”andwaspatent-eligible.40Inmakingitsdecision,thecourtlookedtothetwo-steptestidentifiedinAlice.41

TheFederalCircuitbeganitsanalysisbyexaminingwhatconstitutesapatent-ineligibleabstractidea,notingthedifficultyofdistinguishingbetweenclaimsthat are patent-eligible and those that “add too little to a patent-ineligibleabstract concept . . . .”42 Claims that are ineligible are those that are “insubstance. . .directedtonothingmorethantheperformanceofanabstractbusinesspracticeontheInternetorusingaconventionalcomputer,”evenifthey“recite[]variouscomputerhardwareelements....”43Thus,claimsshouldnot be “recited too broadly and generically to be considered sufficientlyspecificandmeaningfulapplicationsoftheirunderlyingabstractideas.”44

The Federal Circuit recognized that it not easy to determine “the precisenatureof the abstract idea” as requiredby steponeofAlice.45Because theclaimswereeligibleunder step two, the courtmovedonwithoutmakingaspecificsteponeholding.46

36Id.at1248.37Id.38Seeid.39Id.at1248–49.40Id.at1255.41Seeid.42Id.43Id.at1256.44Id.45Id.at1257.46Seeid.


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Itexplainedthat, thoughtheclaimssolvea“businesschallenge”(“retainingwebsite visitors”), that challenge is “particular to the Internet.”47 In otherwords, the claims “donotmerely recite the performance of somebusinesspracticeknownfromthepre-Internetworld,alongwiththerequirementtoperform iton the Internet.”48Theseclaimsdomore than that: “theclaimedsolutionisnecessarilyrootedincomputertechnologyinordertoovercomeaproblemspecificallyarisingintherealmofcomputernetworks.”49Thecourtfound an inventive concept because the claims do not involve a computernetwork“operatinginitsnormal,expectedmanner....”50Instead,theclaimssendthe“visitorto[a]...hybridwebpagethatpresentsproductinformationfrom the third party and visual ‘look and feel’ elements from the hostwebsite.”51

In his dissent, Judge Mayer did not agree with the majority’s inventiveconcept.52Hefoundthattheclaims“simplydescribeanabstractconcept. . .andapplythatconceptusingagenericcomputer.”53Hewouldhaveheldnoinventiveconceptfor“achieving[the]goal”describedbytheclaims.54Inhisview,theclaimsweresimplythewell-known“ideaofhavinga‘storewithinastore’”accomplishedovertheinternet.55

47Id.48Id.49Id.(emphasisadded).50Id.at1258.The“normal,expected”operation,accordingtothecourt,was“sendingthewebsitevisitortothethirdpartywebsitethatappearstobeconnectedwiththeclickedadvertisement....”Id.at1258–59.51Id.at1259.52Seeid.at1263(Mayer,J.,dissenting).53Id.(Mayer,J.,dissenting).54Id.at1264(Mayer,J.,dissenting).55 Id. at 1264–65 (Mayer, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed with thischaracterization:aphysical“‘storewithinastore’...[does]nothavetoaccountfortheephemeralnatureofan internet ‘location’or thenear-instantaneous transportbetweenthese locations . . .which introducesaproblemthatdoesnotarise inthe‘brickandmortar’context.”Id.at1258.


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Enfish,LLCv.MicrosoftCorp.(May12,2016)56

RepresentativeClaim17ofU.S.PatentNo.6,151,60457[17] Adatastorageandretrievalsystemforacomputermemory,

comprising:[17(a)] meansforconfiguringsaidmemoryaccordingtoalogicaltable,

saidlogicaltableincluding:[17(a)(i)] apluralityof logicalrows,eachsaid logicalrowincludingan

objectidentificationnumber(OID)toidentifyeachsaidlogicalrow, each said logical row corresponding to a record ofinformation;

[17(a)(ii)] a plurality of logical columns intersecting said plurality oflogical rows to define a plurality of logical cells, each saidlogical column including anOID to identify each said logicalcolumn;and

[17(a)(iii)] meansforindexingdatastoredinsaidtable.TheFederalCircuitconsideredapatentondatabasesoftwareinEnfish,LLCv.MicrosoftCorp.58EnfishassertedtwopatentsagainstMicrosoft:U.S.PatentNo.6,151,604 (“the ’604 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,163,775 (“the ’775patent”).59

Priortothepatentsatissue,databasesstoredinformationindifferenttables,separated by the type of information each table contained.60 For example,databaseswouldhaveatablecalled“DocumentTable”thatstoredinformationaboutvariousdocuments,whileinformationaboutvariouscompanieswouldbestoredinaseparate“CompanyTable.”61Inthepatentedsystem,everythingcouldbestoredinonetable.62Theinventivetablewasalsoself-referential:thecharacteristicsofeachcolumninthetablewasdefinedbyarowinthesametable.63

56822F.3d1327(Fed.Cir.2016).57Seeid.at1336.Claim17isrepresentativeofclaims17,31,and32ofthe’604patent,aswellasclaims31and32ofthe’775patent.Seeid.58Seeid.at1330.59Seeid.at1330,1333.60Seeid.at1330–31.61Id.at1330.62Seeid.at1332.63Seeid.at1332–33.


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TheEnfishCourtstoppeditsanalysisatsteponeoftheAliceinquiry:itheldtheclaims at issue were not directed to an abstract idea and were thereforepatent-eligible.64

According to the Federal Circuit, the first step ofAlice requiresmore thanmerely “ask[ing] whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept,because” even the “routinely patent-eligible claim[s]” involve a patentineligibleconcept.65Instead,thecourtconsideredthefirststepa“stage-onefilterto[the]claims,consideredinlightofthespecification,basedonwhether‘theircharacterasawholeisdirectedtoexcludedsubjectmatter.’”66

TheEnfishCourtheldthat,similartothesteptwoinquiryintoinventiveness,Alice step one requires questioning “whether the claims are directed to animprovementtocomputerfunctionalityversusbeingdirectedtoanabstractidea.”67Itfurtherexplainedthatabstractideasinclude“fundamentaleconomicand conventional business practices,” as well asmath equations.68 PatentsdirectedtothoseconceptsstillfailthefirststepofAlice,evenifthestepsare“performedonacomputer.”69

Thedecisioncounseledcourtsagainst“describingtheclaimsat...ahighlevelofabstractionanduntetheredfromthelanguageoftheclaims”becausethat“allbutensurestheexceptionsto§101swallowtherule.”70Thedistrictcourtheldtheclaimswere“directedtotheabstractideaof‘storing,organizing,andretrievingmemoryinalogicaltable’... .”71TheFederalCircuitrejectedthischaracterization, instead holding the claims at issue were “specificallydirectedtoaself-referentialtableforacomputerdatabase.”72

The Federal Circuit concluded that the claims were “directed to animprovementofanexistingtechnology,”ratherthananabstractidea.73Thisconclusionwas “bolstered by the specification’s teachings that the claimedinvention achieves other benefits over conventional databases, such as

64Seeid.at1336,1346.65Id.at1335.66Id.67Id.68Id.69Id.70Id.71Id.at1337.72Id.73Id.


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increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memoryrequirements.”74

Thefactthattheinventioncould“runonageneralpurposecomputer”didnotdoomtheclaimsbecausetheydidnot“simplyadd[]conventionalcomputercomponents to well-known business practices” or “mathematicalformula[e].”75 Likewise, the improvement does not have to be “defined byreferenceto‘physical’components....”76

The Federal Circuit looked to “[t]he specification’s disparagement ofconventionaldatastructures,”aswellasthedescriptionoftheinvention“asincludingthefeaturesthatmakeupaself-referentialtable,”to“confirmthat[its]characterization. . .ha[d]notbeendeceivedbythe‘draftsman’sart.’”77Theinventionwasnotmerelycarryingoutanabstractideaonacomputer.78Instead,“theclaims[were]directedtoaspecificimplementationofasolutiontoaprobleminthesoftwarearts.”79

BascomGlobalInternetServs.v.AT&TMobility(June27,2016)80

RepresentativeClaim1ofU.S.PatentNo.5,987,60681[1] Acontent filteringsystemfor filteringcontentretrievedfroman

Internet computer network by individual controlled accessnetworkaccounts,saidfilteringsystemcomprising:

[1.1] alocalclientcomputergeneratingnetworkaccessrequestsforsaidindividualcontrolledaccessnetworkaccounts;

[1.2] atleastonefilteringscheme;[1.3] apluralityofsetsoflogicalfilteringelements;and[1.4] a remote ISP server coupled to said client computer and said

Internetcomputernetwork,saidISPserverassociatingeachsaidnetworkaccounttoatleastonefilteringschemeandatleastone

74Id.75Id.at1338.76Id.at1339.77Id.78Seeid.79Id.80827F.3d1341(Fed.Cir.2016).81Seeid.at1345.Thecourtdidnotmakeaspecificfindingregardingarepresentativeclaim, but “BASCOMpoint[ed] to Claim 1” of U.S. PatentNo. 5,987,606 (“the ’606patent”)as“instructive”ofthe“individuallycustomizablefiltering”groupofclaims.Id.


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set of filtering elements, said ISP server further receiving saidnetworkaccessrequestsfromsaidclientcomputerandexecutingsaid associated filtering scheme utilizing said associated set oflogicalfilteringelements.

RepresentativeClaim23ofU.S.PatentNo.5,987,60682[22] AnISPserverforfilteringcontentforwardedtocontrolledaccess

networkaccountgeneratingnetworkaccessrequestsataremoteclient computer, each network access request including adestinationaddressfield,saidISPservercomprising:

[22.1] amasterinclusive-listofallowedsites;[22.2] a plurality of sets of exclusive-lists of excluded sites, each

controlledaccessnetworkaccountassociatedwithatleastonesetofsaidpluralityofexclusive-listsofexcludedsites;and

[22.3] a filtering scheme, said filtering scheme allowing said networkaccess request if said destination address exists on saidmasterinclusive-listbutnotonsaidatleastoneassociatedexclusive-list,whereby said controlled access accounts may be uniquelyassociatedwithoneormoresetsofexcludedsites.

[23] TheISPserverofclaim22furthercomprising:[23.1] apluralityofinclusive-listsofallowedsites,eachcontrolledaccess

userassociatedwithatleastoneofsaidpluralityofinclusive-listsof allowed sites, said filtering program further allowing saidnetwork access request if said requested destination addressexistsonsaidatleastoneassociatedinclusive-list.

BASCOMsuedAT&T,alleginginfringementofitspatentoninternetfiltering.83Inpriorart systems,an internetcontent filterwas installed inoneof threelocations:(1)oneachindividualcomputer,(2)onalocalnetworkserver,or(3)onremoteInternetServiceProvider(ISP)servers.84Underthepatentedinvention, the filter is located on the ISP server.85Whenwebsite access isrequestedfromtheISPserver,theserverisabletoidentifytheuserrequesting

82 See id. at 1345–46. The court did not make a specific finding regarding arepresentative claim, but “BASCOM point[ed] to Claim 23” of the ’606 patent asinstructiveofthe“hybridfilteringscheme”groupofclaims.Id.at1345.83Seeid.at1346.84Seeid.at1343–44.85Seeid.at1344.


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accessandcan filter thecontentdifferentlybasedonwho isrequestingtheaccess.86

TheFederalCircuitheldtheclaimsweredirectedtoanabstractidea,butwerestillpatenteligibleunderstep twoofAlicebecause therewasa sufficientlyinventiveconcept.87

Initssteponeanalysis,theFederalCircuitheldtheclaimswere“directedtofilteringcontentontheinternet.”88Thecourtexplainedthat“filteringcontentis an abstract idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method oforganizing human behavior . . . .”89 Thus, the ’606 patent is directed to anabstractidea.90

TheFederalCircuitmovedontoanalyzetheclaimsundersteptwo.91Fortheclaimstobepatenteligible,theinventiveconcept“mustbesignificantlymorethantheabstractideaitself....”92TheFederalCircuitagreedwiththedistrictcourt’srulingthat,separately,theclaimlimitations“recitegenericcomputer,networkandInternetcomponents,noneofwhichisinventivebyitself.”93

But the Federal Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s holding that thecombinationoflimitationsrecitedsomething“well-understood,routine,[and]conventional.”94 Importantly, theappellatecourtheld“an inventiveconceptcanbefoundinthenon-conventionalandnon-genericarrangementofknown,conventional pieces.”95 In this case, “[t]he claims do not merely recite theabstractideaoffilteringcontentalongwiththerequirementtoperformitontheInternet....Nordotheclaimspreemptallwaysoffilteringcontentonthe

86Seeid.at1344–45.87Seeid.at1352.88 Id. at 1348. (“Specifically, claim 1 is directed to a ‘content filtering system forfilteringcontentretrievedfromanInternetcomputernetwork.’Claim22similarlyisdirectedtoan‘ISPserverforfilteringcontent.’”).89Id.90 See id. at 1348–49. The court recognized it “sometimes incorporates claimlimitationsintoitsarticulationoftheideatowhichaclaimisdirected,”butexplainedthiscaseisdifferentbecausethe“claimsandtheirspecificlimitationsdonotreadilylendthemselvestoastep-onefindingthattheyaredirectedtoanonabstractidea.”Id.at1349.91Seeid.at1349.92Id.93Id.94Id.at1349–50.95Id.at1350.


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Internet....”96Instead,“theyreciteaspecific,discreteimplementationoftheabstract idea of filtering content.”97 Because “the patent describes how itsparticulararrangementofelementsisatechnicalimprovementoverpriorartwaysof filtering such content, . . . the claimsmaybe read to ‘improve[] anexistingtechnologicalprocess.”98

TheFederalCircuitanalogizedthiscasetoDDRHoldings: thepatent inthatcaseclaimed“atechnicalwaytosatisfyanexistingproblemforwebsitehostsandviewers”;itwas“notclaimingabusinessmethodperse....”99Likewise,the ’606patentsurvivessteptwobecauseit is“claimingatechnology-basedsolution...tofiltercontentontheInternetthatovercomesexistingproblemswithotherInternetfilteringsystems”;it“isnotclaimingtheideaoffilteringcontentsimplyappliedtotheInternet.”100

RapidLitigationManagementv.CellzDirect,Inc.(July5,2016)101

RepresentativeClaim1ofU.S.PatentNo.7,604,929102

[1]

A method of producing a desired preparation of multi-cryopreserved hepatocytes, said hepatocytes being capable ofbeingfrozenandthawedatleasttwotimes,andinwhichgreaterthan70%of thehepatocytesofsaidpreparationareviableafterthefinalthaw,saidmethodcomprising:

[1.1]subjecting hepatocytes that have been frozen and thawed todensitygradientfractionationtoseparateviablehepatocytesfromnonviablehepatocytes,

[1.2] recoveringtheseparatedviablehepatocytes,and

[1.3]

cryopreservingtherecoveredviablehepatocytestotherebyformsaid desired preparation of hepatocytes without requiring adensitygradientstepafterthawingthehepatocytesforthesecondtime,whereinthehepatocytesarenotplatedbetweenthefirstandsecond cryopreservations, andwherein greater than70%of thehepatocytesofsaidpreparationareviableafterthefinalthaw.

96Id.97Id.Thecourtnotedthatmerelyaddingextra“conventional”stepsto“perform[]theabstractidea”doesnotmakeapatentanylessabstract.Id.at1352.98Id.at1350–51.99Id.at1351.100Id.(emphasisadded).101827F.3d1042(Fed.Cir.2016).102Seeid.at1046.Claim1isrepresentativeofassertedclaims1and5.Id.


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U.S.PatentNo.7,604,929(“the ’929patent”)at issue inCellzDirect resultedfromadiscoverythatcertainlivercellscouldbefrozentwice,andthosecellswould“behave[]likecellsthatwereoncefrozen.”103Theprocessofthe’929patentisanimprovedprocessforpreservingthosecellsbyfreezingagroupofcellsonce,thensettingapartandrefreezingonlytheviablecells.104Thisallowsliver cells to be “thawed and used later without unacceptable loss ofviability.”105Moreover,theabilitytorefreezethecellsmakesiteasiertopooltogetherlivercellsfrommultipledonors.106

Thedistrictcourtrejectedtheclaimsunder§101.107Itheldthattheclaims(1)weredirectedtoalawofnature(theabilityoflivercellstobefrozenmultipletimes),and(2)lackedtheinventivesteptomakethempatenteligible.108TheFederal Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the claims were “notdirectedtoapatent-ineligibleconcept”understeponeofAlice.109

According to the Federal Circuit, the ’929 patent is “directed to a new anduseful laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes,” not “the ability ofhepatocytestosurvivemultiplefreeze-thawcycles.”110Thecourtnotedthattheinventorswerenotattemptingtopatentthediscoveryoftheabilityofcellstosurvive,theywereinstead“claim[ing]applicationsofthatknowledge.”111

The CellzDirect Court distinguished this case from previous cases findingineligibility:“[a]lthoughtheclaimsineachofth[o]secasesemployedmethodsteps,theendresultoftheprocess,theessenceofthewhole,wasapatent-ineligibleconcept.”112However,“theclaims[here]aredirectedtoanewandusefulmethodofpreservinghepatocytecells.”113Asevidencethattheclaimsare not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the court noted “the claims

103Id.at1045.104Seeid.105Id.106Seeid.at1045–46.107Seeid.at1046.108Seeid.109Id.at1052.110Id.at1048.111Id.(quotingAss’nforMolecularPathologyv.MyriadGenetics,Inc.,569U.S.576,596(2013))(“Theyemployedtheirnaturaldiscoverytocreateanewandimprovedwayofpreservinghepatocytecellsforlateruse.”).112Id.113Id.


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recite a ‘methodofproducingadesiredpreparationofmulti-cryopreservedhepatocytes.’”114 It did notmatter to the court that oneway to explain theinvention was by describing “the natural ability of the subject matter toundergo the process . . . .”115 If thatwere theAlice test, thenmany patent-eligiblemethodswouldbeineligible.116

TheFederalCircuitaddressed threeSupremeCourt cases in itsdecision.117Twoof those casesdidnot containmethod claims.118The first “held that amixtureofdifferentbacterialspecieswasnotpatenteligible,”whilethesecondheld“compositionclaimstoisolatedDNA[are]patentineligible.”119However,the’929patentis“directedtoanewandusefulprocessofcreatingthatpool,nottothepoolitself.”120Thisimpliesthat,hadthe’929patentbeenaproductclaimitwouldnothavesurvivedsteponeoftheAlicetest.Butbecausethe’929patentisclaiminga“newanduseful”method,itpassesstepone.121Thethirdcase contained “process claims, [but] the court concluded that they were‘directed to’ . . . patent-ineligible cffDNA itself.” 122 Thus, because the ’929patentisnotdirectedtothelivercellsthemselves,itcansurvivestepone.123

The Federal Circuit briefly addressed step two, holding that there is asufficiently inventive step: the process the claims recite is a significantimprovementoverthepriorart.124Moreover,thefactthatthestepsdisclosedin the patentwere known separately does notmean there is no inventivestep.125 Combining those steps in a new way can be patent-eligible.126Although the individual steps were well known, the prior art disclosed

114Id.115Id.at1049.116Seeid.(observingthatapatenton“treatingcancerwithchemotherapy”wouldbeineligibleifexplainedintermsof“cancercells’inabilitytosurvivechemotherapy”).117Id.118Id.(citingFunkBros.SeedCo.v.KaloInoculantCo.,333U.S.127,130–131(1948);Myriad,569U.S.at594–596).119Id.(citingFunkBros.,333U.S.at131;Myriad,569U.S.at594–596).120Id.121Id.122Id.(citingAriosaDiagnostics,Inc.v.Sequenom,Inc.,788F.3d1371,1376(2015)).123Seeid.124Seeid.at1050.125Seeid.at1051.126Seeid.


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freezing and thawing thehepatocytesonce.127Thus, at step two, itwas the“particular‘combinationofsteps’”thatwaspatentable.128

McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc. (Sept. 13,2016)129


[1] A method for automatically animating lip synchronization andfacialexpressionofthree-dimensionalcharacterscomprising:

[1.1]obtainingafirstsetofrulesthatdefineoutputmorphweightsetstream as a function of phoneme sequence and time of saidphonemesequence;

[1.2] obtainingatimeddatafileofphonemeshavingapluralityofsub-sequences;

[1.3]

generating an intermediate streamof outputmorphweight setsand a plurality of transition parameters between two adjacentmorphweight setsbyevaluatingsaidpluralityof sub-sequencesagainstsaidfirstsetofrules;

[1.4]generatingafinalstreamofoutputmorphweightsetsatadesiredframeratefromsaidintermediatestreamofoutputmorphweightsetsandsaidpluralityoftransitionparameters;and

[1.5]applying said final stream of output morph weight sets to asequenceof animated characters toproduce lip synchronizationandfacialexpressioncontrolofsaidanimatedcharacters.

McRO, Inc. sued a collection of video game developers and publishers forpatent infringement.131 The asserted patent involved a method ofautomaticallysynchronizingthe lipsofanimatedcharacterswiththewordsthey are speaking.132 The prior art method involved manually setting thepositionofthecharacter’slips“atcertainimportanttimes(‘keyframes’),”theninterpolating between the manually set positions to achieve smooth

127Seeid.128Id.(“Repeatingastepthatthearttaughtshouldbeperformedonlyoncecanhardlybeconsideredroutineorconventional.”).129837F.3d1299(Fed.Cir.2016).130 See id. at 1307 n.3. Claim 1 of U.S. PatentNo. 6,307,576 (“the ’576 patent”) isrepresentativeofassertedclaims1,7–9,and13ofthe’576patentandclaims1–4,6,9,13,and15–17ofU.S.PatentNo.6,611,278(“the’278patent”).Id.131Seeid.at1308.132Seeid.at1303.


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transitionsthatmatchthewords.133Notonlydoesthepatentusearulesettoautomaticallydefine the lippositionateachkeyframe,but it createsaddedrealismbyadjustingthemouthpositionbasedonthecontextofwhatisbeingsaid.134

TheFederalCircuitperformeditsanalysisundersteponeofAliceandheldthatthe claims survived the § 101 challengebecause theywerenot directed topatent-ineligiblesubjectmatter.135

The Federal Circuit began its analysis by explaining that Alice step onerequirescourtstolookattheclaims“asawhole. . . .”136Ontheotherhand,courtsalsoshouldnotover-simplifytheclaims“bylookingatthemgenerallyandfailingtoaccountforthespecificrequirementsoftheclaims.”137Althoughthe ’576 patent did not identify specific rules the invention must use, theclaimslimitedtherulestothose“withcertaincommoncharacteristics....”138Inotherwords,thepatentedmethodclaimsagenusofrules.139

TheFederalCircuitexplainedthatlimitsonthebreadthofclaimscomefromthedisclosurerequirementsof35U.S.C.§112,not§101.140Theonly§101concern implicated by broad claims is preemption, which arises when theclaims “are not directed to a specific invention and instead improperlymonopolize‘thebasictoolsofscientificandtechnologicalwork.’”141Tosatisfythispreemptionconcern,courtsmustask“whethertheclaims...focusonaspecificmeansormethodthatimprovestherelevanttechnologyorareinsteaddirectedtoaresultoreffectthatitselfistheabstractideaandmerelyinvokegenericprocessesandmachinery.”142Accordingtothecourt,itispossibletopatentamethodofproducingaparticulareffect,eveniftheeffectitselfisnotpatentable.143

133Id.at1307.134Seeid.135Seeid.at1316.136Id.at1312–13.137Id.at1313.138Id.139Seeid.140Seeid.at1313–14.141Id.at1314.142Id.143Seeid.


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TheFederalCircuitappliedtheseprinciplestodeterminewhethertheclaimsatissueweredirectedtoanabstractidea.144ItbeganbynotingthatClaim1doesnotsimplyutilizeacomputertoautomate“conventionalactivity.”145Thecourtemphasizedthefactthattheclaimedmethodwasnotthesameaswaspreviously practiced.146 Under the prior art method, an animator used“subjective determinations” to synchronize the lips, but under the claimedprocess,acomputerused“specific,limitedmathematicalrules”toaccomplishthegoal.147Thus,itwas“theincorporationoftheclaimedrules,nottheuseofthecomputer,that‘improved[the]existingtechnologicalprocess’....”148

Althoughthepatentedmethoddidnotproduceatangibleresult,“theconcernunderlyingtheexceptionsto§101isnottangibility,butpreemption.”149McROwasabletoshowthatanalternativeprocesstoitspatentedmethodexists,butthatwasnotentirelysufficient.150Preemptionwasfurtherpreventedbythe“specificstructureoftheclaimedrules.”151TheFederalCircuitexplainedthat“[b]yincorporatingthespecificfeaturesoftherulesasclaimlimitations,claim1islimitedtoaspecificprocess...anddoesnotpreemptapproachesthatuserulesofadifferentstructureordifferenttechniques.”152

144Seeid.at1314–16.145Id.at1314.146Seeid.147Id.148Id.149Id.at1315.150Seeid.(quotingAriosa,788F.3dat1379)(“[T]heabsenceofcompletepreemptiondoesnotdemonstratepatenteligibility.”).151Id.152Id.at1316.


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Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc. (Nov. 1,2016)153


[1]Acomputerprogramproductembodiedonacomputerreadablestoragemedium for processing network accounting informationcomprising:

[1.1]computer code for receiving from a first source a first networkaccountingrecord;

[1.2]computercodeforcorrelatingthefirstnetworkaccountingrecordwithaccountinginformationavailablefromasecondsource;and

[1.3]

computer code forusing the accounting informationwithwhichthe firstnetworkaccountingrecord iscorrelated toenhance thefirstnetworkaccountingrecord.

Amdocs(Israel)Ltd.asserted fourpatentsagainstOpnetTelecom, Inc.:U.S.Patent Nos. 7,631,065 (“the ’065 patent”), 7,412,510 (“the ’510 patent”),6,947,984(“the ’984patent”),and6,836,797(“the ’797patent”).155All fourpatents involved a system created for accounting and billing by “networkserviceproviders.”156

PriortoAmdocs’patents, therequisiteaccounting informationwouldallbestoredinoneplace,whichresultedinlargedatabasesprocessingconsiderableamounts of incoming data.157 The patented system arranges its dataprocessing components in a “distributed architecture” that spreads theprocessingacrossthenetwork.158Asaresult,informationis“collect[ed]and

153841F.3d1288(Fed.Cir.2016).154Seeid.at1299.Claim1ofU.S.PatentNo.7,631,065isrepresentativeofassertedclaims1,4,7,13and17ofthe’065patent.Id.at1299.Thecourtfoundotherclaimsrepresentative of the other asserted patents, but applied the same logic to theeligibilityanalysis.Seeid.at1302,1304,1305.Thus,theotherrepresentativeclaimsarenotincludedhere.155Seeid.at1290.156Id.at1291.157Seeid.at1292.158Id.at1291–92.


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process[ed] . . . close to its source.”159 This prevents the network frombottlenecking,butstillallowsdataaccessfroma“centrallocation.”160

AmajorityoftheFederalCircuitheldallfourpatentswereeligibleundersteptwoofAlice.161Foreachpatent,themajority“acceptedthedistrictcourt’sviewof thedisqualifying abstract ideas,” then explained the inventive concept itfound.162

The Federal Circuit began its analysis of the ’065 patent by examiningprecedent containing “somewhat facially similar claims” it had previouslyfoundbotheligibleandineligible.163BecausethecourtfelttheclaimsatissueweresimilartothoseinBascomandDDR,itmovedtosteptwowithoutmakingaspecificsteponeholding.164LikeDDR,theclaimlimitations,whenconsideredindividuallyandasanorderedcombination,resultinaninventiveconceptviathedistributedarchitecture.165LikeBascom,thebenefitsoftheinventionhereare only possible because of the specific architecture disclosed by theclaims.166

In the Federal Circuit’s view, the “distributed enhancement” recited by theAmdocspatentswasa“criticaladvancementoverthepriorart....”167Despitethe use of generic components, the enhancement limitation requires thosecomponents to “operate in an unconventional manner to achieve animprovementincomputerfunctionality.”168Therefore,theclaimsofthe’065patentcontainaninventiveconcept.169

159Id.at1291.160Id.at1292.161Seeid.at1307.162Id.at1306.163Id.at1300.164Id.(citingBascomGlob.InternetServs.,Inc.v.AT&TMobilityLLC,827F.3d1341(Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.2014)).165Seeid.at1301–02(citingDDRHoldings,773F.3dat1259).166Seeid.at1302(citingBascom,827F.3d1341).167Id.at1300.168Id.at1300–01.169Seeid.at1301.


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Themajority held that each of the other patents was eligible for “reasonssimilarto”the’065patentanalysis.170Thus,thecourtfoundallfourpatentseligibleunderAlicesteptwo.171

JudgeReyna disagreedwith themajority’s “mechanical comparison” of theclaimsherewiththeclaimsinprevious§101cases.172Healsotookissuewithwhatheviewedas the importationof “innovative limitations” to theclaimsfromthespecification.173

The dissent found that the ’065 and the ’797 patents are ineligible underAlice.174 In Judge Reyna’s view, claim 1 of the ’065 patent only recitesfunctional limitations and does not contain a “specific process foraccomplishingtheabstractgoalofcombiningdata....”175Moreover,noneofthelimitations“confin[e]theclaimtoaparticularmeans”ofperformingtheabstractidea,sotherewasnoinventiveconcept.176Similarly,the’797patentonlyrecitesstepsthat“comprisethe[ineligible]abstractconceptofcollectinginformationaboutnetworkservices....”177

Judge Reyna did agree with the majority that both the ’510 and the ’984patentswereeligible,butdisagreedwiththeirmethodology.178Atstepone,thecourtshouldhavedeterminedifthepatentswereissimply“directedto[anabstract]goal”oriftheyweredirectedto“amethodofachieving”thatgoal.179Thismethod “must [have]meaningfully limit[ed] the claim to amanner ofachievingthedesiredresultwithoutundulyforeclosingfutureinnovation.”180Because the ’510and ’984patents “captureat least someof theprocessbywhichthedisclosedsystem”achievesitsgoal,theysurvivestepone.181

170Id.at1302,1304,1305.171Seeid.at1307.172Id.173Id.174Seeid.175Id.at1313.176Id.at1314.177Id.at1319.178Seeid.at1307.179Id.at1314.180Id.181Id.at1315.Thequotedlanguagerefersspecificallytothe’510patent,butJudgeReynaviewedthe’984patentas“analogousto...the’510patent....”Id.at1317.


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ThalesVisionixInc.v.UnitedStates(Mar.8,2017)182

IndependentClaim1ofU.S.PatentNo.6,474,159183

[1] Asystemfortrackingthemotionofanobjectrelativetoamovingreferenceframe,comprising:

[1.1] afirstinertialsensormountedonthetrackedobject;

[1.2] asecondinertialsensormountedonthemovingreferenceframe;and

[1.3]

anelementadaptedtoreceivesignalsfromsaidfirstandsecondinertialsensorsandconfiguredtodetermineanorientationoftheobjectrelativetothemovingreferenceframebasedonthesignalsreceivedfromthefirstandsecondinertialsensors.

IndependentClaim22ofU.S.PatentNo.6,474,159184

[22]

A method comprising determining an orientation of an objectrelative to amoving reference framebasedon signals from twoinertial sensors mounted respectively on the object and on themovingreferenceframe.

The asserted patent in Thales relates to a system for tracking an object’smovement relative to a moving platform.185 Under the prior art, sensorsmountedonanobjectcouldmeasureandcalculate“position,orientation,andvelocity of the object” relative to a predefined startingposition.186Becausesmall errors in themeasurement of the object could propagate into larger

182850F.3d1343(Fed.Cir.2017).183Seeid.at1345.ThecourtdidnotmakeaspecificfindingastowhichclaimwasrepresentativeofU.S.PatentNo.6,474,159(“the’159patent”).Seeid.Thepatenteesassertedclaims1–5,11–13,20,22–26,32–34,and41.Seeid.at1344.Oftheassertedclaims,only1and22areindependent,sothecourtconsideredthosetwoclaims.Seeid.at1345.184Seeid.at1345–46.Thecourtdidnotmakeaspecificfindingastowhichclaimwasrepresentativeofthe’159patent.Seeid.Thepatenteesassertedclaims1–5,11–13,20,22–26,32–34,and41.Seeid.at1344.Oftheassertedclaims,only1and22areindependent,sothecourtconsideredthosetwoclaims.Seeid.at1345.185Seeid.at1344.186Id.at1344–45.


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ones,trackingsystems“generallyinclude[d]at leastoneothersensor . . . tointermittently correct [those] errors . . . .”187 The ’159 patent identified aproblem in this prior art: the object’s tracking sensors measured motionrelative to earth, while the error-correcting sensors measured “positionrelativetothemovingplatform.”188Combiningthisdataledto“inconsistentpositioninformationwhenthemovingplatformacceleratedorturned.”189

Thepatentedsystempurportedtosolvethisproblem.190Thepatentdisclosedtracking sensors on the platform measuring the direction of gravity, andsensorsontheobjecttakingmeasurementsrelativetothemovingplatform.191Changing the reference frame in thisway allowed the object to be trackedwithoutcalculatingthepositionororientationofthemovingplatform.192Thisresultedinthreeimprovements:(1)anincreasedmeasurementaccuracy,(2)areducedneedforextrahardwareonthemovingplatform,and(3)simplerinstallation.193

Thelowercourtgrantedamotionforjudgmentonthepleadingsbecause,initsview,theclaimswere“directedtotheabstractideaofusinglawsofnaturegoverningmotiontotracktwoobjects”andhadnoinventiveconcept.194TheFederalCircuitrejectedthisruling,andinsteadheldthattheclaimswerenotdirectedtoanabstractideaunderstepone.195

In its analysis, theFederalCircuit recognized that, at stepone, it “must . . .articulatewhattheclaimsaredirectedtowithenoughspecificitytoensurethesteponeinquiryismeaningful.”196Thecourtdevotedthemajorityofits§101analysisdrawingparallelsfromthiscasetoaSupremeCourtcase,Diamondv.Diehr.197 In Diehr, the patent’s “claimed method used [a] well-known . . .equationtocalculatetheoptimalcuretime”ofrubber.198TheSupremeCourtnoted that the mathematical equation itself would not have been patent-

187Id.at1345.188Id.189Id.190Seeid.191Seeid.192Seeid.193Seeid.194Id.at1346.195Seeid.at1349.196Id.at1347.197Id.at1347–48(citingDiamondv.Diehr,450U.S.175(1981)).198Id.at1347(citingDiehr,450U.S.at177n.2).


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eligible,evenifitwaslimitedtoaparticulartechnology.199ButtheclaimsatissueinDiehrwereeligiblebecause“whenaclaimcontainingamathematicalformulaimplementsorappliesthatformulainastructureorprocesswhich,whenconsideredasawhole,isperformingafunctionwhichthepatentlawsaredesignedtoprotect,”itispatenteligible.200

The Federal Circuit viewed the claims of the ’159 patent as “nearlyindistinguishable”fromDiehr.201Theclaimshereuse“navigationequations... derived from [the] particular arrangement of sensors” to calculate theposition and orientation of the object.202 The patent’s use of equations issimplytofacilitatethisparticularconfigurationofthesensors.203Andbyusingthisconfiguration,theclaims“resultinasystemthatreduceserrors”presentinthepriorartsystems,“[j]ustastheclaimsinDiehrreducedthelikelihood”oferrorinthepriorartrubbercuringprocess.204

Thepatentspecificationaddsfurthersupporttotheideathattheclaimsarenotdirectedtoanabstractidea.205Itidentifiesthedifficultiesinthepriorartandnotesthattheclaimedarrangement“mayseemsomewhatstrange,”butresultsintheimprovementscitedbythepatent.206

Theclaimsarepatenteligibleundersteponebecause theyare“directed tosystemsandmethodsthatuseinertialsensorsinanon-conventionalmannertoreduceerrorsinmeasuringtherelativepositionandorientationofamovingobjectonamovingreferenceframe.”207

199Seeid.(citingDiehr,450U.S.at191–92).200Id.at1347–48(quotingDiehr,450U.S.at192).201Id.at1348.202Id.203Seeid.204Id.(citingDiehr,450U.S.at187).205Seeid.206Id.207Id.


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VisualMemoryLLCv.NVIDIACorp.(Aug.15,2017)208

Claim1ofU.S.PatentNo.5,953,740209

[1]

A computer memory system connectable to a processor andhaving one or more programmable operational characteristics,saidcharacteristicsbeingdefinedthroughconfigurationbysaidcomputer based on the type of said processor, wherein saidsystem is connectable to said processor by a bus, said systemcomprising:

[1.1(a)] amainmemoryconnectedtosaidbus;and[1.1(b)] acacheconnectedtosaidbus;

[1.2] wherein a programmable operational characteristic of saidsystemdeterminesatypeofdatastoredbysaidcache.

The’740patentatissueinVisualMemoryrelatestocomputermemorythatcanbeconfiguredtobeusedwithdifferenttypesofprocessors.210Computersoften utilize “a three-tieredmemory hierarchy.”211 The first tier is a slow,inexpensivememory(e.g.,aharddisk).212Thesecondtieris“mediumspeedmemory” used for the computer’smainmemory.213 The third tier is a fast,expensivememoryknownas“processorcachememory.”214Underthepriorart to the ’740patent,memorysystemshad tobe “designedandoptimizedbasedonthespecifictypeofprocessor”used.215Thismeantpriorartmemorylackedversatility andwas expensive.216Using adifferent typeof processordecreased the memory system’s efficiency, and even systems designed tooperatewithmultipletypesofprocessorshaddecreasedperformancefor“oneorallofthecomputers.”217

208867F.3d1253(Fed.Cir.2017)209Seeid.at1257.ThecourtdidnotmakeaspecificfindingastowhichclaimwasrepresentativeofU.S.PatentNo.5,953,740(“the’740patent”).Seeid.Instead,itcitedclaim1asanexample.Seeid.210Seeid.at1255.211Id.212Seeid.213Id.214Id.215Id.216Seeid.217Id.


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The ’740 patent discloses a memory system that can be programmed tooperate differently depending on the processor type it is used with.218 Itconsists of amainmemory and three separate caches.219 The caches “self-configure” to use the correct operational characteristic when powered on,allowingthesystemtoperformaswellorbetterthanpriorartcachememory“manytimes largerthanthecumulativesize”ofthepatentedcaches.220Thesystemalsoimprovesthemainmemorybydividingitintodifferentsectionsto be accessedby different processor types.221Overall, the patent recites asystem that “confers a substantial advantageby” creating theability tousedifferent types of processors with the same memory without harmingperformance.222

Thedistrict courtgranteda12(b)(6)motion todismissbecause the claimswere“directedtothe‘abstractideaofcategoricaldatastorage’”anditfoundthepatentrecites“genericandconventional”computercomponents,notaninventiveconcept.223TheFederalCircuitheldtheopposite:itruledtheclaimswereeligibleundersteponeofAlice.224

TheFederalCircuitcitedEnfish,explainingthattheclaimsthereweredirectedtoanimprovementincomputerfunction.225Tothecourt,the“keyquestion”inEnfish’ssteponeanalysiswaswhetherthe“focusoftheclaims[is]...onthespecificassertedimprovement...or,instead,onaprocessthatqualifiesasan‘abstractidea’forwhichcomputersareinvokedmerelyasatool.”226

TheVisualMemoryCourtbrieflydiscussedThalesaswell.227Itexplainedtheclaims there were eligible because they were “directed to ‘systems andmethods that use inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduceerrorsinmeasuring....”228

218Seeid.at1255–56.219Seeid.220Id.at1256.221Seeid.222Id.at1256–57.223Id.at1257.224Seeid.at1262.225 See id. at 1258 (citing Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.2016)).226Id.(quotingEnfish,822F.3dat1335–36).227Seeid.at1259(citingThalesVisionixInc.v.UnitedStates,850F.3d1343(Fed.Cir.2017)).228Id.(quotingThales,850F.3dat1348–49).


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The claims were eligible under step one as “directed to a technologicalimprovement . . . .”229Theclaims focusonthespecific improvement, ratherthananabstractideaplacedongenericcomputercomponents.230Moreover,thespecificationidentifiesimprovementsoverthepriorartand“discussestheadvantagesofferedbythetechnologicalimprovement.”231

AnotherreasontheFederalCircuitheldthepatentsteponeeligiblerelatedtopreemption concerns.232 The ’740 patent does not attempt to preempt “alltypesandallforms”ofdatastorage.233Thecourtfoundevidenceofthisinthespecification because it identifies improvements over the prior art.234Accordingtothespecification,thepatentenablesuseofprocessorsofdifferenttypes without sacrificing performance.235 Additionally, manufacturers “nolonger need to design a separate memory system for each type ofprocessor.”236 Finally, the specification teaches that the disclosed cachesoutperformlargeronesduetotheirconfigurability.237

The claimshereweredistinct from ineligible claims inprior casesbecausetheseclaims“reciteanallegedlynew,improved,andmoreefficientmemorysystem.”238

Judge Hughes’ dissent found that the claims are not directed to animprovementbecausetheydonotdescribethespecific“meansormethodofimplementing” the claimed “programmable operational characteristic” andthus “lack[] any details” describing how the invention is realized.239 In hisview,therewasalsonoinventiveconceptbecausethepatentonlydescribes“genericcomputercomponents,”andtheclaimonlyusesthosecomponents“to perform generic computer functions.”240 The majority found threeproblemswith this.241 First, at this procedural stage (a 12(b)(6)motion to

229Id.230Seeid.at1259–60.231Id.at1259,1260.232Seeid.at1259.233Id.234Seeid.235Seeid.236Id.237Seeid.238Id.at1260.239Id.at1263.240Id.at1264.241Seeid.at1261.


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dismiss),thefactsmustbereadinthelightmostfavorabletothenon-movingparty(here,thepatentee).242Second,issuesofadequatedisclosurefallunderenablementrequirements,not§101eligibility.243Third,theclaimedinventionistheabilitytoconfigurethememory,notthespecificprogrammingrequiredtoimplementthatconfigurability.244

Finjan,Inc.v.BlueCoatSystems,Inc.(Jan.10,2018)245


[1] Amethodcomprising:

[1.1] receivingbyaninspectoraDownloadable;

[1.2]generatingbytheinspectorafirstDownloadablesecurityprofilethatidentifiessuspiciouscodeinthereceivedDownloadable;and

[1.3]

linkingbytheinspectorthefirstDownloadablesecurityprofiletotheDownloadablebeforeawebservermakestheDownloadableavailabletowebclients.

Finjan owned several patents related to malware identification andprotection.247 The eligibility issue arose with respect to U.S. Patent No.6,154,844 (“the ’844 patent”), which “recite[s] a system and method forproviding computer security by attaching a security profile to adownloadable.”248Thepatent involvesamethodof scanninganapplicationdownloadedfromtheweb,creatinga“securityprofile”thatidentifiesmalwarein the application, then attaching the security profile to the downloadedapplication.249

242Seeid.243Seeid.at1261.244Seeid.at1261–62.245879F.3d1299(Fed.Cir.2018).246Seeid.at1303.Claim1isrepresentativeofclaims1,7,11,14,and41.Seeid.at1302,1303.247Seeid.at1302.248Id.249Id.at1303.


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TheFederalCircuitheldthe’844patentiseligibleundersteponeoftheAlicetestbecauseitisnotdirectedtoanabstractidea.250

Initssteponeanalysis,theFederalCircuitnotedanearlierholdingrelatingtoscreeningapplicationsfordangerouscode:“[b]yitself,virusscreeningiswell-knownandconstitutesanabstractidea.”251Evenintroducingan“intermediarycomputer” to perform the task is “‘perfectly conventional’ . . . and is alsoabstract.”252

Thepriorart“code-matching”methodofvirusscanningcomparedthecodeinthedownloadedapplicationwithcodeofpreviously-knownviruses,whereasthe’844patentproducesasecurityprofile(includingpotentialthreats)usinga “behavior based”method of scanning.253 Thus, the Federal Circuit had todetermine whether the behavior based method “constitute[d] animprovementincomputerfunctionality.”254Thecourtfoundit“doesagooddealmore.”255The invention’sability to identifypotentiallydangerouscodeprotectsagainstbothunknownvirusesandvirusesthataredisguisedtoavoiddetectionbycode-matching.256Moreover,theinventionenablesflexibilityinvirusscanning:userscancreateorbeassigneda“securitypolicy”thatiseasilytailored to the individual and canbe “alter[ed] . . . .in response toevolvingthreats.”257

Like the claims inEnfish, the ’844 patent “employs a new kind of file thatenables a computer security system todo things it couldnotdobefore.”258Citingtheimprovementsconferredbythepatent,theFederalCircuithelditwas“directedtoanon-abstractimprovementincomputerfunctionality.”259

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the arguments of the defendants, whoassertedthattheclaimswerestillabstract(evenif“directedtoanewidea”)“becausetheydonotsufficientlydescribehowtoimplementthatidea.”260The

250Seeid.at1306.251Id.at1304.252Id.253Id.254Id.at1304.255Id.256Seeid.257Id.258 Id. at 1304–05 (citing Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.2016)).259Id.at1305.260Id.at1305–06.


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court explained the claims at issue are patent eligible because they “recitemorethanamereresult.Instead,theyrecitespecificsteps...thataccomplishthe desired result.”261 In other words, the claims disclose “an inventivearrangementforaccomplishingtheresult,”sothe’844patentiseligible.262

Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs. (Jan. 25,2018)263


[1]

A computing device comprising a display screen, the computingdevicebeingconfiguredtodisplayonthescreenamenulistingoneormoreapplications,andadditionallybeingconfiguredtodisplayonthescreenanapplicationsummarythatcanbereacheddirectlyfrom the menu, wherein the application summary displays alimitedlistofdataofferedwithintheoneormoreapplications,eachof the data in the list being selectable to launch the respectiveapplication and enable the selected data to be seen within therespective application, and wherein the application summary isdisplayedwhiletheoneormoreapplicationsareinanun-launchedstate.

InCoreWireless,theFederalCircuitconsideredtheeligibilityoftwopatents:USPatentNo.8,713,476andUSPatentNo.8,434,020.265Bothofthesepatentsaredesignedtoimprovedisplayinterfaces,especiallyfordisplayswithsmallscreens.266Thepriorarttothesepatentsrequireduserstodolotsofscrolling,changingviews,andnavigatingthroughlayersofinformationtoaccessdataor a function theywanted.267 The improvement described in these patentsallowedforfasteraccesstothedataandapplicationsbycreatingasummarywindowcontainingdataorfunctions.268

261Id.at1305.262Id.at1305–06.263880F.3d1356(Fed.Cir.2018).264See id.at1359.Thedistrict court found independentclaim1ofU.S.PatentNo.8,713,476(“the’476patent”)representativeofasserted(dependent)claims8,and9ofthe’476patent,anddependentclaims11and13ofU.S.PatentNo.8,434,020(“the’020patent”).Seeid.at1360.265Seeid.at1359.266Seeid.267Seeid.at1363.268Seeid.


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Thedistrictcourtdeniedamotion forsummary judgment,holding that theclaims were patent eligible.269 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed thisdecision.270 It recognized the claims were not directed to an abstract ideaundersteponeofAlice.271

TheFederalCircuitbeganbysummarizingmanyofitspriordecisionsfindingeligibility.272Itfirstexplainedthatthepatent(s)inEnfishwereeligiblebecausetheyclaimeda“specifictypeofdatastructuredesignedtoimprovethewayacomputer stores and retrieves data . . . .”273 Next, the court addressed theclaimsatissueinThales.274There,theclaimsrelatedtospecificconfigurationsandmethodsthat improvedcomputerfunctionbyeliminatingdifficulties inconventional methods.275 The court then summarized the Visual Memoryholding:theinventioninthatcaseintroducedflexibilitynotavailableinthepriorartandsimultaneouslyeliminatedtheneedtodesignmultipletypesofmemory for each type of processor.276 Thus, the claims were eligible.277Finally, thecourtnotedthat theclaims inFinjanwereeligiblebecausetheyenabledcomputersecuritysystemstodonewthings.278

TheFederalCircuitheldtheclaimsaredirectedtoanimproveduserinterface,nottoanindex,asassertedbytheallegedinfringers.279Thecourtreachedthisconclusion because the claimed ways of summarizing and presentinginformation were specific.280 Under the claim limitations, the summarywindowmustbeaccessedinacertainway,the informationtobedisplayedmustbe limitedtocertaintypes,andtherelevantapplicationsmustbe inaparticular state (unlaunched).281 Thus, the patent claims a specific

269Seeid.at1360.270Seeid.at1359.271Seeid.at1363.272Seeid.at1361–62.273Id.at1362(quotingEnfishLLCv.MicrosoftCorp.,822F.3d1327,1338–39(Fed.Cir.2016)).274Seeid.(citingThalesVisionixInc.v.UnitedStates,850F.3d1343(Fed.Cir.2017)).275Seeid.(citingThales,850F.3dat1348–49).276Seeid.(citingVisualMemoryLLCv.NVIDIACorp.,867F.3d1253,1259(Fed.Cir.2017)).277Seeid.(citingVisualMemory,867F.3dat1259).278See id. (citingFinjan, Inc.v.BlueCoatSystems, Inc.,879F.3d1299,1304,1305(Fed.Cir.2018)).279Seeid.280Seeid.at1362–63.281Seeid.


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improvement over the prior art: an improved user interface.282 Thespecificationalsosupportsthecourt’sconclusionbecauseitslanguageteachestheinventionasanimprovementoverthepriorart.283Therefore,theclaimsare directed to an improvement in computer functionality and are eligibleunderAlicestepone.284

Aatrix Software v. Green Shades Software (Feb. 14,2018)285


[1]

Adataprocessingsystemfordesigning,creating,andimportingdata into, a viewable form viewable by the user of the dataprocessingsystem,comprising:

[1.1(a)]

aformfilethatmodelsthephysicalrepresentationofanoriginalpaper formandestablishes thecalculationsandruleconditionsrequiredtofillintheviewableform;

[1.1(b)]

a form file creation program that imports a background imagefromanoriginal form,allowsausertoadjustandtest-printthebackgroundimageandcomparethealignmentoftheoriginalformtothebackgroundtest-print,andcreatestheformfile;

[1.1(c)]adatafilecontainingdatafromauserapplicationforpopulatingtheviewableform;and

[1.1(d)]

aformviewerprogramoperatingontheformfileandthedatafile,to perform calculations, allow the user of the data processingsystemtoreviewandchangethedata,andcreateviewableformsandreports.

The Federal Circuit considered two patents which relate to systems andmethodsofgeneratinga“viewableform”ofdatathatuserscanmanipulateon

282Seeid.at1363.283Seeid.284Seeid.285882F.3d1121(Fed.Cir.2018).286Seeid.at1223–24.Claim1isrepresentativeofassertedclaims1,2and22ofU.S.PatentNo.7,171,615(“the’615patent”),andclaims1,13and17ofU.S.PatentNo.8,984,393(“the’393patent”).Seeid.


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theircomputer.287Thepriorart to thesepatentsonlyallowedextractionofdata from databases that were “widely available” and had “published . . .schemas.”288Theclaimsatissueallegedlyimprovedthepriorartintwoways:(1)theyallowedtheuseofdatafromthirdpartyapplicationswithouthavingtocustomizeforeachapplication,and(2)theyeliminatedtheneedtohand-typedata,whichresultedineliminationoftranscriptionerrors.289

ThedistrictcourtheldthatalltheclaimswereineligibleandgrantedGreenShades’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.290 Aatrix subsequently asked to file asecond amended complaint, arguing that the amended complaint providedallegations and evidence “preclud[ing] a [12(b)(6)] dismissal . . . .”291 Thedistrictcourtdeniedthisrequest.292

The Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal because the second amendedcomplaint contained factual allegations that the district court should haveconsidered.293TheFederalCircuitrecognizedthateligibilitycanbedecidedduringa12(b)(6)motiontodismiss,butheldthatcanonlybethecasewherethereareno“plausiblefactualallegations”which,whentakenastrue,preventsuchadecision.294Inotherwords,theissueofeligibilityisaquestionoflawwithunderlyingfactquestionsthatmayprecludedismissalunder12(b)(6).295

TheFederalCircuitexplainedtheproposedsecondamendedcomplainthadfactual allegations which impact the § 101 analysis.296 First, the proposedamended complaint alleges the patent is directed to an improvement inimportingdatafromthirdpartysoftware.297Second,itraisesthequestionofwhetheraparticularclaimterm“constitutesaninventiveconcept,aloneorincombinationwithotherelements . . . .”298Third, itdescribesthe invention’sdevelopment, the prior art’s problems, and “presents specific allegations”

287Id.at1123.288Id.at1127.289Seeid.290Seeid.at1124.291Id.292Seeid.293Seeid.294Id.at1125.295Seeid.at1126.296Seeid.297Seeid.at1127.298Id.at1126.


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about the improvements of the invention.299 According to the court, “theseallegationssuggest[thepatent]isdirectedtoanimprovementinthecomputertechnology itself, and not directed to generic computer componentsperformingconventionalactivities.”300

In addition, Alice step two requires determiningwhether the claims recitesomething“well-understood,routine,andconventional....”301Thatquestion“isaquestionoffact”which“cannotbeansweredadverselytothepatenteebasedonthesourcesproperlyconsideredonamotiontodismiss....”302Here,theproposedsecondamendedcomplaintraised“concreteallegations”relatedtothatinquiry,andtherecordpresentednoreasontorejectthem.303

JudgeReynadissented-in-part;hetookissuewithaddinga“significantfactualcomponent”fortworeasons.304First,addingafactquestionopensthedoortoa floodofextrinsicevidence.305Under themajority’sholding,allapatenteemust do to defeat a motion to dismiss is amend the complaint to allegeextrinsicevidence,evenifitisinconsistentwiththe“intrinsicrecord.”306Thisgoesagainstthe“utilityofthe12(b)(6)procedure”because it is“convertedintoafull-blownfactualinquiry. . . .”307Second,“[t]hemotiontodismissonappealonlychallengesthefirstamendedcomplaint,”notthesecond.308JudgeReynafeltthatthemajoritywasimproperly“prejudg[ing]”whatitthoughttheresultshouldbeonremand,andfoundtheopiniononthesecondamendedcomplaintwasentirelydicta.309

299Id.at1127(explainingAatrixallegedimprovementssuchasdecreasedmemoryusageandfasterprocessing).300Id.301Id.at1128.302 Id. (noting proper sources include complaint, patent, andmaterials subject tojudicialnotice).303Id.304Id.at1130(Reyna,J.,dissenting).305Seeid.(Reyna,J.,dissenting).306Seeid.(Reyna,J.,dissenting).307Id.at1130–31(Reyna,J.,dissenting).308Id.at1131(Reyna,J.,dissenting).309Id.(Reyna,J.,dissenting).


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VandaPharms.Inc.v.West-WardPharms.Int’l(Apr.13,2018)310


[1]A method for treating a patient with iloperidone, wherein thepatient is suffering from schizophrenia, themethod comprisingthestepsof:

[1.1] determiningwhether thepatient is aCYP2D6poormetabolizerby:

[1.1(a)] obtainingorhavingobtainedabiologicalsamplefromthepatient;and

[1.1(b)]performing or having performed a genotyping assay on thebiologicalsampletodetermineifthepatienthasaCYP2D6poormetabolizergenotype;and

[1.2]if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, theninternallyadministeringiloperidonetothepatientinanamountof12mg/dayorless,and

[1.3]ifthepatientdoesnothaveaCYP2D6poormetabolizergenotype,then internally administering iloperidone to the patient in anamountthatisgreaterthan12mg/day,upto24mg/day,

[1.4]

whereinariskofQTcprolongationforapatienthavingaCYP2D6poor metabolizer genotype is lower following the internaladministration of 12 mg/day or less than it would be if theiloperidonewereadministeredinanamountofgreaterthan12mg/day,upto24mg/day.

TheVandaCourtconsideredtheeligibilityoftheclaimsrecitedbyU.S.PatentNo.8,586,610(“the’610patent”).312Themethodclaimsatissuecovertreatingschizophrenia patients using a drug called iloperidone.313 According to the

310887F.3d1117(Fed.Cir.2018).311Seeid.at1121.Claim1isrepresentativeofclaims1–9,11–13,and16.Seeid.at1120.312Seeid.at1133–36.313Seeid.at1121.


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patent,thedosageofthedrugisdeterminedbasedontheactivityofacertaingene inthepatient.314Forthosepatientswhohave loweractivity fromthatgene(“poormetabolizers”),ordinarytreatmentcouldleadto“seriouscardiacproblems.”315 The ’610 patent teaches that poormetabolizers can bemoresafelytreatedbygivingthemalowerthannormaldose.316

Thelowercourtheldthattheclaimswereeligibleunder§101becauseitwasnot convinced they recited routine or conventional steps.317 The FederalCircuitalsoheldtheclaimswereeligible,butitdidnotaddresstheinventiveconceptinquirybecauseitfoundthemeligibleunderstepone.318

TheFederalCircuitreacheditsconclusionbydistinguishingtheseclaimsfromsimilarclaimsthatwerepreviouslyheldpatent-ineligible.319UnliketheclaimsinMayo,theinventorshere“recognizedtherelationshipsbetween”thedrugandthebody’sresponse,“butthat[was]notwhat[was]claimed.”320Instead,the patentees “claimed an application of that relationship.”321 This wasevidencedbytheclaimsthemselves,whichrequiredaspecificdosagetobeadministered.322Thecourtfoundfurthersupportinthespecification,which“highlight[ed] the significance of the specific dosages” by explaining thecorrelationbetweenthedosageandtheriskofheartproblems.323

TheFederalCircuitalsonotedthatpreemptionwasnotaconcernforthe’610patentbecausetheclaimsinvolvedactually“usingthenaturalrelationship.”324InMayo,theclaimedtest“simply‘indicate[d]’aneedtoincreaseordecreasedosage,without...otheraddedstepstotake,”whiletheseclaims“recitethestepsofcarryingoutadosageregimenbasedontheresults”ofatest.325

Becausetheclaimsatissuewere“directedtoaspecificmethodoftreatmentforspecificpatientsusingaspecificcompoundatspecificdosestoachievea

314Seeid.315Id.316Seeid.317Seeid.at1123.318Seeid.at1134.319Seeid.at1134–35(citingMayoCollaborativeServs.v.PrometheusLabs.,Inc.,566U.S.66(2012)).320Id.at1135.321Id.(emphasisadded).322Seeid.323Id.324Id.(citingMayo,566U.S.at77).325Id.(quotingMayo,566U.S.at75).


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specificoutcome,”theFederalCircuitfoundthempatenteligibleunderAlicestepone.326

ChiefJudgeProstdissented,arguingthattheclaimsareindistinguishablefromMayo.327Sheexplainedthat,likeMayo,theclaimsofthe’610patent“alsoset[]forthanaturalrelationship....”328Inresponsetothemajority’sfocusonthespecificityoftheclaims,ChiefJudgeProstnotedthat“recitingspecificmetesandboundsintheclaimsdidnotpreventtheSupremeCourtfromconcludingthoseclaimssetforthanaturallawinMayo.”329Inherview,thepatentwasdirectedtoanaturallawanddidnotaddaninventiveconceptbecause“[i]tclaim[ed] no more than instructions directing [the] audience to apply thenaturallawinaroutineandconventionalmanner.”330

Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC (Oct. 9,2018)331


[1]

Inanelectronicspreadsheetsystemforstoringandmanipulatinginformation, a computer-implementedmethodof representing athree-dimensional spreadsheet on a screen display, themethodcomprising:

[1.1]

displayingonsaidscreendisplayafirstspreadsheetpagefromaplurality of spreadsheet pages, each of said spreadsheet pagescomprising an array of information cells arranged in row andcolumnformat,atleastsomeofsaidinformationcellsstoringuser-supplied information and formulas operative on said user-suppliedinformation,eachofsaidinformationcellsbeinguniquelyidentifiedbyaspreadsheetpageidentifier,acolumnidentifier,andarowidentifier;

326Id.at1136.327Id.at1140(Prost,C.J.,dissenting).328Id.at1141(Prost,C.J.,dissenting).329Id.(Prost,C.J.,dissenting).330Id.at1142(Prost,C.J.,dissenting).331906F.3d999(Fed.Cir.2018).332See id.at1004–05.Claim12is“representativeofallassertedclaimsoftheTabPatents”(claims1–2,12–13,16–17,19,24,46–47,and51ofU.S.PatentNo.5,590,259(“the’259patent”),claims1–2,5–7,10,13,and35ofU.S.PatentNo.5,784,545(“the’545patent”),andclaims1,3,6–7,10,12–13,15,and18ofU.S.PatentNo.6,282,551(“the’551patent”)).Id.


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[1.2]

whiledisplayingsaid first spreadsheetpage,displayinga rowofspreadsheet page identifiers along one side of said firstspreadsheet page, each said spreadsheet page identifier beingdisplayedasanimageofanotebooktabonsaidscreendisplayandindicatingasingle respectivespreadsheetpage,whereinat leastone spreadsheet page identifier of said displayed row ofspreadsheetpageidentifierscomprisesatleastoneuser-settableidentifyingcharacter;

[1.3]receivinguserinputforrequestingdisplayofasecondspreadsheetpageinresponsetoselectionwithaninputdeviceofaspreadsheetpageidentifierforsaidsecondspreadsheetpage;

[1.4]

in response to said receiving user input step, displaying saidsecondspreadsheetpageonsaidscreendisplayinamannersoasto obscure said first spreadsheet page from display whilecontinuingtodisplayatleastaportionofsaidrowofspreadsheetpageidentifiers;and

[1.5]

receivinguserinputforenteringaformulainacellonsaidsecondspreadsheet page, said formula including a cell reference to aparticular cell on another of said spreadsheet pages having aparticular spreadsheet page identifier comprising at least oneuser-suppliedidentifyingcharacter,saidcellreferencecomprisingsaid at least one user-supplied identifying character for saidparticularspreadsheetpage identifiertogetherwithsaidcolumnidentifierandsaidrowidentifierforsaidparticularcell.

InData Engine Techs., the Federal Circuit considered a group of patents itreferred to as the “Tab Patents.”333 The court noted the patents disclosesystems andmethods of adding “familiar, user-friendly interface objects—specifically notebook tabs” to electronic spreadsheets.334 According to thecourt,priortothesepatents,operatingelectronicspreadsheetsrequiredusersto enter various commands to carry out simple tasks, and such commandswere often found buried in variousmenus, but users oftenmemorized the

333Seeid.at1002.TheTabPatentsincludethe’259patent,the’545patent,andthe’551patent.Seeid.TheFederalCircuitalsoconsideredU.S.PatentNo.5,303,146,buthelditineligible.Seeid.Thus,itisoutsidethescopeofthisarticle.334Id.at1002.


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mostcommoncommands.335Thecourtalsonotedsomepriorartelectronicspreadsheets allowed three-dimensional data storage via the creation ofmultiple“pages,”butthisonlyservedtoincreasethecomplexityofusingthespreadsheets.336

AccordingtotheFederalCircuit,comparedwiththepriorart,theinventionmakesmultipageelectronicspreadsheetsmoremanageablebecausetheuserdoesnothave toremembercomplicatedcommands.337Thecourtexplainedthe patented system gives the user the ability to switch betweenmultipledifferent“pages”ofspreadsheetsbyselectingatabatthebottomofthescreen,ratherthanthepriorartmethodoffindingandenteringacommand.338

Thedistrict courtheld that theTabPatents are ineligiblebecause they aredirectedtoabstractideasanddonothaveaninventivestep.339Specifically,itfoundtheyare“directedtotheabstractideaofusingnotebook-typetabstolabelandorganizespreadsheets.”340Thedistrictcourtdeemedthisanabstractidea“thathumanshavecommonlyperformedentirelyintheirminds,withtheaidofcolumnarpadsandwritinginstruments.”341

TheFederalCircuitreversedtheeligibilitydecisionwithrespect to theTabPatents.342ItheldthattheclaimsoftheTabPatentsareeligiblebecausetheyarenotdirectedtoanabstractidea,exceptforclaim1ofthe’551patent.343

TheFederalCircuitbeganitsanalysisoftheTabPatentsatsteponeofAlice.344According to the court, the patents “provide[] a specific solution to then-existing technological problems in computers and prior art electronicspreadsheets.”345Asdiscussedabove,thesespreadsheetswerecomplexand“hinderedauser’sabilitytofindoraccessthemanycommandsandfeatures

335Id.336Seeid.337Seeid.at1003.338Id.at1003–04.339Seeid.at1006.340Id.341Id.342Seeid.343Seeid.at1002.Thecourt’sanalysiswithrespecttoclaim1ofthe’551patentisnotdiscussed here because that claimwas found ineligible. See id. at 1101. It is thusoutsidethescopeofthisarticle.344Seeid.at1007–11.345Id.at1008.


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available . . . .”346Accordingtothecourt,theinventiondisclosedbytheTabPatents addresses this problem with its “highly intuitive, user-friendlyinterface . . . .”347 The court made specific mention of the industry praisereceivedbytheinventionforitsimprovementstotheabilityofcomputerstofunction “as a tool able to instantly access all parts of complex three-dimensionalelectronicspreadsheets.”348

The Federal Circuit explained that representative claim12 “recites specificsteps detailing the method of navigating through spreadsheet pages.”349Accordingtothecourt,thepatent“doesnotrecitetheideaofnavigating. . .usingbuttonsoragenericmethodoflabelingandorganizingspreadsheets.”350Instead, the court found that it “require[s] a specific interface andimplementationfornavigatingcomplexthree-dimensionalspreadsheetsusingtechniquesuniquetocomputers.”351

TheFederalCircuitanalogizedtheclaimsoftheTabPatentstothoseinCoreWireless.352Inthatcase,theinventionwasdifferentthanthepriorartinthatit“sparedusersfromtime-consumingoperationsofnavigatingto,openingup,andthennavigatingwithin,eachseparateapplication.”353ThecourtfoundtheTab Patents also recite methods different from the prior art, and thosemethods improve the ability of users to “rapidly access[] and process[]information.”354

The Federal Circuit found the claims inAffinity Labs,Capital One, andErieIndemnitywere all dissimilar to theTabPatents.355According to the court,thosecasesinvolvedclaims“directedtodisplayingagraphicaluserinterfaceorcollecting,manipulating,ororganizinginformationtoimprovenavigation

346Id.at1008.347Id.348Id.349Id.350Id.351Id.352Seeid.at1009(citingCoreWirelessLicensingS.A.R.L.v.LGElectronics,Inc.,880F.3d1356(Fed.Cir.2018)).353Id.(citingCoreWireless,880F.3dat1363).354Id.(citingCoreWireless,880F.3dat1363).355Seeid.at1010(citingAffinityLabsofTex.,LLCv.DirecTV,LLC,838F.3d1253(Fed.Cir.2016);IntellectualVenturesILLCv.CapitalOneFin.Corp.,850F.3d1332(Fed.Cir.2017); IntellectualVentures ILLCv.Erie Indem.Co.,850F.3d1315 (Fed.Cir.2017)).


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through three-dimensional spreadsheets.”356 On the other hand, the courtfoundtheTabPatentsinclude“aspecificstructure(i.e.,notebooktabs)withina particular spreadsheet display that performs a specific function (i.e.,navigatingwithinathree-dimensionalspreadsheet).”357Therefore,thecourtheldtheclaimshereweredissimilarfromtheclaimstheFederalCircuithadpreviouslyfoundineligible.358

AccordingtotheFederalCircuit,despitethefactthattabbednotebookshavelongbeenusedtoorganizeinformation,“[i]tisnotenough...tomerelytracethe invention to some real-world analogy.”359 The court explained “[t]heeligibility question is not whether anyone has ever used tabs to organizeinformation....”360Instead,the“question...iswhethertheclaimis‘directedto’theabstractideaitself....”361Thecourtansweredthatquestion:theclaimsoftheTabPatents“whenreadasawhole,inlightofthespecification,...[are]directedtomorethanagenericorabstractideaas[they]claim[]aparticularmanner of navigating three-dimensional spreadsheets, implementing animprovementinelectronicspreadsheetfunctionality.”362

356Id.357Id.(emphasisadded).358Seeid.(“[U]nlikeineligibleclaimsthatmerely‘collect[],organiz[e],anddisplay...informationonagenericdisplaydevice,’claim12recites‘aspecificimprovementtothewaycomputers...operate.’”).359Id.at1011.360Id.361Id.362Id.


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AncoraTechnologies,Inc.v.HTCAmerica,Inc.(Nov.16,2018)363


[1]

Amethodofrestrictingsoftwareoperationwithinalicenseforusewithacomputerincludinganerasable,non-volatilememoryareaofaBIOSofthecomputer,andavolatilememoryarea;themethodcomprisingthestepsof:

[1.1] selectingaprogramresidinginthevolatilememory,

[1.2]using an agent to set up a verification structure in the erasable,non-volatile memory of the BIOS, the verification structureaccommodatingdatathatincludesatleastonelicenserecord,

[1.3]verifyingtheprogramusingatleasttheverificationstructurefromtheerasablenon-volatilememoryoftheBIOS,and

[1.4] actingontheprogramaccordingtotheverification.

The asserted patent the Federal Circuit considered in Ancora relates to amethod for preventing a computer from running software outside itslicense.365Underonepriorartmethod,licenseinformationforsoftwarewasstoredonaharddrive,butthatmethodwassusceptibletohacking.366Anothermethodinvolvedinstallingaphysical“dongle”inthecomputertoauthenticatesoftware, but that was “costly, inconvenient, and not suitable for internetdistribution.”367

Themethodinthe’941patentusesa“key”(auniqueidentifierforacomputerwhichcannotbechanged)anda“licenserecord”(alicenseforeachapplicationcontainingtheauthor’sname,theprogram’sname,andthenumberofuserslicensedtousetheprogram).368Theinventionofthepatentinvolvesstoring

363908F.3d1343(Fed.Cir.2018).364Seeid.at1345–46.Thecourtdidnotmakeaspecificfindingastowhichclaimwasrepresentative of U.S. Patent No. 6,411,941 (“the ’941 patent”), nor did it specifywhichclaimswereasserted.Seeid.However,itonlyconsideredclaim1becausethatwaswhere“thepartiesfocusedtheirarguments....”Id.at1345.365Seeid.at1344.366Seeid.367Id.368Id.at1345.


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authentication information in the modifiable “Basic Input Output System”(BIOS)memoryinsteadofonaharddiskordongle.369Underthepatent,thelicense record is encrypted using the computer’s key, then stored in BIOS,whichisrelativelydifficulttohack.370Whentheprograminquestionstartsup,thecomputertakesacopyofthelicenserecordfromtheprogram,encryptsthat,thencheckstoseeiftheresultmatcheswhatisstoredinBIOSmemory.371ThismethodisdifferentthanthestandarduseofBIOSmemory;itisordinarilyusedtostoreprogramsthathelpthecomputerbootup.372

Thedistrictcourtheldtheclaimsofthe’941patentineligibleandgrantedamotiontodismiss,buttheFederalCircuitreversedbecauseitfoundtheclaimseligible under step one of Alice.373 According to the appellate court, “theclaimed advance is a concrete assignment of specified functions among acomputer’s components to improve computer security,” and thereforepatentable.374

TheFederalCircuitbeganitsanalysiswithareviewofeligibilitycaselaw.375ThecourtcharacterizeditsCoreWirelessholding,explainingthattheclaimstherewerenotdirectedtoanabstractideabecausetheyweredirectedtoa“specific type of index for a specific type of user.”376 It also cited theDataEnginedecision.377Thecourtexplained theclaims inDataEnginewerenotdirected to an abstract idea because they presented “a specific solution tothen-existingtechnologicalproblems,”whichwere“addressedinaparticularway....”378TheDataEngineCourtdistinguishedothercasesbecauseitsclaims“recite[d] ‘a specific structure (i.e., notebook tabs) within a particularspreadsheetdisplaythatperformsaspecificfunction(i.e.,navigatingwithinathree-dimensional spreadsheet).’”379 According to the Ancora Court, § 101precedent also shows improvements to computer security can be “non-

369Id.370Seeid.371Seeid.372Seeid.373Seeid.at1344.374Id.375Id.at1347–48.376Seeid.at1348(citingCoreWirelessLicensingS.A.R.L.v.LGElectronics,Inc.,880F.3d1356,1362–63(Fed.Cir.2018)).377Seeid.(citingDataEngineTechs.LLCv.GoogleLLC,906F.3d999(Fed.Cir.2018)).378Id.(quotingDataEngine,906F.3dat1008).379Id.(quotingDataEngine,906F.3dat1010–11).


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abstract”improvementstocomputerfunction,“ifdonebyaspecifictechniquethatdepartsfromearlierapproachestosolveaspecificcomputerproblem.”380

Here, thepatent“specifically identifies”howit improvescomputer function“inanassertedlyunexpectedway[.]”381 ItreliesontheuniquepropertiesofBIOSmemory,which,accordingtothepatent,hadnotpreviouslybeenusedthis way.382 This unexpected use results in improvements to licensingsoftware.383 The Federal Circuit further noted the prosecution historysupportstheassertionthattheinventionisunexpected.384

Because the Federal Circuit found the patent survived step one, it did notcontinuetosteptwo.385However,duetotheoverlapbetweenthetwosteps,itexplainedsomeofitssteptwoprecedentindirectlyreinforcesthedecision.386According to thecourt, thesame logic it applied inBascom appliedhere.387There, the claims were eligible despite the fact that internet filtering wasknownatthetime.388Inbothcases,“thepatentdescribeshowitsparticulararrangement of elements is a technical improvement over the prior art”methods.389

Natural Alternatives v. Creative Compounds (Mar. 15,2019)390

NaturalAlternativesassertedfivepatentsagainstCreativeCompounds,LLC:PatentNo.5,965,596,PatentNo.7,825,084,PatentNo.7,504,376,PatentNo.8,993,610, PatentNo. 8,470,865, and PatentNo. RE45,947.391 The asserted

380Id.(Thesecurityimprovementwas“againstacomputer’sunauthorizeduseofaprogram....”).381Id.at1348–49.382Seeid.at1348–49.383Seeid.384Seeid.at1349.385Seeid.386Seeid.387See id. (citingBascomGlob. InternetServs., Inc.v.AT&TMobilityLLC,827F.3d1341(Fed.Cir.2016)).388Seeid.(citingBascom,827F.3dat1349–50).389Id.(emphasisadded)(quotingBascom,827F.3dat1349–50).390918F.3d1338(Fed.Cir.2019).391Seeid.at1341.


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patents concerndietary supplementswhichuse an amino acid calledbeta-alaninetopreventfatigueinmuscletissue.392

The district court entered a judgment on the pleadings, holding that theasserted claims are not patent eligible.393 But the Federal Circuit reversed,holdingthattheclaimssurvivesteponeofAlicebecausetheyarenotdirectedtoanineligibleconcept.394TheFederalCircuitdividedthepatentsintothreesections:methodclaims,395productclaims,396andmanufacturingclaims.397

a) The“MethodClaims”


[1]A method of regulating hydronium ion concentrations in ahumantissuecomprising:

[1.1]providinganamountofbeta-alaninetobloodorbloodplasmaeffectivetoincreasebeta-alanylhistidinedipeptidesynthesisinthehumantissue;and

[1.2]exposingthetissuetothebloodorbloodplasma,wherebytheconcentrationofbeta-alanylhistidineisincreasedinthehumantissue.


[1] A method of increasing anaerobic working capacity in ahumansubject,themethodcomprising:

[1.1(a)] providingtothehumansubjectanamountofanaminoacidtoblood or blood plasma effective to increase beta-

392Seeid.393Seeid.394Seeid.at1350.395Seeid.at1343.396Seeid.at1347.397Seeid.at1349.398 See id. at 1343. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,965,596 (“the ’596 patent”) isrepresentative,butthecourtdidnotspecificallyidentifywhichclaimswereasserted.Seeid.399 See id. at 1343–44. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,470,865 (“the ’865 patent”) isrepresentative,butthecourtdidnotspecificallyidentifywhichclaimswereasserted.Seeid.


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alanylhistidinedipeptidesynthesisinthetissue,whereinsaidaminoacidisatleastoneof:

[1.1(a)(i)] beta-alanine that is not part of a dipeptide, polypeptide oroligopeptide;

[1.1(a)(ii)] an ester of beta-alanine that is not part of a dipeptide,polypeptideoroligopeptide;or

[1.1(a)(iii)] an amide of beta-alanine that is not part of a dipeptide,polypeptideoroligopeptide;and

[1.1(b)] exposingthetissuetothebloodorbloodplasma,wherebytheconcentrationofbeta-alanylhistidineisincreasedinthetissue,

[1.2] wherein the amino acid is provided through a dietarysupplement.

TheFederalCircuitconsideredtworepresentativeclaimsfromthisset:claim1ofthe’596patent,andclaim1ofthe’865patent.400Thoughbothoftheseclaims “utilize an underlying natural law,” that does not mean they aredirected to the natural law.401 Similar to the claims in Vanda, the MethodClaims“containspecificelementsthatclearlyestablishtheyaredoingmorethan simply reciting a natural law.”402 Those specific elements includeidentifying the result the method achieves, identifying “a compound to beadministeredtoachievetheclaimedresult,”andplacinga limitationonthedosage to be administered.403 Following the Vanda Court’s analysis, theFederalCircuitfoundfurthersupportinthespecification,whichidentifiesamethod to determine the dosage.404 As a result, theMethod Claims go “farbeyondmerelystatingalawofnature....”405

It did not matter to the Federal Circuit that the active ingredient was “amoleculethatoccursinnatureandisconsumedaspartofthehumandiet....”406Itexplainedthatclaimingamethodusinganaturalproductisdifferentthanclaimingthenaturalproductitself.407Furthermore,theclaimsrequired

400Seeid.at1343.401Id.at1345.402Id.403Id.at1345–46.404Seeid.at1346.405Id.406Id.407Seeid.


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administering an amount of the active ingredient that is not naturallyoccurring,andinfact“greatlyexceedsnaturallevels.”408

Because the Method Claims were treatment claims which “cover using anaturalproductinunnaturalquantitiestoalterapatient’snaturalstate”andbecausetheyoutlineparticulardosagestobeapplied,theFederalCircuitheldtheMethodClaimssurvivestepone.409EvenifthecourtreachedsteptwoofAlice, itrecognizedtherewerefactualquestionsaboutwhetherthe“dietarysupplementlimitationwaswell-understood,routine,andconventional....”410Thisfactualdisputemeantthattheeligibilityquestionshouldnothavebeendetermined adversely to the non-movant (patentee) at this proceduralstage.411

b) The“ProductClaims”

RepresentativeClaim6ofU.S.PatentNo.7,504,376412[1] Acomposition,comprising:[1.1] glycine;and

[1.2(a)]an amino acid selected from the group consisting of a beta-alanine,anesterofabeta-alanine,andanamideofabeta-alanine,or

[1.2(b)] adi-peptideselectedfromthegroupconsistingofabeta-alaninedi-peptideandabeta-alanylhistidinedi-peptide.

[5] Thecompositionofclaim1,whereinthecompositionisadietarysupplementorasportsdrink.

[6] Thecompositionof claim5,wherein thedietarysupplementorsportsdrinkisasupplementforhumans.


[1]Ahumandietarysupplement,comprisingabeta-alanineinaunitdosage of between about 0.4 grams to 16 grams, wherein thesupplementprovidesaunitdosageofbeta-alanine.

408Id.409Id.at1346–47.410Id.at1347.411Seeid.412Seeid.at1347–48.Claim6ofU.S.PatentNo.7,504,376isrepresentative,butthecourtdidnotspecificallyidentifywhichclaimswereasserted.Seeid.413Seeid.at1347–48.Claim1ofU.S.PatentNo.7,825,084isrepresentative,butthecourtdidnotspecificallyidentifywhichclaimswereasserted.Seeid.


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The Federal Circuit held the Product Claims were not “directed to beta-alanine,” a natural product.414 Although these claims “incorporate naturalproducts” into their specific formulations, the court recognized thoseformulations“havedifferentcharacteristics” than inthenaturallyoccurringstate and, consequently, can be used differently than the natural productsthemselves.415 Those characteristics include “particular dosage forms.”416Accordingtothecourt,theallegationsrelatingtotheutilityoftheparticulardosageformsweresufficienttosurviveajudgmentonthepleadings.417

TheFederalCircuitfurthernotedthatthefactthattwonaturalproductswerecombinedintoonewas“notnecessarilysufficient”toshowtheclaimsshouldfail step one.418 Here, it was important that glycine and beta-alaninewerecombined to produce “synergistic effects allowing for outcomes that theindividualcomponentswouldnothave.”419

EveniftheFederalCircuithadmovedontosteptwo,theProductClaimsraisedthesamefactualquestionastheMethodClaims,soadeterminationwasnotappropriateatthisproceduralphase.420

c) The“ManufacturingClaims”


[1] Useofbeta-alanineinmanufacturingahumandietarysupplementfororalconsumption;

[1.1]supplying the beta-alanine, which is not part of a dipeptide,polypeptide or oligopeptide, as a single ingredient in amanufacturingstepofthehumandietarysupplementor

414Id.at1348.415Id.416Id.417See id.at1349.Forexample, the ’376patentrequiresenoughbeta-alanine inasportsdrinkto“effectivelyincrease[]athleticperformance,”andthepatent“providesamethodfordeterminingsuchanamount.”Seeid.at1346.418Id.at1349.419Id.Anexpertdeclaration,anarticleattachedtoanexpertreport,andasentenceinthespecificationsupportedtheallegationsofsynergisticeffect.Seeid.420Seeid.421Seeid.at1349–50.Claim1ofU.S.PatentNo.8,993,610isrepresentative,butthecourtdidnotspecificallyidentifywhichclaimswereasserted.Seeid.


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[1.2]mixing the beta-alanine, which is not part of a dipeptide,polypeptideoroligopeptide,incombinationwithatleastoneotheringredientforthemanufactureofthehumandietarysupplement,

[1.3]

wherebythemanufacturedhumandietarysupplementisfororalconsumption of the human dietary supplement in doses over aperiod of time increases beta-alanyl histidine levels in muscletissuesufficienttodelaytheonsetoffatigueinthehuman.

The Federal Circuit only addressed the Manufacturing Claims briefly.422 Itnotedthattheseclaimswere“evenfurtherremovedfromthenaturallawandproductofnatureatissueintheMethodClaimsandProductClaims.”423Giventhat the other two sets of claimswere not directed to laws or products ofnature, the court did not see how the “manufacture of [that] non-naturalsupplement”couldfailstepone.424

SRI Int’l v. Cisco (Mar. 20, 2019, modified July 12,2019)425


[1] A computer-automatedmethodofhierarchical eventmonitoringandanalysiswithinanenterprisenetworkcomprising:

[1.1] deploying a plurality of network monitors in the enterprisenetwork;

[1.2]

detecting, by the networkmonitors, suspicious network activitybasedonanalysisofnetworktrafficdataselectedfromoneormoreof the following categories: {network packet data transfercommands,networkpacketdatatransfererrors,networkpacketdata volume, network connection requests, network connectiondenials, error codes included in a network packet, networkconnectionacknowledgements,andnetworkpacketsindicativeof

422Seeid.423Id.at1350.424Id.425918F.3d1368(Fed.Cir.Mar.202019);930F.3d1295(Fed.Cir.July122019).TheFederalCircuitmodifieditsopinionwithoutchanginganythingofsubstanceinits§101analysis.426Seeid.at1373.Claim1isrepresentativeofclaims1–4,14–16,and18ofthe’615patent,aswellasclaims1–4,12–15,and17ofthe’203patent.Seeid.


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well-knownnetwork-serviceprotocols};

[1.3] generating,bythemonitors,reportsofsaidsuspiciousactivity;and

[1.4] automaticallyreceivingand integrating thereportsofsuspiciousactivity,byoneormorehierarchicalmonitors.

InSRIInternational,theFederalCircuitaddressedtwopatentsregardingthedetectionofhackersinacomputernetwork.427Thecourtexplainedthatsomesecurity threats to computer networks are only detectable by analyzinginformationfromseveraldifferentsources.428Withoutthistypeofanalysis,itwouldbedifficultorimpossibletodetectattackswhereanintrudertriestologinto several different computers in a network simultaneously.429 SRIresearchedthedetectionofintrusionintonetworks,andattemptedtosolvethisproblemwithU.S.PatentNos.6,484,203(“the’203patent”)and6,711,615(“the’615patent”).430

Cisco moved for summary judgment, asserting the claims were ineligibleunder§101.431Thedistrictcourtdeniedthemotion,soCiscoappealed.432TheFederal Circuit held the claims were eligible under step one of Alice andaffirmed.433

Themajority noted that the claims focus on an improvement to computertechnology: “providing a network defense system that monitors networktraffic in real-time to automatically detect large-scale attacks.”434 Thespecification supported this conclusion because it laid out problems in thepriorartandexplainedhowtheinventionovercomesthem.435Accordingtothespecification, the integrationof thenetworksmakesthemvulnerableto

427Seeid.at1372.428Seeid.429Seeid.430Seeid.431Seeid.at1373.432Seeid.at1373,1374.433Seeid.at1376.434Id.at1375.435Seeid.(“Thespecificationbolstersourconclusionthattheclaimsaredirectedtoatechnologicalsolutiontoatechnologicalproblem.”).


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hacking.436Even“localized”problemscanleadtomuchlargerscaleeffects.437The specification explained the invention was designed to solve theseproblems.438

CiscoarguedthattheclaimswereanalogoustoElectricPowerGroup,LLCv.AlstomS.A.439TheFederalCircuitdisagreedbecausethoseclaims“weredrawnto using computers as tools to solve a power grid problem, rather thanimproving the functionality of computers and computer networksthemselves.”440 Like theDDR Holdings case, the ’615 claims do more thanrecitetheconventionaloperationofacomputernetwork;here,theyactuallypreventnormalfunctioningofordinarycomputernetworks.441

JudgeLouriedissentedfromtheFederalCircuit’seligibilityanalysis.442Inhisview,theclaims“differverylittlefromtheclaimsinElectricPowerGroup....”443He found the claimswere “directed to the abstract idea ofmonitoringnetwork security” because they simply use a computer as a tool to moveinformation.444Theclaimshavenoinventiveconceptbecause,evenviewedinlightofthespecification,theyonlyrequireconventionalcomponents.445Theclaims were “result-focused, functional claims that effectively cover anysolutiontoanidentifiedproblem,”sotheywereineligible.446

436Seeid.437Id.438Seeid.439830F.3d1350(Fed.Cir.2016).SeeSRIInt’l,918F.3dat1375.440SeeSRIInt’l,918F.3dat1375.441Seeid.at1376(citingDDRHoldings,LLCv.Hotels.com,L.P.,773F.3d1245,1258(Fed.Cir.2014)).442Seeid.at1384(Lourie,J.,dissenting).443Id.(Lourie,J.,dissenting).444Id.at1385(Lourie,J.,dissenting).445Seeid.(Lourie,J.,dissenting).446Id.(Lourie,J.,dissenting).


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Endo Pharms. Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. (Mar. 28,2019)447


[1] A method of treating pain in a renally impaired patient,comprisingthestepsof:

[1.1(a)] providing a solid oral controlled release dosage form,comprising:

[1.1(a)(i)]about 5 mg to about 80 mg of oxymorphone or apharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof as the sole activeingredient;and

[1.1(a)(ii)] acontrolledreleasematrix;

[1.1(b)] measuring a creatinine clearance rate of the patient anddeterminingittobe

[1.1(b)(a)] lessthanabout30ml/min,

[1.1(b)(b)] about30mL/mintoabout50mL/min,

[1.1(b)(c)] about51mL/mintoabout80mL/min,or

[1.1(b)(d)] aboveabout80mL/min;and

[1.1(c)]orallyadministeringtosaidpatient, independenceonwhichcreatinineclearancerateisfound,alowerdosageofthedosageformtoprovidepainrelief;

[1.2]whereinaftersaidadministrationtosaidpatient,theaverageAUCofoxymorphoneovera12-hourperiodislessthanabout21ng·hr/mL.

TheEndoPharmaceuticalsCourtconsideredapatentdisclosingamethodfortreating the pain of patients with “renal impairment” (i.e., poor kidneyfunction)usingadrugcalledoxymorphone.449Impairedkidneyfunctioncan

447919F.3d1347(Fed.Cir.2019).448Seeid.at1350–51.Claim1isrepresentativeofclaims1–6.Seeid.449Id.at1348.


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result in thebuildupofdrugs in aperson’sbody,because thedrugswouldnormally be filtered out by the kidneys.450 The inventor of U.S. Patent No.8,808,737 (“the ’737 patent”) discovered that people with more severeimpairmentneedlessoxymorphonethanwastypical.451

Thetreatmentmethodclaimedinthe’737patent“advantageouslyallows”forthosewithreducedkidneyfunctiontotakelessoxymorphone,butstillreducetheirpain.452Asdescribedinthespecification,theclaimedmethod“‘avoid[s]possibleissuesindosing’and‘allowsfortreatmentwith‘thelowestavailabledose . . . .’”453 Thus, the ’737patent allegedly improves on the prior art byallowing“renallyimpairedpainpatientstobetreatedsafelyandeffectively....”454

Thedistrictcourtheldtheclaimswerenotpatenteligible.455Initsview,theyweredirectedtothenaturallawthat“thebioavailabilityofoxymorphoneisincreasedinpeoplewithsevererenalimpairment.”456Thedistrictcourtfoundnoinventiveconceptbecausethepatentsimplyrequiresusinga“wellknownmethod”to“obtainthenecessaryinformationtoapplyalawofnature,”thenmerely“instructstheadministrationofthecorrectdosage. . .dependingontheseverityoftherenalimpairment....”457

TheFederalCircuitheldtheclaimswerenotdirectedtoanineligibleconcept,andsurvivedAlicestepone.458Itreasonedtheclaimswereactuallydirectedto a “methodofusingoxymorphone . . . to treatpain in a renally impairedpatient.”459

TheFederalCircuitreacheditsconclusionfirstbynotingthattheclaimsrecitespecificsteps.460Next,itexplainedthatotherpartsofthepatent(includingthe

450Seeid.at1349.451Seeid.452Id.at1349.453Id.at1350.454Id.at1349.455Seeid.at1351.456Id.457Id.458Seeid.at1353.459Id.460Seeid.(describingthestepsas“(a)providingapharmaceutical...,(b)testingthepatientforadiseasestate...,andthen(c)administeringthepharmaceutical...basedon”anindicatorintheamountnecessarytomaintainacertainlevelofoxymorphoneinthebody).


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abstract, title, and summary) also support the holding because they “alldescribe the inventionas a ‘methodof treatingpain’ inpatientswith renalimpairment.”461 Finally, the specification lends support by “predominantlydescrib[ing]theinvention”intermsofitsadvantages.462

AccordingtotheFederalCircuit,theseclaimsare“legallyindistinguishable”fromthoseinVanda.463Bothsetsofclaimsaretreatmentmethods,both“recitethestepsofcarryingoutadosageregimenbasedontheresultsof...testing,”andboth“requirespecifictreatmentsteps.”464LikeinVanda,theinventorofthe ’737 patent recognized the natural law, but did not claim only that.465Instead, he claimed an application of the relationship he recognized.466Therefore, the claimswere “directed tomore than just reciting thenaturalrelationship.”467

The Federal Circuit also distinguished the claims at issue from those inMayo.468 First, the claim in Mayo “as a whole was not directed to theapplication of a drug to treat a particular disease.”469 Second, the“administeringstepinMayo...simplydescribe[d]givingthedrugtoapatient,”whereashere,“theadministeringstep. . .describesgivingaspecificdoseofthedrugbasedontheresultsofkidneyfunctiontesting.”470Inotherwords,theMayoclaimsdidnot“confinetheirreachtoparticularapplicationsof”naturallaws,while the ’737claimsdo limit theirreach.471Third, thiscasedoesnotraiseconcernsofpreemption.472UnlikeMayo, theclaimsinthiscasedonot

461Id.462Id.463Id.(citingVandaPharm.v.West-WardPharm.Int’lLtd.,887F.3d1117(Fed.Cir.2018)).464Id.at1353–54(citingVanda,887F.3dat1135).465Seeid.at1354.466Seeid.467 Id. This was also because, in the court’s view, the combination of the“administering step” and the “wherein clause” sufficiently “identif[ied] theappropriatescheduleanddose...toadminister,”sotheclaimsdid“morethanjustrecognizetheneedtoloweradose.”Id.at1355.468Seeid.at1354.469 Id. (citingMayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 74(2012)).470Id.(citingMayo,566U.S.66).471Id.472Seeid.at1354–55.


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“tieupthedoctor’ssubsequenttreatmentdecision”becausethey“provideaspecificdosageregimenthroughthewhereinclause.”473

Moreover, the Federal Circuit found the end result of the ’737 patent “notsimply an observation or detection.”474 Because these claims recite “atreatment method, not a detection method,” and because that method isrecited “specific[ally,]” they are directed to a “new and useful method oftreatingpaininpatientswith”renalfailure.475Thus,theyarepatenteligible.476

UnilocUSA,Inc.vADP,LLC(May24,2019)477

The Federal Circuit considered four patents in itsUniloc decision, but onlyfoundtwoofthemeligible.478U.S.PatentNos.7,069,293(“the ’293patent”)and6,324,578(“the’578patent”)bothrelatetosoftwareinstallation,butthecourtseparateditsanalysiswithrespecttoeachpatent.479

Thedistrictcourtdismissedthecomplaintbecauseitheldthepatentstobeineligible.480TheFederalCircuitreversedandremandedwithrespecttoboththe’293patentandthe’578patentbecauseitfoundthemeligibleunderAlicestepone.481

473Id.at1354–55.474Id.at1356(citingRapidLitigationManagementLtd.v.CellzDirect,Inc.,827F.3d1042(Fed.Cir.2016)).475Id.at1354.476Seeid.at1353.477No.2018-1132,2019WL2245938(Fed.Cir.May24,2019).478Seeid.at*1.Twoofthosepatents(U.S.PatentNos.6,510,466and6,728,766)werefoundineligible,andarenotconsideredherebecausetheyareoutsidethescopeofthisarticle.Seeid.at*8,*9.479Seeid.at*8,*9.480Seeid.at*1.481Seeid.at*1,*6.


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a) The’293Patent


[1]Amethodfordistributionofapplicationprogramstoatargeton-demandserveronanetworkcomprisingthefollowingexecutedonacentralizednetworkmanagementservercoupledtothenetwork:

[1.1] providinganapplicationprogramtobedistributedtothenetworkmanagementserver;

[1.2] specifyingasourcedirectoryandatargetdirectoryfordistributionoftheapplicationprogram;

[1.3]

preparing a file packet associatedwith the application programand including a segment configured to initiate registrationoperations for the applicationprogramat the target on-demandserver;and

[1.4] distributingthefilepackettothetargeton-demandservertomaketheapplicationprogramavailableforusebyauserataclient.

U.S. Patent No. 7,069,293 (“the ’293 patent”) relates to distributing andinstallingsoftwarefromacentralizedlocationonanetwork.483Initsanalysis,theFederalCircuitexplainedthat,althoughtheclaims’“goal”isfunctional,484“the patent claims a particular improvement in how” that goal isaccomplished.485 The court recognized the claims are obviously focused onthatimprovement,andthespecificationhasasimilarfocus.486Moreover,thecourtnotedtherecorddoesnotindicate“suchnetworkarchitecturewassoconventionalastoexcludethat...limitationin”determiningwhatthepatentisdirectedto.487

TheFederalCircuitfurtherheldthefactthatthespecificationillustratestheinvention using “off-the shelf components” did not automatically make it

482 SeeU.S. Patent No. 7,069,293 col. 21 l. 21–37. The court did not designate arepresentativeclaim,butUniloccitedClaim1whenarguingAlicestepone.SeeUniloc,2019WL2245938,at*4.483SeeUniloc,2019WL2245938,at*4–5.484Specifically,thegoalis“toallowcentralizeddistributionofsoftware.”Seeid.at*5.485Id.at*5(“[I].e.byuseofafilepackettoenablethefurtherfunctionalityofinitiatingon-demandregistrationoftheapplication.”).486Seeid.487Id.


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directedtoanineligiblecategory.488Thespecificationdescribedimplementingthe inventionusing thoseoff-the shelf components; it didnot simply claimtheir“routineactivity.”489Thisimplementationactuallyenhancedthefunctionofthosepriorartcomponents,which,accordingtothecourt,“wastheheartofthepatent’sallowance.”490Because “the focusof theclaimedadvance”herewasa“particularimprovementinthefunctioningof[the]priorart,”theclaimsofthe’293patentarenotdirectedtoanabstractidea.491

b) The’578Patent


[1] Amethod formanagementof configurableapplicationprogramsonanetworkcomprisingthestepsof:

[1.1]installinganapplicationprogramhavingapluralityofconfigurablepreferencesandapluralityofauthorizedusersonaservercoupledtothenetwork;

[1.2] distributinganapplicationlauncherprogramassociatedwiththeapplicationprogramtoaclientcoupledtothenetwork;

[1.3]obtaining a user set of the plurality of configurable preferencesassociatedwithoneofthepluralityofauthorizedusersexecutingtheapplicationlauncherprogram;

[1.4] obtaining an administrator set of the plurality of configurablepreferencesfromanadministrator;and

[1.5]

executingtheapplicationprogramusingtheobtainedusersetandthe obtained administrator set of the plurality of configurablepreferencesresponsivetoarequestfromtheoneofthepluralityofauthorizedusers.

Claim1ofU.S.PatentNo.6,324,578(“the’578patent”)recitestheexistenceofboth user preferences and administrator preferences for a software

488Id.489Id.490Id.491Id.492SeeU.S.PatentNo.6,324,578col.14l.63–col.15l.13.Thelowercourtdesignatedclaim1representative,andtheFederalCircuit“analyze[d]alltheassertedclaimsinthe’578patentbasedonclaim1.”SeeUniloc,2019WL2245938,at*6n.4.


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program.493 The administrator preferences are specifically stored on aserver.494 Under the patent, a user is given an application launcher for theprogram in question.495 This setup allows users to install applications on-demand with their custom preferences and the administrator’s custompreferences.496

In the Federal Circuit’s view, claim 1 of the ’578 patent is “directed to aparticular way of using a conventional application server to neverthelessallow on-demand installation of an application incorporating preferencesfrom two different sources by adding the application manager andconfiguration manager as additions to each application.”497 The addedapplicationmanager and configurationmanager are not “merely fulfill[ing]their ordinary roles”; they are being used together in “a different way ofachieving”theclaimedimprovement.498Therefore,thepatentisnotdirectedtoanabstractidea.499

HadtheFederalCircuitheldtheclaimsabstractunderstepone,itclarifiedthatthey would survive step two.500 The court would have found an inventiveconcept because the claims recite an unconventional arrangement ofcomponents that achieved the asserted improvement, like the claims inBascom.501

493SeeUniloc,2019WL2245938,at*6.494Seeid.495Seeid.496Seeid.497Id.498Id.499Seeid.500Seeid.501See id.(citingBascomGlob. InternetServs., Inc.v.AT&TMobilityLLC,827F.3d1341,1350(Fed.Cir.2016)).


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CellspinSoft,Inc.v.Fitbit,Inc.(June25,2019)502


[1]Amethod for acquiring and transferringdata fromaBluetoothenableddata capturedevice to oneormoreweb services via aBluetoothenabledmobiledevice,themethodcomprising:

[1.1] providing a software module on the Bluetooth enabled datacapturedevice;

[1.2] providing a softwaremodule on the Bluetooth enabledmobiledevice;

[1.3] establishingapairedconnectionbetweentheBluetoothenableddatacapturedeviceandtheBluetoothenabledmobiledevice;

[1.4]acquiringnewdataintheBluetoothenableddatacapturedevice,whereinnewdataisdataacquiredafterthepairedconnectionisestablished;

[1.5]detectingandsignalingthenewdatafortransfertotheBluetoothenabledmobiledevice,whereindetectingandsignalingthenewdatafortransfercomprises:

[1.5(a)]determining the existence of new data for transfer, by thesoftwaremoduleontheBluetoothenableddatacapturedevice;and

[1.5(b)] sending a data signal to the Bluetooth enabled mobile device,correspondingtoexistenceofnewdata,bythesoftwaremoduleontheBluetoothenableddatacapturedeviceautomatically,overthe established paired Bluetooth connection, wherein thesoftwaremoduleontheBluetoothenabledmobiledevicelistens

502No.2018-1817,2019WL2588278(Fed.Cir.June25,2019).503Seeid.at*1–*2.Thecourttreatedclaims1and16asrepresentativeofassertedclaims1–4,7,9,16–18,and20–21ofthe’794patentbecauseCellspinonlyoffered“separate arguments” for those two claims. The court considered other claimsrepresentative of the remaining three patents, but noted that the representativeclaimswereall“substantiallysimilar.”Id.at*3.Asaresult,thecourtonlyexplicitlydetailedclaim1ofthe’794patent;theotherclaimsweredescribedintermsoftheirdifferences.Seeid.at*1–*3.


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forthedatasignalsentfromtheBluetoothenableddatacapturedevice, wherein if permitted by the software module on theBluetoothenableddatacapturedevice,thedatasignalsenttotheBluetoothenabledmobiledevicecomprisesadatasignalandoneormoreportionsofthenewdata;

[1.5(c)] transferring the new data from the Bluetooth enabled datacapture device to the Bluetooth enabled mobile deviceautomatically over the paired Bluetooth connection by thesoftwaremoduleontheBluetoothenableddatacapturedevice;

[1.5(d)] receiving,at theBluetoothenabledmobiledevice, thenewdatafromtheBluetoothenableddatacapturedevice;

[1.5(e)] applying, using the softwaremodule on the Bluetooth enabledmobile device, a user identifier to the new data for eachdestination web service, wherein each user identifier uniquelyidentifiesaparticularuserofthewebservice;

[1.5(f)] transferring the new data received by the Bluetooth enabledmobiledevicealongwithauseridentifiertotheoneormorewebservices, using the software module on the Bluetooth enabledmobiledevice;

[1.5(g)] receiving,attheoneormorewebservices,thenewdataanduseridentifierfromtheBluetoothenabledmobiledevice,whereintheone or more web services receive the transferred new datacorrespondingtoauseridentifier;and

[1.5(h)] makingavailable,attheoneormorewebservices,thenewdatareceivedfromtheBluetoothenabledmobiledeviceforpublicorprivate consumption over the internet, wherein one or moreportionsofthenewdatacorrespondtoaparticularuseridentifier.

TheFederalCircuitconsideredtheeligibilityoffourpatentsintheCellspinSoftcase: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,738,794 (“the ’794 patent”), 8,892,752 (“the ’752patent”),504 9,258,698 (“the ’698 patent”),505 and 9,749,847 (“the ’847

504Cellspinassertedclaims1,2,4–5and12–14ofthe’752patent.Id.at*3.However,thecourtonlyaddressedclaim1becauseCellspin“onlyoffer[ed]separateargumentsastoeligibilitywithrespecttoclaim1.”Id.505Cellspinassertedclaims1,3–5,7–8,10–13,and15–20ofthe’698patent.Id.at*3.


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patent”).506 All four patents share a specification and relate to uploadingcontenttoawebsitethrougha“mobiledevice,”whichisconnectedtoa“datacapturedevice....”507Underthepriorart,apersonlookingtocapturecontent(suchasadigitalpicture)anduploadittotheinternetneededa“memorystickorcable”separatefromthedatacapturedevice.508

The ’794patentattemptstosolvethatproblembypairingthedatacapturedevicewithamobiledevice“viashort-rangewirelesscommunication...suchas Bluetooth.”509 An application stored on the mobile device “detects andreceives content” over that connection.510 Then, the mobile device“automatically”uploadsthatcontenttoawebsite.511

Claim1 of the ’794patent involves a “push”modewhere the data capturedevice starts the data transfer by sending a signal to themobile device.512Claim16 “is essentially the same as claim1,” but it involves a “pull”modewherethemobiledevicestartsthetransferbyaskingthedatacapturedeviceifthereiscontenttoupload.513

Thelimitationsofclaim1ofthe’752patenteffectivelyonlydifferfromthatofthe ’794 patent in two ways.514 First, the ’752 patent specifically requiresestablishingaconnectionbetweenthemobiledeviceanddatacapturedevicewithanencryptionkeyforthedevicestoidentifythemselves.515Second,the’752patentstatesthatthemobiledevicemusttransmitcontenttoan“internetservice”usinghypertexttransferprotocol(HTTP).516

However,thecourtonlyaddressedclaim5becauseCellspin“onlyoffer[ed]separateargumentsastoclaim5.”Id.506Seeid.at*1–*3.Cellspinassertedclaims1–3ofthe’847patent.Id.at*3.However,thecourtonlyaddressedclaim1becauseCellspin“onlyoffer[ed]separateargumentsastoclaim1.”Id.507Id.at*1.508Id.509Id.510Id.511Id.512Id.at*2.513Id.514Seeid.at*3.515Seeid.516Id.


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Claim 5 of the ’698 patent is “substantially similar” to claim 1 of the ’752patent.517 The only differences are that the ’698 patent specifies a digitalcamera insteadof adata capturedevice, and that the ’698patentdoesnotreferenceBluetooth.518

AccordingtotheFederalCircuit,claim1of the ’847patent is“substantiallysimilar”toclaim1ofthe’752patent.519

The district court granted a 12(b)(6)motion to dismiss, finding the claimsineligibleasdirectedtoanabstractideawithoutaninventiveconcept.520Withrespecttothe’794claims,Cellspinargued“therewasafactualdisputeaboutwhether the ‘combination’ of these elementswas ‘well-understood, routineandconventional.’”521Butthedistrictcourt“didnotreachtheissue”inpartbecauseCellspindidnotidentifysupportinthespecificationfortheinventiveconceptsitalleged.522Withrespecttotheotherpatents,thedistrictcourtheldtheyweredirectedtoanabstractidea,andthedifferenceswiththe’794claimswerenotenoughtoevidenceaninventiveconcept.523

The Federal Circuit found the claims directed to an abstract idea.524 But itexplainedthatthedistrictcourtshouldnothave“ignor[ed][the]allegationsthat, when properly accepted as true, preclude the grant of a motion todismiss.”525Thus,theFederalCircuitvacatedthedecisionandremandedthecase.526

Under step one, the Federal Circuit held the claims are not directed to animprovement in functionality, but are directed to “the [abstract] idea ofcapturing and transmitting data from one device to another.”527 Thespecificationacknowledgesthatcontentcouldalreadybetransferredfroman“internet-incapable”datacapturedevicetotheinternet.528Inthecourt’sview,

517Id.518Seeid.519Id.520Seeid.at*4.521Id.522Id.523Seeid.at*5.524Seeid.at*6.525Id.526Seeid.527Id.528Id.at*7.


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thesepatentsmerelyautomatethatexistingprocess.529Thus,“theclaimsasawhole,acrossallfourpatents,aredirectedtoanabstractidea.”530

TheFederalCircuitnextturnedtosteptwoofAlicetosearchforaninventiveconcept.531 It explained that the district court should not have disregardedCellspin’s allegations merely because Cellspin did not cite support in thespecification.532Aslongastheinventiveconceptis“recitedbytheclaims,thespecificationneednotexpresslylistallthereasonswhytheclaimedstructureis unconventional.”533 In Aatrix, the allegations in the complaint weresufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.534 But allegations are notautomatically sufficient; they must be “plausible and specific factualallegationsthataspectsoftheclaimsareinventive....”535

Here,theallegationsweresufficientbecausetheywerespecificandplausible,andrelatedtowhytheinventionwasunconventional.536Cellspin’sallegationscontainedmultiplewaystheclaimswere(arguably)unconventional.537Inthepriorart,datacapturedeviceswithbuilt-inwirelessinternetwerebulkyandexpensive.538 The complaints alleged several benefits over this prior art.539First,theclaimeddatacapturedeviceonlyhasonefunction,soit issmallerand cheaper.540 Second, the patented system as a whole is simpler tooperate.541Third,userscan“accessanduploaddataevenifthecapturedeviceis physically inaccessible . . . .”542 Cellspin also argued that separating thecapturingcontentstepfromthepublishingstepwasunconventional,inlightof the prior art.543 Lastly, the allegations asserted that the ordered

529 See id. (“[T]he need to perform tasks automatically is not a unique technicalproblem.”).530Id.at*6.531Seeid.at*7.532Seeid.at*8.533Id.534Seeid.(citingAatrixSoftware,Inc.v.GreenShadesSoftware,Inc.,882F.3d1121,1128(Fed.Cir.2018)).535Id.536Seeid.537Seeid.at*7.538Seeid.539Seeid.540Seeid.541Seeid.542Id.543Seeid.


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combination of the claimed elements was inventive.544 Prior art methodsmerely forwarded content as itwas captured.545 The claimshere require aconnection with the mobile device first, which “ensures that data is onlytransmittedifthemobiledeviceiscapableofreceivingit.”546Therefore,theFederalCircuitcouldnot,asamatterof law,concludethat theclaimswereineligibleunderAlicesteptwo.547

Conclusion

Inthefiveyearssinceconception,Alice’ssubjectivetwo-prongtestremainsunsurprisingly confusing to apply. Hopefully, these illustrated 19 FederalCircuitcases(andtheirexemplarypatentclaims)thatfoundeligibilityuponAlicechallengeswillserveashelpfulguidepostsforpatent-eligibilityanalysis,inbothclaimdraftingaswellaspatent litigation.Worthpointingout is thepatternofthetimingofwhentheseFederalCircuitcasescameout–only4outof19were issued inthe first(approximately) twoyears; inthe latterthreeyears,15casesfollowed.ItappearsasthoughtheFederalCircuittookawhiletofindtheirfeet,waitingforthepercolationofthedistrictcourtcasesbeforebecomingbolderinapplyingAlice’stwo-prongtestandfindingeligibility.

Statistically, the Alice invalidation rate at its near-five-year mark, thoughrelatively lower, still remains themajority (averaging cumulatively56.2%),but it has decreased over time. At Alice’s one-year mark (June 2015), theinvalidation rate was averaging 82.9%.548 Since the Federal Circuit’sBerkheimerdecisioninFebruary2018,theAliceinvalidationratehasdroppedtoapproximately44%.549Inshort,the§101landscapehasevidentlycalmed(somewhat)andbecomemorepredictablesinceAlice’sissuance,butthatmayverywellchangewithCongress’scurrent§101bill.550

544Seeid.at*8.545Seeid.546Id.547Seeid.at*10.548Tran,One-YearReview,supranote9,at545.549Bultman,supranote12.550Seediscussion,supranote28.

2019 patently-o patent law journal9 jasper l. tran, software patents: a one-year review of alice v....

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