AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT June 7, 2016

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely take the shape of a prolonged siege of ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte as anti-ISIS forces move to isolate the city and ISIS hardens defenses.

2. Al Shabaab may surge attacks against government and AMISOM targets in Somalia during Ramadan. An attack on the Ambassador Hotel in Mogadishu killed two parliamentarians.

3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent echoed guidance from al Qaeda senior leadership in condemning attacks that kill civilians and calling for a fight against the far enemy.

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ASSESSMENT:

al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda’s affiliates continue to release statements that are intended to preserve and build popular support for the groups. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) emir Asim Umar released an Urdu-language statement warning fighters against targeting Muslim non-combatants specifically to retain popular support. He encouraged militants to attack the “head of the serpent,” echoing the language of late al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, and cited the 9/11 attacks as an example. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud criticized the January 2016 attack at Bacha Khan University that killed at least 22 people and the December 2015 bombing of the Pakistani National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) that killed at least 26 people. Jamatul Ahrar claimed the NADRA attack and a splinter from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, under the leadership of recently U.S.-designated terrorist Umar Mansoor, claimed the university attack. Both Asim Umar and Usama Mahmoud argued that such attacks do not advance the fighters’ cause. Similarly, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) retracted an April 2016 statement that threatened attacks on the homes of military leaders in Abyan, likely seeking to soften its image on the ground.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to prioritize relationships with local populations over local spectacular attacks that kill civilians.

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AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Kuwait talks may produce a preliminary agreement next week, but it is unlikely to resolve core issues. The al Houthi-Saleh delegation accepted current President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as head of a transitional government. This is a significant concession, but is likely meant to move negotiations toward the real political battles, including cabinet appointments. Former Vice President Khalid Bahah indicated that the UN is reviewing a UN- and Gulf Cooperation Council-led plan should the Yemeni-led peace process fail, but the UN is unlikely to abandon the Kuwait talks at this time.

Outlook: The Kuwait talks will likely produce minor compromises during Ramadan, but no major agreement.

SecurityYemeni government forces with limited coalition air support are putting pressure on Sana’a, likely in an effort to extract al Houthi-Saleh concessions in Kuwait. The ceasefire remains formally in place, but fighting is ongoing along established frontlines and both sides are using accusations of ceasefire violations to justify retaliatory attacks. The al Houthis and allied forces are responding to government pressure by intensifying attacks in Taiz city and seeking gains in al Bayda governorate.

Outlook: Both sides will continue to seek quid pro quo gains, but the established frontlines are unlikely to change significantly.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenISIS may have temporarily slowed its operational tempo in Aden due to counterterrorism operations. An armed group likely led by a relative of a recently arrested ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan leader led an attempt to free the militant, and future efforts will likely succeed. Security forces also dismantled a bomb-making cell in al Mukalla, where ISIS launched an explosive campaign in the wake of AQAP’s withdrawal in April 2016. AQAP continues to prioritize its relationships with local populations. The group retracted an April 2016 statement that threatened attacks on the homes of military leaders in Abyan governorate.

Outlook: ISIS will resume its explosive attack campaign in Aden, and possibly al Mukalla. AQAP will refrain from spectacular attacks that kill civilians in order to retain popular support.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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1) 31 MAY: Aden police arrested seven ISIS members, including a French national.2) 01 JUN: Al Mukalla police dismantled a reported AQAP cell, which included Pakistani nationals.3) 05 JUN: Militiamen attacked Aden International Airport.4) 03 JUN: Al Houthi forces shelled a market in Taiz.5) 01 JUN: Government forces recaptured Nihm, Sana’a, from al Houthi-Saleh forces.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalKenya is expediting efforts to close Dadaab refugee camp, which it sees as an al Shabaab recruitment ground, despite Somali opposition. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited the camp shortly after a Kenyan cabinet secretary said that Kenya will close Dadaab by November 2016 at the latest, moving up the proposed closure date from May 2017.

Outlook: The camp’s closure will exacerbate Kenyan-Somali tensions and may drive al Shabaab recruitment.

SecurityAl Shabaab is targeting Kenyan security forces along the Kenyan-Somali border. Militants attacked two Kenyan police vehicles in Mandera County, Kenya and targeted a Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) convoy in Liboi, Garissa County, Kenya.The Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops are attempting to consolidate gains against al Shabaab in the Gedo region and target the group’s sources of strength in the Lower Jubba region, where they destroyed an al Shabaab taxation center in Berhani, Kismayo. Kenyan airstrikes also targeted al Shabaab in Berhani.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue attacking Kenyan forces in the Somali-Kenyan border region, especially in Mandera County. The group may attempt to regain territory in the Gedo region and stage a retaliatory attack in Kismayo.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab remains capable of conducting complex attacks despite leadership attrition. Al Shabaab militants killed at least 16 people, including two Somali parliamentarians, at the Ambassador Hotel in Mogadishu on June 1, following warnings that it will conduct more attacks during the Ramadan season. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27. U.S. forces also advised Somali special forces and AMISOM troops in a raid targeting al Shabaab’s mid-level commanders near Kismayo on May 31. The raid killed al Shabaab’s senior commander and head of external operations in Kenya Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely increase its operational tempo in Mogadishu during the Ramadan season.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), whose leaders are blocking the implementation of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), is leveraging Libya’s liquidity crisis to strengthen itself as an alternative center of power. Cooperation between Libya’s competing central banks, one aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west and the other aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) in the east, is a short-term solution to Libya’s financial woes that undermines the GNA’s authority in the long term.

Outlook: The GNA will make concessions to draw the HoR into the unity government but will fail to consolidate its authority in eastern Libya.

SecurityMisratan armed groups operating under the GNA continue to advance on ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte and are shaping their offensive to thwart any potential controlled withdrawal by ISIS. Misratan forces shifted the front line from west of Sirte to its south and seized a strategic site that sits along a key road to the Fezzan, where ISIS has a small affiliate and lines of communication to the Sahel. Libyan control of this road will restrict ISIS’s ability to withdraw southwest from Sirte. CTP has assessed that ISIS has laid the groundwork to withdraw into southwest Libya, should holding Sirte become untenable.

Outlook: GNA-aligned forces will hold their frontlines outside of Sirte but are unlikely to advance into the city itself without additional support.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is dedicating significant resources to harden Sirte’s defenses and slow its enemies’ advances. ISIS called militants to deploy to Libya, underscoring the city’s importance for the group’s global campaign. ISIS has lost key terrain in Iraq and Syria and appears determined to retain a North African base, which provides redundancy for its claim to govern a territorial caliphate.

Outlook: ISIS will plant explosives in ceded territory and conduct explosive attacks at the frontlines to slow Libyan offensives.

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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)AQIM is drawing its affiliates together in northern Algeria in order to counter ISIS’s rise in the Maghreb and Sahel regions. Algerian security forces killed eight suspected terrorists in Setif, northern Algeria. Three of the deceased militants were emissaries of AQIM’s Sahara Emirate emir, while three others were linked to AQIM’s Tunisian affiliate, the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a brigade. AQIM is likely attempting to facilitate cooperation between cells and solidify their al Qaeda loyalties in order to protect its position as the leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement in western Africa.

Outlook: AQIM will launch a media campaign to recruit and retain militants in contested regions such as western Tunisia and eastern Algeria.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Likely AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants attacked a Tunisian official in Kasserine governorate, possibly in retaliation for security operations in Jebel Chaambi, a primary Uqba Ibn Nafa’a hideout. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants are severely weakened by ISIS’s growth and recruitment in the area, and those militants still loyal to al Qaeda are actively defending their terrain.

Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will conduct defensive operations against Tunisian forces patrolling in the mountains of Kasserine.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) AQIM-affiliated groups in the Sahel launched a campaign against MINUSMA and Malian Army forces in retaliation for French operations in northern Mali. Militants have conducted at least four separate attacks on MINUSMA in the past three weeks, in addition to coordinated IED attacks on the Malian Army. AQIM released a statement praising these attacks, singling out the two conducted by AQIM’s affiliate, al Murabitoun, on June 1. AQIM affiliates in northern Mali have increased their operational tempo against MINUSMA in recent months.

Outlook: AQIM will continue to provide rhetorical support to its affiliates’ counter-MINUSMA campaign. AQIM affiliates may attempt to conduct a complex attack on a MINUSMA target in northern Mali in the near term.

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MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA

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1) 31 MAY: Algerian security forces killed eight suspected terrorists in Setif.2) 31 MAY-01 JUN: Likely Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants attacked a Tunisian official in Kasserine.3) 02 JUN: Tunisian security forces arrested a suspected terrorist in Sousse.4) 03 JUN: Moroccan security forces dismantled a six-member pro-ISIS cell active in Casablanca, Martil, and Tetouan.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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SAHELWEST AFRICA

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1) 31 MAY: AQIM affiliate al Murabitoun attacked two MINUSMA sites in Gao region.2) 01 JUN: Likely AQIM militants attacked Burkinabe police officers in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso.3) 06 JUN: A Malian Army vehicle struck an IED, likely placed by Ansar al Din, in Menaka.

ACRONYMS

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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569

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